499
187 H
7 & JULY 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

August 1, 1943

Subject: Narrative Report on Strike FFO # 187 H, V Bom Com.

To : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. THRU: S-2 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF.

1. FFO # 187 H was received night of July 6, 1943, ordering 9 planes from this squadron to participate in a GROUP STRIKE on WOODY ISLAND (NUBO) the morning of July 7, 1943. Each squadron from the GROUP had 9 planes making a total of 36 planes in the GROUP FORMATION.

2. Capt. JULIAN B. BAIRD (Squadron Operations Officer) decided to lead the SQUADRON FORMATION. Take off was accomplished at 0750/K. Flights were composed as follows:

Flight # 1	Ship No.	Flight # 2	Ship No	Flight No 3	Ship No.
Capt. Baird	058	Lt. Conant	039	Lt. Taylor	021
Lt. Thompson	013	Lt. Kurowski	017	Lt. Ryder	054
Lt. Gath	097	Lt. Hawver	019	Lt. Snyder	042

Capt. Albert J. Brock, Group P.I. Officer flew with Lt. Gath in ship 097.

3. Group Rendezvous was accomplished over YULE ISLAND after some difficulty. Target was reached without difficulty and finding CAVU weather over target this squadron took it's place behind the 498th SQUADRON. Bomb run was excellent, with all bombs dropped in the target area.

4. Slight, light inaccurate A/A fire was observed during bombing run.

5. Return to Durand Strip was by Squadron - nothing unusual to report.

6. Twenty-seven, One Thousand Pound Aerial Burst Bombs with M44 nose and tail fuses were dropped from four thousand feet indicated. 1595 X .50 and 225 X .30 ammunition expended in strafing target area.

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Reporting Officer:

PAT E. GOFORTH
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Note: No awards or citations should be recommended for personnel on this mission.

499
188-E-33
7 JUL 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

August 1, 1943.

Subject: Narrative Report, Strike FFO 188 E - 33.

To : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF THRU: S-2 345th Bomb Gp. (M) AAF.

1. Having received FFO #188-E V Bom Com. #33, 345th Bomb Gp., 9 A/C were assigned to participate in a THREE SQUADRON STRIKE on the SALAMAUA area. The specific target for this Squadron was TRACK #3, KENNEDY'S CROSSING to LOGGI VILLAGE #2.

2. Lt.O.N. LOVERIN was selected to lead the SQUADRON FORMATION with flights made up as follows:

FLIGHT #1	Ship No.	FLIGHT #2	Ship No.
Lt.LOVERIN	015	Lt.TAYLOR	021
Lt.BURGER	028	Lt.HYDER	054
Lt.BROADHURST	017	Lt.SNYDER	042

FLIGHT #3

Lt.SOMART — 039 Lt.KUROWSKI — 058 Lt.HANVER —019
Lt.J.L.[illegible] was alternate ship.

3. Lt.LOVERIN took-off at 0915 Lt.BURGER who followed with Capt.WALTERS (SQUADRON C.O.) as Co-pilot, crashed at the end of the runway. The ship was not airborne and continued over the end of the runway, hitting a ditch which k knocked off the right whell and dropped the right wing. The plane came to rest in a drainage ditch approximately one-hundred yards from the end of the runway. The plane was very badly damaged but all crew members escaped without serious injuries. The remaining planes were delayed in take-off for a short while but delay did not prevent rendezvous over PORT MORESBY. Lt.J.L.[illegible] was on deck for just such an emergency and readily took-off in ship #016, catching the SQUADRON FORMATION approximately fifty miles South of the target.

3. First flight was over the target at 1041/K hrs. Rain and low clouds over target prevented bombing runs as planned, however, each individual flight made it's run in good order at 6500 ft. indicated. Lt.[illegible] flying with Lt.KUROWSKI who was in first flight over target observed slight, inaccurate A/A fire from the beach area at the end of SALAMAUA STRIP and MACKAY LAKE JUNCTION. Turn after release of bombs was down to right over BUT INLET.

(Narrative Report FFO 188-E-33 Con'td.)

4. Rendesvous over BASI was not accomplished by SQUADRON as ordered because of bad weather, however, flights started back intact. Bad weather was encountered over ranges causing planes to become separated.

5. Planes landed separately at DURAND approximately 1150/K hrs.

6. Fifty-four, five-hundred pound Instataneous Demolition Bombs were dropped in the target area. No ammunition was expended.

7. The eligility of Lt.BURGER'S crew for the "PURPLE HEART" is in doubt. Investigation has been initiated.

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt, Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Reporting Officer:

[redacted]
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

444
190-C

490TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

August 1, 1943.

Subject: Narrative Report on Strike FFO #190-C, V Bom Com. #36, 345th Bomb GP.

To : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. THRU: S-2 345th Bomb Gp. (M) AAF.

1. Having received FFO #190-C V Bom Com. 36 345 Bomb Gp., 9 A/C this Squadron took-off at 0830/K hrs. The assigned target was TRACK #3 KENNEDY'S CROSSING to first bend in FRANCISCO RIVER.

2. Lt.C.C.COMANT was selected to lead the QUADRON FORMATION consisting of the following flights:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt.COMANT	SHIP NO.059	Lt.TAYLOR	SHIP NO. 021
Lt.KUCHOWSKI	" " 020	Lt.HYDEN	" " 054
Lt.HANVER	" " 019	Lt.SNYDER	" " 042

THIRD FLIGHT

Lt.LOVERIN--018 Lt.BROADHURST--017 Lt.GATH--058

3. All nine ships reached the target and made the bombing run with the first flight over the target at 1005/K hrs. All bombs landed in the target area with the exception of six which hit in area approximately 749969 Ref. 1:25,000 Art. Ser. SALERNO.

4. Lt.COMANT'S ship, which was the first over the target was hit by fragments of Medium A/A shell. One fragment entered the right side of the fuselage between the waist guns and the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, shattering on impact with control cables and fuselage primer. Pieces of the fragment pierced the top side of the fuselage. Another fragment struck the door in the Navigator's Compartment, cutting almost through one of the steps. No difficulty was experienced in controling the ship with only one set of the dual controls operative.

5. Nothing of importance was observed during the flight. Return to DURAND was by Squadron, landing at 1130/K hrs.

6. Four-hundred, thirty-two, twenty pound, M-4-1 Frag. Bombs and eighteen Five Hundred Pound Aerial Burst Bombs were dropped. No ammo. expended.

WILLIAM D.LAWSON
Capt.,a Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Reporting Officer:

PAT E.GOFORTH
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
193-D
13 July 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 13, 1943

Subject: Narrative Report of Mission FFO 193-D performed by 499th Bomb Sqdn. (M) AAF, on 13 July 43.

To : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF APO 929.

1. 9 B-25 D A/C, 499th Bomb Sqdn. were ordered to participate in a coordinated bombing attack of AA positions at SALAMAUA, with the other Squadrons of the 345th Group, the 405 Sqdn. of the 38th Bomb Group. The 498, 500th and 501st Sqdns 9 ships each, making a total of 36 ships from the group. First pilots assigned for mission were:

1st Flight

1st. Lt. A. W. THOMPSON	Ship No. 013
1st. Lt. J. L. GEORGE	" " 016
1st. Lt. G. L. COOPER	" " 014

2nd Flight

1st. Lt. G. W. TAYLOR	Ship No. 058
1st. Lt. J. L. SNYDER	" " 042
1st. Lt. N. W. HYDER	" " 254

3rd Flight

1st. Lt. O. L. LOVERIN	Ship No. 015
1st. Lt. J. L. BROADHURST	" " 017
1st. Lt. P. GATH (NMI).	" " 097

2. Lt. THOMPSON (leading formation) took off at 0745/K last ship off at 0748/K. The flight made a wide circle getting into formation and joining the group formation approximately ten miles from Durand Strip.

The Group Formation proceeded to DOBADURA where it circled from thirty to forty minutes. Then the formation proceeded to the target. On reaching the target and finding CAVU weather, the formation circled to west of SALAMAUA breaking off by Squadrons according to plan "A". Lt. THOMPSON zig-zaged to kill time. Since accurate observation was impossible because of broken clouds, Lt. THOMPSON had to approximate the position of the other Squadrons. His guess was good for bombs were seen to strike MCDONALD'S JUNCTION as Lt. THOMPSON'S Bombardier called: "Bombs Away". Lt. THOMPSON saw the wall of ack-ack in front but he continued the run and the crews and bombardier of the other two ships said the bombing run was perfect.

Narrative Report Cont'td)

Just as Lt. THOMPSON'S bombs were released, his ship was hit by A/A fire between the right engine nacelle and the fuselage. A.fire in the nacelle and in the Navigator's Compartment. At the same time, Lt. GEORGE'S ship which was on the left wing received a hit in each engine nacelle, a fragment struck behind Lt. HOLLINGSWORTH the bombardier who was kneeling over the bomb sight, and another fragment entered the bottom of the fuselage and passed close to the Top Gunner's face, making a large hole in the plexiglass dome. As a result of the hit in one of the nacelles, a large hole was made in the oxygen tank and oil lines were cut. The RPM and Airspeed dropped rapidly. Lt. GEORGE and Lt. COOPER stayed with Lt. THOMPSON until shortly before Lt. THOMPSON'S ship hit the water. Lt. THOMPSON made a safe and clean landing on the water using no flaps. He landed some 200 yards off SALUS. Lt. GEORGE had to return to DURAND immediately but Lt. COOPER stayed until relief arrived. Lt. COOPER saw five of the crew swimming in the water and observed five AUSTRAILIAN SOLIDERS on the beach directing two natives who were launching two dugout canoes.

In returning Lt. GEORGE slowly climbed to 12000 + t., using low blower and crossed the mountains, starting a long shallow descent in order to nurse his engines. On arriving at the field he instructed his crew to prepare for a crash landing because he didn't know the extent of damage to wheels and landing gear. The landing was made without difficulty.

While Lt. THOMPSON'S Flight was making it's run, Lt. TAYLOR and Lt. LOVERING lead their flights in a wide circle before making their runs. During this time, crew members of both flights observed Ack/Ack bursts over LAE. Further observations were impossible. Lt. TAYLOR AND LOVERIN made their runs and dropped bombs on beach in dump area and A/A positions between LELA TOWNSHIP and MACDONALD'S JUNCTION. Large fires and high columns of smoke were observed already burning in the target area and on the neck of the penninsula.

3. Very little A/A fire was recifed by Lts. TAYLOR & LOVERIN. S/Sgt. COOLEY, gunner in Lt. TAYLOR'S ship, saw a bomb burst in the center of a 3-gun A/A position (738012, 1:25000 Art.Series). Lt. MAHAFFEY, bombardier in Lt. TAYLOR'S ship, confirmed the sighting. A direct hit was observed on a large building in the dump area, and a near miss on A/A position near MACDONALD'S JUNCTION. Four or five bombs from another squadron were seen to burst over and in the water near the south shore of the penninsula, but the rest of the bombs hit in the target areas on the penninsula. Fires and columns of smoke resulted which were observed by Lt. COOPER for at least on hour.

4. Nine 1000 lb. Aerial Bursts, eighteen 500 lb Aerial Bursts endrine 1000 lb. 1/10 sec. delay bombs were dropped in the target area.

Narrative Report cont'd)

5. A/A was intense, light & medium and accurate at 5000-6000 ft. The first burst, directed at Lt. THOMPSON, was a hit with result as previously stated. This is the second mission on which the first bursts have been very accurate at the altitudes 5000 to 7000 ft.

6. In general, the mission was well carried out. Group formation was good with no difficulty in joining at MORESBEY. Coordination, timing and the break-away at SALAMAUA was particularly good. Indications from Interrogation are that bombing was very good throughout the group. The only complaint seems to be the delay in picking up fighter escort over DOBADURA. A delay of this kind gives the enemy defenses time to get thoroughly prepared.

For the Squadron Commander:

WILLIAM D. LAWSON,
Capt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

Reporting Officer:

PAT E. GOFORTH
1st. Lt., Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
197-D
17 July 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 17, 1943

Subject: Narrative Report on STRIKE FFO 197-D.

TO : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Gp. (M) AAF, THRU, S-2 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF.

1. This Squadron was ordered to participate in a STRIKE on SALAMAUA, morning of July 17, 1943. The attack was to be a coordinated attack with this Squadron leading thenGROUP FORMATION which consisted of SIX B-25-D A/C from each squadron.

2. Lt. G. W. TAYLOR was selected to lead the GROUP FORMATION. The SQUADRON FORMATION was as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Lt. G. W. TAYLOR	Ship No. 021
Lt. J. W. SNYDER	" " 042
Lt. N. W. HYDER	" " 054

SECOND FLIGHT

Lt. C. C. CONANT	" " 039
Lt. O. A. Hawver	" " 019
Lt. W. C. Kurowski	" " 020

Lt. TAYLOR took off at 0754/K. On reaching the target and finding suitable weather, the GAVU plan was used. Lt. TAYLOR broke away leading the SQUADRON FORMATION in an approach from SW to NE. A turn to the left was made in the vicinity of GRODUBI, turning back onto the approach North of KENNEDY'S CROSSING. Lt. TAYLOR lead his flight over the target, bobbing and weaving during the approach. Lt. MUSE (Lt. HYDER'S BOMBARDIER) was on the left of the CHURCH at an estimated 250 ft. two bombs, however, left plane safe. Lt. BRYAN and Lt. WALLACE (Lt. TAYLOR'S and Lt. SNYDER'S BOMBARDIERS) dropped to right of target.

Lt. CONANT broke away from the SQUADRON FORMATION North of KENNEDY'S CROSSING and lead his flight in trail over the dump area. Lt. PARKER (Lt. KURROWSKI'S BOMBARDIER) and Lt. M. C. WILLIAMS (Lt. CONANT'S BOMBARDIER) had trouble with interphone system and were unable to give corrections to pilots. Seeing that they were going to miss the target they dropped their bombs between SALAMAUA STRIP and the FRANCISCO RIVER As shown in OBLIQUE, PRINT #1, 197-D, 499th SQDN.

(Narrative Report on STRIKE FFO 197-D Cont'd)

Several explosions in quick succession followed. Crews reported that the waves of concussion could be seen in the vegetation nearby. A large column of boiling smoke was observed at this point. Lt. R. M. WILLIAMS was able to give Lt. HAWVER (The Pilot) corrections and consequently dropped his bombs exactly in the center of the DUMP AREA (745995) as shown in OBLIQUE, PRINT #1, 197-[illegible], 499th SQDN. No explosions, fires or smoke resulted.

Lt. DANIEL (Co-Pilot for Lt. TAYLOR) saw two bombs burst in the water near MACDONALD'S JUNCTION (749013) during his own bomb run. Bomb Run was made at a ground speed of 300 m.p.h. All ships turned down and to the right after release.

3. Over DOT ISLAND INLET several crew members observed the large column of smoke from bombing by Lt. CONANT and Lt. KUROWSKI. At this same time Lt. PARKER and one other crew member saw 3 or 4 explosions in a cleared area on DOT ISLAND. They were unable to observe the nature or results of the explosions.

4. Ack Ack did not fire at Lt. TAYLOR'S flight at all but Lt. CONANT'S flight which was behind Lt. TAYLOR observed 12-15 bursts above and behind their own formation. Ack Ack was slight, medium and inaccurate at 7-9000 ft.

5. Return to DURAND was without event. Flgith crossed the STRIP in formation at 1048/K.

6. Lt. TAYLOR reported all SQUADRONS joined formation in good order except one which was 15-20 minutes late at RENDEZVOUS.

For the Squadron Commander:

WILLIAM [illegible]. LAWSON
Capta, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.

Reported by:

Pat E. Seforth
1st Lt A.C.
Asst. I.O.

499
201
21 July 43

499TH BOMB Sq. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 22, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Strike FFO 201.

TO : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF APO 929 THRU 345th Group Intelligence.

1. After receiving orders to participate in a group strike on JUNCTION MINDJIM & AGAIBI RIVERS, the morning of July 21, nine airplanes of the SQUADRON took off at 0945/K hrs. the FLIGHTS were as follows:

1st. FLIGHT

Lt. TAYLOR	Ship No. 021
Lt. SNYDER	" " 042
Lt. HYDER	" " 254

2nd Flight

Lt. LOVERIN	" " 015
Lt. GEORGE	" " 097
Lt. GATH	" " 058

3rd FLIGHT

Lt. CONANT	" " 039
Lt. KUROWSKI	" " 020
Lt. HAWVER	" " 017

2. Orders were received to hold take-off until STRAFERS were in the air. This resulted in some confusion, as two SQUADRONS of STRAFERS were down from DOBODURA. However, after the 38th GROUP STRAFERS were up, at 0945/K our ships received the go-ahead, before the other STRAFERS. A heavy overcast around Moresby, up to 6000' prevented Lt. HAWVER and Lt. KUROWSKI from finding their formations. The former turned back at about YULE ISLAND returning directly. The latter proceeded up the coast toward KEREMA, flew over toward WAU and then returned to BASE. The seven PLANES formed in a V, and in a DIAMOND, found the GROUP FORMATION, and with it flew to target, observing damgaged GENA BENA STRIP on way, and near BOGAJIM 3 MOTOR LAUNCHES, 2 POSSIBLE BARGES. Bombing observed the length of the MINDJIM RIVER, especially at mouth and near TARGET. The TARGET RUN WAS made at about 240 degrees. All BOMBARDIERS reported spotting target easily enough, though in one case, the terrain, and dry state of RIVER, were enough to necessitate 2 runs to make sure of general area.

3. Around 1145/K, from 4900', 48 x 300 lbs. inst. demos. were dropped on target, one plane load was dropped on slope just NE of target, in vicinity of several European type frame buildings one with painted roof.

4. Reforming the SQUADRON after run proved easy. Several SHIPS strafed target right after run, and one ship (058) poured plenty of lead into BOROAI VILLAGE, to the West. 1550 round of 50 calibre was used in all. Returning, the overcast had climbed to 14000'. From just below it, at 9000' at 1200/K, white smoke was seen rising from the general area, about 50 miles SE of BENA BENA. The SEVEN SHIPS RETURNED, without further event at 1140/K.

5. Photo prints were too few and too uninformative to affect estimates of bombing.

For the Commanding Officer:

EDGAR KAUFMANNJR.
1st Lt., Air Corps,
REPORTING OFFICER.

Annexel:
Bomb overlay.

499
202
22 July 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GPL (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 22, 1943

Subject: Narrative Report on Strike FFO 202.

To : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Gp. (M) AAF APO 929,
THRU Intelligence Office, 345th Bomb Gp.

1. Receiving orders for a coordinated GROUP attack on the RIDGE running North from KOMIATUM seven of our A/C took off on the morning of July 22nd. The last plane took off at 0806/hrs. The formation of seven planes were as follows:


LT. CONANT	039
LT. KUROWSKI	020
LT. HAWVER	097
LT. TAYLOR	021
LT. SNYDER	042
LT. HYDER	254
CAPT. BAIRD	058

2. Each plane carried three 1000 lb inst. demos. Our SQUADRON joined the GROUP FORMATION and proceeded to the TARGET via DOBODURA. On reaching the TARGET one practice run was made then a 360° turn to the left. The bomb run was excellent and 16 bombs were dropped in the TARGET AREA. Two bombs were salvoed ½ mile NORTH of TARGET due to mechanical trouble. One A/C being to close to our own ground troops did not release their bombs. A right turn was made and bombs were dropped on LOKANU # 1 and proceeded to base via DOBODURA, landing at 1145/K hrs.


3. Heavy black smoke was seen over SALAMAU ISTHMUS probably the results of bombing. Strafing by tail a/c in preceeding formation was reported by our SQUADRON LEADER. Tracers were seen to come down and back. While not being too close this might result in interfering with the bomb run of the following plane. Several BOMBARDIERS reported that the target did not appear to be 3000 ft. Great care should be taken in giving the correct altitude of all TARGETS. If the altitude used by the BOMBARDIERS is to great the bombs will fall short. All BOMBARDIERS stated that the wind report given them just before take-off assisted them in the accuracy of their bombing.

For the Squadron Commanding Officer

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
REPORTING OFFICER


CWAIBALON
C.K.
BUIUMBU
BUIBALI
C.K.
KOMIATUM
WHITE SHOWS LOCATION OF BOMB HITS SHOWN IN PICTURES. PICTURES TAKEN BY QUADRONS AS LISTED.
18
17
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18
EASTMAN TOPOGRAPHIC SAFETY

FILE
MISSION FFO-202



ACCURACY %

OBSERVATION 27
BOMBING 20

S-2 SECTION
499 BOMB SQUADRON (M)
BOMB SPOT OVERLAY
MISSION FFO 202, 22 JULY 43
REFERENCE ASP 26

O BOMB HITS (letters refer to photos taken on mission)

★ ESTIMATED HITS

A, plane 39
B, plane 58
C, plane 21

ob= oblique photo.

444
207 V
27 JULY 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 27, 1943.

Subject: Narrative Report Strike Salamaua, FFO #207 V Bom Com, #66, 345th Bomb Group.

To : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. THRU: S-2 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF.

1. This squadron received Frag Order from V Bom Com #207, #66, 345th Bomb Group which ordered 8 planes from this squadron to participate in a coordinated "Group Strike" on targets at SALAMAUA, this morning of July 27, 1943. This Squadron's target was the northern quarter of MALA TOWNSHIP.

2. Lt.C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the Squadron Formation consisting of the following First Pilots:

1st.FLIGHT	SHIP NO.	2ND.FLIGHT	SHIP NO.
Lt.C.C.CONANT	039	Lt.G.W.TAYLOR	021
Lt.O.A.MAUVER	019	Lt.J.W.SNYDER	042
Lt.W.C.KUROWSKI	020	Lt.N.W.HYDER	054
Lt.P.GATH (MNI)	058	Lt.G.L.COOPER	014

3. Lt.CONANT took off 0735/K hrs. Succeeding A/C at thirty second intervals. Squadron and Group Formations were accomplished without difficulty. Enroute to target overcast was observed at ten-thousand (10,000) ft. over ranges. Weather was CAVU over and in vicinity of the target. The Group "CAVU Plan" was initiated with each squadron breaking away at the initial point. Lt.CONANT lead the Squadron Formation in a circle to left of target and turned in on the bomb run of one-hundred-eighty (180) degrees.

4. Lt.H.C.WILLIAMS (Lt.CONANT'S BOMBARDIER) endeavored to release bombs on target, however, malfunction of "Train Switch" prevented proper release and he was forced to "Toggle" the bombs. The bombs fell in a string within the lower half of target number three.

Lt.MacDANIELS (Lt.GATH'S BOMBARDIER) experienced difficulty similar to Lt.WILLIAM'S and tried to Toggle his bombs also. For some undetermined reason the bombs went out in salvo.

5. With the exception of the above mentioned "Malfunctions", all bombs were released in the target area. (See accompanying Overlay).

(Narrative Report Strike Salamaua Con'td.)

Bomb smoke obscured the target area and prevented accurate observation of damage. Small fires were observed in the target area.

6. A possible submarine was reported off Labu Village but since only two men made the observation under questionable circumstances, the information is considered as improbable.

A/A fire was observed by several crews to originate MacDONALD'S JUNCTION, point ½ mile west of KELA POINT, and point 742030 (1/25000 Art. Series SALAMAUA). Lt.COMANT'S flight reported A/A fire to be Momentarily Intense, medium, inaccurate at six-thousand (6000) feet. Lt.TAYLOR'S ship received at glancing fragment on the left ring cowling from a burst which was immediately below his A/C. The burst was felt by all members of the crew. A/A fire for second flight was momentarily Intense, medium, accurate. After this one burst A/A fire became very inaccurate, bursting considerally above and behind to the right.

7. Return to DURAND STRIP was accomplished in Squadron Formation, landing at 1000/K.


8. 43 X 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped in the target area. 1850 X .50 cal. ammunition was expended in strafing enemy positions during the diving turn away from the target from an altitude of approximately 2500 feet.

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

PAT E. GOFORTH
1st.Lt., Air Corps
REPORTING OFFICER.

FFO-207

ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION...21.
BOMBING.....465





499 Bomb Sq.(M) S-2 Sec.

Bomb Spot Overlay #2. FFO.207-66.

Ref. Salamaua Locality (rev.) 28 June 43.

⊙ = Bomb Burst. No. refers to plane whose camera recorded hit.


ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION ..21.
BOMBING 4.65
CORRECTED LINE
FLIGHT 1
FLIGHT 2
15
25
SHELTER
TARGET 1
6 hits here (21)?
TARGET 2
white smoke here
6 on 7 along this line
NATIVE HOSPITAL
STEEL MASTS
& TRANSMISSION BLDG
VARIOUSLY CALLED PIPE LINE
& TELEPHONE LINE
21
12
400 Bomb Sq.(M) S-2 Sec.
BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #2. FFC. 20. 66
Ref. Station and Target Map Revised 28 June 43
⊙ = Bomb Burst
Numbers by planes whose
bombs landed there.


FILE
MISSION FFO 207
ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION...21.
BOMBING.....4.65
CORRECTED LINES
FLIGHT 1 →
FLIGHT 2
15
25
021
210
021
SHELTER
59
TARGET 1
6 hits here (21)?
58
39
TARGET 2
white smoke here
6 or 7 along this line.
21
NATIVE HOSPITAL
STEEL MASTS
& TRANSMISSION BLDG.
VARIOUSLY CALLED PIPE LINE
& TELEPHONE LINE
21.
12
499 Bomb Sq.(M) S-2 Sec.
Bomb Spot Overlay #2. FFO. 207-66.
Ref. Salamaua Locality (rev.) 28 June 43.
⊙ = Bomb Burst. No. refers to plane whose camera recorded hit.

499
209V
29 JULY 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

July 29, 1943

Subject: Narrative Report Strike Salamaua, PFO & 209 V Bomb Com, #66, 345th Bomb Group.

To : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF: THRU: S-2 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF.

1. This squadron received Frag Order from V Bom Com #209, #66, 345th Bomb Group which ordered 9 planes from this squadron to participate in a coordinated "Group Strike" on targets at SALAMAUA, the morning of July 29, 1943. This Squadron's target was the Northern End of SALAMAUA.

2. Lt. Loverin was selected to lead the SQUADRON FORMATION consisting of the following First Pilots:

1st Flight	Ship No.	2nd Flight	Ship No.
LT. O. N. LOVERIN	015	LT. G. B. TAYLOR	021
LT. J. L. BROADHURST	017	LT. J. W. SNYDER	042
* LT. P. BATH (NMI)	058	LT. K. W. HAWVER	254

3rd. Flight	Ship No.
LT. P. T. LOTTRELL	039
CAPT. J. B. BAIRD	020
LT. O. A. HANVER	097

3. Lt. Loverin took off at 1747/K, succeeding A/C at thirty second intervals (except one as noted). Squadron and Group Formations were accomplished without difficulty. Lt. Hawver was late and did not find his element. Enroute to target overcast was observed at fourteen thousand (14,000) ft. over ranges. Weather over target had thin clouds at seven thousand (7000) ft. and visibility unlimited. The Group "CAVU FLAP" was initiated with each squadron breaking away at the initial point. Lt. Loverin lead the Squadron Formation in a circle to North of Target and turned in on the bomb run of two-hundred-thirty (230) degrees.

4. Lt. MacDaniels (Lt. Bath's Bombadier) endeavored to release bombs on target, however, malfunction of A-2 switch prevented proper release, and he brought all bombs back to base. On ground, wire in bomb bay was found disconnected.

Lt. Hawver failing to meet his formation proceeded to target area, which he reached about 1005/K. Since fighter cover was not in evidence, he made his run over [illegible] #2, on which all his bombs fell.

5. With the exceptions mentioned above, all bombs were released in target area (See Accompaning Overlay). Bomb smoke obscured the target area and prevented accurate observation of damage. Two large fires were observed in target area, from 10,000 ft. altitude, 40 miles away.

6. Large quantities of smoke were observed in and behind KOLA TOWNSHIP. A barge was noted off MISSION POINT. Small amount of brown smoke seen in QUARRY, and an oil slick, in water one mile to North. Tents and huts seen near MORNING POINT. One single engine A/C, unidentified, observed in North Center of SALAMAUA STRIP. 5 or 6 small boats beached in DOT [illegible]. One B-25 seen over DOT I LET, losing altitude, manoeuvering violently, and recovering a hundred feet off the water. It proceeded in the direction of DOROBEA. A/A fire was directed above our planes, at the altitude of B-24'S also on mission. It came from McDONALD'S JUNCTION, the STRIP, and the beach from MISSION HILL to LOGUI # 2. A/A position noted at 738.05 (ref; 1/25000 Artillery Series, SALAMAUA).

7. Return to MOTAND STRIP was accomplished in Squadron Formation landing at 1950/K.

8. 42 X 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped in the target area. 6 were dropped on LOGUI # 2, and 6 returned to base. 360 X 50 cal. ammunition was expended in strafing enemy positions during the diving turn away from the target from an altitude of approximately 3500 feet. . 100 X 30 cal. ammunition were also expended.

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

EDGAR KAUFMANN JR.
1st. Lt. Air Corps
[illegible]

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) P-1 SEC.

BOMB SPOT OVERLAY

MISSION NO. FFO, 209-66.

REF: PHOTO 207-GEN. SOLOMAN & VICINITY (BPS) 29-42 (105) 41.

Lines with [illegible] plane number to hits recorded by that planes camera

● [illegible]

21

N


TARGET.

499TH. BOMB SQ. (M) S-2 SEC.

BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #2.

MISSION NO. FFO. 209-66.

Ref: Photo 207-GEN. Salamaua & Vicinity.
(8PS) 29-42 (105) 41.



ACCURACY %

OBSERVATION 50.%

BOMBING 21.%

File

499
214 G
2 AUG 43
3 Aug

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

August 3, 1943.

Subject: Narrative Report Strike Salamaua FFO 214-G.

To : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF APO 929
THRU: 345th Group Intelligence.

1. On the night of August 2, 1943, the 499th Bomb Squadron was ordered to bomb the isthmus at SALAMAUA on the morning of August 3 rd. After briefing, nine airplanes of the squadron took off, the last plane leaving the ground at 0936/K hrs. The nine airplanes consisted of three flights as follows:

1st.FLIGHT		2nd.FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.G.W.TAYLOR	021	1st.Lt.A.W.THOMPSON	516
1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER	254	1st.Lt.G.L.COOPER	014
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	042	1st.Lt.J.L.GEORGE	016

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.N.LOVERIN — 015 1st.Lt.J.L.BROADHURST — 017
1st.Lt.PHILIP GATH —058

2. The Squadron was lead by Lt.TAYLOR with "C" flight. After rendesvous with a formation of C-47's at DOBADURA they proceeded to the target. Before reaching the target the Squadron squng out to sea about two miles and made a left turn. This put them on the bombing run, of approximately 305°. Thirty four bombs were estimated to hit in the target area starting one large oil fire and exploding an ammunition dump. Dust and smoke from bomb bursts obscured further observations. 90 K-21 and 13 K-20 photos were taken.

3. Making a turn to the right out to sea several planes straffed Kela and LETTU villages with 50 and 30 calibre ammunition. A/A fire was observed coming from near the QUARRY and from a point on the beach near LETTU VILLAGE. Two members of different crews reported a catwalk from shor to the SALAMAUA wreck and also an oil slick between the wreck and shore. Twenty minutes after leaving the target black smoke from the oil fire was seen rising to a height of 1200, feet. No enemy aircraft were observed.


4. Slow S turns were made from DOBODURA to TAMBU BAY in order to remain behind C-47's. The C-47's turned to the left at TAMBU BAY.

(Narrative Report FFO 214-G Con'td.)


Our formation flying at 1000 ft. hugged the coast to DOT ISLAND. Here a climbing right turn to 4000 feet was made and then a left turn for the BOMBING RUN. We think this approach caught the JAPS by surprise and that they were not aware of us until after the right turn was made at DOT ISLAND. Very little A/A was seen and this all came from points near O'DEA HOUSE and near LETTU village. Bomb run was made from new direction and good results were obtained.

5. Trip from target to base was uneventful the last plane landing at 1213/K hrs.

WILLIAM D.LAWSON
Capt., Air Corps
REPORTING OFFICER.


ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION 68.%
BOMBING 34.%
N.B. photos show only 25 hits of 59 Bombs. 29 not included in figuring
(includes 10 bombs allowed for smoke obscured target)
X = bomb hits in photos.
(Nos. refer to ship taking photo)
• = estimated hits
(Nos. refer to ship)
= flight line of photo strips.
N
TARGET
FIRE?
58, 17, 54
FIRE
21, 17, 54, 58
58, 17, 54
54, 21
058
021
499 TH. BOMB SQ. (M) S-2 SEC.
BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #2
MISSION NO. FFO 214-G. 3 AUG 43.
REF. 207-GEN Solamaua & Vic. 27 July 43. 29-42. 105. 41

File



499TH BOMB SQ. (M) S-2 SEC.


BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #1 3 AUG. 43


MISSION NO. FFO 214G

CREW ESTIMATE ONLY

REF: 207 GEN. STAL NIEUA + VIC. 27 JULY, 43

2942 105.41


ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION 68. %
BOMBING 34.1 %
(includes 10 bombs allowed for smoke-obscured target).
N.B. photos show only 25 of 54 bombs, hitting. 29 not used in figuring.
N
TARGET
FIRE
FIRE?
58
54
17
21, 17, 54, 58
58 17
54 21
58 17 54
499TH. BOMB SQ. (M) S-2 SEC.
BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #2
MISSION No. FFO 214-G 3 AUG 43.
REF. 207-GEN Salamaua & Vic. 27 July 43. 29-12 105. 41


ACCURACY %
OBSERVATION 68. %
BOMBING 34. %
(includes 10 bombs allowed for smoke-obscured target).
N.B. photos show only 25 of 54 bombs, hitting. 29 not used in figuring.
TARGET
FIRE
21, 17, 54, 58
FIRE?
58 17 54
58 17 54
54 21
58 17
58 17
499TH. BOMB SQ. (M) S-2 SEC.
BOMB SPOT OVERLAY #2
MISSION NO. FFO 214-G 3 AUG 43.
REF. 207-GEN Salamaua & Vic. 27 July 43. 29-12-105. 41

499
247G
5 SEPT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 6, 1943

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 247-G.

TO : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. THRU 345th Group Intelligence.

1. On September 5, 1943, twelve (12) airplanes of the 499th Bomb Squadron (M) were ordered to bomb and strafe targets #2 (Mac's Camp) and #6 Marakapor, on the north bank of Markham River. The last plane took off at 0850/K hrs. The Squadron Formation led by Capt. Taylor consisted of the crews and airplanes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. Taylor	Ship Number 021	1st Lt. Loverin	Ship Number 015
1st. Lt. Hyder	Ship Number 054	1st. Lt. Gath	Ship Number 058
1st. Lt. Snyder	Ship Number 042	1st. Lt. Kurowski	Ship Number 020
1st. Lt. Banz	Ship Number 097	1st Lt. Broadhurst	SHip Number 017

THIRD FLIGHT			
Capt. Thompson	Ship Number 016	2nd Lt. Parke	Ship Number 047
1st Lt. George	Ship Number 019	Capt. Conant	Ship Number 039

2. The Squadron joined the Group Formation led by the 498th Squadron en route to Thirty Mile Strip and continued with them to Marilinan. Here several urns were made waiting for the approach of the C-47's, carrying parachute troops. Immediately after the C-47's were contacted the Group Formation headed for the targets. Just before the targets were reached the Squadron placed itself in position for the bomb run on Target #2 and dropped 139 fragmentation bombs from 1000' in the target area, results were unobserved. A turn to the left was made behind the 498th Squadron in preparation for the straffing attack. When half way thru the turn two (2) A-20's came across the target laying a smoke screen. They were closely followed by the C-47's droppingthe paratroops. Our lead flight was able to get in a few bursts on Target #2 but the ramining flights were forced to hold their fire. The Squadron continued east along the north bank of the Markham River to Target #6. Several huts and two M/G emplacements were straffed on the way. Target #6 was thoroughly straffed and several huts set on fire. The course continued to Labu Island which was also straffed. A right turn was made and the Squadron Formation returned to base without incident. The last plane landing at 1200/K hrs.

3. The Strike would have been excellent but for the delay of a few minutes which kept the 499th Squadron f rom straffing it's target. This could have been caused by: first, not leaving Marilinan soon enough: second, by making a turn too wide after the bombing run was made: third by not accelerating to 240 mibes per hour from Marilinan to the target. Several malfunctions of guns occured some hung up and would not fire, and others went wild and could not be stopped.
Ammunition Expended: 11,470 x .50 — 1800 x .30

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt, Air Corps,
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
248 H
6 SEPT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

Sept. 8, 1943

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report, FFO 248-H.

TO : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. Thru 345th Group Intelligence, APO 929.

1. On September 6, 1943, the 499th Squadron was ordered to bomb and strafe Malahang Plantation and runway with 12 P-25's. The last plane took off at 0820/K hrs. Squadron formation was formed over Port Moresby. The formation consisted of the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Capt. Taylor	064	Capt. Thompson	016	Capt. Conant	039
1st. Lt. Hyder	054	1st Lt. Cooper	014	1st Lt. Broadhurst	017
1st Lt. Banz	197	1st Lt. Parke	047	1st Lt. George	019
1st Lt. Kurowski	020	1st Lt. Loverin	015	1st Lt. Tatleman	058

2. The Squadron joined the Group Formation enroute to Thirty Mile Strip and assumed #3 position. At Marilinan several 360° turns were made as each Squadron left the formation at intervals of four to five minutes and headed for the target. Our Squadron was over the target at 1026-1028. The plantation and strip were thoroughly straffed by each flight flying abreast. Fifty-three 4 to 5 second delay demos. and 3 six hour delay demos were dropped on the southern half. A shallow turn was made to the left and then a turn to the right over the ocean. The route was about half way between Lae and Salamaua. While passing over the water at altitudes from 100 to 250 feet in front of Lae, some inaccurate medium A/A was encountered. A/A tactics of the Japs was to shoot low and make their bullets richochet off the water.

3. Sightings were made of the bombing of Jacobsen's by the heavies, Allied boats and barges on beach near Hopoi, and numerous grass fires. One unserviceable enemy Airplane was also seen near Malahang strip. A grounded plane was spotted near Madzab.

19600 rds. x .50 cal -- 1880 rds x .30 cal. expended.

WILLIAM D. LAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 8, 1943.

SUBJECT: Gun Record -- Each Ship, FFO 248-F 9/6/43.

TO : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. Thru 345th Group Intelligence, APO 929.

SHIP NO.	TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED	MALFUNCTIONS
064	800	Nil
054	1670	Lower Right Side Gun ammunition jammed.
097	1650	Lower Right Nose Gun shot in opening receiver. Lower Right Side Gun too hot.
020	800	Nil
016	800	Nil
014	800	Lower Left side gun ammo jammed, 1 bomb salvoed.
019	1750	Upper left side gun ammo jammed.
047	1100	Nil
015	800	All guns fired--salvoed 4 bombs.
039	800	Upper right side gun ammo jammed.
017	1400	Lower left side gun jammed.
058	1400	Nil

499
D/rJ1 251-G
9 Sept 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 10, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 251-G.

TO : Commanding Officer 345th Bomb Group. THRU Intelligence Office 345th Bomb Grpup (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Twelve B-25-D-1 Airplanes from this squadron to attack targets at Alexishafen Strip #1, Bostrem Bay and to conduct a Barge Sweep from Alexishafen to Langemak Bay.

2. Captain Alden W.Thompson was selected to lead the formation which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.A.W. Thompson	Ship No.	516	Capt.G.W.Taylor	Ship No.	021
1st.Lt.J.W.Snyder	" "	042	1st.Lt.M.W.Hyder	" "	254
1st.Lt.G.L.Cooper	514 "	014	Capt.C.C.Conant	" "	039
2nd.Lt.W.W.Parke	" "	347	1st.Lt.Kurowski	820 "	020

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.O.N.Loverin	Ship No.	015	1st.Lt.J.L.Broadhurst	Ship No.	017
2nd.Lt.K.D.McLure	" "	164	1st.Lt.P. Gath	" "	058

3. Take-off was 0655/K. Capt.Thompson led the squadron in tight formation to Marilinan where rendezvous with 2 squadrons of P-38's was to be accomplished. The squadron circled for approximately thirty minutes until P-39's appeared. Capt.Thompson, thinking that the escort had been changed, headed toward the target. However the P-39's did not follow. Capt.Thompson again returned to await the P-38's which arrived soon after.

The route from Marilinan was up the Markham, Ramu Valleys to a point twenty-five miles SW of the target. The Bogadjim-Yaula Road was observed to be in excellent repair and many bridges of moderate size were spotted. Weather was good during this stage of the mission.

4. Near the target Capt.Thompson peeled off with his flight to make a run on his targets which were: Motor Pools and Dump Areas at each end of Alexishafen Strip No.1. Continuing the run he was to hit the A/A position on the Penninsula in Bostrem Bay. Lieuts. Snyder, Cooper and Parke followed him in singly. Lt.Cooper made a run on target #1 saw his bullets strike vehicles

(estimated 3), pulled up sharpely and down again on Target #2. During this maneuver 2 bombs broke loose taking shackles and damaging bomb bay doors. Lt.Cooper's guns failed to fire on one truck which was in area of target #2. Lt.Snyder saw three trucks on south side of strip and straffed them, saw bullets striking the vehicles and two bodies slumped over on the trucks. No bombs were dropped on Targets #1 and #2. But Capt.Thompson dropped one at #3 which probably missed. Two ships strafed target #3.

4. When Capt.Thompson's Flight peeled off Capt.Taylor and Lt.Leverin led their flights around to the NW to make runs from N to S in two ship elements on targets 5-4 and 3. During this circle to the NW the Doboa Village was thoroughly strafed.

5. Approximately 14 barges were strafed and bombed in Bostrem Bay with unobserved results. During this run Lt.McClure's ship was hit by a fragment of A/A which came from target #3. Just before the the plane hit, Capt.Baird the Co-pilot released a bomb which fell just short of target #3. Lt.Hyder who followed bombed and strafed the target#3 silencing the position. Several other ships strafed this target. Buildings on Admosin Island were strafed. Target #5 was not attacked.

6. The Squadron reformed over Sek Island and proceeded down the coast on the barge sweep. Very few serviceable barges were observed between Madang and Saidor but an estimated 6 were attacked and believed destroyed.

7. During this sweep Capt.Thompson made a straging run on a village and failed to pull up in time. He crashed into the trees pulling off the tail assembly and crashed, burning. It is believed that his bombs exploded as well as his fuel tanks. The crash point has been placed approximately at Yula Plantation.

8. Capt.Grant bombed and strafed a camp at Saidor causing a large explosion, smoke (blue-grey) and fire which lasted only a short while.

9. Four to six barges at Bunsen Village at Lepsius Point were strafed three barges at Herwath Point were bombed. Reiss and Telista Points were bombed. Reiss and Telista Points were bombed. Three barges were strafed at Koingi Point . Two Barges in Pommern Bay were strafed. Helmholtz Point was strafed Krimba was bombed. Four barges were bombed at Kaumai. One person at Wambariwa was strafed and killed. During the barge sweep two barges were seen in flames and one exploding.

10. Three A/A emplacements (Target #3) consisted of two 40 MM (estimate) guns each. Light A/A fire was received from the shores around Bostrem Bay. The A/A Position 700' N of West end of Strip #1 was observed to fire. A/A fire was moderate, Light, Medium and heavy and mostly accurate. Eight ships were hit by A/A fire —one seriously disabled.

11. One ship was struck by flying debris (mostly mud) which resulted from a bomb burst of another ship which cut in ahead to drop the bomb. A gunner received a cut over the right eye when armor plating came loose.

12. Lt.Loverin and crew saw an object which is believed to have been a sub. It appeared to flash signals and crash dive. Further investigation is being made. Two SSF were seen beached near Saidor—one to the east and one to the west. 3 tin roof buildings were seen on Megas Island.

13. Return from Finschaffen to Dobadura was made in heavy rain storms with clouds to 20000 ft. Ten planes landed at Dobadura returning to Schwimmer at 1600/K.

14. Individual Ship Gun Record:

Ship No.	No. Of Rounds Fired	Malfunctions
014	600	Bolt switch broke.
015	4100	Nil.
017	1600	Nil.
020	3500	Nil.
021	3500	Nil.
039	3000	Oil buffer-body locked spring broke. Upper right side gun.
042	3325	Nil
058	2250	Nil
054	3100	Upper right side gun . Bolt stud broke.
347	3000	Nil.
164	1300	Nil.

52 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay demos, and one dud dropped over targets.
1 bomb returned to base—3 bombs exploded on crash.


PEG

PAT E. [illegible]
1st. Lt., Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

PEG/rjl.

Additional information: Paragraph #5— Beginning at the end of sentence #3.

The right engine cut out immediately. Having 250 to 260 m.p.h. Air Speed, Lt.McClure pulled up sharpely from 50 ft. to gain altitude. The engine caught again to maintain 15 inches Manifold Pressure. Return to base was made alone. Wheels were cranked down and the extra hydraulic fluid was quickly poured into the hydraulic lines to lower the flaps. Only 15 degrees of flaps were obtained necessitating a fast landing of 150 miles per hour. Three control cables and hydraulic lines were severed by the fragment which crossed in front of the Co-Pilot striking the leading edge of the wing midway between the right nacelle and fuselage.


SECOND FLIGHT
TARGET #4
TARGET #5
JAP COASTAL COMMANDER HQ — 1 PLANE DETAILED
RENDEZVOUS
FIRST FLIGHT
SEK IS.
ADMOSIN IS.
TARGET #2
TARGET #1
MEGAS
STRIP 2
STRIP 2.
CHART OF MISSION

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 10, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report, Mission FFO 251-G

TO : 345th Bomb Group Photo Intelligence Officer, APO 929.

#017 (1-6) Only 1-3 received. A trail of .50 cal. M/G bullets in the sea, leads toward two native huts. Left, a group of seven native type roofs in a clearing.

#039 (7-25) Only 7,8,11,13,15,18, and 22 received. 7,8,11,and 13 show bomb bursting hitting probable ammo dumps. 15 shows a bomb burst in what appears to be a small clearing, perhaps a village. 18 and 22 an unsuccessful attempt to bomb a camouflaged barge.

#058 (27-62) Only 29,30,31,32,34,36,37,43,46,47,54,60,and 61 received. 29,30,31,32,34, show the inlet N.W. of Admosin Island assigned as target. Light barges are anchored near the shores, one with a gang-plank reaching to east shore. Camouflage and concealment are summary. Also shown is a small rowboat, beached, (29) A heavy A/A burst, a bomb just after entering the water, and two thatch-roofed huts, as well as a small boat drawn up well under the trees, (34). Squadron photos taken Sept.1, 1943, (FFO 243-G) show all craft on west shore of inlet in same positions as now; plus one small boat, very like one furthest up inlet, on east shore, in present photos. (36&37) show a bomb bursting in a fenced native village, near shore. 13 huts appear within the compound (not all is shown) and one single and one double hut, outside it. (43,46, & 47) show flight over native huts, 43 is devoid of interest except for a possible camouflaged barge, on far side of point. Eleven possibly 12, huts show in 46,47. Does large window-like opening in one wall (possibly unfinished) seem much like native construction? (54) shows smoke drifting away from same bomb burst as shown in #038, 15, 251-G. Present photo also shows at least 4 native huts 60-61 shows a branch-covered barge, type A, flap down, drawn up in shallow water, at the mouth of a small stream. A native outrigger lies beached further upstream.

Edgar Kaufmann Jr.

EDGAR KAUFMANN JR.
1st. Lt. Air Corps
P.I. OFFICER

499
257 H
15 SEPT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 15,1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 257-H.

TO : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. THRU: Intelligence Office, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Twelve airplanes (B-25-D-1) of the 499th Squadron were ordered to make a barge sweep from Alexishafen to Finschafen on Sept. 15, 1943. The Squadron consisted of the following pilots and planes.

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Loverin	Ship No. 015	Lt. George	Ship No. 663
Lt. Luterell	" " 019	Capt. Baird	" " 591
Lt. Kurowski	" " 020	Lt. Taylor	" " 021
Lt. Cooper	" " 014	Lt. Snyder	" " 042

THIRD FLIGHT

Lt. Ryder	Ship No. 254	Lt. McClure	Ship No. 164
Lt. Bans	" " 097	Lt. Parke	" " 347

2. The last plane took off at 0745/K hrs. and followed the 500th Squadron to a point approximately ten (10) miles north of Bogadjim. From there they proceeded inland on a heading north in order to approach the target (Alexishafen) from the west and north. Two flights made one run along the north shore of Borgen Bay and one from the north came in directly over the barge hideout. Several bombs were dropped, strafing run made on the barges and on a new A/A position about 100 yards east of the hideout. Four barges were believed definitely destroyed and others damaged. Squadron reformed about four miles at sea. Madang was by-passed. A large supply dump was located under palm trees at the end of the jetty about ½ mile north of Erina Village. Two flights dropped bombs and strafed this dump evidently exploding ammunition and burning stores. A large column of black smoke five hundred feet high resulted from the runs. Erina, Cargassi Point, Borda, Galek, Mur, Malasanga, Timbe River, Mohka, Langemak Bay, Vinche Point and Schlagen Harbor were straffed and bombs dropped. Results were mostly unobserved but five barges were known to have been destroyed and others possibly damaged. Native Villages between Bogadjim and Finschafen were straffed and many huts left burning.

3. A/A fire at Alexishafen was heavy and mostly accurate. Five airplanes were hit. The top gunner on airplane #015 received a bullet in his upper leg. Six A/A positions besides those already reported were

observed. [illegible] plotting these positions. Light, medium and [illegible] were noticed at [illegible].

4. The total number of barges in eastern [illegible] was estimated to be from fifteen to twenty. From pictures taken these barges are quite large with a very high deck on the stern. We think they resemble luggers, more than barges. Pictures also show portion of supply dump north of Eniu to be intact after bombing. Crews report this to be quite a large dump consisting of tarpaulin covered supplies dispersed under the cocanut trees. Three Flying Officers definitely saw a cigar shaped balloon, with tail fins, flying from 2 to 3 thousand feet over Madang. One hut on Tami Island was observed to have a tin roof.

5. Reductions from this mission are: That there is very little barge traffic between Bogadjim or Maidor and Finschafen, that pilots should proceed at not over 180 m.p.h. while searching for barges, that a flight should never lose sight of each other, that A/A at Alexishafen seems to have been strengthened. One crew member suggested that one plane lead the squadron on a barge sweep, locate the barges and drop smoke bombs locating them for other planes. We mention this for consideration only.

6. 89 x 500 lb. 4/5 second delay demos.
[illegible] rds. of .50 cal. and 6100 rds. of .30 cal ammunition was used.

7. [illegible]

[illegible] No.	Number of [illegible] Iron	Malfunctions
015	2000	Nil
11[illegible]	3000	"
02[illegible]	2500	"
[illegible]	900	"
[illegible]	2000	"
[illegible]	300	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	"
[illegible]	2[illegible]	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	"

[illegible]
[illegible] Corps

499
262K
20 SEPT 43

499th [illegible] Sq. (M) AAF
345th [illegible] Gp. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

September 21, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 262-K.

TO : Commanding Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF. FROM: Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Twelv B-25-C-1 airplanes of this squadron were ordered to participate in a strike in the Bogadjim - Madang Area. The target for this squadron was the coastal area between the GOGOL and MADJIM RIVERS, with the jett and dump area at ERIMA PLANTATION as the PRIMARY TARGET.

2. Capt. C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the Squadron Formation, composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. C.C. Conant	Ship No. 059	Lt.J.W.Snyder	Ship No. 042
Lt. P.T.Luttrell	" " 600	Lt.J.L.George	" " 663
Lt. W.B.Kurowski	" " 020	Lt.W.L.Parke	" " 347
Lt. W. Tatleman	" " 971	Lt.G.L.Cooper	" " 014

THIRD FLIGHT			
Lt.O[illegible].Loverin	Ship No. 017	Capt.J.B. Baird	Ship No. 591
Lt.P. [illegible]	" " 05[illegible]	Lt. R.E.McClure	" " 184

3. Capt.Conant took off from SO. [illegible] STRIP at 0734/K immediately behind the [illegible] Squadron. Succeeding planes took off at thirty (30) second intervals. The squadron circled the field once to get in formation and headed for THIRTY [illegible] STRIP. Some difficulty was experienced in catching up with the lead Squadron. Group Rendezvous was accomplished and the Group Formation headed for MARILINAN. Airplane #184 experienced engine trouble before reaching MARILINAN and returned to base. Bombs were salvoed in ocean. Landing at [illegible]CH [illegible]NER STRIP was at 0805/K. Rendezvous with Fighters and Heavy Bombers was accomplished at MARILINAN. Heavy cloud formations up to fifteen thousand feet over the ranges made good formation difficult. The composite formation of B-25-C-1's, Fighters and Heavy Bombers proceeded to the [illegible] RIVER VALLEY as planned.

4. Break-away was scheduled for BUMPU but was actually accomplished five minutes too soon according to the Squadron Navigator. In order to stay with the formation as long as possible the 499th and 500th Squadrons had to veer to the east, crossing the mountains SE of BOGADJIM.

5. The 499th Squadron (Leading the 500th Squadron) proceeded to the target area as planned while the 498th Squadron and the 501st Squadron proceeded to their targets on the BOGADJIM ROAD. When the target Area was sighted flights of this squadron peeled off, crossed their respective targets at 0930/K going out to sea and turned one-hundred-eighty degrees (180) to attack. The leading flight attacked target #1, second flight #2 and third flight#3.

6. Results were as follows: Bridge over mouth Gogol River and 2 barges bombed, 11 bombs. 4 bombs hit in woods on north bank (2 dropped safe). 2 barges on north end of bridge were destroyed. Malanna strafed and 2 bombs dropped results unobserved. Gorima strafed and bombed with 3 bombs, hut set on fire. Malaga #2 strafed 2 small warehouses at Baluma strafed, 14 bombs dropped. Erima Plantation and jetty strafed. 3 bombs hit jetty 6 on land nearby and 4 hit in water. Plantation was heavily strafed. Erima Village was strafed and bombed with 1 bomb. hut set afire, possible warehouse 1 mile south Erima Village destroyed with 1 bomb. 8 bombs dropped on huts and metal roofed buildings at Bogadjim. Buildings and huts were destroyed. Bogadjim thoroughly strafed. Kubali Mission was strafed and bombed with 3 bombs. Results unobserved. A bomb dropped on Mindjim Village and 5 red roofed buildings ½ mile South of Mindjim Village. Mindjim Village and area thoroughly strafed. 1 building and 3 huts destroyed. Ato Village was strafed and bomb with 2 bombs. Results unobserved 5 buildings on inlet at Gargassi Point were heavily strafed and bombed with 6 bombs, at least 2 buildings were hit by bombs.

7. While making a run on the jetty at ERIMA VILLAGE, Capt.Baird's Radio Man S/Sgt.Robert Blumstein and Engineer S/Sgt.Garret H. Franzenfelder were wounded by light M/G fire from a position near the jetty on the beach. The Radio Man was nicked on the right hip and the Engineer was grazed just under the right eye causing some damage to the cornea of the eye. These two men are eligable for awards of the Purple Heart. Claim will be forwarded.

8. After attacking their targets and finding nothing of particular value, Lieuts. Cooper and Parke spotted five metal roofed buildings near Gargassi Point and attacked them with results as shown in Par.#6.

9. After being over the target thirty five minutes the squadron proceeded to BENA BENA. Rendezvous as a squadron was accomplished before reaching the RAMU RIVER. The formation was at nine thousand feet climbing steadily to clear a fifteen-thousand foot range which was hidden in the clouds.

10. The Squadron hit the coast twenty miles above Kule Island where a clear spot was found. Capt.Conant decided to let down here because clouds looked solid every where else. Formation had to fly at altitude of 150 feet to Port Moresby. Heavy rains were encountered.

11. Eleven ships crossed the field at 1150/K and the first ship landed at 1152/K.

12. It is the unanimous opinion of the pilots that there were very few targets of any value in the area between the GO OL and MI M RIVERS. It seems that the dump area at the jetty which was partially destroyed on Mission #FFO 257-H by this Squadron, has been mover or widely dispersed. The latter may be the case since several widely dispersed and very small dumps were observed. Another possibility is that the RUBBER STRIP (Bogadjim Provivional Map) at BOGADJIM may be in use as a dump area. No definite facts indicated that this is the case but the RUBBER STRIP is near the BOGADJIM ROAD and it offers much more protection from observation than the COCONUT GROVES nearby.


13. It was noted at a critique by the Operations Officer with the Flight Leaders that when bombing from sea to land that a fairly steep angle of attack is necessary because of the Possibility of bombs skipping over the target. Also that when bombing a bridge this same method should be used in an attack from bank to bank instead of broadside as shown in photos No.91, 92, 96 (262-K Erima Plantation 20, Sept. 1943. 499th) which plainly shows bomb skipping and exploding on the creek bank.

INDIVIDUAL AIRPLANE GUN RECORD

Ship No.	Ammunition Used		Malfunctions
663	2000 X .50		Nil
591	1200 X .50	1500 X .30	Nil
042	3000 X .50	200 X .30	Upper Right Side Gun. Charging cable broke.
020	2000 X .50	1000 X .30	Nil
014	1200 X .50	600 X .30	Nil
347	2500 X .50	400 X .30	Nil
600	1000 X .50	Nil	Nil
017	300 X .50	200 X .30	Nil
058	2000 X .50	Nil	Nil
039	1000 X .50	500 X .30	Nil
971	300 X .50	700 X .30	Nil

59 300 lb. 1/5 second delay were dropped.

WILLIAM L. [illegible]
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



499
262-K

Borneo

[illegible]

September 21, 1945.

SUBJECT: Post Report, [illegible] 262-K.

TO : Commanding Officer, 315th Bomb Group, (H) APO 239.

1. Sandakan No.211:

(15) Bomb bursting near building in Selam Plantation.
(16) Road, wrecked building, in Bajadjim Plantation. Bomb burst at shoreline.
(17) Rubber trees strip in Bajadjim Plantation.
Rubber marks are from dirty eyeglasses and fingers.
(17) Wrecked trees and buildings at Prima Village.
Some burnt in upper left corner.
(18) Wrecked buildings and trees at Prima Prima.

2. Sandakan No.212:

(20, 22, 24, 26, 28,. Bomb bursts at foot of letter, Prima Plantation.
Not reliable in serious bomb damage to trees; old bomb craters, [illegible] of bridges, some buildings (26). Unidentified object, lower center, 28.
(2) Wide leading to River, probably Sulpa, some of building at shore.
(7, 11 Bomb bursts in center and at edge of native village, Prima; at lower left corner of both prints, smoke column from bomb damage.

3. Sandakan 1 052:

(23, 22, 21, 20, 26, 27, Shore near Bajadjim Point 2, smoke and [illegible] Prima Plantation. Starting with 23, 5 mm bursts [illegible] to 27.
(21, 25, 26, bridges over [illegible] bomb bursts, all very [illegible] Power line. Unidentified object [illegible].

Edgar Kanzaroni Jr.
[illegible]
1st.Lt. [illegible]
A.I. Officer

499
2695
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499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 September, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report, Mission FFO 269-J.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF:THRU INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Gp. (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. On 27 September, 1943, 12 B-25-D-1's of the 499th Squadron, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, were ordered to strike WEWAK AIRDROME. The FFO number on this mission was 269-J. The following airplanes and pilots took part in this mission:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.TAYLOR	Ship No.021	Lt.COOPER	Ship No.014
Lt.HYDER	" " 254	Lt.PARKE	" " 347
Lt.BANZ	" " 058	Lt.GEORGE	" " 663
Lt.SNYDER	" " 042	Lt.CESSNA	" " 020

THIRD FLIGHT			
Capt.CONANT	Ship No.039	Capt.BAIRD	Ship No.591
Lt.DANIEL	" " 600	Lt.LUTRELL	" " 019

2. The last plane took off from Schwimmer Airdrome at 0805/K hrs. The Squadron formed over the airdrome and joined the 498th and 500th squadrons in the Group Formation en route to Thirty Mile Strip. The Group proceeded to BENA BENA at 9000 feet and made rendezvous there with the 3rd Attack, 38th Groups and fighters. The three groups at 2 minute intervals with fighter escort proceeded NW to a point approximately forty miles south of Cape Moem. Here a right turn was made and the coast sighted at the above Cape. A left turn was made up the coast, then formation broke up and the squadron made their approaches to their targets. The WEWAK AIRDROME was crossed from east to west 6 airplanes abreast, the second section crossing one minute behind the first. A shallow turn was made taking the formation over DALMAN HARBOR, RAIBOIN ISLAND and south of MUSCHU ISLAND. The squadron reformed enroute to KRAVEL BAY and trip to home base, via BENA BENA, made without incident. The last plane landed at 1336/K hrs. Total distance to and from target was approximately 1050 miles. Weather consisted of broken clouds over the ranges and scattered at 3000' over target. Clouds were solid at 11000' over ranges on return trip.

3. A total of 119 3X23 parafrags were dropped on target. Air Strip dispersal areas and nearby stores were straffed. A/A position at WEWAK MISSION was straffed. Lugger in harbor near WOM POINT straffed, barges straffed on SW end MUSCHU ISLAND.

Oil drums and huts on RAIBOIN ISLAND straffed, approximately fifteen (15) camouflaged airplanes in dispersal area at the SE end of strip were bombed and straffed. Eight to ten fires were started in dispersal area. Results difficult to observe due to trees and camouflage. One Betty and one transport North center side of strip definitely destroyed. 3 serviceable and 3 unserviceable Zeros at NW end of strip were bombed and straffed. Barge on beach 2 miles NW of strip straffed. Zero in process of repair and M/T south center of strip of strip bombed and straffed.
23,600 X.50 Cal. and 3,955 X.30 Cal. expended in straffing. Altitude over target ranged from 125 to 300 feet. One airplane returned 12 bombs due to bombay door switch being sprung. Another airplane salvoed 12 bombs on beach near DORIAP and one airplane salvoed one bomb near K RVBR BAY. One airplane reported that all guns failed to function due to burnt relay wire. Four airplanes reported minor gun failures. Time consumed over target was approximately thirty(30) seconds.

4. Photos were taken over target. No interception was encountered due to excellent fighter cover. A/A over the target was reported as moderate, light, medium mostly inaccurate. Only two airplanes received small M/G holes.

5. Sightings were as follows: Large black smoke 1200 ft. high from position near jetty SE of CAPE BOR M. Two fires between strip and beach black smoke 200 ft. in height. Smoke from eight to ten fires in dispersal area SE end of strip. Medium size wharehouse at SE end of strip burning. 12 barges one half mile on beach north of NW end of strip. Burning barges causing large fire and smoke at SW end MUSCHU ISLAND. Large fires seen near DAGUA and BUT. One ZERO shot down by P-38 in water east of WEWAK POINT. One Zero shot down by P-40, falling in flames nearMUSCHU ISLAND. Zero take off from WEWAK STRIP. 1200 ton freighter one quarter mile west of MISSION POINT. Large amount of debris in water east of CAPE WOM. P-40 on fire and falling north of strip altitude about 300 feet. (This last sighting given by only one crew member) Gasoline drums and huts on RAIBOIN ISLAND. Large balls of fire about six inches in diameter were shot at one of our airplane while flying over CAPE WOM.

6. The mission was well planned and excuted. Pilots seem to think better results would have been obtained if three flights four abreast had been used over the target instead of two flights of six abreast. Some amount of flexibility should be left in final orders to formation leaders. If expected A/A fire is not encountered over target the squadron should be allowed to make more than one pass. Every effort should be made to obtain good oblique photos of new targets. These are indispensible on briefing for straffing missions. Verticals taken from high altitudes given are practically useless.

6. Individual Gun Record:

Ship No.	Guns Which Failed	Total Rounds.
039	Nil	600 X .50
019	L.R.Nose Gun. Broken bolt stud.	2000 X.50 600 X.30

Strip No.	Guns which Failed	No. of Rounds Fired
5[illegible]	Nil	2600 X.50 50 X.30
6[illegible]0	Relay Wire Burnt.	Nil 400 X.30
020	Nil	1500 X.50 500 X.30
014	Nil	2000 X.50 700 X.30
347	Nil	1800 X.50 Nil
021	Nil	2000 X.50 300 X.30
254	Lower Right N.G. Broken Charging Cable.	1500 X.50 300 X.30
042	Nil	1500 X.50
091	Nil	2500 X.50 500 X.30
063	Nil	1500 X.50 500 X.30

[illegible]
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
269 J

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 September, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report--Mission FF0269-J

TO : PHOTO INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Airplane Number 014:

201,202, (Nose camera) 201: One Nate, possibly serviceable with wrecked parts nearby; 2,3 ton M/T, one truck trailer; a 3 gun position being strafed in foreground. One Tess being strafed NE side runway. Two distinct fires, in plantation dispersal area just off runway. Large column of smoke from Muschu Island.
202: 7 SSF, 3 clearly U/S, and the Tess.

2. Airplane number 021:

255, 56,57,59,61,63,65,67,68. Show 7 single engine, 4 twin engine airplanes, of which 3 perhaps were serviceable before raid, including Oscar, Zeke, Tess, a few camouflaged; M/Ts; parafrags falling and bursting in dispersal area and along strip. Large buildings on rise at right. A score of fires, including some bomb bursts along runway, and big smoke from E side, N end of strip;&from vicinity of Boram.

3. Airplane number 058:

226,228,230,232,235,236,238,240,244,245,246,250,251,252; 226,227 show dispersal area in plantation, and a few buildings and tants; 3 gun positions; parafrags falling. 230:M/T. 232:1 twin engine airplane U/S; one single engine airplane apparently serviceable. 235,236:parafrags dropping and bursting in dispersal area. 238: 5 M/T, including possible gasoline trailer, 2 unidentified airplanes. 240: Parafrags dropping and bursting on dispersal area and start of strip. 244,245,246: Bomb smoke along strip. Direct hit on unidentified twin engine airplane, N side. Smoke from dispersal bays. 250,251,252: General view of terrain. 25 fires smoking.

Edgar Kaufmann jr.
EDGAR KAUFMANN JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
P.I. OFFICER

444
277 I
5 OCT 43

File

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report, Mission FFO 277-I.

TO : Photo Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Airplane #042: #32,42,44, 49. K-20.

32, Bomb burst and 3 probable fires in Erima Plantation.
42. Large column black smoke, Erima Plantation. Probably Lt.Whipple's crash.
44. Water-logged barge and bomb damage in trees.
49. Bomb-burst in water near shore, missing barge of #44.

2. Airplane #020: #20,23,24. K-21.

20,23,24 show bomb run on tin roofed building, Mindiri Plantation. Bomb was about 150' over, and south of building. Hit was previously reported as Herwath Point.

3. Airplane #039: #3,4,8,9,15,16,17. K-21.

3,4,8,9. Bomb run on 8/10 native huts at Gumbi Village.Likely direct hit. In 3, smoke visible near one hut, possibly result of strafing. Other buildings thru plantation visible. 15.Ramshackle European type building in plantation at Gumbi ? . Two distant puffs of smoke, A/A burst? Possible stores or M/T park, left and beyond building.
16, 17. Bomb burst and A/A puffs Erima Plantation, west edge , just north of Palpa River. Heavy black smoke is likely bomb hitting stores, or possibly Lt.Whipple's crash. Jetty is seen damaged.

4. Airplane #347: 25,31.

31. Bombing and strafing ~~+~~ reported, large at Lepsius Point.
25. Bombs bursting in Erima Plantation.

Edgar Kaufmann jr.

EDGAR KAUFMANN JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
P.I.OFFICER

499 BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345 BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative report, Mission FFO 277-I.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, attention of A.C. of S.,A.-2. A-2, Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Group Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. On 5 October, 1943, 12 B-25-I-1 Airplanes of the 499th Squadron, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, were ordered to conduct a barge sweep on the North Coast of New Guinea from FORTIFICATION POINT to the mouth of the GOGOL RIVER. The FFO number was 277-I.

2. First Lieutenant JACK W.SNYDER was selected to lead the squadron which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1ST.LT. SNYDER	Ship No.	042	CAPT.CONANT	Ship No.	039
1ST.LT. PARKE	" "	347	1ST.LT.LUTTRELL	" "	019
1ST.LT. COOPER	"	014	1ST.LT.KUROWSKI	" "	020
1ST.LT. HYDER	"	254	1ST.LT.TATLEBAW	" "	971

THIRD FLIGHT					
1ST.LT. LOVERIN	Ship No.	600	1ST.LT.WHIPPLE	Ship No.	017
1ST.LT. GATH	" "	053	CAPT.BAIRD	" "	591

3. LT.SNYDER took off at 0800/L with succeeding planes at thirty second intervals. The squadron made one circle getting into formation before crossing field at 3000 feet. The formation proceeded to MARILINAN by way of THIRTY MILE STRIP, encountering heavy cumulus extending from valleys to above 12,000 feet where sky was 9/10 covered. The formation crossed MARILINAN at 0915/L and executed five wide circles at 8000 feet in an attempt to rendezvous with one squadron of P-47's which was to provide escort. As many as eight (8) P-47's were observed in the area but for some reason (probably bad weather) the rendezvous was not accomplished. At this point plane #058 experienced engine trouble (engine cut out several times) and notified formation leader of intention of returning, plane to base at 1035/L with all bombs and ammunition. LT.SNYDER decided to carry out the mission without escort and took up a heading for the target. Heavy clouds were again encountered near MADZAB. Here the formation split into individual flights to go through the weather, at this point, airplane #971 became separated from the formation. Plane #971 landed Schwimmer Drome at 1008/L. Plane was seperated from formation in the vicinity of MADZAB at 0930/L, due to bad weather. Plane landed at LAE in instrument weather at 1030/L. Plane took off at 1300/L and attempted to reach DOBADURA but bad weather interfered. Plane then attempted to cross ranges but clouds were built up to 30,000 feet and plane returned to LAE at 1500/L.

CONFIDENTIAL

Due to Airplane #058's return to base and Airplane #971's becomming lost the flights reorganized as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
LT.SNYDER	Ship No.042.	CAPT.CONANT	Ship No. 039
LT.COOPER	" " 014	LT.LUTTRELL	" " 019
LT.PARKE	" " 347		
CAPT.BAIRD	" " 591		

THIRD FLIGHT

LT.LOVERIN	Ship No.600	LT.HYDER	Ship No.254
LT.SHIPPLE	" " 017	LT.KUROWSKI	" " 020

All flights came out of the weather on the North coast near SIO.

4. One flight covered the coast from SIO down to KANOMI, then returned back up the coast following the other two flights with the following results: 1 M/G nest at AGO straffed and silenced. One serviceable barge ONISSENAU POINT straffed 4 bombs dropped. SIO thouroughly straffed. Two (2) barges KIARI bombed, 7 bombs, strafed, results unobserved. LAPSIUS POINT, 1 barge bombed and straffed. 1 hit and 2 near misses. MUR 2 barges straffed hits observed. SAIDOR thoroughly strafed. GUMBI VILLAGE bombed 3 bombs and strafed. BILIAU VILLAGE straffed. huts at TAGUR strafed. 2 barges HERWATH POINT strafed results unobserved, 1 bomb dropped at building HERWATH POINT, building destroyed. Two barges TOWNSHIP strafed, results unobserved. Huts MINDJIM VILLAGE strafed, results unobserved. ERIMA PLANTATION 27 bombs dropped, and area then thoroughly straffed. Jetty and small boats hit by one bomb. 2 near misses stores and buildings bombed with 24 bombs. One bomb dropped on bridge over IDWORO RIVER 15 miles from mouth.

