499
91-B
31 Mar 44

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

1 April,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 91-B. Performed 31 March,1944, with objective at MUSCHU ISLAND in the WEWAK Area(143°35'E - 03°20'S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General.

a. The objective of this mission was to attack two villages, coastal area and beached barges on the NW tip of MUSCHU ISLAND at minimum altitude with 80 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs per plane and a maximum load of .50 Cal. ammunition for the strafing guns. The attack was to be coordinated with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group, 1 Squadrn of the 38th Group and 1 Squadron of the 3rd.Attack Group. This squadron, the squadron of the 38th Group and the 3rd.Attack Squadron were assigned targets on MUSCHU ISLAND. The 498th, 500th and 501st squadrons were assigned targets between KAIRIRU VILLAGE and the garden area E of this point on the SW tip of KAIRIRU ISLAND.

b. Rendezvous

Rendezvous with one squadron of P-40's, one squadron P-47's, 1 Squadron B-25's of the 38th Group was accomplished over ANNANBERG at 0913/K.

c. Attack.

This squadron made its's attack on the assigned target simultaneously with the 501st Squadron which was attacking the Southern end of KAIRIRU ISLAND. A total of 200 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped in the assigned target, starting at Village at 230264 (KAIRIRU West 1 mile to 1 in.). to the village at 241269 (Same Map).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

40 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped near MANAI VILLAGE 2976 (Ref: Same Map). When bombs failed to release over the target, a total of 290 parafrag bombs and 6 racks were salvoed in the vicinity of MUSCHU ISLAND when bombs hung up. A total of 30 bombs were returned to base. The target waswell covered by bombs and the entire area wasthoroughly strafed. Each of the three villages attacked were hit by both bombs and strafing but only one small fire resulted at MANAI VILLAGE.

c. Interception

1. Nil E/A encountered.
2. Nil E/A destroyed.
3. Nil E/A observed destroyed. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

e. Time and Location of:

ALERT:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0730/K.
Take off	Strip 3 NADZAB	0810/K.
Rendezvous	Squadrons over NADZAB	0820/K.
	Group: Enroute ANA NOEMJ	
	at:	0900/K.
Attack	MUSCHU ISLAND	1008/K.
Landing	Strip 3 NADZAB	1200/K.

f. Route

NADZAB - MANAM - South of [illegible] - MANAM - Strip 3 NADZAB.

2. Planes and Pilots in the Attack.

A. The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group formation. This Squadron flew in the number 3 position and Capt.R.D.RUNBOLD was assigned to lead the Squadron formation.

B. Planes and Pilots

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.R.D.RUNBOLD	A/P015	1st.Lt.C.B.J.TUAN	A/P 019
1st.Lt.A.L.NILES	" 020	2nd.Lt.W.H.[illegible]LSY	" 164
1st.Lt.W.J.IRISH	" 016	2nd.Lt.A.F.GRADY	" 016
1st.Lt.J.R.ALLEY	" 591		

3. Details of Mission.

a. Capt.R..N.OLD held the squadron in the Group Formation while flying to the E and N of MUSCHU and KAIRIRU ISLANDS. On reaching a point approximately 5 miles NE of KAIRIRU ISLAND, Capt.REINBOLD placed the squadron in a position slightly wide and to the right of the lead Squadron. At this time the second flight took it's interval in trail. Capt.REINBOLD continued the circle and passed between KARABAU ISLAND and KAIRIRU ISLAND. This brought him on to the axis of attack from W to E across the N part of MUSCHU ISLAND. At this time he observed the 501st Squadron attacking from N to E along the N coast of Kairiru Island. When approximately 1500 yards from the NW tip of MUSCHU ISLAND, Capt.REINBOLD began strafing the Village. He poured a long burst into a group of huts but no fires resulted. He began dropping bombs approximately 200 yards W of the first Villages and continued dropping in train until 30 bombs were out at which time a malfunction made it necessary to salvo the bomb rack. He continued the strafing run to MAI VILLAGE where the attack was broke off. He continued out to sea and joined the Group Formation.

Lt.KIBBE flew the number 2 position of the first flight. He stayed on Capt.R..N.OLD's right wing during the attack. He began dropping bombs at the same time as his flight leader, however, only ten bombs released until a malfunction made it necessary to salvo the racks. He strafed the area thoroughly.

Lt.C.. JR flew the number three position of the first flight throughout the attack. He began strafing prior to reaching the target and on reaching the coastline tried to release bombs without success. He continued strafing and on reaching the swampy area W of MAI VILLAGE, again tried to release his bombs. A total of 10 released between the swamp and MAMAI VILLAGE before a bomb hung up and subsequent salvo of the racks.