5. LT.LOVERIN'S flight was the first to hit ERIMA PLANTATION. When the flight crossed the edge of the PLANTATION the A/A opened up with barrage type fire bursting at two hundred (200) feet and below. during the run over the PLANTATION LT.SHIPPLE'S plane which was in the No.3 position in the flight at 50 feet, received a direct hit in the nose whell nacelle just forward of the pilot's compartment. Flames (probably hydraulic fluid) immediately enveloped the nose and fuselage past the trailing edge of the wing. The plane nosed over and flew straight into the gounnd. All observers state that there was no possibility of any survivors. It is thought by the Intelligence Officer that two things account for the readiness and accuracy of the A/A: First, B-17's and B-24's had been bombing the area and receiving A/A fire; second the approach of the first flight was made from sea to land on a heading of 345° approximately which enabled the A/A to set guns and fuses for low level attack from this direction. It is further thought that since no A/A other than light M/G fire had previously been reported at ERIMA that the B-17's and B-24's(knowing that this area was to be covered by this squadron) could have radioed this information to the base in plenty of time to reach "DRUM" Strike. At least one hour elapsed between the heavies break away and "DRUMS" initial attack. This is a point which should be stressed by all Intelligence Officers. After crossing the target LT.LOVERIN radioed instructions not to cross ERIMA PLANTATION, but no one received him.

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6. Eight planes returned to base by way SARENA, YULE ISLAND, with the first plane landing at 1325/L.

7. A/A was light, medium; intense; accurate for the first flight, light, medium, moderate; accurate to inaccurate for the second flight; light, medium mostly inaccurate during first run of the third flight. No A/A was received during the second (last run) by the third flight. Although at least six (6) positions were observed in the PLANTATION area (in square 6703) only one medium position was pinpointed at 670031. One crew member who is usually very accurate and reliable reported a heavy position at 675045.

8. Sightings were as follows: SARENA — Plane No.017 seen to crash and burn in north center of plantation. Six (6) 40 mm A/A positions in PLANTATIONS south of jetty. Direct bomb hit on jetty, SARENA PLANTATION. M/G positions installed in bomb craters. FINSCHAFEN TO SIO: tracks appeared well used. Large neat gardens around SIO and west of SAIKOR. Front extending from two or three thousand feet to above 12 thousand feet. lying in HUON GULF and extending to the NORTH COAST OF HUON PENINSULA.

8. 61 bombs were dropped 300 lbs. on targets.
6 bombs salvoed on MINDJIM RIVER. 10 bombs returned to base (one plane with engine trouble which returned early had seven bombs, three returned due to lack of target.
15,950 X .50 Cal.
2,450 X. 30 Cal.
3250 X.50 fired by one plane to loose weight.

9. Casualties were as follows: 2ndLT. CHANDLER S. WHITTLE, 0735715 Pilot. F/OFFICER E.TUTTLE T-187606, Co-Pilot; S/Sgt.WALTER C.SCHULTZ 18080791, ENGINEER. T/Sgt.HUBERT A.CAMPER, 1306325 RADIO Operator. S/Sgt.JAMES B.WIXON 1h12h159 Gunner. These men were crew members of Airplane #017 which crashed.

10. No recommendation for awards have been forwarded.

11. GUN RECORD

Ship No.	.50 cal.	.30 cal.	Malfunctions
591	2300	500	Upper Right side gun cable off pully.
600	2915	200	Upper right nose gun " " ".
020	1200	100	Nil
014	1200	25	Left right side gun Boltstud lost.
042	2000	250	Accelerator stuck. L.R.S.G.
254	2500	0	Nil
019	1800	0	Nil
039	1800	250	Nil
547	1700	150	None.

PAT E. [illegible]
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

CONFIDENTIAL

499 BOMB SQ. (H) AAF
345 BOMB GP. (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative report, Mission FFO 277-i.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, attention of A.C. of S.,A.#2. A-2, Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Group Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (H) AAF, APO929.

1. On 5 October, 1943, 12 B-25-i-1 Airplanes of the 499th Squadron, 345th Bomb Group (H) AAF, were ordered to conduct a barge sweep on the North Coast of New Guinea from FORTIFICATION POINT to the mouth of the OOOOL RIVER. The FFO number was 277-i.

2. First Lieutenant JACK R.SNYDER was selected to lead the squadron which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1ST.LT. SNYDER	Ship No.	042	CAPT.CONANT	Ship No.	039
1ST.LT. PARKE	" "	347	1ST.LT.LUTTRELL	" "	019
1ST.LT. COOPER	"	014	1ST.LT.KUHOWSKI	" "	020
1ST.LT. SYDER	"	254	1ST.LT.TATLEMAN	" "	971

THIRD FLIGHT					
1ST.LT. LOVERIN	Ship No.	600	1ST.LT.WHIPPLE	Ship No.	017
1ST.LT. GATH	" "	058	CAPT.BAIRD	" "	591

3. LT.SNYDER took off at 0800/L with succeeding planes at thirty second intervals. The squadron made one circle getting into formation before crossing field at 3000 feet. The formation proceeded to MARILINAN by way of THIRTY MILE STRIP,encountering heavy cumulus extending from valleys to above 12,000 feet where sky was 9/10 covered. The formation crossed MARILINAN at 0915/L and executed five wide circles at 8000 feet in an attempt to rendesvous with one squadron of P-47's which was to provide escort. As many as eight (8) P-47's were observed in the area but for some reason (probably bad weather) the rendesvous was not accomplished. At this point plane #058 experienced engine trouble (engine cut out several times) and notified formation leader of intention of returning,plane to base at 1035/L with all bombs and ammunition. LT.SNYDER decided to carry out the mission without escort and took up a heading for the target. Heavy clouds were again encountered near MADZAB. Here the formation split into individual flights to go through the weather, at this point, airplane #971 became separated from the formation. Plane #971 landed Schwimmer Drome at 1006/L. Plane was seperated from formation in the vicinity of MADZAB at 0930/L, due to bad weather. Plane landed at LAE in instrument weather at 1030/L. Plane took off at 1300/L and attempted to reach DOBADURA but bad weather interfered. Plane then attempted to cross ranges but clouds were built up to 30,000 feet and plane returned to LAE at 1500/L.

CONFIDENTIAL

Due to Airplane #058's return to base and Airplane #971's becomming lost the flights reorganized as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
LT.SNYDER	Ship No.	042.	CAPT.CONANT	Ship No.	039
LT.COOPER	" "	014	LT.LUTTRELL	" "	019
LT.PARKE	" "	347			
CAPT.BAIRD	" "	591			

THIRD FLIGHT

LT.LOVERIN	Ship No.	600	LT.HYDER	Ship No.	254
LT.WHIPPLE	" "	017	LT.KUROWSKI	" "	020

All flights came out of the weather on the North coast near SIO.

4. One flight covered the coast from SIO down to KANOMI, then returned back up the coast following the other two flights with the following results: 1 M/G nest at AGO straffed and silenced. One serviceable barge GNEISSENAU POINT straffed 4 bombs dropped. SIO thouroughly straffed. Two (2) barges KIARI bombed, 7 bombs, strafed, results unobserved. LEPSIUS POINT, 1 barge bombed and straffed. 1 hit and 2 near misses. MUR 2 barges straffed hits observed. SAIDOR thoroughly strafed. GUMBI VILLAGE bombed 3 bombs and strafed. BILIAU VILLAGE straffed. Huts at TAGUR strafed. 2 barges HERWATH POINT strafed results unobserved, 1 bomb dropped at building HERWATH POINT, building destroyed. Two barges TOWNSHIP strafed, results unobserved. Huts MINDJIM VILLAGE strafed, results unobserved. ERIMA PLANTATION 27 bombs dropped, and area then thoroughly straffed. Jetty and small boats hit by one bomb. 2 near misses stores and buildings bombed with 24 bombs. One bomb dropped on bridge over IGNORO RIVER 15 miles from mouth.

5. LT.LOVERIN'S flight was the first to hit ERIMA PLANTATION. When the flight crossed the edge of the PLANTATION the A/A opened up with barrage type fire bursting at ~~two~~ hundred (200) feet and below. during the run over the PLANTATION LT.WHIPPLE'S plane which was in the No.3 position in the flight at 50 feet, received a direct hit in the nose wheel nacelle just forward of the pilot's compartment. Flames (probably hydraulic fluid) immediately enveloped the nose and fuselage past the trailing edge of the wing. The plane nosed over and flew straight into the gounnd. All observers state that there was possibility of any survivors. It is thought by the Intelligence Officer that two things account for the readiness and accuracy of the A/A: First, B-17's and B-24's had been bombing the area and receiving A/A fire; second the approach of the first flight was made from sea to land on a heading of 345° approximately which enabled the A/A to set guns and fuses for low level attack from this direction. It is further thought that since no A/A other than light M/G fire had previously been reported at ERIMA that the B-17's and B-24's(knowing that this area was to be covered by this squadron) could have radioed this information to the base in plenty of time to reach "DRUM" Strike. At least one hour elapsed between the Heavies break away and "DRUMS" initial attack. This is a point which should be stressed by all Intelligence Officers. After crossing the target LT.LOVERIN radioed instructions not to cross ERIMA PLANTATION, but no one received him.

6. Eight planes returned to base by way KERAMA, YULE ISLAND, with the first plane landing at 1325/L.

7. A/A was light, medium; intense; accurate for the first flight, light, medium, moderate; accurate to inaccurate for the second flight; light, medium mostly inaccurate during first run of the third flight. No A/A was received during the second (last run) by the third flight. Although at least six (6) positions were observed in the PLANTATION area (in square 6703) only one medium position was pinpointed at 670031. One crew member who is usually very accurate and reliable reported a heavy position at 675045.

8. Sightings were as follows: KERAMA — Plane No.017 seen to crash and burn in north center of plantation. Six (6) 40 mm A/A positions in P ANTATIONS south of jetty. Direct bomb hit on jetty, KERAMA PLANTATION. M/G positions installed in bomb craters. FINSCHAFEN TO SIO: tracks appeared well used. Large neat gardens around SIO and west of SAIDOR. Front extending from two or three thousand feet to above 12 thousand feet. lying in HUON GULF and extending to the NORTH COAST OF HUON PENINSULA.

8. 61 bombs were dropped 300 lbs. on targets.
6 bombs salvoed on MINDJIM RIVER. 18 bombs returned to base (one plane with engine trouble which returned early had seven bombs, three returned due to lack of target.
15,950 X .50 Cal.
2,450 X. 30 Cal.
3250 X.50 fired by one plane to loose weight.

9. Casualties were as follows: 2ndLt. CHANDLER S. SHIPPLE, 0735715 Pilot. F/O[illegible] R.TUTTLE T-137606, Co-Pilot; S/Sgt.WALTER C.SCHULTZ 19080791,ENGINEER. T/Sgt.NORBERT A.CARLSEN, 1306325 RADIO Operator. S/Sgt.JAMES B.WILSON 14126159 Gunner. These men were crew members of Airplane #017 which crashed.

10. No recommendation for awards have been forwarded.


11.

GUN RECORD

Ship No.	.50 cal.	.30 cal.	Malfunctions
591	2300	500	Upper Right side gun cable off pully.
600	2915	200	Upper right nose gun " " " .
020	1200	100	Nil
011	1200	25	Left right side gun Solitatud lost.
042	2000	250	Accelo rator stuck. L.R.3.C.
254	2500	0	Nil
019	1800	0	Nil
039	1800	250	Nil
547	1700	150	None.

PAT E. HOFORTH
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

CONFIDENTIAL




Annex I to Tactical Operations Report

499 Bomb Squadron (H) 345 Group. Target Sweep Chart. 5 Oct. 1943.

FFC 277-I Ref: Australian Aeronautical Map, B-8, 3rd Ed. Scale 1:1,000,000.

S-2 Sec.




Annexe 1 to Mission Narrative Report.

499 Bomb Squadron (M) 345 Group. Barge Sweep Chart. 5 October 1943

FFO 277-I . Ref: Australian Aeronautical Map B-8 Third Ed. Scale 1:1,000,000

9-2 Sec.



499 Bomb Squadron (M) 345 Group. Barge Sweep Chart. 5 Oct. 1943.

FFO. 277-I Ref: Australian Aeronautical Map, B-8. Third Ed. Scale 1:1,000,000

X = strafe O = bomb.

S-2 Se

499
284 A
12 OCT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

14 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report - Mission FFO 284-A.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2. Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Twelve B-25-D-1's airplanes of this squadron took off from SCHWIMMER AIRFIELD at 0830/L, 11 October, 1943 and proceeded to DOBODURA. Landing on Strip #15 at 1000/L.

2. This squadron was ordered to participate in a coordinated strike on the RABAUL AREA the morning of 12 October, 1943. The Primary Target for this squadron and the 345th Group as a whole was VUNAKANAU AIRDROME.

3. Capt.O.N.LOVERIN was selected to lead the Squadron Formation which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
CAPT.O.N.LOVERIN	Plane No.015	CAPT.J.B.BAIRD	Plane No.591
LT.P.GATH	" " 058	LT.V.W.TATLEMAN	" " 971
LT.R.BAKER	" " 164	LT.KELLY T.R.	" " 020
THIRD FLIGHT		**FOURTH FLIGHT**	
LT.G.C.COOPER	Plane No.014	CAPT.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.039
LT.W.N.PARKE	" " 347	LT.LUTTRELL P.T.	" " 019
LT.W.W.CABELL	042	LT.J.CLEVENGER	" " 016

4. CAPT.LOVERIN, in the lead airplane, took off at 0728/L with succeeding planes at intervals of thirty seconds. The Squadron Rendezvous was accomplished enroute to ORO BAY where the Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute to the target, shortly after leaving ORO BAY.

5. The Task Force proceeded directly to NEW BRITAIN ISLAND, striking the coast near WIDE BAY. At 0950/L, shortly after sighting NEW BRITAIN ISLAND airplane "019 turned back because of propeller trouble and landed on STRIP #15 at 1200/L. This plane was joined enroute to base by a plane from the 500th Squadron which landed at KIRIWINA ISLAND - cause unknown.

6. On striking the coast the Force turned North, skirting the coast to the WARANGOI RIVER. A short distance up this river, groups broke formation and proceeded to designated targets.

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The 345th Bomb Group came in low behind the hills south of VUNAKANAU AIRDROME, which was the target. The target was hit in six waves of one squadron each, in the following order: 498th Squadron, with COL.TRUE (Group C.O.) leading, 500th Squadron, 501st Squadron, 499th Squadron, followed by two Squadrons of the 38th Bomb Group. The attack was made in a Squadron Front of 12 planes abreast, squadrons in trail.

7. During the approach to the target, A/A fire was received from a new position just North of RAPUI VILLAGE. Probably of medium caliber. CAPT.LOVERIN saw the gun position on his left and strafed the position which did not fire again.

8. The bombing run was made on a course of approximately 310 degrees. CAPT.LOVERIN'S flight made it's run covering an area 1/4 mile in width from the left side of the strip. CAPT.LOVERIN began strafing in the PLANTATION just south of the strip and continued strafing with short bursts all the way through. He dropped 3 clusters of 23 pound parafrags (a total of 18 individual bombs) in the dispersal area SW of the South end of the drome 4 clusters (24 bombs) were dropped in the dispersal area along the south side of the strip. 3 clusters (18 bombs) were dropped in the dispersal area along West of the North end of the drome.

As this squadron approached the drome an airplane, identified as "NATS" was taking off. When this plane became airborne it turned left in front of CAPT.LOVERIN and LT.COOPER'S flight. Five B-25-D-1s fired nose and turret guns at this plane with unobserved results. Because of attack on this "NATS" CAPT.LOVERIN did not release 2 clusters and returned them to base.

LT.BAKER (Capt.Loverin's left wingman) dropped 3 clusters on 4 M/B in the South West Dispersal area (Ref. B-2732 Vunakanau 2 August, 1943 20" F.L. 34,800' 8th D.S.). 4 clusters were dropped on a building near the GARDEN PLOT and in the N W. Dispersal area (Reference same as above). Continuing his run LT.BAKER turned right across the Fighter Dispersal Area and strafed the R/T station.

LT.GATH (right wingman) dropped 1 cluster on fuel dump, B-5514 (CIU, T-24 VUNAKANAU AIRDROME). 3 clusters were dropped on buildings near GARDEN PLOT, 5 clusters on control tower and 3 clusters on U/I 2/E bomber at an unidentified position.

LT.COOPER who was leading the extreme left flight dropped 2 clusters on a camp area approximately 2 miles South of the Drome and strafed the second GARDEN PLOT (B-2732 VUNAKANAU AIRDROME C I U T-24 25 June 1943) was strafed. 10 clusters were dropped between the A/A position and the end of the drome on a heading of 300 degrees approximately. Near the end of the drome LT.COOPER and his flight had to turn left to avoid planes which were shooting at the "NATS" taking off.

LT.CARREL and LT.PARKE (Lt.Coopers wingmen) strafed and dropped all of their bombs on the stores and Personnel area B-2716 (Vunakanau 2 August 1943 CIT T-24 25 June 1943 and along the NW dispersal area.

CAPT.BAIRD made his run along the "Runway Dispersal Area" (Vunakanau 2 August 1943 24" F.L. 34,800' 8th P.S.) According to two of his crew members almost every revetment contained a plane. Twelve clusters were dropped at intervals along the dispersal lane.

LT.KELLY (Capt.Baird's right wingman) strafed buildings on the approach to the drome and dropped his bombs on a course of 315 degrees starting at the SW corner of the drome, strafed a T/E Fighter in the "Fighter Dispersal Area" and carried over into the Personnel Area in the Northern Personnel Area.
LT.TATLEMAN (left wingman) strafed a red roofed, white wall building near RAPUI. 2 clusters were dropped on motor vehicles at the South end of the runway. 5 clusters were dropped on the "Runway Dispersal Area" (Same run as CAPT.BAIRD) 5 clusters dropped between the end of the runway and the road to the NW.
CAPT.CONANT strafed 2 T/E fighters at B 5035 (Vunakanau CIU,T-24 25 June 1943) dropped on a M/B across taxiway from the above. 8 clusters were dropped at intervals between this point and the "Northern" Plantation. The "Stores" and "Personnel" area within the Plantation were strafed. Continuing his run he strafed the "R D F Station". After leaving the target CAPT.CONANT strafed buildings on KERAVAT AIRDROME.
LT.CLEVENGER (Capt.Conant's right wingman) dropped 12 clusters parallel to Capt.Conant's run through the dispersal area. This area was also thoroughly strafed.

9. A/A was medium and light, slight, inaccurate from an unknown number of positions near RAPUI VILLAGE, from one position N. of TOKUA AIRDROME and 1 position at B 2722 (Vunakanau Airdrome CIU,T-24 25 June 1943), The position at RAPUI was strafed and silenced.
This squadron reformed enroute to the south of the WARANGAI RIVER. Near this point rendezvous with the 498th squadron was effected. Shortly afterward 4 splashes (size of 100 lb. bomb burst) were seen. One pilot expressed the opinion that they may have been fighter belly tanks dropping since there was only a splash and no towering column of water.

10. A patrol boat containing 20 to 30 men was seen, frantically making for shore. No plane from this squadron broke formation. Several fires and a good deal of smoke were observed from VUNAKANAU, RAPOPO and in the vicinity of RABAUL HARBOR,after leaving the target,. Two large Radar Towers were seen near RAPUI ILLAGE (Refer to K-20, 284 (12 October 1943) 499th Squadron-number unknown).

12. Return was direct to KIRIWINA ISLAND where LT.CLEVENGER in plane #016 landed to refuel. The fuel shortage resulted when the turret fuel tank could not be transfered. This plane landed on STRIP # 15 at DOBODURA at 1510/L, 12 Oct.1943. The squadron landed at 1315/L, 12 October,1943.

13. Fighter escort was was excellent through out.

14. Plane #591 received a .50 slug in the main spar of the left wing which necessitates repair and probable replacement of the wing. No other casualties to personnel or planes were sustained.

15. No individual decorations are due as a result of this mission.

16. A total of 302, twenty-three pound, parafrag bombs were dropped on targets on and near YONAKANAC AIRDROME. 50 bombs were returned with plane #019 and 12 bombs returned with plane #039.
NOTE: The word cluster refers to a cluster composed of 6 individual bombs.

Pat E Gofforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

PEG/rjl.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Original) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925
Attention of A.C. of S., 2.
(1 copy) A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
(2 copies) V Bomber Command, APO 929.
(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

14 October, 1943.


SUBJECT: Gun Record - Mission FFO 284-AA.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929 A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929, Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF.

Airplane Number	Ammunition Expended	Malfunctions
039	3200 X .50 300 X .30	Nil.
164	3500 X .50 700 X .30	Upper right side gun failed to fire Broken charging cable.
971	2000 X .50 Nil	Right lower gun jammed.
020	2000 X .50 150 X .30	One gun failed to fire Broken charging cable.
015	2000 X .50 Nil	Nil
042	2500 X .50 Nil	Lower left nose gun did not fire.
347	2000 X .50 500 X .30	Nil
058	2000 X .50	Nil
016	3000 X .50	Nil
044	1700 X .50	Nil.
591	1500 X .50 150 X .30	Upper right side gun did not fire.

Pat E. Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL



499TH BOMB SQDN. 345TH BOMB GROUP
MISSION OCTOBER 12 1943 - FFO 284 - AA
BOMBING & STRAFING CHART. REF. VUNAKANAU PHOTO
2ND AAF PHOTO INTELL. DEPT. V BOMBER COMMAND
11 SEPTEMBER 1943.

499
288 M
16 OCT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

17 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report - Mission FFO 288-M.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2, Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929,. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. 9 B-25-D-1's airplanes of this squadron took-off from SCHWIMMER AIRFIELD at 0814/L, 16 October, 1943.

2. This squadron was ordered to participate in a Strafing and Bombing attack on BORAM & WEWAK AIRFIELDS.

3. Capt.C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the Squadron Formation which composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
CAPT.C.C.CONANT	Ship No.039	LT.G.L.COOPER	Ship No.015
LT.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 020	LT.W.N.PARKE	" " 347
LT.V.W.TATLEMAN	" " 971	CAPT.J.B.BAIRD	" " 663

THIRD FLIGHT			
CAPT.O.M.LOVERIN	Ship No.015	LT.K.D.McCLURE	Ship No.164
LT.P.OATH	" " 058		

4. Capt.CONANT took-off at 0814/L with the rest of the Squadron planes at 30 second intervals. The Group Formation was accomplished enroute to thirty mile strip. The Group continued on to MT.YONKI where it rendesvous with three squadrons of P-38's.

5. The Group Formation continued on to RITTER BAY where the squadrons spaced themselves for a run over the target. This squadron was No.3 to make a pass.

6. Capt.CONANT'S flight made the first pass with him taking center of BORAM RUNWAY on a heading of approximately 270°, strafing entire length and area at West end of strip. He continued on to WEWAK where he again straffed dispersal area at south side of east end of runway and areas at west end of runway. No bombs dropped due to rack malfunction.

CONFIDENTIAL

LT.TATLEMAN (left wingman) straffed south side of BORAM STRIP. He dropped one bomb in supply area east end of WEWAK STRIP, straffed dispersal area east end and straffed U/I fighter sitting on west end of WEWAK STRIP. After turning down toward the coast this plane (971) was attacked by 1 Zeke from 7 o'clock. Upper turret gunner shot it and observed hits in the Zeke which crashed straight into ocean 12 miles SE of MUSCHU ISLAND 11 bombs were returned due to malfunction of rack.
LT.LUTRELL (right wingman) made a forced landing at HADZAB STRIP on the return route to this base so results of his run on the target are unknown as yet.
LT.COOPER led second flight, which took to area north of the BORAM STRIP Lt.Cooper straffed and dropped bombs on a road running through this area parallel to the strip. Hits were observed on planes on North side of BORAM STRIP, three of which were burning. 3 bombs were dropped in supply area Northeast of WEWAK STRIP, 3,000 feet SW of MISSION POINT. 1 bomb dropped NE end of strip. 3 bombs dropped in dispersal area North of west end of strip. 1 bomb dropped on patrol boat SW of MUSCHU ISLAND scoring a direct hit. Enemy fighters made passes at LT.COOPER'S flight, but P-38's intercepted, one enemy fighter pressed attack to within 300 yards and was shot down by upper turret gunner.
LT.PARKE (right wingman) made his run over shore North of BORAM straffing and dropping 3 bombs on known A/A position. 3 bombs were dropped on neck of CAPE BORAM on known A/A positions and supplies. Area North of WEWAK STRIP was straffed with 3 bombs dropped. 1 bomb dropped 1000 yards north of center of runway. Dispersal area north of west end of WEWAK STRIP was straffed and 2 bombs dropped. Gunner in this plane saw LT.COOPER'S gunner shoot down Zeke.

CAPT.BAIRD (left wingman) made straffing run on dispersal area north side of BORAM STRIP swinging over to strafe dispersal are, at west end of strip. 2 bombs were dropped here. The dispersal area south of the east end of WEWAK was straffed, continuing the run, a pass was made on dispersal area west end of WEWAK STRIP where approximately 15 planes were seen. These were straffed and 10 bombs were dropped.
LOVERIN flight leader of the third flight and was assigned the area south of the BORAM STRIP, on a heading of approximately 255°. He made a straffing run through the south dispersal area. 2 bombs were dropped on center of the area directly south of the center of the strip. His second target was the WEWAK MISSION area which was thoroughly straffed and bombed 10 bombs being strung out over this area. On leaving this target, a Nap was seen to crash approximately 3000 yards due south of WEWAK STRIP. It is thought this plane was shot down by P-38. Heading out to sea, a Zeke made a pass at No.3 plane in the formation coming up between it and CAPT. LOVERIN'S plane. The turret gunner sent a solid stream of bullets to this Zeke, which fell off on one wing and crashed into the sea a little NW of RAIBOIN ISLAND. The Zeke was seen hitting the water by CAPT.COMANT. Pulling out to sea to rejoin the Squadron Formation, MUSCHU ISLAND was strafed.

LT.McCLURE (right wingman) straffed the northside of the south dispersal area starting at the east end of BORAM STRIP. 2 bombs were dropped along

CONFIDENTIAL

this area. Straffing continued on through the area south and west of the strip. The area surrounding the WEWAK MISSION was straffed and bombed with 10 bombs being dropped on the North side of this area.LT.McCLURE also saw the Hap that crashed south of the WEWAK STRIP.
LT.GATH (leftwingman) straffed the south side of the south dispersal area on BORAM a known A/A position approximately 1200 yards south afthe center of BORAM STRIP was straffed and two bombs dropped . An A/A position 3000 yards south of BORAMSTRIP that was firing was straffed by the upper turret and immediately ceased firing. The run was continued on to WEWAK MISSION where 7 bombs were dropped on the south side of this area. Two of these bombs were dropped safe cause was unknown. Proceeding on to sea, this plane was attacked by one Zeke from the front and above. LT.GATH pulled his plane up to meet the attack, turning loose with all nose guns. The Zeke just barelycleared this plane, stalled out, and crashed out to sea. 2bombs which were to be dropped on MUSCHU ISLAND fell into the water because of the violent manauver of the plane to get sight on the Zeke.

7. A/A was medium, light; intense to light and accurate to inaccurate. No new positions were seen. Two noticeable columns of smoke were seen coming from WEWAK area, from several crews, one was estimated as being from 1500 to 2000 feet high.

8. A B-25 was seen in the water approximately 5 miles north of RICHTOFEN POINT. A life raft was by the plane and several men were in the water. Pictures were taken of the plane.

9. The squadron rejoined the group formation and the same route was taken back. On reaching MARKHAM VALLEY plane #020 left the formation and landed at NADZAB, this plane force landed due to engine trouble sustained from A/A. All crew members were reported safe. The Squadron landed at SCHWIMMER at 1345/L.

10. Fighter escort was excellent throughout.

11. Plane # 058 received holes in both nacelles, Plane #039 holes in left nacelle. Plane #164 received hits in right wing.

12. No individual decorations are due as a result of this mission.


13. A total of 73,100 lb. wire wrapped bombs with 8/11 second delay fuses were dropped. Plane #039 returned twelve bombs. Plane #971 returned 11 bombs.

14. Teletype message received this office from AV 2nd. Air Task Force in regard to Plane #020 received 17 October 1943 is as follows:
" (020) WEWAK BORAM dromes 1050L 200 ft. 12 X 100 lb. bomb dropped, and 3000 X.50 cal. used in bombing and straffing. A/A over water beyond CAPE BORAM. Received Machine gun fire damaging hydraulic system and holeing gas tanks. One enemy single sead fighter made one pass over BORAM, no damage done to either planes. Will return to base 17 October unless ordered otherwise, plane will need repairs."

15. This is individual plane "FIRING RECORD" :

Plane No.	.50 Cal	.30 Cal	Malfunctions
039	750	200	Nil
971	1855	100	"
058	1850	Nil	"
164	600	50	"
015	1255	400	"
347	1925	300	"
014	2400	400	"
663	2600	1000	"

Frank M. Parker Jr.
FRANK M. PARKER JR.
1st.Lt. Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



499TH BOMB SQDN. 345TH BOMB GROUP

FFO 288-M OCTOBER 16, 1943

BOMBING & STRAFING CHART OF WEWAK & BORAM

REF.-COLLATION MAP, TARGET INFORMATIONAL SUMMARY WEWAK & BORAM- 25/9/43.

499
290 AA
1502 T 4

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

19 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report -- Mission FFO 290-AA.

TO : PHOTO INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Plane #015: (K-20)
629, large fire heavy smoke on the East side of North end of runway.

Plane #019: (K-21) 66-69-74-76.
66,69 shows bombs falling and bursting south end east side of strip. 66, shows 1 plane (possible S/E fighter in revetment. 69, One T/E bomber in revetment. 74 - 76 Bombs falling in by 1 Topsy and 1 Lilly both serviceable at end of strip. (1 unserviceable L/B.

Plane #600: (K-20) 44-46-48-49-52.
44, Bombs exploding in strip area. 46, Explosions on east side of strip. Large column of smoke at south end of strip. (Possible Topsy and Lilly on fire). 48, Explosions on strip and in dispersal area on East side. Large column of smoke about center of strip. 49, Explosion and smoke all around strip area. Two large columns of smoke. 53, Three warships (reported as CL's) and 1 small boat just West of Lesson Point.

Plane #663: (K-20) 22-26-31-32-33-37-39.
26, One T/E bomber (Possible Helen) SW dispersal area. 26,31, and 32, Explosions and smoke on strip and dispersal areas. 35, Three warships (reported CL's) and 1 small boat which was throughly strafed.

Plane #254: (K-21) 79-93-93-95-96-99-100.
79 Bomb bursts and large columns of smoke on strip and in dispersal area. 93, Bomb burst on South end of strip. 1 U/I plane in hardstand in dispersal areas. 95, Parafrags falling in dispersal area W side of strip, 1 U/I plane in hardstand. 96, Parafrags in dispersal area west side of strip 6 planes (S/E and T/E) in hardstands. 97, 1 T/E plane in hardstand. 100, parafrags in dispersal area T/E medium bomber in hardstand being repaired.

Frank M Parker Jr
FRANK M. PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

19 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report -- Mission FFO 290-AA.

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FRANK M. PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

499
290 A
18 Oct 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M)AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

19 October,1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission to RABAUL, N.B. 18 October,1943. FFO 290-A.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. This squadron took-off from SCHWIMMER AIRDROME early the morning 17 October,1943 and proceeded to DOBODURA arriving at 1002/L during a Red Alert. Four planes of this squadron saw Red Alert signal on Strip #15 and left the area. These planes landed one hour later.

2. At 0800/L 18 October,1943, nine B-25-D-1 airplanes from this squadron were alerted for a coordinated strike on the RABAUL area. Four squadrons of the 345th Group were to take part. Three squadrons were to strike RAPOPO AIRDROME and one squadron was to strike shipping off VUNAPOPE. The target for this unit was RAPOPO.

3. At 1000/L Capt.O.N.LOVERIN, the Squadron Formation leader, took off and assembled the formation at 1004/L over Strip #15. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
CAPT.O.N.LOVERIN	Plane No.015	LT.G.L.COOPER	Plane No.014
LT.K.D.McCLURE	" " 019	LT.W.N.PARKE	" " 347
LT.R. BAKER	" " 600	LT.W.W.CABELL	" " 016

THIRD FLIGHT

CAPT.J.B.BAIRD	Plane No.663	LT.P.GATH	Plane No.254
LT.V.W.TATELMAN	" " 021		

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over ORO BAY shortly afterward. Two squadrons of the 38th Bomb Group were picked up over the BUNA WRECK. The whole formation,with 3 squadrons of P-38's as escort, took a course for KABANGA BAY which was the Initial Point.

4. After forty-five minutes flying a line squall, extending from sea level to twelve-thousand feet, was encountered. The B-25-D-1's entered the heavy cloud formation and broke out one hour later. The P-38's escort was nowhere in sight. The formation continued to the target.

5. Instead of striking the coast of NEW BRITAIN at KABANGA BAY as planned the formation crossed the coast just south of CAPE GAZELLE. The formation, with the 498th Squadron leading, turned west to a point approximately ten miles south of RAPOPO AIRDROME where the break for the target was made.

6. The runway and area four-hundred feet on either side was the target designated to this squadron. Since this area was overlapped by a squadron on either side, a three-hundred-sixty degree circle was made to allow the other squadrons to clear the target. Capt.LOVERIN leader, lead the squadron to the southeast of the DROME where a left turn was made. A short right turn was necessary to line up on the target. Time over target was 1258/L.

7. Just after completing the three-hundred-sixty degree circle a medium A/A position near BITAPAKA (Ref: Gazelle Peninsula, 1" to 1 mile Prov) was observed to fire slight, medium, inaccurate at our formation.

8. The number 1 and 2 planes of No.1 Flight made a run south to north along the eastern side of the drome. 3 planes (2 Lilly, 1 Topsy) were bombed at the SE corner of the drome. Approximately five-hundred feet farther north another "Lilly" was hit. Thirty-six parafrags and twelve one-hundred pound bombs were dropped, by two planes, starting at the SE corner of the drome and continuing to the north end. The number 3 plane made a run down the west side of the drome and dropped twelve one-hundred pound bombs with unobserved results.
The number two flight thoroughly strafed a known A/A position at B4718 (CIU T-23 RAPOPO AIRDROME 17 June 1943). which was firing at the formation. The guns were silenced. Crews reported 3 medium and one heavy guns here. Twenty-four one hundred pound bombs were dropped by 2 planes in trail starting in the SE dispersal area and extending to the N end. One direct hit and two near misses on three planes were observed. One plane of this flight experienced electrical trouble, bombs failed to release and guns failed to fire. The other two planes strafed throughout the run.
The number 3 flight made a run along the west side of the strip dropping 12 one hundred pound bombs and thirty-six parafrags bombs with unobserved results. Hits were observed on six or seven planes by strafing.

9. After leaving the target a small boat (probably a ferry) near GREITNER ISLAND was strafed by four planes with heavy damage. All planes turned right on the break-away from the target. During this turn several crews observed several ships (1,000 to6,000 tons) off VUNAPOPE. Two near misses and two hits b y B-25-D-1's were observed. Three light cruisers were seen off PRAED POINT heading NE at a high rate of speed. A/A fire from shipping was observed to be heavy, moderate, inaccurate. Heavy smoke was seen from near CAPE GAZELLE to originate from BLANCHE BAY.

10. Fifteen Zekes intercepted near CAPE GAZELLE and followed the formation to a point at 152.0 E and 0530 S. A total of twenty passes were made however most of these passes were made in a half-hearted manner and breaking

off when fired upon at extreme range. As many as ten passes were made within range. Most of these were made upon the number 2 flight which was slightly out of formation. One Zeke made a pass from five o'clock on the number 3 plane of the second flight and was hit by fire from the number 3 plane top turret first and then by fire from the number 1 plane top turret. Zeke was seen to crash. Another Zeke made a pass from six o'clock on the number 3 plane, number 2 flight. Hits by turret gunner were observed and Zeke crashed. A Zeke, making a pass from three o'clock on the lead formation was hit by turret fire from No.1 plane. Zeke faltered and went into a steep dive. Zeke claimed as probable since the formation was flying low on the water.
During the running fight 1 B-25 was seen near WILE BAY being attacked by several S/E fighters. Later, from a distance, 2 splashes and one fire on the water were seen. No further observation was possible because of the distance.
One B-25 was seen in the water off OHO POINT, N.I.
Several crew members expressed the opinion that enemy pilots encountered during this attack were less experienced and much less agressive than those encountered recently over MENAK. During this attack the B-25 was hit by one 20 mm shell in the left wing and by one 20 mm shell in the life raft compartment. Plane remained at DOBODURA for repairs.
An U/I plane resembling VAL as to tail and general form but having retractable landing gear was also observed during the fight. This plane did not take part in the fight but flew paralled to our formation. When the formation turned into this plane it pulled ahead and crossed over the formation and did not reappear.

10. The squadron returned to DOBODURA and landed at 1600/L.

11. The bomb load as previously reported in the Final Report was incorrect. Due to malfunctions of racks before take-off the bomb load was changed. Correct figures are as follows: 72 X 23 parafrags and 60 X 100lb. wire wrapped daisy cutter bombs were dropped on the target.

12. No decorations are merited as a result of this mission.

PAT.E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Distribution:

(1) Copy Commanding General , Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
(1) Copy A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
(2) Copies A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
(1) Copy Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF, APO 929

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

19 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Individual plane, gun record.


TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

Plane No.	.50 Cal. Fired	.30 Cal. Fired	Malfunction
015	2000 rds.	1000 rds.	Nil
019	3000 rds.	200 rds.	Nil
600	2000 rds.	200 rds.	L.L. Nose gun would not charge.
014	2650 rds.	100 rds.	L.L. Side gun charging cable broke.
[illegible]	3500 rds.	300 rds.	Nil
347	750 rds.	700 rds.	Nose guns did not fire due to electrical trouble.
663	3300 rds.	500 rds.	UL Side gun exelarator stuck.
021	1500 rds.	250 rds.	Nil
254	2400 rds.	200 rds.	Relay to upper nose gun burned out.

2,4[illegible] 3,[illegible]

NOTE: These figures are not entirely correct since no Armament Personnel were present.

PAT E. HOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



400TH BOMB SQDN. 345 BOMB GROUP
MISSION FFO-290AA. OCTOBER 18, 1943
BOMBING & STRAFING CHART.
REF. - INTELLIGENCE MAP OF RAFOPO, V BOMBER COMMAND. SEPTEMBER 25, 1943.

L99
296 AA
24 OCT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO503

26 October,1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission to VUNAKANAU Airdrome. FIFTH FFO ~~#65~~ 296 AA

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. This Squadron took-off from SCHWIMMER AIRDROME, APO 929, the morning of 23 October, 1943 and proceeded to Strip #15 APO 503.

2. The morning of 24 October, 1943, this squadron took-off at 0815/L to participate in a "Strike" on Airdromes in the RABAUL area. The target designated for this Squadron and other 3 Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group was VUNAKANAU AIRDROME.

3. Capt.O.N.LOVERIN was selected to lead the formation of 9 B-25-D-1's which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.O.N.LOVERIN	Plane No.015
1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 019
1st.Lt.P.GATH	" " 600

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.G.W.COOPER	Plane No.014
1st.Lt.J.W.GEORGE	" " 016
Capt.J.B.BIRD	" " 591

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.G.F.TAYLOR	Plane No.021
1st.Lt.C.L.BAND	" " 097
1st.Lt.E.W.SNYDER	" " 254

4. Rendezvous was accomplished over [illegible] at 0850/L and the Task Force of Strafer A/C and P-38 escort proceeded by way of MIRWIN ISLAND to a point within sight of CAPE ST.GEORGE. The force turned left crossing ST.GEORGE CHANNEL and striking

CONFIDENTIAL

the coast of NE BRITAIN near the mouth of the WARANOI RIVER. At this point two crews reported seeing several explosions in the water near KABANGA BAY. Explosions were closely grouped and gave a mushroom effect. This same incident at the same place, was noted in previous mission reports. The Intelligence Officer holds the opinion that these may be some sort of acoustic mine. At KABANGA PLANTATION a good sized fire was seen and much black smoke. This was possibly a plane burning. At a point several miles up the river the 3 Squadrons attacking TOBERA and RAMPO AIRDROMES turned right. The 345th Group continued North, assuming a safe interval between squadrons enroute to a point 3 to 4 miles SE of VUNAKANAU AIRDROME. Here 6 Zekes intercepted the Squadron making a few weak passes but in general only shadowed the formation to and from the target. All squadrons flew at a comparatively low level in order to take advantage of screening provided by a low ridge to the S of VUNAKANAU.

5. During the approach to the target a previously reported A/A position on the ridge near KALABUNGA JUNCTION (Rabaul 4 mile Strat). was observed firing Light, medium, and inaccurate at one formation. One plane of the #3 flight thoroughly strafed and bombed the position with 3 bombs. The position ceased firing and did not fire again at our formation.

The number 1 and 2 flights of 3 planes each made a run on a heading of 300° ~~across~~ along the right hand side of the runway, crossing the SE dispersal area, the NE Bomber dispersal area and the fighter dispersal area.

The SE Dispersal Area was thoroughly strafed and bombed with 22 bombs. Crews reported 5 Sally's on fire after run completed. The majority of revetments were occupied.

The NE dispersal area was thoroughly strafed and bombed with 17 bombs. Results were unobserved but one dump near the center of this area was hit.

The fighter dispersal area was also thoroughly strafed and bombed with 17 bombs. Results were unobserved.

At the beginning of this run A/A fire over RAPOPO was observed to be light, medium, intense. An U/I fighter was seen going down in flames. A large dogfight East of VUNAKANAU was also observed.

The number 3 flight made a run on a course of 300 degrees down the left side of the runway. One plane flying directly over the repair center in the fiscus trees which border the South Plantation and the runway dispersal area. Two planes made a run on a course of 300 degrees, some 1500 to 2000 feet to the left of the runway.

The second Garden Plot was strafed by two planes. One plane dropped 3 bombs here with unobserved results.

Four bombs were dropped in the Repair Center and the area was strafed. 1 Betty was hit and destroyed. 5 bombs were dropped near the Operations Buildings at the S corner of the drome. The buildings were also strafed. The Runway Dispersal area was thoroughly bombed and strafed. 12 bombs were dropped in a line straight down the dispersal lane. Practicallyevery revetment here contained a Betty. Bombs were seen to explode very near several of these but no exact resultswere observed.

Seven bombs were dropped in the NW Dispersal area which contained no planes. Bombs hit near huts with unobserved results.

One unreported S/L at an undetermined position (probably 2000 feet West of the NW end of the Runway) was thoroughly strafed andbombed with bombs. Bombs are believed to have hit in or very near this position.

Two bombs weredropped in o very near the known A/A and S/L installations 1500 feet N of the NW Dispersal Area. Two bombs waredropped in an unamed Village approximately 4 miles NW of the Drome.

Seven bombs were dropped along the W. edge of the South Plantation and two bombs near theNW end of the runway with unobserved results.

Before reaching thetarget, two Bettys were seen on fire in the Runway Dispersal Area.

After completion of the run all planes turned left. It was during this turn that several crews reported, light (20mm) intense and accurate fire from known positions near the N corner of the runway and 500 feet N of the runway. As a result of this fire two planes sustained minor damage and one plane sustained a hit on the turret which destroyed the plexiglass dome. No further casualties to personnel or aircraft were sustained.

6. Six Sallys and Bettys definite and 4 Sallys and Bettys very probably are claimed as destroyed as a result of attack, b this squadron.

7. The 6 or 7 Zekes which intercepted this squadron displayed a marked respect for defensive fire from turret guns. Very few definite passes were made and even these broke away at extreme range when fired upon. A total of six passes were made from 3,6 and 9 o'clock with no attempt at coordinated attack and with no outstanding display of airmanship.

8. Weather wasgenerally favorable for the mission and presented no difficulty at any time. Enroute to the target scattered cumulus was encountered at 1500 feet with high cirrus. Over target scattered cumulus was at 2500 to 3500 feet. On the return flight scattered cumulus had descended to [illegible] feet with topsat 3000 feet.

SECRET

9. Observations were limited in the RABAUL Area because of the enemy fighters presence of which attacked and followed our formation for quite some time.

10. A total of 106 K-21 and 57 K-20 exposures were made. Fourty-four K-21 and 2 K-20 prints were received by this squadron.

11. Fighter was excellent and well executed and the mission as a whole is thought, by this squadron, to have been well executed as planned. Bombing was excellent.

12. No individual citations, decorations or awards are due as a result of this mission.

Pat E Gofforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution:

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Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
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APO 929.

CENSORED

499TH BOMB SQ. (H) AAF
345 TH BOMB GP. (H) AAF
APO 503

26 October,1943.

SUBJECT: Armament Report - Individual Planes.


TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Fifth Air Force APO 929. A-2 7 Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (H) AAF, APO 929.

Plane No.	.50 Cal fired.	.30 Cal Fired.	Malfunctions
021	3100	800	Nil
600	400	800	L.left side gun, charging cable broke.
454	2000	500	L.L.G. Gun Ruptured cartridge.
015	1600	300	Nil
016	3000	800	Turret out.
019	1700	Nil	Nil
014	3100	500	Turret guns damaged by Enemy fire.
591	2400	500	Nil
097	2400	Nil	Nil
Total:	19,700	4200	

CONFIDENTIAL

PEG

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


499TH
345TH BOMB
FATF FFO-65 OCTOBER 24,1943 BOMBING & STRAFING
CHART REF MAP OF VUNAKANAU V BOMBER COMMAND
OCTOBER 11,1943
A/A position's
Bomb (100
KUNAI PTN.
R.G. MISSION &
HOSPITAL AREA
RDT
BIDDMAN CORNER
591
015
016
014
019
027
600
039
016
014
591
015
019
600

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 October,1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report - Mission FATF FEO #65.

TO : Photo Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF APO 929.

Plane #019: 255,56,57,58,61,62,64,65,66,68,71,82, and 83. (K-21)

#255: 1 Betty M/B in hardstand, 3 M/T. #256: 2 Bettys in hardstand, 3 M/T/. #257: 4 Bettys M/B in hardstand, 1 T/E Bomber in hardstand probable Betty. #258: 9 Bettys M/B in hardstand. #261: 262: 8 M/B Bettys, 1 M/T. #264: 8 Bettys in hardstand, 1 U/S "Zeke". #265: 6 M/B (Bettys) in hardstand, 1 U/S "Zeke". #266: 5 M/B (Bettys) in hardstand. #268: 6 M/B Bettys in hardstand, bombs bursting on SE edge of Strip. #271: 3 Tonys in hardstand, 1 A/P completely destroyed in hardstand (probable fighter) 2 M/T's on Strip. #282: 283: Known S/L position, (Ref: 1070 C.I.U. T-24)

Plane #254: 220,21,22,29,30,32, 36. (K-21)

#220 - 222: Second Garden Plot with sunken road. (Ref: 4302 C.I.U. T-24) #229: Buildings and fork of roads, (Ref: 2415 C.I.U. T-24) small graveyard. #231:- 230: Heavy A/A positions shown , 6 light A/A at 2414 (Ref:C.I.U. T-24). #232: 2 heavy A/A positions shown as 6 light A/A at 2414 (Ref: C.I.U. T-24). #236: Probable S/L (1520 Ref: C.I.U. T-24) smoke from vicinity of second Garden Plot and 2 A/A positions.

Plane #016: 188,98,89,90,93,99, and 203,04,08,11,13,15,18,19. (K-21)

#188: 5 M/B Bettys in hardstand, 1 oil truck, 3 small trailers. #189 - 193: 4 M/B Bettys, 2 oil trucks, 3 small trailers, 1 road-roller. #198 - 199: Bomb Bursts in SW dispersal area, 3 wrecked planes at 4449 (Ref: C.I.U. T-24). #203 - 204: Approximately 30 U/S B/E and T/E airplanes in dispersal area at 3558 (Ref: C.I.U. T-24). #208 - 218: Bomb bursts in north dispersal area, known fuel dump 1256 (Ref: C.I.U. T-24). #299: Known S/L at 1070.

Plane #021: 238,39,42,44,45,49,51,52. (K-21)
#238: 2 M/B Bettys in hardstand in SW dispersal area. Fire in one of the hardstands.
#239 - 242: 3 M/B Bettys in SE dispersal area large column of smoke from repair area at 4326 (Ref: C.I.U. T-24) bombs bursting in S dispersal area.


#244: 3 M/B Bettys in hardstand West dispersal area. Bomb bursts S end of strip, 1 column of smoke. 1 U/S airplane on edge of strip.
#245 - 249: 5 M/B Bettys in West dispersal area, bomb bursts S end and West side of strip.
#251 and 252: Bomb bursts in dispersal areas and East, South and West side of strip. Bomb bursts on North end of Strip.

Plane #591: 317 - 318 (K-20)

317 and 318: 9 M/B Bettys in SW dispersal area. Bomb burst around M/B's.

Frank M. Parker, Jr.
FRANK M.PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

499th BOMB SQDN. 345TH BOMB GROUP MISSION
FATF FFO-65 OCTOBER 24, 1943 BOMBING & STRAFING
CHART REF MAP OF VUNAKANAU V BOMBER COMMAND
OCTOBER 11, 1943



499
290 AA
26 OCT 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 October, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Strike on Mission to Rabaul. FATF FFO #67. Z 90 AA

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 , V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. On 26 October, 1943 this Squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on RABAUL TOWNSHIP as part of the primary mission which was to neutralise enemy shipping and naval activity in the RABAUL area. The specific mission for this Squadron as well as the rest of the 345th Bomb Group, was to render automatic weapon fire in RABAUL TOWNSHIP ineffective.

The target for this Squadron was an area one-half mile N and one half mile S of SULPHUR CREEK, and extending inland from the coast one-half mile. This Squadron was to follow the 501st Squadron (dropping parafrags on the same target) and drop 100 lb. W.P. Smoke Bombs. RABAUL TOWNSHIP, MATUPI ISLAND and small craft in SIMPSON HARBOR were to be strafed.

Seven Squadrons of the 3rd. Attact Group and the 38th Bomb Group were to follow the 345th Group and attack M/V and Naval Vessels in the Harbor.

2. Capt. G.W. TAYLOR was selected to lead the 499th Squadron which was assigned the number four position in the Group Formation. The Squadron formation of 10 B-25-D-1's was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. G.W. TAYLOR	Plane No.021	Capt.O.H.LOVERIN	Plane No.015
1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	" " 097	1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 019
1st.Lt.N.W.H DER	" " 254	1st.Lt.P. GATH	" " 600

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.J.B.BAIRD	Plane No.591	1st.Lt.G.L.COOPER	Plane No.014
1st.Lt.J.L.GEORGE	" " 042		

1st.Lt.W.N.PARK was pilot of the 10th Plane which was used as spare plane. This plane flew for 30 minutes and returned as planned.

3. The first plane took-off from Strip #15 APO 503 at 0835/L with succeeding planes at thirty second intervals. By 0905/L the complete Group

and Bomber Force Formation had completed the rendezvous and were on course to KIRIWINA ISLAND.

4. The formation of eleven bomber squadrons crossed the southern tip of KIRIWINA ISLAND which was covered by part of an occluded front which extended approximately forty miles to the west. Heavy rain was falling on KIRIWINA. The formation turned SE for approximately thirty miles and then turned NNE for approximately 20 miles. Sometime during this leg the code word "Ruth" was received, cancelling the mission. The formation then turned E for ten miles or so, made a one-eighty degree turn and returned directly to DOBODURA. This squadron landed at 1153/L.

5. Crews state that the fighter escort of 6 squadrons of P-38's could not take off at KIRIWINA because of adverse weather conditions. The weather on course to the target did not look favorable but the bomber formation could have gone through.

6. All bombs and ammunition returned to base. No citations, decorations are awarded or merited as a result of this mission.

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
(1 copy) A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
(2 copies) A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF
APO 929.

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2 NOV 43

499TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
APO 929

4 November, 1943

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Rabaul Mission 2 November, 1943. FATA FFD 305 DD.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929.

A-2, Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.

Group Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb. Gp. (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. This squadron took off from strip #4, Dobadura at 0735/L, 2 November, 1943 to participate in a strike on naval vessels and M/V in Rabaul Harbor. However, soon after take-off the mission was cancelled b because of weather. The squadron returned to base, landed, refueled and stood by at the strip for take-off at 1045/L.

2. The purpose of the strike was to neutralize naval and M/V activity in the Rabaul Area in order to prevent reinforcements from reaching the Solomon Islands. The 345th Bombardment Group was to precede the 38th Bombardment Group and the 3rd Attack Group, who were to attack shipping, and neutralize A/A positions in Rabaul Township. Two squadrons (one dropping parafrags and one carrying 100lb, W. P. Smoke Bombs) were to attack automatic weapon positions in the NW corner of Simpson Harbor. This squadron dropping smoke bombs was to follow another squadron dropping parafrags in the Sulphur Creek area which contained some 83 Automatic weapons positions.

3. Following the 501st squadron, this squadron took off at 1648/L with Capt. G.W. Taylor leading the formation of ten B-25D-1 airplanes with flights set-up as follows:

1st Flight
Capt. G.W. Taylor 021
1st Lt. H.K. Hyder 254
1st Lt. [illegible] Bane 097

2nd Flight
1st Lt. G.L. Cooper 014
1st Lt. J.L. George 016
1st Lt. [illegible] Parke 347

3rd Flight
Capt. J.B. Baird 591
1st Lt. F. Cath 663
1st Lt. R.L. McClure 019
1st Lt. W. W. Cabell 042

4. [illegible] was accomplished over [illegible] by the 345th Bombardment Group which then picked up the 5th Bombardment Group and 3rd Attack Group and the striking force with fighter escort proceeded on course from [illegible] point to [illegible] Channel. The [illegible] time Capt. Baird [illegible] was forced to return to base. Lieutenant Cath[illegible] (2) turned [illegible] and joined with Lieutenant Unbell in #2 (the spare ship) assuming the #3 slot position.

5. The striking force proceeded up St. George's Channel below 4000 feet at [illegible] 10 miles [illegible] Rabaul two V's, [illegible] fighter escort [illegible] 5000 feet. [illegible] fired at the formation [illegible] short in the water. A/A was [illegible], heavy, slight, inaccurate. [illegible] of the squadron [illegible] to make the fighter sweep as planned. On striking Rabaul which was the I. P., this squadron started a swing to the north in order to make the correct run [illegible] over the target.

6. On striking the coast approximately midway between the 4 Laughter and 5 Laughter, this squadron made a left turn of 60 degrees. At this time A/A guns on the ridge which connects the 4 and 5 Laughter pts. was put up a barrage which was not fired directly at the formation but rather a pattern which was intended to catch our formation when it hedge-hopped over the ridge, since our squadron was below the altitude of the ridge. However, these tactics were successfully countered by thoroughly strafing these positions and then pulling up sharply at an altitude which was unexpected by the Jack Ack. The preponderance of the A/A fire was medium, although some light and heavy bursts were observed. The barrage was intense but bursting below our formation. The formation continued the turn and lined up on a 4 to 5 run over Rabaul Township, Sulphur Creek and Matupi Island. Shortly after straightening out, the formation crossed just behind the 500th squadron which was making a run almost 90 degrees to our course on the other target. Apparently the A/A batteries did not observe our squadron and directed fire at the 498th and 500th squadrons.

At this point the turret gunner in [illegible] strafed an A/A position silencing it and sweeping the gun crews.

The entire formation thoroughly strafed Rabaul Township and dropped all bombs on the automatic weapon positions in the area one-half mile N and E of Sulpher Creek. All flights strafed these positions. Two oil fires were started in Rabaul Township by strafing.

The No. 3 flight pulled left after bomb release to hit the A/A positions at the [illegible] corner of Lakunai Drome. These positions would have had a very clear shot at the formation consequently this [illegible] detailed to silence these guns. No A/A was fired after the strafing.

The first and second flights strafed [illegible] planes on Lakunai Drome with unobserved results. [illegible] taking off and were strafed also with unobserved results.

The No. 4 flight made a pull-[illegible] run [illegible] sweep Matupi Island. A/A fire from [illegible] caliber, inaccurate and inaccurate. Other positions [illegible] unobserved results.

CONFIDENTIAL

The number 2 flight crossed Katupul Island along the western edge with the flight leader crossing the flight plane approximately. Approximately fifteen Nates were at anchor, four of which were seen to burst into flames and others were definitely damaged. A large concentration of stores were observed. The Dentaitan Island light and A/C in Simpson Harbor and Katupul Harbor began firing, at our first pass which employed evasive tactics (bobbing and weaving) to evade the intense fire. These tactics no doubt are responsible for the lack of confirmed plane shot down. However, plane No 019 received a burst in the right vertical stabilizer which made control difficult. This plane landed at Kiriwina at 1600/, refueled, checked damage and landed with no difficulty at Org. 4, Dobodura at 1830/L. Plane No 042 was holed by 20 mm A/A but escaped with other damage sustained. Flights 1 and 2 combined on across the harbor heavily strafing a picket boat in the process and crossing Rabaul. The formation leader saw intense, light A/A and A/C coming from various positions on and around Rabaul. In order to insure a safe withdrawal these two flights strafed these positions as well as buildings, stores and huts.

7. It was at this point that interception occured. A Nate made a pass at plane 042 in the blind spot at 11 o'clock. 042 pulled up sharply and nosed down immediately when the Nate began firing. All shots passed over the plane.

A Zeke made a pass on obj from 5 o'clock; was hit by turret guns and crashed off Vunakapo. Another Zeke made a pass from 4 o'clock, was hit and smoking but was still under control but was goin down steeply when last seen and can only be claimed as probable.

A Zeke made a pass on 041 from 6 o'clock, pressed attack home and fired, blowing out a tire. The turret gunner registered hits sending the Zke down in flames to crash. Several other Nate and Zeke attacks were made on this plane, but attacks were broken off without firing when turret and waist guns fired at extreme range. This plane landed safely with no brakes and a blow out.

One Zeke crossed up 2 Zekes crossed in front of the No 1 flight. Both Zekes fired rear guns. Plane did registered hits on No 2 Zeke causing smoke to issue from cowl. No 2 pulled up, burned, and fell off to crash. No 1 Zeke crossed the rear of the formation to the right wing and then vertically up. Turret gunner registered hits with no visual damage but Zeke nosed straight down toward the water. Several hits were definitely seen registering [illegible] but not dead but the Zeke is claimed as probable. [illegible] observed results.

[illegible] 044 from 5 o'clock. Hits were registered by turret gunner. [illegible] to be seen from cowling [illegible] was still under control but can only be claimed as damaged. The other two Zekes were [illegible] 5 o'clock without damage.

[illegible] of Zeke resulting in [illegible] of the right elev. Because of this [illegible] from 2 o'clock low [illegible]. [illegible] out of control [illegible]. The co-pilot was [illegible].

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

4 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Armament Report, Mission FWO MAIF 305 DD.


TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

Plane No.	.50 Cal.	.30 Cal.	Malfunctions.
016	800	1400	Nil
254	2300	1200	Nil
097	2300	500	Nil
042	2300	200	Nil
021	3200	1800	Nil
014	2700	500	Nil
063	2400	2400	Nil
347	3800	500	Nil
019	1500	Nil	.30 Cal. Guns failed to fire.

Each Plane dropped 12 X 100 lb. W.P. Smoke Bombs.

FRANK M. PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

499TH BOMB SODN. 345TH BOMB GROUP MISSION
FATF FFO-305 DD NOVEMBER 2, 1943 BOMBING & STRAFING
CHART. REF. C.I.U. NEG. 5309



499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

18 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Roster of Personnel participating on Strike Mission: RABAUL TOWNSHIP, 2 November, 1943.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 5th Bomber Command. THRU: 345th Group Intelligence.

1. The following is the list of planes and crews with their individual positions in each plane. These planes participated in the strike on RABAUL TOWNSHIP, 2 November, 1943.

FIRST FLIGHT

Plane No.021:

Capt.Glen W.Taylor	0-726846	Pilot - SQDN. LDR.
2nd.Lt.Leo L.Fleniken	0-796115	Co-Pilot
2nd.Lt.Charles J.Murry	0-739564	Bombardier Navigator
T/Sgt.James E.Griffin	11053888	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Dean L.Butler	17036975	Engineer Gunner
Sgt.Joseph Lehane	20123664	Turret Gunner

Plane No.251:

1st.Lt.Norman W.Hyder	0-730915	Pilot
2nd.Lt.George Irish	0-730919	Co-Pilot
Sgt.Micheal J.Costa	32422134	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Hyman Prosten	32333635	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.John L.Huddleston	14108167	Turret Gunner

Plane No.09:

1st.Lt.Charles L.Banz	0-734142	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Bert Shaber Jr.	0-793038	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.John J.Ladolcetta	32496012	Radio Gunner
Sgt.Louis Laczkowski	6150016	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.Ralph A.Montgomery	37133714	Turret Gunner

SECOND FLIGHT

Plane No.01:

1st.Lt.George L.Cooper	0-664543	Pilot
1st.Lt.Richard D.Reinbold	0-24875	Co-Pilot
Capt.Ralph M.Stevens	0-662311	Bombardier Navigator
T/Sgt.Ford R.Hill	39682524	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Thoms F.May	31020126	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.A.F.Iberardine	11102173	Turret Gunner

1st.Lt.Jack L.George	0-792580	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Mack L.Simms Jr.	0-735828	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.Kenneth L.Andrews	31148975	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Willima J.Parkhurst	37096458	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.Adolph F.Svec	37074998	Turret Gunner

Plane No.347:

1st.Lt.William N.Parke	0-793438	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Aaron L.Niles	-0798020	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.Robert J.Barbers	11066234	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.Frederick F.Dietz	32335110	Radio Gunner
Sgt.William E.Simmons	31144520	Turret Gunner

THIRD FLIGHT

Plane No.663:

1st.Lt.Philip Gath	0-792577	Pilot
1st.Lt.Richard Baker	0-734171	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.Alexander Korch	3246087	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.John F.Collins	13056200	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.LaVance A.Glenn	18032656	Turret Gunner

Plane No.019:

1st.Lt.Kenneth D.McClure	0-734248	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Robert W.Spear	0-735681	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.Robert D.Stewart	17107383	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.James W.Stephens	39606865	Engineer Gunner
S/Sgt.Lawrence H.Harvey	32581781	Turret Gunner

Plane No.042:

1st.Lt.William W.Cabell	0-735521	Pilot
2nd.Lt.William E.Rushworth	0-742783	Co-Pilot
S/Sgt.Donald E.Hichcock	32448452	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Arthur F.Croft	31881018	Engineer Gunner
Sgt.Julius C.Walker	15233784	Turret Gunner

Plane No.591:

Capt.Julian B.Baird	0-725121	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Jones MacLeod	0-796830	Co-Pilot
2nd.Lt.Leroy F.Puthoff	0-669107	Navigator
S/Sgt.Lawrence L.Wintersheit	37212278	Radio Gunner
S/Sgt.Archie G.Martin	19099899	Engineer Gunner
Sgt.Andrew T.Chesanek	31145299	Turret Gunner

2. Plane No.019, Lt.McClure, was hit from warship A/A and received damage to right vertical stabilizer. Although difficult to control, this plane was brought into Kiriwina without further damage.
Plane No.042, Lt.Cabell, was hit by A/A from warships. Damage was minor.
Plane No.047, Lt.Parke was hit by fire from Zeke which blew out a tire and damaged the hydraulic system.
Plane No.016, Lt.George, was hit by A/A over Raluana Pt. damaging the hydraulic system and spraying fluid on windshield. At the same time this plane was attacked by an enemy A/P which inflicted leg wounds on the Co-Pilot, and seriously wounded the radio operator and engineer. Disregarding his own wounds the co-pilot crawled over the bombay twice to assist the gunner in administering first aid to the engineer and radio operator. This burst of fire from the enemy aircraft also put this planes nose guns out of commission.

3. Eight planes returned to Dobodura, while the ninth landed at Kiriwina as reported, above.

4. Plane No.591, piloted by Capt.J.B.Baird, after flying one hour developed engine trouble and was forced to turn back. Plane 042 piloted by Lt.Cabell, flying as spare, then completed the nine plane formation.

5. No airplanes were lost on this strike. The conduct of all officers and enlisted men against the fiercest defence the enemy could offer was worthy of the finest traditions of the U.S. Army Air Corps.

6. There were no sightings of ships damaged, as the strike on shipping followed this attack. Two DD's were sighted in St.Georges Channel. Five U/I warships and M/V were seen in Simpson Harbor.

William D. Lawson

WILLIAM D.LAWSON
Capt., Air Corps
ACTING INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
316J
13 NOV 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

14 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Strike on Madang. FFO 316-J

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. On 13 November, 1943, this squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on MADANG with the other squadrons of the 345th Group. The target was: supply dumps, grounded A/P and A/A positions. The bomb load was 4 X 300 lb. and 6 X 100 lb. demolition bombs, with 8/11 second delay fuses, per plane.

2. Captain C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the 499th Squadron which was third squadron in the Group Formation. The Squadron formation of 9 B25-D-1's was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C. CONANT	Plane No.600	Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	Plane No.591
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 663	1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	" " 097
1st.Lt.V.W.TATTELMAN	" " 042	1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER	" " 254

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.O.M.LOVERIN - 015 1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE - 164 1st.Lt.R.BAKER - 058

1st.Lt.G.L.COOPER in plane #014 was spare plane. This plane flew with the formation for 40 minutes and returned to base as planned.

3. The first plane took off from SCHWIMMER STRIP at 0830/L with the rest of the Squadron following at 30 second intervals. The Group formation was accomplished enroute to 30 mile STRIP and proceeded to YULE ISLAND, to rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group and the P-47 Fighter Escort. The 38th Bomb Group was met as planned and the formation started on course for the target . The "Fighter Cover" was not observed at YULE ISLAND, but they were undoubtedly there for they were seen from the back after reaching the target.

4. On reaching the target area the Group Formation spaced itself for the run on the target. There was approximately 30 second intervals in Squadron runs on the target, with this squadron the third to make the run.

CONT

5. Capt.C.C.COMANT lead the Squadron front attack with #2 flight on his right wing and #3 flight on the left. Capt.COMANT had the area directly south and parallel with the strip, his flight strafed and bombed dump areas, dispersal areas along the strip, and A/A positions at Northeast end of the strip and around main wharf were bombed and strafed. Capt.TAYLOR'S flight (No.2) bombed and strafed the Dump Area Southwest of the strip. A/A positions and building on the peninsula and RAGETTA ISLAND were bombed and straged.
CAPT.LOVERIN'S flight (No.3) was assigned the area North of the strip. This flight bombed and strafed: dispersal areas and supply areas adjacent to the strip, A/A positions, houses and barges at East end of strip on HELIAU ISLAND.

6. Anti-Aircraft fire was very light, a few bursts of medium and some M/G fire were observed. One plane received a small hole in the right engine nacelle.

7. The Squadron reformed over the BAY, for the return to the base. One other squadron was seen on return course, however, due to weather which was getting worse, each Squadron returned by itself. One plane failed to reach the target, due to trouble with right engine, this plane landed at HADZAB. This plane was previously reported as landing at GUSAP.

8. It is thought that the element of surprise was lost by approaching the target at altitudes of three to four thousand feet when ten or fifteen miles away. A close study of the surrounding terrain showed enabled the formation leader to approach the target at minimum altitude. This would greatly shorten the time given the A/A to train their guns and increase the margin of safety for our airplanes.

FRANK M.PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST.INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
(1 copy) A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
(2 copies) A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 929.

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

14 November, 1943.


SUBJECT: Armament Report - Individual Planes.


TO: : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

Plane No.	.30 Cal.	.50 Cal.	Malfunctions.
600	1500	Nil.	Right nose gun) Cockpit Left nose gun) Switch.
254	1800	100	Nil.
042	1500	100	2 Forward nose guns failed to fire.
591	1100	200	Nil.
164	1600	Nil	Accelarator stuck. Left lower nose gun.
015	1500	400	Nil
058	1200	500	Nil
097	1800	300	Nil
663	Nil	Nil	Nil

FRANK M. PARKER JR.
1st. Lt., Air Corps
ASST. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.


499TH BOMB SQDN.
345TH BOMB GROUP MISSION
FFO-316-D NOVEMBER 13, 1943
BOMBING & STRAFING CHART.
REF. MAP OF MADANG
V BOMBER COMMAND
SEPTEMBER 13, 1943




IMPORTANT Please see Grid Reference Note overleaf
NORTH
T.
M.
Var.n 6°10'E.
Statute Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5
Compass readings indicate Magnetic Bearings toward the Target
NO RELIABLE DATA IN THIS AREA
MADANG A/D
ASTROLABE BAY
GOGOL RIVER
KOKUK RIVER
Gurul River
Bilibili
Jabob
Jurembo
Malaune
Gorima
Malaga
Balama
Erime
Bogadjim
Kuabi Mission
Mindjim
Maie
Kaiika Mission
Konscentin (Mesamu) Mission
Garagass
Hamleta
Rerao
Dumpu
Serum
Kabenau
Erima Pt
Erima Hbr
Erima Pen
Bogadjim Pen
Mindjim Pen
Maie Pen
Kaiika Pen
Erima Reef
Bogadjim Reef
Mindjim Reef
Maie Reef
Kaiika Reef
Kabenau Reef
Kabenau Pt
Kabenau Bay
Kabenau Harbour
Kabenau Mission
Kabenau Plantation
Kabenau Village
Kabenau Creek
Kabenau River
Kabenau Road
Kabenau Hill
Kabenau Mountain
Kabenau Valley
Kabenau Ridge
Kabenau Spur
Kabenau Gap
Kabenau Saddle
Kabenau Peak
Kabenau Summit
Kabenau Slope
Kabenau Foothills
Kabenau Lowlands
Kabenau Coastal Plain
Kabenau Coastal Strip
Kabenau Coastal Belt
Kabenau Coastal Zone
Kabenau Coastal Area
Kabenau Coastal Region
Kabenau Coastal District
Kabenau Coastal Province
Kabenau Coastal Territory
Kabenau Coastal Island
Kabenau Coastal Peninsula
Kabenau Coastal Cape
Kabenau Coastal Bay
Kabenau Coastal Harbour
Kabenau Coastal Port
Kabenau Coastal Town
Kabenau Coastal City
Kabenau Coastal Village
Kabenau Coastal Mission
Kabenau Coastal Plantation
Kabenau Coastal Road
Kabenau Coastal River
Kabenau Coastal Creek
Kabenau Coastal Hill
Kabenau Coastal Mountain
Kabenau Coastal Valley
Kabenau Coastal Ridge
Kabenau Coastal Spur
Kabenau Coastal Gap
Kabenau Coastal Saddle
Kabenau Coastal Peak
Kabenau Coastal Summit
Kabenau Coastal Slope
Kabenau Coastal Foothills
Kabenau Coastal

F.F.O. 316	Squadron [illegible]	Scale
Date [illegible]	Group [illegible]	[illegible]

3 Flight			1 Flight			2 Flight		
No	A/P	Pilot	No	A/P	Pilot	No	A/P	Pilot
1	[illegible]	Capt. [illegible]	1	600	Capt. C. C. COLLART	1	[illegible]	Capt. [illegible]
2	[illegible]	[illegible]				2	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	[illegible]



600 ft. between 1st & 3rd flight

#3 A/p of 2nd flight moved over and took position in 1st flight

#2 A/p of 1st flight did not make the target

400
318J
16 NOV. 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

16 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission FFO 318-J.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. On November 15,1943, this Squadron was ordered to participate in a "strike" on BORAM & WEWAK AIRDROMES, against grounded airplanes, gun positions and supplies, with the other squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group. The bomb load was 12 clusters of Parafrag Bombs (3 Bombs per cluster) for each plane. This squadron was to attack BORAM AIRDROME only.