Lt.KELLEY was flying the fourth plane of the first flight on Lt.NIL.S right wing. Lt.KELLEY began strafing prior to the target and immediately upon crossing the coast of MUSCHU ISLAND, began dropping bombs. He was able to release 60 bombs starting W of the first Villages and carrying through and past the garden area. It was then necessary to salvo the racks and remaining 20 bombs.

Lt.JORDAN lead the second flight in it's attack at an interval of 30 seconds behind the first flight and on the same heading. He was unable to release a singlebomb and was forced to salvo the entire bomb load and racks. He thoroughly strafed the coastal area and gave his wingmen a good bombing run. After breaking off the attack, he lead the flight back into formation with the first flight.

Lt.SELBY flew the number 2 position on Lt.JORDAN's right wing throughout the attack. He released the first bomb at the coastline on the NW tip of the Island and trained a total of 50 bombs S of the first Village to the Garden area. Since the remaining bombs were still in position but would not release he returned 50 bombs and racks to base.

Lt.BRODY flew the number three position and released 40 bombs between the two villages. It was the n necessary to salvo the remaining 40 and the racks.

After reforming, the Squadron and group returned to base without incident.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

Caliber : Unknown (probably heavy).
Intensity: Slight.
Accuracy : Poor.
Altitude : 2 bursts at 3000 feet; 2 bursts at 300'.
Origin : Unknown.

Note: On approach to target the formation was flying at 3000 ' to S of MAIPIRY ISLAND. The Squadron then began losing altitude in a left turn on to the axis of attack. When over KAHASAU ISLAND , 2 black bursts appeared at 3000 feet behind and to left of formation which was then at approximately 300 - 900 feet. During the attack when approximately over the swampy area N of NANAI VILLAGE two more black bursts appeared at 300 ' far behind the second flight.

c. Fighter Cover

Close cover was provided by one squadron of P-40's Call word "Pinky". Top Cover by one squadron P-47's Call word "Captive".

d. Details of damage to A/P in Ac.

1. Damage to own. - Nil.
2. Damage to enemy. Nil.

e. Personnel Casualties.

There were nil injuries to personnel of this squadron on this mission.

4. Citations.

There will be no recommendations for awards using this mission as a basis.

5. Tables

See Incl. #1.

6. Sightings

3 distinct fires at Garden A of KAIRIRU VILLAGE sending black column of smoke up to 700 feet which later rose to approximately 1500 feet.
Approximately 20 horses seen running through Garden Area on MUSCHU ISLAND. 1 probable large lugger at anchor between CapeMOSEM and CAPE BORAM. Definitely not a wreck. Several flashes probably A/G fire from 235290 (Ref:Kairiru West 1 mile - 1 inch.Prov).

7. Photo Interpretation

No photographs received at the time this report was submitted.

Pat E Gopath
PAT E.GOPORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-3
Incl:-1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 3 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:

1 copy Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.
1 " File

C O N F I D E N T I A L

BOMBING TABLE

A/F	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.On Target	No.Salvoed
015	80	23 lb.	Parafrag	40	40
020	80	23 lb.	"	10	70
016	80	23 lb.	"	40	40
591	80	23 lb.	"	20	60
019	80	23 lb.	"	0	80
164	80	23 lb.	"	50	30 returned
347	80	23 lb.	"	40	40

TOTAL: 200 X 23 lb. Parafrags on target.
330 X 23 lb. Parafrags salvoed.
30 X 23 lb. Parafrags returned to base.

Note: Page 2 line 4 should read 330 parafrags returned not 290.

STRAFING TABLE

A/F	Rds.Car'd.	Rds.Fired	Gun Fail.	
015	4200	1660	Nil	
020	4200	1250	Nil	
016	4200	1885		
591	4200	1660	Nil	120 X .30 Cal.
019	4200	1700	Nil	
164	4200	1700	Nil	
347	4200	1750	Nil	

TOTAL: 11835 X.50 Cal. 1200 X.30 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

A/F	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken	Altitude
016	K-21	30	Minimum
019	K-21	30	" "

TOTAL: 60 K-21 Photos taken of Attack.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


KAIRIRU STRAIT
016
015
020
164
019
347
591
Manai Village
230 x 23 lb. PARAFRAGS
MUSCHU ISLAND
Cape Pousum
Muschu Pt.
FFO : 91-B
Time Over Target: 1005
Order Over Target: First
Altitude:100-150 feet
Photos Taken
31, March 1944
Map Ref: KAIRIRU ISLAND
West- 1 to 1mb