2. Capt.G.W.TAYLOR was selected as Squadron Leader. This Squadron was the lead Squadron in the Group Formation. The Squadron Formation of 9 B-25-D-1's was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	Plane No.021	Capt.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.600
1st.Lt.C...R NZ	" " 097	1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 019
1st.Lt.[illegible]	" " 058	1st.Lt.G.L.COOPER	" " 011

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.C.N.LOWERY - 015 1st.Lt.K.L.McCLURE - 164 1st.Lt.W.C.KULAWSKI - 591

1st.Lt.V.W.T.TTLMAN in plane #042 was spare plane, this plane flew with Squadron for 30 minutes, and returned to base as planned.

3. The Squadron took-off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0830/L. The Group formation was accomplished enroute to 30 mile strip. At the 30 Mile Strip the 345th Group Formation accomplished rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group as planned at 5,000 feet. This formation set out to Mt.Yonkie with the 345th Group leading. Shortly before reaching Mt.Yonkie, Capt.CONANT in plane #600 left the formation due to engine trouble and returned at SCHWIMMER DROME landing at 1005/L.

4. The rendezvous with three squadrons of P-47's at Mt.Yonkie was successful and the formation took up the course to the target.

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5. Shortly after leaving Mt.Yonkie the fighter escort left the formation to join in on attack on Japanese formation of bombers and fighters making a raid in the RAMU MARKHAM VALLEY. The formation continued on course for several minutes, then returned to base as ordered by Group Formation leader.

6. Approximately 14 BETTY'S were seen over GASAP at 18 to 20 thousand feet. 2 formations of 5 and one formation of 4, these planes were seen at 1002/L. At the same time approximately 20 enemy fighters headed in the same direction at 25,000 feet were also observed. At 1010/L one ZEKE headed 150° at 4000 feet. at this same time approximately 15 enemy fighters were observed dog fighting with our fighters.

7. No ammunition was expended, all bombs were returned to base.

Frank M. Parker, Jr.
FRANK M.PARKER JR.
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASST.INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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CONFIDE

499
330 J
23 NOV 43

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

28 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission FFO 330-J BORAM AIRDROME.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

* 1. On 27 November, 1943, nine (9) airplanes B-25-D-1's of the 499th Bomb Squadron (M), were ordered to bomb and strafe BORAM AIRDROME, along with Supply Dumps and A/A positions surrounding the strip. The last plane took off at approximately 0835/L hrs. The Squadron Formation led by Capt. COMANT consisted of the following planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.COMANT	Plane No.663	Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	Plane No.014
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTHRELL	" " 019	1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 164
1st.Lt.V.W.TATELMAN	" " 971	1st.Lt.P.GATH	" " 058

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.J.L.SNYDER - 042 1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER - 254 1st.Lt.BANE - 020

1st.Lt.R.BAKER in plane #015 was spare.

2. The squadron which was approximately on course within ten (10) minutes after the last plane took off, joined the Group Formation, led by the 500th Squadron, enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP, and continued with them to our rendesvous point, whichwas WARUP, approximately 12 miles due north of MARILLIMAN. At this point four (4) squadrons of P-38's were picked up without delay as it was planned. This fighter protection was to cover our Group and the 38th Group. They were in sight every minute from the time of rendesvous until we reached the target. They provided excellent cover.

3. Before reaching our rendesvous point, Capt.TAYLOR dropped from our squadron formation, because of airspeed indicator became inoperative and left oil pressure low. He turned back at approximately 0935/L, between Yule Island and Mt.YULE. At approximately 0940/L, Lt.TATELMAN turned back from the formation, because of left propeller governor becoming in-operative. He turned back soon after Capt.TAYLOR.

* The first line should read 10-B-25-D-1's.

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Lt.LUTTRELL turned back at 1000/L, because of accidental fire from machine gun on his plane, severed left rudder controls. He turned back about ten (10) minutes after this Group Formation was on course with fighter cover. Lt.McCLURE turned back at 1030/L, approximately thirty minutes after on course with fighter cover. "aft engine very rough, with power cutting down. At this point, Lt.GATH tagged on to Capt.CONANT'S left wing and Lt.BAKER, the spare plane, came up on Capt.CONANT'S right wing. All of these four (4) planes landed safely at their home base. This formation was held throughout the mission.

4. This Squadron was the fourth in the Group Formation to make the run on the target.

5. This Squadron started their target run on an approximate course of 355°, and at approximately 1138/L.

6. This Squadron went over the target in a wing to wing formation, all planes were abreast.

7. Positions mentioned thru out this report refer to reference chart: (C.I.U. T-31 WEWAK & BORAM , 30 August, 1943).

8. The assignment for Capt.CONANT'S Flight was to bomb and strafe A/A positions, stores and dumps on both sides of the "STRIP", and possible planes that might be in the dispersal areas on either sides of the strip or on the strip itself.
Capt.CONANT bombed and strafed small Supply Dump at 7511, A/A positions at 7305 and also dropped two (2) of his twelve clusters of parafrags on 2 barges, which were at the approximate position of 8650.
Lt.BAKER, right wingman, bombed and strafed A/A positions S.E. of the strip, approximately 8113. Also bombed and strafed one (1) SALLY type plane, six serviceable bombers, types unobserved. He then set afire two (2) barges that were on the N.W. tip of CAPE MOEM.
Lt.GATH, left wingman, bombed and strafed eight (8) "ZEROS" on the north side of the strip at position 7218.2 (Uncertain of serviceability). M/G positions on both sides of strip at positions 7114 and 7117 respectively, one "BETTY" bomber (serviceable) at approximately same dispersal as "ZEROS" and Small Supply Dump at position 7419.
Lt.SNYDER, Flight Leader, of Third Flight, went over the target on the left of Capt.CONANT. He thoroughly bombed and strafed A/A positions at 6215 N.W. end of BORAM STRIP. Due to malfunction of Bomb Bay doors handle, five clusters were dropped in "Salvo".
Lt.BAEZ, right wingman of this flight, bombed and strafed from North side of strip at 6819 to a jetty at 6924. He saw three barges at Jetty, and two of these were bursting in flames, after he had passed over them.
Lt.HYDER, left wingman of this flight, bombed and strafed A/A positions at 5827, putting it out of commission. He also bombed and strafed six (6) .105 mm A/A positions on the tip of CAPE BORAM, putting at least three out of order.

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9. Photos were taken over thetarget. Among them was a very good picture of the six (6) .105 mm A/A positions that Lt.HYDER encountered on his target run. Pictures taken with K-21 and K-20 cameras.

10. This squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0835/L and landed at same at 1400/L.

11. The bomb load per plane was twelve (12) clusters, (6 parafrag bombs in each cluster) parafrag bombs.
7850 K.50 - 1700 K.30 rounds of ammunition and 402 parafrag bombs were expended.

12. No decorations are merited as a result of this mission.

13. Armament report for each plane:

Plane No.	.50 Used	.30 Used	Malfunctions
015	1800	500	Short round (Upper left side gun)
020	1500	400	Broken barrel extension. (Upper left side gun)
042	1000	400	Broken mount (Upper left side gun)
054	750	X	Short rounds (Upper lower right side guns)
663	1300	X	Ruptured cartridge (Upper right side gun)
058	1500	X	Nil

Pat E. Goforth


PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


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Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
(1 copy) A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
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F.F.O. 330-J	Squadron 499th	Scale
Date 27 November, 1943.	Group 345th	1:10

A Flight			B Flight			Flight		
No.	A/P	Pilot	No.	A/P	Pilot	No.	A/P	Pilot
1	663	Capt. CC. CONANT		042	1st. Lt. SNYDER			
2	015	1st. Lt. BAKER		020	1st. Lt. BANZ			
3	058	1st. Lt. GATH		254	1st. Lt. HYDER			





C.I.U. T-31 WEWAK & BORAM, New Guinea. (Wewak A/D Lat. 03° 34'S., Long. 143° 37½'E., Boram A/D Lat. 03° 35'S

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Photo Report, Mission FFO 330-J.

TO : PHOTO INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, (M) AAF, APO 929.

1. Plane No.054

Photos: 51,56,59,62,65,67,68,69,72,73,74,75.

51,56,59: Parafrags dropping in area directly south of Cape Boram.
62,65,67,68,69: At least 7 parafrag bombs can be seen dropping on camp area along the neck of Cape Boram. A/A bursts are shown inpictures 67,68.
72: Large huts, underground shelter and a truck in a revetment along the neck of Cape Boram.
73: Seven .105 mm gun positions, pipelines running from each position to a small hut in the center of the picture. Two guns are not in operation. Japs can be seen in practically all positions. In one case one Jap is seen jumping out of the position.
74,75: Huts and palm trees on at tip of Cape Boram. A/Abursts.

2. Plane No.663

Photos: 76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83.

76: Nine parafrags dropping in area of medium A/A position, 7206 (Ref: C.I.U. T-31 Wewak & Boram, 30 August, 1943).
77: Five parafrags dropping across Boram Airdrome, one unserviceable fighter.
78: Parafrags dropping near one Betty bomber and a probably fighter (serviceability undetermined). Underground shelter on south side of airdrome.
79: Explosion in dispersal area and on airdrome. Two fighters (type unknown) in dispersal area North of Airdrome.
81: Two barges in bay right off Boram Airdrome. Set on fire by strafers. A fire can beseen coming from oildrums at the rear of one of the barges.
82: A large fire on Wewak Airdrome. In the background are the Muchisu and Kairiru Islands. 83: Fox Tare Dog vessel on the N.W. side of Cape Moem.

M.C. Williams
M.C.WILLIAMS
1st.Lt., Air Corps
P.I.OFFICER

499
335-G
2 DEC 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

3 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission FFO 335-G BORGEN BAY.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. On 2 December, 1943, nine (9) airplanes B-25-D-1's of the 499th Bomb Squadron (M), were ordered to bomb and strafe Supply Dumps and Barges on the East coast of BORGEN BAY. Also any possible Barges and Coastal Vessels which may appear in the immediate vicinity of BORGEN BAY. The last plane of this Squadron took off at approximately 0843/L. The Squadron Formation led by Lt.SNYDER consisted of the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	Plane No.042	Capt.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.600
1st.Lt.M.W.HYDER	" " 254	1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 019
1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	" " 097	1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN	" " 971

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.G.L.COOPER - 058 Capt.J.E.BAIRE - 591 1st.Lt.W.C.KUROWSKI - 663

2. The Squadron was approximately on course within fifteen (15) minutes after last plane took off from SCHWIMMER AIRDROME. They were flying a "V" of "V" formation on the right wing of the leading Squadron of our Group, which was the 501st Squadron. The Group proceeded to the THIRTY MILE STRIP when they met the 38th Bomb Group, which was the leading group thru out the mission. We then proceeded to CAPE WARD HUNT where we met two Squadrons of P-38's which were our fighter cover.

3. The entire formation then took a course for the target. At a point twenty-five miles South of New Britain, the 345th Group pulled away as planned and crossed the South coast at a point just West of CAPE BUSHING. Soon after Squadrons of the 345th Group went into a formation of Squadrons in trail, spacing themselves far enough behind to allow preceeding Squadron to clear the target. This Squadron followed the 501st. Squadron which was leading. At this time, Mt.LALAWE was approximately 16 miles to the West of our formation and Mt.SCHRADER was a short distance to the east.

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4. After passing very near to Mt.SCHRADER, this Squadron turned NNW striking the North coast near MAREKA VILLAGE. Here the 3 flights of 3 planes each went into a trail formation.

Lt.SNYDER led his flight in a one-eighty degree turn to get into position for the bombing and strafing run. Lt.SNYDER'S flight dropped all bombs within the target with the exception of one which the No.3 plane saved to drop on a M/G observed to be firing from MATAMO POINT. Results of bombing were unobserved because of dense foliage. The run was made on a course of approximately one-eighty degrees, turning right, after the bomb run and following the coast crossing MATAMO POINT and SILIMATI POINT. The target and coastline was strafed through out, including 1 M/G at on a small point of land east of MATAMO POINT. 1 M/G at MATAMO POINT and 2 M/G on SILIMATI POINT. 10 or 12 unserviceable barges were observed on shore just South of SILIMATI POINT.

Capt.CONANT led his flight in much the same path as traversed by the first flight. All bombs were dropped on the target with unobserved results. The target was also thoroughly strafed. Capt.CONANT made a short right turn after the bombing run in order to regain the first flight. Capt.CONANT received no ground fire from the M/G positions which were bombed and strafed by the first flight.

Lt.COOPER led his flight in a one-eighty degree turn following the second flight but spaced far enough behind to allow the second flight to clear the target. Just before reaching the target two small explosions were observed under the flight. These explosions were smaller than one-hundred pound bomb bursts. Cause and source of these explosions is unknown. Plane #663 was unable to drop two bombs because of rack failure. Only seven bombs were loaded at base because one station failed to function. For these reasons plane #663 only dropped five bombs in the target. The other two planes of this flight dropped all bombs in the target with unobserved results. The target was thoroughly strafed as well as the coast to MATAMO POINT. Lt.COOPER reported no ground fire whatsoever.

5. The Squadron reformed out to sea north of BORGEN BAY where the Group was to rally with the 38th Group. However the 38th Group was on a collision course with our formation at this time. Consequently the Squadron could not join the formation as planned. As an alternative, Lt.SNYDER joined another Squadron of the 345th and proceeded on course to base. The route back was over BORGEN BAY to CAPE BUSHING to CAPE WARD HUNT to Base.

6. When the formation crossed BORGEN BAY enroute to Base, no fires smoke, or activity was observed.

7. Ground fire was received from LOGAN VILLAGE on the return trip. The Squadron made one strafing run on the village with no damage observed.

8. The formation returned to base intact with the last plane landing at 1330/L.

9. Weather was generally favorable throughout the mission. The Ranges were exceptionally clear on the route out. However, scattered to broken clouds with scattered showers were encountered over thesea. On the return trip these clouds had developed somewhat and had moved SW. Cumulus tops were at 1300' but presented no hazard to flying. Weather over target was practically CAVU.

10. No decoration or awards are merited as a result of this mission.

11. Armament report -- Individual plane.


Plane No.	.50 Cal.	.30 Cal.	Malfunctions
600	1600	200	Lower Right Side Gun - Loose Projectile.
663	1200	200	Upper Left Side-Extractor Spitch.
591	1800	X	Broken Depresser U/Left Side gun.
254	1400	X	Nil.
042	1800	500	L/Left Nose Gun - Loose headspace.
097	1000	X	L/Right Side Gun - Cables.
058	1400	200	Nil.
019	1600	300	Nil.
971	2300	X	Nil.

69 X 300 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs were dropped.

12. There was no damage to airplanes or casualties among personnel.

Pat E. Goforth
PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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ORGEN BAY
0 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
SCALE IN FEET
V BOMBER COMMAND
1ST. DET. 2ND AAF PHOTO INTELL. SET.
N
Mission No. 335-G
Squadron 499th (M)
Order Over Target 2nd.
Altitude 100'
Time Over Target 1125/L
Bombs Dropped 69 X 300 lb.
Crews Report on Bomb Falling
Fires
Explosions
Took Photos
691 058 663
971 600 010
NATAMO PT.
079
042
254

499
377
4 DEC 43

CONF

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

5 December,1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission FFO 337-K REIN BAY.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925,ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The morning of 4 December,1943, this Squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on targets between REIN BAY and ROTTOCK BAY, N.B. The strike was to include six planes from each squadron in the 345th Group, all four squadrons of the 38th Group, and one squadron of P-47's as escort. Rendezvous with the fighters was to take place over the "Gona Wreck".

2. The first plane of this squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0830/L. The last plane was off at 0833/L. Capt.G.W.TAYLOR, Operations Officer, elected to lead the formation which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	Plane No.021	Capt.C.C.[illegible]	Plane No.019
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	" " 042	1st.Lt.R.D.REINHOLT	" " 600
1st.Lt.W.C.KUROWSKI	" " 663	1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN	" " 971

3. Capt.TAYLOR assembled the squadron in one turn over the field and circled to Rendezvous with the Group. Unable to spot the Group, he proceeded to THIRTY MILE STRIP where the two Groups were to rendezvous. Here again he was unable to locate any of the strike force, so he climbed through a thin overcast.After circling THIRTY MILE STRIP once, he spotted the 498th Squadron through a break in the clouds. He peeled off and joined in the number two position.

4. The 38th Group was not contacted so the 345th Group proceeded to DUKDUBA, reaching the "Gona Wreck" at 0943/L. After circling here without sighting either fighter escort or the 38th Group, the 345th Group proceeded on course to the target at 0950/L.

5. Scattered rain showers were encountered enroute to the target but presented no difficulty to flying. Some forty miles prior to reaching the coast of New Britain squadrons began to drop back, assuming intervals of attack. Just prior to reaching the coast the second flight went into trail formation, thirty seconds behind the number one flight.

CONF

6. Both flights crossed the coast east of CROCODILE POINT (which is east of ARAWE) and proceeded to the headwaters of the ARIA RIVER near UPHANDUNG VILLAGE at an altitude of 6-700 feet. Keeping the ARIA RIVER on the left, the squadron proceeded to a point 6 miles inland from the mouth of the ARIA RIVER.

7. Here the leading flight turned left on a course of approximately 300 degrees for the sweep on the targets.

At 1110/L, Capt.TAYLOR strafed IBOKI PLANTATION and continuing his run, strafed the mouth of the BANU RIVER where a bridge was reported to have been. However the bridge was not there so no bombs were dropped. The co-pilot spoted a flimsy footbridge across the mouth of the BANU RIVER directly on the coast. Catp.TAYLOR dropped 4 bombs on 6 serviceable barges, in the mouth of the second river east of CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI, but dense foliage and delay of bombs prevented observation of results. He strafed various places along the coast which he suspected were occupied. Several barges were seen between CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI and CAPE RAOULT. (Barges were wrecked) Nothing else of importance was sighted until TAMUNIAI ISLAND was spotted. Capt.TAYLOR dropped four bombs here scoring 3 hits on the village.

Lt.SNYDER was Capt.TAYLOR'S right wingman and followed the same general course which Capt.TAYLOR traversed. He strafed IBOKI PLANTATION, dropped one bomb on MAKATI and one on KAINAUA VILLAGES as well as strafing. He dropped 2 bombs on KETEN'E VILLAGE and strafed. On a tip of land between two rivers just east of CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI, he spotted a clearing in which were several caliber fifty M/G. He continued his run dropped 3 bombs on medium A/A positions at CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI, turned back down the coast and circled to the east of the M/G positions and made a south to north run dropping one bomb and strafing. At this time medium A/A and M/G fired slightly and inaccurately from unobserved positions along the east coast of CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. At the same time several white streaks passed under the plane and to the left side. He immediately turned sharply right to avoid further danger. It was well that he did for several other white streaks crossed his previous flight path. Looking back the crew observed twenty to thirty objects hanging in the air which were unlike anything seen to date. Objects were small and definitely not A/A bursts. The general opinion of the crew seemed to be that these were some sort of parachute device. The co-pilot saw following flight (not this squadron) score a hit among a group of barges in the river near CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. Lt.SNYDER continued on up the coast strafing and rejoined his flight near HOOK REEF.

Lt.KUROWSKI was the left wingman and made his run in this position. Because of malfunctions he was unable to release any bombs or fire six of his eight guns. Faulty ammunition was the cause of the gun malfunctions. He strafed one barge on HOOK REEF and observed bombs to burst on TAMUNIAI ISLAND.

Capt.CONANT dropped one bomb on IBOKI PLANTATION and strafed. Because of malfunctions seven bombs has to be salvoed safe. He strafed one serviceable barge among several unserviceable barges and drums located in the river near CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI.

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The co-pilot observed roads and tracks between KETENGE and CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. to be in good condition and showing signs of use. Capt.CONANT strafed various other places along the coast including part of ROTTOCK BAY.

Lt.REINBOLD was Capt.CONANT'S right wingman. It was his task to take nose camera shots of IBOKI PLANTATION, the reported bridge and to take movie tail shots of the bridge. He strafed IBOKI PLANTATION and dropped two bombs. The repertedbridge across the BANU RIVER was not there consequently no bombs were dropped nor was the movie camera started. Lt.REINBOLD planned to take pictures of the bridge on the return trip. He dropped two bombs on MAKATI VILLAGE, 2 bombs on KETENGE VILLAGE and one bomb on the barge which Capt. CONANT strafed near CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. He continued strafing up the coast to TAMUNIAI ISLAND where he dropped one bomb which was a direct hit on the village. He strafed part of the coastline on ROTTOCK BAY and then followed Capt. CONANT out to sea.

Lt.TATELMAN was the left wingman of this flight. He dropped one bomb on IBOKI PLANTATION and strafed. He dropped two bombs near TAVELIAI VILLAGE one bomb on barges which Lt.REINBOLD bombed near CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. He dropped one bomb near BILIKU ISLAND and one bomb on unserviceable barges on the we st coast of KETENGE ANCHORAGE. He dropped two bombs on a small creek which ran into a small bay just west of KETENGI ANCHORAGE. He suspected barges under over hanging trees. Lt.TATELMAN strafed throughout the sweep.

8. The leading flight returned down the coast to REIN BAY after leaving thetarget. Again the bridge over the BANU RIVER could not be found. The number two flight followed the first flight to REIN BAY. Lt.REINBOLD turned away from the formation in an attempt to locate the reported bridge and take pictures. He flew up the river for a short distance but saw only the foot bridge.

9. The proposed "Rally" with the Group off REIN BAY was not effected. Retrun was reciprocal of route out exuept that the formation crossed the coast to the west of ARAWE. Here a frame building with a metal roof was strafed launch was observed.

10. The formation took a course for BOBODURA but was forced to trun north because of weather. The squadron returned to base without incident and crossed SCHWIMMER DROME at 1329/L. The first plane landed at 1330/L the last at 1333/L.

11. There were no casualties to personnel nor damage to planes.

12. No decorations or citations are merited as a result of this mission.

Pat E Gofourth
PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

5 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Armament Report - Each Plane.


TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

Plane No.	.50 Cal.	.30 Cal.	Malfunctions
600	3200	1400	Nil
019	3500	500	Nil
971	2000	300	Lower Right Side Gun. Belt feed lever bent.
663	800	300	Bad Ammunition. 6 Guns failed to fire.
042	2000	1500	Nil
021	2000	300	Lower left gun- plate came off.

33 X 300 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs were dropped.

Pat E Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


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



499th Bomb Sq., 345th Bomb Gp.

FFO 337-K - 4 December, 1943.

Formation: 2 Three Plane "V"
30 second interval between
each flight.


Strafed 1 Barge
HOOK REEF
TAYLOR
CONANT
REINBOLD
KUROWSKI
TAYLOR
SNYDER
TAMUNAI ISLAND
1 Direct Hit
4 Bombs
Cape Raourt
Karakal
Armed H.Q.
Armed Pln
PIRAU RIVER
MT. ANDEWA


Strafed 1 Barge
HOOK REEF
Cape Raoult
Karatai
Arimeti Pt.
PIRAU RIVER
MT. ANDEWA



PARACHUTE DEVICES FIRED FROM HERE
.50 CAL M/G POS
6 BARGES
1 Serviceable Barge Among 4 U/S
Olapum
Boat - Soldiers
20-30
BANU

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Ref Map: Provisional Series 1/63,360.

Mission No.	337-K
Squadron	499
Order over target	2
Altitude	50' - 100'
Time over target	1110/L - 1125/L
Bombs dropped	33 x 300lb 8/11 Sec.
Crews report of bombs falling	
Photos taken	T



499
339 L
6 DEC 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

7 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report - FFO 339-L

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2, A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. On 6 December, 1943, six (6) airplanes B-25-D-1's of the 499th Bomb Squadron (M), were ordered to bomb and strafe the coast at Borgen Bay and any enemy installations found there. The secondary target was the Kumbun Jetty and barge area in the Arawe Island group. Special instructions were that bombs were not to be brought back. The formation led by Captain J. B. Baird consisted of the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. J. B. Baird	Plane No. 991	1st Lt. J. F. Snyder	Plane No. 042
1st.Lt. R. Baker	" " 055	1st.Lt. E. W. Ryder	" " 254
1st.Lt. K. D. McClure	" " 164	1st.Lt. C. L. Banz	" " 097

2. The Squadron took off from 0814 to 0817 and proceeded by way of Thirty Mile Strip to Gona Wreck where rendezvous was to be made with fighter cover. No fighters were seen and the 38th Group with which the 345th Group had joined left Gona Wreck at 1105, 38th Group leading the flight. At 1115, 4 P-47's were seen flying at high altitude in opposite direction and no effort was made by them to join the formation. No radio calls were heard. Shortly after sighting the coast of New Britain the 38th Group turned toward Vitiaz Strait whereas this Squadron proceeded on to target. The other three Squadrons from the 345th Group did not follow the 499th Squadron, but were seen to fly toward secondary target. At no time during the strike did this Squadron fly on instruments.

3. The approach to the target was somewhat handicapped on account of weather. The Squadron climbed up to 4000' and circled northeast of Mt. Schrader. The weather was closed in over the ranges, but it was found that it was clear over target with 1000' ceiling. The approach was made by coming down over Bottock Bay, circling at sea and striking Cape Gauffre from the northeast. (See flight and observation plat.) The target was attacked at minimum altitude (100' to 400'). The Squadron flew in flights of three with about one mile distance between the two flights. Only one bombing and strafing run was made on target.

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In sweeping the coast from Gauffre to the southwest various villages were attacked. The second flight flew over the Silimati Pt. and over a small island to the north of it, strafing both localities. Upon returning the first flight bombed and strafed a plantation slightly inland from the Borgen Bay coast. (See bomb assessment plat, Fig.#2.) The Squadron on their return flight crossed the south coast of New Britain between Cape Bushing and Cape Beach and Lt. Bane in plane #097 strafed a settlement near the coast. On this strike 24 x 300 lb. 6-12 hour delay bombs and 12 x 300 5/11 second delay bombs were dropped and 11,900 rounds of .50 calibre and 600 rounds of .30 calibre were fired.

4. The distance from base to target was 350 miles and the various planes landed as per following table:

Name of Pilot	No. of A/P	Time T.O.	Time Landed	Target Reached
Capt. Baird	591	0816	1319	Yes
Lt. Baker	058	0817	1320	Yes
Lt. McClure	164	0816	1320	Yes
Lt. Snyder	042	0817	1321	Yes
Lt. Hyder	254	0819	1322	Yes
Lt. Bane	097	0818	1321	Yes

5. All photo information is listed below in addition attention is called to Fig. #2 (the bomb assessment plat):

No. A/P	Time Photo Taken	Locality	Type of Photo	Made	Prints Rec'd
058	1130	Borgen Bay	Oblique	15(173-205)	3
164	1130	" "	"	15(206-235)	2
054	1130	" "	"	15(262-281)	3
097	1130	" "	"	15(282-317)	2

6. Bombing and strafing information has been incorporated in tables for ready reference as follows:

BOMBING TABLE

No. A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	No. Salvoed
042	4 plus 2	(4)6-12 hr.	300 lb.	6	Nil
254	"	delay	"	"	"
097	"	(2)5/11 sec.	"	"	"
591	"	delay	"	"	"
058	"		"	"	"
164	"		"	"	"
Total	36		10800 lb.	36	0

STRAFING TABLE

No. A/P	.50 Caliber Rds. Car.	Rds. Ex.	Gun Failures	.30 Caliber Rds. Car.	Rds. Ex.	Gun Fail.
591	4800	2100	Nil	2000	Nil	Nil
058	"	2000	"	"	200	"
164	"	1000	4 NG	"	200	"
042	"	2000	1 LRH	"	Nil	"
254	"	2000	Nil	"	400	"
097	"	2600	"	"	Nil	"
Total	28800	11900	5 Guns	12000	800	0

NOTE: NG (nose gun), LRH (lower right gun)

7. No enemy opposition was encountered. Enemy airplanes were not seen and ground opposition was nil.

8. Capt. Baird, flying A/P No. 591, lead the Squadron and the 345th Bomb Group. Capt. Baird dropped his bombs when passing over Alaido Village, his first bomb falling on the left bank of the creek. No activity was seen by Capt. Baird and having strafed the coast up to Borgen Bay he turned to the left and circled for his return course down the Itni River on the south side of the island.

9. Lt. McClure, flying A/P No. 164, was in No. 2 position of the leading flight. He bombed and strafed simultaneously as Capt. Baird, his first bomb dropping at the mouth of the river in Alaido Village. All six bombs were dropped and the target strafed. On the return flight Lt. McClure observed a thatched hut with radio masts near Turittii Village (7366). (All coordinates refer to 1" to 4 mi Provisional Map Western New Britain.) In addition two (2) wrecked barges were observed in the reef off Cape Gauffre.

10. Lt. Baker, flying A/P No. 058, was in No. 3 position in the leading flight. He strafed the bridge at El River (0955) during the strafing and a .50 caliber bullet hit the windshield causing slight casualties to the pilot and co-pilot on account of shattered plexiglass. Lt. Baker dropped his bombs as soon as Capt. Baird dropped his trail of bombs, his last bomb hitting the east coast of Borgen Bay.

11. Capt. Snyder, leader of second flight, flew A/P No. 042. Capt. Snyder and his flight circled northeast of Mt. Schrader before dropping to Cape Gauffre where he made a circle as did the first flight prior to attack of target. Capt. Snyder started dropping his bombs at the Alaido Village and strafed from this point to the west coast of Borgen Bay. Whereas the first flight circled in Borgen Bay, Capt. Snyder proceeded and strafed Silimati Pt. and in making his circle passed a small island north of Silimati Pt. This island was also strafed. All of Capt. Snyder's bombs hit in the target. Six (6) rusty and wrecked barges were sighted half way between Silimati Pt. and Matamo Village lined up along the coast.

12. Lt. Bass flying A/P No. 897 in No. 2 position of second flight bombed target with unobserved results stringing his bombs in trail from coast to coast of the Alaide Peninsula. He also strafed Silimati Pt. On the return flight the south shore of New Britain Island was strafed.

13. Lt. Ryder, flying A/P No. 25[illegible] in No. 3 position of second flight, dropped four bombs straddling the river at Alaide. The last two were 5/11 sec. delay bombs. One of these bombs exploded on impact. Since Lt. Ryder was flying at approximately 200 feet altitude his plane was severely shaken from the bomb explosion. Three holes of approximately one inch in diameter each were found - one in right nacelle, one through the right aileron, and one through the right blister of navigator's compartment. The last two bombs 6 to 12 hour delay were dropped on the east shore of Dampier Bay. Lt. Ryder observed four (4) dark army tents at Cape Fedder (9055).

14. The mission was completed as ordered, but no sign of enemy activity was observed.

15. It is the opinion of the Officer submitting this report that no citations or awards to individuals were justified for this mission.


For the Squadron Commander:


PAT R. GONDEK
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

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F.F.O. FFO 339-I	SQUADRON 499th	SCALE
DATE 6 Dec., 1943	GROUP 345th	1:20' 1:1000'

FLIGHT			FLIGHT			FLIGHT		
NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT
	591	Capt. Baird		042	Lt. Snyder			
	164	Lt. McClure		254	Lt. Hyder			
	058	Lt. Baker		097	Lt. Banz			




LEGEND
HEAVY A/A
LIGHT A/A
CAPE GLOUCESTER
BRIDGE
DUMP
DISPERSAL
ZANE
GARDEN
STRIP NO 2
DUMP AREA
BRIDGE
6 GUN
4 GUN
3 GUN
GUN
CONTROL
PHOTOGRAPHS
COMPILATION
GILUE37 CAPE GLOUCESTER




BORGEN BAY
0 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
FEET
V BOMBER COMMAND
1st.Det.2nd.AAF Photo Intell.Det.
STRAFE
SILIMATI POINT
N
CONFIDENTIAL
NATAMO PT

Fig 2


BAY
4000 5000 6000
Intell.Det.
CONFIDENTIAL
NATAMO PT
HOUSE BOMBED AND STRAFED

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

8 December,1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - FFO 340-K, KOKOPO AREA-BORGEN BAY.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The morning of 7 December,1943 this Squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on targets at KOKOPO AREA and BORGEN BAY, N.B. This strike included 6 planes from each squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group, along with the 38th Bomb Group and 2 squadrons of P-38's as escort.

2. The first plane of this Squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0812/L, the last plane of the formation was off at 0818/L. Capt.G.W.TAYLOR was leader of the formation for this squadron, which included the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	Plane No.021	Capt.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.663
1st.Lt.W.C.KUROWSKI	" " 020	1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	" " 600
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	" " 663	1st.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 591

The Squadron was assembled in formation after one turn over the field at approximately 0826/L and proceeded on way to THIRTY MILE. The Group Formation was formed while enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP and rendesvous with 38th Group was reached as planned there. From there the 2 Groups proceeded to "GONA WRECK" and picked up 2 Squadrons of P-38's, then headed on course for target at approximately 7000'.

3. Reaching ROTTOCK BAY this Squadron made a wide circle over the sea, to get into position behind the 498th Squadron, then lined formation for sweep over target, going just west of CAPE GAUFFRE and making sweep from BAMBAK VILLAGE to MATAMO POINT at BORGEN BAY.

4. Capt.TAYLOR'S flight bombed and strafed villages between MAREKA and SARHE, a point in BORGEN BAY, (Ref: 1 mile to 1 in.Borgen Bay Prov. Preliminary Edidion) (117145).
Lt.KUROWSKI, Capt.TAYLOR'S right wingman bombed and strafed the coast

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and dropped one bomb on barge in BORGER BAY, with unobserved results. A foot bridge was observed across small creek on point approximately 1 mile West of MOREKA VILLAGE. IThis sighting was not reported in mission report.

5. Capt.CONANT'S flight bombed and strafed villages along the coast from a point approximately 1½ mile S.W. of MAREKA VILLAGE to NATAMO POINT/ Results were unobserved.
Lt.REINBOLD, Capt.CONANT'S right wingman dropped his last 2 bombs in plantation just South of SAPHE VILLAGE after circling out to sea and on way back inland.
Heavy smoke was observed on eastern coast of CAPE GLOUCESTER while squadron circled out to sea after bombing and strafing run.
All bombswere dropped on target, none were salvoed. No A/A or M/G fire was reported.

There were no casualties to personnel nor damage to planes.

6. Both flights truned up to SILIMATI POINT circled out to sea and then joined the Group Formation to return, immediately after hitting the coast. The Group Formation was later broken to individual Squadrons over the ranges, due to weather. Fires were observed at NORTH FORTIFICATION POINT on way back. The planes landed at SCHWIMMER DROME at 1230/L.


7. No decoration or citation is merited as result of this mission.


8. Ammament Report.— Each Plane.

Plane No.	.50 Cal.	.30 Cal.	Malfunctions.
663	1600	200	Nil.
600	1600	0	L.L. Side gun, Sprung belt on feed lever.
591	2200	0	Upper M.G.Sprung Cover.
042	1000	0	Nil.
020	3200	100	Nil.
021	2000	0	Nil.

12 X 300 lb. 8/11 second delay — 24 X 300 lb. 6/12 hr.Delay were dropped.
11600 X .50 Cal. 300 X .30 Cal. were expended.

Frank M. Parker, Jr.
FRANK M.PARKER JR.
1st. Lt., Air Corps
ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



N
Reed Flats
Assembly 600
Current 645
551
BAMBAK
MARIENO
WARIEN
1 MILE
1 MILE IN MILE



C.I.U. T-37 CAPE GLOUCESTER. New Britain. Lat. 05° 27' S. Long. 148° 25' E. Elev 10 ft. 4 Oct. 1943

F.O. 340-K	SQUADRON 499th	SCALE
DATE 7 Dec., 1943	GROUP 345th	1-20' 1-1000'

FLIGHT			FLIGHT			FLIGHT		
NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT
	021	Capt. Taylor		600	Capt. Connant			
	042	Lt. Snyder		663	Lt. Reinbold			
	020	Lt. Kurowski		591	Lt. Luttrell			



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499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

10 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report - Mission FFO 342-K, REIN BAY.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. On the morning of 9 December, 1943, this Squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on targets on the coast of New Britain, from REIN BAY to CAPE RAOULT. This strike included 6 planes from each squadron of the 345th Bomb Group along with the 38th Group and 2 squadrons of P-47's for "fighter cover".

2. The first plane of this Squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0847/L with the rest of the squadron following at the specified 30 second interval. 1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER was Squadron Flight Leader, which included the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	Plane No.042	Capt.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.185
Capt.J.B.BAIRD	" " 591	1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 164
1st.Lt.H.W.SNYDER	" " 014	1st.Lt.C.L.CESSNA	" " 020

3. The Squadron formation was accomplished enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP, where the Group formation was accomplished and the rendezvous with the 38th Group was completed. The two Groups then set out on course to "GONA WRECK" where the fighter cover was picked up at 0958/L. After each Fighter Squadron had gotten into its respective position, the entire force set out for the target at 1019/L, with the 38th Group leading.

4. On reaching the southern coast of NEW BRITAIN, the 38th Group took up the course to their target which was at BORGEN BAY. The 345th Group continued on to REIN BAY. On reaching REIN BAY, the different squadrons spaced themselves for their respective runs on the target. This squadron was the third squadron to make a pass at the target. The individual squadrons were broken up into two (2) elements.

5. Lt.SNYDERS' flight was first over the target, thoroughly strafing the entire area and bombing the areas reported to have stores and personnel. Lt.SNYDER observed huts on small reefs just off mouth of PIRAU RIVER near CAPE RAOULT and some on the coast at the same place. The huts on the land were thought to be occupied. This pilot also strafed ARIMEGI ISLAND.

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Capt.BAIRD (right wingman) strafed and bombed the designated areas. The crew on this plane observed a foot bridge over the PIRAU RIVER. One bomb was dropped on ARIMEGI ISLAND.
Lt.HYDER (left wingman) saw a camouflaged barge one mile southeast of SAUREN VILLAGE when the formation first reached the south coast of N.B. This crew reported that the coastal track along the target area appeared to be well used. The bridge over the PIRAU RIVER was also reported by this crew.

6. Capt.CONANT led the second element of the squadron on the target. This flight also thoroughly strafed and bombed the assigned targets. Lt.McCLURE (right wingman) saw a barge in a cove East of CAPE RAOULT, and the bridge over the PIRAU RIVER, near KARAI-AI VILLAGE.
Lt.CESSNA (leftwingman) reported seeing the above mentioned bbridge.

7. On leaving thetarget the two elements rejoined to form the Squadron Formation out to sea, with Capt.CONANT taking the lead position. The formation then flew down the coast to REIN BAY where it set out on course direct for PORT MORESBE. On reaching the south coast of N.B.the Squadron joined the GROUPFORMATION. The first plane landed at SCHWIMMER DROME at 1335/L.

8. There was no results of the bombing observed due to the long delay fuses used on this mission. A/A bursts were observed from only one gun position on CAPE BOGUSLAUSKI. Although the gun position was not seen, it had been previously reported in this area. This Squadron dropped propaganda leaflets on the target. The target area appeared extremely wet and soggy. On the return trip, this Squadron flew over the ARAWE ISLAND group and approximately 15 European type houses on KUMBUN ISLAND were spotted.

9. There were no casualties to personnel nor damage to planes.

10. No decoration or citation is merited as result of this mission.

11. Armament Report.

Plane No.	.50 Cal.	.30 Cal.	Malfunctions.
014	1400	0	Lose projectile. Upper R.gun.
591	2600	500	L.Right Side gun. Broken Sear.
042	2000	200	R.Nose gun. Split cartridge.
164	2500	1200	1 gun jammed.
020	1600	0	Nil.
185	1600	0	L.L.side gun, Ruptured cartridge.


11700 X.50 Cal. 2900 X .30 Cal. 18 X 300 lb. 6/12 hrdelay
24 X 300 lb. 8/11 sec. delay.


Pat E. Goforth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

.F.O. 342-K ATE 9 Dec., 1943.	SQUADRON 499th GROUP 345th	SCALE 1:20' 1:1000(

FLIGHT			FLIGHT			FLIGHT		
NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT	NO	A/P	PILOT
	042 591 014	Lt.Snyder Capt.Baird Lt.Hyder		185 020 164	Capt.Conant Lt.McClure Lt.Cessna			





Ref: 4 miles to 1 in. Prov.
Western New Britain

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Formation: 2 Three Pland "V"
30 sec. interval between each Flight.

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499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

14 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report - FFO 346-F, Ring Ring Plantation.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The morning of 13 December, 1943, six B-25-D-1's of this squadron were ordered to participate in a strike on RING RING PLANTATION in the GASMATA AREA. The 345th and 38th Bomb Group (M) executed the strike in conjunction.

2. Capt.C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the squadron formation of six planes in two flights of three each. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.CONANT	Plane No.185	Capt.O.N.LOVERIN	Plane No.016
Capt.J.B.BAIRD	" " 097	1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 164
1st.Lt.R.L.REINHOLD	" 600	1st.Lt.W.C.KROWSKI	" " 020

3. The first plane took off at 1045/L and the last at 1048/L. The Group completed the rendesvous at Thirty Mile Strip with the 498th Squadron leading, the 499th Squadron in the number two position. The Group contacted the 38th Group Formation and proceeded to the "Gona Wreck" with the 38th Group leading. The formation left the "Gona Wreck" at approximately 1200/L and proceeded to the target. Weather was good until reaching at point just south of the target. Here scattered cumulus clouds were encountered at 2500 feet and rain squalls were seen some little distance from the flight path.

4. The entire force sighted land east of the target while several miles out to sea. The force then turned back west and made landfall west of GASMATA. The 38th Group detached itself and proceeded over the target. The 345th Group was forced farther west in order to obtain proper spacing behind the 38th Group. To cut short east of GASMATA would have resulted in the two Groups arriving at the target at the same time. To execute a three-sixty degree circle would have resulted in arriving at the target late as well as causing a good deal of confusion. Consequently the approach to the target was necessarily over GASMATA AIRFIELD. It is thought that on the first approach to the target the 38th Group leader observed heavy bombers over the target and turned back west to allow the heavy bombers to clear the target.

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5. This Squadron followed the 498th Squadron in on the target, spaced far enough behind to clear the 8/11 second delay bombs. The run began at GASMATA AIRDROME at 1323/L with the squadron in two shallow "V" abreast. A total of nine bombs were dropped on and near GASMATA AIRDROME. Targets were two probably M/S, single engine airplanes and one dummy airplane, an A/A position midway between TIBAL CREEK and TOLOCK RIVER, just N.W. of AVAHAIN ISLAND. The squadron then turned slightly left to make the planned run over KIWOK ISLAND and RING RING PLANTATION. One bomb was dropped in a point at the mouth of the ANWEK RIVER. One bomb was dropped on a narrow bridge across the mouth of the TOLOCK RIVER. One bomb was dropped on KIWOK ISLAND near a reported M/G position and O.P This target was not observed however. Twenty Four bombs were dropped in RING RING PLANTATION. Five of these near the forty-three foot bridge across an inlet near SIWOT ISLAND. Several bombs hit in reported supply areas where two fires resulted. One bomb was dropped on WALANGUO ISLAND, one on LOE ISLAND and four at probable supply dumps in LINDENHAFEN PLANTATION. A barge and two luggers were seen near SIWOT ISLAND. Planes (Other than this Squadron) were observed strafing these craft.

6. Withdrawal from the target was executed by turning right over LINDENHAFEN at 1328/L. The Squadron returned to SCHWIMMER AIRDROME without event and landed at 1530/L.

7. No fighter escort was observed by this squadron either enroute to or over the target.

8. Results were generally unobserved because of delayed action bombs and nature of the target which had few definite targets. For the most part the objective was to cover the Plantation with bombs with special attention to reported supply areas and bridges.

9. Plane number 185 sustained damage from small arms fire from RING RING PLANTATION. Damage was moderate but resulting in the plane's being out of commission the following day.

10. Light and heavy A/A fire was observed bursting far ahead of our formation probably originating from GASMATA AIRDROME. One position near the TOLOCK RIVER, which was bombed by this squadron, was observed to fire at the formation and one M/G was actually seen. The pilot observed what he thought was a twenty mm. gun but could not say positively.

11. There were no casualties to personnel and no awards of decorations are merited as a result of this mission.

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ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE TABLE

Plane No.	Bombs Dropped	Bombs Return To Base	Reason	Bombs Salvoed	Reason	.30 Fired	.50 Fired	MALFUNCTIONS
600	7x300# G/11sec	none	———	———	———	800	2700	Bad ammo left up & low nose " " rt. side guns
016	do	———	———	———	———	500	2100	ULMG solenoid stuck. URMG charging cables stuck. LRMG ammo jam. URMG ammo jam.
097	do	———	———	———	———	500	2400	LLMG charging cable pulley. URMG " " " " frozen.
164	do	———	———	———	———	300	1900	URMG Charging cable off pulley LLMG " " " " ULMG Loose projectile.
000	do	———	———	———	———	200	1200	None
135	do	———	———	———	———	1000	2400	Fuse burned out no guns fired.
TOTALS	42x300# G/11sec	———	———	———	———	3300	12700	


PHOTOGRAPHIC TABLE

Plane No.	Type of Gun Camera	Reason	No. of Pictures Taken	Malfunctions
000	K-21	Nose	0	Nil
097	K-21	"	"	Nil
016	K-21	"	"	Nil
600	K-21	Nose	0	Nil
164	K-21	Nose & rt.	21	Nil
135	K-21	Nose & rt.	200	Nil

Patrick Goforth
[illegible]
[illegible]







C.I.U. T-46 GASMATA AERODROME (New Britain) Lat. 06°17'S. Long. 150°21'E. Elev. 10 Feet.

14 Oct. 1943.



C.I.U. T-46 GASMATA AERODROME. (New Britain) Lat. 06° 17'S. Long. 150° 21' E. Elev. 10ft. 14. Oct. 1943

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CONFIDENTIAL

499TH BOMB SQ. (M) AAF
345TH BOMB GP. (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

15 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report - FFO 347-I AMALUT PLANTATION.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. On the morning of 14 December, 1943, nine B-25-J-1's of this squadron were ordered to participate in a strike on AMALUT PLANTATION in the ARAWE ISLANDS area. The 345th Bomb Group and the 38th Bomb Group executed the strike in coordination.

2. Capt. O.N.LOVERIN was selected to lead the Squadron. This Squadron was the lead Squadron of the 345th Group and also the leading element of the entire striking force. This Squadron was composed of three 3 plane elements composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt. O.N.LOVERIN	Plane No.	058	1st Lt. J.A.SNYDER	Plane No.	042
1st Lt. K.P.McCLURE	" "	164	1st Lt. C.CASSONA	" "	097
1st Lt. J.D.[illegible]	" "	663	1st Lt. N.A.HYDE	" "	254

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt. C.C.[illegible] - 014 Capt. TAYLOR - 021 1st Lt. P.N.KELLY - 591

3. The first plane of the Squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0731/L, with the rest of the planes following at the specified 30 second interval. The Squadron Formation was formed enroute to THIRTY MILE strip in a javelin down. On arriving at THIRTY MILE the squadron went into a V of V formation. The Group Formation was accomplished over the THIRTY MILE with the Group forming a box formation, twenty minutes after take off. Leaving THIRTY MILE, the 345th Group was joined by the 38th Bomb Group. The route over the range was made by the Southern Pass.

4. The ranges were covered by two overcasts, one at 9,000 ft. and the other at 12,000 ft. with the higher one converging with the lower on the Northern side of the range. Having to fly through this cloud layer, which was fairly thin, caused the Group to be separated. This Squadron continued on to CAPE WARD HUNT, where after circling for approximately twenty minutes, the rest of the formation joined up.

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A course was then taken for the target. On sighting the southern coast of NEW BRITAIN, the 38th Group made a turn to the left to get in position for their run on the target. The 345th Group also made a shallow turn to the left to get on the prescribed heading for their run and get the necessary spacing between the four Squadrons. The Squadron went in 3 three plane elements.

5. At the start of the target run from 4 to 6 splashes were noticed in front of the Squadron in the water 2500 yards S.W. of ARAWE ISLAND. These splashes were thought to be shells from known coastal defense guns in ARAWE GROUP. On the first run, ARAWE ISLAND was thoroughly strafed and AMALUT PLANTATION was thoroughly strafed and bombed. Leaving the target, the Squadron made a large 360 degree turn allowing time for the rest of the 345th Group to make their pass at the target and also the 38th Group who's target run was 90 degrees to that of ours. Then Capt. LOVRIEN led the Group on another pass at the target. This second run was strictly a strafing pass.

6. Withdrawal from the target was made by a left turn and setting out a course for PORT MORESBY the entire Group had reformed in five minutes after leaving the target.

7. Direct results of bombing was generally unobserved due to the delayed action bombs dropped and the type target. However, bomb smoke was observed to cover the large portion of the target. Several bombs were seen to burst on the northern tip of PILELO ISLAND. Bomb smoke seen on KUMBUM ISLAND. Small fires were observed on AUSAK ISLAND. Fighters were seen strafing the target at the start of the second run.

8. The Group returned to PORT MORESBY without event. The different Squadrons leaving the Group Formation when the approaching their respective Bromes. This Squadron landed at SCHWIMMER DROME at 1150/L.

9. Fighter Cover was in evidence on reaching the target area.

10. Two active H/G were observed, one on the Southern coast of ARAWE ISLAND and the other in a building in AMALUT PLANTATION.

11. There were no casualties to personnal and no awards or decoration are merited as result of this mission.

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APPENDIX [illegible] TO REPORT [illegible]

Plane No.	Bombs Dropped	Bombs Return to Base	Reason	Bombs Salvoed	.30 Fired	.50 Fired	MALFUNCTIONS
058	7X300 8/11 sec.	Nil	X	X	300	2600	LLSS & ULNG Cable off pully.
164	Same	Nil	X	X	450	2000	Nil
663	Same	Nil	X	X	500	2100	Cover Latch weak on URSG
042	Same	Nil	X	X	1500	2500	URNG & ULSG Short rounds.
097	Same	Nil	X	X	400	2300	LLT Ammo.
254	1 X 300 8/11 sec.	Nil	X	0	100	1600	Nil
014	7X300 8/11 sec.	Nil	X	X	265	2650	[illegible] Ammo. jammedn
021	Same	Nil	X	X	2000	1000	Nil
591	Same	Nil	X	X	150	2100	3 nose guns Ammo jam.
TOTALS	57 X 300lb. 8/11 sec. Delay.				5150	18750	

PHOTOGRAPHIC TABLES

Plane No.	Type of Camera-position		No. of Exposures Made.
058	K-21	Tail	30
:	K-21	Tail	30
663	K-20	Tail -	25
042	K-21	Tail	30
097	K-21	Tail	30
254	K-21	Tail	30
014	K-21	Tail	30
019	K-20	Tail	25
021	K-21	Tail	24

[signature]
[illegible] TH
Capt., Air [illegible] S
[illegible]

Distribution:
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(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 31st [illegible] (H), APO 927.

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499
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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

19 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 351-I performed 18 Dec., 43. Objective at BORGEN BAY, N.B.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925., ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345 Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The assigned objective was an area approximately two miles long and one mile wide (bounded on the west by a large creek near NATAMO POINT and on the east by a second large creek) in the southern part of BORGEN BAY, N.B. Targets in this objective consisted of reported gun and defense positions as well as supply and personnel, targets of opportunity.

Each plane carried eight, three hundred pound, 8/11 second delay bombs and maximum load of ammunition for each of the eight forward firing guns. The entire coastline of BORGEN BAY was to be strafed from minimum altitude.

The pursuit escort joined the Group Formation enroute to the target shortly after leaving CAPE WARD HUNT, New Guinea.

The approach to the target was from the mouth of the ITKI RIVER on the South coast of NEW BRITAIN, circling to the east of MT. SCHRADER in General N.B. and out to sea near CAPE GAUTIER where a turn to the left brought the squadron in a position to attack on a heading of approximately one-hundred, eighty five degrees.

This Squadron was number four in the sequence of attack, crossing the target at 0948/L in two 3 plane "V"s with a spacing of thirty seconds between flights.

The entire coastline of BORGEN BAY was thoroughly strafed and the target was bombed with excellent results inasmuch as the majority of bombs were dropped in the target. However the delayed action bombs and the extremely dense foliage prevented observation of actual damage.

2. The 500th Bomb Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation and 1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER was selected to lead this Squadron. The Squadron Formation was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.J.W.SNYDER	A/P No.042	Capt.G.A.TAYLOR	A/P No.021
1st.Lt.C.L.[illegible]	" " 097	1st.Lt.P.[illegible]	" " 020
2nd.Lt.T.P.[illegible]	" " [illegible]00	1st.Lt.C.L.[illegible]	" " 971

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. Lt.SNYDER taxied out at 0714/L and took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0718/L with succeeding planes at thirty-second intervals. The Squadron formation was accomplished enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP where the Group Formation was accomplished at 0733/L. The Group, "In a box" Formation, departed from THIRTY MILE STRIP at 0745/L with the 500th Squadron leading, 501st Squadron in the number three position, 498th Squadron in the number three position and this squadron in number four.

The Group proceeded to CAPE WARD HUNT, going through the "NORTHERN PASS" at an altitude of ten-thousand feet. At 0823/L, the Group crossed CAPE WARD HUNT where two large circles were made. The Group left on course for the target at 0850/L.

The Group proceeded to NEW BRITAIN Island without incident and crossed the coast near the mouth of the ITNE RIVER. Shortly afterward the pursuit escort consisting of one squadron of P-40's was sighted above the formation. The pursuit escort was well executed throughout.

Squadrons began to drop back in order to attain the proper spacing and this Squadron (being number four in the sequence of attack) made a swing to the east of Mt.SCHRADER to insure the proper spacing. After passing around Mt.SCHRADER the Squadron turned northwest and crossed the North coast near CAPE GAUFFRE. Here a left turn was made, during which the number two flight spaced itself thirty seconds behind the first flight. This maneuver placed the Squadron just off the east coast ofBORGEN BAY on a course of one hundred eighty-five degrees.

At 0942/L, just after crossing the coast on the east side of BORGEN BAY, the first flight began strafing. Lt.SNYDER lead his flight in a right turn, following the coast line and strafing throughout. When he rolled out of the turn he was over the bombing target and began dropping his bombs, six of which fell on the target with unobserved results, and two bombs fell just outside of the target. The reported M/G position near NATAMO POINT was firing inaccurately at the flight and after dropping the last bomb, Lt.SNYDER strafed the position heavily.

Lt.BANZ was in the number two position and flew relatively close to the number one plane throughout. His attack followed the same pattern as the flight leader, strafing and dropping all bombs on the target. He also strafed the M/G position.

Lt.CESSNA was flying the number three position and made up the third plane of the shallow "V" which was employed over the target. He strafed intermittently during the run dropped all bombs on the target.

The second dlight began its attack at 0943/L following closely the first flight's course.

Capt.TAYLOR strafed throughout the run and dropped allbombs in the center of the target with unobserved results.

Lt.GATH was in the number two position and made his run just inland from the coastline and staying close to the flight leader's right wing. He strafed throughout the run, dropped six bombs on the target and two just over.

Lt.KELLEY was in the number three position and made his run in formation with this flight. Details of his attack are unknown for reasons set forth below:

C O N F I D E N T I A L

After dropping bombs both flights turned right, still following the coastline and strafing. Withdrawal was made in a northerly direction and then turning right over the sea north east of CAPE GLOUCESTER. During this right turn the squadron reformed and recrossed BORGEN BAY on a course of approximately one-hundred, eighty degrees. From here the squadron took a course between Mt.TALAWE and MT.SCHRADER and crossed the south coast near CAPE BACH. Shortly afterward Lt.KELLEY left the formation and proceeded toward LAE. He was apparently in no difficultty except that hydraulic fluid was streaming along the fuselage. (It was later learned that fragments from one of his own bombs, which detonated on impact, punctured a hydraulic line in the right engine). He landed safely at LAE. Damage to this plane was the extent of damage sustained by airplanes.

There were no personnel casualties. The Squadron returned to the home baseSCHWIMMER DROME, the first plane landing at 1130/L.

4/ Information currently available reveals no grounds for awards or citations.

5. BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	Remarks
042	8	8/11 sec.	300 lb.	6	2 Outside target.
097	"	" "	" "	8	
600	"	" "	" "		Details unknown at present.
021	"	" "	" "	8	
020	"	" "	" "	6	2 Outside target.
971	"	" "	" "	8	
TOTAL	36 X 300 lb. 8/11 second delay dropped on target.				

STRAFING TABLE

No.A/P.	.50Cal. 5300 X.50 Per Plane Rds.Ex.	Gun Fail.	.30 Cal. 2000 X.30 Per Plane Rds. Ex.	Gun Fail
042	1200	RGN Ejector Broke. LRS Ammo.	300	Nil.
097	1800	URG Link Broke. LLS Losse Projectile	0	"
600	No report -------			
021	1500	Nil.	300	Nil.
020	800	LLS Amma Jammed.	0	"
971	2400	ULS Cable off pulley.	200	Nil.
TOTAL:	7700 X.50 Cal.		800 X.30 Cal.	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PHOTOGRAPHS


A/P No.	Type Camera	No. of Pictures Taken	Position	Locality
042	K-21	30	Tail	Borgen Bay.
097	" "	"	"	" "
600	No Report			
021	K-21	30	Tail	Borgen Bay.
020	K-21	"	"	" "
971	K-20	36	Pilot Comp.	" "
TOTAL:	120 K-21 36K-20.			

6. One small boat 1/2 mile from mouth of ITNI RIVER. Many craters in target area. Two barges on coast near MAREKA VILLAGE AT08493 (Ref: 4 miles to 1 inch Prov. Series W.New Britain). Two barges newly camouflaged on east side of NITAMO POINT. Coastal road around BORGEN BAY appeared well used. Ruts showed presence of wheeled vehicles. Heavy bombers observed bombing CAPE GLOUCESTER. Many bombs are seen bursting, and much smoke resulting. Approximately 15 serviceable barges seen at mouth of river at 7887 (Ref: W.New Britain Prov. Series 4 miles to 1 inch.) seen by two crew members. Bridge on the GURISAU RIVER at 9685 (Western N.B. Prov). Two red roofed European type houses at KOPOPO VILLAGE. Defense position was not seen by any crew member of the intital run or enroute out.

Pat E. Goforth


PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group., APO 929.



Mission No. 351 - I
Squadron No. 499th Group 345th
Squadron Order Over Target 4th
Altitude 100 - 150 FT.
Time Over Target 0942/L - 0948/L
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency
●(Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
●(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photographs
T(Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T(Black) Other Planes (All Planes to be shown at Beginning of Run.)

MAP REF:-
Western New Britain
Provisional - Prelim. Sheet
1 inch = 4 miles
1:10,000 Metric, Modified British Grid System


SILIMATI PT.
1-E
GROUP 343-
RDER OVER TARGET at-0830
100 - 100 FT.
TARGET 0742 - 3745
PATION BOMBING EFFICIENCY
O REPORT OF BOMB HITS
8 HITS SHOWN ON PHOTOGRAPHS
NES TAKING PHOTOS
THER PLANES (ALL PLANES TO BE
BEGINNING OF RUN)
MAP REF:
LIMATI PT. SPECIAL MAP
SCALE 1/20000
89
88
87
73
74
79
Goth-020
Taylor-021
BANZ-097
Snyder-042
Cessa-971

CONFIDENTIAL

499
352 I
20 DEC 43

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

20 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 352-I. Performed 19 Dec., 43. Objective at CAPE GLOUCESTER, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The morning of 19 December, 1943, this squadron was ordered to participate in a strike on CAPE GLOUCESTER, N.B. with intent to destroy dump and personnel areas between POTNI VILLAGE (NW tip of N.B. Island) and CAPE GLOUCESTER AIRDROME. Each plane was to carry eight, three hundred pound, 8/11 second delay bombs.

The approach to the target was through the VITIAZ STRAITS to DORF POINT. This squadron was number one in the sequence of attack crossing the target in two shallow, three plane "V"s abreast, flights echeloned to the right. The squadron commenced strafing at 0933/L and broke away at 0935/L. The results of bombing were generally unobserved but according to pilots reports, bombing was excellent.

The other squadrons of the Group followed our formation in trail employing a similar formation. After leaving the target, one squadron was observed to make an excellent run over the target, with bombs effectively covering area.

2. Capt. G.W. TAYLOR was selected to lead our squadron formation which was leading the Group. The squadron formation of two three plane flights was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. G.W. TAYLOR	A/P NO. 021	1st Lt. J.W. SNYDER	A/P NO. 042
1st Lt. K.D. McCLURE	" " 164	1st Lt. N.W. HYDER	" " 254
1st Lt. P.T. LUTTRELL	" " 019	1st Lt. P. GATH	" " 014

3. From SCHWIMMER DROME at 0727/L, Capt. TAYDOR began his take off and three minutes later the last plane was airborne. The squadron formed enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP where the Group Rendezvous was accomplished at 0748/L.

The Group Formation then proceeded to CAPE WARD HUNT, "In a box" formation arriving there at 0823/L. Since the Group rendezvous was so quickly accomplished, it was necessary to circle in order to lose time.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Group departed from CAPE WARD HUNT at 0832/L and proceeded on course for the target.

Some thirty miles from DORY POINT, this squadron increased speed and other squadrons began to take up interval in trail.

Capt.TAYLOR lead the first flight onto the target with a heading of approximately seventy degrees. He began strafing when he crossed the coast line and dropped three bombs near POTNI VILLAGE, two in the supply and personnel area between SAUMOI VILLAGE and the barge hideout, and three in the personnel and supply area near the Barge Hideout. He continued his run over the CAPE GLOUCESTER Number one strip on out to sea. Catp.TAYLOR strafed during the entire run and strafed the wrecked DD off CAPE GLOUCESTER and old camouflage was seen on the bow.

Lt.LUTTRELL was in the number three position and consequently his run was near the coastline throughout. He dropped one bomb in the supply and personnel area near POTNI VILLAGE, and one near ULAMAINOI VILLAGE, one near WAREMO VILLAGE, two in the supply and personnel area between the Barge Hideout and SAUMOI VILLAGE and three in the target near the barge hideout. He strafed during the entire run.

Lt.McCLURE was in the number three position. He dropped 3 bombs in the POTNI VILLAGE area, two midway between SAUMOI VILLAGE and the barge hideout and three in the BARGE HIDEOUT area near a native garden.

Lt.SNYDER lead the second flight abreast and to the right of the number one flight, maintaining this position throughout the run. He dropped three bombs on the supply and personnel area just south of WAREMO VILLAGE near a native garden and mission site, and five farther on near native gardens.

Lt.GATH was in the number two position. He dropped one bomb near the Mission site one on CAPE GLOUCESTER, two on the dispersal area of number two strip and salvoed four bombs in the water just off the coast. He strafed the targets thoroughly.

Lt.HYDER was in the number three position. He dropped three bombs near the mission site, four approximately a mile farther on near native gard ens where a supply and personnel area was located. He dropped one bomb on the runway of CAPE GLOUCESTER Strip number two. This bomb was dropped at wrecked planes.

The two flights continued the flight path at lowest possible altitude until over the water and out of effective A/A range. Here a left turn was made in Squadron Formation. The formation leader throttled back to allow the other squadrons to make their runs and rejoin.

The Group quickly reformed and returned direct to PORT MORESBY without incident. The first plane of this squadron landed at 1110/L.

Fighter escort was not seen at any time.

4. In view of information available at present, no awards or citations are merited as a result of this mission.

5. BOMBING TABLE

A/P no.	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	Remarks
021	8	8/11	300	8	
164	"	"	"	"	
019	"	"	"	8	
042	8	8/11	300	8	
254	"	"	"	8	
014	"	"	"	4	4 bombs salvoed.

TOTAL 44 X 300 8/11 second delay bombs dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

No.A/P	50 Cal. Rds.Car'd	rds.Ex.	Gun Fail.	30 Cal. Rds.Car'd.	Rds.Ex.	Gun Fail.
021	5300	1700	No gun	2000	200	Nil.
164	" "	1000	failures	"	700	"
019	" "	1500	reported, numerous	"	500	"
042	" "	1800	stopages due	"	900	"
254	" "	500	to ammo.	"	500	"
014	4600	1600		"	1000	"
TOTAL	31000	7800		12000	4100	

PHOTOGRAPHS

No.A/P.	Locality	Type Camera	No Photos Taken
021	Cape Gloucester	K-21	30
164	" " "	"	"
019	" " "	"	18
042	" " "	"	30
254	" " "	"	"
014	" " "	"	30
			168 K-21.

6. During the bomb run a concrete building (Possibly a bomb shelter) was seen at 593947 (Dorf Point Special Map. Preliminary Sheet, 1/20000) near the mission site. Three wrecked "Nells" were seen on the CAPE GLOUCESTER STRIP number one. One apparently serviceable "Mike", mist colored, was seen on the NE side of Number one strip. A road leading West from CAPE GLOUCESTER STRIP number one appeared in good condition and well used.

On leaving the target bursting bombs and bomb smoke were observed to cover the target area. One small fire with smoke up to one hundred feet was observed in the target area - exact position unknown because of distance and low altitude.


Approximately thirty minutes after leaving the target a large oil slick and much debris was observed on the water but since the plane did not have a navigator, the exact position is unknown.


Pat E. Gofoth

PAT E. GOFOTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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

148°30'
Cape Gloucester
Runways
Ulamaingi
Bala Dola
Potmi
5°30'
29
Kalingi Sub District
MT. TALAWE
Borgen Bay
Cape Gauffre
Kokopo
Bambak
Gorissi
Alaido
Sarhe
Gurisau River
Lagoon Pt.
Tauali
Aimola
Naveilpuel
Gi
Sag Sag
Aipati
AIMA R.
Aimaga
Nalvovo
Sekul
Nakarp
Altavalo
Niapaua
Aitaplok
Agulupella
Rovata
Vitnari
Arasalpua
Mt. Schrader
Arani
Kakuma
Aikururio
Gurimati
Sahe Sub District
Mt. Tangi
Goropio
Relman
Grass Pt.
Mt. Namur
Walawalapua
5°45'
Aumo
Namatuty
Turitei
ITNI
Potsaken R.
Gilmit
RUNGLO R.
RIVER
26
Aisega
Annen Pt.
Cape Bach
Cape Bushing
Rungio
Cape Pedder
Grid and True North
Mag. North
Murcadha Ba
82
Cape Peih
Mission No. 351-I
Squadron No. 444 Group 345
Squadron Order Over Target 1st.
Altitude 100-150 FT.
Time Over Target 0933 - 0935 L
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency E
O(Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
⊕(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photographs
T(Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T(Black) Other Planes (All Planes to be shown at Beginning of Run.)
148°30'
MAP REF:-
Western New Britain
Provisional - Prelim. Sheet
1 inch = 4 miles
10,000 Meter Modified British Grid System


SILIMATI PT.
BORGEN BAY
NATAMO PT.
NATAMO
(OLD SITE)
89
88
87
74
73

Mission No. 352-1
Squadron No. 499 Group 345
Squadron Order Over Target 1st.
Altitude 100-150 FT.
Time Over Target 0433-0435 ZZ
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency ER
O (Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
⊕ (Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photographs
T (Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T (Black) Other Planes (All Planes to be shown at Beginning of Run)

MAP REF:-
Dorf Pt. (-Special Map Preliminary Sheet)
Gloucester Airdromes
(Special Map - Prelim. Sheet)
1,000 Meter Modified British Grid System -
Scale: 1 / 20,000

Grid and True North
Mag. North



499
353 D
20 DEC 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

21 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 353-D. Performed 20 Dec., 1943. Objective- SILIMATI POINT, BORGEN BAY, N.B.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The assigned objective was the coastal area between NATAMO POINT and Target Hill on the west side of BORGEN BAY. The area between NATAMO POINT and SILIMATI POINT was to be strafed and the area between SILIMATI POINT and Target Hill was to be bombed and strafed. The bomb load for each plane was eight, three-hundred pound 4/5 second delay bombs.

2. The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation. Capt.C.C.CONANT was selected to lead our squadron which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.CONANT	A/P No.663	1st.Lt.N.T.HYDE	A/P No.254
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 019	Capt.J.W.SNYDER	" " 042
1st.Lt.C.L.GIBSON	" " 020	1st.Lt.P.SMITH	" " 591

3. Capt.CONANT took off from [illegible] immediately behind the 501st Squadron at 1003/L. The last plane took off at 1006/L. The Squadron formed enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP where the Group Rendezvous was accomplished at approximately 1020/L. The Group, in box formation, with each Squadron of six planes javelin down, proceeded to CAPE WARD HUNT. Weather enroute over the ranges presented no difficulty to flying and was excellent over CAPE WARD HUNT.

The Group left CAPE WARD HUNT on course for the target at 1202/L. The squadron crossed the South coast of NEW BRITAIN ISLAND at the mouth of the ITNE RIVER and continued up the valley between MT. [illegible] AND MT. SCHRADER.

On reaching the north coast a heavy rain storm was seen over the target. The Squadron formation continued out to sea because of the squall and then turned 180° over the water in BORGEN BAY to make a run over the target.

The first flight started strafing near NATAMO POINT at 1205/L and turned right on a course of approximately 355° for the bombing run. Capt.CONANT lead the flight in a shallow "V" with all three planes in formation throughout the bomb run. Each plane dropped all bombs on the target and thoroughly strafed the area.

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Lt.HYDER lead the second flight behind the first flight in a similar maneuver, strafing throughout. Catp.SNYDER and Lt.HYDER dropped all bombs in the target but Lt.OATH was forced to return all eight bombs to base.

The two flights continued out to sea, turned left, still in train, and made a second run on the target to strafe. The second run was made on a course of approximately 150°. Consequently, only the TARGET HILL area was strafed.

The heavy rainstorm caused considerable difficulty on the bombing run because of poor visibility. The storm also prevented the squadron from making the strafing run which was/to cover the entire target.

Withdrawal was a reciprocal course to the route in — again crossing the mouth of the IPPA RIVER.

Return to base was without incident. The last plane landed at 1357/L.

4. Present information gives no basis for awards or citations.

5. STRAFING TABLE

	.50 Cal.			.30 Cal.		
No.A/P.	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Ex.	Gun Fail	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Ex.	Gun Fail.
663	5300	2800	LLH Brkn. Cable.	2000	200	Nil.
019	"	2900	Nil	2000	400	Nil.
020	"	1400	URN Not charged	2000	1000	Nil.
254	5300	2400	Nil	2000	200	Nil
042	"	2100	Nil	"	"	Nil
591	"	"	Nil	"	1600,	Nil
TOTAL	11300 X.50		3400 X.30Cal.			

BOMBING TABLE

No.A/P	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target	Remarks.
663	8	4/5	300	8	
019	"	"	"	"	
020	"	"	"	"	
254	8	4/5	300	8	
042	"	"	"	"	
591	"	"	300	0	RETURNED TO BASE
TOTAL	40 300 lb. 4/5 sec.delay dropped on target.				

PHOTOGRAPHS


No.A/B.	Locality	Type Camera	Pictures Taken
863	Borgen Bay	K-20	19
019	" "	K-21	30
020	" "	K-21	30
254	Borgen Bay	K-21	30
042	" "	"	"
591	" "	K-20	11
TOTAL	30 K-20	120 K-21	

6. Six planes were seen on Strip No.2 Cape Gloucester - serviceability unknown because of distance. 2 columns of black smoke up to 200 ft. were seen just west of Silimati Point. Smoke had dissipated on second run. On second run many craters seen in target area.
Several P-47's seen heading toward Lae before reaching the target. One serviceable barge (appeared new) was seen in the barge hideout at 737887 (Silimati Point 1/20000 Special Map Preliminary Sheet).
M/T road off coast between Cape Gloucester and Borgen Bay appeared well used. M/G flashes from 737894 (Silimati Point 1/20000 Spec. Map. Prelim. Sheet) Small pier possibly for barges at 737895 (Same Map as others).

Pat E Dofforth


PAT E. DOFFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


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Mission No. 353-D
Squadron No. 499 Group 345
Squadron Order Over Target 3
Altitude Minimum FT.
Time Over Target 1205/6 1217/6
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency Ex.
O (Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
⊕ (Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photographs
T (Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T (Black) Other Planes (All Planes to be shown at Beginning of Run.)

MAP REF:-
Western New Britain
Provisional - Prelim. Sheet
1 inch = 4 miles
10,000 feet Modified British Grid System


SILIMATI PT.
FIRES
CAMOUFLAGED BARGE
CAMOUFLAGED BARGE
88
87
73
74
NAITAMO (OLD SITE)


SILIMATI PT.
BORGEN BAY
NATAMO PT.
NATAMO (OLD SITE)
88
87
74
73

499
354-F
20 DEC 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

22 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 354-F/ Performed 20 Dec.,43. Objective at TARGET HILL, BORGEN BAY, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The assigned target was TARGET HILL in the BORGEN B Y sector of NEW BRITAIN. The objective was two coastal Defense Gun positions on the crest of the hill on the Northern side.

Each plane carried four 500 Demolition Bombs with 1/5 second delay fuses, and maximum number of rounds for the forward guns. Theassigned target was bombed, and on the second pass, thoroughly strafed from minimum altitude.

The pursuit escort, consisting of two squadrons of P-47 s joined the Group Formation at the specified rendezvous point, CAPE WARD HUNT, N.G.

Approach to the target was made over BORGEN BAY out to sea, where a large circle was made, allowing each Squadron to get its proper spacing for the target run which was made on a southerly heading.

This Squadron was number two in the Group Formation crossing the target on the first pass at 0945/L in two 3 plane elements of "V"'s with a spacing of twenty seconds between flights.

TARGET HILL, was thoroughly strafed on the second run, and the bombs, which were dropped on the first run, covered the target thoroughly. The crown of the hill was seen to be entirely pock-marked on the second pass, showing the bombing to be excellent.

2. The 498th Bomb Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation and Capt.J.W.SNYDER was selected to lead this Squadron. The Squadron formation was composed of the following planes and pilots:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
CAPT.J.W.SNYDER	A/P No.	~~042~~ 014	1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	A/P No.	019
1st.Lt. O.J.DANIEL	" "	021	Capt.C.C.CONANT	" "	663
1st.Lt.P.SMITH	" "	015	1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" "	164

3. Capt.SNYDER taxied out at 0725/L and took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0730/L, with the rest of the Squadron taking off in the customary thirty second intervals.

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The Squadron formation was accomplished enroute to THIRTY MILE STRIP where the Group Formation was formed at 0750/L. The Group Formation, in a box, departed from THIRTY MILE at 0755/L with the 498th leading, this Squadron in the number two position, the 500th in number three and the 501st in number four.

The Group proceeded to CAPE WARD HUNT, going through the NORTHERN PASS at the altitude of 10,500 feet, passing over the top of the ranges at 0803/L. The Group Formation made several circles over this point while waiting for the fighter cover of two Squadrons of P-47's to join the formation. The fighters joined at 0835/L and the formation set out on course for the target at 0845/L at 3000 foot altitude.

The Group proceeded to NEW BRITAIN, and when about half way, met a force of planes consisting of A-20's, B-25's and 13 B-24's which were returning from a strike on New Britain, with the fighter cover which was excellent throughout the mission. The formation reached the coast of N.B. at the ITNE RIVER. On reaching the north Coast of N/B. at BORGEN BAY they flew out to sea, where the Squadrons spaced themselves for the target run, on a heading of approximately 170° at 0945/L.

Capt.SNYDER, leader of the first flight, reached the target and dropped his four bombs from about half way up the hill to the crest. Passing over the target he made a left turn out to sea so as to get in position for the strafing run.

Lt.DANIEL, right wing man, flying abreast of Capt.Snyder dropped his bombs on the right side of the hill. After the bombs were dropped, he followed the lead ship for the second run.

Lt.GATH, left wing man, dropped his bombs starting at the base of TARGET HILL and dropping the last on the top of the hill.

Lt.LUTTRELL leading the second element followed Capt.SNYDER, twenty seconds later, and led his flight on to the target. His course was directly over the center of the hill. All bombs dropped at the designated point. This flight followed the first flight out to sea for the second run, strafing, which was made on the same heading as the bombing run.

Capt.CONANT, right wing man, flew over the Western edge of the hill training his bombs so as to cover the vital position of the target.

Lt.McCLURE, left wing man, flew over the eastern side of the hill, but due to a rack malfunction, failed to release any bombs. However, his portion of the target was well strafed on the first pass.

The second target run was made in the same style, two elements of "V"'s with TARGET HILL being thoroughly strafed. After the strafing run was made, the Squadron again made a turn to the left, back out to sea where the Group was reformed and returned to it's Base. The return trip was made without incident. The first plane landed at SCHWIMMER DROME at 1134/L, with rest of the Squadron following at close interval.

5. BOMBING TABLE

A/C No.	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	Dropped on Target	Remarks.
014	4	A/S	500	5	
021	"	"	"	"	
015	"	"	"	"	
019	"	"	"	"	
663	"	"	"	"	
164	"	"	"	0	Brought back Rack Malnf.

Total 20 X 500 lb. Bombs. dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

No. A/C	.50 Cal. Rds. Carried	Rds. Ex.	Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds. Carried	Rds. Ex.	Gun Fail.
014	5300	1855	3 R.G. Chutes	2000	0	Nil.
021	"	1855	LLS Short Rd.	"	200	"
015	"	1590	Nil	"	0	"
019	"	1590	Nil	"	1000	"
663	"	1855	LRN Rup.Ctr.	"	0	Nil
164	"	1325	Nil	"	200	"

PHOTOGRAPHS

No. A/C	Type Camera	No. Pictures Taken	Locality
014	K-21	30	Target Hill
021	"	19	" "
015	K-20	39	" "
019	K-20	0	
663	"	26	" "
164	K-21	19	" "
Total:	79 K-21	85 K-20	

6. Small bugger being strafed by other squadron at 740887 (Ref: Dilimati Point Special Map. Preliminary Sheet 1/200). Boats (life boat type) at 730914. Heavy A/A and emplacement on S. side of TARGET HILL. Several puffs of grey smoke 50 fe above TARGET HILL in front of lead Squadron. Had general appearance of A/A burst. Bridge over stream 737893. 1 barge, probably serviceable at 743892. Two black boxes, approximately 4 ft. Square. Floating in ocean 15 miles South of Mouth of Itni River. Several new buildings 2 well worn tracks at Dilnit Village at 7872 (Ref: 4 miles to 1 in. Prov. Western N.B.)

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.
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499
355-G
22 Dec 43

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

27 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 355-G performed 22 Dec., 1943. Objective BORAM DROME, New Guinea.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929. Intelligence Officer 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. General.

A. The target assigned BORAM DROME with the main objectives being A/A positions and planes on the ground which were bombed with 150 clusters of 8 X 23 lb. parafrags and the target was thoroughly strafed.

The first plane of this squadron took off from SOUTHMAR DROME at 0645/L and rendezvous with the Group was made at THIRTY MILE STRIP. The Group then flew to DUBAP where the fighter cover, consisting of four squadrons of P-38's were picked up. The striking force then set out on course to the target.

B. Attack.

The 499th Squadron was 2 in the Group formation and made it's run over the target at the same time and parallel with the 500 th the lead Squadron. Bombing was excellnt. Area strafed was area around DEWAK MISSION and from 920k CIU T-31 West end of Boram Strip. A 6 gun A/A position was bombed and strafed id silenced. Known light A/A position 343051 Ref: (Wewak Special Map 1/25000 Preliminary Edition) was attacked and silenced. 1 M/B at ashead North side of Boram Strip set afire. 3 M/B on North side center of Strip strafed and bombed. A/A position at 7512 (C.I.A. T-31 Wewak Boram Airdrome) bombed. S/E fighter at at 371045 (Wewak Special Map 1/1000 Preliminary Edition) strafed and bombed. Bombs dropped in supply dump and general area of Boram Strip. 1 M/B was destroyed or badly damaged and 3 others believed damaged.

The 345th Bomb Group was only hit on this strike. The other squadrons carried out their attack according the flight plan and it is believed their action was very effective.

Although there were enemy figers in the area and other Squadrons were attacked fairly hard, only on "Zeke" made attacks on one of our planes making two passes, one pass at 3 o'clock and another from 7 o'clock. The turret gunner gunner staged this Zeke and hits were observed. The Zeke turned away and disappeared behind a ridge, losing altitude and smoking. This plane was claim as a probable.

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Another enemy fighter, thought to be a "Zeke" came in at 90° to this Sqd. turned to make a headon attack on the Squadron thin one, it was hit as the turn was made and was seen to do a violent wing over at about 400 ft. and disappear behind a low ridge in an almost vertical dive. This was observed by two crews. The Zeke could not possibly have recovered. Claimed as destroyed.
2U/I enemy fighters crashed in flames in water north of Boram Strip shot down by P-38's. 2 U/I enemy fighters were seen to crash near Wewak Mission.
1 U/I enemy fighter down in flames in water North of Boram Strip.

II. Personnel and Planes participating.

The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt. C.C.CONANT was assigned to lead the Squadron Formation. Flights were as follows:

First Flight

Capt.C.C.CONNANT	Plane No.663	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	" " 016	
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 019	

Second Flight

Capt.J.W.SNYDER	Plane No.014	
1st.Lt.O.J.DANIELS	" " 021	
1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	" " 097	

Third Flight

1st.Lt.P.GATH - 015 1st.Lt.K.D.McCURE - 164 2nd.Lt.T.R.KELLEY - 591

III. Details of Mission.

A. Execution of Mission.

The lead plane of this Squadron took off from SCHWIMMER DROME at 0645/L with the other planes of this Squadron following at the specified 30 second interval. The Group rendezvous was accomplished at THIRTY MILE STRIP at0800/L. The formation then continued on to GUSAP where the fighter cover consisting of four Squadrons of P-38's joined the formation. The striking force went on to the target. The target was made parallel to the course and at the same time with the 500th Squadron. The target run was made from 0947/L to 0956/L. Six planes of this Squadron landed at SCHWIMMER DROME, the first landing at 1210/L. All three planes of the second flight landed at GUSAP at [illegible]5/L. Capt.Snyder and Lt.Banz landed due to low supply of gas. Lt.Daniels crash landed Plane #021 which had been hit badly by A/A. All crew members were safe.

Capt.CONANT lead the Squadron in and he began his run just south of Wewak Mission where he bombed and strafed buildings and supply dumps. Continuing on to the Boram Strip he strafed and bombed known A/A positions and personnel area and dumps in the south side of the strip. He strafed and dropped remainder of his bombs on the SE dispersal area and A/A positions and dumps at the East end of Boram Strip.

Capt.TAYLOR (right wing) followed the same line of flight as Capt. CONANT bombing and strafing the same target. However, when reaching the

A/A position on the south center of Boram Strip, Capt/TAYLOR flew right into a heavy A/A position of several guns that was shooting and by strafing and dropping bombs into this position silenced one gun.

1st.Lt.[illegible] (left wing) started his run over [illegible] which he thoroughly strafed, but due to a rack malfunction could not drop any bombs, then he was forced out of formation when the number one and three flight drew too close together., he made his run, strafing throughout, over the dispersal areas and A/A position , and supply dumps on the northern side of Boram . All bombs returned to base.

Capt. [illegible] leader of the second flight was on the right of the 1st. flight. His line of flight was over buildings and dumps south of [illegible] which he strafed. Next he hit known A/A position south of [illegible], starting just before the A/A position, he dropped his bombs on the A/A area to east end of [illegible].

Lt. [illegible] (right wing) dropped 2 clusters on area south of [illegible]. His plane received a hit by A/A which knocked out electrical system in bomb bay which kept him fro releasing any more bombs. However, he strafed through out the remainder of the run, concentrating on A/A positions. 2x Clusters were salvoed ; water 15 miles east of Boram.

Lt. [illegible] (left wing) dropped 12 clusters in vicinity of [illegible] and personnel and dump areas. The rest of the bombs were evenly spaced along south side of [illegible] in wal areas.

Lt. [illegible] leader of the third flight and flying on Capt. [illegible]'s left wing, [illegible] his first pass of [illegible] where he strafed and bombed A/A positions and dispersal areas. His flight path took him on the west end of [illegible], where he bombed and strafed A/A positions, dispersal areas and supply dumps.

Lt. [illegible] (right wingman) made his initial pass on [illegible] where he and [illegible] dropped 2 clusters of bombs. Due to the congestion [illegible] was forced out of his position in the formation flying outside [illegible] on the left, [illegible] his position in the flight.

Lt. [illegible] (2nd flight) bombed & strafed vicinity just north of [illegible]. A/A positions, dumpareas and dispersal areas west of Boram strip were bombed and strafe

[illegible] damage to A/A gunners.

[illegible] flight joined the group formation after leaving [illegible] area to be the second flight leader. [illegible] crash landed because of damage received from A/A. (More details of damage mentioned on next page.)

IV. Observations:

Recommendation for award of the Air Medal will be made for one member of the squadron for shoot down one enemy fighter.

Plane #663: Hole in radio compartment. Several holes in right wing tip, thought to be 20 m.m. shell. Hole in Navigator's compartment. Hole in right nacelle.
Plane #016: Hole in leading edge right wing breaking through on top of the wing.
Plane #011: Grazed in nose 20 m.m. under pilot's compartment- in right engine and cowl flaps, and left side of fuselage near turret.
Plane #097: minor damage, causing hydraulic leak.
Plane #591: Eight 7.9 holes in left vertical stabalizer.
Plane #021: 1 cylinder shot out in left engine, large hole in left wing, fragment in left nacelle. 7.9 holes in nose and cockpit- knocking out instrument panel. Shell exploded in navigator's compartment. Hole in fuselage, [illegible] left side blister guns. One hole in left horizontal stabelizer.

V. Tables:

A/P No.	.50 Cal. Rds. Carried	.50 Cal. Rds. Fired	.50 Cal. Malfunction	.30 Cal. Rds. Carried	.30 Cal. Rds. Fired	.30 Cal. Malfunction
591	1200	1500	[illegible]	2250	1200	Nil
			[illegible]			
615	1200	1200	[illegible]	2000	1200	Nil.
163	"	1150	[illegible]	2000	1200	"
019	"	1500	Nil	2100	Nil	"
503	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	"
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
014	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	2000	200	"
097	"	1200	[illegible]	2000	1200	"
011	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	2000	1200	Nil.
021	"	2000	[illegible]	2000	Nil	Nil.
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

A/P No.	No. Bombs Dropped	Type	No. Bombs Dropped	Target	Remarks
591	2m	A	5	A	23 lb.	24	[illegible]	Salvoed.
615	"	"	"	"	"	19	[illegible]	[illegible] to see.
163	"	"	"	"	"	-	[illegible]	Hung fast.
019	"	"	"	"	"	0	[illegible]	
503	"	"	"	"	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	
016	"	"	"	"	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	
097	"	"	"	"	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	
011	"	"	"	"	"	24	[illegible]	
021	"	"	"	"	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	Salvoed
TOTAL	150	E	5	A	23 lb.	[illegible]	[illegible]	Unobserved.

Photos: 12 K-21's 53 K-20 were taken over target.


	A/A Fire			
No.G ~~un~~	Intensity	Cal.	Accurac	Location
6	Intense	Heavy	Inaccurate	Wewak Mission
M/G	light	Light	accurate.	Ridge Wewak and Boram Ridge.

Barrage over ridge between Wewak and Boram. Intense but Inaccurate.
Bursts over ridge between Wewak and Boram was intense .

VI. All references to F-31 Wewak and Boram Chart.
1 2/E twin tail fighter seen on both side Boram Strip. Serviceable.
3 columns of grey smoke in dispersal area north of runway at Boram.
1 Sugar Charlie with steam to of field near Cape Boram.
1 possible Love Able at above position.
1 Fox Able or Fox Dare Charlie NW West side of Cape Moem.
2 U/I enemy fighters or smoke inflames in water north of Boram Strip, shot down by P-38's.
1 U/I enemy fighter down in flames just off shore east of Cape Moem in water.
2 U/I silver fighters seen to crash near Wewak Harbor.
A/A bursts seen reaching our fighting P-38's and escort Fighters.
1 Large Red top building and several small buildings Grid.
2 Zekes taking off from Boram West.
Possible heavy gun position approximately [illegible].

Pat E Doforth
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Distribution: Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2.
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Mission No. 355 -
Squadron No. 444 Grou
Squadron Order Over Target
Altitude F
Time Over Target
Crew Observation Bombing E
(Red) Crew Report of Bomb
(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on P
T (Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T (Black) Other Planes. (All Pl
be Shown at Beginning of Re
Grid and True N.
Mag. North
Wewak
al Area
Wewak Airdrome
Wiriwiri
Rdm.
Mission Pt.
Cape Boram
MIG
CRASH
Boram
591
015
164
019
63
016
MISSION
Prince Alexander Mountains
147° 38'
143° 39'
143° 40

499
357 LL
24 DEC 43

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

25 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 357-LL. Performed 24 Dec.,43. Objective at YELLOW BEACH, (Near Cape Gloucester) NEW, BRITAIN.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2, First Air Task Force. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. The assigned objective was YELLOW BEACH between CAPE GLOUCESTER [illegible] and BORGEN B.M, NEW BRITAIN. The purpose of the mission was primarily for practice in proceedure and timing which will be required in a Ground Support Mission in the future, and secondly to further neutralize defense and supply areas. The bomb load per plane was four, 500 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs. A maximum load of approximately 4,200 rounds of .50 ammunition were carried by eac plane for the eight forward strafing guns. Since the target demensions (2 miles X1/2 mile) were such that each plane could not cover the target effectively, the target was didived and each flight assigned one half of the area.

(b) Attack:

This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack following the 500th Sqdn. whose objective was TARGET HILL. The approach from sea to land on a SE course, paralleling the shoreline. The attack formation consisted of two, three plane shallow "V"'s in trail and spaced at approximately 30 seconds. Bombing was excellent with 100% of bombs on the target. Low altitude and high speed, dense jungle, and delayed action bombs all combined to prevent observation of specific results. However, bomb smoke covered the target for approximately three-fourths of the entire length. The target could not be entirely covered because of an insufficient number of bombs.

The 500th Squadron preceeded this squadron and were observed to bomb target hill accurately from NW to SE. Bombs began bursting at the base of the hill and continued to the top with a larger concentration one half way up the hill. The 498th and 501 st. squadrons which followed this squadron on the same target and a similiar approach, were observed to bomb accurately with only one bomb hitting outside the target in the water.

II. Personnel and planes participating:

Lt.Col. TRUE lead the 500th Squadron which was the lead squadron in the Group, and Capt. C.L. [illegible] was Squadron leader of the 499th. This squadron sustained considerable damage in a raid on HOWAK the previous day and was unable to put six planes in the air.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The squadron formation was set up as follows:

LEAD FLIGHT				SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt. T.L.CRIPPEN	A/P No.	018	(499th)	Capt. J.D.	A/P No.	024
1st.Lt. T.T.LEWIS	" "	971		2nd.Lt. KELLEY	" "	991
1st.Lt. P.GATH	" "	058	(498th)	1st.Lt. BARNASKEY		225

III. At 0533/L the first plane of this squadron took off from Strip #4, HOLLANDIA. Succeeding planes took off at 40 second intervals. Individual planes turned left and took a course up the coast toward [illegible], P.I. and then took a course for [illegible] just north of the [illegible]. Just before reaching [illegible] it became light enough to distinguish planes and landmarks. The Squadron Formation was accomplished soon after. The squadron reached Driar Island at 0617/L and circled once to rendezvous with the Group. The Group Formation circled once again and took a course for the target at 0712/L with the 500th Squadron leading, 499th in number two position, 498th number three and the 501st in number four.

On sighting the target, the lead squadron was several miles out to sea. A right turn brought the squadron on a heading of almost south west. This heading was continued until almost over the coast where a left turn brought the formation on the bombing run from N. to S.

Capt. [illegible] lead the first flight along the same course as flown by the lead squadron, spacing himself at the proper interval to allow bombs of the preceeding squadron to explode. Lts. [illegible] were on his wings and held this formation throughout. Capt. [illegible] flight was assigned the first half of the target. All three planes dropped all bombs in the assigned area and strafed the entire length of the the target, beginning at 0721/L. A circle to the left was begun at [illegible] and continued the flight in on another run over the target behind the second flight at 0721/L. The target area was again strafed thoroughly.

[illegible] the 498th squadron lead the second flight with Lt. KELLEY and Lt. [illegible] on his wings. He followed closely behind the first flight but still spaced at a safe interval. This flight was assigned the second half of the target. All planes dropped all bombs in the target. A left turn over [illegible], inside the first flight was made to make another pass over the target. The flight on the second run was somewhat closer to the lead flight than on the first, there being approximately twenty seconds between. The target was thoroughly strafed.

After the second run both flights turned left and sailed into the Group formation. The Group withdrew over [illegible] at 0733/L.

No specific targets were observed to be hit but no smoke or fires resulted. However on the second run and on the withdrawal, smoke and many craters were seen in the target area.

Return to Hollandia was accomplished in Group formation without incident the formation arrived over Strip four at approximately 0834/L but because of congestion of planes on the strip and in the air, this

squadron was unable to land until 0929/L. There were no casualties to aircraft or personnel.

IV. Citations.

In view of information currently available, there will be no recommendations for citations or decorations.

V. Tables.

BOMB TABLE

a/c No.	No. bombs	Type	Weight	No. bombs dropped on Target
014	4	M/11	500 lb	4
971	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
024	"	"	"	"
591	"	"	"	"
225	"	"	"	"

TOTAL 24 x 500 lb. M/11 second delay bombs dropped on target.

AMMUNITION TABLE

Plane No.	Rds. Carried	Rds. Exp.	Malfunction.
014	4200	1200	.50 Ammo stuck.
058	4200	1200	Broken cable extention. Rem.
971	4200	500	Nil.
591	4200	2000	Nil.

TOTAL 5200 A.P.I. Mk. exploded. No .30 ammunition expended.

Note: This record is for planes of this squadron only, other two planes of the unit squadron are not included.

CAMERA TABLE

a/c No.	Type Camera	No. Photos taken.
014	K-21	30
971	K-20	27
058	K-21	30
591	K-20	27

TOTAL: 60 K-21 54 K-21.

VI. Sightings.

On second run (strafing) and on withdrawl bomb craters were observed throughout the target. After 1st. run(bombing), [illegible] of other squadrons generally observed to be excellent. Target Hill well covered from base to top. Only one bomb of another squadron observed out of target on shore near target 20-3.
No change in wrecked barges previously reported at 736894.Ref: Cape Gloucester - Silimati Point Special Map 1/20000 Preliminary Sheet.
Two small huts south of Target Hill at 730895.
Road from Gloucester to Silimati Point, defense systems, etc. not observed.

VII. Photo Interpretation.

No prints have been received, consequently no photo interpretation was possible.

Pat E. Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
[illegible]

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.
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(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M),APO 929.

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499
358 JJ
25 DEC 43

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

27 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FEB 358-JJ performed on 25 Dec., 43. Objective at YELLOW BEACH, N.G.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. DISTRIBUTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 [illegible], APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

1. General.

A. The target designated for this squadron was Fifth Air Force Target 20-B. The target was a small area, approximately 1/4 mile X 1/4 mile, on YELLOW BEACH. The entire 345th Group was to strike targets in this area which is located between CAPE GLOUCESTER AIR [illegible] and ROPEN BAY. The objective of the Group Strike was to neutralize reported or suspected ground defenses, supply and personnel areas. The bomb load per plane was 7 X 300 lb. A/S second delay bombs. A maximum load of .50 ammunition for the strafing guns.

B. Attack.

This squadron was number three in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The bomb run was from sea to land on a course from N to S. Formation over the target was two, three plane, Shallow "V"'s with each flight spaced at thirty seconds intervals. Bombing was considered to be excellent. However, because of the smallness of the target, several bombs were long or short. As is invariably the case on this type of target. Specific results were unobserved, other than bomb bursts and smoke on the target.

Bombing of other units was unobserved because this squadron hit it's target previous to the attack of the other units. The other units were observed making strafing runs.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt. G.L.COOPER was selected to lead the Squadron Formation. The Squadron Formation was as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P No.014	Capt.J.W.SNIDER	A/P No.591
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 971	1st.Lt.O.J.DANIELS	" " 020
1st.Lt.P.GATH	" " 058	1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER	" " 254

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III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of Attack.

The route out was BOBODURA to VITIAZ STRAITS to SAKAR ISLAND a point just North of SILIMATI POINT where the 500th Squadron was to peel off on it's target followed by the 499th. The 501st and 498th Squadrons were to hit their targets with first flights of both going over the targets abreast. All squadrons were to climb left off the respective targets in order to avoid confusion in the strafing patterns. Two runs were to be made over the target. All bombs were to be dropped on the first run.

B. Execution of the Mission

The first plane took off from Strip No.1 [illegible], at 1305/L with the last plane off at 1308/L. The squadron formed in a wide left turn enroute to the Gona Area. Here the Group formed with the 501st leading, 498th second, 499th third and the 500th Squadron in number four position. The Group then took up a course for the VITIAZ STRAITS. On arriving there, bad weather was encountered. The Group leader elected to take the alternate route overland through the pass between Mt.TALAWE and Mt.SCHRADER.

The Group Formation crossed the north coast of NEW BRITAIN at BOROGEN BAY and proceeded on out to sea several miles where a left turn was made. This squadron being No.three , peeled off first and made the run as in the original plan. Capt.[illegible] lead the first flight and had no difficulty in locating the target. The first bombs were away at 1427/L each plane dropped all bombs. Strafing on this run was accurate but not extensive because a short turn off the target was necessary to maintain timing and avoid overlapping patterns of adjacent squadrons. During this run the flight pulled up to a thousand feet to avoid bombs bursting on TARGET HILL. A three hundred sixty degree circle brought the flight in position for the second run (strafing) just after the second flight's bombs burst. Strafing on the second run was accurate and thorough.

Capt.[illegible] then lead the second flight in a run very similar to that of the first flight and [illegible] dropping all bombs on the first run, turning left and returning to strafe the target.

After the second run both flights withdrew [illegible] Target Hill and Katumo Point.

Bombing was excellent. However, owing to the small size of the target a few bombs fell short and a few fell long.
Other than some craters in the target, no results of bombing were observed. Both flights withdrew through the pass between [illegible] and Mt.SCHRADER and pulled into Group Formation, shortly afterward.

Return to [illegible] was without incident. Slight difficulty was experienced in landing because several planes other than the 38th Group had arrived at the same time and were attempting to land. Capt.[illegible] chose to allow the traffic pattern to clear before landing. Finally at 1512/L after circling for the best part of forty-five minutes, the first plane landed.

One plane sustained minor damage probably from ground fire. Two small holes in the ring cowling and one in the Navigator's Compartment comprised the extent of the damage.
There were no casualties to personnel.

IV. Citations.

In view of information known to date, no recommendation for citations or awards will be made.

V. Tables:

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds. Car'd.	Rds. Exp'd.	Malfunction
011	1200	[illegible]	Guns not charged.
056	"	1200	1 gun-no ammo in chamber.
591	"	1800	Nil.
971	"	600	Nil.
020	"	1200	Guns not charged.
254	"	1200	Nil.
Total	7200	6000	1200 ammunition expended.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. Bombs Dropped on Target
011	7	300	1/5 sec.	7
056	"	"	"	5
591	"	"	"	"
971	"	"	"	"
020	"	"	"	7
254	"	"	"	12
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	31 Recovered dropped on target.

[illegible] TABLE

A/P No.	No. Rds. Exp'd.	Type Guns
011	[illegible]	K-20
056	[illegible]	K-20
591	[illegible]	K-20
971	[illegible]	K-20
020	[illegible]	K-20
254	[illegible]	K-20
TOTAL:	72 K-20	30 K-21

VI. Sightings.

Small fires at various points between Silimati Point and Cape Gloucester. Bridge over river at 7[illegible]872 (Ref: Cape Gloucester Silimati Point Special Map 1/20000 Prelim Sheet). Road to Target Hill observed to be in fairly good condition.

Pat E. Gofforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
359 EE
26 DEC 43

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499Th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 December, 1943.

SUBJECT; Narrative Report on Mission FFO 359 EE performed 26 Dec.,43. Objective, YELLOW BEACH, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 BAF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (H), APO 929.

I. General.

A. The target assigned this Squadron was YELLOW BEACH between CAPE GLOUCESTER DROPS and [illegible] BAY, N.B. The purpose of this mission was to pave the way for the landing forces who were to arrive on the beach shortly after our attack. The primary objective was the coastal area, however, targets of opportunity such as defense guns, reinforcements, troop movements etc., were authorized. In short, the Group was to neutralize opposition to the landing. The bomb load per plane was 22 [illegible] lb. bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses & maximum load of .50 ammunition was carried for the strafing guns.

B. Attack.

This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack following the 500th squadron. The approach was from sea to land on a course SE, paralleling the shoreline. The attack formation consisted of three, three plane "V"'s in trail at twenty to thirty second intervals. Bombing was excellent [illegible] in the target. Bombs were seen to burst in the target area. Aerial photographs substantiate observed results. The entire length of the target was well covered with [illegible] concentration of bombs in the upper three-fourths.

C. Action of other units.

All squadrons made runs very similar to that of this squadron and were observed to bomb and strafe accurately.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. Lt.Col. [illegible] lead the 500th Squadron which was the lead squadron in the Group. Capt.J.L.C [illegible] was the Squadron Leader of the 499th.

B. The Squadron Formation was composed as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P	No.014	Capt.J.C.CONANT	A/P	No.340
1st.Lt.P.GATH	"	" 058	1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	"	" 971
Capt.J.W.SNYDER	"	" 097	1st.Lt.L.W.HYDER	"	" 254

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Third Flight

Maj.J.B.BAIRD - 015 2nd.Lt.T.REELLY - 591 1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL - 317

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of Attack.

The take off was set for 0530/L. All planes were to take off at 40 second intervals, make a left turn and proceed direct to SAKAR ISLAND off CAPE GLOUCESTER. Each squadron was assigned a certain altitude in order to prevent collision in the darkness. Squadrons were to form at first light enroute and continue on to SAKAR ISLAND. There Lt.Col.TRUE was to circle to the left and blink his landing lights periodically. After forming, the Group was to leave SAKAR ISLAND at 0715/L and circle to the left of the flagship of the Naval Forces. The formation was to call the Flagship and notify the commander of intentions to attack YELLOW BEACH. At this time the Naval bombardment was to cease. Squadrons were to take intervals at this time. The 500th Squadron was to make the initial attack and drop smoke bombs on target area from defense guns (if still intact). The 499th was to follow, dropping bombs along the coastal area where the landing was to be made. The 498th and 501st Squadrons were to follow in that order also hitting the coastal area. A maximum of three runs were tobe made over the target with all squadrons turning out to sea over [illegible] Bay and then circling for the strafing runs. A turn off the target S by the lead Squadron signified to the Group and to the Naval Commander that the Air Attack was ceasing. Then the Group was to withdraw S over [illegible] Bay and through the pass between Mt. [illegible] and Mt. [illegible]. As the second run was made over the target the barges were to be 500 yards off shore. A third run was at the discretion of Lt.Col. [illegible].

B. Execution of attack.

This Squadron started engines at 0520/L and taxied out. At this time Lt.DANIEL in plane #020 found that the brake on the right main landing gear was frozen. For thirty minutes he attempted to break it loose but was unsuccessful. The crew and equipment were quickly transferred to plane #317 which was to be flown only in emergency since it had undergone extensive repairs and had not been test-hopped. Plane #317 took off approximately 45 minutes behind the group.

The first plane of the squadron took off at 0537/L (After the 500th Squadron) and proceeded to SAKAR ISLAND according to plan, arriving at 0617/L. The Group rendezvous was accomplished at 0710/L. Shortly afterward the Group proceeded to the target according to plan. However, a few shots were fired at the Group as it passed over the Naval Forces.

This Squadron took up interval behind the 500th Squadron and flights then took up interval. Capt. [illegible] lead the first flight in, according to plan dropping the first bombs at 0720/L and continued dropping until all twenty-two were dropped. The last bomb was dropped 1/2 mile N.W. of Target Hill. Lt.[illegible] and Capt.[illegible] were the wingmen and dropped their bombs in the same manner as did Capt. [illegible]. All planes strafed throughout the run. The flight was forced to cut the run short because smoke from the phosphorus bombs entirely covered TARGET HILL and most of SILIWATI Point and part of the target.

Capt.CONANT lead the second flight,on it's run thirty seconds behind the first flight. Bombs were spaced at wider intervals and covered most of the target. This flight thoroughly strafed the target.

Major BAIRD with Lt.KELLEY on his right wing followed the second flight spaced at a twenty second interval. Thetarget was strafed thoroughly.

After the bombing run each of three flights returned to make a second and third strafing run at 0734/L and 0739/L respectively. The pattern was similiar to a circle with the first flight of the 500th Squadron hitting the target just after the last flight of the 501st Squadron. The flights of this squadron were spaced behind the 500th Squadron and ahead of the 498th Squadron. Each strafing run started farther up the coast toward CAPE GLOUCESTER and ended also farther to the coast because the smoke spread out and covered a good deal of the target. Strafing was both accurate and intense.

During the third run , Lt.COL.TROY was seen to turn right over BORGEN BAY, signifying the end of the air attack. At this time the landing barges were no more than 25 to 50 yards off shore. Strafing ceased immediately at 0740/L.

Lt.BAIRD arrived at the target just as the last flight was passing over the target for the third time. He made only one pass dropping his bombs outside the area covered by smoke, just S of TARGET HILL. He joined the squadron soon after and returned to base in formation. Withdrawal and return to base was according to plan and without incident. The first plane landed at 0912/L.

There were no casualties to aircraft or personnel.

IV. Observations.

[redacted] of Lt. [redacted] and crew was most commendable in flying a plane of [redacted] performance and flying alone into an area where intense [redacted] was [redacted] and carrying out his mission as ordered. [redacted] is [redacted] with the recommendation of a citation.

V. Tables:

[redacted] to BLR

A/P No.	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	No. Bombs dropped on target.
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	22
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"	"	"
317	"	"	"	"	Bombs Dropped South of Target Hill.

Total: [redacted] Bombs dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

A/C A/P No.	Rds. Carried.	Rds Fired.	Malfunction
015	4200	2900	Blast tube off URG.
004	"	2200	Nil
058	"	1800	"
591	"	1000	Blast Tube off 1 gun.
571	"	1350	Nil
254	"	2125	Nil
340	"	1350	"
317	"	265	No rds in chamber in all side guns.
097	"	2150	Nil

Total 13780 .50 Cal. Ammo. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	No. Pictures Taken	Type Camera
591	20	K-20
058	30	K-21
014	30	K-21
254	50	K-20
~~340~~ 317	7	K-21
097	30	K-21
TOTAL	97 K-21's	71 K-20's.

VI. Sightings.

Heavy bombers seen leaving target at 0639/L with P-47's escort. 7 to 9 explosions in vicinity of [illegible] Forester airframe. Smoke bombs covered [illegible] hill; west of railroad point and area 1/2 mile to west of Target 417, very effectively. Other squadrons bombed very effective only two [illegible] were seen to [illegible] target. Was at least 30 miles off shore after [illegible] pass.

Patt Doherty
[illegible]
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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499
359 KK
26 DEC 43

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

28 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 359-KK. Performed 26 Dec.,43. Objective, MATAMO POINT, BORGEN BAY, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FEAF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

I. General.

A. The assigned target for this squadron was Fifth Air Force Targets 27 X and 28 X. These targets were part of a defense system - probably M/G position on MATAMO POINT, BORGEN BAY, NEW BRITAIN. The purpose of the mission was to destroy these positions and in so doing aid the advance of the landing forces. The bomb load per plane was FIVE, 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs. A maximum load of .50 ammunition was carried for the strafing guns.

B. Attack.

This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack. The approach was from N to S over BORGEN BAY, bearing slightly eastward when off SILLEATI POINT. Formation over the target consisted of two, three-plane flights abreast and echeloned to the right. Both targets are believed to have been hit. Ten bombs hit in another squadron's target area.

C. Action of other units.

The 499th Squadron was observed to make it's run on the target but observation of results was nil.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 499th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt.C.C.COMANT was selected to lead this squadron.

B. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.COMANT	A/P No.185	1st.Lt.P.GATH	A/P No.058
1st.Lt.N.WHYDEN	" " 258	1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" " 015
1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN	" 971	1st.Lt.D.J.DANIEL	" " 097

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of Attack.

The route was from NOEMFOR to FINSCHAFEN to SAK ISLAND to a position off SILLEATI POINT. Here the squadrons were to take interval and approach the target from N to S over BORGEN BAY. Flights were to go

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into right echelon on the ap roach. The first flight of this squadron was to hit target 27 X, the second was to hit 28 X. Only one run over the target was to be made. Withdrawl was to be directly from the target through the valley between Mt.[illegible] and Mt.[illegible] and direct to base.

B. Execution of the attack.

The first plane took off at 1305/L the last was off two minutes and forty-four seconds later. The Group Formation was accomplished enroute to FINSCHHAFEN. at [illegible], fighter escort of P-38's was picked up at 1400/L. The drop procedure [illegible]. On arriving in the [illegible] GLOUCESTER Area, several "Vals", six "Pettys" and a few "Zeros" were seen attacking Naval Vessels at several positions in the area. The DD's were throwing up A/A fire. This forced the Group closer into shore than was planned. Regardless of the enemy planes in the area, this squadron followed the 498th Squadron into the target.

Capt.[illegible] signals for right echelon maic was quickly accomplished by flights and by individual planes. He lead the first flight directly over NAT[illegible] POINT and target 27 X. The first bomb was away at 1446/L and fell on the shore line just short of the target. The rest of the bombs dropped in train one help bracketing the target. Strafing was limited by the short run.

Lt.[illegible] led the second flight in on the right of the first flight. The bomb run was at such an angle that both targets were practically in line and less than a mile apart. For this reason the second flight was forced off the target. Lt.[illegible] turned directly behind the first flight in order to bomb the designated target. When he dropped his bombs he was practically in formation with the first flight, slightly high and behind. His bombs bracketed the target. Lt. [illegible] and T/Sgt. Baker were unable to bail out and the I.L. were forced to drop their bombs in another squadron's area.

The formation attempted to plan and began to assume the regular three-plane "V". In accomplishing this Lt.[illegible] fell slightly behind when he "crossed under" from the right to the number three position. When approximately three minutes away from the target, a lone "Val" was observed flying to the right and parallel to the second flight on a level. The Val turned and made a pass from 5 o'clock and began firing at approximately 1000 yards. His fire fell short. The number one and two planes were unable to fire but Lt.[illegible]'s turret gunner opened fire at 600 to 700 yards, scoring hits on the nacelle. The Val began smoking nosed over and was seen to crash without burning either right or left.

The 499th and 498 squadrons returned together without further incidnet. The first 499th plane landed at 1515/L.

IV. Citations.

The turret gunner will be recommended for the appropiate award as soon as confirmation of destruction of aircraft is received.

V. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds. Carr'd.	Rds. Fired.	Malfunction
058	42000	300	Nil.
971	"	650	Nil.
185	"	900	2 Short rounds.
097	"	800	Nil
015	"	850	Nil
254	"	300	"

Total: 4500 rounds .50 Cal. ammunition expended.

Bombing Table

A/P.No.	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target
185	5	500 lb.	4/5 sec.	5
254	5	500 lb.	" "	5
971	5	"	" "	5
058	5	"	" "	5
015	5	"	" "	(5 Other Squadron Target)
097	5	"	" "	" " " " "

Total Bombs dropped on target: 20 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay.

Photo Table

A/P No.	No. Photos taken	Type Camera.
058	30	K-21
097	30	"
254	"	"
185	7	K-20
971	12	"


TOTAL 90 K-21 19 K-20's.

VI. Sightings.

6 LST's and 12 smaller barges, 2 DD approximately 5 miles off shore Potni Village on course 190 degrees. 7 LST's and 2 DD 10 12 miles North Sillimani Pt. course 340 degrees being attacked by 4 -5 Vals. Near-misses observed but no apparent damage. One barge seen being hit and sunk. One direct hit by 1/2 on barge beached and empty in vicinity of Target Hill. 6 bettys attacking barges 1/2 mile north Target Hill. 2 U/I planes strafing Yellow Beach encountered a considerable amount of A/A and possible light A/A. 7 Sallys at 10,000 feet bombing convoy 10 to 12 miles at sea. Bridge at Yard Ref: 4 miles to 1 inch Sp. Western N.S. 8 to 10 ft. wide.

Earl E. Foster
EARL E. FOSTER
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


SILIMATI PT.
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BORGEN BAY
NATAMO PT.
NATAMO
(OLD SITE)

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

30 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 362 GG, performed 29 Dec.,43.
Objective CAPE GLOUCESTER AIRDROME AREA, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

I. General

A. The assigned target was section of ground bounded on the West by a line drawn through the center of #2 Strip Cape Gloucester inland running WNE to SSW having a width of 1700 yards to the east. This Squadron had a definite section 400 yards wide from the east boundary. This target was thought to have gun positions and enemy troops.

B. Attack

This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack. The target run was made on a heading of approximately 230° from the sea to land. The Squadron formation over the target was an echelon of six planes to the right. The target was well covered with bomb hits. Six bombs, however, fell short and went into the water just off shore.

C. Action of other units.

Due to the position of the formation and the flight path taken, action of other units were not observed.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 499th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group, and Capt. J.W. SNYDER was selected as Squadron leader. Major MARSTON, Group Operations Officer, flew in the lead with Capt. SNYDER acting as co-pilot.

B. Flights were set up in the following order:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. J.W. SNYDER	A/P No. 015	Capt. C.C. CONANT	A/P No. 185
2nd. T.R. KELLEY	" " 591	1st. Lt. R.D. REINBOLD	" 016
1st. Lt. N.W. HYDER	" " 254	1st. Lt. V.W. TATLEMAN	" 971

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A. Plan of Attack

The route was from DOBODURA to the "Gona Wreck" to target through DAMPIER STRAITS to position at sea and north of target. At this point the individual Squadrons were to take up the proper spacing for the target run. On the approach each Squadron was to go into a Squadron echelon of six planes. The plan of attack called for the strike to be executed at 0900/L, for the first run which was bombing., a second pass was to be made for the purpose of strafing. After two runs were made, return was direct.

B. Execution of attack.

The first plane of this Squadron took off from DOBODURA at 0733/L with the last plane being airborne in less than two minutes. The Group rendezvous was affected over "Gona Wreck" at 0755/L. Course was then taken up for the target, but due to the fact the Group was early in regard to time, the formation flew to FINSCHAFEN and then through DAMPIER STRAITS. Care was taken to fly outside the Naval Units offshore of the target in accordance with plans. On arriving at the designated point off the target, the individual Squadrons took up their spacing and the echelons were affected on the approach. The echelon was as follows: #1 Major Marston, Lt. Kelley, Lt. Hyder, Capt. Conant, lt. Reinbold, and Lt. Tatleman.

The first plane of this Squadron hit the target at 0914/L. After the bombing run, which left the target saturated with bomb hits, a large 360° turn was made, allowing the other squadrons to make their bombing run, and a second run, strafing, was made along the same line as the first run. On completion of the strike, this Squadron reformed into two three plane elements and made a shallow turn to allow the other squadrons to reform. Course was then taken up direct to base, the first plane landed at DOBODURA at 1037/L.

III. In view of the information on hand, there will be no recommendation for citations on this mission.

IIII. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds Car'd.	Rds. Fird.	Malfunctions	
015	4200	1800	URN	Loose Projectile.
591	"	2000	LLN	Not charged.
254	"	1200	Nil	
185	"	1500	Nil	
016	"	1400	LLN	Accelorator jam.
971	"	1200	LLN	Ammo Jammed.
Total:		12100	X .50 Cal. expended.	

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. bombs dropped on target	
015	5	500	4/5	None	(Short of target)
591	5	"	"	4	
254	"	"	"	5	
185	"	"	"	5	
016	"	"	"	5	
971	"	"	"	5	

Total: 24 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	No. Photos Taken	Type Camera
971	27	K-20
185	42	"
054	30	K-21
[illegible]	Nil	
016	30	K-21
015	Nil.	

Total: 60 K-21 69 K-20


V. Sightings.

Bombing by Heavy Bombers and 22 dn Group appeared excellent. Target well covered by other squadrons of 345th bombing and strafing excellent. Concrete slab 647953 use unknown.
P-47's high patrol.

Pat E. Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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Mission No. 362-GG
Squadron 499th
Squadron Order Over
Altitude: 250 - 300
Time Over Tagget: 09
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29 DEC 43

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

30 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 362 GG, performed 29 Dec.,43. Objective CAPE GLOUCESTER AIRDROME AREA, N.B.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FEAF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

I. General

A. The assigned target was section of ground bounded on the West by a line drawn through the center of #2 Strip Cape Gloucester inland running WNW to SSW having a width of 1700 yards to the east. This Squadron had a definite section 400 yards wide from the east boundary. This target was thought to have gun positions and enemy troops.

B. Attack

This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack. The target run was made on a heading of approximately 230° from the sea to land. The Squadron formation over the target was an echelon of six planes to the right. The target was well covered with bomb hits. Six bombs, however, fell short and went into the water just off shore.

C. Action of other units.

Due to the position of the formation and the flight path taken, action of other units were not observed.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 499th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group, and Capt. J.W. SNYDER was selected as Squadron leader. Major [illegible], Group Operations Officer, flew in the lead with Capt. SNYDER acting as co-pilot.

B. Flights were set up in the following order:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt. J.W. SNYDER	A/P No.	015	Capt. C.C. CONWAY	A/P No.	185
2nd. T.R. KELLEY	" "	591	1st. Lt. R.D. REINBOLD	"	016
1st. Lt. N.W. HYDER	" "	254	1st. Lt. V.W. TATLEMAN	"	971

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Plan of Attack

The route was from DOBODURA to the "Gona Wreck" to target through DAMPIER STRAITS to position at sea and north of target. At this point the individual Squadrons were to take up the proper spacing for the target run. On the approach each Squadron was to go into a Squadron echelon of six planes. The plan of attack called for the strike to be executed at 0900/L, for the first run which was bombing., a second pass was to be made for the purpose of strafing. After two runs were made, return was direct.

B. Execution of attack.

The first plane of this Squadron took off from DOBODURA at 0733/L with the last plane being airborne in less than two minutes. The Group rendezvous was affected over "Gona Wreck" at 0755/L. Course was then taken up for the target, but due to the fact the Group was early in regard to time, the formation flew to FINSCHAFEN and then through DAMPIER STRAITS. Care was taken to fly outside the Naval Units offshore of the target in accordance with plans. On arriving at the designated point off the target, the individual Squadrons took up their spacing and the echelons were affected on the approach. The echelon was as follows: #1 Major Marston, Lt. Kelley, Lt. Ryder, Capt. Conant, Lt. Reinhold, and Lt. Tatleman.

The first plane of this Squadron hit the target at 0914/L. After the bombing run, which left the target saturated with bomb hits, a large 360° turn was made, allowing the other squadrons to make their bombing run, and a second run, strafing, was made along the same line as the first run. On completion of the strike, this Squadron reformed into two three plane elements and made a shallow turn to allow the other squadrons to reform. Course was then taken up direct to base, the first plane landed at DOBODURA at 1037/L.

III. In view of the information on hand, there will be no recommendation for citations on this mission.

IIII. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P no.	Rds Car'd.	Rds. Fired.	Malfunctions
015	4200	1800	JRN Loose Projectile.
591	"	2000	LLN Not charged.
254	"	1200	Nil
185	"	1500	Nil
016	"	1400	LLN Accelorator jam.
971	"	1200	LLN Ammo Jammed.
Total:		12100	X .50 Cal. expended.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. bombs dropped on target
015	5	500	4/5	None (Short of target)
591	5	"	"	4
254	"	"	"	5
185	"	"	"	5
016	"	"	"	5
971	"	"	"	5

Total: 24 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	No. Photos Taken	Type Camera
971	27	K-20
185	42	"
254	30	K-21
~~591~~	Nil	
016	30	K-21
015	Nil.	

Total: 60 K-21 69 K-20

V. Sightings.


Bombing by Heavy Bombers and 22 dh Group appeared excellent. Target well covered by other squadrons of 345th bombing and strafing excellent. Concrete slab 647953 use unknown.
P-47's high patrol.

Pat E. Gofforth

PAT E. GOFFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
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(1 copy) A-2 FATF , APO 503.
(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 929.

Mission No. 362-GG
Squadron 499th
Squadron Order Over Target: First.
Altitude: 250 - 300 feet.
Time Over Target: 0914/L to 0920/L.
0 Crew Report of Bombs Falling.
1 Took Photos



499
364 DD
31 DEC 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

2 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 364-DD, performed 31,Dec.43. Objective at ERIMA PLANTATION, NEW GUINEA.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S.,A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 929.

I. General.

A. The assigned target was supply dumps, A/A positions, and personnel areas in ERIMA PLANTATION near BOGADJIM, N.G. The bomb load per plane was five, 500 lb. bombs with 8/11 second delay fuses. A maximumload of 4200 X.50 ammo was carried for the strafing guns.

B. Attack.

This squadron was number three in the sequence of attack. The approach was from land to sea on a course of approximately forty five degrees. The squadron formation over the target consisted of two, shallow, three plane "V"'s in echelon to the right. Bombing results were excellent with every bomb in the target. No smoke or fires resulted, however, it is thought that considerable damage was sustained by at least two supply areas.

C. Action of the other units.

Other squadrons were observed to make the bomb run on approximately the same run as executed by this unit. Seven bombs of preceeding unit were seen to be dropped in the water after leaving the target. Otherwise the bombing was excellent.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt.C.C.CONANT was selected to lead the to lead the Squadron Formation.

B. The Squadron Formation was set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.CONANT	A/P No.185	Capt.COOPER	A/P No. 014
1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN	" 971	1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	015
1st.Lt.P.GATH	" 058	1st.Lt.C.CESSNA	097

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of the Mission.

The route out was Dobodura via the MARKHAM VALLEY to a point twenty miles North of DUMPU VALLEY. Here a turn to the right was to be made on the target approach. On the approach squadrons were to take up intervals and make individual squadron attacks on an axix of approximately 45°. All squadrons were to turn right after leaving the target rendesvous with the rest of the group and return along the North coast of N.G. to FINSCHAFEN and then proceed directly to DOBODURA.

B. Execution of the Mission.

The first plane of this squadron took off from strip #4 at 0804/L behind the 498th Sq adron. The last plane took off at 0805/L . The squadron formed on take-off in a left turn toward the "Gona Wreck" where the Group formed without the necessity of circling. The Group Formation was formed and on course for DUMPU at 0815/L. The Group Formation enroute was good. Flight to DUMPU was without incident. Just North of DUMPU Squadrons began to take up interval for the bombing run. This squadron was number three in the Group Formation and took up interval behind the 498th Squadron. On sighting the target, Capt.CONANT gave the signal for echelon which was promptly executed.

Capt.CONANT did not sight the reported A/A position at Erima Township (Just SW of Erima Village) and since there was no A/A fire, he began to drop his bombs in the upper half of the target.

Lt.TALTEMAN left wing man, dropped one bomb just N of the PALPA RIVER and strung his bombs throughout the plantation, the last of, falling opposite the jetty in the Plantation.

Lt.GATH dropped all of his in the upper part of the plantation near the jetty area.

Capt.COOPER leader of the second flight did not sight the reported A/A position at ERIMA Township and since there was no A/A fire he saved his bombs for the supply and personnel areas in the plantation. He dropped his bombs in the prescribed area bur saw no definite targets.

Lt.REINBOLD (the left wingman) dropped two of his bombs in two of five or six supply dumps which he sighted on either side of the PALPA RIVER. (Note: Only one other crew sighted these dumps but the largest concentration of bombs was here - see attached bomb diagram). The rest of his bombs were dropped throughout the plantation.

Lt.CESSNA (right wingman) saw the same supply dumps and dropped two bombs here the rest were strung out through the plantation with the last dropped near the jetty.

All planes turned right over the sea after crossing the target and reformed the squadron. Return was as planned down the coast to FINSCHAFEN to DOBODURA. The return flight was executed in Group Formation without incident.

IV. Citations.

In view of information currently available there will be no recommendation for award of citations.

V. Tables.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs	Weight	Type	No.dropped on Target.
185	5	500 lb.	8/11	5
971	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
014	"	"	"	"
015	"	"	"	"
097	"	"	"	"

TOTAL 30 X 500 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs dropped.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds Car'd.	Rds.Exp.	Malfunctions
185	4200	2350	Nil
971	"	450	Three guns not charged.
058	"	2000	Nil
014	"	2000	Nil (400 rds .30 Cal.)
015	"	1100	Nil
097	"	1300	Nil

Total: 7150 .50 Cal. 400 .30 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	No.Photos Taken	Type Camera
185	48	K-20
971	5	"
058	30	K-21
015	None	(Switch left off)
014	23	K-21
097	None	(Switch left off)

TOTAL: 53 K-21 53 K-20


VI. Sightings.

Dugouts and bombshelters at (658014) Ref: Bogadjim Prov. Prelim. Sheet 1/63360). Roads and bridges in plantation in good repair and seemed well used. Two bombs of preceeding squadron hit water and seen explode at 676030. Jetty in good repair. Five bombs seen dropped in water after leaving target on return to base. At least two large fires and large columns of smoke seen at Madang and Alexishafen. 1 Squadron of medium bombers seen dropping bombs in Bogadjim Plantation.

VII. There was no photo interpretation.

Pat E. G. Forth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



96

Mission No: 364-DD
Squadron: 498th
Squadron Order Over Target: Third
Time Over Target: 0940-0943/L.
Crew Report on Bomb Falling.
Took Photos

Ref: Bogadjim. Prov. 1/63360

499

Jan - May 44

499
E-1-E
1 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

3 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFE E-1-E performed 1 Jan., 44. Objective at SAIDOR, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General

A. The assigned targets were targets 1 B - 3 A on Target Map, situated on the east coast of SAIDOR. The assigned target was not hit however. The lead Squadron made a run on WEBER POINT. The lead Flight of the lead Squadron, however, left this target as it was being attacked by a number of A-20's. As the remaining flights had gotten their interval, they did not notice the lead flight pull away from this particular target and go on up the coast to the original. The second flight of the lead Squadron, made a large 360° turn, allowing the A-20's time to clear, and made a bombing run over WEBER POINT. This Squadron, in number two position followed this flight on both runs, the bombing and strafing run.

B. Attack

This Squadron was number two in the sequence of attack. The target run was made on a heading of approximately 175° from sea to land. The Squadron Formation over the target was two separate flights of three planes each, one trailing the other. The particular area was well covered with bombs, however, one bomb was dropped in the water and two failed to release as the releases had not been cocked.

C. Action of other units.

The other two Squadrons and one flight of the lead Squadron seemed to have hit the target well.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 498th Bomb Squadron was assigned to lead the Group, and Capt.G.L.COOPER was selected as Squadron Leader for this Squadron which consisted of the following planes and pilots.

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P No.	185	1st.Lt.N.W.HYDEN	A/P No.	254
Capt.J.W.SNYDER	" "	042	Major J.B.BAIRD	" "	015
1st.Lt.C.CESSNA	" "	097	1st.Lt.W.W.TATLEMAN	" "	971

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III. Plan of Attack.

The route was from DOBODURA to the "Gona Wreck" to LONG ISLAND then to target. On reaching the target the individual Squadrons were to take their runs in separate flights of 3 planes. After two runs, one bombing, and one strafing, the route back was direct to base.

B. Execution

The first plane of this Squadron took off from Strip #4 at 1348/L. The Squadron formed enroute to "Gona Wreck". At the "Wreck" the Group Formation was accomplished at specified time and headed out on course to Long Island, Leaving Long Island, the Group set out for the target. After flying for a few minutes, the lead Squadron peeled off and got the necessary interval between flights. This Squadron also spaced itself. As the lead Squadron approached the target, there were a number of A-20's flying low and the opposite direction from our target tun, all planes of this Group pulled out and made a circle. On the second time in, both flights dropped bombs and strafed the area. A second pass was made over the same target and on the same heading, there were three small fires observed burning in the section that had been bombed. It was not determined whether the fires resulted from exploding bombs or incendary bullets. After completion of the strafing run, the Squadron reformed and joined the 501st Squadron and a course taken for base. Shortly after leaving the bombed area, the 500th Squadron joined the two Squadrons, and one flight of 3 planes of the 498th joined and took the lead. The return to base was without incident. The first plane landed at DOBODURA Strip #4 1700/L.

IV. Sightings.

There will be no recommendations for citations as result of this mission.

V. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds.Car'd	Rds Fired	Malfunctions
185	4200	1200	Nil.
042	"	600	URN Ammo Stuck. LRS Extractor broken.
097	"	1200	Nil
254	"	1400	Nil
015	"	2700	Nil
971	"	2300	Nil
TOTAL:	9800 X.50 Cal.		

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. Bombs dropped on Target.	
185	5	500	8/11	5	(Note: Bombs not dropped on assigned target)
042	5	"	"	5	
097	"	"	"	"	
254	"	"	"	"	
015	"	"	"	4	
971	"	"	"	5	
Total	30			27	

PHOTO TABLE


A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
185	K-20	10
042	K-21	30
097	K-21	30
254	K-21	30
015	K-21	30
971	K-20	24
TOTAL:	34 K-20's	120 K-21's.

VI. Sightings.

On second run fires were observed. Entire area covered with bomb smoke and well strafed.

Frank M. Parker R.J.P.
FRANK M.PARKER JR.
Asst. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
1st.Lt,, Air Corps

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FFO E-1-E
499th
Squadron Order Over Target: 2nd.
Time Over Target: 1528 -1535/L
Altitude: Minimum.
O Crew Report on Bomb Falling
⊥ Took Photos

499
FFO 2 D-1
2 Jan 43

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

3 January, 1943.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 2 D-1 performed 2 Jan., 43.
Objective at Saidor (146°30'30" E 5°35'20" S) New Guinea.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General.

A. The assigned objective was Fifth Air Force Target 6-A which is a hill South of SAIDOR which commanded all sea approaches to the area. The purpose of the mission was to lay a smoke screen covering the hill and the area to the east. Thereby screening the landing force from possible coastal guns and O.P.'s. Each of the four planes assigned for this mission were to carry one,1100 pound, smoke tank of 70 gallon capacity. The normal amount of ammunition was to be carried for the strafing guns.

B. Attack.

These three planes operated independantly from the rest of the striking force but timing was coordinated with both Naval and Air Units. Each plane made an individual run over the assigned target at intervals in order to maintain an effective screen. The attack was apparently successful since the smoke effectively screened the landing area.

However, only five seconds were required to empty the smoke tanks instead of ten seconds as originally thought. For this reason the smoke required several minutes to dissipate and effectively cover the area. Smoke bombs have given better results in the past.

C. Action of other units.

B-24's bombed areas from which reinforcements were expected. Bombing was from medium altitude and was observed to be accurate.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. Capt.G.L.COOPER was assigned to lead the flight which was set up as follows:

Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/B No.814	No.1 Position -	1st. Over Target.
1st.Lt.P.GATH	" " 658	" 2 "	2nd. " "
1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL	" " ~~343~~ 340	" 3 "	3rd. " "
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" " 317	" 4 "	Over target only if necessary to maintain screen.

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III. Details of the Mission.

Before taxiing out Capt.COOPER found that his smoke tank would not function properly because of a leak. For this reason he substituted Lt.BAKER'S plane for his own. He took off at 0555/L from Strip #4 Dobodura, behind the other nine planes of this squadron which were to bomb targets at SAIDOR. Succeeding planes took off at forty second intervals. The extra time was necessary because darkness and dust caused poor visibility. Each plane took up a course for FINSCHAFEN N.G. and pulled into close formation at first light. The flight proceeded to Long Island from there took up a course for the target. Bad weather was encountered soon after leaving Long Island. This forced the flight to circle to the North of SAIDOR instead of to the South as planned. The flight arrived at a point 5 miles East of SAIDOR at 0735/L and circled until time to make the initial attack.

CAPT.COOPER noted the wind direction from bomb smoke which resulted from the B-24 attack and made his run from NW to SE. He began the run by strafing a bombing target just prior to reaching his own target. He began laying his smoke at 0817/L between the "Hill" and the landing area. He continued the run out over the water and began circling to allow the other planes to get into formation.

LT.GATY followed Capt.COOPER and also strafed. He began laying his s smoke directly over the hill at 0828/L. When the smoke tank was exhausted he joined the flight leader.

Lt.DANIEL made his run between the flight paths of the other two planes also strafing. He began laying his smoke at 0837/L. He joined the other two planes and after circling several times to get pictures and observe the effectiveness of the smoke screen, returned to DOBODURA by way of FINSCHAFEN without incident.

IV. In view of information currently available there will be no recommendations for awards of citations.

V. Tables:

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds.Car'd.	Rds Fired	Malfunctions
317	4200	400	Nil
058	4200	600	Nil
340	4200	500	Nil

TOTAL: 1500 X.50 Cal. Expended.

Photos: Plane 058 -- 30 K-15's.

VI, Sightings.


B-24's bombing Helmolts Point and shoreline to S.W. .
Bombing Very effective and accurate.
AST's and DD'S leaving the landing area at0900/L.
Track in Sisigul (492791 Saider Prov. 1/63360). Susaka (497745) appeared well used. 8 to 10 native type buildings at Sisigal or Busaka were in good repair - apparently in use.
1 European type house probably of stone or cement construction near Paramushi 445778 was observed.
Bagges observed off [redacted] South Blucher Pt. heading up the coast.
Gun flashes of unknown caliber firing from vicinity of Kolema Village target unknown. Apparently 4 guns.

Pat E Goforth R.J.S.
PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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Mission No.2 B1
Squadron: 499th
Time Over Target: 0817 -0837/L
Altitude: Minimum
Took Photos
Smoke Run Over Target

Ref: Saidor Prov:1/63360



499
FFO 5 D-1
5 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

6 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 5 D-1. Performed 5 Jan., 44. Objective at SCHLANGEN HARBOR, N.G. (147 degrees 15 minutes E. 5 degrees 55 minutes S.)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General.

A. The assigned targets were bivouac areas and barge hideouts on the coast between VINCKE POINT and PESCHEL POINT at SCHLANGEN HARBOR, New Guinea. The purpose of the mission was to bomb and strafe enemy troops which were reported to have retreated from areas farther down the coast. The bomb load per plane was seven, 300 lb. bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses. A maximum load of .50 ammo was carried for the strafing guns.

B. Attack

The approach was from sea to land on a heading of approximatelely two-hundred thirty degrees. This Squadron attacked two bivouac areas and one barge hideout. The first run over the area was entirely for strafing and for locating the bombing targets. Bombs were dropped on the second run. A large percentage of the bombs were seen to drop in the targets. The delayed action bombs only allowed observation, of general results. However, it is believed from bomb bursts and bomb smoke observed that targets were hit and considerable damage was sustained by any personnel in this area.

C. Action of other units.

The 501 st. Squadron was seen to follow this squadron on both runs and bomb two targets nearer to PESCHEL POINT than our own. Bombing was apparently excellent.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. This Squadron (with Capt. J.L.COOPER leading) was assigned to lead the strike force which consisted of the two squadrons— 499th and 501 st.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P NO.014	1st.Lt.H.W.HYDER	A/P No.254
1st.Lt.W.W.CABELL	" 016	Capt.J.W.SNYDER	" " 042
1st.Lt.P.GATH	" 058	1st.Lt.C.L.CESSNA	" " 317

III. Details of the mission.

A. Plan of attack.

Take off was to be at 1045/L for both Squadrons. The 499th from Strip #4 DOBODURA and the 501 st. from Strip #7 DOBODURA. Rendezvous was to be over "Dona Wreck", accomplished and on course for the target at 1100/L. Formation was to be javelin down for squadrons and flights. Route out was DOBODURA - FINSCHAFEN - target. Squadrons and flights were to take interval in trail and follow the number 1 flight on the run from sea to land, following the coastline from HINCKE POINT to PESCHEL POINT.

Formation over the target was to be 3 plane flights in shallow "V". The first run was planned for strafing the entire coastline and for pinpointing the bombing targets. A circle out to sea was to bring the first flight, first squadron, in on the same run, thirty seconds behind the last flight, second Squadron which was beginning the strafing run. The second run was to be primarily for bombing the specidied targets. After completion of the bombing run this squadron was to turn inland and thoroughly search the area for signs of tropp activity. After searching the area the squadron was to return to base. The 501 st. Squadron was to search the coastal area in the vicinity of SIO.

B. Execution of the attack.

Take-off of the first plane was at 1045/L as planned. The last plane of this squadron was airborne one minute and fifteen seconds later. Rendezvous with the 501 st. was accomplished as planned.

The "strike" force was on course at 1100/L. The flight to the target was without incident. Weather presented no difficulty throughout the mission.

On sighting the target Capt.COOPER signaled for the second flight to take up echelon to the right. Then Capt.COOPER turned in on the target.

Capt.COOPER began strafing at VINCKE POINT and his wingmen followed suit. The strafing run was continued to PESCHEL POINT. Strafing was thorough and intense.

At a safe interval, Lt.HYDER lead the second flight on the same run with similar results.

Both flights turned right over the water; still in trail, and allowed the 501 st. Squadron to complete the strafing run. Then identical run was made.

Capt.COOPER'S flight dropped 3 bombs per plane in target 1., and 2 bombs per plane in target 2 and 2 bombs per plane in target 3. (See attached bomb diagram). Strafing was again thorough but not so intense as on the first run.

Lt.HYDER lead the second flight on the bomb run immediately behind Capt.COOPER and at a safe interval. This flight dropped 2 bombs per plane on target 1., 2 per plane on target 2., and 2 bombs per plane on target 3 with one exception: Capt.SNYDER saved a bomb for a camouflaged barge in the barge hideout at KIARI which he spotted on the first run. However, he was unable to locate it.

After the bomb run Capt.COOPER lead the squadron inland where both flights strafed the DUWI MISSION and village. Capt.SNYDER dropped his remaining bomb between the Mission and a tin roofed building nearby. Results of this bomb were notobserved but the bomb was near enough to both buildings to cause consaidarable damage. Flights then separated and thoroughly searched the area for signs of troop movements on tracks in the vicinity. (See attached diagram). During this search, the first flight strafed an unamed village seven miles SSE of SIO. An area of approximately 156 square miles surrounding VINCKE POINT and SIO was thoroughly searched. For sightings see Par.IV below.

After the search, the squadron reformed and returned to base without incident. The first plane landed at 1350/L.

IV. In view of information to hand at present no reccomendations for awards of citations will be made.

V. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

.50 Cal. A/P No.	Rds.Car'd.	Rds. Fired	Malfunction.	.30 Cal. Rds.Car'd.	Rds.Fired.
014	4200	2400	Nil	2000	1000
016	"	2500	RS Acc.Locked.1	600	600
058	"	3500	U.L.S. Loose Proj.		Nil
254	"	2400	Nil	2000	"
042	"	2000	[illegible]	2000	1000
317	"	2000	Nil	2000	Nil
TOTAL	14700 X.50 Cal.			2600 X.30 Cal.	

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bomb Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. Bombs dropped on Target.
014	7	300	4/5	7
016	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
254	"	"	"	"
042	"	"	"	6
317	"	"	"	7

Total Bombs Dropped on Target: 41 X.300 4/5 second delay.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	No. Photos Taken	Type Camera Taken
014	None	K-21 (Camera Not turned on.)
016	"	" " " "
058	30	"
254	30	"
042	30	"
317	32	K-20/
Total:	90 K-21	32 K-20

VI. Sightings.

Tracks in vicinity Duwi Mission very well used. M/T road Sio to Nambarewa well used and in good condition.
Trakk Vincke Point to Peschel Point well worn.
On east side Oneisenam Point midget sub beached, rusty, hatches open and stern pointing toward shore. No damage evident but lack of signs of activity indicate Unserviceable.
1 Serviceable barge 300 yards up river mouth on west bank at Oneisenam Point.
Several U/S barges at Mouth Kwama River.
2 U/I fighters seen momentarily disappeared into clouds near target area.
501st targets well covered by bomb bursts and bomb smoke.

VII. Photos taken on the mission have not yet returned. Consequently no photo interpretation was possible.

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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499
7 Jan 44

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bomb Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bomb Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

8 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 7 D-1. Performed 7, Jan.44. Objective at ERIMA PLANTATION., 145° 42' E 05° 33' S.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General

A. The assigned objective was supply areas in ERIMA PLANTATION (Bogadjim Area) NEW GUINEA. The purpose of the mission was to destroy supplies thus hampering the enemy effort in forward areas near SAIDOR and DUMPU. Thebomb load per plane was seven, 300 lb. bombs with 4/5 sec. delay fusses and a maximum load of .50 ammunition for the strafing guns.

B. Attack

This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The approach was from a point S of BOGADJIM Northward over the KINDJIM and OORI RIVERS on a course of approximately ten degrees, to the target. Formation over the target consisted of two, three-plane shallow "V"s at intervals of approximately thirty seconds. Bombing was excellent. One bridge definitely destroyed and very probable damage to two dumps and two trucks.

Results of the bombing were generally unobserved but pilot reports of bombing indicate good coverage and considerable damage inflicted.

C. Action of other units.

The 498th Squadron was observed to make a run from S to North. The second flight's run and bombing was reported as excellent.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 498th Squadron was assigned to lead the strike and Capt.G.L.COOPER was selected to lead our squadron.

B. Flights were set up in the following order:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P No.014	1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER	A/P No.254
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" " 058	Capt.J.W.SNYDER	" " 042
1st.Lt.W.W.CABELL	" " 016	1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	" " 600

C O N F I D E N T I A L

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of attack.

The plan of attack specified two squadrons to conduct the strike. The 498th Squadron was to take-off from Strip #4 at 0954/L followed closely by the 499th Squadron. Rendezvous was to be accomplished over the "Gona Wreck" by 1000/L. The two squadrons were to proceed to DUMPU by way of the MARKHAM VALLEY where the force was to turn N and cross the mountains. On reaching DUMPU, squadron interval was to be established. On crossing the mountain range, slights were to take up interval.