Ivaride I.
Hollandia
Sentani
cyclops
PACIFIC OCEAN
Manus I.
ADMIRALTY IS.
Mamberamo R.
Artopi
Tadji
But
Wewak
Boram
Sepik R.
Awar
Nubia
Manam I.
Hansa Bay
Karkar I.
Madang
Long I.
Ramu R.
NEW GUINEA
Saidor
Vitiaz Str.
Gusap
Markham R.
Finschafen
Nadzab
Lae
Huon Gulf
Fly R.
Mission Number: FFO: 91-B
Time Over Target: 1005/K
Order Over Target:
Altitude: 100-150 feet
Photos Taken
31, March 1944
MAP REF:
SHIP SIGHTINGS SUMMARY MAP
Intelligence No. 168

499
92-D
1 Apr 44

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

2 April,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 92-D, performed 1 April, 1944 by 6 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at TADJI AIRDROME, N.G. (03°19' S - 143°25'E).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2. A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929, A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. S-2, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike on personnel and stores area at TADJI DROME on the N shore of NEW GUINEA. The 6 planes of this Squadron were to attack the target with 6 X 500 lb. instantaneous demolition bombs per plane from medium altitude followed by a strafing run at minimum altitude. This strike was to be made in conjunction with the 498th, 500th, and 501st. Squadrons of the 345th Group. A simultaneous attack on AITAPE VILLAGE, ST.ANNA PLANTATION andTUMLEO ISLAND was to be conducted by the 38th Group in a similar manner.

b. Rendezvous

Rendezvous accomplished with the 498th, 500th and 501st Squadrons over LEROME RIVER at 2500 feet and with Fighter Escort and the 38th Group over ANNANBERG at 7500 feet.

c. Attack

This Squadron was numb er one in the sequence of attack leading the Group Formation. The approach was made from SE to NW following the 38th Group to a point several miles S* of the target where a wide 180°turn to the right was executed to begin the bomb run.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Extremely bad weather conditions forced the Squadron down to 2300 feet for the run which was made on a heading of 110° at 200 mph I.A.S. by two 3 plane "V"'s in close trail. An excellent bomb pattern was laid over the target with 100% of the bombs bursting therein. Results other than bomb bursts and smoke however, were not observed. A large circle to the right put the Squadron in position for a strafing run but due to steady drizzle of rain from low clouds and smoke from the following Squadron's bombs. The first flight was forced to pull up short of the target and only by the second flight was the target strafed. This pass was also made on a course of 110°. Withdrawal was made over the water where the Squadron and Group reformed for the return trip.

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed.

1. Nil Interception encountered.
2. Nil Allied airplanes observed lost.
3. Nil enemy airplanes destroyed on the ground or in the air by the Squadron on this mission.

e. Time and Location of:

Alert	Strip 3 MADZAB	0750/K
Take Off	" " "	0830/K
Rendezvous	Over ANNANBERG	0947/K
Attack	TADJI	1050/K
Landing	Strip 3 MADZAB	1250/K

f. Route Out: MADZAB LERONE RIVER ANNANBERG TARGET.
Return : TARGET GUSAP MADZAB
Attack Rt: NW to SE over Target.

2. Airplanes of the 499th Squadron in the attack.

Col.C.U.TRUE was Group Commander on the mission, leading both this Squadron and the Group Formation. This Squadron was first in the sequence of attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Col.C.U.TRUE	A/P	491	Major J.B.BAIRD	A/P	382
1st.Lt. A.L.Niles	"	020	2nd.Lt.H.P.Palmer	"	410
1st.Lt.W.G.Irish	"	347	2nd.Lt.W.W.Graham	"	014

a. Details of the Attack.

Col.C.U.TRUE led the first flight with Lt.MILES on his right wing and Lt.IRISH on his left. He led the formation in the approach from the SE to the NW to a point several miles SW of the target where he swung to the right to begin the bombing run. It had been planned to bomb from 6000 feet but an overcast of thick cumulus clouds forced the Squadron to go over at 8300 feet. The run was made on a heading of 110° at 200 mph I.A.S. according to plan and all 16 of the first flight's bombs went directly into the target. No results other than bomb smoke were observed, however, Col.TRUE began a decending turn to the right which brought the flight in position for the strafing run, which was to be made on the same heading as the first. Smoke from the following Squadron's bombs plus a steady drizzle from the low clouds so obscured visibility as to force Col.TRUE to pull up over the target after firing only 40 rounds of ammunition. His wingmen did not open fire at all. He then headed out to sea where he reformed the Squadron and Gramp and returned to the base.