The target was to be bombed farther inland than on previous missions (It is thought that since the coastal area of the Plantation has been heavily bombed on numerous occasions, the enemy has moved supplies inland). Strafing was to begin at a point due west of BOGADJIM VILLAGE and approximately two miles inland. Bombing was to begin approximately one mile South of the PALPA RIVER and continue approximately one mile North. Since the target was too large to be covered effectively by each plane, one half of the target was assigned to each flight. After the bombing run both squadrons were to turn right, reform and return to base by way of FINSCHAFEN.

B. Execution of the attack.

The first plane of this squadron took off from Strip #4 DOBODURA at 0948/L. The last plane was airborne at 0950/L. The Squadron formed in a left turn to the "Gona Wreck" where the rendezvous was accomplished at 0956/L. Both squadrons proceeded to DUMPU as planned in good formation.

On reaching DUMPU the 498th Squadron turned N as planned. This squadron took interval in trail. Flights took interval on crossing the Mountain Range. The approach deviated somewhat from the plan. This Squadron was forced to fly out of line with the target toward the sea and then "S" back into line. This was necessary in order to maintain the proper interval behind the lead squadron. Low scattered clouds also provided some difficulty.

For these reasons strafing was concentrated only in the upper one-fourth of the strafing target.

Capt.Cooper lead the first flight on it's run over the target as planned. Capt.Cooper dropped his first bomb directly SE of ERIMA TOWNSHIP, and continued dropping at evenly spaced intervals to the PALPA RIVER. During this run Capt.Cooper spotted medium and M/G fire originating in several weapon pits but was unable to turn quickly enough to place these positions under fire (see attached overlay)

Lt.BAKER made his run on Capt.Cooper's right wing and dropped his bombs in the same relative positions as did Capt.Cooper. Lt.Baker did not spot the positions seen by Capt.Cooper but some of his bombs may possibly have hit the positions (see attached overlay) one of his bombs was dropped at the supply,dumps as indicated.

Lt.CABELL made his run on Capt.COOPER'S left wing, dropping all but two of his bombs in the first one-half of the target. Two bombs were dropped just N of the River. Two bombs were dropped on several huts with unobserved results.

Lt.H.W.HYDER lead the second flight on the same run as executed by the first flight. Lt.Hyder's first bomb was dropped thirty seconds after the last of the first flight. He began dropping just N of the PALPA RIVER and continued dropping at intervals to a point inland and just NW of the Jetty.

Lt.REINBOLD made his run on Lt.Hyder's right wing and dropped his bombs as indicated in the diagram. He did not see the A/A position 2000 yards SW of the jetty however it is possible that one of his bombs landed nearby. He dropped his last bomb on an M/T bridge which was definitely destroyed.

Capt.J.W.SNIDER was unable to open the bomb-bay doors, therefore he was unable to drop his bombs. Two of these bombs were dropped two miles out to sea at SAIDOR. The rest were returned to base.

All planes thoroughly strafed the target.

After breaking away from the target the squadron reformed and joined the lead squadron. Return to base was without incident. The first plane landed on Strip #7 at 1311/L.

IV. Citations

In view of known information, no recommendations for awards of citations will be made.

V. Tables

STRAFING TABLE

.50 Cal. A/P.No.	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Fir'd	Malfunction	.30 Cal Rds.Car'd.	Rds Fired
054	4200	800	Nil	2000	600
042	"	2400	Nil	"	200
014	"	1200	"	"	Nil
600	"	2400	"	"	1000
016	"	1200	"	"	800
058	"	1000	"	"	500
Total:	9000 X .50 Cal	3100 X.30 Cal.			

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Bombs dropped on target
054	7	300	4/5	7
042	7	"	"	Nil
014	"	"	"	7
600	"	"	"	7
016	"	"	"	7
058	"	"	"	7

Total: 35 X 300 lb.4/5second delay dropped on target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Pictures taken
014	K-21	30
058	"	30
016	"	30
254	"	30
042	"	30
600	K-20	48

TOTAL: 150 K-21's 48 K-20's

VI. Sightings.

Map Ref: 1 in. to 1 mile Bogadjim Series, Prelim Edition.) Bridge at 671993 over Gori River in good condition. Roads crossing this bridge and connecting Bogadjim Plantation with Erima Plantation, were well rutted as if heavy trafficeccured just after rain. Small M/T bridge probably at 673045 in good condition. Road in good condition. 3 to 4 columns of black smoke from Madang Area. Probably result of H/B.


VII. Nil Photo Interpretation.

Pat E Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

PEG/rjl.

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" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M), APO 503.



Mission No.FFO 7 D-1
Squadron: 499th
Squadron Order Over Target: 2nd.
Time Over Target:1121 -1123/L
Altitude: 100 -150 feet.
0 Report on Bomb Falling.
6 Took Photos 1

Ref: 1 in.to 1 mile Boyadjim.

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499
FFO 8-1
8 Jan 44

499th Bomb Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bomb Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

9 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 88-1. Performed 8 January, 44. Objective at ULIGAN HARBOR, New Guinea. 125° 25' E 04° 30' S.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General

A. The assigned objective was supply dumps in coastal villages near Uligan Harbor, New Guinea. Targets of opportunity such as barges both in the Uligan area and down the coast to CAPE CROISILLES were to be destroyed. The bomb load per plane was seven, 300 lb. demolition bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses. Approximately 4200 X 50 ammunition was carried for the strafing guns of each plane.

B. Attack

This squadron was number four in the sequence of attack. The approach to the target was made up the coast and out to sea and then turning inland approximately fifteen miles N. W. of the target. A gradual left turn brought the formation to KROMPRINZ HARBORwhich was the I. P. of the bomb run. The formation over the target was two shallow "V"s in trail. The larger concentration of bombs was in the coastal villages N.W. of ULIGAN HARBOR with the majority of bombs in the designated targets. Some bombs were dropped in ULIGAN HARBOR, destroying three barges and very probably destroying a medium A/A position and a possible heavy A/A position. Several bombs were dropped on KARKAR ISLAND with no results observed. No results were observed of bombing in the villages N.W. of ULIGAN HARBOR. However if supplies were located as reported, considerable damage certainly resulted.

C. Action of other units.

The 498th Squadron was observed on a run similar to that employed by this squadron, but at such a distance that details were indistinguishable.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the group formation and 1st Lt. N. W. Hyder was selected to lead this squadron.

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B. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st Lt. N.W. Ryder, A/P No. 254		Capt. G.L. COOPER	A/P No. 014
1st Lt. O.J. DANIEL " " 340		1st Lt. R. BAKER	" " 058
1st Lt. R.D. REINBOLD " " 600		1st Lt. W.W. CAGELL	" " 016

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of attack.

Take off was on orders from higher Headquarters. Over target at takeoff plus two hours, twenty minutes. Rendezvous with two squadrons of P-38's over CAPE WARD HUNT. Route out was up the Markham Valley to a point West of the target and then over the mountains. The 500th and 501st Squadrons were assigned ULIGAN HARBOR proper; the 499th and 498th Squadrons were assigned coastal villages above and below ULIGAN HARBOR. The 500th Squadron was to lead the attack with the 501st to the right and abreast on a run West to East over the harbor. 498th and 499th were to make individual runs NW to SE. After hitting primary targets, all squadrons were to conduct a "Barge Sweep" down the coast to CAPE CROISILLES. Group Rally Point was to be BAGABAG ISLAND. Return was to be by way of FINSCHAFEN.

B. Execution of the attack.

The first plane of this squadron took off from Strip # 7, DOBADURA at 1403/L behaind the 498th Squadron. The last plane was airborn one minute and fifteen seconds later. Squadrons rendezvous was accomplished enroute to CAPE WARD HUNT, where the Group Rendezvous was accomplished as well as the rendezvous with the fighter cover. At approximately 1415/L the Group left CAPE WARD HUNT with the 500th Squadron leading, 501st in number two position, 498th in number three and 499th in number four position of a box formation. Fighter cover departed on course with the Group and was well executed through-out the mission.

The Group Leader chose to take the alternate route (FINSCHAFEN up coast to target) instead of the originally planned route up the MARKHAM VALLEY. Bad weather was the deciding factor.

The Group proceeded up the coast to the target, staying well out to sea. The Group continued on past the target as if going to Hansa Bay and turned inland approximately fifteen miles N.W. of ULIGAN HARBOR. A gradual left turn was made to bring squadrons in position for the attack. The 499th and 498th Squadrons detached themselves from the other two in this turn. The 499th took up interval behind the 498th and followed one to two minutes behind. The extra interval was used because this squadron's run was generally on a straight line, whereas the 498th Squadron's run was undulating. At closer interval this undulating flight path would have caused the 499th Squadron to overtake the 498th.

Lt. K.M. Hyder lead the first flight on a run beginning at MORO VILLAGE. This flight dropped a total of sexteen bombs on MORO, KORIMAT, SAPANA, AND MEDIMUR VILLAGES. Lt. Hyder dropped one bomb on land east of the Harbor. Lt. Reinbold saved three bombs for barges which he spotted in ULIGAN HARBOR and Lt. Daniels saved one bomb. Lt. Daniel called the flight leader on interphone and notified him of the barges. The flight leader decided not to circle and make a run on the harbor. Consequently Lt. Reinbold dropped his remaining three bombs at two houses and a pier on the S.W. tip of KARKAR Island with unobserved results. Lt. Daniel dropped his remaining bomb near an unnamed village just east of the mouth of ULIGAN Harbor.

Capt. G.L. Cooper lead his flight on a run at a thirty second interval behind Lt. Hyder. This flight dropped a total of thirteen bombs on the villages. When Capt. Cooper reached the village of TOTO he spotted the barges on the E side of ULIGAN Harbor and immediately turned in to make a run on them. Lt. Cabell and Lt. Baker turned with Him. Capt. Cooper's co-pilot dropped two bombs, one of which was a near miss between two luggers. The other bomb was a direct hit in the center of a group of approximately ten barges. Three of these barges were definitely destroyed. His remaining tow bombs were dropped at buildings on KARKAR Island and were observed to overshoot.

Lt. Cabell, on the right wing, spotted a twenty MM postition firing from a known position near ULIMASI Village. Apparently only one gun was firing but firing continuously and accurately. Lt. Cabell had to turn sharply right to bring his guns to bear. In this turn the turret gunner placed the position under fire and silenced it. Lt. Cabell then began firing the nose guns with telling effect. He released four bombs in quick succession. Two of the bombs were seen to hit the weapon pit but delayed action prevented specific observation of damage. The position was undoubtably destroyed. A probable heavy position (large pit) was probably damaged.

Lt. Baker had dropped all bombs on the villages and was unable to do more than strafe along the east shore of the harbor.

Both flights thoroughly strafed the entire area on the bomb run. Both flights were unable to strike targets on the coast S.E. of ULIGAN Harbor because of the heavy thunder-storm which covered this area. All planes thoroughly strafed the buildings and jetty areas on KARKAR Island.

The barge sweep was not executed because of bad weather on the coast from ULIGAN Harbor to CAPE CRUSENSTERN. Close fighter cover remained with the Group until beginning of approach N.W. of the target then broke off to patrol.

IV. Citations.

In view of known information, no recommendations for awards of citations will be made.

V. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

.50 Cal. A/C No.	Rds. Car'd	Rds. Fir'd	Malfunction	.30 Cal. Rds. Car'd.	Rds Fired
016	4200	3000	Nil	2000	900
600	"	2800	Nil	2000	500
058	"	2100	LH. Solenoid	"	300
014	"	1750	Nil	"	800
254	"	700	Nil	"	300
340	"	1300	Nil	"	500
Total:	11650 x .50 Cal		3300 x .30 cal.		

BOMBING TABLE

A/C No.	No. bombs car'd.	Weight	Type	No. bombs dropped on target
016	7	250	4/5	7
600	"	"	4/5	4
058	"	"	"	7
014	"	"	"	5
254	"	"	"	7
340	"	"	"	7

Total: 37 x 250 lb. 4/5 second delay dropped on target.
(Note: 5 bombs dropped on Karkar Island.)

PHOTO TABLE

A/C No.	Type Camera	No. Pictures taken
016	K-21	30
600	K-20	32
058	K-21	28
014	K-21	30
254	K-21	30
340	K-20	5
Totals:	4 K-21's	37 K-20's

VI. Sightings.
Map Ref: Malala and Uvo East Series 1 in. 1 mile.

M/T bridge at mouth river 21/130. M/T bridge at 164155 heavy pilong. Road on coast and villages from above bridge to below Uligan Harbor 20 mm gun position at Sikon Village was just outside Village nearest harbor on top of a flat topped rise. Fire near Sikon Village apparently still burning from morning raid by other unit. Definitely not as result of bombing of this group. A/A position at 219032 was not seen to fire. Pits and revetments observed. 3 luggers and probably 10 barges in on east side Uligan Harbor. No apparent damage until this squadron made run. 2 large buildings (white) on Karkar Island. (165105 Karkar Island Prov. 1st. edition 1in. to 1 mile) K-21's seen strafing Uligan Harbor. 2 jetties at Kavilo Bay (Karkar Island). Jetty [illegible] at 107111 (Karkar Island Prov). Large pit with [illegible] (tanks) near Mission at 127105 (Karkar Island Prov.)

Villages and roads on SW part of Karkar Island good condition well used road excellent for M/T.
2 Jap soldiers seen at Kobanon Village.
3 small fires on SW tip of Island.
Large camouflaged building at 127108 (Karkar Prov.)

VII. Nil Photo Interpretation.

Pat E Goforth

PEG/eja.

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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499
10 51
10 Jan 44

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

11 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 10 J-1. Performed on 10 Jan. Objective: Barge Sweep, Bogia Harbor (145° E; 4° 20' S) to Cape Croisilles (145° 50' E; 4° 50' S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General

A. The assigned mission was to conduct a Barge Sweep from BOGIA HARBOR to CAPE CROISILLES with the Primary Target in an unnamed Bay four and one-half miles WNW of HATZFELDT HARBOR (145° 13' E; 4° 23' S). Approximately 15 barges were reported here by fighters. Eight planes were loaded with 8 X 250 lb. demo with 4/5 second delay fuses. One plane was loaded with 4 X 500 lb. demo with 4/5 second delay fuses.

B. Attack

The I.P. of attack was the southern tip of BOGIA HARBOR. Formation at beginning of sweep was three flights of three planes in a shallow "V" - flights in trail. As the attack developed, however, planes were operating singly in some instances. The entire coastal area between BOGIA HARBOR and CAPE CROISILLES was covered in the sweep. The following is a summary of damage inflicted:

8 European Type buildings destroyed by bombing.
2 European Type Buildings set afire by strafing.
2 bridges destroyed by bombing.
1 lugger bombed, destroyed by explosion.
1 lugger set afire by strafing.
1 lugger heavily damaged by strafing.
3 barges definitely destroyed and one heavily damaged, probably destroyed.
4 small boats destroyed by bombing.
1 M/G position strafedand silenced.
1 M/G position destroyed by bombing.
1 A/A position (M/G, Med.) bombed and strafed. Probably destroyed by accurate observed bombing.
1,5 gun A/A position strafed.
1 truck loaded with supplies destroyed by bombing.
A crashed "Zeke" and one S/S barge nearby strafed.

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II Personnel and Planes participating.

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR was assigned to lead the strike. Flights were set up in the following order:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	A/P	No.020
1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	"	" 600
1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL	"	" 346

SECOND FLIGHT

Capt.J.W.SNYDER	A/P	No.042
2nd.Lt.G.IRISH	"	" 254
1st.Lt.R.T.KELLEY	"	" 591

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P	No.016
2nd.Lt.A.S.ANDERSON	"	185
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	"	058

III. Details of the mission.

An attempt was made in the early morning hours of the same day, to conduct the strike. However, fighter cover was not contacted and the squadron turned back when twenty minutes past the fighter rendezvous point.

At 1325/L, orders were received to take off at 1400/L on the same mission. The first plane took off from Strip #7, DOBODURA at 1400/L. One plane took off late but joined the squadron at GUSAP where rendezvous with the "Fighter Cover" of P-38's was accomplished. The Squadron, with fighter cover, then proceeded up the MARKHAM RAMU VALLEYS to a point just N on ATEMBLE. From here the squadron proceeded to BOGIA HARBOR which was the I.P/ Time here was 1612/L. Flights then separated to conduct the sweep.

The first flight strafed villages and huts to a point just below HATZFELDT HARBOR (Malala West) where Capt.TAYLOR pulled out of formation to make a run on a bridge. The bridge was situated over the mouth of a large unnamed river at 066153. (Ref: Malala West Provisional Series, 1 in. to 1 mile, Preliminary Sheet, W.D. Corps of Engineers) All references taken from this map series.

Capt.TAYLOR made two runs over the bridge, each time dropping two bombs and strafing. The bridge was definitely destroyed. Capt.TAYLOR continued down the coast, strafing villages on the way. At ULIGAN HARBOR (Uvo East) he saw only two barges. Since he did not think it profitable to risk the A/A and since he had orders to that effect he did not enter the harbor. However, he was near enough to see A/A bursts across the mouth of the Harbor. He dropped 3 bombs at a lugger between Cape GOURDON and the bridge. Bombs missed (lugger destroyed by another plane).

At BUNABUN HARBOR (Karkar West) he spotted two barges drawn up to shore. He thoroughly strafed one and set it afire. He turned to make a second run and when almost over the barge it exploded. The explosion destroyed the other barge. At the same time small arms fire and probablyfragments from the barge explosion damaged the plane. The aileron controls on the pilot's side were shot out, nose wheel nacelle damaged, number 1 and 2 transmitters shot out. The co-pilot took over immediately and returned to base. The nose wheel would not lower. All the crew except pilot, co-pilot, and Navigator-Bombardier, were ordered into the tail in an endeavor to keep the nose high. In spite of this precaution the nose dropped just before the plane stopped rolling. Damage to the plane was not severe and only minor injuries sustained by crew members.

Lt.REINBOLD stayed in formation with the flight leader until the flight leader peeled off on the bridge. Lt.REINBOLD proceeded down the coast strafing Villages and dropping 4 bombs with unobserved results. He reached BUNABUN HARBOR (Karkar West) prior to the attack by Capt.TAYLOR. He attacked two barges and a lugger in the southern part of the harbor at some distance from those attacked by Capt.TAYLOR. On the first run one barge was set afire by bombing and strafing. The barge exploded. On the second run the lugger was heavily strafed and bombed with a near miss. The lugger was listing during the following runs. On the third and fourth runs the other barge was heavily strafed. It was heavily damaged and probably rendered unserviceable. On breaking away Lt.REINBOLD found that four of his strafing guns were entirely out of ammunition and only a few rounds left in the remaining guns. He did not attack any other targets until reaching MUGIL HARBOR (Matuka East) where an A/A position opened fire on him. He immediately dove on the position and placed it under fire. There were at least five gun positions located on a hill east of the harbor. Of these positions at least two guns were heavy calibre. Because of the lack of ammunition the positions were not silenced but the fire was accurate and some personnel in the pits were probably killed. The plane was holed by 10 to 15 fragments. For this reason he decided to return directly to base. The right main landing gear tire was flat on landing. However, by applying power to right engine, a safe landing was made without injury to personnel or plane. (Note: Only 3 rounds of ammunition left in strafing guns)

Lt.DANIEL flew on Capt.TAYLOR'S right wing until Capt.TAYLOR attacked the bridge. He dropped one bomb in a plantation at DALUA BAY and strafed villages along the coast to BUNABUN HARBOR. He arrived there during Capt.TAYLOR'S attack. He made two runs, dropping two bombs and strafing the lugger which was attacked by Capt.TAYLOR. The bombs missed but strafing was accurate and intense. Lugger sustained further damage and was left smoking. He then flew down the coast and spotted a truck loaded with supplies at 361001 (Uvo East). He bombed and strafed the truck. Debris was seen flying high into the air.

He circled to strafe a lugger nearby. During this circle the truck was observed to be completely destroyed (further confirmed by P-38 pilot). The lugger was heavily strafed and probably damaged. From here, Lt.DANIEL continued down the coast strafing targets of opportunity. At MUGIL HARBOR the A/A barrage was observed to be of heavy and medium caliber, intense in a small area and accurate.

Capt.SNYDER was leading the second flight which remained intact during the entire sweep. When over DACIO PLANTATION, BOGIA HARBOR, he saw a supply dump but sighting was too late to permit attack. He strafed villages down to his first bombing target which was two metal roofed buildings in the S end of an unnamed Bay at 020776 (Malala West). He dropped two bombs and strafed with one direct bomb hit. He proceeded down the coast strafing to Uligan Harbor. Here he was fired on by A/A from the vicinity of ULIGAN MISSION. He was out of range and circled out to sea for a run over the A/A position. He strafed the position which then stopped firing. He dropped four bombs with direct hits observed on the position and two buildings nearby. His plane was holed 4 times by fragments. He then continued down the coast to MUGIL PLANTATION (Matuka East) where he strafed several buildings with no apparent damage. He turned out toward KARKAR ISLAND, during this turn he observed his two wingman heading for ALEXISHAFEN. One of these planes was piloted by relatively inexperienced men(one on his first mission as first pilot) Capt.SNYDER realized the planes were in danger of A/A fire so he overtook the planes and pulled them out of range.

Lt.IRISH dropped his first two bombs on two European type houses (probably Swarong Mission (Matuka East). A direct hit was observed. His next target was a lone lugger just off-shore at TOMBAHUN VILLAGE (same attacked by Capt.TAYLOR). He strafed anddropped one bomb which was a direct hit. The lugger must have been loaded with gasoline or explosives for a large sheet of flame from the explosion destroyed the lugger. He made the run on ULIGAN HARBOR but was unable to bring his guns to bear on the A/A position. He strafed the shoreline of the harbor with unobserved results. Continuing down the coast he strafed a crashed "Zeke" and an unserviceable barge at Dove Pt. (Karkar West).
He became separated from the flight leader in strafing buildings at MUGIL PLANTATION. He rejoined the flight leader near ALEXISHAFEN.

Lt.KELLEY began strafing the coastline near BOGIA HARBOR (Bogia East) he had no target but was checking his guns. His first bombing target was an M/G position at TEMOKAT VILLAGE (Malala East) . The position was destroyed by hits from two bombs and strafing. He was slightly behind Lt. IRISH when he bombed a barge at TOBAHUM VILLAGE he saw Lt.IRISH drop his bomb and had to pull up. For this reason his own two missed. He made the run at ULIGAN HARBOR on Capt.SNYDER'S right wing. He strafed and dropped two bombs on a M/G position near the position bombed by Capt.SNYDER. Re-

sults of Lt.KELLYE'S bombs were not observed. His next target was four small boats at the mouth of the GILAGIL RIVER (Karkar West) which he bombed and strafed on the first run. On the second run he strafed and saw the boats had been serving as a pontoon bridge. The target was destroyed. Soon after this he pulled out of formation because of lack of bombs and ammunition.

CAPT.COOPER lead the third flight and began strafing at DAGIO PLANTATION. His first target was two metal topped frame houses at Nagoi Village (Bogia East). The buildings were destroyed by bombing and strafing. His next target was a bridge at 066153 (Malala West). The bridge was destroyed with two bombs. He continued down the coast strafing villages to ULIGAN HARBOR. Here he lead his flight in an attack on an A/A position near the one bombed by Capt.SNYDER. He strafed and dropped two bombs with unobserved results. He reached BUMABUM HARBOR and saw other planes present he made a run on the barges and dropped 3 bombs on the barges which were already aifre. He spotted a lugger at 500850 (Karkar West) the lugger was apparently of metal construction because he observed his first shots to rickochet from the sides, however, his strafing left the lugger smoking. He turned out to sea before reaching MUGIL HARBOR but was near enough to see the A/A barrage.

Lt.ANDERSON flew on Capt.COOPER'S right wing. He dropped his first bombs on two European type houses at 053170 (Malala West). The two houses were destroyed by direct hits. He continued strafing down the coast strafing huts and Villages. He spotted a M/G position at 190150. He made two bombing and strafing runs on the position which was silenced on the first run. Further observation not made. He continued down the coast strafint with no important targets and turned out to sea before reaching Cape CROISILLES because he had no ammunition or bombs.

Lt.BAKER strafed villages on the coast down to DOGAMUR BAY (MALALA WEST) where he attacked a bridge dropping four bombs in two runs. Three of the bombs hit close enough to the bridge to destroy it but skipped out of effective radius. The fourth bomb destroyed approximately one-half of the bridge near the river bank. He continued strafing down the coast to ULIGAN HARBOR where he strafed and bombed a serviceable barge and one sunken in the SE part of the harbor. The bomb was a near miss and possibly damaged, the barges. He strafed the crashed "Zeke" and U/S barge at Dove Pt. He then strafed villages on the coast to MUGIL HARBOR and broke off the sweep in formation with Capt.COOPER.

All planes with the exception of Capt.TAYLOR and Lt.REINBOLD returned together. The first plane landed at approximately 1840/L.

IV. Citations.

Investigation is being conducted as to eligibility of any crew members for award of medals. Some crew members were injured in action.

V. Tables

STRAFING TABLE

.50 A/P No.	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Fired	Malfunctions.	.30 Rds.Car'd	Rds.Fired
185	4200	3600	Nil	2000	1400
254	4200	2600	"	"	1000
042	"	3000	"	"	800
600	"	3700	"	"	1000
340	"	1800	"	"	500
016	"	2500	"	"	800
058	"	2500	"	"	600
591	"	900	"	"	500
020	"	2500	"	"	100
23100 X.50 Cal.				6700 X.30 Cal.	

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No. On Target
185	4	500	4/5	4
254	8	250	"	8
042	"	"	"	"
600	"	"	"	"
340	"	"	"	"
016	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
591	"	"	"	"
020	"	"	"	"

Total Bombs Dropped on Target: 64 X250 lb demos. 4 X.500 lb. dropped on targets.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Pictures taken
058	K-21	30
254	"	"
020	"	"
600	K-20	50
340	"	6
TOTAL 90 K-21	56 K-20	

VI. Sightings

Supplies in area approximately at 820280 (Bogia East), Road from Bogia Harbor to Cape Croisilles in excellent condition showing signs of much use.Road observed at many places along coast. Bridges sturdy and well kept.
Telephone lines(several on single posts at various places along coast on landward side on Road. Two to three probable communication centers seen. (Between Bogia and Cape Croisilles.)Telephone lines converged into buildings. One probable radio station. Camouflaged antenna at Meigar Village.(Matuka East. Large bridge at 164155 (Malala East) over river mouth 50 yards inland. Bridge had open center section , large cables running across top, probably draw bridge to allow barges to pass through.
Underground storage area with sod top in vicinity of hill west of Dalua Bay (Malala West)

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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" A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929.
" A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

499
12 B-1
12 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

13 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 12 B-1 performed 12 Jan. 44. Objective: Barges and supply dumps at ALEXISHAFEN (146° 48'E 5°05' S) New Guinea.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FAIF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 503.

1. General.

A. The assigned mission was to make a single pass over ALEXISHAFEN attacking barges and supply dumps along the shores of BOSTREM BAY and SEK HARBOR, and on ADMOSIN and SEK ISLANDS. One Airplane was to photograph BAGABAG ISLAND (146°15' E - 4°50' S) 35 miles NE of ALEXISHAFEN. Nine airplanes were loaded with 8 X 300 lb. demo bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses.

B. Attack

The attack was begun from the mountains West of ALEXISHAFEN. Formation was three flights of three airplanes each, the first two flights abreast and the third following. The sweep was made over BOSTREM BAY including areas adjacent to both shores; the North coast of SEK HARBOR; ADMOSIN MEGAS AND SEK ISLANDS.

C. Action of other units:

The 498th Squadron which had been assigned the same general target area was observed leaving the target by the leading flight of this squadron.

2. Personnel and planes participating.

Capt.G.L.COOPER was selected to lead the squadron. Flight formation was to be line abreast and flights were set up in the following order:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P	No.185
Lt.R.BAKER	"	" 058
Lt.A.S.ANDERSON	"	" 016

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SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Capt.J.W.SNYDER	A/P No.042	Lt.H.W.HYDER	A/P No.254
Lt.O.J.DANIEL	" " 340	Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	" " 019
Lt.R.T.KELLEY	" " 591	Lt.C.CESSNA	" " 097

3. Details of the Mission.

The first airplane took off from Strip #7 DOBODURA, at 0830/L. Rendesvous with fighters P-47's was accomplished at NADZAB and the Squadron proceeded up the MARKHAM -RAMU VALLEYS a point 25 miles NW of DUMPU where they swung North. 35 miles farther on they turned East to begin the sweep. The Squadron came over the mountains just East of ALEXISHAFEN at approximately 4000 ft. and dropped gradually to about 200 ft. as they reached the target area. Time over Target was 1042/L.

Capt.COOPER lead the first flight which started their run along the shore of BOSTREM BAY. Nine bombs were dropped at suspected supply dumps in this area. The inlet just E of the peninsula which forms the north side of the mouth of BOSTREM BAY three bombs were dropped at two barges. On the peninsula on the east side of the inlet mentioned above one more bomb was dropped at a suspected supply dump. Eight bombs were dropped at a wharf and supply dumps at the South tip of VITAR PLANTATION which juts into SEK HARBOR. Two more bombs were dropped at approximately six native huts partially concealed by trees on the North Tip of SEK ISLAND. As this flight crossed OTTLIEU PASSAGE the second flight drew very close so Lt.BAKER who was flying on Capt.COOPER'S right wing pulled up to avoid a possible collision and was unable to drop his last bomb. All areas bombed were also heavily strafed.

Capt.J.W.SNYDER led the second flight to the right and abreast of the first flight. Three bombs were dropped around the West end of BOSTREM BAY, one near the tip of the peninsula at the North side of the mouth of BOSTREM BAY, and two more just across the mouth of the Bay on DANIP PLANTATION. Two bombs were dropped at a M/G position in the center of the same section of DANIP PLANTATION. Three bombs were dropped on ADMOSIN ISLAND, one of which skipped into the water. Nine bombs were dropped on SEK ISLAND at suspected supply dumps. Lt.DANIEL was unable to drop his last two bombs because of malfunction of racks. Lt.KELLEY dropped his last two bombs on BAGABAG ISLAND. All areas bombed were also strafed.

LT.HYDER led the third flight which followed the first two by about fifteen seconds. Three bombs were dropped along the South shore of BOSTREM BAY and three along the North shore on the peninsula at the mouth of the bay.Three bombs were dropped at ADMOSIN ISLAND one of which fell short.

One bomb was dropped at a jetty just East of the mouth of the MAPRAIN RIVER and one just east of the mouth of the BIGES RIVER. Two bombs were dropped at MEGAS ISLAND, one of which overshot. Nine bombs were dropped at SEK ISLAND, four of which went in the water. They left the target at 1044/L.

The rendezvous point was BAGABAG ISLAND which was circled once before starting back. Lt.DANIEL took pictures of BAGABAG ISLAND as ordered. Although Capt.SNYDER'S flight was delayed slightly while Lt. DANIEL photographed BABABAG ISLAND, they soon caught up with the squadron and all planes returned together. The first airplane landed at 1238/L.

Nil damage was suffered by airplanes or personnel with the exception of A/P No.058 flown by Lt.BAKER. The underside of the fuselage was hit by a metal fragment probably from one of the bombs dropped by Lt.KELLEY on SEK ISLAND. The fragment did not completely prnetrate the bottom of the fuselage and damage was negligible.

4. No recommendations of awards will be made as a result of this mission.

5. Tables.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	.50 Rds. Car'd.	.50 Rds. Fired	Malfunctions	.30 Rds Car'd	.30 Rds. Fired
185	4200	1200	Nil	2000	400
019	"	1350	"	"	500
016	"	1100	"	"	400
042	"	2500	"	"	500
254	"	600	"	"	
058	"	750	"	"	
097	"	1800	"	"	
340	"	1350	"	"	2000
591	"	650	"	"	1000
Total:	11350 Rds. .50 Cal.		4800 Rds. .30 Cal.		

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target.	
185	8	300	4/5 Sec.	8	
019	"	"	"	5	(3 in water)
016	"	"	"	8	
042	"	"	"	8	
254	"	"	"	6	(2 in water)
058	"	"	"	7	(1 returned to base)
097	"	"	"	7	(1 in water)
340	"	"	"	6	(Rack Malfunction)
591	"	"	"	6	(2 on Bogabag Island)

TOTAL BOMBS ON TARGET: 61 X 300 lb. Demos.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
185	K-20	31
058	K-21	30
340	K-20	37
591	K-29	14
854	K-21	30
019	K-21	30
097	K-21	30
K-21 - 120	K-20 - 88	

6. Sightings/

All references this paragraph: Alexishafen Spec. Mapl Prelim Sheet 1/25000.
2 well camouflaged barges at 724394.
A/A position 737378 was observed 2 guns seen in position, guns inactive.
Small fire 703394 believed to be result of H/B attack or lead Squadron.
Two to three docks at 715393.
1 small fire, black smoke at 724380.
1 Small fire, white smoke at 715388
1 small fire while smoke at 704398.
1 small fire black smoke at 713397.
Buildings near St.Micheal's Cathedral appeared in good shape but gave appearance of being deserted.
Results of attacy by Heavy Bombers not observed.
Bomb Smoke had raised to 200 feet.

Pat E. Goforth

PEG/rj.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M) APO 503.

499
14 B-1
14 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503.

15 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 14 B-1. Performed 14 Jan.44. Objective at FREDREICH KARL HARBOR, N.G. (145° 46' E - 05° 09' S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M), APO 503.

I. General

A. The assigned objective was FREDRICH KARL HARBOR, ALEKISHAFEN, N.G. Purpose of the mission was to destroy barges and shipping in the Harbor as well as targets of opportunity, such as supply dumps, personnel areas and installations. The bomb load per plane was 8 X 300 lb. demolition bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses.

B. Attack.

The route out was Base to FINSHAFEN to Target. Approach was from sea to a point midway between MADANG and SOMADJIM. From here circling inland to make a run on the target with an axis of attack of approximately 50 degrees.
Sequence of attack was 499th Squadron, 500th Squadron, 501 st Squadron, 498th Squadron in that order with flights in trail. Formation over the target varied from a shallow "V" to echelon to the left. Bombs were generally dropped in possible supply and personnel areas. 90% of bombs fell in these areas with only six bombs in the water. No resulting fires or smoke were observed.

II. Personnel and planes participating.

A. This squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation with Capt.G.W.TAYLOR leading the squadron.

B. Squadron formation was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	A/P No.097	Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P No.185
2nd.Lt.C.W.IRISH	" " 254	1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" " 058
1st.Lt.C.G.JORDAN	" " 591	1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" " 016

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III. Details of the Mission.

A. Plan of attack.

The strike was to be coordinated with three squadrons of B-24's which were to be off the target one minute before this Group's attack,.

The first plane was to take off at 1250/L. Rendezvous was to be accomplished within fifteen minutes with the Group Formation on course at 1305/L. Fighter cover of 1 squadron of P-47's was to be contacted off SAIDOR at 1355/L. The Group was to proceed to the target with squadrons taking up interval before making landfall between MADANG and BOGADJIM. Flights were then to take up interval in the turn toward the target. The axis of attack for the 499th and 500th Squadrons was to be approximately 50 degrees. The 499th taking the seaward half of the Harbor and the 500th, the landward half. The 501 st and 498th Squadrons were to circle farther inland and to the NW making their runs on an axis of approximately 160degrees. Each was assigned a section of the target similar to the assignment of the first two squadrons. These tactics were employed to insure adequate coverage of the harbor since heavy foliage and low altitude combine to make targets difficult to spot. No A/A fire was expected since A/A in the entire area has been bombed out of existence. However, the above tactics were also employed to disperse the A/A fire if encountered. After making the bombing run the two lead squadrons were to make a slow turn to the S. and allow the other squadrons to continue the bomb run and join the formation without turning. All squadrons were to return in Group Formation.

B. Execution of Attack.

The first plane took off at 1247/L from Strip 4, DOBODURA. (The early take-off was necessary when the lead navigator computed the ETA and found the time insufficient to allow execution as ordered. It was later found that a typographical error in the "Strike Orders" had delayed the take-off by forty minutes.) The Group Rendezvous was accomplished in one wide circle over Strip 4 at 1258/L with the Group on course for the target at 1300/L. Capt.TAYLOR maintained an I.A.S. of 210 m/p/h. to SAIDOR in order to arrive there as soon as possible and still maintain a [redacted] Group Formation. In spite of the bomb load, a strong headwind and high throttle settings, the Group Formation was excellent. Capt.TAYLOR only made one turn in reaching SAIDOR. The fighter escort was still waiting off SAIDOR when the Group arrived thirty-two minutes late at 1355/L. At SAIDOR the fighter escort joined the formation and provided excellent close cover throughout the mission. Before making land fall the B-24's were seen leaving the area.

Some difficulty was experienced in recognizing the target because of the large number of islands, bays and inlets in the same area. However, oblique photographs enabled the lead plane to spot the target. Intervals were assumed as planned.

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR signaled for the lead flight to echelon to the left which was promptly executed. He lead the first flight on the prescribed run over the seaward half of the squadron target at 1439/L. All planes began strafing at two miles S of the Harbor at an altitude of approximately one-thousand feet and continued throughout the run. Since no barges were present in the harbor, this flight dropped a total of twenty one bombs on both sides of the Harbor in suspected supply and personnel areas. Three bombs were dropped in the water. Capt.TAYLOR thoroughly strafed a large village on RUO ISLAND at the end of his run. The flight then assumed the usual three plane "V" formation and began a slow right turn.

Capt.G.L.COOPER lead his flight over the target in a loose three plane "V". His run was on a somewhat sharper diagonal starting to the West of the first flight's run and crossing RUO ISLAND. This flight dropped a total of twenty-one bombs on both sides of the harbor with one in the water. Capt.COOPER dropped two bombs on the large village on RUO ISLAND. The bombs hit directly in the center of the village but skipped and probably exploded in the water. The flight also thoroughly strafed the area. Because of the sharper angle of attack, Capt.COOPER was able to turn inside the first flight and pull into formation without difficulty. Other squadrons joined as planned and the Group proceeded to base.

The Group Formation crossed Strip #4 in excellent, close formation at 1620/L. The first plane of this squadron landed at 1625/L.

There were nil casualties to aircraft or personnel.

IV. No recommendations for awards or citations will be made as result of this mission.

V. Tables.

.50 Cal. STRAFING				.30 Cal.	
A/P No.	Rds. Car'd.	Rds Fir'd.	Malfunctions	Rds. Car'd.	Rds Fired
185	4200	800	Nil		
097	"	1100	"		
016	"	1100	"		
254	"	1700	"		(No .30 Ammunition expended)
591	"	600	"		
058	"	800	"		

Total 6100 X.50 Cal. expended.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. Bombs dropped on Target	
185	8	300	4/5	7	(1 in water)
097	"	"	"	6	(2 in water)
016	"	"	"	7	(1 " ")
254	"	"	"	7	" "
591	"	"	"	8	
058	"	"	"	7	(1 in water)

Total Bombs dropped on target: 42 X 300 lb. demo.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Pictures Taken
185	K-20	25
591	K-20	21
254	K-21	30
097	"	30
016	"	30
097	"	20
TOTAL:	46 K-20's	120 K-21's


VI. Sightings.

One unusually large building of Native Construction at 727297
Ref: Madang Airdrome Special Map - Prelim Sheet 1/25000.
Large white building at Mabonob Mission in good repair apparently in use.
Nagada Mission in good repair apparently in use.

Pat E Goforth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO503.



Mission No.FFO 14 B-1
Squadron No. 499th
Squadron Order Over Target: 1st.
Altitude: Minimum/
0 Crew Report On Bomb Falling.
1 Took Photos

Ref: Madang Airdrome - Alexishafen.
1/25000

499
15 C-1
15 Jan 4

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

16 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 15 C-1. Performed on 15 Jan.44. Objective at SAIPA VILLAGE No.1 (145° 42' E 5° 41' S.)

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. General.

A. The assigned objective was SAIPA VILLAGE No.1. The purpose of the mission was to attack and destroy a Japanese Army Headquarter which was reported to be located in this village. The attack was in direct support of Australian Ground Forces which are patroling within a short distance of SAIPA.

B. Rendezvous with one squadron of P-40's and one Australian "Boomerang" was accomplished as ordered.

C. Attack

1. Plan of attack.

This squadron was ordered to attack SAIPA VILLAGE No.1, employing ten planes loaded with five, 500 lb. demolition bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses, and a maximum load of .50 ammunition for the strafing guns.

The general plan of attack was as follows; Take off of the first plane was scheduled for 0845/L. Squadron formation to be accomplished in one circle over the base on Strip 4 DOBODURA. The Squadron Formation enroute was to be three, three-plane flights in "V" formation with flights in trail, javelin down. The tenth plane was to assume the number four position in the number three flights. The squadron was to proceed to NADZAB in the MARKHAM and rendezvous with one squadron of P-40's at 2000 feet at 1000/L. The squadron with fighter escort was then to proceed to GUSAP and rendezvous with one Australian "Boomerang". The entire force was then to proceed to the target with the "Boomerang" leading. Time over the target was to be 1030/L.

On sighting the target the squadron was to circle above while the "Boomerang" dived, strafing to pin point the target. At a given signal the flights were to break up and circle to the west and south.

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Approach was to be from the South through a pass and then down into the valley on the target. All bombs were to be dropped in one run over the target. Subsequant strafing runs were at the discretion of the Squadron Leader. Each plane was to maintain a close interval so that if the plane in front did not drop bombs then the following plane would follow suit. This measure was adopted to prevent bombing of the wrong target.

After breaking away from the target, the lead flight was to remain intact while the deputy flight leaders assumed leadership of their respective flights. (This practice is being used to give experience to future flight leaders). The formation was then to return to base in the same type of formation used enroute.

2. Bombing results were excellent with only five bombs reported outside the target.

3. Damage is thought to have been severe to enemy installations in the target area since the target itself and the area five-hundred feet on either side was thoroughly covered with bomb bursts. The first few planes over the target reported at least six buildings in the target area, the last two reported only two left intact. These sightings were made before the last planes made their runs. Further confirmation of the excellent results was received by the Squadron Leader in a radio conversation with the "Boomerang" Pilot who stated that bombing was accurate and target was well covered. He also stated that there were two bridges left intact in the area but of course these were not the assigned target. However, one bridge near the target was observed to be damaged with a near miss.

The "Boomerang" proved invaluable in locating the general vicinity of the target but it is thought that a smoke bomb or candle dropped by the "Boomerang" would be much more effective than strafing for reasons set forth in III C below.

II. This Squadron was the only Bombardment Unit envolved in the strike. First Lt.NORMAN W.HYDER (with MAJOR MARSTON, Assistant Group Operations Officer) was selected to lead the Squadron Formation. The Formation was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

1st.Lt.N.W.HYDER	Plane No.	254
1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL	" "	340
1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	" "	097

SECOND FLIGHT

Capt.J.W.SNYDER	A/P No.	042
1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	" "	317
1st.Lt.C.SESSNA	" "	016

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	A/P No.	058
Capt.G.L.COOPER	" "	185
1st.Lt.P.T.LUTTRELL	" "	347

2nd.Lt.R.T.KELLEY A/P NO.015

III. Details of the Mission.

Times of essential phases.

A. The first plane took off from Strip 4, DOBODURA, at 0845/L. The last plane was airborne one minute and fifty-five seconds later. The Squadron Formation was accomplished in one wide circle over the base, five minutes after the first plane took off. Rendezvous with fighter escort was accomplished at 1000/L. The Squadron was circling over the target at 1030/L and the initial attack began at 1039/L. Breakaway from the target was 1100/L. The first plane landed at base, at 1340/L.

B. Route.

The Route out was base - Lae - Nadzab - Gusap - to Target. Return was Nadzab - Lae - Base.

The approach after circling over the target was from S to N through a 4500 foot pass between two mountains of approximately 7000 ft. and then down into the valley and on to the target which was approximately 1500 feet above sea level.

As executed this represented a descent of approximately 3000 feet in a distance of 5 miles.

Maneuver: Planes in trail circled to the W and then S and then turning N through the pass.

C. Details of action.

On sighting the target Maj.MARSTON who was flying at the time, circled above and observed the "Boomerang" strafing run. He then led the squadron to a point just NW of the target and signaled for the formation to break up and individual planes to fall into trail.

Maj.MARSTON made the prescribed pattern, circling W and S then through the pass and down onto the target. He spotted the general area strafed by the "Boomerang". He then picked out the target within the area and dropped all five bombs from an altitude of approximately 200 feet. He reported all his bombs in the target and the crew confirmed his statement. He then climbed out of the valley and turned left - thus completing a "Luffberry Circle". He made his initial strafing fun just behind the last plane's bombing run.

Action of all planes was almost identical with that of the lead plane, as to approach, descent, bombing and subsequent strafing runs with one exception - one plane dropped five bombs ½ mile short of the target damaging a bridge with a near miss. Each plane made 2 to 3 strafing runs.

D. Fighter escort was excellent throughout the mission.

E. There were no casualties to air-planes or personnel.

IV. In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for citations will be made.

V. Armament and Ordnance Table.

Bombing Table

A/P No.	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	Remarks
254	5	4/5	500 lb.	~~Nil~~ 5	~~(Bombs dropped short)~~
340	"	"	"	5	
097	"	"	"	Nil	BOMBS JUST SHORT
042	"	"	"	"	
317	"	"	"	"	
016	"	"	"	"	
058	"	"	"	"	
185	"	"	"	"	
347	"	"	"	"	
015	"	"	"	"	
Total:	50 X 500 lb. Bombs Dropped			45 X 500 lb. On Target.	

Strafing Table

A/P No.	.50 Cal. Rds Car'd	Rds Ex. Gun Fail.		.30 Cal. Rds. Car'd.	Rds. Ex. Gun Fail.	
254	4200	1000	Nil	2000	500	Nil
340	"	800	"	"	Nil	"
097	"	1300	"	"	"	"
042	"	1800	"	"	"	"
317	"	600	"	"	"	"
016	"	2000	"	"	"	"
058.	"	1900	"	"	"	"
185	"	2400	"	"	400	"
347	"	600	"	"	"	"
015	"	800	"	"	"	"
Total:	42000	13,900		20000	900	

Photographs

A/P No.	Time Photo Taken		Locality		Type of Camera	Ex. Made	Prints Rec'd.
254	1030 - 1100		Saipa Village		K-21	30	(Not available.)
097	"	"	"	"	"	Nil	Nos used.
340	"				K-20	"	" "
042	"	"	"	"	K-21	20	(Not Available)
016	"	"	"	"	K-21	20	" "
058	"	"	"	"	K-21	30	" "
185	"	"	"	"	K-20	21	" "
347	"	"	"	"	K-20	18	" "
						100	K-21
						39	K-20

VI. Sightings.


A.(References: Mt.Kumari Prov. Map 1 in. to 1 mile)
M/T bridges observed on unnamed rivers in target area at 605736.
Several huts observed in Valley at 613722 near Saipa.
All tracks and huts gave appearance of considerable activity.

B. Rugged terrain and dense rain forest prevented crews from making the usual number of sightings.

VII. Reason why No. of Prints received (Par.5 Section 3) were not given, is due to the fact that prints have not yet been received.

Pat E Goforth
PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M), APO 503.


499th Bomb Sq
FF015-G-1
Ref. Mt. Kubuni - Origina
1 in. - 1 mile Series
MINDJIM RIVER
HAILE RIVER
SOLU RIVER
N
45 BOMBS HERE
5 BOMBS HERE
Palpa (1)
Palpa (2)
RETURN I
STRAFING RUNS

499
20-A-1
20 Jan 44

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

21 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 20 A-1. Performed 20, Jan. 44. Objective at Hansa Bay, N.G. (144°52'E; 04° 11'S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FAFF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General.

A. The assigned objective was HANSA BAY. The purpose was to attack enemy barges and supply dumps along the shore of the Bay and in adjacent areas.

B. Attack.

1. Plan of attack.

This squadron was number four in sequence of attack. Ten planes were to be employed, loaded with five 500 lb. demolition bombs and a maximum load of .50 Cal. ammunition for the strafing guns.

The general plan of attack was as follows: Alert was scheduled at 0715/L and take-off at 0750/L. The Squadron formation was to be accomplished enroute. The Squadron Formation was three, three-plane flights in "V" formation with flights in trail javelin down. The tenth plane was to assume number four position in the third flight. The Squadron was to rendezvous with the Group enroute to [illegible]. The Group was then to proceed to MADANG in the MARKHAM VALLEY and rendezvous with one squadron of P-40's, close cover, and two squadrons of P-47's, top cover, at 3000 feet at 0915/L.

The Group with fighter escort was to proceed up the MARKHAM-RAM VALLEY to a point about 30 miles South of HANSA BAY in the vicinity of [illegible] VILLAGE where they were to turn North. The approach to the target was to be low, keeping down behind the [illegible] as long as possible. It was hoped that the element of surprise could thus be achieved. The Group was to cover the Western shore of HANSA BAY including [illegible] and [illegible]. The squadrons were to make individual runs of one pass only over the target, two making their runs to the North and two crossing the target in a Northeasterly direction. Withdrawal was to be accomplished by proceeding North over the water.

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The P-40's were then to strafe the coast to CAPE BRODRICK with the Group flying a parallel course well out over the water. If they became separated from the fighters the second rendezvous point was to be SAGA BAG ISLAND. One Squadron of P-47's was to come down as close cover while the P-40's made strafing attack. The route back was via MADDAB, making landfall in the vicinity of BOGADJIM and carefully avoiding SHAGGY LEDGE. The formation on the return was to be the same type as used enroute.

2. Bombing was excellent with only four bombs reported outside the target area.

3. Damage was thought to be severe to enemy installations in this area since the target was heavily strafed and well covered by bomb bursts. A known heavy A/A position S of NUBIA STRIP and a M/G position W of NUBIA STRIP were bombed, heavily strafed and silenced. Two bombs dropped at 2 serviceable "Haps" and nearby U/S fighters on NUBIA STRIP were thought to have landed near enough to cause damage. A camouflaged fighter, possibly serviceable, on AWAR STRIP was probably damaged by a bomb burst. Ten trucks near the shore at NUBIA PLANTATION and one M/T bridge just S of the PLANTATION were probably damaged by bombs. Three barges at the jetty NE of EKU VILLAGE were heavily damaged by strafing and supply dumps in AWAR PLANTATION were definitely damaged by bombs.

B. Interception.

1. There was nil interception by enemy A/C/.
2. Nil airborne enemy A/C were sighted.

II. The 500th Bomb Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and 1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ was selected to lead the 499th. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	A/P No.097
1st.Lt.T.R.KELLEY	" " 591
1st.Lt.R.G.IRISH	" " 252

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.R.E.[illegible]	A/P No.016
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" " 052
1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	" " 164

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.C.L.[illegible]	A/P No.015
1st.Lt.C.J.DANIEL	" " 130
1st.Lt.J.P.WILSON	" " 317

[illegible].T.TAYLOR A/P No. 317

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Times of essential phases.

The first plane took off from Strip #4 Dobodura at0759/L. This squadron was preceeded by the 498th Squadron whose first A/P took off at 0754/L. The delay was caused by several transports which were attempting to land at this time. Rendezvous with Group at CAPE WARD HUNT accomplished at 0815/L, and with fighter escort at MADZAB at 0915/L. Time on target was 1023/L and breakaway was at 1025/L. The first plane landed at 1240/L.

B. The route out was CAPE WARD HUNT, LAE, MADZAB, ASHAMBERG, TARGET. Return was BAGABAG ISLAND, KEIMA PLANTATION, MADZAB, LAE, BASE. The approach was made from the vicinity of ASHAMBERG aiming in Low behind the RUBOMI MT.RANGE, over the range and out to the target at minimum Altitude.

Maneuver: A slight circle was made behind the RUBOMI RANGE and respective flights slowed down to achieve proper spacing for the attack.

C. Details of action.

Lt.C.L.BAMZ, led the first flight and as he approached the RUBOMI RANGE he executed a slight turn and slowed down to give the squadron a proper interval behind the preceeding squadron and allowing the other flights to space themselves correctly. He made his run over the target from SW to NE. As he crossed MUSIA STRIP he noticed two "Baps" poorly camouflaged at which he dropped one bomb. It was a near miss and he was of the opinion that some damage was sustained by the "Baps". As he crossed over the bay he saw some barges, and being able to hit only one of them he did not think it a profitable target for a bomb so he saved the remainder for AWAR PLANTATION. He strafed the barges however. As he passed SISIMAWOO VILLAGE, the A/A position nearby fired twice at his plane. The bursts were very close, being just off his right wing. The airplane was just outside the effective range of the nearer burst and the right wing passed through the smoke. Lt.BAMZ dropped four bombs at supply dumps on AWAR PLANTATION, then proceeded out over the water and headed for BAGABAG ISLAND.

Lt.KELLEY, was flying number two position on Lt.BAMZ's right wing. He dropped two bombs at the same two Baps but thought that they overshot as the time between sighting them and dropping the bombs was very short. He strafed and silenced a H/G position just E of the center of MUSIA STRIP. As he passed the shoreline he saw some barges lined up at 90° to his course so dropped no bombs as he thought it would not be worthwhile but he strafed three of them and inflicted heavy damage.

He dropped three bombs on AWAR PLANTATION on boxes covered with tarpaulins which he noticed throughout the area. He is of the opinion that his bombs caused considerable damage to these supplies. As he went out passed CONDOR POINT, he noticed A/A following him, throwing shells above and about 500 yards to the rear of the airplane. He followed Lt.BANZ on down toward BOGABAG ISLAND.

Lt.IRISH, was in number three position on the first flight. He strafed NUBIA STRIP and dropped two bombs at a supply dump at NUBIA VILLAGE. He strafed barges along the shore and in the AWAR RIVERMOUTH at EKU VILLAGE. He dropped 3 bombs at supplies on AWAR PLANTATION, then swung out over the water and headed toward BOGABAG ISLAND.

Lt.REINHOLD led the second flight and came across the RUBONI BANKS to the left and abreast of the first flight. He strafed NUBIA AIRDROME and proceeded up across AWAR PLANTATION. He dropped one bomb on AWAR PLANTATION at a supply dump but salvoed four bombs near the NE end of AWAR DROME due to a faulty switch. He strafed heavily the whole area in his line of flight across the target and proceeded out over the water toward the Group rendezvous point. He observed light and medium A/A from known positions on AWAR PLANTATION but nil damage was suffered by his airplane.

Lt.McCLURE flew number two position on Lt.REINHOLD'S right wing. He strafed NUBIA STRIP heavily and dropped one bomb at a well conditioned bridge over the AWAR RIVER which he estimated a probable hit. He saw three camouflaged barges which were behind the bridge. He proceeded on across AWAR PLANTATION and dropped four bombs on supplies there before swinging out over the water.

Lt.BAKER flew number three position on Lt.REINHOLD'S left wing. He strafed NUBIA STRIP and dropped two bombs just S of bend in AWAR RIVER one-half mile W of EKU VILLAGE at a suspected supply dump. He saw approximately 17 barges along the shore near EKU VILLAGE. He proceeded on across AWAR DROME strafing heavily and dropping one bomb at a camouflaged fighter on the NE end of AWAR STRIP. Two more bombs were dropped at supplies between the NE end of AWAR STRIP and the shore. As he proceeded down the coast toward the rendezvous point he saw P-40's strafing the coast. At RARIK VILLAGE near CAPE GOODENOUGH he noticed A/A fire, probably 20 mm., directed at the P-40's.

Capt.COOPER led the third flight over the target. Proceeding up the HAMU VALLEY on the way to the target he noticed artillery fire in the SHAOGY RIDGE area, probably friendly as the flashes appeared to be S of the Bomb Line in his estimation. Approximately 15 miles S of HANSA BAY he noticed new buildings under construction in two small unidentified villages, fairly close to each other.

He executed a right turn coming over the BUKOMI RANGE which brought the flight over the S end of NUBIA STRIP thus enabling them to cover LAING ISLAND. He strafed the S end of NUBIA STRIP and proceeded across the Bay to LAING ISLAND. As he crossed the Bay, he noticed a small ship, single mast, about a half mile South of AWAR POINT but was unable to observe further details. He saw no worthwhile targets at LAING ISLAND but since it was his assigned objective, he dropped four bombs at it. Due to the narrowness of the island in his line of flight, only one bomb hit, two falling just short and one overshooting. He proceeded on down the coast to BAGABAG ISLAND to rendezvous with the Group. As the Group made landfall over ERIMA PLANTATION he noticed that there was nil A/A fire from any points there.

Lt.O.J.DANIEL flew number two position on Capt.COOPER'S right wing. As he crossed the S end of NUBIA STRIP he saw approximately 10 trucks parked near the shore in NUBIA PLANTATION, which he strafed and at which he dropped 2 bombs. They were a near miss and he estimated probable damage. As he crossed the water he observed 3 barges at a jetty about ½ mile S of NUBIA VILLAGE, 2 barges at the jetty at SISIMANOO VILLAGE, and two luggers beached at NUBIA VILLAGE. He also noticed many bomb bursts in AWAR PLANTATION and felt that this area was thoroughly covered. He saw two C/Sbarges on the S shore of LAING ISLAND, and although he did not think them good targets nor observe anything else there, he dropped 3 bombs, one of which overshot. As he swung out of the Bay he saw P-40's strafing MANAM ISLAND.

Lt.WILSON was in number three position on Capt.COOPER'S left wing. As he came over the mountains he began to strafe NUBIA STRIP but almost immediately all of his guns jammed except one. He continued to strafe with his single gun. As he crossed the water toward LAING ISLAND he observed 3 or 4 barges in the mouth of the AWAR RIVER at SEKU VILLAGE. Due to malfunction of racks, no bombs were dropped and he returned all five bombs to base.

Capt.C.H.TAYLOR flew the fourth plane in the third flight. As he came across NUBIA STRIP he strafed a known active A/A position at the S end of the strip. The position was silenced. He noticed P-40's strafing the strip immediately prior to his own attack. As he crossed the water he saw approximately 4 barges at the jetty at SISIMANOO VILLAGE. He dropped all five bombs on LAING ISLAND, one of which overshot, but he saw no evidence of activity there. Just as he passed LAING ISLAND there were 3 heavy A/A bursts near the tail of the plane. There was nil damage to the airplane but the empennage was noticeably shaken. As he proceeded toward BAGABAGISLAND he observed P-40's strafing the coastline.

D. Fighter escort was excellent throughout, the action.

E. There was nil damage to our aircraft or personnel.

IV. Citations.

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for citations willbe made.

V. Tables

ARMAMENT REPORT .30 Cal. .50 Cal.

No.A/P	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Ex.	Gun.Fail	Rds.Car'd	Rds.Ex.	Gun Fail
340	4200	1060	Nil	2000	Nil	Nil
015	"	530	Feed L.R.S.	"	"	"
591	"	1325	Nil	"	"	"
058	"	1575	Nil	"	1000	"
016	"	1325	Nil	"	500	"
097	"	1100	Nil	"	400	"
347	"	1800	LRS Cover plate.	"	500	"
254	"	1325	URM Firing pin weak	"	500	"
185	"	2250	Nil	"	100	"
317	"	1325	Nil	"	N 1	"
Total	42,000	13615		20000	4300	

BOMBING TABLE

No.A/P	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target	Remarks &
340	5 AS50	SAP	500	4	1 in water (Overshot)
015	"	"	"	2	3 in water
591	"	"	"	5	
058	"	"	"	5	
016	"	"	"	1	(4 salvoed) Target Area
097	"	"	"	5	
347	"	"	"	4	1 in water
254	"	"	"	5	
185	"	"	"	5	
317	"	"	"	0	(Malfunction, bombs brought back).

TOTALS : 40-500 Lb. Demos. dropped on Target.

PHOTO TABLE

No/A/P	Time Photo	Locality	Type of Camera	No.Made	Prints Rec'd.
097	1023-1023½L.	Hansa-Bay	K-21	30	Prints Not yet
591	" "	" "	K-20	4	received.
016	" "	" "	K-21	30	
058	" "	" "	K-21	8	
[illegible]5	" "	" "	K-21	15	
317	" "	" "	K-20	22	
TOTAL	26 K-20	83 K-21			

D. GROUND OPPOSITION.

The known A/A positions S of MUBIA STRIP fired slight, heavy and inaccurate. The known positions E of MUBIA STRIP fired moderate, medium, and accurate. Its bursts shook the tail section of A/P No.347 flown by Capt.TAYLOR. Most bursts were trailing. The known position at EKU VILLAGE was also firing. The calibre was estimated to be 20mm. as no heavy bursts were seen. The fire was inaccurate. The known position at CONDOR POINT was classified as Moderate, heavy, and accurate, It's bursts rocked some airplanes and it continued firing after the formation was off the target over the water. The last bursts were above and approximately 500 yards behind. M/G and small arms fire was noted from several points near the beach between MUBIA PLANTATION and CONDOR POINT. An unreported medium position was located in AWAR PLANTATION approximately one-half mile NW of AWAR POINT. It's fire was described as slight, medium and inaccurate. Fire was also received from the known position on AWAR PLANTATION, slight, medium, and inaccurate.

VI. Sightings.

Friendly A/B in Shaggy Ridge Area. Probably friendly artillery fire in vicinity of Shaggy Ridge. New Buildings under construction approximately 15 miles S of Hansa Bay. 17 barges sloppily camouflaged and in poor condition along shore just N of EKU VILLAGE.
10 barges, well camouflaged and apparently in good condition, along the North shore of the Bay at AWAR PLANTATION about one-half mile S of MUBIA VILLAGE.
2 beached luggers on the shore at MUBIA VILLAGE.
~~2 beached luggers on the shore at MUBIA VILLAGE.~~
2 barges just inside south of Awar River at Eku Village.
1 small ship, single mast, one-half mile south of Awar Point.
Evidence of heavy activity observed in MUBIA and AWAR PLANTATION.
Several Jap soldiers were seen running in these areas, presumably from the several trucks hastily parked and abandoned that were noticed nearby.

There was heavy traffic on the roads and around several dumps near CONDOR POINT. Several bombs from preceeding Squadrons were observed bursting in the water of the Bay.
Two large fires, one E of AWAR STRIP, which gave appearance of burning fuel and the other in AWAR PLANTATION. The latter looked like an ammunition dump going up, in flames. Both fires were probably the result of the 498th Squadron attack.
The P-40's were noticed strafing MANAM ISLAND and the coastline. There was some possible return fire.
P-40's strafing RABIN VILLAGE near CAPE GOURDON were seen to receive light A/A fire.

VII. Photo Interpretation.

Photographs taken on the mission have not yet been received.

Pat E Goforth

PEG/rjl.

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FAIT, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

499
21 M-1
21 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

22 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 21 M-1. Performed on 21 Jan.44. Objective at LORENGAU, MANUS ISLAND. 147° E 02°S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A/C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bombardment Group,(M), APO 503.

1. General.

A. The assigned mission was to attack and destroy three, 5000 ton and one 6000 ton M/V which were reported to be at anchor in the Harbor at LORENGAU on the North side, eastern end of MANUS ISLAND.

B. Rendezvous

Rendezvous was accomplished with the 501 st. Squadron over "Gona Wreck", Dobodura at 0745/L. Rendezvous with fighter escort of 16 P-38's was accomplished over FINSCHHAFEN at 0900/L.

C. Attack.

1. Plan of Attack.

Three planes of this squadron were to execute a strike on LORENGAU HARBOR in conjunction with eight planes of the 501 st. Squadron. The bomb load for each plane was two, 1000 pound bombs with 4/5 second delay, fuses.

The planes were to take off from Strip #4, Dobodura and form enroute to "Gona Wreck" where rendezvous with the 501st. Squadron was to be accomplished. The entire formation with the 501 st. Squadron leading and our three planes in the number two position, was to proceed direct to FINSCHHAFEN and rendezvous with one Squadron of P-38's. The formation with escort were to proceed direct to MANUS ISLAND.

On arrival there our three planes were to attack opportune targets on the starboard side of the axis of attack, regardless of the course being flown. The 501st. Squadron was to attack targets directly in line of attack and those targets to the port.
After attack the formation was to form and return to base by way of FINSCHHAFEN.

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2. Execution of attack.

The approach was from S to N over KELAWW HARBORon the S side eastern end of MANUS ISLAND. The formation continued overland to within sight of LORENGAU and seeing no shipping in the harbor, turned eastward to attack shipping in the eastern part of SEEADLER HARBOR. The formation on the initial attack was a V of V's.

One freighter (probably 2000 - 2500 tons) was hit directly under the stern. The resulting damage caused the freighter to settle on one side and catch fire (this observed during attack on three different runs over the ship. Also smoke 500 or more feet high observed thirty minutes after attack).

One Patrol Craft (possibly 500 tons) hit by two bombs and blown to bits following an attack by the 501st.Squadron which damaged the boat and probably would have sunk the boat eventually.

A jetty and nearby barges were definitely damaged by one bomb in an inlet due west of MAMOTE DROME. A jetty and nearby barges were definitely damaged by one bomb on the west side of LOS NEGROS ISLAND.

Several barges in the inlet west of MAMOTE DROME were strafed and damaged as were barges in the vicinity of PAPATALAI VILLAGES.

Two barges and nearby houses were damaged by strafing.

MAIKUTU ISLAND was strafed on return from target. Points of suspected activity were strafed in coconut groves. No definite targets.

Bombing was excellent with 3 direct hits and 3 near misses (all within 150 feet of targets).

3. Action of Other Units.

The 501st.Squadron was observed to strafe HUTJOLUO ISLAND and then make a run from W to E on the Patrol Craft. All bombs missed entirely. A flight turned N to make a run from W to S. An undetermined number of bombs were dropped one of which damaged the boats with a hit on one side. Other bombs near misses and entirely covered the boat with water. This flight of several planes then turned right and made another run from N to E but seeing only wreckage as a result of bombing by both squadrons, did not release bombs. On the return trip the 501st. Squadron was observed to strafe in the St.ANDREWS ISLAND Group.

B. INTERCEPTION.

Although 1 Rufe was observed over SEEADLER HARBOR, no interception was attempted.

II. The 501st.Squadron was assigned to lead the composite formation which included three of the 499th Squadron planes. 1st.Lt.R.D. REINBOLL was selected to lead the flight of three planes from this Squadron.

The flight was set up as follows:

No.1 Position	No.2 Position	No.3 Position
1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLL A/P No.014	1st.Lt.T.R.KELLEY A/P No. 340	1st.Lt.J.D.WILSON A/P No.254

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B. The route out was Base - FINSCHAFFEN - MANUS ISLAND: The initial attack was made from W to E from the vicinity of LORENGAU and continuing over LOS NEGROS ISLAND. The second pass by the flight leader from E to W over the Patrol Craft. The second pass by the #3 plane from N to S over the patrol craft and the second pass by the #2 plane from S to N attacking LOS NEGROS ISLAND in the vicinity of SALAMI PLANTATION. The third pass by the #3 plane from W to E over the debris of the Patrol craft. All three planes then made runs generally from NE to SW over the land in the vicinity of PAPITALAI VILLAGE.

C. Action of Individual Planes.

1st.Lt.REINBOLD was leading the flight, which was on the right wing of the formation leader, when a right turn was made near LORENGAU. He saw no targets in LORENGAU HARBOR, consequently he stayed in formation. He saw the Patrol Craft out in SEEADLER HARBOR and that it was clearly a 501 st. target. He continued the run down the coastline to the inlet near RUTJOLUO IS. On topping a small hill he saw a freighter at anchor near the shore being unloaded by barges. He saw that he would be unable to attack the freighter so he motioned for Lt.KELLEY the #2 man to attack. Lt. REINBOLD continued the run and attacked a jetty and nearby barges in an inlet opening into PAPILALI HARBOR with one bomb and strafing. The barges were in motion just off shore and heading shoreward. He saw bombs miss the Patrol Craft so he executed a left turn and made a run on the Patrol Craft from E to W. He saw that he would have sufficient time to attack before the 501st made a second pass and dropped his second bomb which was a near miss, silencing 20 mm or heavy M/G fire from the boat. He then turned left to strafe barges on the coastline with damaging results. Lt.PETHOFF the Bombardier-Navigator observed the 501st bombs shower water over the boat and one bomb to damage the boat. He expressed the opinion that the boat might have sunk as a result of this bomb.
Lt.KELLEY was flying on Lt.REINBOLD'S right wing when he received direction to attack the freighter. He made a low attack from port stern to starboard bow. He dropped one bomb directly under the stern and pulled up sharply to clear the masts. He continued the run and strafed barges in the vicinity of PARLAKA VILLAGE. He then turned left to attack SALAMI PLANTATION. He dropped his remaining bomb on a jetty and nearby barges on the W side of LOS NEGROS ISLAND, scoring a near miss and resulting damage.
During this attack he observed Lt.REINBOLD'S attack and saw his bomb miss close enough to cause minor damage to the boat.
He also saw Lt.WILSON'S attack following that of the 501st. He saw the boat still floating and right side up so he spaced himself behind Lt.WILSON and followed to strafe the boat in case Lt.WILSON missed. However, Lt.WILSON'S bombs hit the boat squarely and destroyed it to the extent that strafing was not warranted.
Lt.KELLEY then made another run over the freighter that he had bombed and saw it listing heavily (probably resting on the ocean floor) and burning. He strafed barges in the vicinity and then broke off his attack.

Lt.WILSON was flying in number 3 positions. He strafed barges on the coastline from W to E but saw no targets worthy of a 1000 lb. bomb so did not bomb. He saw the 501st. attack and miss on the first pass. He turned left; and spaced himself behind the 501st flight which was making a turn for a second attack on the Patrol Craft. He saw the 501st bombs explode and completly obscure the boat with theappearance of complete destruction. However when the water settled the boat was still intact and right side up. He attacked and dropped two bombs one which was barely short and the other a direct hit. He banked sharply right and saw debris floating in the water. Still following the 501st planes he made another run from W to E and saw only debris on the water. The 501st planed did not drop bombs on this pass and neither did Lt.WILSON. Lt.WILSON turned south and observed the freighter bombed by Lt.KELLEY to be burning and listing. He made a pass over PAPITALAI HARBOR strafing barges and MAROTE STRIP. He turned N and attacked a barge white house and a large native hut on LOMBRUM PT. He then made a pass from N to S and attacked two barges and nearby huts in on inlet N of MATAAN VILLAGE.

All three planes then reformed and circled in the vicinity of PAPITALAI HARBOR to join the 501st Squadron Formation. The formation turned S and strafed in the ST.ANDREWS GROUP of ISLAND. The 499th planes strafed coconut groves on MANOTE ISLAND appearance indicated activity and habitation.

The formation returned to FINSCHHAFEN where Lt.KELLEY and Lt.WILSON throttled back toconserve dwindling gasoline supply. In spite of this all three planes landed within a space of two minutes. The first plane landed at 1325/L.

D. Fighter escort was excellent throughout.

E. There was nil damage to A/P of this unit.

F. There were no casualties among personnel.

IV. Eligibility of crew members for citations is being considered. Recommendation, if made, will be forwarded in the near future.

V. Tables: See next page.

STRAFING TABLE

	.50 Cal.			.30 Cal.		
A/P No.	Rds.Car'd.	Rds.Fired.	Gun Fail.	Rds.Car'd.	Rds.Fired	Gun Fail
014	4200	1600	Nil	2000	1300	Nil
340	"	3380	Nil	"	500	N
254	"	3150	Nil	"	900	"
TOTALS:	12600	8130		6000	3000	

Bombing Table

A/P No.	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Bombs on Target	Remarks.
014	2	4/5	1000	(2 near misses)	
340	"	"	"	1	(Other near miss)
254	"	"	"	2	

TOTAL 3 Bombs on Target 3 near misses.

Photo Table

A/P No.	Type Camera	No.Pictures Taken
014	K-20	Not available.
254	K-20	" "
340	K-21	8


TOTAL: 8 K-21 Number of K-20's taken not available.

VI. Sightings.

1 Rufe at 3000' over Harbor heading North. Disappeared by time over target.
Nil enemy A/C on Lorengau or Momote Airdromes.
501st second run bombs near miss shower of water covered boat when water settled, boat intact.
Several huts and houses along coast between Lorengau and E tip of Manus Island.
Wreck near Lombrum Harbor. Only superstructure showing.
4 barges and several small boats about the size of lifeboats along the beach on the SE shore of Papitalai Harbor. 2 or 3 barges in small inlets at SE end of Los Negros Island. Houses, M/T roads, good condition on SW½ half of Los Negros Islands. 1 M/V 3500 tons in inlet (5275(Ref: Manus Is. and ajacent islands 4 miles to 1 in.) Large house (European Style) and large native structure on E tip of Manus Island.

Pat E Goforth
PAT E.GOFORTH
CAPT., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

PEG/rjl.



Mission No; 21 M-1
Squadron ; 499th
Squadron Order Over Target; 2nd.
Time Over Target; 1044/L - 1054/L.
oCrew Report on Bomb Falling.
Book Photos.

499
24-D-1
24 Jan 44

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499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

25 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 24 D-1. Performed on 24 Jan., 44. Objective at LORENGAU AREA, Manus Island. (Long. 147° E Lat. 02°S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FAFF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General.

A. The assigned mission was to attack and destroy barges, shipping installations and targets of opportunity in the LORENGAU AREA, at the East end of MANUS ISLAND.

B. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous with 2 Squadrons of P-38's was accomplished enroute prior to reaching FINSCHAFEN at 2000' at 1045/L. No other group participated in the strike.

C. Attack.

1. Plan of Attack.

Four Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group were to conduct a strike on the LORENGAU AREA, MANUS ISLAND. The ten planes comprising of this Squadron were to be third in the sequence of attack. The bomb load per plane was two 1000 lb. demolition bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses. They were to take off from Strip #7, Dobodura, circle to the left forming by the time Strip #1, Dobodura was reached where rendezvous with Group was to be accomplished.
The four Squadrons in "Box Formation", Javelin down were to proceed direct to FINSCHAFEN and rendezvous with 2 Squadrons of P-38's. The formation with escort was then to proceed direct to MANUS ISLAND.
Upon arrival at the target, Squadrons were to go in trail at the signal of the Group Leader and were to make individual passes over the targets in flights of three in proper sequence.
The attack was to be made from East to West covering LORENGAU ISLAND and the eastern part of MANUS ISLAND including inlets, harbors, anchorage and installations in the adjacent areas.

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After passing the LORENGAU AREA the flights were to turn South and to rally over LOU ISLAND. There the Group was to reform and return to the base via FINSCHAFEN.

2. Execution of the attack.

The approach was made from South to North. RAMBUTYAL IS. was the I.P. and then Axis of attack was East to West. As the Group made a gradual turn over RAMBUTYAL ISLAND the squadrons dropped back in trail and flights of three planes in a shallow "V" spaced themselves at approximately 30 second intervals. This Squadron was third in the sequence of attack being preceded by the 501st and 498th Squadrons and followed by the 500th Squadron.

Buildings were heavily strafed and damage on Salami Plantation, Los Negros Island, causing damage but not resulting in fires. One bomb was dropped on a damaged freighter, thought to be in the mouth of PAPITALAI HARBOR. A direct hit furthered the destruction of the boat, the stern of which had already been badly shattered. A barge nearby was also destroyed. A camouflaged lugger was destroyed with one bomb at an unamed Bay at 4486 (Ref: Manus Island 4 mile to 1 inch Map). Bear Point was strafed heavily with no visible results. A jetty, a small amount of supplies thereon and 3 barges were destroyed by a direct hit with one bomb and a near miss by another in LORENGAU HARBOR. 1 bomb dropped on LORENGAU VILLAGE exploded in the center of a group of 2 European type houses and some native huts. Smoke from the bomb burst obscured vision of the result but damage was estimated as extremely heavy.
1 bomb was dropped at two buildings near a road junction at 3877(Same map as above) which was a near miss. 1 bomb was dropped 1 mile East of LOMBS MISSION. (This was by a 498th plane and results were not reported to this unit). 2 bombs were dropped at suspected supply dump W of LORENGA [illegible]. Buildings in this area were strafed. 1 bomb was dropped on houses N of SIPALAU VILLAGE at 2683. 1 bomb dropped at BOWAT MISSION 2482, was thought to have missed but the mission was heavily strafed. Another bomb was a near miss on BOWAT-MISSION damaging but not destroying the building. 1 bomb missed a suspected barge in BOWAT BAY. A bomb was dropped on houses on W shore of KAILENO BAY, and another bomb destroyed houses on the Point at 2183. 1 bomb destroyed houses on ANDRU PT. 1584. 1 bomb dropped 1 mile N. of LAMAHAN ISLAND. (This was by a 498th plane and results were not reported to this unit). Inland villages in the vicinity of HALL BAY, were strafed heavily but no results were apparent. 1 bomb dropped on village on Island, 2383, destroyed several huts. Fishing boats S of MANUS ISLAND were strafed. The entire target area was thoroughly strafed. Bombing was excellent with 15 of a total of 18 bombs on the targets.

3. Action of other units.

The 498th Squadron which preceeded this Squadron over the target was observed to blow up an ammunition dump on the E side of a bay near BUTJOULO ISLAND at 4385. Several houses throughout the E end of MANUS ISLAND, a fire in LORENGAU PLANTATION and burning buildings at

LORENGAU VILLAGE were observed as results of preceeding squadrons attack's. The following Squadron, the 500th, was seen destroying a P.T. Type boat in the W end of SKEADLER HARBOR. A possible gasoline fire in LIAP VILLAGE 1884, was probably caused by a preceeding Squadron's attack.

D. Interception.

(1) Nil enemy interception.

(2) Nil destruction of accompanying units observed.

II. The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the group and Capt.G.L. COOPER was selected to lead this Squadron.
Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P	No.014	
1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL	"	"	058
2nd.Lt.J.D.WILSON	"	"	016

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.L.BAND	A/P	No.097	
1st.Lt.T.R.KELLEY	"	"	591
1st.Lt.H.H.ALGER	"	"	019
1st.Lt.W.G.IRISH			164

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.O.J.DANIEL	A/P	No.	317
1st.Lt.W.D.JORDON	"	"	185
1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	"	"	164

Note: 2nd.Line in first flight should read: 1st.Lt.R.BAKER - 058.

III. Details of the Mission.

A. Time of take-off:0940/L.
Group Rendezvous: Form over Strip #7 Dobodura, at 1000 ft.
On course at 0950/L.
Attack: Time over Target, 1230/L. - 1245/L.
Landed: Strip #7, 1518/L.

B. Route out: Dobodura - Finschafen - Rambutyo Island - Target.
Retrun Route: Target - Lou Island - Finschafen - Base.

Attack route: I.P. was Rambutyo Island. Axis of attack, East to West. Attack was made over Los Negros Island, Papitalai Harbor, Lorengau Village, Bowat Bay, thence SE to Lou Island.

Maneuver: As Rambutyo Island was reached Squadrons dropped back in trail and individual flights spaced themselves at approximately 30 second intervals.

C. Action of Individual Planes.

Capt.COOPER led the first flight. As he approached Los Negros Island he saw a small fishing boat near HORNO ISLAND which he strafed. He strafed Salami Plantation on Los Negros Island and Bear Pt. Manus Island but could not discern results. He noticed a plane of the 498th Squadron blow up an ammunition dump on the E Side of Bay near BUTJOULO ISLAND. He saw Lt.IRISH, his left wing man, set a lugger afire in POAVEI PASSAGE by strafing. He saw 3 barges at the jetty in LORENGAU HARBOR and a small amount of supplies on the jetty which he strafed and set afire. He dropped a bomb which was a direct hit and destroyed everything there. Proceeding on up the coast, he dropped his second bomb at 10 to 12 houses at SAPILAN VILLAGE, W of LORENGAU STRIP. It was a near miss and damage could not be estimated. He turned S near BOWAT BAY and as he approached the rally point, LOU ISLAND, he observed and strafed a small fishing boat just W of the island.

Lt.BAKER flew on Capt.COOPER'S right wing. He strafed huts and several frame houses on LOS NEGROS ISLAND. He crossed out over SEEADLER HARBOR and as he passed BUTJOULO ISLAND he saw a long camouflaged lugger in the Bay just S. He strafed buildings W of LORENGAU STRIP and and observed a lugger explode off McEVOY POINT as a result of the attack of a previous squadron. He strafed at SAPILAI VILLAGE and dropped his first bomb at BOWAT MISSION which overshot. He swung South then, strafing inland villages between BOWAT BAY and the South coast of MANUS ISLAND. He saw a village on POAHANDA ISLAND, just S of MENUS ISLAND, and dropped his second bomb there destroying several huts. As he approached LOU ISLAND he observed several huts there, which he strafed heavily. He observed P-38's strafing the target area during and after the attack.

Lt.IRISH, originally scheduled to fly #4 position in the third flight, moved up to Capt.COOPER'S right wing about 20 minutes after take off when Lt.WILSON was forced to turn back due to mechanical difficulties. Lt.IRISH continued for the remainder of the mission in this position. He strafed houses on LOS NEGROS ISLAND. as he approached LORENGAU AREA he saw buildings burning as a result of previous attacks. He dropped his first bomb on houses at a point near KARENG BAY and another at a house near ANDRAU POINT. He then turned toward the Rally Point, LOU ISLAND.

Lt.BANZ led the second flight. He strafed buildings on LOS NEGROS ISLAND some of which he observed were already burning. He saw a large barge going toward the E side of PAPITALI HARBOR but was unable to go after it. As he passed POAVEI PASSAGE he noticed a large lugger at the inlet but it was not in his line of flight and he was unable to attack it. He ceased strafing as he neared LORENGAU VILLAGE to avoid damaging nearby P-38's, also strafing and did not drop bombs then for the same reason. He strafed buildings W of LORENGAU STRIP and dropped two bombs in what appeared to be a plantation in the area W of LORENGAU STRIP. He saw a barge burning in BOWAT BAY and after he swung South his crew members saw two barges in good condition, in KARENG BAY.

Lt.KELLEY flew on Lt.BANZ's right wing. As he crossed PAK ISLAND he saw a jetty on a beach on SW shore of the island at MAKERA VILLAGE. It appeared suitable for barge traffic.
He also approached LOS NEGROS ISLAND firing his strafing guns. As he passed over PAPITALAI HARBOR several airplanes began to close in to his right and another flight was just ahead of him. He took slight evasive action to avoid their bomb bursts. He dropped his first bomb at LORENGAU VILLAGE it was observed by another crew to have burst in the center of 2 houses and several huts causing considerable damage. As he proceeded along the coast he noticed 4 to 5 barges in poor condition along the coast of the unamed Bay near BUTJOLOU ISLAND. He dropped his second bomb just E of the S end of LORENGAU STRIP at several huts near a crossroad. As he passed the strip he observed 3 or 4 A/A butsts accurate as to altitude but off his right wing a considerable distance. The bursts were estimated to be from 20 or 40 mm. guns. Some light M/G or small arms fire was also noticed in the vicinity but he was unable to observe the definite positions. He strafed up the coast to the vicinity of BONAT BAY before turning S. He saw a bomb burst in a village on the S coast of MANUS ISLAND about due S of BONAT BAY, probably LOICHA VILLAGE, which caused considerable damage to the huts in the village. Ashe approached LOU ISLAND he strafed and damaged a small fishing craft 5 miles NW of the island.

Lt.McCLURE flew on Lt.BANZ's left wing. He crossed LOS NEGROS ISLAND and PAPITALAI HARBOR and started to make a bombing run on a P.T, type boat which was moving across SEEADLER HARBOR. Just at that point a P-38 dropped it's belly tank almost on the flight and disrupted the run. He was unable to get the boat but observed the squadron following blow it up with a direct hit. He observed a fire burning in LOMBRUM HARBOR as a result of previous squadron's attack. He destroyed a camouflaged lugger in the unnamed bay on the shore at McEVOY PLANTATION with one bomb and heavily strafed it. He proceeded on up the coast and dropped another bomb on camouflaged houses just N of KAMING BAY before turning S. He strafed villages on the S shore of MANUS ISLAND and went on to the rally point, LOU ISLAND. Lt.McCLURE was originally scheduled in the third flight but moved up to number three position in the second flight when Lt.ALGER dropped out of formation 25 minutes from the base due to engine trouble.

Lt.DANIEL led the third flight. As he crossed LOS NEGROS ISLAND he saw a damaged freighter with a barge along side in PAPITALAI HARBOR at which he dropped one bomb. He believes he scored a hit as explosion followed and fire was observed. Smoke from this approximately point was observed later from the rally point.
He strafed on up the coast and observed only one A/A burst near LORENGAU STRIP which he estimated to be 40 mm calibre. He observed a camouflaged barge, apparently in good condition near the mouth of a creek at LOGUS MISSION. He dropped his other bomb at a suspected barge in BONAT BAY, which he believed was a near miss. As he turned S he saw a possible gasoline fire in the vicinity of LIAP VILLAGE. Cause of the fire was undetermined. He strafed inland villages and proceeded on out to LOU ISLAND.

Lt.JORDAN was Lt.Daniel's right wing man. He saw a large lugger in an inlet on the SW Part of PAPITALAI HARBOR as he crossed LOS NEGROS ISLAND and dropped one bomb at it. He believes it was a direct hit as orange flame was seen to spurt out of the lugger. Thas target was also heavily strafed. He passed on out over SEWADLER HARBOR and observed a bomb fromLT.KELLEY'S plane bursting in the center of LORENGAU VILLAGE. He proceeded on up the coast and made a run on BOWAT MISSION. He strafed the mission and drooped his other bomb which although it was a near miss is believed to have caused heavy damage. He then swung S and headed for LOW ISLAND.

The third position in this third flight was filled in by a 498th Squadron plane. It's results were not reported to this unit.

D. Fighter Escort.

With the exception of a few instances of premature strafing and dropping belly tanks in front of our airplanes, interfering with their runs, fighter cover was excellent throughout.

E. Damage to A/C.

Airplane #391 flown by Lt.KELLEY received a small dent in leading edge of the left wing. The turred canopy was also knocked off. Both of these damages were believed to have resulted from nearby bomb bursts.

F. Damage to personnel.

Radio man in airplane #25b flown by Lt.McCLURE sustained a minor head injury when struck by the charging handle of his .30 cal. waist gun. It is believed that this handle was sheared off as a result either of enemy small arms or m/g fire or by a bomb fragment from a nearby burst.

G. Citations.

Recommendation for the award of the Purple Heart are being prepared and will be forwarded upon completion.

V. Armament and Ordnance Tables.

See next page.

Ordnance Table

A/P No.	.50 Cal. Rds Car'd	.50 Cal. Rds Fi'd	.50 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds Car'd	.30 Cal. Rds Fi'd.	.30 Cal. Gun Fail
591	4200	2120	Nil	2000	500	Nil
014	"	2385	"	"	Nil	"
058	"	3120	Nil	"	1000	"
185	"	2120	"	"	200	"
317	"	1325	"	"	500	"
164	"	2385	"	"	400	"
097	"	3120	Cable off pulley		900	"
347	"	1600	GRN	"	Nil	"
Total:		20275 X.50 Cal.		3600 X.30 Cal.		

Bombing Table

A/P No.	No. Bombs,	Weight,	Type	No. Bombs dropped on Target	
591	2	1000	A/S	2	
014	"	"	"	1	(Other near miss)
058	"	"	"	2	
185	"	"	"	1	(Other near miss)
317	"	"	"	1	" " "
164	"	"	"	2	
097	"	"	"	2	
347	"	"	"	2	
TOTAL:	15			13	

Note: The 498th Plane which flew with this squadron dropped it's bombs on target, thus making a total of 15 X 1000 lb. bombs on target.)

Photo Table

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Pictures taken	Target	Time Photos Taken
591	K-20	14	Manus Is.	1229 -1235/L
014	K-21	30	"	" "
058	K-21	Nil		
185	K-20	13	"	" "
164	K-21	17	"	" "
317	K-20	None (Not used)		
097	K-21	30	"	" "
347	K-20	None (Not used)		
Total:	77 K-21	27 K-20's.		

C. Ground Opposition

M/G and small arms fire were observed from the vicinity of LORENGAU DROME. 3 to 4 bursts of medium A/A (20mm or 40 mm) were seen over LORENGAU DROME. 3 crew members from 3 differint planes made this observation. Bursts were accurate as to altitude but for the most part were N and to the right of the airplanes.


VI. Sightings.

1 lugger seen in PORUBI PASSAGE at 4786. (All ref. 4 miles to 1 inch Manus Island) Good jetty at Mokare Village, S shore of Pak Island 7471. 1 Med. A/A position, 1 gun, no crew, no activity N of Bossun Village. 3776. 4 to 5 B/S barges on S side Butjolou Island. 1 large barge or lugger, camouflaged, in creek mouth of Lugas Mission 3478.
2 serviceable barges on S shore Kareng Bay.

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.
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" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 ATF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO503.


DRUGAI BAY
KARENG BAY
BOWAT BAY
SAPMOR
LORENGAD AIRFIELD
TINGAU R.
LEHEI R.
LAURENGAU R.
WARI RIVER
PATUSI BAY
SANDERS PT.

CONFIDENTIAL

499
25-D
25 Jan 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

26 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 25-D. Performed 25 Jan., 44. Objective at MANUS ISLAND, 147° E - 02° S.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. GENERAL

a. The assigned objective was MANUS ISLAND in the ADMIRALTY GROUP OF ISLANDS, Targets were shipping, barges, supply areas and facilities. The bomb load per plane was five 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group was accomplished over Strip #7, Dobodura as ordered. Rendezvous with P-38 escort was accomplished over FINSCHAFEN at 1005/L.

c. Attack:

(1) This squadron was number 3 in the sequence of attack at 1147/L. Formation over the target consisted of three, three plane "V"'s, each spaced at a safe interval in trail. Approach to the target was from SW to NE, turning W on the attack route over PAK ISLAND which is due E of MANUS ISLAND. Bombing was excellent with 41 bombs dropped. Only three of which missed the target entirely. 3 bombs were returned to base because of rack malfunction and one bomb dropped safe for the same reason. For the most part buildings and villages were the targets bombed and damage to these was substantial. Two large mission buildings were heavily damaged. Several other buildings and villages at various points along the N coast of the Eastern end of MANUS ISLAND were damaged or destroyed. Three jettys were bombed, one of which was destroyed together with a laden barge nearby. Two of the jettys damaged. Supply areas near LORENGAU STRIP were bombed with a considerable number of bombs. No fires or smoke resulted but bombs definitely hit in the target. A string of five bombs were dropped on LORENGAU STRIP straddling a revetment on the S side of the strip which contained a Betty which appeared servicealbe and fairly new.

Succeeding planes cinfirmed the destruction. Two damaged luggers or small freighters received further damage. Neither could be salvaged or repaired as a result of this and previous attacks.

(2) Other units were observed taking interval prior to our attack. Otherwise action of other squadrons of the 345th Group were unobserved. The 38th Group was observed to make a run on LOS NEGROS ISLAND from N to S during or just prior to attack by the 498th Squadron of the 345th.

d. Interception.

(1) No planes destroyed in combat by this unit.

(2) No enemy A/P were seen to be destroyed by other units and no freindly planes were shot down by enemy fighters/

II. PERSONNEL AND PLANES PARTICIPATING:

a. The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation and Capt.G.W.TAYLOR selected to lead our Squadron Formation.

b. Flights of this Squadron were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	A/P No.	340
2nd.Lt.H.N.ALGER	" "	016
2nd.Lt.D.J.WILSON	" "	019

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.G.L.COOPER	A/P No.	014
1st.Lt.T.R.KELLEY	" "	591
1st.Lt.C.J.JORMAN	" "	185

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.L.BANZ	A/P No.	097
1st.Lt.K.D.McCLURE	"	600
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	"	058

2nd.Lt.W.G.IRISH - 317

Note: A/P #591 returned to Finschafen prior to reaching the target when a prop control cable broke. A/P #317 assumed the #2 position. A/P #600 crash landed at sea. 40 miles S of target as a result of damage sustained by A/A fire. The crew was rescued by a Catalina. Flight #3 made attack before #2 flight.

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Time and place of :
Alert at planes - 0730/L.
Take off, Strip #7 Dobodura - 0905/L.
Rendezvous 345th Group Strip.#7 at 2000 feet - 0915/L.
Rendezvous 345th and 38th Group Strip #7 - 0920/L.
Over Target: 1147/L - 1205/L.
Landing - Strip #7: 1430/L.
Note: Above time includes 6 planes. Three planes landed at Finschafen and returned to base at 1600/L.

b. Route/.

(1) Route out: Base - Finschafen - Target.

(2) Attack Route: Maneuver from E to W over LOS NEGROS ISLAND and Island Chain N of MANUS ISLAND, turning onto target over KARENG BAY (Manus Island) and making bombing and strafing run from W to E along N coast of Manus Island.

c. Individual Action of each plane.

Capt.TAYLOR lead the first flight over LOS NEGROS ISLAND from E to W. He strafed the Islands N of MANUS ISLAND and turned one-eighty degrees over KERENGE BAY to make his attack. He heavily strafed BOWAT MISSION at 2483. He strafed the coastline down to LORENGAU without sighting a suitable target. On reaching LORENGAU DROME he observed an apparently new and serviceable 2/E M/B (Probably Betty) in a revetment on the S side of the drome. He dropped all five bombs here. The crew observed the bombs to straddle the revetment apparently destroying the bomber. (This confirmed by the last flight.) While over LORENGAU STRIP a heavy A/A position was observed firing from a point approximately 1000 feet S of the drome. Capt.TAYLOR took evasive action and as a result only 1 of several bursts caused minor damage to his plane. He continued his run down the coast, strafing, to PAPITALAI HARBOR.

Lt.ALGER flew on Capt.TAYLOR'S right wing and made the entire run in that position. He strafed buildings and a jetty area on the W side of LOS NEGROS ISLAND. He strafed the Islands N of MANUS ISLAND and dropped two bombs on HAUWRI ISLAND. One of these bombs hit in the water just offshore and the other just on the beach. He turned with the flight leader and strafed down to LORENGAU DROME. Here he dropped one bomb which went out safe. He continued down the coast strafing to McEVOY PLANTATION where he dropped two bombs on a damaged lugger. The bombs were direct hits. Lt.ALGER continued strafing down the coast and broke off the target with the flight leader.

Lt.WILSON flew in the number 3 position of this flight and strafed LOS NEGROS ISLAND as well as the Islands off the N coast of MANUS IS. He observed a plane on fire going down near PAPITALAI HARBOR. The plane crashed, burned and exploded. After turning onto the target at KARENG BAY he dropped two bombs on BOWAT MISSION (2483). Both bombs missed the building but exploded within 100 feet causing damage. He continued strafing down the coast to LORENGAU where he dropped two bombs in the supplyarea S of the drome. He had fallen behind his flight, consequently he stayed wide and to one side to avoid bursting bombs. He dropped his last bomb just S of the E end of the Drome. He continued strafing down the coast and followed his flight leader off the target.

Capt.COOPER, leader of tht #3 flight brought his flight over the target behind the first flight. As he came in toward LOS NEGROS he saw an airplane in a previous squadron go down in flames and crash on the N side of PAPITALAI HARBOR in what appeared to be a swampy area.

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At this time he noticed two large balls of fire about 100' apart in the air in the vicinity of MOMOTE AIRDROME. One he thought was the engine of the burning plane and the other a prematurely exploding bomb. However, he was not certain. He saw a burning barge deep in PAPITALAI HARBOR. He dropped his first bomb at a jetty at the N side of PAPITALAI HARBOR on shore, just W of SALAMI PLANTATION, which he believed to be a hit or a near miss. He proceeded westwardly across SEEADLER HARBOR and strafed a few shacks in PITIJULU PLANTATION on PITIJILU ISLAND, as he passed LORENGAU STRIP he saw Medium A/A bursts between 500 feet and 1000 feet coming from the vicinity of the drome. They were far off his left wing and he is of the opinion that they were directed at the first flight. After strafing PITYILU ISLAND he made a 180° turn to the left and proceeded back down the coast of MANUS ISLAND. His second bomb exploded midway between a house and a bridge, approximately 100 yards apart, at the mouth of LORENGAU RIVER. He is certain that considerable damage was inflicted. He swung south over POAVEI PASSAGE toward the rally point but made no further sightings. Due to a malfunction of the racks he was able to release only two bombs and returned three to the base.

Lt.IRISH flew on Capt.COOPER's right wing. He also saw an airplane crash on the land N of PAPITALAI HARBOR and observed a barge burning well inside the Harbor as he approached LOS NEGROS ISLAND. He strafed the NORTHERN PART of this island and strafed islands to the W of LOS NEGROS He observed A/A bursts from the vicinity of LORENGAU STRIP as he made this strafing run. He Also made a 180° turn at PITYILU ISLAND and swept down the coast. He let 2 bombs go at some buildings at McEVOY PLANTATION and one at a jetty on the beach due E of BUTJULOU ISLAND. He could not ascertain the results of these bombs. He turned S immediately, after that andtdropped 2 bombs at some huts in a plantation on the S shore of LOS NEGROS ISLAND about 2 miles E of LONIU VILLAGE. He believed the bursts caused some damage. As he reached LOU ISLAND he observed planes of the 501st Squadron drop 4 bombs on WAIKUTU ISLAND, in the St.ANDREW ISLANDS, just N of LOU ISLAND. 3 of these bombs fell in the water.

Lt.JORDAN flew on Capt.COOPER'S left wing. He too, saw the plane crash as he approached LOS NEGROS ISLAND and at the same time observed A/C fire from MOMOTE DROME hitting the water E of HYANE HARBOR. He strafed the Island and proceeded out over SEEADLER HARBOR . As he turned left near PITJILU ISLAND he saw P-38's strafing LUGOS MISSION setting it afre. He dropped his first bomb at this Mission which was a near miss, as he came down the coast he dropped 3 more bombs in the suspected stores area S of and adjacent to LORENGAU STRIP. He also saw one "Betty" on the E side and just off of this Strip. The "Betty" was observed to be definitely U/S Just as he passed POAVEI PASSAGE, too late to drop a bomb, he saw a large barge moored to a jetty in the middle of the pasaage which he estimated to be 75 feet long and 20 feet wide. It had a flat top, was very low in the water and had several new looking barrels on it. It was apparently serviceable and in good condition. He dropped his last bomb near the S Shore of LOS NEGROS ISLAND E of LONIU VILLAGE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

As he went out over the water one of his gunners observed a column of grey-black smoke about 50 feet high to the W of this same village. Near LOU ISLAND he strafed a small fishing boat and believed he damaged it severely. Both of these flights circled at the Rally Point over LOU ISLAND and joined the Group formation. When the Group Formation departed for base these flights assumed that the other three planes were following and would catch the Group.

Lt.BANZ led the second flight over LOS NEGROS ISLAND, following Capt.COOPER'S flight. He strafed SALAKI PLANTATION and continued, strafing the islands off the N coast of MANUS ISLAND. He turned onto the target near KARENG BAY and strafed the coastline to PAPITALAI HARBOR without finding a suitable target, he dropped all his bombs in the revetment area on the W side of MOMOTE DROME with unobserved results.

Lt.McCLURE flew in the number two position of this flight. He bombed a large white building near the northern tip of LOS NEGROS ISLAND with two bombs. One bomb was a close miss and the other a direct hit. He strafed KORUINAT, NDRILO AND HAUWEI ISLANDS. He turned on the target and strafed down the coast to LUGUS VILLAGE (3578) where he dropped one bomb on a building with reslutant destruction. He continued down the coast strafing and dropped one bomb in a small inlet between LUGOS MISSION and LORENGAU. He saw no A/A fire whatsoever from LORENGAU. He continued the run strafing the coast to PAOITALAI HARBOR. Here he was at very low altitude and just as he topped a small ridge, he saw heavy A/A bursts just in front He banked sharply to the right but just as he did so he felt a burst hit his airplane. The crew described it as sounding like a lot of stones hitting the plane. Although he knew he was hit he made a complete circle and made another run dropping one bomb and strafing where he thought the position was located. He then turned off the target. As he came out over the water and turned right again he realized his left engine was smoking. A heavy A/A burst had left a large hole in his wing. Destroying the oil cooler and allowing all the oil to leak out. He immediately started to climb towards the coluds and try to extinguish the fire, for soon flames were coming from the nacelle. He was unable to put out the fire because this plane was not equipped with a lux system, nor could he feather the prop. A plane of the 408th Squadron, 38th Group drew up beside himand Lt.McCLURE pointed to his bad engine and signaled that he would not be able to go much farther. This plane stayed with him for a time, then Lt.McCLURE called Lt.BAKER by radio and after some difficulty succeeded in notifying him that he was on course for base at 3500 feet and that he would get out to sea as far as possible. In the meantime his instruments began to indicate a high oil temperature, low oil pressure and large loss of power. The left engine quit and the prop windmill and vibrated very badly. The plane began losing altitude at the rate of about 700 feet per minute. Lt.McCLURE had the right engine wide open but was unable to maintain more than 150 mph airspeed. He called Lt.BAKER again and told him he would make a water landing. After stretching his decent to the maximum distance Lt.MCCLURE gave the order to lower the flaps. The co-pilot did so and the plane gradually mushed down onto the water. The time was approximately 1230/L. It bounced once then settled down. No one was seriously injured. All of the crew got out safely and quickly inflated two life rafts.

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It was estimated that the plane stayed afloat between 2 and 3 minutes. Several planes of the 501st Squadron circled overhead and dropped supplies. Most of these broke open upon hitting the water and consequently proved of little value. They then tied the two rafts together and started paddling South away from the islands. They continued to paddle for two hours until a breeze came up which blew them South faster than they could paddle. They noticed many sharks around them all the time. Consequently firearms were made ready to fire in case of attacks on the boats.
3 pistols were lost with the airplane but the other three were made ready to shoot at the sharks if any came close. It was not necessary, however, as none of them came within range. The men were on the water about five hours altogether. A few minutes before 1730/L, 5 u/i planes were sighted and it was feared that they were enemy aircraft. They prepared to overturn the rafts and get under them but the planes were identified as 1 B-24 and 4 P-47's. The airplanes circled some distance away in their search. When they drew near rockets were fired which were spotted immediately by the fighters and the PBY. They were picked up at 1730/L. and brought to FINSCHAFEN where they spend the night, and returned to the base the following morning for interrogation.

Lt.BAKER was Lt.BANZ's left wing man. As he approached LOS NEGROS ISLAND he observed M/G bullets hitting the water E of HYAUE HARBOR. His navigator pinpointed the flashes as coming from a crossroads just E of PARLAKA VILLAGE W of the N tip of MOMOTE DROME. He also saw the airplane crash in the swamp S of SALAMI PLANTATION on LOS NEGROS ISLAND, and the islands to the W of LOS NEGROS. He observed nothing on KORUNIAL NERILO, HAUMEI or PITYILU ISLANDS but strafed them as a defensive measure to hold down any possible fire from them. He proceeded W to a point between ONOSPA and HUS ISLANDS. He dropped two bombs at a barge and small jetty on the E shore of BOAT BAY. The barge seemed to be covered with barrels and was apparently serviceable. One of the bombs was a direct hit and debris was observed flying through the air. Fox holes, slit trenches and possible A/A positions were seen near SIPIMAI VILLAGE B.T no evidence present to indicate that they were recently constructed. He dropped 2 more bombs at [illegible], which he believed to be either a hit or very near miss but dust and smoke obscured the results from view. As he passed over LOMBRUM strip he saw a "Jetty" just off the E center definitely U/S. One lugger (1 mast) was observed in the East part of LOMBRUM anchorage. It seemed to be in good condition. Lt.BAKER continued his course across PAPITALAI BAY SE towards MOMOTE DROME. He dropped his last bomb at a building and nearby inactive, A/A position at the SE corner of MOMOTE DROME. He saw the bomb skipping toward the building and believes he got a direct hit or a very near miss. As he turned S again towards LOU ISLAND he saw a submarine awash about 15 miesl due W of the HORUS ISLANDS. The conning tower was clearly visible although it is not known if the sub was moving. 8 P-38's were observed vigorously strafing the submarine but nothing further could be discerned. As he left LOU ISLAND he saw Lt.McCLURE make a water landing at 147°E 02° 45' S.

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Planes from the 501st Squadron were seen circling the spot. Lt.Baker was unable to return to the scene as one of his crew members was in a serious condition as a result of enemy ac ion over the target. He landed at FINSCHAFEN to get this man to a hospital and to refuel. He returned to the base at 1600/L.

D. Fighter escort was excellent throughout.

E. Damage to our planes.

Plane #600 crashed at sea as reported above. Plane #058 punctured by two .25 bullets and one.50. Minor damage. Plane #840 sustained minor damage to fuselage from small pieces of A/A fragments.

F. OTTO L.BOWKER, 32470453, sustained severe injury when shot through the left lung by an object probably a fragment or a .50 slug. He later died. Lt.McCLURE and Lt.MAHAFFEY sustained minor injuries in the crash landing.

IV. Recommendations for citations of crew which crash landed are being forwarded. As well as recommendation for award of Purple Heart.

V. Tables.

See attached page.

ORDNANCE TABLE

A/P No.	/.50 Cal. Rds Car'd	Rds.Fired	Gun Fail.	/.30Cal. Rds Car'd	Rds Fired	Gun Fail
019	4200	1855	Nil	2000	200	Nil
016	"	2385	Nil	"	500	"
014	"	1590	URS Timin	"	600	Nil
340	"	1500	ULS		800	"
			LLN Weak Firing			
			URN Pins.			
185	"	1855	Nil	"	400	"
317	"	3185	Nil	"	Nil	"
097	"	2385	Nil	"	1600	"
058	"	2385	Nil	"	1000	"

TOTAL: 17140 X.50 Cal. 5100 X .30 Cal.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target.	
097	5	4/5	500	5	
600	5	"	"	"	
019	"	"	"	"	
016	"	"	"	4	1 safe.
340	"	"	"	5	
058	"	"	"	5	
014	"	"	"	2	3 returned to base malfunction of racks.
317	"	"	"	5	
185	"	"	"	4	1 entirely missed target.

TOTAL: 40 X.500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs dropped on target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Time Photo Taken	Locality	Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd.
016	1152 -1205/L	MANUS ISLAND	K-21	5	
019	" "	"	"	K-21	30
097	" "	"	"	K-21	30
058	" "	"	"	K-21	30
014	" "	"	"	K-21	30
185	" "	"	"	K-20	13

TOTAL: 125 K-21 13 K-20's.

Note: Prints were not received at the time of submitting this report.

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VI. Sightings:

References: 4 miles to 1 inch map, Manus Island.
Plane seen to go down in flames and explode in vicinity of position 5476. This seen on approach to target.
1 bomb observed to hit 200 feet from A/A position seen firing from vicinity of MOMOTE DROME. Barge burning in PAPITALAI HARBOR NEAR 5474.
Large barge 75 feet long 20 feet wide, flat topped new barrels on deck. seen in Poairei Passage at 4674 moored to jetty.
3 barges in bay S of BUTJOLUO ISLAND.
Column of smoke near Loniu Village 4673. 50 feet high grey - black.
4 P-38's dive and strafe Lugos Mission. Later smoke seen from this area.
Lugger, single mast in S part of Lombrom Anchorage 4974.
One plane(probably 501st) drop 4 bombs on 4 objects, apparently barges S side Waikutu Island. 1 direct hit, others near miss.
Sub sighted 557 awash being strafed by 8 P-38's.


VII. Photo Interpretation.

There was no photo interpretation since photos have not yet been received.

Pat E. Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 7 Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FEAF, APO 503.
" " A-2 345th Bomb Group, (M), APO 503.

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HUS I.
BONNETA I.
WALI BAY
ANDRU PT.
DERIMBAT
KARENG BAY
LABAHAN IS.
BOWAT BAY
BOWAT
MISSION
BOWAT STATION
TIMBAU
WARI
RIVER
OPERI
I.
PATUSI
BAY
PATUSI
POAMONDA I.
SANDERS I

499
26-D
26 Jan 44

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

27 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 26-D. Performed 26 Jan., 44. Objective at ALEXISHAFEN, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FifthAir Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 503.

I. GENERAL

a. The objective assigned was barges and luggers, reported to be in BOSTREM BAY, to be attacked and destroyed.

b. Rendesvous was accomplished with P-47 "Fighter Escort" at FINSCHAFEN at 1530/L.

c. Attack.

(1) 7 Airplanes of this Squadron took off from Strip #7 Dobodura, at 1432/L and were on course at 1440/L. The approach was made from E to W from the mountain W of ALEXISHAFEN over BOSTREM BAY and areas adjacent thereto, ADMOSIN ISLAND, SEK ISLAND. The first flight consisted of 3 airplanes in a shallow "V". The other two flights of 2 plane elements followed in trail. The attack was begun at 1631/L and broken off at 1635/L. Several bombs were dropped at the reported "New Medium A/A Position" in cleared area just NW of the inlet at the W end of BOSTREM BAY approximately 703400 (All references Alexishafen 1/25000 Map) although the position was not actually observed. 2 bombs were dropped on the tip of the peninsula at 722392 but no target was seen. Several bombs were dropped at a 30 ft. barge camouflaged and loaded with supplies, at 732397. It was not observed to be destroyed but the pilot reported that the bombs could not have missed. A bomb was dropped on a deserted A/A position on a peninsula at 722388 and several more on ADMOSIN ISLAND one of which was aimed at a small jetty but the results were not seen.

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Several bombs were dropped in VITAR PLANTATION in the area adjacent to SEK HARBOR and one at a dock there at739392. Two good sized buildings were destroyed on SEK ISLAND at 755382, and other bombs were dropped on the N tip of SEK ISLAND. 3 bombs skipped off SEK ISLAND, two going in the water and one exploding in the air. Concussion fromthe latter was felt to rock several planes. Bombing was excellent with 29 of 33 bombs in the target area.
2 bombs were returned to the base. The entire area was strafed thoroughly.

d. Interception.

(1) Interception by enemy A/P was nil.

(2) There were nil sightings of enemy A/P. Our crews reported no losses of any allied A/P on this strike.

II. Personnel and Planes participating.

(1) The 499th Squadron was the only squadron assigned to make this attack but 2 planes of the 501st Squadron were to be included. Capt.G.W.TAYLOR was selected the "Formation Leader" for the strike.

(2) Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT	SECOND FLIGHT	THIRD FLIGHT
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR - 591	Capt.G.L.COOPER 014	Lt.C.J.JORDAN 019
1st.Lt.C.L.SMITH - 097	2nd.Lt.H.N.ALGER 971	1st.Lt.T.K.LEWIN 060 (501st)
1st.Lt.[illegible] 016		

Note: Lt. Olson, A/P No.340, flew with the formation to a point 5 minutes away from the target. Due to a bad oil leak in his right engine he turned back and landed at FINSCHAFEN. He returned to the base at 1800/L.
Lt.McKenney, A/P No.060, 501st Squadron took off from Dobodura but was unable to make contact with the formation. He circled Finschafen from approximately 1530 to 1550, then returned to the base landing at 1655/L. He salvoed 1 bomb off Cape Ward Hunt for greater safety in landing.

III. Details of the Mission.

a. This Squadron took off from Strip #7, Dobodura, at 1432/L and accomplished rendezvous with the one 501st plane enroute. The attack was begun at 1631/L and broken off at 1655/L. The Squadron landed at 1815/L.

b. Route out was Base - Finschafen - Amele Village - Target. The Axis of attack was W to E and the I.P. was a point 5 miles due W of BOSTREM BAY. As the Squadron comes over the mountain W of Alexishafen the flights spaced themselves in trail at 30 second intervals.

c. Action of individual planes.

Capt.TAYLOR was the Flight Leader of the first flight. He made landfall near BOGADJIM at the mouth of the NURU RIVER. He kept the squadron inland on a course of approximately 300° in a gradual turn to the right. On reaching a point due W of ALEXISHAFEN, he turned right to make a run from W to E over BOSTREM BAY. He pulled up over a small mountain range and began a long dive toward the target, at the same time increasing the throttle setting. His indicated airspeed was 230 - 240 M/P/H. Capt.Taylor strafed the cleared area near the West end of BOSTREM BAY where a new medium A/A position was reported. He did not see the gun position nor fire from the area. He had previously ascertained that no barges or shipping of any kindwere in open water as reported. Therefore he elected to cover the S shore of the Bay. He thoroughly searched the entire S shore but saw no evidence of barges. He dropped one bomb on an apparently deserted A/A pit on the boat-shaped peninsula in BOSTREM BAY where, at one time, a heavy concentration of A/A guns of various calibre was located. He saw no further targets and dropped all four of the remaining bombs on SEK ISLAND at houses. He is certain that his bombs hit the target.

Lt.BANZ took the position left vacant by a plane which turned back andflew number two on Capt.Taylor's right wing. He was in this position over the target. He saw no shipping targets and consequently dropped one bomb on the "Stella Maris" wreck. He dropped one bomb at a jetty on the southern part of ARUSSIN ISLAND but was unable to determine the accuracy of his bomb. He dropped one bomb on SEK ISLAND with no specific target. He returned 3 bombs to base because of the fact that he could find no suitable targets. He saw three of Capt.Taylor's bombs hit the target and skip. Two of which exploded in the water and one in the air.

Lt.CABELL made his run on the Flight Leader's left wing and held this position throughout the run. He dropped two bombs on ADMOSIN ISLAND and three on SEK ISLAND at buildings and huts. No definite results could be determined.
Capt.COOPER led the second flight. As he passed AMELA VILLAGE, approximately 15 miles SW of MADANG, he noticed a well-used track in the vicinity of the village. As he approached BOSTREM BAY he saw the clearing just NW of BOSTREM BAY at approximately 703400 where a new medium A/A position had been reported. He did not see the position but dropped one bomb there, without visible results. He observed a camouflaged barge in good condition in an inlet near the mouth of BOSTREM BAY at 722397 but it was not on his flight line and he did not see it until he was over the inlet. He observed another barge in another inlet to the East of this at 732397 but was unable to bomb it. He dropped a string of 4 bombs in the E section of Vitar Plantation adjacent to SEK HARBOR starting at 735395. All bombs exploded on land but were not dropped at any definite target. A column of black smoke approximately 50 feet high, larget that from the burst above, was observed as a result of the last bomb. He thoroughly searched the area but made no other sightings. He then went out over the water and headed for the base.

Lt.ALGER flew on Capt.COOPER'S right wing. He also dropped his first bomb at the cleared area, 703400, at the suspected A/A position but did not observe any results. He dropped another bomb at the tip of a peninsula at 722392 but at no specific target. As he passed over the water W of ADMOSIN ISLAND he noticed debris floating in SEK HARBOR at approximately 734393. He dropped 2 more bombs at a dock on Vitar Ptn. at 739392 and heavily strafed nearby houses but did not see any results. He dropped his last bomb on the N tip of SEK ISLAND which skipped into the water. Although a careful observation was made throughout the run nothing further was sighted.

Lt.JORDAN led the third flight. He strafed the reported A/A position NE of BOSTREM BAY then proceeded up the N coast of the Bay strafing heavily. He observed a barge, approximately 30 feet long, loaded with supplies and camouflaged, near an inlet at 732397. He dropped 4 bombs at this barge theresults of which he could not see but was certain that it was destroyed. As he crossed the N tip of SEK ISLAND he dropped his last bomb which exploded on the island but no results were observed.
Lt.T.K.LEWIS of the 501st Squadron flew on Lt.JORDAN'S right wing. He also strafed the reported A/A position. As he passed along the N shore of BOSTREM BAY he dropped 4 bombs in this area but could observe no results of the bursts, he saw near misses by 499th planes on a barge at 732397 and reported that the barge must surely have been destroyed.
A possible lugger was seen just E of ADMOSIN ISLAND at 735388 unusually well camouflaged. Lt.LEWIS was unable to pull over and bomb it as it was too far S of his line of flight. He dropped his last bomb on the N tip of SEK ISLAND again with unobserved results.

d. Fighter escort was excellent throughout.

e. 1 plane sustained minor damage from one .25 Cal. bullet in right rudder.

f. No injuries were inflicted on personnel.

IV. Citations for Awards.

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for citations will be forwarded.

V. Ordnance and Armament Facts.

See attached page, for a., b., of this paragraph.

c. There was nil ground opposition observed.

d. No air opposition was encountered.

VI. Sightings.

1 well used track in the vicinity of Amele Village [illegible] of Madang about 15 miles. 4 small boats in the mouth of the Kuru River. 2 or 3 storehouses, thatched roof, boarded sides approximately 75 ft. long, in area approximately 8336 (Madang 4 miles to 1 in. map). 1 small serviceable barge in inlet at 722397 (Alexishafen Special Map: 1/25000). Debris seen floating in Sek harbor at 732397. 1 possible lugger, extremely well camouflaged at 735388.

PEG/rjl.

Pat L. Goforth
PAT L. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

2 Incl:
Incl. 1 - Bombing Assessment Diagram.
2 - Bombing, Strafing, & Photo Tables.

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FEAF, APO 503.
" " S-2 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

Incl: #2

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Bombing Table

A/P	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	
591	5	A/S	500	2	(2 bombs skipped and hit the water, 1 exploded in the air.)
097	5	A/S	500	3	2 returned to base.
016	"	"	"	5	
014	"	"	"	5	
971	"	"	"	4	1 inwater.
019	"	"	"	5	
060	"	"	"	5	

TOTALS: 29 X.500 lb. bombs dropped on target.
4 X.500 lb. bombs dropped in water.
2 X.500 lb. bombs brought back.

Armament Report

A/P	.50 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.50 Cal. Rds Fired	.50 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.30 Cal. Rds Fired	.30 Cal. Gun Fail
591	4200	1325	Nil	2000	Nil	Nil
097	"	2120	"	"	"	"
016	"	1345	"	"	"	"
014	"	Nil	"	"	"	"
971	"	1590	"	"	"	"
019	"	1345	"	"	400	"
060	"	1200	"	"	"	"
Total:	8894 X.50 Cal.			400 X.30 Cal.		


PHOTOGRAPHIC


A/P	Time Photo Taken	Locality	Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
591	1631-1635/L	BOSNEK BAY	K-20	20	
019	" "	" "	K-21	18	
016	" "	" "	K-21	30	
097	" "	" "	K-21	19	

TOTAL: 67 K-21's 20 K-20's.

Note: Prints were not received at the time of submitting this report.

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MACLAY
(MAKLEY)
ROAD
RIVER
ROAD
Malar
Vitar
plantation
BOSTREM
BAY
Danip
Plantation
ROAD
DISPERSAL LANES
ALEXISHAFEN AIRDROME
RIVER
Alexishafen
Plantation
MARRAIA
ROAD


ROAD
(MAKLEY)
RIVER
ROAD
Vitar
Plantation
VITAR
PLANTATION
BOSTREM
BAY
Danip
Plantation
SEK HARBOR
ADMOSIN
ISLAND
RIVER
Alexishafen
Plantation
ALEXISHAFEN
DOCK
Megas IS.
ROAD
Dulimal IS.
SEK
ISLAND

499
28-G-1
28 Jan 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

29 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 28-G-1. Performed on 28 January, 1944 with Objective: Barge Sweep, Bogia Harbor 145° 0' E 4°20' S to Cape Croisilles 145° 50'E 4° 20' S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. GENERAL.

a. The assigned mission was to conduct a barge sweep from Bogia Harbor to Cape Croisilles on the North Coast of New Guinea. Secondary targets were bridges, buildings, supply areas and other installations.

b. Rendezvous with fighter escort was accomplished over Finschafen at 0840/L.

c. Attack:

(1) This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack, followed by the 501st. Squadron. The approach was from S, out to sea turning over Bogia Harbor to make the sweep down the coast from N to S. Formation over the target generally consisted of two, three plane "V"'s with the number 7 plane acting singly. However, in some cases planes attacked individually then rejoined the flight after the attack. Bombing was excellent with all bombs within 1000 feet of the target and the majority hits or near misses. A total of 30 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs were dropped. 50% of these were hits 45% were near misses which caused damage 5% were complete misses. (including onewhich failed to explode even though armed). Asummary of damage inflicted on the enemy is as follows: Two barges destroyed, 1 damaged; four bridges rendered unserviceable with sectionsdestroyed; 7 houses either destroyed or heavily damaged; one truck heavily strafed, damaged; 1 enemy fighter plane, camouflaged in Kunai Patch left smoking.

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A/A position near Uligassi Mission silenced by bombing and strafing.

(2) The action of the 501st Squadron which followed our attack was not observed.

d. Interception:

(1) Nil Enemy Aircraft observed airborne during the mission.

(2) Nil Enemy Aircraft observed destroyed by other units nor losses by Allied units.

2. Capt.G.W.TAYLOR was selected to lead this Squadron which was the lead squadron in the "Strike". Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W.TAYLOR	A/P No.340	Capt.C.C.COMANT	A/P No. 097
1st.Lt.W.W.CABELL	" " 016	1st.Lt.T.R.KELLEY	" " 591
2nd.Lt.D.J.WILSON	" " 058	2nd.Lt.A.S.ANDERSON	" " 347

Major J.B.BAIRD A/P No.015

3. Details of the Mission:

a. Time and location of:
Takeoff at Strip #7 - 0730/L.
Rendesvous over Strip #4. - 0750/L.
On course fortarget. - 0745/L.
Over Target. - 1005/L to 1055/L.
Landing at Strip #7. - 1245/L.

b. The route flown was from Dobodura, Finschafen, out to sea and up the coast to Bogia Harbor, Cape Croiselles, Karkar Island, Finschafen, Base.

c. Individual action of each plane.

Capt.G.W.TAYLOR, the "Strike Leader" , brought the two Squadrons to a point just North of Bogia Harbor as ordered. Here the formations broke up with flights remaining intact and spaced up with proper intervals to conduct the sweep.

Capt.Taylor's initial attack was on a building on the South shore of Bogia Harbor. He made two passes, dropping one bomb and strafing. He was unable to tell the extent of damage done. He continued down the coast withoug finding a suitable target until he reachedthe Kumbun River where he attacked a bridge, he dropped one bomb which destroyed two sections. Five miles farther down the coast he attacked a truck which was parked on the coastal road. Substantial damage was caused by strafing in two passes. Capt.Taylor continued the sweep to Bunabun Harbor without further attack. In a Kunai Patch just NW of Bunabun Harbor he spotted a camouflaged, radial engine, pursuit plane. He made two passes dropping one bomb (which missed but undoubtedly caused damage) and strafing with strafing guns as well as the top turret. The plane was left smoking. After breaking off thisattack he continued the sweep to Sarang Harbor without finding a worthy target. Just South of Sarang Harbor at Walog village he attacked several tin, red roofed buildings dropping two bombs and strafing. One building was definitelydestroyed. Four others nearby were damaged by the bombing and strafing. Capt.Taylor then broke off the attack and proceeded to Karkar Island, the Rally Point.

Lt.CABELL made his run on Capt.Taylor's right wing, breaking off occasionally to make an individual attack. His initial bombing attack was on a barge on the West side of Uligan Harbor, his bomb was seen to miss. He continued down the coast, strafing, to Sarang Harbor where he spotted a barge. He attacked the barge dropping two bombs and strafing in two passes. His first bomb was a near miss, the second a hit. The barge was destroyed. He strafed huts along the East and broke off theattack when his flight leader pulled away toward Karkar Island. Lt.Cabell returned 2 bombs to basebecause of lack of worthy targets.

Lt.WILSON flew in the number three position, breaking away at times to make individual attacks. He strafed huts between Bofia Harbor and Balua Village. Just S of the village he attacked a large (apparently 3 story) metal roofed house which had adjoining wings. He strafed and dropped 1 bomb. The building was not destroyed but heavily damaged. He strafed down the coast to Hatzfeldt Harbor where he attacked a bridge across the Deigun River. The bridge was destroyed. Lt.Wilson strafed the coastal villages to Sarang Harbor without finding a bombing target. At Sarang Harbor, Lt.Wilson made an attack on the barge which Lt.Cabell had just previously attacked. He saw Lt.Cabell's first bomb miss closely. He then made arun on the barge, dropping one bomb which missed. He saw Lt.Cabell's second bomb hit and destroy the barge. His next attack was on a bridge on the South shore of Sarang Harbor.He dropped two bombs one of which failed to explode even though armed. The other is thought to have hit the bridge.

Capt.CONANT ledthe second flight. He started his run at Potsdam Harbor where hesaw a barge on the SE shore. He dropped his first bomb at this barge, a near miss. He saw a bridge over a small river in the vicinity of Ulumba Plantation on which he scored a direct hit with his second bomb.

His crew led him down the coast and he sighted nothing worthwhile to attack till he neared Hatzfeldt Harbor.He saw a bridge over the Daigun River and a house on the East bank close to the bridge. 2 bombs were dropped at this target which missed the bridge but destroyed the house. Hethen rounded Cape Groudon and headed toward Kromprinz Harbor. As he passed Simbui Village he saw a camouflaged truck, stationary, on the well-maintained M/T road which runs along the coast. He did not strafe it as it was some distance to the right of his line of flight when he finally saw it and did not deem it worthwhile to lead the whole flight in asecond pass over the truck. He saw a bridge near Malala Village, Kromprinz Harbor, at which he directed his last bomb. This bomb definitely hit the bridge but he was not able to observe the extent of the damage. Heswung left over the water as he neared Uligan Harbor to avoid A/A. He saw aB-25 head into Uligan Harbor at this time and observed several bursts of heavy A/A over the hill on the East side of the harbor. If the A/A was directed at the B-25 it was inaccurate as the bursts were about one-half mile to the rear of the plane and between 800 feet and 1000 feet high. The plane was estimated to be flying at about 300 feet. Flying down the coast he strafed several huts near Bunabun Village but observed no results. Inthe vicinity of Malas Mission he saw the remnants of a hut which was almost completely burned up and still smouldering.He went on to the rally point, Karkar Island, but made no further sightings.

Lt.KELLEY flew on Capt.Conant's right wing. He made his first attack near the shoreat Bogia Harbor where he strafed several huts. Hesaw tracers hitting the huts butcouldsee no visible damage. He followed Capt.Conant, strafing intermittantly along the coast but observed no worthwhile targets for bombing until he reached the vicinity of Malas Mission. Hedropped his first bomb at abridge. As he approached Sarang Harbor he saw several buildings in the vicinity and dropped 2 bombs at a house on a hill near the South shore of the harbor. He did not observe results other than a few bits of debris flying through the air but for this reason he believes his bombs inflicted considerable damage. He noticed that the M/T road all along the coast, where visible, showed evident at several points of recent usage. Lt.Kelley returned 2 bombs to the base due to lack of sighting suitable targets, although he reached the coast well for barges.

Lt.ANDERSON was Capt.Conant's left wing man. He strafed the barge at Potsdam Harbor and dropped one bomb at it which missed. His second bomb was directed at what appeared to be a large boathouse with a tin roof, about 300 yards South of Bogia Harbor, on the shore. He estimated that the bomb missed the house between 80 feet and 100 feet. He followed Capt.Conant down the coast, strafing several huts in the vicinity of Hatzfeldt Harbor. He reported that damage was inflicted.

He also noticed a damaged bridge at Kaiten Village, Hatzfeldt Plantation. At Korinat Village between Kronprinz Harbor and Magnus Pt. he saw a large puff of yellowish - white smoke about 200 feet high but could not determine the cause. As he passed Uligan Harbor he saw A/A firing at some P-47's. The fire came from the vicinity of Uligasi Mission and he estimated 2 heavy batteries were in action there. The P-47's were at that time approximately 600 feet altitude and he saw 3 bursts directed at them about 600 feet short and 200 feet high.
At Mandura Village he saw a hut that had burned to the ground, the remains of which were still smoking. He strafed 3 huts near Yedikum Village but could not determine the extent of damage caused.
His next attack was made at a frame house on a slight hill about 100 feet inland from the South shore of Sarang Harbor. He dropped two bombs at the house one of which was a near miss. Debris was observed but he thought the house was still standing after the attack. As he reached the rally point he observed several P-47's making passes just inland from Cape Croisilles. He cound not tell if the planes were firing, nor did he observe any return fire from the ground.

MajorBAIRD flew the number four position in the second flight. He observed attacksbeing made on the barge at Potsdam Harbor as he approached the area and again as he left but saw no visible results. He saw a camouflaged truck in the vicinity of Cape Gwurdon but was unable to pinpoint the exact spot. This was probably the same truck that Capt.Conant spotted at Simbiui Village. Major Baird continued down the coast and left the formation to swing into Uligan Harbor. So intent was on his search for barges he did not realize he was at Uligan until he was headed into the harbor and saw A/A fire. He saw two busts which were high and to the rear a considerable distance and noticed that the fire was coming from a hill near Uligasi Mission. He turned West at the end of the harbor then executed a 180° turn to make a run at the position. He strafed it heavily on his approach and it ceased firing. He intended to drop only 2 bombs but for some untetermined reason all five of them fell in a string in this area. He reported a near miss on the A/A position but direct hits on 2 shacks just East of it. His last two bombs were seen to burst in the water. He saw no barges in the Harbor. After rejoining the flight he went on down the coast strafing intermittantly but made no further sightings.

4. In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for citations will be forwarded.

5. Ordnance and Armament Table.

See Incl.#2.

6. No air opposition was encountered.

6. Sightings:

All references : Bogia and Karkar Maps, 4 miles to 1 inch.

3 to 4 black bursts from position on Hill North of Uligassi Mission. Three crews observed bursts 600 feet behind P-47's at 800 feet.
Coastal road appeared well used but muddy and rutted.
Hansa Bay observed, no activity, no shipping.
Possible supplies (Boxes seen) at Kiwongil Village 8410.
2 trucks in plantation, Bogia Harbor.
Hut burning at Kronprinz enroute to Bogia (prior to attack)
Possible M/G flashed (possible richocets) from vicinity of Maiias Mission 5074.
Large column of yellowish-white smoke at Kornuat at 3804 during attack, cause unknown.
P-47&s diving, inland from Cape Croisilles.

PEG/rjl

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

2 Incl:
Incl. 1-Bombing Assessment Diagram.
2-Bombing, strafing and Photo Tables.

Distribution: (1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " S-2 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

Bombing Table

A/P	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target.	
340	5	4/5	500	5	
016	5	4/5	500	3	(2 brought back to base)
058	"	"	"	4	(1 bomb missed)
097	"	"	"	5	
591	"	"	"	3	(2 brought back)
347	"	"	"	5	
015	"	"	"	5	

TOTAL 30 X500 lb.4/5 second delay bombs dropped on target.

Armament Table

	.50 Cal.			.30 Cal.	
A/P	Rds Car'd	Rds Fired	Gun Fail	Rds Car'd	Rdr Fired	Gun Fail
AHS	4200	2650	U.R.S.Weak Firg. Pin. also L.R.S.	2000	1000	Nil
016	"	1325	Nil	"	300	"
058	"	1590	"	"	1000	"
097	"	2120	"	"	500	
591	"	795	"	"	Nil	"
347	"	1590	"	"	1000	"
015	"	795	"	"	300	"


TOTALS: 10600 X.50 Cal. 3000 X.30 Cal.


Photo Table

A/P	Time Photos taken	Locality	Type Camera	No.Photos taken
097	1005-1055/L	Bogia-Cape Croiselles	K-21	30
591	" " "	" "	K-20	28
347	" " "	" "	K-20	23

TOTALS: 51 K-20's 30 K-21's.

Note: No prints received at the time this reported was submitted.


ARGE (1 MISS, 1 HIT
FROM BARGE
DESTROYED SMALL BRIDGE
IN ULUMBA PTN.
2 BOMBS DROPPED ON HOUSE AT BOG
(1 MISSED, 1 NEAR MISS)
1 BOMB DAMAGED BUILDING, S OF DALUA VILLAGE
1 BOMB DESTROYED 2 SECTIONS OF BRIDGE OVER MOUTH OF KUMBUN R.
DAIUA BAY
BILAU BAY
DOGAMUR BAY
HATZFELD HR
PATAKA IS.
CAPE TOMBENNAM
KUMBUN R.
TRUCK STRAFED
SAMOA PT
CAPE GOURDON
N HOUSE & BRIDGE
DEIGUN R.
STROYED. HUTS STRAFED
E VICINITY OF HATZFELDT HR.
DEIGUN R.
RARIN
SOWASO
SIMBINI
BALEBUL IS.
KRONPRINZ HR.
MALALA
MAGNUS PT.
1 BOMB ON
OF U
1 BOMB DIRECT HIT ON BRIDGE
ULIGAN HR.
ULIGAN
SIKOR
5 BOMBS DROPPED AT A/A
ON HILL ABOVE ULIGASS
MISSION, BOMBS MISSE
DESTROYED 2 SHACKS
2 BOMBS IN WATER
A/A POSITION HEAVILY STRAFED.
B
Bunab
1 BOMB DROPPED
ON 1 FIGHTER IN
KUNAI PATCH NEAR BABIR
MISSED. PLANE STRAFED LEFT
SMOKING


BOGIA HR.
BOMB DAMAGED BUILDING, S OF DALUA VILLAGE
1 BOMB DESTROYED 2 SECTIONS OF BRIDGE OVER MOUTH OF KUMBUN R.
TRUCK STRAFED
KUMBUN R.
SAMOA
CAPE GOMMON
RARIN
SOWASO
SIMBINI
BALEBUL IS.
KRONPRINZ HR.
MALALA
1 BOMB DIRECT HIT ON BRIDGE
MAGNUS PT.
1 BOMB ON BARGE ON N SIDE OF ULIGAN HR. (MISSED)
ULIGAN HR.
ULIGAN
SIKOR
5 BOMBS DROPPED AT A/A
ON HILL ABOVE ULIGAN
MISSION. BOMBS MISSED
DESTROYED 2 SHACKS
2 BOMBS IN WATER
A/A POSITION HEAVILY STRAFED.
BUNABUN HR.
DOVE PT.
SAPARA
Bunabun
1 BOMB DROPPED
1 FIGHTER IN
KUNAI PATCH NEAR BABIR
MISSED. PLANE STRAFED LEFT
SMOKING

N SIDE
2. (MISSED)

HR



499
34 C-1
3 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

4 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 34 C-1, performed 3 Feb., 44.
Objective: Dagua Airdrome, N.G. 145° 17' E 03° 26' S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. GENERAL

a. The assigned mission was to conduct a strike on enemy airplanes and installations at Dagua Airdrome on the North coast of New Guinea.

b. Rendezvous was accomplished with 2 squadrons of P-38's and 2 squadrons of P-40's, fighter escort, at Gusap at 1033/L - 1047/L.

c. Attack:

(1) Heavy bombers with fighter escort were to attack Wewak and Boram Strips one hour beforethis Group's attack, knocking down as many fighters as possible and rendering those two strips temporarily U/S. The 38th Bomb Group was to attack But Drome immediately prior to this Group's strike.
This Group was to proceed to target "javelin down" in "V" of "V"'s unbalanced to the left. This squadron was to be second in the sequence of attack. As the approach to the target was made, squadrons were to space themselves at proper intervals coming over the target flights abreast. The target, Dagua Strip was to be attacked with parafrags clusters and strafing guns. The run over the target was to be made from E to W. The extreme left flight of each squadron was to attack A/A positions and store areas South of the strip. Squadrons were to turn over the water immediately after passing the W end of Dagua Strip, and rendezvous with the Group at Bam Island, approximately 20 miles NE of the mouth of the Sepik River. The Group was then to return to Dobodura, over water as far as Finschafen.

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(2) Execution of the Attack

The approach was made from SE to NW the I.P. being the ridge just E of Dagua Village and the axis of attack E to W. As the group approached the ridge the Squadrons placed themselves at correct intervals and this Squadron went into flights abreast, each flight in a shallow "V". This Squadron was second in the sequence of attack, being preceeded by the 498th Squadron and followed by the 500th and the 501st Squadron. A/A positions S of the E end of Dagua Strip were bombed and strafed, as were stores areas along the track S of and to the runway. Dagua village was bombed, and a direct hit on one long building in the center was seen to blow off the roof. At least 30 enemy aircraft were caught on the ground lined up along both sides of the runway. Some were being gassed and some even had props turning over. 66 clusters of para-frags were scattered along the North side of the strip where approximately 4 "Betty"s and 8 fighters were lined up. These planes were also heavily strafed as were 3 nearby gasoline turcks. A total of 28 clusters were dropped at 4 "Betty's" and 15 fighters on the side of the strip. These planes, too, were strafed heavily. 4 or 5 u/i 2 engine planes parked in the dispersal area at the South side of the East end of the strip were strafed. 12 to 15 airplanes destroyed is a conservative estimate, of the damage inflicted by this squadron on enemy A/P's. A hitherto unreported medium A/A position South of the center of the runway near the track and the known heavy gun position SW of the W end of the strip were strafed but not silenced.

(3) The 498th Squadron's attack was observed to be well executed with bombs excellently placed. Damage caused was thought to be extensive, however, no fires were seen as a result.

(4) Interception.

a. Nil interception.

b. Nil destruction of accompanying units was observed. One A/P, probably Tony, was seen to crash in flames 1 mile W of Tendayne Islandafter 5 P-38's were observed diving on 2 u/i planes heading North.

2. The 498th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt.C.C. Conant wasselected to lead this Squadron. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.Conant	A/P 185	1st.Lt.C.L.Banz	A/P 254
1st.Lt.T.R.Kelley	" 591	1st.Lt.J.D.Wilson	164
1st.Lt.V.W.Tatleman		1st.Lt.C.B.Jordan	317

THRID FLIGHT			FOURTH FLIGHT		
Capt.G.W.Taylor	A/P	015	Capt.G.L.Cooper	A/P	014
2nd.Lt.A.S.Anderson	"	340	1st.Lt.W.N.Parks	"	347
1st.Lt.R.Baker		058	1st.Lt.W.W.Cabell	"	016

Note: Lt.Wilson, Lt.Kelley and Lt.Cabell were forced to drop out of formation due to mechnical difficulties with airplanes.

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Time of take off: 0900/L.
Group Rendezvous
over Strip #7,: 2000 feet.
On course at 0915/L.
Attack: Time over Target: 1200/L - 1203/L.
Landed Strip #7, Dobodura:1503/L.

b. Route out: Dobodura, Gusap, target.
Return Route: Target, Rally point at Bam Island, Finschafan, Base.
Attack Route: I.P. was ridge just E of Dagua Village.
Axis of attack: E to W. Attack was made over Dagua Village, Dagua Strip and areas immediately adjacent thereto and was broken off just W of Dagua Strip.

Maneuver: As approach was made to I.P. Squadrons spaced themselves behind each other an average of 30 to 45 seconds. Squadron attack formation was "flights abreast".

3. Action of Individual planes.

Capt.Conant lead the squadron on the approach from the South, around the end of a chain of hills which flank the target and coastal area on the S and over a small ridge down on to the target. Capt.Conant flew as low as possible to take advantage of the difiladed area protected by this ridge. After crossing the ridge he again hugged the tree-tops with the result that most of the A/A fire burst above the Squadron Formation. Capt.Conant began strafing the A/A positions East of the Drome at 1200/L. He observed 20 - 25 planes lined up on the South side of the runway and led his flight directly over them. Due to a malfunction, none of Capt. Conant's parafrags released. However he began strafing as soon as he was in range. He heavily strafed the first Group of planes near the east end of the Drome and observed his bullets to strike each plane as his fire swept forward. He concentrated heavily on a M/B farther on and had the satisfaction of seeing it burst into flames.

He continued down the line of planes strafing thoroughly with heavy damage resulting. After sweeping the entire line of planes he turned right near the end of the strip in order to keep out of A/A fire from But Drome.

Lt.Bans flew on Capt.Conant's right wing throughout the run. He heavily strafed the line of planes which Capt.Conant strafed and dropped 6 parafrag clusters just in front of the line of planes. The parafrags were well within effective range and undoubdtedly caused extensive damage. In addition he heavily strafed the A/A positions east of the Drome. He turned right off the target with his flight leader.

Lt.Tatleman made his run on Capt.Conant's left wing just to the rear of the planes. He swept the entire line of planes and observed his fire to cause considerable damage. He dropped eight parafrag clusters on the group of planes at the east end of the drome and fourteen clusters on the long line of planes farther West. His bombs easily dropped within effectiverange and assuredly caused extensive damage. After making a highly satisfactory attack he turned off the target with his flight.

Capt.Cooper led the second flight over the target. As he made his approach he noticed A/A bursts over the ridge but the only fire apparently directed at him came from light A/A positions at the East end of the runway. He made his run over the center of the strip dropping his first bombs in the area along the South side of Dagua Village and at light A/A positions E of the strip. As he proceeded down the center of the strip he strung out the remainder of his bombs. He saw many fighters on both sides of the runway and several "Betty" bombers along the S side. One "Mike" was seen among the other airplanes at the strip. He saw agas truck at the E end of the strip and another toward the S center which he believes he hit. One "Ford Truck" was seen at the N end of the runway. He turned right at the end of the strip and lead his flight out over the water.

Lt.Parke was Capt.Cooper's right wing man. He also observed A/A bursts over the ridge as he approached the target but they did not seem to be directed at him. His course brought him along the shore line. As he passed over Dagua Village he dropped several slucters which didnot open but fell directly into a long building in the center of the village near the beach. The roof was seen to blow off the building. As he neared the E end of the strip he experienced light A/A fire from positions in the clearing E of the strip. He strafed in return but with no visible results. He passed over the shoreward edge of the strip sighting several airplanes at which he dropped the rest of his parafrags.

He could see no definite results but felt that the clusters were well spaced and was certain that damage was inflicted. As he came over the water he could see black smoke all along Dagua runway.

Lt. Jordan flew on Capt. Cooper's left wing. He too only experienced light A/A fire from the S of the strip, the heavy apparently being directed at tothe flights. As he approached the strip he saw a lot of black smoke coming from the middle of the runway. He strung his bombs along the S edge of the runway at many airplanes parked there. As he neared the end of the runway he saw 3 gasoline turcks to his right all of which appeared to be burning. He was not able to strafe them as they were off his ins of flight. He followed Capt. Cooper on out over the water.

Capt. Taylor led the third flight over the target. He made his run over the target at minimum altitude and at a speed of 250 m.p.h. As he came over the ridge E of Dagua Strip A/A opened fire on him. The bursts were accurate, moderate, heavy and medium from the known heavy position just South of the East end of the Strip. Altogether he estimated between 15 and 20 bursts dead ahead of him. He strung his entire bomb load out beginning at this A/A position and continuing through the stores area near the track which runs parallel to the runway. The string ended at a point South of the strip about one third of theway down it. He did not believe that he silenced the A/A and was unable to tell what damage was inflicted in the supply area due to the number of trees there. He noticed a previously unreported 3 gun medium position South of the center of the strip at the track. This position also fired at him but all bursts were short although correct as to altitude. As Capt. Taylor came S of the center of the strip he opened fire on the heavy gun position SW of the W end of the strip. It fired on him and followed him out over the water. The bursts were correct as to range but about 100' high. One "Betty" was seen burning fiercely on the S side of the runway 1/3 of the way from the E end. 2 others nearby appeared to be smoking. Approximat ly 10 fighters were observed along the middle of the S side of the strip 2 of which were smoking. He noticed about 6 fighters on the N side of the runway. 2 fires were seen on the W end of the strip. Before leaving the target area he also strafed a light position approximately 1 mile E of Sarain Village. As he swung N over the water he saw water spouts from bursts from an undetermined position. The bursts were in front of his airplane and several were very close. At this time he saw intense, inaccurate, heavy A/A fire from the vicinity of But Village which appeared to be a barrage type of fire. He was well out of range of this A/A and did not go near it.
A dogfight was observed in progress E of But Drome at about 2000 feet but no particulars could be given. As he led his flight toward the rally point he observed the whole Dagua area covered with smoke. One large column in particular attracted his attention. It was from the W end of Dagua strip.

Lt.Anderson flew on Capt.Taylor's right wing. He also saw the A/A bursts as he came over the ridge E of the target and began strafing it immediately. He started dropping his bombs at huts in the vicinity of the first heavy gun position S of the E end of the runway and continued to string them out S of the track at boxes of supplies and other stores seen in the area. His string ended near the heavy gun position SW of the W end of the runway. Due to heavy foliage he was unable to observe the extant of damage his bombs caused. He strafed throughout his bombing run. He saw about 20 men in the gun pits at the heavy position S of the E end of the strip but did not see any effect of his strafing on them. The only A/A he noticed firing at him was a M/G near this gun position. He described the fire as moderate and accurate. Several tracers narrowly missed the nose of his airplane.
He saw many airplanes on Dagua Drome most of which appeared to be fighters. He also saw 2 engine bombers burning on the S side of the runway, and noticed several wrecked A/P's, near the W end on the S side. He reported that no one appeared to be attacking the wrecks. As he followed Capt. Taylor out over the water he saw a flaming u/i fighter crash in the water about 1 mile W of Tendayng Island. He also saw several heavy bursts, 25 to 50 feet behind the tail of another B-25 before it got out of range of fire. He reported that smoke from the target was visible 100 miles away from Dagua.

Lt.Baker flew on Capt.Taylor's leftwing. He observed the same A/A bursts as the others as he came over the ridge, and also a few about 1000 feet above the ground. He saw no specific target to bomb but dropped about 1/3 of his load when he saw Capt.Taylor make his release. His second third he dropped S of the center of the runway and the remainder in the vicinity of the heavy gun position SW of the W end of the runway. He strafed heavily along the entire run. He could see fires along the S side of the strip but as he was at minimum altitude and some distance S of the strip he was unable to discern any detail. He also saw a u/i airplane crahs in flames about a mile W of Tendayne Island.

Lt.Wilson was scheduled to fly number 2 position in the second flight but shortly after take-off the oil pressure in one engine dropped off and he returned at once to the base. He and his crew then took another airplane and left Strip #4 for the second time at 0930/L. Lt.Wilson attempted to overtake the group but at 1125/L, 40 minutes N of Cusap he gave up and turned back. He headed for the coast and came out overm the water just below Bogia Harbor and proceeded down the coast. He saw one barge in a small inlet E of Uligan Harbor, but as he turned in to makea run on it saw that it was empty and unserviceable. He strafed a house on the E shore of the inlet near the barge but did not observe any results. He proceeded back to the base with no further attacks or sightings, landing at 1345/L.

d. Fighter cover was excellent throughout.

e. Nil damage to own airplanes.

f. Nil casualties.

4. Citations.

In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for citations will be forwarded.

5. Armament and Ordnance Table. Photo Table.

See incl.#1 attached with report.

Ground Opposition.

On the approach heavy, moderate, inaccurate bursts to the front as planes topped the ridge. Planes then flew low and all bursts were above. New medium position S of center of Strip fired moderate and accurate. Bursts on all sides of one flight were seen. Known gun position SW of W end of strip heavy, moderate and accurate as to range bur high. A/A fire from known positions E of E end of strip, light, moderate, and inaccurate. M/G fire from N side of strip on beach was silenced when strafed.

6. Sightings

Fire and smoke from Madang Area seen both enroute and return 3 luggers observed in Dalman Harbor near Wewak. A large column of black smoke up to 1000' rising from Wewak Area. Gasoline truck at E end of runway; Ford Model gasoline truck at W end of runway. 20 men were seen busily manning the known heavy A/A position S of E end of the runway. 3 U/S bombers observed near W end of strip. Most planes on strip appeared to be painted blue with orange roundels on the wings. A few were observed, to be an Olive Drab color. 1 Mike was sighted among other airplanes at the E end of the strip. A possible A/A position was noticed in a clearing on a ridge 7000 feet E of Dagua Strip. A two-lane M/T road with good bridges was observed between Wewak and Dagua. Hansa Bay appeared empty.

PAT E. HOFFOATH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:
Incl.-1 Tables.
" -2 Bomb assessment Chart.

Armament Table

A/P	.50 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.50 Cal. Rdfired	.50 Cal. Malfunc.	.30 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.30 Cal. RdsFired	.30 Cal. Malfunction
347	4200	1855	Nil	2000	100	Nil
058	"	2120	Nil	"	400	"
014	"	2120	Nil	"	200	"
317	"	1060	LrS Weak firing pin	"	100	"
971	"	795	Nil	"	185	"
185	"	2385	Nil	"	1500	"
254	"	2915	Nil	"	200	
015	"	1590	Nil	"		
340	"	1855	Nil	"		
TOTALS	16695 X.50 Cal.		3000 X.30 Cal.			


Bombing Table


P	No Bombs	Type	No.Bombs dropped on Target	
347	22	Parafrag Cluster	22	
058	"	" "	"	
014	"	" "	"	
317	"	" "	"	
971	"	" "	"	
185	"	" "	Nil	(Bombs brought back to base due to Malfunction)
254	"	" "	6	(16 Bombs brought back to base - Mal.)
015	"	" "	22	
340	"	" "	"	


TOTAL: 160 Clusters, parafrags dropped on target.

Photo Table


A/P	Type Camera	No.Pictures taken	Time	Area where taken
015	K-21	30	1200-1203/L	Dagua Drome
014	"	"	" "	" "
340	K-20	21	" "	" "
347	"	41	" "	" "
016	K-21	30	" "	" "
058	K-21	30	" "	" "
971	K-21	20	" "	" "
164	K-21	30	" "	" "
TOTAL:	170 K-21's	62 K-20		



(NOTICE)
NEW MED. A/A
6700'
DAGUA AEROD
Bombed
+
Strafed Pk
Parked Alon
of Runw


340
015
058
3rd.
FLIGHT.


000
3000
4000 FEET
1000 YARDS.
N
FFO 34-C-1
Squadron: 499th
Order Over Target: 2nd.
Altitude: Minimum.
A/A Positions.
Took Photos.
Map Ref: BRIEFING PLAN NO. C.I.U./33
DAGUA AERODROME
STRAFED
DAGUA VILLAGE
347
014 - 2nd
317 FLIGHT
254
185 1st.
971 FLIGHT.
TO KARAWOP


POSITION







JETTY

BOMBED & STRAFED SUPPLIES
IN THIS AREA




0 500 1000
0 500
STRAFED
L
ED
TRUCKS.


BRIDGE
TO BUT
ED

499
35 C-1
4 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

5 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 35 C-1. Performed, 4 Feb., 44. Objective at Alexishafen, N.G. 145° 45' E 5° 5' S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General.

a. The assigned objective was Alexishafen, New Guinea, with supply areas between Strip 1 and 2 as targets. The mission was to attack these dumps with five 500 lb. bombs with 8/11 second delay fuses for each of twelve planes. The two supply areas were to be bombed and strafed from minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group was not accomplished as planned at Nadzab even though the Group arrived at the prescribed time. Rendezvous with one Squadron of P-38's was accomplished between Nadzab and Dumpu at 0944/L.

c. Attack

(1) This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack at 1034/L. Approach to the target was from vicinity of Dumpu across mountains to a point between Madang and Alexishafen, turning North (while inland) to point 5 miles SW of Strip #1 and then turning right on a course of approximately 55 degrees which was the general axis of attack for all four flights of this squadron. Formation over the target consisted of four 3 plane flights. Two flights over Strip #1 area in "V", and two flights over Strip #2, echelon to the right. The targets were well covered by bombs with only 3 bombs outside the target area. One in the water and 2 on land in Vitar Plantation N of Bostrem Bay. Low altitude high speed and long delay action of bombs prevented accurate and specific observation of results. However, fires were started in the vicinity of Strip #2 and a small fire in the supply area just S of Strip #1.

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(2) Action of other Units unobserved since this squadron was over the target ahead of the other squadrons in the Group.

d. Interception.

(1) Nil enemy planes airborne in the area consequently.

(2) Nil sightings of enemy or friendly planes destroyed in aerial combat.

2. This squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of 499th, 500th, 501st, and 498th Squadrons in number, 1, 2, 3, 4 positions respectively. Major Julian B.Baird the Squadron C.O. elected to lead the Squadron. Lt.Col.B.F.Fridge, the Deputy Group Commander, lead the number 3 flight of this squadron. Flights were as follows:

FRIST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Maj.J.B.Baird	A/P	015	Capt.G.W.Taylor	A/P	340
2nd.Lt.D.J.Wilson	"	014	1st.Lt.W.N.Parks	"	347
1st.Lt.C.N.Jordan		317	1st.Lt.W.W.Cabell	"	016

THIRD FLIGHT			FOURTH FLIGHT		
Lt.Col.B.F.Fridge	A/P	254	Capt.C.C.Conant	A/P	185
1st.Lt.R.Baker	"	058	1st.Lt.V.W.Tatlsman	"	971
1st.Lt.T.R.Kelley	"	019	2nd.Lt.W.H.Alger	"	164

3. Details of the mission.

a. Time and location of:
Alert, Strip 7, Dobodura: 0800/L.
Take off Strip 7 : 0830/L.
Group Rendesvous Strip 4 Dobodura 0845/L. Pulling into formation enroute to Nadsab.
Attack Alexishafen: 1034/L.
Landing Strip 7, Dobodura: 1235/L.

b. Route.

1. Base - Nadsab - Dumpu - Point between Madang and Alexishafen.
2. Attack route - Point between Madang and Alexishafen to a point 5 miles SW Strip #1 turning onto a heading of 55 degrees, the axis of attack.

3. (Continued)

C. Action of individual planes.

Maj.Baird was the first of the Group to take off.He made one wide circle over the area getting the squadron into formation before crossing Strip #7. Because of time element was pressing, Maj.Baird cut short the circle and headed out oncourse to Madzab in order to make the Fighter Rendezvous Point at Madzab. The Squadrons of the Group fell into formation enroute. On reaching Madzab, Major Baird observed the fighters circling and continued on course for Dumpu, The fighters failed to follow, however, and Major Baird circled midway between Madzab and Dumpu and the fighters joined the formation. At Dumpu bad weather, 9/10 covered 2000 to 5000 feet forced the Group to climb to 6000 feet and detour to the West in order to stay clear, This necessitated aslightly different approach, and altitude than planned. After the Group formation broke up to obtain the correct interval, Maj.Baird led the Squadron on the approach and gave the signal for attack formation. Maj.Baird led the first flight on a run directly over Strip #1 on a course of approximately 55 degrees. He observed the alternate target area S of the S W end of strip #1 to be bomb packed and thoroughly deveid of targets. Consequently he strafed in this area causing a small fore to burn from undetermined sources. He dropped one bomb just S of the strip, tow in the Plantation area just N of NE end of the strip and two in Vitar Plantation just N of Bostrem Bay. He observed no specific targets and no definite results of his attack. He strafed throughout the run including the withdrawal over the eastern end of Vitar Plantation. (For exact flight line, see attached overlay).

Lt.Wilson flew the number two position throughout the run but was unable to release bombs because of a rack malfunction. However, he thoroughly strafed the target area and area N of Bostrem Bay.

Lt.Jordon flew the number 3 position throughout and dropped all bombs in the target with unobserved results. He also thoroughly strafed during the bomb run and withdrawal.

Capt.G.W.Taylor led the second flight and a run of approximitely eighty degrees when he saw the number 3 and 4 flights would be unable to cover the A/A positions in and around Strip #2, in sufficient time to provide the desired immunity. Therefore he swung left of the first flight and then crossed behind them to make his attack. Capt.Taylor observed no specific targets other than two houses intack among many others shattered by previous bombing raids. He thoroughly strafed the target area and especially the A/A defanse area. His bombs were seen to explode in the target area but details of damage were impossible to gauge.

Note: See page 7 for details of other 2 planes of this flight.

Lt.Col.Fridge led the third flight over the target in echelon to the right. He began his run at the S tip of Damip Plantation proceeding across the plantation and stores area N of Strip #2 on a course parallel to the strip. 4 bombs were dropped in this didpersal area and just N of the NE end of Strip #2, at piled supplies and stores scattered therein. He was unable to observe the results of the bursts as the bomb fuses were set for 8 to 11 seconds delay and by the time explosions occured, trees obstructed his view. He strafed several small piles of drums stacked in the disoersal area N of the center of the strip but did not see them catch fire. His waist gunner strafed a U/I camouflaged A/P in this area with .30 cal ammunition but results othen than some tracers appearing to hit the plane were not observed. This gunner also scored hits on several piles of boxes to the right of the line of flight, the effect of which could not bedetermined. Lt.Col.Fridge also strafed heavily all through this stores area. He then led his flight across Sek Harbor andOttlien Passage out over the water toward the rally point.

Lt.Kelley flew on Lt.ColFridge's right wing. He dropped 4 bombs in the stores and dispersal area N of Strip #2 and 1 bomb in Alexishafen Plantation near the shore of Sek Harbor. He was unable to preceive the effects of the bursts but saw two bombs fall near two piles of wooden boxes, and a third approximately 150 feet from a camouflaged single engine fighter in the dispersal area. He saw 3 single engine fighters camouflaged with palm fronds, serviceability undetermined, in this area N of the NE end of the strip but was unable to strafe them as they were to the leftof his line of flight. He strafed heavily throughout his run however. As he reached Sek Harbor he saw in Alexishafen plantation to his left some live stock, probably horses, and several Japs. The group seemed to be working on the ground as the earth in their immediate area appeared to be freshly plowed. As Lt.Kelley turned toward the rally point he noticed smoke and many bomb bursts in the target area.

Lt.Baker flew number three position in the flight on Lt.Kelley's right wing. Two of his bombs dropped in the NE end of the stores area N of Strip #2 and a third skipped into Sek Harbor, due to a slight malfunctiaan af rack he was unable to start releasing bombs earlier on his run and returned 2 to base. As he passed by the SW end of the strip he saw parts of wrecked planes in what appeared to be an A/P graveyard. He strafed throughout his course but at no specific target. He saw a u/i wrecked A/P near the NE end of the strip before following the rest of the flight out over the water.

Capt.Conant led the fourth flight, in echelon to the right. On his approach he noticed 1 M/G, moderate and inaccurate firing at him from the vicinity of Amron Mission. His course was to the right of the third flight and consequently he made his run just S of, and parallel to Strip #2. He released 5 bombs at suspected stores in the plantation area between the Biges River and the strip and strafed heavily along this line of flight.

He saw a column of brown smoke 500 feet high coming from a point near a bend in the Biges River about 300 yards SE of the NW end of the runway. He also noticed a fire in the dispersal area N of the runway which was sending up adolumn of black smoke estimated to be about 600 feet high. Another 500 foot column of borwn smoke was observed to be coming from the unamed point j st S of Alexishafen Township. Fromthe vicinity of this last fire he saw several rapid flashes which had the appearance of 40 mm. gunfire but due to the absence of bursts was thought to be exploding ammunition. Capt.Conantthen swung out over Sek Island and headed for the rally point.

Lt.Alger was in number two position on Capt.Conant's right wing. He dropped his only bomb at several huts on the S side, of the SE end of Strip #2. His other bombs failed to release due to rack malfunction. He noticed a white canvas-covered object with a sharp peak in the dispersal area N of the strip as he passed by the center of it. He strafed heavily along his course and as he crossed Sek Island strafed several huts about ½ mile N of Sibisibi Village. Results other than tracers hitting the huts were unobserved.

Lt.Tatleman flew third position in the flight on Lt.Alger's right wing. He dropped his first 2 bombs in the reported bivouac area in the NW sector of Militat Plantation between the "V" shaped bend in the Biges River and the Madang-Alexishafen M/T road. His remaining three were released at huts along this road S of the center of Strip #2. He strafed as well along his entire run. Several huts N of Sibisibi Village were also strafed while crossing Sek Island. Looking back toward the target he saw several bombs exploding inthe area between the two strips and noticed that there was smoke throughout the entire Alexishafen Area.

All planes reformed over the water E of the target and returned to base without further incident.

d. Fighter escort was excellent throughout, sticking in close formation in face of promising bad weather.

e. There was Nil damage to any of this Squadron's planes.

f. There were no casualties to personnel.

4. In view of the information currently known, no recommendations for awards will be forwarded.

5. Tables

For Tables A, B, and C, see incl. #1.

c. Ground opposition - Nil.

d. Air opposition - Nil.

6. Sightings:

Apparent camp area 15 miles W of Alexishafen probably in vicinity of Nake. Huts, well worn tracks gave appearance of considerable activity. Several buildings on a flat topped hill East of Fellen village (8 miles SW Alexishafen). Amron mission possibly being rebuilt. Many wrecked buildings nearby.
Weapon pits, den boot shaped Peninsula, Bostrem Bay appeared deserted and unkpet. Small fire seen to result from strafing by formation leader in Danip Plantation S of strip #1.
1 S/E camouflaged plane in revetment N of center of S strip #1. Serviceability unknown - appeared intact.
38th Group seen to attack Madang during our attack.
3 camouflaged S/E fighters dispersed in palm trees N of center Strip #2.
1 white canvas covered object giving appearance of A/A gun in dispersal N Strip #2.
Group bombing observed to be accurate and effective after leaving target.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photographs taken by this Squadron show general devasted condition of target area as a result of previous heavy attacks. No evidence of attempt to repair damage. Several bomb craters on Strip one, are filled with water.

Photos: 4 - 0 -100, 4-35-1, 499th Plane 014, show 1 [illegible] in revetment on S side of Strip NE end, with 2 wrecked Zekes nearby. 1 possibly serviceable Tony in a revetment N of the NE end of the strip in the dispersal area. 2 bomb bursts are seen S of the strip and 1 N of the strip. No damage assessable.

Photos: 3-0-70-4-35-C-1 499th Plane 016, show light A/A pits E of the NW end of Strip #2 probably not occupied and camouflaged to appear in use. Lighttank NE of NE end strip #2. Bombs bursting S of strip #2. Damage not assessable. Bomb hitting and skipping into air E of NE end strip. Bomb shown exploding on ground in succeeding picture. Showing unassessable bomb bursts, over area N and S of Strip #2.

Photos: 1-0-11 4-35-C-1 499th Plane 164.
Showing bomb bursts unassessable.

Photos: 2-0-33 4-35 C-1. Plane 058.
Showing several huts in unnamed Village SW of Strip #1.

(Continuation of Action of individual planes: Capt.Taylor's two wingmen).

Lt.Parks flew on Capt.Taylor's right wing throughout, dropping his bombs in the same areaas covered by Capt.Taylor. He observed two or three small piles of supplies and dropped his last two bombs on these with unobserved results.

Lt.Cabellflew the number 3 position throughout and observing the generally razed condition of the area, dropped all five of his bombs in the area just S of the Strip #2 and N of the Begis River. No results observed.

Pat E. Goforth Rfd.

PEG/rj.

PAT E.GOFORTH
CAPT.AIR CORPS
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:
Incl.-1 Tables.
Incl.-2 Bombassesment chart

Distribution:

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " A-2 345th Bombardment Group (M), APO 503.

Strafing Table

A/P	.50 Cal. Rds Car'd	.50 Cal. Rds Fi'd.	.50 Cal. GunFail	.30 Cal. Rds Car'd	.30 Cal. Rds Fir'd	.30 Cal. Malfunctions
058	4200	795	Nil	2000	300	Nil
015	"	1590	"	"	Nil	"
254	"	1590	"	"	200	"
164	"	795	"	"	100	"
185	"	1590	"	"	600	"
971	"	1060	"	"	Nil	"
317	"	1590	"	"	1200	"
340	"	1590	"	"	300	"
019	"	1325	"	"	500	"
014	"	1590	"	"	100	"
347	"	1325	"	"	Nil	"
016	"	——	"	"	——	"

Total 14830 X.50 Cal. 3300 X.30 Cal. expended in strafing.

Bombing Table

A/P	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target	
058	5	500	8/11	2	(1 skipped in water, 2 brought back)
015	"	"	"	5	
254	"	"	"	"	
164	"	"	"	1	(4 bombs brought back)
185	"	"	"	5	
971	"	"	"	"	
317	"	"	"	"	
340	"	"	"	"	
019	"	"	"	"	
014	"	"	"	Nil	(All bombs brought back)
					Rack Malfunction
347	"	"	"	5	
016	"	"	"	"	

Totals: 48 X 500 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs on Target.
1 X 500 lb. 8/11 seconddelay bomb in water.


Photo Report


A/P	Type Camera,	No. Pictures Taken	Time		Location
185	K-20	25	1034/L	1037/L	Alexishafen
971	K-21	30	"	"	"
254	K-21	30	"	"	"
164	K-21	30	"	"	"
015	K-21	30	"	"	"
340	K-20	48	"	"	"
058	K-21	30	"	"	"

TOTALS: 150 K-21 43 K-20's

Squadron: 499th
Order: Over Target: 1st
Altitude: Minimum
Crews Escort: On Bomb Falling.
T—Took Photos

Map Ref: Alexishafen Prelim. Map 1/25000.




Plantation
BOSTEL
PLANTATION
OTTILIEN
SEK HARBOR
SEK ISLAND
SEK I.
Kanaman pt
Kanaman Is
Tausch I.
MILILAT HARBOR
Plantation
MALAMAL IS.
N

499
36 C-1
5 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

6 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 36 C-1. Performed on 5 Feb. 44. Objective at Hansa Bay, N.G. 144°50' E 4°10' S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General

a. The assigned objective was Hansa Bay, New Guinea. The target for this Squadron was shipping in the Bay with supply dumps in Awar Plantation as an alternate target in the event that no shipping was not present. Each of ten planes of this Squadron carried five, 500 lb. bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses.

b. Rendesvous with "Fighter Escort" and A-20 Strike Force was accomplished near Dumpu in the Markham Valley at 0906/L.

c. Attack

(1) This squadron was number 3 in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The Squadron approached the target on a heading approximately W to E and turning SE over the Boroi River Mouth for the bombing and strafing run. Formation over the target consisted of 3,3 plane "V"'s gàing over the target at 15 second intervals. A total of 43 X 500 lb. bombs were drpped on targets in the area. A total of 31 X 500 lb bombs weredropped on supply areas in Awar Plantation. Bombing here was accur ate but coconut trees prevented observation of specific results. However, several small fires were observed to flare up, and burn briefly in the manner of small fuel fires. It is thought this is a result of wide dispersal of fuel dumps.
Several good sized buildings probably containing supplies were bombed and strafed prior to reaching

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the actual target with possible damage. (See appendix 1). A light A/A position observed firing near a damaged 6 gun Heavy position S of the NE end of Awar Strip, was bombed and strafed with unobserved results other than the fact that the position was silenced. A serviceable "Betty" parked on the S side of the NE end of Awar Strip was heavily strafed with resulting fire which was raging fiercely as the third flight crossed the target. In general, the attack was successfully executed with undoubtedly substantial damage to supplies which at the present time are vital to the enemy in forward areas. Coordination of attack within this Group and with the A-20 attack on the Nubia was without fault. The one flaw in the attack was the fact that the heavy A/A position at Eku Village and the heavy A/A position on Awar Pt. were apparently untouched since these positions were seen firing on withdrawal.

(2) Action of other units.

The 498th Squadron was observed to make a run from NW to SE and bomb accurately and covering A war plantation effectively. A-20's were observed making a run from N to S over the coastal area starting at the Awar River. Bombing appeared to be accurate and effective.

d. Interception

Nil enemy planes were observed airborne in the area.

One plane probably an A-20, was observed to crash in flames in the vicinity of Nubia Village.

2. The 501st. Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt. G.W.Taylor was selected to lead our Squadron. Flights were as follows:.

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.G.W.Taylor	A/P 015
1st.Lt.W.N.Parke	" 347
1st.Lt.W.W.Cabell	" 016

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.L.Bane	A/P 591
2nd.Lt.D.J.Wilson	" 014
2nd.Lt.W.G.Irish	" 164

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.V.W.Tatleman	A/P 971
1st.Lt.C.D.Jordan	" 019
1st.Lt.R.Baker	" 380

Note: Capt.C.C.Conant took-off as leader of the third flight but engine trouble necessitated returning to base from Dumpu.

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Time and location of:-
Alert Strip #7: 0700/L.
Take-off : 0745/L.
Group assembly enroute: 0800/L.
Attack, Awar Plantation 1009/L - 1011/L.
Landing Strip #7: 1235/L.

b. Routes Flown.

1.Base-Nadzab to I.P. 15 miles W of Hansa Bay.
2.Axis of attack: NW to SE over Awar Plantation.
3.Return: Target down coast 20 miles off shore to Alexishafen Nadzab - Base.

c. Action of Individual Planes.

On reaching the I.P. Capt.Taylor led the squadron from the number 3 position in the Group Formation in a wide swing to obtain spacing. His Navigator brought him to the mouth of the Boroi River, where Capt.Taylor turned the flight onto the axis of attack. In order to provide the most difficult target for A/A, Capt.Taylor flew on the tree topsand on reaching a stretch of Marshy ground flew even lower on the deck. As a result A/A positions were surprised as well as rendered ineffective. Only a few light positions fired spasmodically and futily. Capt.Taylor strafed huts during the approach and on reaching Awar Strip spotteda "Betty " in excellent condition on the S side of the NE end. He concentrated a large volume of fire on this plane and observed his bullets striking the target with damaging results. (Capt.Taylor did not observe the plane to catch fire but his wingmen observed the damage and the third flight observed the fire to be rapidly consuming the plane.) Capt.Taylor observed 2 or 3 other planes dispersed under the trees but saw them too late to attack. On reaching the edge of Awar Plantation he began taggling his bombs which were strung from this point to the Southern edge on the beach. No definite targets were spotted, however, the bombs burst accurately in an area where supplies were heavily concentrated.

Lt.Parke flew in the number two position of this flight staying within 200 feet of Capt.Taylor's right wing throughout. He dropped 3 bombs in the supply area and saved 2 for possible barges in the jetty area. However, no barges were in his ling of flight and the bombs were returned to base. Lt.Parke observed blacksmoke over the jetty area near the Awar Plantation Buildings probably the result of the 498th attack.

Lt.Cabell flew the number 3 position throughout and dropped his bomb in pattern similar to Capt.Taylor's and in the same area. His gunner observed several small fires break out as a result of this flights attack.

Lt.Bans was the leader of the second flight. He veered out over the water slightly near the Soroi River mouth but swung back almost immediately to begin his approach. At this time he experienced intense, light, inaccurate A/A fire. He dropped his first bomb at a small village about 4 miles NW of Awar Plantationbuildings at approximately 648470 (Ref: Hubia East 1mile to 1 inch) which he believes he hit but could not observe definite results. Another bomb was released at several shacks in some trees about 3 miles NW of Awar Plantation buildings. At this time he experienced intense, light inaccurate A/A from positions around the NW end of Condor Strip. He saw several small fires along the coast near this Strip and 2 u/i planes at the NW end of the runway. As he neared Awar Plantation he observed many bomb bursts from preceeding squadrons throughout the area. He droppedhis remaining 3 bombs in the area N of the Awar Plantation buildings, but due to smoke and dust from previous bursts was unable to ascertain any results. He strafed heavily during his bombing run. As he broke away from the target moderate heavy A/A accurate as to altitude but about 100' short, off his right wing followed him across the Bay as far as Laing Island.

Lt.Wilson made his run on Lt.Bans's right wing. About 5 miles from the target area he saw a wrecked 33', definitely u/S, near the shore. He dropped 2 bombs at 2 clumps of trees about 3 miles NW of Awar Plantation buildings at suspected supply dumps but observed no results. He dropped 3 more bombs in the immediate vicinity of Awar Plantation buildings but results were obscured from his vision. He also strafed along his ling of flight. He noticed several small fires having the appearance of burning gasoline in the vicinity NW of Condor Strip. These fires seemed to die quickly. 1 "Betty", apparently serviceable was seen off the NW end of Condor. He saw many bomb bursts in the vicinity of Awar Plantation from the preceeding Squadron and reported that the area was well covered. He saw 2 bursts of heavy A/A as he approached the target both of which were short but one so near that he flew directly through the smoke. As he left the target he saw only afew bursts of heavy A/A which appeared to him to be accurate as to range but from 100 to 200 feet overhead.

Lt.Irish was Lt.Bans's left wing man. Asne approached the main target he dropped 2 bombs at the suspected new supply and bivouac area about 4 miles NW of Awar point. He was unable to discern any results of these bombs. His remaining three bombs were dropped in Awar Plantation between Condor Strip and Awar Point.

He had been flying about 200 feet above the ground over the target for greater safety in releasing bombs but when he broke away over Hansa Bay he saw 2 bursts of heavy A/A directly in front of the airplane. So close was one burst that the right wing passed through the smoke. He immediately went down to minimum altitude and had no further difficulty.

Lt.V.W.Tatleman led the third flight at avery close interval behind the other two flights butover the coastal area to the east. He strafed a native village 4 miles NW of Awar Point wherea small amount of stores were observed. Approximately two miles farther on he strafed and dropped two bombs on a similar target. He observed 3 or 4 planes dispersed under thatches in dispersal area but saw them too late for attack. He dropped three bombs in Awar Plantation with the last dropping directly on the beach. Just after crossing Awar Pt. the gunner observed an explosion in the area attack by this flight. The explosion was probable amunition for no fire resulted and a relatively small amount of smoke.
Lt.Jordan flew on Lt.Tatleman's right wing. As he approached the target area he saw several bursts of medium A/A out of range to his right and considerably high. He began strafing when he passed the SE end of Condor Strip and strafed continually for the rest of the run. He saw a "Betty" bomber at the NW end of the strip burning fiercely as a result of the attack of another flight. He dropped all five bombs in a string on Awar Point. Other than the fact that allbombs burst on land no results were observed. As he crossed over Hansa Bay he noticed a column of black smoke from the vicinity of Awar Plantation buildings about 100 feet high and being carried northward by the wind. A large ballof fire 50 feet off the ground thought to be a friendly A/P exploding was seen near Nubia Village Heavy A/A from the vicinity of Nubia Strip followed him out over the water. He described it as being accurate as to range inaccurate as to altitude the first few bursts were low almost in the water beneath him and the remainder were all about 100 feet above. One burst however shook ernpennage appreciably but inflicted no damage.

Lt.Baker flew the number 3 position in this flight during the entire run. He spotted a group of huts near the ~~mouth of the group of huts near the~~ mouth ofthe Boroi River and dropped one bomb with no specific results observed. Two miles SE of this point he bombed a similar target. Lt.Baker strafed a group of pits and trenches where M/G fire was originating. He also droppedone bomb with the result that the position ceased firing. Lt.Baker then heavily strafed and dropped two bombs in Awar Plantation with unobserved results.
All nine planes circled to the east of Hansa Bay, just out of A/A range and assembled the formation. The squadron then rallied with the Group and returned to base without further incident.

d. Fighter escort was extremely good sticking with the bombers in bad weather which was encountered throughout the mission.

e. Damage to our planes waspractically Nil as a result of careful planning of approach and consideration of defiladed areas as well as the excellent coordination of the attack.

f. There were no personnel casualties.

4. Citations

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for awards will be forwarded.

5. Tables

(See Incl.#2)

6. Sightings.

Apparent plane crash in flames in vicinity Nubia Village. Probably A-20.
A/A position on Condor Point seen firing after all planes cleared target.
A/A position near Eku Village seen firing after all planes cleared target.
4-5 probably serviceable u/i, 2/e, very well camouflaged, planes in dispersal area S of NE end Awar Strip.
1 u/i plane possibly serviceable parked at NE end of Awar Strip.
Wrecked u/i, S/E radial engine fighter 5 miles NW Awar Plantation.

7. Photo interpretation.

Photos have not yet been received.

Pat E. Gofort

PAT E. GOFORT
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: Incl.-1 Bomb Assessment Chart
" 2 Tables (Par.5)

Distribution:

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
A-2 FATF, APO 503.
Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M). APO 503.

Strafing Table

A/P	.50 Cal. Rds C'r'd	.50 Cal. Rds Fired	.50 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds C'r'd	.30 Cal. Rds Fired	.30 Cal. Gun Fail
164	4200	2125	L.E.S. Cable Brks.	2000	300	Nil
971	"	1325	Nil	"	Nil	"
015	"	750	Nil	"	300	"
340	"	650	"	"	Nil	"
019	"	1625	Nil—Old weak spring	"	200	"
347	"	1000	Nil		Nil	"
[illegible]	"	2125	Nil	"	200	"
016	"	2120	Nil		Nil	"
591	"	2120	Nil	"	"	"
TOTAL:	4025	.50 Cal.		1000	.30 Cal.	


Bombing Table

A/P	No Bombs	Weight	Type	No. on Target.	
164	5	500	4/5	5	
971	"	"	"	"	
015	"	"	"	"	
340	"	"	"	"	
019	"	"	"	"	
347	"	"	"	3	(two brought back)
016	"	"	"	5	
016	"	"	"	"	
591	"	"	"	"	

TOTAL: 43 A.500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs dropped on target.

Photo Table


A/P	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Time	Location
971	K-21	30	[illegible]	[illegible]
019	"	"	"	"
164	"	"	"	"
016	"	"	"	"
016	"	25		
TOTAL:	145 K-21's			




FFO 36-C-
Squadron:
Order Ove
Altitude:
Crews R


Heavy A


Map Ref: M





Hansa Pt


164
591
014
340
971
019
016
015
347
HUTS - SUPPLIES
Boroi
BORDI (NUAN) RIVER
BAK
Damor
HUTS - SUPPLI
M/G SILU
4-5 U/
DISPERSE
Condor
Condor STRIP
Awar
RIVER
AWAR
Awar Pln
Bldgs
Awar Village
Nubia R.C. Mission
Nubia Village
Sisimanango Village
NEW NUBIA STRIP
Nubia Pln.


HUTS - SUPPLI
164
591
014
340
971
019
016
015
347
Boroi
BOROI (MUAN) RIVER
BAK
Damor

499
39 A-1
8 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group ( ) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

9 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission No. 39 A-1. Performed 8 Feb., 44. Objective at Madang, N.G. 5°50' S 145°50'E.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FEAF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (-), APO 503.

1. GENERAL

a. The assigned objective was Madang, New Guinea. The target for this squadron was supply dumps and barges in the immediate vicinity of Madang. Each of the six planes of this squadron carried five 500 lb. demolition bombs with 4/5 second delay fuses.

b. Rendezvous with "Fighter Escort" and A-20 Strike Force accomplished near Saidor in the Markham Valley at 1030/L.

c. Attack

(1) This squadron was number [illegible] in the sequence of attack: following [illegible] squadron. The approach was made on a heading of approximately [illegible] to a point about [illegible] miles [illegible] of Madang where the [illegible] turned for a bombing and strafing run. Formation over the target was two flights in trail, each flight consisting of 3 airplanes in a shallow "V", going over the target at approximately 15 second intervals. A total of 29 500 lb. bombs were dropped in three passes made over the target area. Bombing was accurate but [illegible] prevented observation of specific results. Several small fires and explosions were seen to flare up briefly, emitting heavy black smoke for a short time appearing as small fuel fires. Several unidentified villages west of Madang were strafed on the approach with possible damage.
Bombs were dropped on the area between Diar Harbor and Madang Airdrome, Seliau Island, the S part of Arapot Island, Pano Tibin Island, Madang Township and throughout Modilon Plantation on the Schering Peninsula.

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These areas were also thoroughly strafed. In general the attack was successfully executed and if supplies were present in the designated areas they undoubtedly suffered considerable damage. Coordination within the Group was excellent.

(2) The 499th Squadron was observed making its run prior to this Squadron and what bomb bursts were observed were accurately placed in designated target areas. The 500th Squadron was also observed but results of their attack could not be discerned. The A-20's were seen over Alexishafen with smoke and one fire as the observed results.

d. Interception

Nil enemy a/c's were observed in the area.
Nil friendly craft observed to be damaged or destroyed.

2. The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Capt.C.C. Conant led the 499th. Flights for this squadron were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.C.C.Conant	A/P 185	Maj.S.T.Marston	A/P 317
1st.Lt.F.R.Kelley	" 591	1st.P.T.Mitchell	" 019
1st.Lt.V.W.Tittleman	" 204	1st.Lt.W.A.Campbell	" 014

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Time and locations:

Alert:	Strip - 7	0830/L.
Take-off	"	0902/L.
Group assembly enroute		0917/L.
Attack	Madang	1034/L - 1130/L.
Landing	Strip - 7	1300/L.

b. Route - from.

1. Base - Nadzab - Busap - to I. P. 15 Miles S. Madang.

2. Axis of attack: [illegible] over Madang area.

3. Return: Target - Finschafen - Base.

c. Action of Individual Planes.

Capt.Conant held the Squadron in the number four position of the Group Formation until 1040/L when Madang was sighted. At which time the A-20's broke off forAlexishafen. After test firing the strafing guns at 1044/L the squadron taking interval approximately 10 miles SW of Madang. At 1046/L, the 498th began their run just as the 500th Bombs were exploding. Capt.Conant lined up the first flight at interval behind the 498th Squadron and began losing altitude from 2000 feet. At 1049/L he opened his bomb bay doors and made his initial attack from W to E as the 498th bombs were exploding in front. He dropped one bomb in a reported supply area just S of Erina Heinrich Harbor. Just afterward he flew through a waterspout which covered the windshield with mud. For this reason Capt.Conant led his flight out over the sea just S of Iraget Island to clean off the mud. He allowed most of the planes to complete their runs and then took his flight on a run from NE to SW over Iraget Island at 1055/L. However, he saw another squadron making a run from S To NE so he broke off the run and circled once more at 1104/L. Capt. Conant led the flight on the same run and dropped his four remaining bombs - two in the eastern edge of Madang Township, one in a suspected supply area S of Madang Township and one further on in another suspected supply area near the Modilon Labor Houses. Capt.Conant broke off the run at 1105/L and flew out to sea to rally the squadron and join the Group Formation.

Lt.Kelley flew on Capt.Conant's right wing throughout. As he crossed the S tip of Iraget Island he dropped one bomb in a suspected supply area. He did not release bombs on the second run but on the third run from NW to SE over Modilon Location he dropped the remaining four-two in the eastern edge of Madang Township and two in a reported supply area SW of Modilon Labor Houses. He then turned off the target with the flight leader.

Lt.Tatleman flew the number three position in this flight during the entire attack. He did not release bombs on the first and second runs for lack of a target however, on the third run he released four bombs in a string from NW to SE starting near Cape Kasserow and extending to Modilon Labor Houses. He did not release the last bomb for lack of a target. He then turned off the target with the flight.

All three planes strafed throughout the attack. No fires or smoke resulting from their attack were observed by any of these planes.

Major Marston led the second flight over the target. As he reached the I.P. and began his approach he noticed several unidentified villages between 10 and 15 miles S of Madang which had the appearance of being occupied. He noticed A/A fire, inaccurate, from one of them. Clouds were below and

in front of the flight. As he leveled off at about 150 feet near the Madang-Alexishafen road to begin his first pass over the target one crew member saw a A/C position 1/2 mile NW of His Village (712258) Madang Airdrome Map 1/25000, firing at the airplanes. The tracers were to the left of the A/P and above it. He strafed starting with His Village and continued on a due E course to the S shore of Dragat Island. At this time he scrutinized the shores of Diar Harbor but saw no barges. As he crossed Dragat Island he dropped 2 bombs. He then led his flight in a wide circle to the left in a preparation for the second pass. This was begun over Tab Island, and continued in a southwesterly direction across Dragat Island and Schering Peninsula. He strafed Drogate Villages onDrugot Island, and as he crossed Dalkhan Passage he saw a W/S barge on the beach on the N shore of Madang Township. As he crossed Schering Peninsula he dropped one bomb just N of the lighthouse and strafed Modilon Plantation. He swung seaward about 3 mile N of Modilon Labor houses then made a sweeping arc to the right for his final pass. This was begun near the N end of Madang Strip continuing in NE across Panu Pibun Island, Paewai Island and Tab Islands. Major Marston had been saving 2 bombs in hopes of spotting a serviceable barge but as none were sighted he dropped them both at several huts at Panu Pibun Island. He was unable to perceive any results but believed that both exploded on the island. He swung out over the water again and reformed his flight with the Squadron and Group without further incident.

Lt.Luttrell flew number two position in the flight on Major Marston's right wing. He also experienced slight M/G fire from villages N of Madang but was unable to pin point the exact location of the positions. He strafed the area N of Madang strip and as he crossed Dragat Island he dropped one bombat a possible camouflaged gun position near Drogat Village. He followed Major Marston in his left turn, and as he made his second pass, proceeding across Dragat Island in a southwesterly direction he saw one camouflaged barge, possibly serviceable on the beach of the S shore of the island. As he was not in the vicinity of his line of flight he was unable to attack it. He dropped his second bomb at the E edge of Madang Township at several huts. He saw at this time 2 small fires N of, and near the mouth of the Nagol River. They flared up then died down quickly giving the appearance of burning fuel. He saw a similar fire near the center of Modilon Plantation about 1/2 mile S of Cape Kunserow. He turned left then, and made his third pass dropping his remaining 3 bombs in a string in the area between Diar Harbor and Madang Strip. As he went over the water S of Madang Harbor he saw 3 large orange flashes at Cape Janszen on Dragat Island. These he thought to be exploding fuel drums.

Lt.Cabell flew on Major Marston's left wing, in number 3 position. He did not drop any bombs on his first pass but strafed heavily along his line of flight. He carefully searched Diar Harbor for barges but reported that none were visible. On his second pass he dropped his first bomb in the target area N of the lighthouse on Schering Peninsula.

He strafed Modilon Plantation and as he broke out over the water he saw near the beach at the Modilon Labor Houses, one sunken barge and one camouflaged possibly serviceable barge, but he was not in a position to place them under attack. On his final pass he toggled 4 bombs in a string over Beliau Island. Lt. O'Bell stated that it was possible that the last bomb skipped into the water but he could not be certain.

d. Fighter cover was excellent throughout.

e. No damage was sustained by our airplanes.

f. None of our personnel were injured.

4. Citations

In view of the information currently at hand no recommendation for citations will be forwarded.

5. Tables.

(See inclosure #1)

6. Sightings

1 camouflaged barge possibly serviceable S shore Dragot Island and one at Modilon Harbor No 5es, Modilon Plantation.

16 to 12 t rp covered supply dumps (approx.1 truck load each) in target 25 D.

1 L/s ba[illegible] Tomadip.

1 possible camouflaged [illegible] position (743839: [illegible] 1/25000).

Former k/s position at approximately 7h42h7 (Same Map as above) appeared destroyed by 4 or 5 [illegible] craters. Is entirely s/s.

Pat E Galbraith
PAT E. GALBRAITH
Capt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

MH:/rjl

Incl: -1 Armament, Ordnance and Photo Table.
-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FAETF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Armament Table.

Plane No.	.50 Cal. Rds. Car'd.	.50 Cal. Rds. Fired	.50 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds. Car'd	.30 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds. Fired
014	4200	1060	Nil	2000	Nil	200
591	"	1590	Nil	"	"	500
058	"	2385	"	"	"	1200
317	"	1855	"	"	"	500
254	"	1855	"	"	"	500
185	"	1590	"	"	"	200

TOTAL: 10685 X.50 Cal. 3100 X.30 Cal.

Bombing Table


A/P No.	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. Bombs on Target
014	5	500 lb	4/5	5
591	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
317	"	"	"	"
254	"	"	"	4 (1 brought back to base)
185	"	"	"	5

TOTAL: 29 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target area.

Photo Table

A/P	Type Camera	No. Pictures Taken	Time	Location
185	K-21	26	1050-1105/L	Wabang Area
591	K-20	32	" "	" "
254	K-21	23	" "	" "
317	K-20	50	" "	" "
019	K-21	15	" "	" "
058	K-21	30	" "	" "

TOTAL: K-20 82 K-21 95


329
Panab I.
Siar Plantation
D'Lole I.
Paeowai I.
Siar No. 2.
Siar I.
Matupi Plantation
Schlangan I.
Lipan
Harbor
Samin Dangan I.
Sdi Dangan I.
Pana
Paru Tibun I.
FIRST FLIGHT CIRCLED
Gragat I.
MEIRO RIVER
MADANG AIRDROME
Madang Hr.
MADANG
Launch Wharf
Dock
DISPERSAL LANES
PASSAGE
Lighthouse
Kalibobo (Schering) Peninsula
Cape Kusserow
BINNEN HARBOR
Beliau
Pook I.
Madilon
WAGOL RIVER
Ficus Rubber Plantation
Old Tramline
Madilon Road
Madilon Labor Houses
322
Ficus Rubber Plantation
Road
Bogadjim
Jomba I.
Jabub
Jabub I.
MAP REF:-
MADANG AIRDROME, BILI BILI. Special Map - Preliminary Sheet.
Scale: 1:25,000 (Approx.)
1000 Meter Modified British Grid System.
Mission No. FFO 39-A-1 Date FEB. 8/44
Squadron No. 499 c.a. Group 345 c.a.
Squadron Order Over Target 4 c.a.
Altitude MINIMUM FT.
Time Over Target 10:55
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency—
(Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photos
T (Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T (Black) Other Planes. (All Planes to be Shown at Beginning of Run.)
T/Sgt. Baldwin
345th B.G.
S-2

499
FFO 44
13 Feb 4

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

14 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 44 S-1. Performed 13 Feb.44. Objective at Los Negros Island. 02°00' S 147°25'E.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FAIF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

1. General

a. The assigned objective was LOS NEGROS ISLAND in the ADMIRALTY GROUP OF ISLANDS. The target for this Squadron was shipping in PAPITALAI HARBOR with the supply areas adjacent to the W shore of PAPITALAI HARBOR as an alternative in the event that no shipping was present. Each of the 11 planes of this Squadron carried five, 500 lb. bombs, demolition, equipped with instantaneous nose fuses and 4/5 second delay tail fuses.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bombardment Group was accomplished over TOLOKIWA ISLAND. No fighter escort was seen by this Squdiron at any time.

c. Attack

(1) This Squadron was second in the sequence of attack. The Squadron approached the target from SW to NE and made the bombing from SE to NW beginning beginning at the S end of MOMOTE STRIP continuing across SAKUKALEO POINT out over SEADLER HARBOR. Formation over the target consisted of flights in close trail javelin down. The first flight of 4 airplanes was in box formation and the remaining two in 3 plane "V"s. Bombing was superior with 52 of the 55 x 500 lb. bombs exploding in the designated target area. No fires were observed as a result however one possible explosion was seen. The target was completely covered with bomb smoke and dust. Although some difficulty was encountered in coordinating the attack it was in general well executed and any enemy supplies in the area were undoubtedly destroyed or severely damaged.

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(2) Action of other units.

The 38th Bombardment Group was observed attacking MOMOTE AIRDROME prior to this Squadron's attack. Resulting bomb bursts were observed along the entire length of the runway and throughout the dispersal area E of the Strip. Results of the 498th Squadron, which preceded this Squadron, were not seen but it was observed that the 498th Squadron made a second pass over the target.

d. Interception

Nil interception by enemy planes was encountered on this strike.
Nil damage to friendly A/P's observed.

2. The 498th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Lt. P.T. Luttrell was selected to lead this Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.P.T Luttrell	A/P 259
1st.Lt.R. Baker	" 058
1st.Lt.C.B Jordan	" 317
1st.Lt.W.H. Parks	" 347

SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.G.W. Taylor	A/P 185
1st.Lt.R.D. Reinbold*	340
Maj.J.B. Baird	" 015

THIRD FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.V.H. Tatelman	A/P 971
2nd.Lt.W.G. Irish	" 254
1st.Lt.J.D. Wilson	" 014

Note: Capt. C.C. Commat was forced to turn back 30 minutes E of the target because of failure of fuel transfer pump and overheating of left engine. 1st. Lt. T.I. Kelley took off late. Details of his action are included in Paragraph 3. c.

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Time and location of:-
Alert: Strip #4, Dobodura: 0630/L.
Take-off : 0705/L.
Group assembly: Over strip #4.
Attack, LOS NEGROS ISLAND 0953/L.
Landed: Strip #4: 1245/L.

b. Routes Flown.

Route out: Base, TOLOKINA ISLAND, Target.
Attack Route: Approach: W side LOU ISLAND, 2 miles E HYANE HBR., E end MOMOTE STRIP.
Axis of Attack: SE to NW.
Return Route: Target, Finschafen, Base.

c. Action of Individual Planes.

Lt. P.T Luttrell, with Lt. Baker on his right wing, Lt. Jordan on his left wing and Lt. Parks in number four position, led the flight one. Lt. Luttrell's airplane, was the only one over the target equipped with a bomb sight and all planes dropped their bombs on him. His orders were to follow the 498th Squadron on their run. During the approach the 38th Group was observed attacking MOMOTE STRIP and apparently fro that reason the 498th Squadron did not begin the bomb run as it did first drew near LOS NEGROS ISLAND. Lt. Luttrell followed the 498th to a point about 2 miles E of the W end of HYANE HARBOR where he made a 180° turn to the left and proceeded to the E end of MOMOTE STRIP. Here he executed an approximate 90° turn to the right to make his bomb run. The run was made at 210 MPH on a heading of 290° at 7800 feet of altitude. All bombs of this flight were observed to burst in the target area with the exception of two which overshot and exploded in the water. These two were thought to be from the right wing plane flown by Lt. Baker. During the run two Squadrons, one of which was on a course approximately parallel to Lt. Luttrell's but at a lower altitude were seen coming together head on. Both formations were obliged to break up to avied possible aerial collision. After the run Lt. Luttrell followed the 498th Squadron over SEEADLER HARBOR toward the N tip of LOS NEGROS ISLAND. Here they executed an 180° turn to the left, Lt. Luttral doing the same. This brought both Squadrons over the SW tip of LOS NEGROS ISLAND where the 498th swung to the left again with the apparent intention of making a second bomb run. Lt. Luttrell left them as soon as this became evident, and staying well to the E of LOS NEGROS ISLAND, made another 180° turn to the right and led this Squadron to LOU ISLAND, the Group rally point.

Cap't. G.W. Tayler led the second flight with Lt. Reinbold on his right wing and Major Baird on his left. He stayed in close trail to the first flight throughout the bomb run. All bombs were reported to have burst in the target area. After the run, however, when he observed the first flight making a left turn which would carry them back over the Island, he chose to lead his flight in to the right away from the Island and out of range of any possible anti-aircraft fire. He made a wide circle to the right and proceeded to LOU ISLAND where he rejoined the rest of the Squadron a short while later.

Lt. V.W. Tatel man led the third flight. Lt. Irish flew on his right wing and Lt. Wilson on his left. Lt. Tatelman followed in close trail throughout the entire run. All bombs from this flight were believed to have hit the target, but one burst was seen in PAPITALAI HARBOR just off the W shore. It was impossible to determine from which airplane this bomb came, but it was dropped by the right wing man of either the second or third flight.

Lt. T.I. Kelley was originally scheduled to fly A/P #164 but just prior to take off one of the brakes on this airplane froze. He and his crew then transferred to A/P #019 and took off at approximately 0730/L. He caught the Group just as they reached the target and barely had time to move into number four position in the last flight of the 501st Squadron. His plane was not equipped with a bombsight so he dropped his bombs on the lead plane of this Squadron. The designated target area was the same for both the 501st and 499th Squadrons. He reported that all 5 of his bombs burst in the target area and that bombs from the 501st Squadron also burst throughout the area. He saw no bombs hit the water. After the bomb run Lt. Kelley observed the 501st Squadron breaking formation to avoid colliding with another Squadron approaching them head on, so he peeled off to the right making a wide circle past the N tip of LOS NEGROS ISLAND and rejoined the 499th Squadron at the rally point.

d. Fighter escort was not seen by this Squadron during the entire mission.

e. Nil damage was sustained by any airplanes in this Squadron.

f. No personnel were injured on this mission.

4. Citations

In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for awards will be forwarded.

5. Tables

For Tables a and b see incl. #1.

c. Ground Opposition

Nil ground opposition was encountered on this mission.

d. Air Opposition

Nil air opposition was encountered on this mission.

6. Sightings:

Jetty in good condition on NE side PAK ISLAND with 4-5 European type buildings on NW side of this Island.
2 small fishing boats 45 minutes S of target.

7. Photographs of mission have not been received at the time of submitting this report.

PEF/eja.

Pat E Goforth
PAT E. GOFORTH
CAPT. AIR CORPS
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:
Incl.-1 Tables.
Incl.-2 Bomb assessment chart.

Distribution:

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " A-2 345th Bombardment Group (M), APO 503.

Bombing Table


A/P	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target	
019	5	500	4/5	5	
347	5	"	"	5	
058	5	"	"	5	(2 in Water)
[illegible]					
014	5	"	"	5	
971	5	"	"	5	
317	5	"	"	5	
354	5	"	"	5	(1 in water)
185	5	"	"	5	
289	5	"	"	5	
015	5	"	"	5	
340	5	"	"	5	

Totals: 52 x 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs on Target.
5 x 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs in water.

Photo Report

A/P	Type Camera, No. Pictures Taken	Time	Location
289	K-21 30	GMT/L	LOS NEGROS ISLAND
185	K-21 30	"	" " "
971	K-21 30	"	" " "

Total: 90 K-21s




LEGEND

- STORES
- PERSONNEL
- STORES & PERSONNEL
- GUN POSITIONS B A/A
- A A/D & DISPERSAL
- C SHIPPING
- D STORES & PERSONNEL
- E DEFENSE WORKS


MISSION NO. 10-C-1 DATE. 2-13-44
SQUADRON NO. 1 991st Bomb. GROUP. 345th Bomb
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET... 2nd
ALTITUDE. 7,800 FT.
TIME OVER TARGET. 09:52
CREW OBSERVATION BOMBING EFFICIENCY.....

- (RED) CREW REPORT OF BOMB HITS.
- (RED) BOMB HITS SHOWN ON PHOTOGRAPHS.
- (BLUE) PLANES TAKING PHOTOS.
- (BLACK) OTHER PLANES. (ALL PLANES TO BE SHOWN AT BEGINNING OF RUN.)



MISSION NO.....44-C-1.....DATE...2-13-44....
SQUADRON NO...499th. Bomb.....GROUP..345th. Bomb.
ALTITUDE.....7,800.....FT.
TIME OVER TARGET.....09:53.....L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLI-
GENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).



MISSION NO. 44-3-1 DATE. 2-13-44
SQUADRON NO. 499th. Bomb. GROUP. 345th. Bomb.
ALTITUDE. 7,800 FT.
TIME OVER TARGET. 09:53 L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).

S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B. GP.
S-2

CONFIDENTIAL

499
45<1
14Feb44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

15 February,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 45 C-1. Performed 14 Feb.,44. Objective at MEMOTE AIRDROME, LOS NEGROS ISLAND. 146°40'E-2°02S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. GENERAL.

a. The assigned objective was MEMOTE AIRDROME on LOS NEGROS ISLAND. The purpose of the mission to attack the runway and dispersal areas with 2x1000 lb. bombs,with 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/4 second delay tail fuse, per plane and to render the Airdrome temporarily unserviceable. The specific target for this squadron was the S half of the drome.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Squadron was accomplished en-route to CAPE WARD HUNT. Rendezvous with Fighter escort was not accomplished. However, several fighters were seen above and trailing the formation prior to reaching the target.

c. Attack

(1) This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack, leading the 345th Group Formation as well as the 38th Group Formation. Approach to the target from S of LOS NEGROS ISLAND. Bombing run was on a heading of 355°, directly over the length of the runway. Bombing altitude was 7000 feet for the lead flight at a ground speed of 240 mph. Formation over the target consisited of four 3 plane "V's" in trail, javelin down with all planes bombing on the lead plane.
A total of 21 x 2000 lb. instantaneous bombs were dropped on the target. The S part of the runway and the SE dispersal area were blanketed with bomb bursts. No fires were started as a result of this attack nor were planes present on the strip. However, the objective was accomplished, leaving the drome temporarily unserviceable.

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(2) Action of Other Units was generally unobserved. One 8/L Squadron was observed to bomb through the eastern dispersal area covering the jetty area N of the N end of the strip and 3-4 bombs in the water in Ryans HARBOR.

4. Interception

(1) There were no enemy A/P airborne in the area.

(2) No allied planes observed destroyed.

II. This Squadron was assigned to lead the entire "Strike Force" of the 345th and 38th Bomb Groups. Major Bruce T. Marston, Ass't Group Operations Officer elected to fly the lead plane. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Maj. B.T. Marston	A/P #259	Capt. C.G. Canark	A/P # 185
1st Lt. T.A. Kelley	" 591	2nd. Lt. H. Alger	" 348
2nd Lt. G. Irish	" 254	1st. Lt. R.D. Reinbold	" 015

THIRD FLIGHT		FOURTH FLIGHT	
1st. Lt. P.T. Luttrell	A/P # 019	1st. Lt. W. Parks	A/P # 347
1st. Lt. V.W. Tahlmann	" 971	2nd. Lt. D. Wilson	" 014
1st. Lt. C.L. Ossana	" 164	2nd. Lt. A.S. Anderson	" 058

(Note: A/P no. 259 is a "Norden Equipped" M/B. All other planes B-25D-1 "Strafers"

III. Details of the Mission

a. Time and location of:

Alert:	Strip #4 DOBODURA	0715/L.
Take-off	" " "	0745/L.
Attack	Momote Drome, LOS NEGROS ISLAND	1031/L.
Landing	Strip #4 DOBODURA	1312/L.

b. Routes Flown

1. Base - VITIAZ STRAITS - TOLOKIWA ISLAND - Target.

2. Attack Route: From S to N over MOMOTE RUNWAY on heading of 355°.

3. Withdrawal: Right turn after bomb run to Rally Point just S of Target.

4. Return to Base: Same as enroute.

c. Details of Action of Individual Planes.

Major B.T. Marston led the Squadron on this mission with Lt's. Malley and Irish on his wings. Capt. Conant led the second flight in close trail, with Lt. Alger and Lt. Reinhold as his wingmen. Lt. Luttrell, the third flight leader, has as his wingmen Lt. Tabelman and Lt. Cessna. Lt. Parks led the fourth flight with Lt. Wilson and Lt. Anderson on his wings. Major Marston led the Squadron in the approach on a due N course. Just before reaching LOS NEGROS ISLAND, he made a slight turn to the left and began the bomb run. This bomb run was made on a heading of 355° at 7000 ft. altitude at 210 MPH XXX I.A.S, with a true ground speed of 249 MPH. Major Marston's plane was the only one in this Squadron equipped with a bomb sight, so all airplanes bombed on his ship. All bombs fell on the S third of the runway and in the dispersal area E of and adjacent to the strip. Both of Lt. Irish's bombs failed to release, as did one of Lt. Luttrell's. These three bombs were salvoed in the water E of the target. After the bomb run, Major Marston led the Squadron in a wide circle to the left and headed for the Group rally point, over the water just S of LOS NEGROS ISLAND. The Squadrons pulled into Group formation there and returned to the Base without further incident.

d. Fighter Escort was adequate.

e. Nil damage to A/P.

f. Nil casualties to personnal.

IV. Citations

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for award of decorations will be made.

V. Tables.

(See inclosure #1)

VI. Sightings

Possible fuel smoke, black, from area between MEMOTE STRIP and Jetties at HIANE HARBOR. Smoke up to approximately 2000 feet. 1 small col. of grey smoke seen coming from area adjacent to NW dispersal area.

Jetties at S end of HIANE HARBOR possibly destroyed as result of 3-4 bombs bursting nearby. This was seen from a distance after leaving the target, trainof bombs seen to hit in E dispersal area extending along shore of peninsula and out into water.

Many bombs seen bursting on N end of Strip and in dispersal area just N.

Prior to run bomb craters from previous attacks seen along both sides of runway.

Possible M/V in LORENGAU HARBOR. (Seen by only one crew member)

Apparently 4 tanks on W side LOU ISLAND with pipes leading from them to wooded area just E.

1 large native type house approx 100 feet long on W tip of RAMBUTSO YO ISLAND.

2 European type structures, somewhat smaller, red roofs also nearby.

Several native type huts built over water along the beach. Good M/T road along beach. 2 trucks seen on road. (Ref. MANUS and adjacent Islands 4 miles to 1 inch.

45 varied sizes native huts, well kept on S coast of BALIAN ISLAND. Appeared to be considerable activity in area. Several canoes on beach. (Same Ref).

VII. Photo Interpretation.

Nil photos received at present.

PEG/eja

PAT E. GOFORTH
CAPT., AIR CORPS
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incls: - 1 Bombing and Photo Table.
2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FATF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

(Ins: #1)

BOMBING TABLE


A/P No.	No. Bombs	Weight	Type	No. Bombs on Target
185	2	1000	1/10 sec. delay nose fuse & 1/4 sec. delay tail fuse.	2
015	2	1000	" " "	2
591	"	"	" " "	2
347	"	"	" " "	"
340	"	"	" " "	"
317	"	"	" " "	"
019	"	"	" " "	One bomb salvoed-released by hand
164	"	"	" " "	2
058	"	"	" " "	"
971	"	"	" " "	"
254	"	"	" " "	2 bombs salvoed
016	"	"	" " "	2

TOTAL: 21 X 1000 lb. 1/10 sec. delay nose fuse and 1/4 sec. delay tail fuse bombs dropped on target.
3 X 1000 lb. 1/10 sec. delay nose fuse and 1/4 sec. delay tail fuse salvoed.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	No. Pictures Taken	Time	Location
259	K-21	30	1031/L	MOMOTE DROMEDLOS MANUS ISLAND
819	K-21	30	1031/L	" "
347	K-21	30	1031/L	" "

TOTAL: K-21 90




LEGEND

- STORES
- PERSONNEL
- STORES & PERSONNEL
- GUN POSITIONS B A/A
- A A/D & DISPERSAL
- C SHIPPING
- D STORES & PERSONNEL
- E DEFENSE WORKS

MISSION NO. 45-C-1 DATE. 2/10/44
SQUADRON NO. 499 GROUP. 345 Bomb
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET. 1st
ALTITUDE. 7000 FT.
TIME OVER TARGET. 10:30 I
CREW OBSERVATION BOMBING EFFICIENCY.....

O (RED) CREW REPORT OF BOMB HITS.
⊕ (RED) BOMB HITS SHOWN ON PHOTOGRAPHS.
T (BLUE) PLANES TAKING PHOTOS.
T (BLACK) OTHER PLANES. (ALL PLANES TO BE SHOWN AT BEGINNING OF RUN.)

MAP REF:- POHNAKA - SPECIAL MAP, PRELIM.
SHEET. SCALE: 1/20,000 (APPROX.)
1,000 METER MODIFIED BRITISH GRID SYSTEM



MISSION NO. 45-C-1 DATE. 2/14/44.
SQUADRON NO. 499 GROUP. 345
ALTITUDE. 700 FT.
TIME OVER TARGET. 1021 L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).

S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B. GP.
S-2

499
46C1
15Feb44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

16 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 46 C-1. Performed 15 Feb. 44. Objective at KAVIENG TOWNSHIP, NEW IRELAND. 02°35'S - 150°50'E.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (H), APO 503.

I. GENERAL

a. The assigned objective was KAVIENG TOWNSHIP, NEW IRELAND. The purpose of the mission was to attack buildings, supplies and installations with 5 x 500 lb. demolition bombs, 8/11 sec. delay, per airplane and strafing guns from minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group was accomplished enroute to CAPE HAND HUNT. Rendezvous with "Fighter Escort" accomplished at SAND ISLAND at approximately 2000 feet at 1005/L.

c. Attack

(1) Plan of Attack
A-20's were to strike shipping in KAVIENG HARBOR 1 hour and 15 minutes before this Squadrons attack and heavy units were to bomb KAVIENG AIRDROME 15 minutes prior to our attack. This Group in conjunction with the 38th Bomb Group was to conduct the strike. They were to proceed to target, flights in trail "javelin down." Landfall on NEW IRELAND was to be made about 30 miles SE of the target in an attempt to avoid enemy Radar stations. The Group was to proceed over the Island toward KAVIENG making their approach over BALIAI BAY and the run over the target slightly E of due N. Target was to be attacked with 500 lb. bombs and strafing guns. Breakaway was to be between CAPE NAUN and NORTH CAPE. Rally point was over water 10 - 15 miles N of KAVIENG. The Group was to return to LONDARRA via FINSCHAFFA.

(2) Execution of the Attack
The approach was made from SE to NW over BALIAI BAY, the I.P. being the S tip of MAGO ISLAND. This SQUADRON was fourth in the sequence of attack, being preceeded by the 500th, 501st and 498th Squadrons. As this Squadron crossed BALIAI BAY, flights went into right echelon and the second and fourth flight leaders moved

CONFIDENTIAL

Up to the right at the first and third flights to form two waves of airplanes. After spacing themselves at approximately 30 second intervals they made their attack. The entire Township including the area adjacent to the W and N, and the shore line were heavily bombed and strafed. By the time this Squadron reached the target the entire area was covered with heavy smoke making observation of specific results very difficult. Bombs were dropped at a M/V anchored off shore approximately half way down the length of the TOWNSHIP, and at 2 patrol boats near the DISTRICT OFFICE. 7 or 8 F/P's along the shore at this point heavily strafed and later seen to be burning. One bomb was dropped at 2 F/P's in the F/P anchorage. Several bombs in the stores areas S of the F/P anchorage and between Cape MAUN and NORTH CAPE. 1 plane dropped 2 bombs at a BETTY BOMBER in a revetment SE of the center of the strip. Many bombs were dropped on buildings and stores in KAVIENG TOWNSHIP, one of which was observed to set fire to a large stack of drums, estimated to be at least 100, about midway down KAVIENG TOWNSHIP. Many bombs were also dropped among stores and buildings in CHINATOWN causing additional fires as well as flying debris. In general the damage was thought to be extremely heavy throughout the entire area.

(3) Action of Other Units unobserved.

d.(1) 1 HAMP, U/S, seen in shallow water on sand bar in STEFFIN STRAIT NW of BAUDISSIN ISLAND. 2 B-25's seen down in water approximately 6 miles W of KAVIENG.

(2) Nil Interception by enemy A/P

II. The 500th Squadron was assinged to lead the Group and Capt. C.C. Conant was selected to lead this Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. C.C. Conant	A/P 185	1st. Lt. W.N. Parke	A/P ~~592~~ 347
Maj. J.E. Baird	" 015	2nd. Lt. H.N. Alger	" 340
1st. Lt. T.I. Kelley	" 591	1st. Lt. J.D. Wilson	" 317
THIRD FLIGHT		**FOURTH FLIGHT**	
1st. Lt. P.T. Luttrell	A/P 019	1st. Lt. V.W. Tatleman	A/P 971
1st. Lt. A.S. Anderson	" 164	2nd. Lt. W.G. Irish	" 254
1st. Lt. C.L. Cessna	" 058	1st. Lt. R.D. Reinbold	" 016

Note: (1st. Lt. J.D. Wilson crashed shortly after take-off.

III. Details of the Mission

a. Time and Location of:

Alert: Strip #4 DOBODURA 0715/L
Take-off " " " 0802/L
Group Rendezvous: Enroute to CAPE WARD HUNT. Accomplished by 0810/L.
Attack: KAVIENG TOWNSHIP, 1128/L - 1129/L.
Landing: Strip #4 DOBODURA. 1420/L.

b. Routes Flown

1. Base - TOLOKINA ISLAND - GAMU ISLAND - Point on MEW IRELAND 30 miles SE of KAVIENG - KAVIENG TOWNSHIP.

2. Attack Route: Approach over BALOAI BAY S tip NAGO ISLAND to Target.

3. Axis of Attack: S to N the length of KAVIENG TOWNSHIP.

4. Return Route: Target - TOLOKINA ISLAND - FINSCHAFEN - Base.

c. Details of Action of Individual Planes.

Capt. C.C. Conant led the Squadron and first flight over the target at 215 mph, I.A.S. and at minimum altitude. He strafed a small wooden fishing boat off the S side of NAGO ISLAND but saw no results other than tracers hitting the boat. As he was on the extreme left of the first wave he was over the water along the shore for his part of the run. As he neared the target, he noticed heavy smoke over the TOWNSHIP which prevented observation of much details of damage; however he did see the Heavy A/A position on NUSA ISLAND firing at the formation. He noticed at this time 4 bursts of Heavy A/A directed at P-38's above the target. The P-38's were about 1200 feet and the bursts appeared very close to them. As he passed the MAIN WHARF he saw a M/V, estimated at 3000-5000 Tons offshore SE of the DISTRICT OFFICE near a wharf. He strafed this boat and dropped all 5 bombs at it but was unable to ascertain any results. Just beyond this boat he saw 7 or 8 F/A's lined up along the shore wing tip to wing-tip. All of these planes appeared to be burning and smoking. As he passed CHINA TOWN he could see many fires and much smoke coming from it. Several of the buildings appeared to be completely wrecked. As he broke away over CAPE MUAN he saw fire and black smoke 100 feet high coming from the stores area just NE of the CAPE. He then proceeded to the rally point to reform the Squadron and join the Group formation.

Maj. J.B. Baird flew on Capt. Conant's right wing and made his attack in that position. He began strafing approximately a mile S of the target. At this time, 3-4 medium bursts of A/A appeared high and behind the formation from an unknown position. Seven or eight fires and dense smoke, which blanketed KAVIENG TOWN from one end to the other, greatly restricted his vision. It was also necessary to pull up several times to avoid flying through fires. During the run he observed the flight leader to attack two burning Patrol Boats just above the MAIN WHARF. He also saw the flight leader's successful attack on 7-8 F/P farther on. Maj. Baird dropped his five bombs evenly spaced starting at the S end of the Township and extending through the E end. These bombs were dropped at buildings. In addition he strafed heavily throughout the run. He pulled off the target to the left in formation with the flight leader after leaving the target. Major Baird saw two B-25's down in the water 5-6 miles E of KAVIENG. Since planes were circling he did not think it necessary to circle also.

Lt. Kelley flew on Major Baird's right wing. As he began his run he saw a large fire just E of the DISTRICT OFFICER'S HOUSE emitting black smoke in a column 400 feet high. He strafed and set fire to a good sized tank also near the D.O's House. Just N of this tank he saw a large stack of drums, at least 100, at which he dropped his first bomb. Flames and black smoke were observed as a result. In a cleared area along the shore just E of the DISTRICT OFFICE he saw many airplane segments - wings, fuselages, empennages and other material. All parts observed appeared to be brand new. Lt. Kelley dropped 2 more bombs at buildings S of CHINATOWN. As he approached Chinatown, his A/C was holed by A/A from positions near this sector. He dropped his last 2 bombs in CHINATOWN, which already appeared to be heavily damaged, and observed flying debris as the only result. He was having difficulty with his airplane at this time and consequently made no further sightings after passing CHINATOWN.

Lt. Parke led the second flight. Lt. Alger was his only wingman as Lt. Wilson crashed shortly after take-off. Lt. Parke was to the right of Lt. Kelley, third man in the first flight. He began strafing as he reached the TOWNSHIP and continued intermittantly throughout his run. He dropped his first bomb at several buildings about 500 feet SE of the European Hospital. His next bomb went at the edge of a clump of trees about 1000 feet S of the CAGE. Another bomb was dropped in the vicinity of the CAGE and the fourth in CHINATOWN. Lt. Parke's plane was holed by A/A prior to reaching CHINATOWN. Due to the heavy smoke in the area he could not tell which A/A position was firing at him, so consequently was unable to strafe it. He believes this to be the reason his plane was hit. His last bomb was dropped about 500 feet N of CHINATOWN. As Lt. Parke passed the

strip he saw near the control tower an apparently dismembled U/I 2 E plane. He also noticed boxes and other canvas covered stores all along the coast to his left. As he broke away from the target over the water he saw 2 splashes in the water over 1 mile off his right wing which were apparently shells lobbed from the C/D position at NORTH CAPE.

Lt. Algar flew on Lt. Parks's right wing. As he approached the target he saw a fire on the water near the F/P anchorage. He also noticed a medium sized U/I M/V at the MAIN WHARF burning fiercely. As he neared the target and saw the heavy smoke covering the area he swung out to the right somewhat to be sure of maintaining a safe interval and to avoid crowding the rear of the first section. He dropped 2 bombs at houses and revetments in the area just S of the NW end of the strip. At this time he saw 4 bright red flares along the N side of the runway and 2 along the S edge. He noticed that the Control Tower was intact as he passed it. He dropped the third bomb at the NW end of the runway and the fourth near the N W end at what appeared to be a heavy M/G position firing at him. The tracers from this position all went low. He saw in the revetments in this area 2 U/I 2E planes, one of which was camouflaged. He also noticed 1 burst of A/A from the position near the NW end of the strip dead ahead of Lt. Parks's plane. He saw bombs from a plane to his left destroy several huts S.E. of CHINATOWN. His last bomb was directed at buildings near the Heavy A/A position ½ mile NE of CHINATOWN. A crew member reported a direct hit on one building. As Lt. Algar withdrew from the target he counted 7 columns of black smoke and 1 of white smoke rising from KAVIENG TOWNSHIP. He also reported that the column of smoke from CHINATOWN was up to 2000 feet and visible 30 minutes away from the target.

Lt. P.T. Luttrell lead the third flight on it's run abreast of the first flight. He heavily strafed the F/P base but saw no planes. He made his run just to the east of KAVIENG TOWN passing over CHINATOWN. He dropped all five bombs in a string starting ½ mile S of CHINATOWN and extending to CHINATOWN. He strafed throughout the run. Here again the smoke and fire limited observation of results. He turned to the left off the target.

Lt. Anderson made his run on Lt. Luttrell's right wing and bombed in the same area. However, his last two bombs were dropped in CHINATOWN at several very large crates. He strafed the entire area and turned off the target with Lt. Luttrell.

Lt. Cessna became separated from the third flight leader and made his run over the TOWN between planes of another flight. He dropped two bombs just N of the F/P base and three bombs at large supply dumps in the E part of KAVIENG TOWN. He strafed throughout the run and turned left off the target. After leaving the target he observed a probable dog fight and apparently 3 enemy fighters fall in flames in quick succession N of the target.

Lt. Tatelman was the flight leader of the fourth flight. He made his run over the S edge of the Town and dropped 3 bombs near the center of the TOWN and then turned slightly and dropped two bombs at buildings and supplies in CHINATOWN. One of these bombs was seen to hit in a dump of large crates. He strafed during the entire run and turned left off the target. During this turn he observed the coastal defense gun on the E.CAPE firing into the water behind the formation. Just before reaching the target he observed 3-4 bursts of heavy A/A among the P-38 escort which was flying a 4000 feet over the target.

Lt. Irish flew on Lt. Tatelman's right wing. During his approach he saw 1 U/S HARP painted black in shallow water on a sand bar in STEFFIN STRAIT NW of BAUMGARTEN ISLAND. Nearing the target he saw 1 burst of Heavy A/A 50 yards dead ahead of a P-38 at 1200 feet over the TOWNSHIP. He strafed intermittently throughout his run over the target. He dropped 2 bombs at huts and shacks just E of the known heavy A/A position in KAVIENG TOWNSHIP but was unable to report results. As he neared CHINATOWN he noticed intense light A/A fire from a position S of this area. Although the fire appeared accurate, his plane was not hit by any M/G fire. He dropped 3 bombs in CHINATOWN but thickness of smoke in the vicinity obscured vision of results. During his run the tail of the A/P was holed by a fragment of heavy A/A but location of the position that fired it could not be determined. Lt. Irish noticed a large fire N of CHINATOWN in which there were occasional explosions increasing the volume of smoke and flame. He then swung out over the water toward the rally point.

Lt. R.D. Reinhold became separated from his flight and made his run on the outside of the formation over the NW end of KAVIENG AIRDROME. He dropped 3 bombs at a REVETT in the dispersal area just S of the NW end of the runway. He dropped two more bombs just E of the NW end of the runway. He strafed during the entire run and withdrew directly over the coastal defense gun at N CAPE. He observed the position to consist of one gun in a concrete installation. He also observed this gun to fire in the water behind the formation.

g. Fighter Escort excellent throughout.

2. Details of Damage to Own Airplanes.

A/P #591 had 5 M/G holes in L Nacelle and 2 larger ones, either 20 mm or large heavy A/A fragments. 5 additional M/G and A/A fragment holes near center of fuselage. One burst of Med. A/A in the bomb bay. Hydraulic system was shot out and fuel line to L auxiliary tank severed. This plane landed at CAPE CHARLESTON STRIP. As the airspeed indicator was out, this plane was guided in by A/P #185.

A/P #347 had one M/G hole through right fin and a 3 foot hole in L half of horizontal stabilizer. Many A/A fragment holes in fuselage near tail.

This A/P landed at FINSCHAFEN.
A/P #254 had a small piece torn from the trailing edge of the elevator by a fragment of heavy A/A.

f. The turret% gunner of A/P #571, S/Sgt. Jack V. Mcnafee,12050056, sustained a minor head injury as a result of A/A.

IV. Citations

Investigation is underway to determine eligibility of crew members of this strike for awards.

V.a-bTables.

(See inclosure #1)

c. Ground Oppositions

Slight, medium, inaccurate A/A from vicinity CAPE SIMUSAT. Position on S tip MUSA ISLAND fired at formation on withdrawal from target. Only flashes were observed, no bursts. 4/5 medium bursts above and behind formation just prior to reaching target. Position of guns unknown. 1 heavy burst in front of formation and intense M/G fire from position 1 mile N of NW end of Strip. Intense M/G and medium A/A fire from known position E of CHINATOWN. M/G fire from S side of CHINATOWN. Slight, inaccurate M/G fire from S side KAVIENG STRIP. A/A fire of undetermined calibre received from bridge of sunken boat in harbor. Slight, heavy, inaccurate fire from C/D position at NORTH CAPE. Position fired as planes made withdrawal from target. In general the A/A observed was moderate and accurate; however all crews expressed the opinion that A/A was intense but heavy smoke limited observation. The belief was also expressed that a barrage type A/A fire was being laid in the smoke over the TOWNSHIP in hopes of hitting unseen planes.

d. Nil air opposition encountered on this strike.

VI. Sightings:

1 probable Sugar Baker, undamaged, 1 mile N SCHNEIDER ISLAND.
Many large boxes, possibly crated airplanes, seen in CHINATOWN and along coast between CAPE NAUN AND NORTH CAPE.
1 FOX-TARE-BAKER, serviceable, at MUSA ISLAND.
6 Barges in BALGAI BAY.
1 Lugger off S side NACC ISLAND.
1 U/I 2EB on S side KAVIENG STRIP.
1AU/I 2EB near control tower at NW end Strip.
1 large Jetty on S side NEW HAVOVER ISLAND.

Block Houses and C/D Gun at NORTH CAPE.
1 small fishing boat with large white sail in SILVER SOUND.
2 jetties, good condition on BAUDISSIN ISLAND protruding into ALBATROSS CHANNEL. Several good European type houses nearby.
1 large lifeboat empty except for tarpaulin and several small boats 03°35'S; 150°07' E.
1 U/I object, possibly conning tower but no wake evident, seen at 04°57'S; 146°20'E at 1022/L.

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photographs received too late for interpretation.

PEG/ejm

Pat E Goforth

PAT E. GOFORTH
CAPT., AIR CORPS
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Encl: - Bombing, Strafing and Photo Table.
Bomb Assessment Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FAIF, APO 503.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	Rds Car'd	Rds. Fired	Gun Fail.	Rds Car'd	Rds Fired	Gun Fail
	/.50 Cal.			/.30 Cal		
185	4200	1000	Nil	2000	1500	Nil
015	"	1500	Nil	"	1000	Nil
591	"	1200	Nil	"	750	Nil
347	"	2000	Nil	"	600	Nil
340	"	500	L/L Short Rd.	"	800	Nil
019	"	750	L/L Short Rd.	"	500	Nil
164	"	1750	Nil	"	600	Nil
058	"	2200	Nil	"	400	Nil
971	"	2350	Nil	"	1275	Nil
254	"	3100	Nil	"	1600	Nil
016	"	2345	Nil	"	1000	Nil
TOTAL:	18845 X .50 Cal.			10025 X .30 Cal.		


BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No dropped on Target
185	5	8/11 Delay	500	5
015	"	"	"	"
591	"	"	"	"
347	"	"	"	"
340	"	"	"	"
019	"	"	"	"
164	"	"	"	"
058	"	"	"	"
971	"	"	"	"
254	"	"	"	"
016	"	"	"	"

TOTAL: 55 x 500 8/11 Sec. delay bombs dropped on target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Time Photo Taken	Locality	Type	Number
185	1129/L	XAVIENC, N.I.	K-21	30
015	"	" "	"	30
591	"	" "	K-20	38
347	"	" "	K-21	30
019	"	" "	"	30
164	"	" "	"	30
971	"	" "	"	30
054	"	" "	"	30
Total:	210 K-21	35 K-20		



MISSION NO. FEB 44-C-1 DATE. 14 FEB 1944.
SQUADRON NO. 499 GROUP. 345
ALTITUDE. Minimum Altitude FT.
TIME OVER TARGET. 1128 - 1129/L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).

S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B. GP.
S-2

499
47-C-1
16 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 503

17 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 47 C-1. Performed 16 Feb.,44. Primary objective at NEW HANOVER ISLAND 150°10'E - 02°20'S.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 FATF, APO 503. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 503.

I. GENERAL

a. The assigned Mission was to attack and destroy a fourteen ship convoy reported in the vicinity of NEW HANOVER ISLAND and heading for KAVIENG. The bomb load per plane was 5 x 500 lb. bombs with 4/5 sec. delay fuses.

b. Rendezvous with 38th Bomb Group accomplished enroute. Rendezvous with fighter cover accomplished near SAND ISLAND at approximately 1000/L.

c. Attack

(1) KXXXXX Attack Execution
This Squadron was number three in the sequence of attack. Approach to the reported position of the convoy was around the N end of NEW HANOVER. Bombing was excellent with a total of nine direct hits and 21 near misses. Thirteen bombs were dropped on a corvette which was damaged and burning slightly in a bay off the NW shore of NEW HANOVER ISLAND. Some personnel were observed fighting the fire and others abandoning ship. Four direct hits were scored which exploded the boiler and magazine. The Corvette was left a total wreck and resting on a reef. 30-40 of personnel escaping to land were heavily strafed with resulting high casualties. The beach and jetty nearby were well strafed. A lugger and buildings near the S end of CLOBIC ISLAND was bombed with eight bombs. A direct hit was scored on the lugger which destroyed it. Two other bombs were near misses. Five bombs fell among buildings with undetermined results. A lugger on the beach of the S tip of KAWILIKIAU ISLAND was bombed with one bomb and strafed. The bomb was a near miss but undoubtedly caused damage since the lugger was on stilts, either being repaired or under construction. During the return to base,

3 metal roofed, red topped, European type houses and a good sized native village were bombed with eight bombs. Two direct hits and two near misses scored on the European type houses and two direct hits and two near misses scored on the native village. At least two of the European houses were destroyed and possibly the third. Several huts in the native village were destroyed.

(2) Action of the other units

Unobserved since Squadrons were in trail with this Squadron split into two - ship elements for the attack.

d. Interception

(1) There were nil E/A sighted.

(2) No enemy or Allied planes observed to be destroyed.

II. The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation and Capt. C.C. Conant was selected to lead this Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt. C.C. Conant	A/C	185
1st. Lt. T.A. Kelley	"	016
1st. Lt. V.M. Tatleman	"	971

SECOND FLIGHT

1st. Lt. L.N. Parke	A/C	014
2nd. Lt. H.N. Alger	"	340
1st. Lt. R.D. Reinbold	"	015

THIRD FLIGHT

1st. Lt. J.T. Luttrell	A/C	019
2nd. Lt. A.S. Anderson	"	164
2nd. Lt. W.G. Irish	"	254
1st. Lt. C.L. Cessna	"	058

Note: (Formation split into two - plane elements for attack as follows: Capt. Conant and Lt. Kelley; Lieuts. Tatleman and Parke; Lieuts. Reinbold and Alger; Lieuts. Luttrell and Anderson; Lieuts. Irish and Cessna.)

III. Details of the Mission

a. Time and Location of:

Alert: Strip 7 DOBUDURA 0745/L.
Take-off: " " " 0815/L.
Group Rendezvous: Strip 4 DOBUDURA. 0830/L.
Attack: Near N.W. HANOVER ISLAND 1105/L - 1145/L.
Landing: Base 1420/L.

b. Routes Flown

Base - FINSCHAFEN - SAND ISLAND.- NEW HANOVER - SAND ISLAND - CAPE GLOUCESTER - Base.

c. Details of Action of Individual Planes.

Capt. C.C Conant lead the Squadron enroute to the target. During the flight, his and other radio operators attempted to contact the B-24's which were shadowing the convoy. However, no contact was established. For this reason Capt. Conant did not know the definite location of the convoy so he signaled for attack formations of two-plane elements to spread out and conduct a search. On rounding the N end of NEW HANOVER ISLAND, Capt. Conant saw a probable FOX-TARE-BAKER listing and burning. Further attack was unnecessary. However, he observed a Corvette damaged and burning slightly as a result of previous attacks. Some of the ship's crew were attempting to extinguish the blaze and 30-40 other personnel abandoning ship and swimming for shore. Capt. Conant made two strafing and two bombing and strafing passes. He scored two direct hits and two near misses. Damage was severe and the fire began to spread as a result. Personnel escaping to shore were thoroughly strafed. Life vests prevented bodies from sinking, consequently it was difficult to estimate the number of casualties. However, it was noted that only a few reached shore. After this attack, Capt. Conant proceeded down the E Coast of the Island in search of further targets. On the S tip of MANUKIKAN ISLAND he spotted a lugger or sloop raised on stilts as if being repaired or under construction. He strafed and released his remaining bomb here. The bomb was a near miss. The bombing and strafing undoubtedly caused substantial damage.

Lieut. T.A. Kelley made his attacks on Capt. Conant's wing. He was able to release only one bomb on the CORVETTE because of a malfunction. The results of this bomb were unobserved. Lt. Kelley strafed the CORVETTE and personnel with Capt. Conant. He also strafed the beach and jetty area. He strafed houses and buildings on NEW HANOVER and adjacent Islands and withdrew from the area with Capt Conant. During these attacks, Lt. Kelley saw the burning freighter sink.

Lieuts. Tatleman and Parke conducted their search and attacks together. Lt. Tatleman found no worthy targets until he reached GLOBIG ISLAND. Here he attacked a lugger and buildings on the S tip of the Island. One of his bombs was a direct hit on the lugger and one a near miss. The other bomb fell in the building area. The lugger was destroyed.

Lt Parke flew with Lt. Tatleman after reaching NEW HANOVER. He made 2 very effective strafing passes on personnal from the burning corvette. .50 calibre bullets were seen to churn the sea white and red tinges of blood were evident in the water. The few Japs that did reach shore did not run and gave the appearance of being severely wounded. Lt. Parke also attacked the large lugger at GLOVIG ISLAND. On his first pass he dropped all 5 bombs at it. All missed. The first two landed in the water and the last three exploded on the shore nearby among several buildings in a village. The bursts were near enough to cause considerable damage but he was unable to observe specific results. He also strafed the village heavily. As he made the pass he saw a small motor launch to his right near the superstructure of a sunken M/V which was just SE of GLOBIG ISLAND. Light M/G fire was seen from the launch and one .30 cal. bullet penetrated the cowl of the right engine but did no apparent damage. Lt Parke later saw Lt.Tatleman score a hit on the lugger with one bomb. Lt. Parke strafed two luggers near the shore of VUTTE ISLAND one of which was set on fire. Lt. Parke left Lt. Tatleman near Cape Gloucester to land at the Gloucester Strip to refuel. He returned to the Base shortly thereafter.

Lt. P.T. Luttrell paired off with Lt. Anderson as the Squadron reached NEW HANOVER. As he rounded the N tip of the Island he saw a wrecked FOX-TARE-DOG on MOSSUM REEF near CAPE MANATANALEM. Proceeding along the N Coast he observed in THREE ISLANDS HARBOR near the shore a corvette, burning and almost in a sinking condition. A little further out in the water was a FOX-TARE-BAKER which was burning and was seen to sink before Lt. Luttrell left the area. Lt. Luttrell felt that the corvette was so badly damaged it was not worth bombing but he made a strafing pass at the survivors and strafed a small shack near a very small jetty on the shore of the target. About this time he saw a ball of fire in the air above the corvette, 150-200 feet, which he thought to be exploding ammunition. He proceeded on E along the N Coast of NEW HANOVER looking for shipping to attack. He saw a wrecked FOX-TARE-CHARLIE on a reef at NEMTO N of the center of the Island. As he neared the KAVIENG AREA he saw several columns of black smoke and 2 columns of white smoke all ranging from 500 to 2000 feet in height. He then turned N and made a wide sweep over the ocean back to the W and around the W tip of NEW HANOVER. He found no shipping and made no further sightings so he then returned to the base. He did not drop any bombs as he saw no worthwhile targets.

Lt. Anderson flew with Lt. Luttrell during the whole mission and his sightings and actions were practically the same as Lt. Luttrell's. He observed in addition, Capt. Conant score a very near miss on a beached lugger on KANULIKUAU ISLAND, NE of NEW HANOVER ISLAND.

Lieuts. Reinbold and Alger flew together during the search and return to base. No targets were sighted in the NEW HANOVER area. Consequently the alternate target (GAROVE ISLAND) was attacked.

Lt. Reinbold saw the wrecked FOX-TARE-DOG on MOSSUN REEF near CAPE MATANALEM on the W tip of NEW HANOVER as he reached the Island. He proceeded in a Northerly direction for a time and from a distance saw only a burning M/V in THREE ISLANDS HARBOR. He swung S then, and neared the N coast of NEW HANOVER at NEMTO where he saw another wreck, a FOX-TARE-CHARLIE. As he approached the NW end of NEW IRELAND a wrecked FOX-TARE-CHARLIE was observed S of BANGATANG ISLAND. Large columns of smoke rising from KAVIENG were also visible. Lt. Reinbold went down the SE coast of NEW IRELAND about 30 miles then reversed his course to cover the sea some distance N of NEW IRELAND and NEW HANOVER in a vain search for shipping. Finding northin he proceeded to GAROVE ISLAND, the secondary target. Here he observed the 501st Squadron bombing installations around PETER HARBOR. He made 2 passes on GAROVE ISLAND scoring direct hits with 2 bombs on 2 red roofed European houses just S of Perer Harbor, completely demolishing them. He made direct hits with 2 more bombs on 4 or 5 native huts on the SE tip of the island at CAPE LAMA. These were also destroyed. He did not drop his last bomb as he saw no further suitable targets. Lt. Reinbold then returned to the Base.

Lt. Alger made two passes on GAROVE ISLAND, dropping four bombs. Two bombs were near misses in 3 European type houses on the E side of GAROVE ISLAND just S of PETER HARBOR. Two bombs were near misses on a native village at CAPE LAMA. Lt. Alger also heavily strafed the area.

Lts. Irish and Cessna made their attacks and search together. I

Lt. Irish dropped three bombs on the Corvette after Capt. Conant made his attack. One bomb was a direct hit and the other two near misses. He observed the Corvette to be a total wreck. He also thoroughly strafed personnel which had abandoned ship. He thought the Corvette to have been armed with one gun in turret forward (probably 3) and four "tubs" aft (probably 20 mm A/A guns). Lt. Irish strafed buildings in the area and then returned to base with planes of the 38th Bomb Group when he became separated from Lt. Cessna.

Lt. Cessna flew with Lt. Irish during the attack. As he came to THREE ISLANDS HARBOR he saw the burning Corvette and proceeded to make two bombing runs on it. On the first he dropped 3 bombs one of which was a direct hit. The other two on the second run were near misses. On the first pass as he was directly over the Corvette an explosion occured, believed to be the boilers because of the volume of steam observed. 2 pieces of debris were driven through the bottom of the fuselage between the camera hatch and the end of the fuselage. These set several boxes of .30 calibre ammunition on fire, ove of which was thrown overboard and the others extinguished. Several nicks and scratches were also noticed on the right front of the fuselage and on the wing inboard of the right nacelle as a result of the other pieces of debris. After the bomb runs Lt. Cessna made several passes strafing the survivors. He expended almost all of his ammunition in this strafing and reported that practically all of the Japs were killed. Very few reached shore and those that did seemed barely able to walk. When he and the others first started strafing, many of the Nips were seen threshing about in the water with their arms and legs but after they finished all remaining were motionless and the sea was colored with blood. At same time during the attack Lt. Irish and Lt. Cessna became separated so Lt. Cessna tacked on to a formation of the 38th Group for the homeward trip. As he passed near the VITU ISLANDS at 1240/L he saw a U/I object in the water 2 miles NE of MUNDUA ISLAND heading N. The object was leaving an approximate 40 foot wake and was thought possibly to be the top of a conning tower of a Submarine. The object did not appear large enough to be making such a wake but poor weather obscured further vision of details. Lt. Cessna was low on gas so he did not want to leave the formation for a closer look. He landed with this unit of the 38th Group at FINSCHAFEN TO REFUEL, WHERE HE MET Lt. Irish again. They returned to the base together shortly thereafter, landing at approximately 1530/L.

d. Fighter escort was excellent.

e. Details of damage to own Airplanes.

One plane suffered minor damage from debris of explosion on the Corvette. Two four inch holes were sustained on the bottom of the fuselage between the camera hatch and tail section. One .30 cal hole in right engine cowl of the same plane.

f. There were no casualties to personnel.

IV. Citations

In view of information known at present, no recommendations for award of a decoration will be made.

V. TABLES

(See Inclosure # 1)

VI. Sightings

FTD sunk and resting on reef off C.
Freighter (probably FTD) sunk on reef at N'ly off N. coast
HANOVER.
Jetty and Industrial Building on N. coast
burning CONVOYS.
Wrecked Freighter (probably F/C) S of
SAVIDOG and NEW HANOVER)
Sunken Freighter with superstructure showing just SE of GIBBIC Is.
A launch nearby firing one light M/G.
Several bursts heavy A/A near a formation of B-25's off ENVIZ.G.
Possible submarine almost submerged 2 miles NE of
WITU GROUP at 1240/L on course N. Make 40 feet long behind craft.
Poor visibility prevented observation of further details.

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Prints have not been received to date.

RC/ejf

[redacted]
A.I., A.U.S.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: - Bombing, Strafing and Drop Tables.
Bomb Assessment Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 927.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 FEAF, APO 925.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (H), APO 929.

Strafing Table


A/P No.	/.50 Cal Rds Car'd	/.50 Cal Rds. Fired	/.50 Cal Gun Fail.	/.30 Cal Rds Car'd	/.30 Cal Rds Fired	/.30 Cal Gun Fail.
185	4250	2120	LLS-Solenoid URS-Striking cable	2000	800±	Nil
016	"	1325	ULS-Sup.cart.	"	200	Nil
971	"	2700	Nil	"	None	"
014	"	3445	Nil	"	300	"
340	"	1400	Nil	"	600	"
015	"	1060	LRS-Broken extractor	"	None	"
019	"	1335	Nil	"	None	"
164	"	300	Nil	"	"	"
254	"	1855	LRS-Broken belt	"	"	"
058	"	1800	ULS & URS- Sol fuse ULN-Short round LLN-Ammo jammed	"	600	"
TOTAL:	17340 x .50 Cal.			2600 x .30 Cal.		

Bombing Table

AP No	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped	Remarks
185	5	A/S Delay	500	5	2 direct hits,3 N. misses
016	"	"	"	1	1 unobserved,4 ret. m/fn.
971	"	"	"	3	2 D. Hits, 1 N Miss,2 Ret
014	"	"	"	5	3 D. Hits, 2 N. Misses.
340	"	"	"	5	4 N. Miss., 1 sklvaed
015	"	"	"	4	4 D. Hits, 1 returned
019	"	"	"	0	5 Returned, No target
164	"	"	"	"	" " " "
254	"	"	"	3	1 D. Hit, 2 N.Miss, 2 Ret
058	"	"	"	5	1 D. Hit, 4 N. Misses.
Total:	30 x 500 A/S Sec Delay bombs dropped at targets.			1 salvoed.	19 ret.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Time Photo Taken	Locality	Type	Number
185	1105/L-1146/L	Locality NEW HANOVER ISLAND	K-21	30
971	" "	" " "	"	30
014	" "	" " "	"	7
340	" "	" " "	K-20	10
016	" "	" " "	K-20	21
019	" "	" " "	K-21	6
058	" "	" " "	K-21	3-
Total:	103 K-21	31 K-20		




MAP REFERENCE ;- KAVIENG AIRDROME- FIGHTER GRID.


LEGEND


FFO. 47-C-1
SQDN. NO. 499TH BOMB
ORDER OVER TARGET ;- 3RD.
PHOTOS TAKEN.

MAP REF: KAVIENG STRIP 4 miles to 1 inch.

MISSION NO.	47-C-1	DATE	16 FEB 44
SQUADRON	499	GROUP	345.
ALTITUDE	MINIMUM		
TIME OVER TARGET	Primary: 1103L - 1140/L Secondary: 1226L - 1230/L.		







340 & 015 -
Proceed To Garove
Island - See
Insert ABOVE.

499
53
22Feb44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713 - 1

25 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 53-E-1. Performed 22 Feb.44.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 928. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929. A-2 SATF, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General.

a. The assigned objective was Momote Airdrome, Los Negros Island in the Admiralty Group. The purpose of the mission was to attack the runway and dispersal areas with 2 X 1000 lb. bombs, instantaneous nose fuses, per airplane and to render the airdrome temporarily unserviceable. The secondary target was supplies and installations at Iboki Plantation Rein Bay, New Britain.

b. Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group was accomplished enroute to Cape Ward Hunt. Rendezvous with fighters over Sakar Island at 1004/L.

c. Attack:

(1) This Squadron was number one in the sequence of attack, leading the 345th Group as well as the 38th Group Formation. Approximately 100 miles N of Sakar Island a tropical front was encountered which the Group was unable to penetrate, so turned toward the secondary target. Iboki Plantation at Rein Bay N.B. Bombing run was at 7000 feet on a heading of 116 ° at the rate of 190 m.p.h.. Formation over the target consisted of two 3 plane "V"'s and one 4 plane "box" formation, all in close trail "javelin down" with all planes bombing on the lead plane. Bombing was fair with 50% of the 20 X 1000 lb. bombs bursting in the target area. Results other than bomb bursts were not observed.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Action of other units.

Generally unobserved, however, one of the following Squadrons was seen to drop all bombs well within the target area.

d. Interception

(1) There were nil enemy A/P observed on this mission.

(2) No allied planes seen to be destroyed.

2. This Squadron was assigned to lead the entire "Strike Force" of the 345th and 38th Groups. Lt.WmN.PARKE was selected to fly the lead plane. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT				SECOND FLIGHT		
W.N.Parke	A/P 249	1st.Lt. C.C.Conant		A/P 186		Capt.
N.A. Alger	" 340	2nd.Lt. J.B.Baird		" 045		Major
R.N. Spear	" 019	2nd.Lt. W.N.Graham		" 068		2nd.Lt.

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt. C.L. Bans	A/P 164	1st.Lt. C.Cessna	A/P 014
1st.Lt. W.H. Rushworth	018	1st.Lt.V.W.Tiemann	" 036

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Time and location of:

Alert: Strip #7 Dobodura.	0800/L.
Take off: " " "	0830/L.
Group Rendezvous Enroute to Cape Ward Hunt.	0845/L.
Attack: Iboki Plantation, Rein Bay New Britain.	1125/L.
Landing:	1245/L.

b. Route out: Dobodura - Dampier Strait- Sakar Island - Point 100 miles N Sakar Island - Secondary Target.
APProach: W from Rottock Bay to Secondary Target.
Axis of Attack: W to E (Approximately).
Maneuver: Circle over Rottock Bay to reform Group.
Return Route: Target Point 40 miles E Arawe on S Coast of New Britain - Base.

c. Details of action:

Lt.W.N.Parke was the Squadron as well as Group, leader. Approximately 35 minutes N of Sakar Island he encountered a tropical front with rain squalls at the base and a top well over 15000 feet. Lt.Parke climbed to 8000 feet but still could find no hole in the front suitable for a Group Formation so he turned East toward the secondary target. Shortly thereafter he turned N and again tried to pierce the front. Failing a second time he led the Group to Rottock Bay. During the attempt to get through the front the Group Formation had become somewhat scattered so Lt.Parke contacted them by radio and received acknowledgement from them as to his intentions of reforming the group and bombing the secondary target. He circled over Rottock Bay to allow the Squadrons to rejoin but when it became apparent that this would not be accomplished he led this Squadron on in the run over the target. Due to difficulty with the bomb sight Lt.Parke's bombs overshot the target and as a result only 50 % of the Squadrons bombs hit the target, the rest bursting in the water of Rein Bay. Lt.Parke then led the Squadron directly across New Britain on the return route. Lt.Spear and Lt.Alger flew 1 and 2 ppsitions, respectively, in the first flight and their actions closely paralleled those ofLt.Parke's.

Capt.C.C.Conant led the second flight with Major Baird on his right wing and Lt.Graham on his left. He followed the first flight closely throughout the mission. The third flight which consisted of Lt.Bans as leader and Lt.Rushworth and Lt.Cessna and Lt.Tatleman in number 2, 3, and 4 positions respectively. This flight also followed in close trail.

d. Fighter escort was only fair, after the turn toward the secondary target fighterswere not seen.

e. Nil damage was sustained by our aircraft.

f. Nil injury suffered by our personnel.

4. In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for citations will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. Armament and Ordanance Table - Photo Table.

Due to altitude which bombs dropped and lack of direct observation of bomb hits, it is impossible to forward an accurate table, however, 50% of the bombs were dropped on the target - the remainder which overshot the target landed in the water.

Since the strike was carried out from minimum altitude, strafing guns were not used, therefore no ammunition was expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No Pictures Taken	Time	Altitude	Place
249	K-21	30	1123/L	7000 ft.	Iboki Ptn.
164	" "	"	"	"	"
185	" "	"	"	"	"

TOTAL: 90 K-21 Photos taken.

6. Sightings:

There were nil important sightings.

7. Photo Interpretation.

No photographs received at time of submitting this report.


For the Squadron Commander:

Pat E. Gilforth

PAT E. GILFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:
Incl. 1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 2 Route - Target Chart.


Distribution:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, ATTENTION OF A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 929.
" " A-2 S.A.T.F. APO 713 - 1.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group APO 713 - 1.



499 sq

FFO 53 E-1

ROUTE TO TARGET AND RETURN


FFO 63 E - 1.
Squadron: 499th.
Order Over Target: 1st.
Altitude: 7000 Feet.
Blue Planes Took Photos.
Other Planes.
Map Ref: Rein Bay & Gaho Prov. Maps 1/63360.
KETENGE
014
164
058
185
019
249
MAKATI
036
016
018
34D
20 X 1000 lb. BOMBS DROPPED IN THIS AREA
UTAN. I.
REIN BAY
CAPE KIRCHOFF
BANU RIVER
Dengai
POTNANGARA RIVER
BOLO
ILOLI
TALIWAGA
APIA RIVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499
56 B-2
25 Feb 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

25 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 56 B-2. Performed 25 Feb.44. Boram Airdrome, New Guinea, 03°35' 143° 40' E.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. A-2 309th Bomb Wing, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General.

a. The assigned mission was to conduct a strike on enemy supplies and installations at Boram Airdrome, on the North coast of New Guinea.

b. Rendezvous with one Squadron of the 38th Bomb Group and "Fighter Escort" was accomplished over Gusap at 8000 feet at 1131/L.

c. Attack

(1) The approach was made from SE to NW, the I.P. being a point over the Alexander Mountains due S of Boram Strip. Asthe Group reached the I.P. squadrons began spacing themselves at slight intervals. This Squadron followed the 498th Squadron in the run over the target and was third in the sequence of attack. The 9 planes of this Squadron dropped 42 X 500 lb. demolition bombs with instantaneous nose fuses from 6800 to 7000 feet on a course of 45° at 230 m.p.h. A.I.S.. A total of 24 bombs fell just E of the heavy A/A position SW of Boram Strip extending through to the heavy position S of center of the Strip. One bomb, also in the same area, dropped safe. 12 bombs burst in the water NE of Cape Boram due to the lead plane's failure to release bombs over target area. The wingmen consequently, also released late.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

5 bombs not released over the target due to difficulty with the toggle switch, were finally dropped on Angoram Village on the Sepik River from 2500 feet scoring a direct hit on one building and 3 damaging near misses on other buildings.

(2) The two preceeding Squadrons were observed making a bombing run somewhat different than planned.

d. Interception.

(1) Nil interception encountered on this mission.

(2) Nil allied airplanes observed to be destroyed.

2. The 498th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group and Lt.V.W. Tatleman was selected to lead this Squadron. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.V.W.Tatleman	A/P 249	1st.Lt.W.N.Parke	A/P 259
2nd.Lt.A.J.Niles	" 254	1st.Lt.R.A.Spear	" 019
2nd.Lt.W.N.Graham	" 058	2nd.Lt.A.N.Alger	" 185

THIRD FLIGHT

1st.Lt.C.L.Sams	A/P 097
1st.Lt.A.Hushworth	" 016
1st.Lt.C.Cessna	" 014

3. Details on the Mission.

a. Time and Location of:

Alert: Strip 4, Nadzab.	1025/L.
Take off: " " "	1085/L.
Group Rendezvous: Over Strip 4.	1115/L.
Attack: Boram Airdrome	1242/L.
Landed: Strip 4 Nadzab.	1457/L.

b. Route out: Nadzab - Gusap- Target.
Attack Route: Approach: S.E. to NW to point over Alexander Mts. just S of Target.
Maneuver: Slight "S" prior to Bomb run.
Return: North coast of New Guinea to Finschafen - Nadzab.

c. Details of action of individual Airplanes.

Lt.Tatleman led the Squadron and the first flight. He climbed to 8200 feet over the Alexander Mountains to enable the Squadron to gain the necessary air speed for the run. As he neared the target he saw the preceeding squadron turn to the left somewhat off the prearranged line of flight.

He was thus forced to make an "S" before leading this squadron on the planned course over the target. At this time he saw an intense A/A barrage over the Strip. It started at 6500 feet and gradually rose to 7500 feet. His bombardier seeing that the prearranged bombing altitude would carry the squadron into this barrage, prepared immediately to bomb from 7000'. As a result most A/A bursts were above the Squadron as it passed over the target. Due to this combination of circumstances the bomb run lasted only 10 seconds. The bombardier toggled when his sights were on the target but for some undetermined reason the bomb bay doors were not open and the bombs did not release, so the wingmen, whose planes were not equipped with bombsights, did not release either. 2 bombs were toggled over Cape Moem but both overshot in the water. 8 were returned to the base. Lt.Niles and Lt.Graham flew number two and three positions respectively and bombed on Lt.Tatleman's plane. All 10 of their bombs overshot Cape Moem and landed in the water. The A/A position S of the strip, fired at this flight intensely as did the position on the tip of Cape Boram. The position on the W side of Cape Moem was observed firing sporadically. Most bursts were high and to the left but Lt.Graham's plane received 12 hits just after crossing the strip and considerable damage was sustained by the tail section. No A/A was seen coming from a heavy position SW of the runway.

Lt.~~Parke~~ W.N.Parke led the second flight in close trail with Lt.Spear on his right wing and Lt.Alger on his left. He also noticed the terrific A/A barrage at 7500-8000 feet on the approach so was prepared to bomb slightly below 7000 feet. All of this flight's bombs fell just E of the heavy A/A position S and SW of the runway. Slight A/A fire was seen from the position at Wewak Mission and possibly one gun firing from the position SW of the runway. A possible medium position was reported by one crew from a point approximately 3000 feet due S of the tip of Cape Boram. 2 intense fires emitting heavy black smoke were seen on Cape Boram and another from the N center of the N dispersal area.

Lt.Bagnz led the third flight with Lt.Rushworth on his right wing and Lt. Cessna on his left. He led this flight over the target in close trail and slightly to the right of the second flight. All bombs were dropped on the lead plane of the second flight bursting in the same general area. Lt.Cessna experienced some difficulty with the toggle switch and did not release his bombs over the target. On the return trip he pulled slightly out of formation to drop 5 bombs on Angoram Village on the Sepik River. 4 of them hit in the village scoring one direct hit and three near misses.

d. Fig ter Escort.

Fighter Escort was excellent throughout.

e. A/P #058 sustained 12 A/A hits on the tail section and rear part of the airplane causing considera ble damage to the plane and severe damage to the tail camera.

f. Nil injuries sustained by any personnel on this mission.

4. Citations

In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for awards will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. Armament-Ordanance and Photo Tables.
(See incl.#1)

c. Ground Opposition.

A/A was intense, heavy, and accurate at 7000 feet, one plane being holed and several bursts felt. On the approach a barrage was seen directly over Boram Strip between 6500 and 7000 feet creeping up to 7500-8000 feet as our planes neared the target. No A/A was received on the approach as the barrage was received only over Boram Strip. An estimated 100 butsts were seen in the air. The plane which was hit had just crossed the runway. A/A was 100-200 feet below, and behind the formation over Cape Moem. The heavy positions seen firing were:
Position S of center of runway firing rapidly.
Position on Cape Moem firing sparadically.
Position on Cape Boram firing rapidly.
Possible position 3000 feet S of tip of Cape Boram reported by one crew only.
Medium and light bursts were observed 2000 feet below bombing altitude and medium positions on either side of the heavy position just S of the Strip. Flashes were seen from N dispersal area of the strip, possibly M/G's firing at A-20's.

d. Air Opposition.

Nil.

6. Sightings:

2 intense fires, aheavy smoke from Cape Boram.
1 good sized fire and smoke from N center of N dispersal area.
A-20's seen making run from E to W at minimum altitude as lead flight crossed strip. Results unobserved.
A-20's observed strafing A/A position on Cape Boram - position continued firing. Fire on Wewak Point.
10 P-40's possibly dog figh ing, milling around 1 u/i plane, at 12 to 15000 feet N of Wewak.

Pat E. Gofgrth

PAT E.GOFORTH
CAPT., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-1 Ordanance, Armament- Photo tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 3 Route to and from target.

Ordnance Table

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Bombs dropped on Target.	Remarks
~~249~~	5	Inst. Fuses	500	Nil	2 in water - 3 returned to base.
254	"	" "	"	"	5 bombs overshot target- in water.
058	"	" "	"	"	5 bombs overshot target- in water.
259	"	" "	"	5	
019	"	" "	"	5	
185	"	" "	"	5	
097	"	" "	"	5	
015	"	" "	"	4	1 shott.
014	"	" "	"	Nil	5 bombs dropped on Angorma Village due to switch malfunction over target.
$$$$					


TOTAL: 24 X 500 bombs on Target. 15 X 500 lb. in water.
5 X 500 dropped on Angorma Village. 3 X 500 lb. bombs returned to base.


Note: Since Strike was carried out from MEDIUM minimum altitude, no ammunition was expended from the strafing guns, therefore, no Armament table is needed/


Photo Table

A/P	Type Camera	No. Pictures Taken	Altitude	Time	No. Prints received.
249	K-21	30	7000 ft.	1242/L	Nil
259	"	"	" "	"	"
097	"	"	" "	"	"
014	"	"	" "	"	"

Total: 120 K-21's taken. No prints received this office at time this report was submitted.


Crew Observation
O(Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
⊕(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photos
T(Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T(Black) Other Planes. (All Planes to be Shown at Beginning of Run.)
Dispersal Area
Wewak Airdrome
Wirlwiri Ptn.
Mission Pt.
Cape Boram
Boram Airdrome
Dispersal
Boram Ptn.
Mission
25 BOMBS DROPPED IN THIS AREA
Prince Alexander Mountains
143°37'
143°38'
143°39'
143°40'
143°41'
76
31


Time Over Target - 1242 1/2
Crew Observation Bombing Efficiency
O(Red) Crew Report of Bomb Hits
⊕(Red) Bomb Hits Shown on Photos
T(Blue) Planes Taking Photos
T(Black) Other Planes. (All Planes to be Shown at Beginning of Run.)
Grid and True
Mag. North
1000 Meter Modified British Grid System
5°08
Cape Moem
FLIGHT 3
3°34'
014 DROPPED 5 BOMBS ON Angoram Village OR RETURN
Cape Boram
Mission Pt.
Ptn.
5°05
3°35'
Boram Airdrome
Dispersal Lanes & Bays
Boram Ptn.
25 BOMBS DROPPED IN THIS AREA
76
40
Alexander Mountains
143°39'
143°40'
143°41'
143°42'



MISSION NO FFO 56 B-2 DATE 25/2/44
SQUADRON NO. 499 th GROUP 345 th
ALTITUDE 6800 — 7000 FT.
TIME OVER TARGET 1242/L L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLI-
GENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).

S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B. GP.
S-2

499
58-N
27 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

28 February, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 58-H, performed 27 Feb.44., by three flights of three planes each of them from the 498th, 499th and 500th Squadrons. Objective - Stores and supplies at NUMIA AIRDROME, HANSA BAY, N.G. (04° 10'S 144° 50' E.)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. 309th Bomb Wing A-2, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bombardment Group, (M) AAF, APO 713-1.

1. GENERAL.

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a medium altitude attack on NUBIA AIRDROME, and supplies and stores in areas adjacent thereto. Bomb load was 5 X 500 lb. demolition bombs with instantaneous nose fuses per airplane.

b. Rendezvous with both the Group and "Fighter Escort" was accomplished enroute to OBUSAP.

c. Attack

9 planes of this Squadron reached the target but only 8 bombed due to malfunction of racks. Bombs were dropped from 8000 feet on a heading of 360° at 230 m.p.h. I.A.S. Formation consisted of three 3 plane "V"'S in close trail, all planes bombing on the Squadron Leader. Bombing was excellent as 100% of the total of 39 bombs dropped were in the designated target area. The pattern covered the E side of the strip and the E dispersal areas with a few bombs falling along the W side of the strip. Although no results other than the bomb bursts were seen any supplies in the area were undoubtedly destroyed or severely damaged.

d. Interception.

Interception and airplanes destroyed.
(1) Nil interception encountered.
(2) Nil allied planes observed lost.
Nil enemy A/P's seen to be destroyed on the ground.

e. Time and location of:

Alert: Strip 4, Hadzab 1315/L.
Take off: Strip4, Hadzab 1415/L-1420/L.
Rendesvous: Entire formation including "Fighter Escort" accomplished rendesvous enroute to GUSAP. On scene by 1435/L.
Attack: NUBIA AIRDROME, HANSA BAY, 1531/L.
Landing: Strip 4 HADZAB 1655/L - 1700/L.

f.

Route: HADZAB-GUSAP-HANSA BAY-.

2. Airplanes of the 499th Squadron in the attack.
The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group formation and 1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN was selected to lead this Squadron, which was second in the sequence of attack.
Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.V.W.TATLEMAN	249	Maj.J.S.BAIRD	015	1st.Lt.W.W.CARELL	018
2nd.Lt.A.W.WILES	097	1st.Lt.R.SPEAR	019	2nd.Lt.A.J.ALGER	186
2nd.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	254	1st.Lt.C.CESSNA	014	2nd.Lt.A.RUSHWORTH	240

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the attack.

Lt.TATLEMAN led this Squadron as well as the first flight with Lt.WILES on his right wing and Lt.GRAHAM on his left. He made the approach to the target from SW to NE. As he prepared for the bomb run he realized that the preceeding Squadron was in such a position as to render considerable interference so he led the Squadron in a tight 360° turn to the left. Thus he was able to get a 30 second bomb run at 8000 feet on a heading of 360° at 230 m.p.h. I.A.S. Lt.TATLEMAN'S plane was the only one of this Squadron equiped with a bombsight and the entire Squadron bombed on his airplane. The Squadron's bombs were seen to burst in an excellent pattern along the E side of NUBIA STRIP and in the E dispersal areas. A few bombs exploded along the W edge of the runway. Heavy A/A bursts were seen throughout the attack, however, they did not appear to be directed at this Squadron until the bomb run was completed. Lt.TATLEMAN'S plane was holed several times before he could get out of range of the A/A. His withdrawal consisted of a left turn after bombs were away.
Major BAIRD, with Lt.CESSNA AND Lt.SPEAR as his wingmen, led the second flight in close trail. His actions paralled those of Lt.TATLEMAN'S. Lt.CARELL, with Lt.ALGER and Lt.RUSHWORTH in number two and three positions respectively, led the third flight. This flight's actions were also very similar to those of the first two.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

A/A was heavy, moderate and accurate to inaccurate at 8000 feet, from known positions at EKU VILLAGE and on N side of NUBIA STRIP. Most bursts were correct as to altitude but 300 feet to the right of the formation. Approximately 60 bursts were counted in front of the formation prior to reaching the bomb release line.

c. Fighter Cover.

"Fighter Escort", consisting of one Squadron of P-47's as top cover and one Squadron of P-47's as medium cover, was reported excellent throughout.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

(1) Damage to our own airplanes.

A/P 249: Heavy A/A fragments shattered glass plate in front of bombsight prior to bomb release. Heavy A/A fragments struck left wing punching hydraulic system out of commission. Pilot forced to use emergency air brakes on landing.

A/P 097: Two small A/A fragments holed the right wing.

A/P 014: Several small A/A holes in right front of fuselage.

A/P 019: Antenna knocked off by A/A burst.

(2) Nil enemy A/P's shot out of air.

e. Injury to Personnel.

S/Sgt.RAYMOND E.BOWERSOCK, 36397608, turret gunner of A/P 015, sustained abrasions from A/A fragments.

S/Sgt.GORDON A.KING, JR. 14057179, Turret gunner of A/P 249, sustained bruises from landing with emergency air brakes.

4. Citations.

Recommendation for Awards: Investigation is being conducted to determine elegibility of crew members on this mission for awards.

5. Tables:

See incl. #1 for armament, ordnance and photo tables.

6. Sightings:

u/i Squadron seen effectively bombing AMAE PLANTATION.
3 possibly single engine enemy A/P, serviceability undetermined, at S end of NUBIA STRIP.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photographs not received at time of submitting this report.

Pat E. Goforth

PEG/rj.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: -1 Tables.
-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
-3 Route to and from target.

DISTRIBUTION:

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
" " A-2 309th Bomb Wing, APO 713-1.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bombardment Group APO 713-1.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target	Remarks
249	5	Inst.	500	5	
097	5	"	"	"	
284	5	"	"	"	
015	5	"	"	"	
019	5	"	"	Nil	Toggle switch malfunction.
014	5	"	"	5	
016	4	"	"	4	
156	5	"	"	5	
340	5	"	"	5	


TOTAL: 39 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target. 5 X 500 lb. bombs brought back.


AMMUNITION TABLE

Note: Since the mission was carried at medium altitude, no .50 Cal. ammo was expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude	Time	Place
249	K-21	35	8000	1531/L	[illegible]


Wakde I.
Hollandia
Sentani
Cyclops
Mamberamo R.
Aitape
Tadji
Schouten Is
Blupblup I.
Wewak
Boram
Sepik R.
Buriu
Angoram
Awar
Nubia
Bogia
Manam I.
Hansa Bay
Bostrem Bay
Madang
Bogadjim
Ramu R.
Gusap
Bena Bena
Nadzab
Malahang
Lae
Finschafen
Saidor
Gali
Sio
Vitiaz Str.
Dampier Str.
Salamaua
Huon Gulf
Fly R.
NEW GUINEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
Lorengau
Momote
ADMIRALTY IS.
ST. MATTHIAS IS.
New Hanover
Kavieng
Panapai
BISMARCK SEA
Rabaul
Garove I.
Unea I.
Lolobau I.
Wide Bay
Long I.
Tolokiwa I.
Umboi I.
Cape Gloucester
Talasea
Hoskins
Natamo
NEW BRITAIN
Jacquinot Bay
Arawe
Gasmata
Montague Hr.
Gona
Buna
Horanda
MISSION NO FEO.578.44 ... DATE 27/2/44
SQUADRON NO. 499 ... GROUP 345
ALTITUDE ... 8000 ... FT.
TIME OVER TARGET ... 1531/4 ... L.
Route To Target & Return
MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).
S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B.GP.
S-2
138°
139°
140°
141°
142°
143°
144°
145°
146°
147°
148°
149°
150°
151°
152°


HAN A B
1000 2000 3000 4000
SCALE IN FEET
V BOMBER COMI
1ST DET 2ND AAF PHOTO IN
"TARGET LOCATION
AWAR PT.
AWAR PTN.
JETTIES
WAR DROME
H A N S
JETTIES
EKU VILL.
JETTY
NO. 1
NO. 2
NUBIA V
AWAR VILLAGES
NUBIA MISS.
SISIMANGO V.
AWAR RIVER

BAY

4000 5000 6000

FEET

COMMAND

TO INTELL DET

TION MAP"

LAING ISLAND

FFO 58 - H.
Squadron: 499th.
Order Over Target: 2nd.
Altitude: 8000 Feet.
Area In Which Bombs Fell.
Blue Planes Took Photos.

S A B A Y

JETTY

JETTY

IA VILLAGE

NUBIA PT N.

NUBIA DROME

249 097 019 195

254 075 014 015 340

39 BOMBS IN
THIS AREA

499
59-E
28 Feb 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

1 March,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 59-E, performed 28 Feb.44. Objective at LORENGAU VILLAGE and AIRDROME, MANUS ISLAND, ADMIRALTY GROUP. (02° 01'S 147°17'E)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. A-2 309th Bomb Wing APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. GENERAL

a. The purpose of this mission was to attack targets 13D, 14D, 15D, and 16D at LORENGAU VILLAGE and AIRDROME, MANUS ISLAND, with 7 B-25-D-1's each loaded with 6 X 500 lb. bombs, 8/11 second delay fuses.

b. Rendezvous

Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute to GUSAP. Nil "Fighter Escort" accompanied the Group on this mission.

c. Attack

The seven planes of this Squadron attacked the designated target areas at minimum altitude in two passes from E to W with a total of 31 X 500 lb. bombs. Formation over the target consisted of a lead flight of a 3 plane "V" and a trail flight of 4 planes in a "Box Formation" at a 30 to 40 second interval. 4 bombs were dropped in Target 13D 4 in the W part of 14D, 20 in 15 D and 3 S of LORENGAU DROME 600 yards. The entire area was thoroughly strafed.

d. Interception and Airplanes destroyed.

(1) Nil interception encountered.

(2) Nil Allied A/P's observed lost.
Nil enemy aircraft destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Time and location of:

Alert:	Strip 4, MADZAB	0646/L.
Take off:	" " "	1015/L.
Rendezvous:	Over MADZAB	1025/L.
A	Group Rendezvous enRoute to GUSAP	1055/L.
Attack:	LORENGAU, MANUS ISLAND.	1248/L 1258/L.
Landing:	Strip 4 MADZAB	1520/L 1525/L.

f. Routes.

Route Out: MADZAB, DUMPU, BOGADJIM, BAGABAG ISLAND, TARGET.

ATTACK ROUTE: Approach: Across E tip LOS NEGROS ISLAND
Axis of attack: E to W.

Withdrawal: S across MANUS ISLAND to LOU ISLAND.

Return: LOU ISLAND, BOGADJIM, DUMPU, MADZAB.

2. Airplanes of the 499th Squadron in the attack.

The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation. This Squadron was number two in the sequence of attack and Lt.W.H. PARKE was selected as the Squadron leader. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.W.H.PARKE	A/P	015	1st.Lt.P.BAKER	A/P	135
2nd.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	254	2nd.Lt.A.MUSHINSKI	"	340
2nd.Lt.A.J.WILES	"	019	1st.Lt.W.W.CABELL	"	016
			1st.C.CROSSMA	"	014

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the attack.

Lt.PARKE led the Squadron in the attack with Lt.GRAHAM on his right wing and Lt.WILES on his left. He followed the 500th Squadron over the target in a run from approximately W to E at a safe interval, as all Squadron's bombs had 8.11 second delay fuses. As he neared LORENGAU TOWNSHIP he could see that the preceeding Squadron had covered target 13 D thoroughly so he saved his bombs for target 14 D and 15 D and 16 D. His first bomb went in the N part of 13 D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

2 more were released in 14 D and the last 2 in 15 D. As Lt.PARKE pulled up after the last bomb was away he saw a gun pit on the hill just S of 15 D. He was unable to report the size of the pit but did state definitely that it was empty. He then made a wide circle to the right and led the first flight back across Lorengau for a strafing run NE to SW after which he proceeded to LOU ISLAND the Group Rally Point.

Lt.GRAHAM flew on Lt.PARKE'S right wing. He dropped his five bombs in a string near the shore in targets 14 D and 15 D. Lt.NILES, the left wingman had but four bombs in his airplane. Two were dropped in 14 D and the remainder in 15 D. In addition to strafing on the second pass, Lt.NILES strafed HAUWEI ISLAND at the northern-most point in his circle between passes.

LT.BAKER led the second flight. He also stayed considerably behind the preceeding flight in view of the 8/11 second delay fuses. He also made two passes over the target, the first approximately from E to W. He dropped only 2 of his 5 bombs due to rack malfunction, one on each pass. The first bomb exploded approximately in the center of target 14 D. He thoroughly strafed the TOWNSHIP as he crossed it but reported that most buildings were damaged or demolished from previous strikes and no apparent attempts had been made to repair the damage. The TOWNSHIP impressed as being in a state of considerable disrepair. Lt.BAKER led his flight in a circle to the right over SEEADLER HARBOR and made his second run over 13 D from N toS. He dropped his second bomb in target 13 D which was also thoroughly strafed. He then led the flight to the Group rally point.

Lt.RUSHWORTH was Lt.BAKER'S right wingman. He dropped 5 bombs in a string along the coast in targets 14 D and 15 D. Lt.CARELL flew on Lt.BAKER'S left wing. He dropped 2 bombs in the S portion of 15 D and 3 more parallel to LORENGAU STRIP and approximately 600 yards S of it. Lt.CROSSWA flew number four position in this flight. 2 of his bombs were released in 13 D and 3 in target 14 D.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

Nil A/A fire encountered on this mission.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil fighter cover accompanied the Group on this strike.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

(1) Nil damage to aircraft and nil injury to personnel of this Squadron on this mission.

(2) Nil enemy aircraft encountered.

4. Recommendations for Awards.

In view of information currently at hand no recommendation will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. Tables

See Incl.#1 for Ordanance, Armament and Photo Tables.

6. Sightings

Large barge, empty, sighted at jetty at BRIMA PLANTATION at 1445/L. Nil apparent activity around the barge or in the Plantation. One large fire at MADANG.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photographs of the mission not received at the time of submitting this report.

rbg/rjl

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 3 Route to and from Targe.

Distribution.

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.
(" ") A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-L.
" " 309th Bomb Wing, A-2, APO 713-1.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No.Bombs, Type	Weight	No.Bombs on Target	Remarks
015	6	8/11	500 lb. 6	
254	"	"	" "	
019	4	"	" 4	Only 4 bombs loaded
185	6	"	" 2	3 returned to base due to rack malfunction.
340	6	"	" 6	
016	6	"	" "	
014	"	"	" "	

TOTAL: 31 X 500 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs dropped on targets.

STRAFING TABLE


A/P	.50 Cal. Rds Car'd	Rds.Fired	Malfunction	.30 Cal. Rds.Car'd	Rds.Fired	Malfunction
019	4200	1855	ULNG Accelarater Stuck.	2000	Nil	Nil
185	"	1590	Nil	"	200	"
254	"	2385	Nil	"	300	"
016	"	3130	Nil	"	Nil	"
014	"	3975	"	"	500	
340	"	1590	"	"	Nil	"
015	"	3710	"	"	"	"

TOTAL: 18235 X .50 Cal. 1000 X. 30 Cal. expended.

PHOTO TABLE


A/P	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken	Time	Altitude	Place
015	K-21	30	1248/L 1253/L	Min.	Lorangau
254	"	30	" "	"	"
019	"	30	" "	"	"
185	"	25	" "	"	"
340	K-20	21	" "	"	"
016	K-21	30	" "	"	"
014	"	"	" "	"	"

TOTAL: 175 K-21's 20 K-20's.



FFO 59-E

499th Squadron
Time Over Target: 1248/L
Altitude: Minimum.
Order Of Squadron Over Target:
28 Feb. 1944.



MISSION NO. FEO-59E ..... DATE. 28/2/44 ....
SQUADRON NO. 499th BOMB. Sq. GROUP 345th BOMB Gp.
ALTITUDE.... MINIMUM ..... FT.
TIME OVER TARGET... .....1248-1253..... L.

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).

S/SGT. Baldwin
345th B. GP.
S-2

APO713-1

1 March,1944.

SUBJECT: NarrativeReport on Mission FPO 60-G, performed 29 Feb.44., by two flights of three airplanes each of the 499th Bomb Squadron (M), Objective at LOS NEGROS ISLAND, ADMIRALTY ISLANDS GROUP. (147°26' E; 02°00'S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.ATTENTION OFh A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General

a. The purpose of the mission was to be on Air Alert over PAK ISLAND to attack targets on LOS NEGROS ISLAND in support of landing operations as requested by Bomber Command Ship, "Jumbo". Bomb load was 5 X 500 lb. demolition bombs with 8/11 second delay nose fuses.

b. Rendesvous.

There was no rendesvous. Squadron assembled enroute to target.

c. Attack.

Six planes of this Squadron reached PAK ISLAND and circled on Air Alert as ordered. A call was received from "Jumbo" to attack Target #7 from SW to NE. A total of three passes were made over the target at minimum altitude from SW toNE. Formation during the runs consisted of two 3 plane flights left echelon at approximately 30 second intervals. A total of 17 X 500 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs were dropped in the designated area. Results of the bomb bursts were generally unobserved as the planes were a considerable distance from the bombs by the time explosions occured due to the 8/11 second delay fuses. No specific targets were spotted but all bombs were dropped throughout the entiretarget area. Some bursts of the lead flight were seen by the second flight but nothing other than bomb smoke was observed. The target was also thoroughly and heavily strafed by all planes on all three passes.

fourth attack was requested by "Jumbo" but [illegible] bad weather and the close proximity of landing craft the Formation Leader deemed this inadvisable. The duration of the actual strike was nine minutes. The Squadron was released from Air Alert by "Jumbo" at 1017/L. Almost immediately after leaving the target the formation was forced to fly on instruments. After about 15 minutes a break was reached and it appeared that the main front penetrated on the approach to the target, had separated into two narrower fronts. The formation then flew through scattered rain squalls, skirting thunderstorms when possible, for about an hour. After some time spent in searching the Squadron Leader found a break in the second front and did not have to resort to instruments to get through. Return to base was then accomplished without further incident.

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed.

(1) Nil interception encountered on this mission.

(2) Nil Allied A/P's observed lost and nil enemy A/P's observed destroyed either in air or on ground.

e. Time and Location of:

Alert: Strip 4 Nadsab 0630/L.
Take Off: " " " 0715/L.
Rendesvous: Norendesvous. Squadron assembled enroute. In formation and encourse by 0730/L.
Attack: Target #7 LOSNEGROS ISLAND, 0942/L 0951/L.
Landing: Strip #4, Nadsab 1225/L.

f. Route out: Nadsab, FINSCHAFEN, PAK ISLAND.
Attack Rt: SW to NE over Target #7 LOS NEGROS ISLAND.
Maneuver: For the attack flights changed from "V" to left echelon formation and spaced themselves at 30 second intervals.
Return Rt: PAK ISLAND, FINSCHAFEN, NADZAB.

2. Airplanes ofthe 499th Squadron in the attack.

This Squadron was to conduct the strike individually. Lt.R.D. REINBOLD was selected to lead the Squadron Formation. Flights were as follows:

1st.Lt.R.D.REINBOLD	A/P 015	1st.Lt.V.W.TATELMAN	A/P 185
1st.Lt.R.BAKER	" 347	2nd.Lt.R.D.SPEAR	" 019
1st.Lt.C.B.JORDAN	" 014	1st.Lt.W.W.CABELL	" 016

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the attack.

Lt.REINBOLD was the Squadron Leader on this mission. After take off he proceeded to the BOGADJIM area with out difficulty, although the weather was beginning to become heavy. Shortly after leaving BOGADJIM several heavy thundershowers were encountered. These were successfully flanked but much time was wasted. For this reason Lt.REINBOLD requested a course and ETA from the Navigator. He then drew the formation in close and prepared to fly through the 70 mile front which extended from 900 to 15000 feet. After approximately 30 minutes of flying through the weather, the formation broke out into a small hole in the weather at 0916/L at PAK ISLAND, one minute later than the specified time. He began circling as ordered. Heavy thundershowers were surrounding the target areas. At approximately 0939/L, he received acall from "JUMBO" the Task Force Commander, to attack target number 7 on a run from SW to NE. Lt.REINBOLD lead the formation to a position SW of MOMOTE DROME and turned onto the target run. The thunderstorm had moved in considerably by this time and poor visibility made target recognition difficult. On the first pass the formation, because of poor visibility, crossed the SW tip of the target with only the wingmen passing over the entire target. During this run, the disposition of Naval Craft was noted as shown in the attached overlay. The landing craft were entering the mouth of HYANE HARBOR. Lt.REINBOLD then circled to make another attack. He was well orientated and made an excellent run strafing, as on the first pass, and dropping 2 bombs. By this time the landing craft were in the center of the Harbor. A third pass was made dropping one bomb and strafing. The landing craft were within 150 yards of shore during this last attack. Lt.REINBOLD heard a call from "JUMBO" ordering a 4th pass but because the weather had moved in over the target (ceiling very low) and because the landing craft were very close to shore he deemed it inadvisable to make another attack. He reformed the squadron and left the target area. Lt.BAKER flew number two position in the attack remaining on Lt.REINBOLD'S right wing throughout the mission except during the attack when he shifted to the left wing of the number 3 plane. Lt.BAKER'S action was very similar to Lt.REINBOLD'S. On the first pass he dropped a bomb in the S part of target #7. On the second pass he released a bomb at the N end and a third bomb was unloaded in the N center of the target on the final pass. Lt.BAKER was unable to discern the results of his bombs other than that all were drfinitely dropped in the targetarea. He strafed heavily on all 3 passes. 2 bombs weresaved for an additional attack, should "JUMBO" call for it.

a large warship, barely visible through the rain and haze, several miles [illegible] of LOS NEGROS ISLAND. He thought the vessel to be either a battleship or a heavy cruiser. After the last pass he heard "Gangway" broadcasting from the beach and a short while later a message from "Gangway" stating that a position had been taken as planned. As the Squadron headed homeward after being released by "JUMBO" Lt.BAKER saw the 498th Squadron in the vicinity of LOU ISLAND but the Island itself was unobserved due to heavy weather.

Lt.JORDAN flew number three position in the first flight remaining on Lt.REINBOLD'S left wing throughout the mission. His actions also closely paralleled those of the Formation Leader. As the formation broke out over PAK ISLAND, 3 or 4 salvoes were seen coming from the cruisers SE of the target. In the attack, he dropped 1 bomb in the S end of the target on the first pass, one in the center and one near the N end on the second pass, and one in the N center of the area on the third. One bomb was saved for possible future attack. He also strafed on every pass. Lt.JORDAN reported that the runway appeared to be in fair condition and that there was no visible resistance to the landing. He could see many shell craters in the coastal areas during his attacks and said that these areas were effectively bombarded. A P/P, probably from one of the cruisers, was reported circling SE of LOS NEGROS ISLAND.

Lt.TATELMAN was the leader of the second flight. He kept it in close trail to the first flight throughout the air alert period. During this time he also saw the naval vessels S of LOS NEGROS ISLAND and reported a large warship, possibly a battleship or a heavy cruiser, several miles NE of the N half of LOS NEGROS ISLAND almost hidden by a thunderstorm. He heard "JUMBO" request the Squadrons to strike Target 7 so was well prepared when Lt.REINBOLD gave the cue to attack. He formed his flight in left echelon and spaced it at 30 seconds behind Lt.REINBOLD'S to allow plenty of time for the 8/11 second delay fuses. Lt.TATELMAN dropped his first bomb in the trees at the S end of Target #7. He strafed the rest of the target but was unable to release any more bombs due to rack malfunction. As he made this run he saw 7 Higgins boats in single file at the entrance to Hyane HARBOR. He followed the first flight in a wide circle to the right and made a second pass strafing the area thoroughly. The Higgins boats were then in the center of the harbor heading toward the "Hathm Skidway". On his third pass these boats were fairly close to Lt.TATELMAN'S flight as he began his final run. Soldiers in the boats were seen to wave enthusiastically. He reported that 3 minutes after passing the barges he heard "Gangway" broadcasting clearly from the beach. After the attack Lt.TATELMAN re-formed his flight into a tight "V" and again fell in very close trail to the lead flight. Visibility had gradually become poorer and no further sightings were made by Lt.Tatelman. After being released by "JUMBO" he followed Lt.REINBOLD back to base without further incident.

attack he shifted to number 3 position on the left wing of Lt.CABELL. His actions during the mission closely paralleled those of Lt.TATELMAN. Prior to the attack he saw three B-25-D-2's equipped with smoke laying apparatus circling several miles SE of LOS NEGROS ISLAND but did not see them over the target area. Lt.SPEAR dropped 3 bombs , one on each pass. 2 went in the center of the designatedtarget area and one along the beach near the E end of the target. 2 bombs were saved in case another attack was requested. He strafed heavily throughout all three passes. He was unable to observe the results of his bomb bursts due to the fact that he was a considerable distance away from the target by the time the explosions occured. Lt.SPEAR'S only further sighting was a PBY several miles S of the target, seen as the formation was enroute back to base.

Lt.CABELL flew number 3 position and remained on Lt.TATELMAN'S left wing during the entire mission. His actions were also quite similar to his flight leader's. He dropped 3 bombs, one on each pass, all of which were in the target area but he was unable to discern any results. He saved 2 bombs in the event that a further attack might be fartgeimubg. Lt.CABELL reported that bomb bursts from the first flight's runs werescattered throughout the targetarea. He saw a road in good repair from the beach near the "NATIVE SKIDWAY" NW into SALAMI PLANTATION. Lt.CABELL strafed the area heavily on all three passes.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire
Nil.

c. Fighter Cover.

Area fighter cover was to be provided over target. Only fighters seen on the mission were 12 P-38's which were observed coming down through the overcast asthe Squadron was leaving the area.

d. Details of Damage toAircraft in the Air.

(1) Nil damage to own aircaft.

4. Recommendations for Awards.

Investigation is being conducted to determine eligibility of crew members on this mission for awards.

5. Tables.

See Inclusure # 1, 2, and 3 for tables and charts.

6. Sightings

1 possible BB or CA in rain squall off N part of LOS NEGROS .
4 APD off mouth of HYANE HARBOR.
7 HIGGINS landing barges in mouth of harbor on first pass over target; in center of Harbor on 2nd. pass; 250 yards off shore target #7 during 3rd. pass.
3 CL and one DD off Southeast Point.
3 Recco B-25's circling over ships. 12 P-38's in area and one F/P.
498th Squadronattempting to hit Lou Island.
Apparently no resistance whatso ever to landing party.
Momote Strip appeared in fair condition.
On approach to area, 3-4 Naval broadsides observed.
Truck in movement # to E on road on PAK ISLAND.
Roads on LOS NEGROS appeared in good condition.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photos ofthe mission received too late for interpretation.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

JCH/rjl

JACK C.HOOPES
1st.Lt.,Air Corps
ASS'T. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 3 Route to and from Target.

Distribution:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF:
A.C.of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
(2 copies) A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
(1 copy) Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

ARMAMENT REPORT

A/P	.50 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.50 Cal. Rds.Fired	.50 Cal. Gun Fail	.30 Cal. Rds.Car'd	.30 Cal. Rds.Fired	.30 Cal. Gun Fail
016	4200	2385	Nil	2000	400	Nil
014	"	1525	"	"	Nil	"
347	"	1590	"	"	"	"
015	"	2120	"	"	200	"
185	"	1855	"	"	400	"
019	"	2120	"	"	Nil	"
Total	11595 X.50 Cal.		1000 X.30 Cal. expended.			

BOMBING TABLE


A/P	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target	Remarks.
016	5	500	8/11 sec.	5	Others brought back to base.
014	5	"	" "	4	" " " " "
347	5	"	" "	5	" " " " "
015	5	"	" "	5	" " " " "
185	5	"	" "	1	4 returned rack malfunction.
019	5	"	" "	5	Others brought back to base.


Total: 17 X 500 lb.8/11 second delay bombs dropped on target.
9 X 500 lb.8/11 second dealy bombs returned, these bombs were kept in event that squadron would of had further attack orders from "Jumbo".
4 X 500 lb.8/11 second delay bombs returned - rack Malfunction.

PHOTO TABLE


A/P	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken	Altitude	Time
185	K-21	5	Minimum	0942-0951/L
019	Nil			
014	K-21	25	"	" "
347	" "	30	"	" "
015	" "	Nil		
016	" "	22	"	" "

Total: 82 K-21's.


Papitalai
Mission Station
Jetty
Musoo Island
Jetty
Komwia Island
Leaiu Island
Sekukaio Pt
PAPITALAI
HARBOR
PLANTATION
SALAMI
N



FFO 60-C
499th Bomb Sq.
Altitude - Minimum
T.O.T. 0942-0951/L



MISSION NO, FEO 60-C. DATE 28 FEB., 44
SQUADRON NO, 499th GROUP 345th
ALTITUDE, MINIMUM FT.
TIME OVER TARGET 0942/L - 0951/L
ROUTES TO TARGET AND RETURN

MAP REF:-
SHIP SIGHTINGS MAP(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NO. 168).