Major J.S.BAIRD was the leader of the second flight with Lt.PALMER and Lt.GRAHAM in number two and three positions respectively. He followed the first flight in close trail during the first run and his flight's bombs wereseen to burst in a pattern in the target. He made a slightly wider turn after this pass, to allow his flight a 30 second interval for the strafing run, so by the time he reached the target again, the smoke had cleared sufficiently for him to see the ground. He and his wingmen in a shallow "V" formation were consequently able to strafe the target thoroughly. Major BAIRD THEN swung out over the water and rejoined the Squadron Formation for the return, trip.

b. Anti Aircraft Fire

Nil A/A fire encountered on the mission.

c. Fighter Cover

Fighter escort was reported as excellent by all crews.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

1. Nil damage to own A/P's.

2. Nil enemy aircraft observed shot out of air.

2. Nil injuries sustained by personnel of this squadron, on this mission.

4. Citations

No recommendation for awards or citations will be submitted as result of this mission.

5. Tables

See Incl. #1.

6. Sightings.

38 th Group's bombing of AITAPE and TUMOLO ISLAND observed to be excellent.
FRC VILLAGE observed to be very effectively covered by the 390th Squadron's bomb pattern.
2 U/I planes on the main strip at TADJI.

7. Photo Interpretation

Photos not received at this report submitted.

For the Squadron Commander:

Pat E. Gofforth
PAT E. GOFORTH 1st Lt.
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-3
Incl:-1 Tables.
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-3 Route to and from Target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
2 " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
1 " A-2 V Bom Com., APO 713-1.
" " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, (M), APO 713-1.
File

CONFIDENTIAL

BOMBING TABLE

A/C	No. Bombs Carr'd.	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target
491	5	500 lbs.	Inst.	5
339	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
347	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
488	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
418	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
344	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
Total	30 X 500 lb.	Inst.	Live Bombs dropped.	

STRAFING TA BLE

A/C	Rounds Carr'd	No. Rds Fired	Gun Fail
344	4200	1855	Nil
339	4200	1590	Nil
418	4200	795	Nil
491	4200	40	Nil
Total		3880	.50 Cal. Ammunition expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/C	Type Camera	No. Photos taken	Altitude
488	K-21	30	Minimum
347	K-21	30	Minimum


Wakde I.
Hollandia
Mamberamo R.
PACIFIC OCEAN
Manus
ADMIRALTY IS.
Aitape
Tadji
Wewak
Boram
Sepik R.
Manam I
Hansa Bay
Karkar I
Madang
Long I.
Saidor
Vitiaz Str
NEW GUINEA
Ramu R.
Gusap
Markham R.
Finschafen
Lae
Nadzab
Huon Gulf
Fly R.
499th Squadron. FFO. 92-D
Altitude: 2300 feet. Time Over Target: 1030/K
Order Over Target: First
Took Photos. T
Ref: Ship Sighting
Map Int. Summary 169



99th Squadron. FFO. 92-D
ltitude : 2300 feet. Time Over Target: 1030/K
rder Over Target: First
ook Photos.

Ref: Tadji Photo Map. V Bomber Command
Scale;-

0' 1000' 2000'

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
94-E
3 Apr 44

JCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

4 April,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 94-E performed on 3 April,1944 with objective at HOLLANDIA (140° 30' E 02°35'S).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Forces, APO 925.ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2, A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General

a. The assigned mission was to attack HOLLANDIA DROMES from minimum altitude with aircraft as the primary target.

b. Plan of Attack

10 planes of this squadron were to participate in the strike. Three planes were loaded with 22 X 100 lb. parademo bombs. Seven planes were loaded with 22 clusters of 2 X 23 lb. para-frags.

The entire strike force of A-20's, B-25's and fighter escort were to assemble in the GUSAP area and proceed to HOLLANDIA with the 345th Group leading. Before reaching the target the A-20 Squadrons were to pull ahead then hit the target 50 minutes after the B-24's had cleared. This Group was to follow crossing the I.P., which was a mountain SE of SENTANI LAKE. During this turn, squadrons were to take intervals of 30 seconds and attack the dromes in squadron front, 10 planes abreast. The approach was to bring all squadrons of the Strike Force west of SENTANI LAKE to a range of low hills 5 miles NW of the target. Here all squadrons were to turn onto the attack route and cross all 3 dromes on a heading of approximately 120°. The planes which carried para-demos were to attack A/A positions on the ridges N of the Dromes while the planes with para-frags attacked planes on the dromes and in the dispersal areas.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Withdrawal was to be over SENTANI LAKE and out over HUMBOLDT BAY where the Group was to Rally. The Group was to proceed to TADJI AIRDROME and rendezvous with fighters which were to escort the Group on the return to base.

b. Rendezvous

Rendezvous with the 38th Bomb Group, 2 Groups of A-20's and the Fighters was accomplished N of GUSAP at approximately 0935/K.

c. The approach over the ridge NW of HOLLANDIA DROMES was accomplished as ordered. This squadron hit the target in 10 plane front according to plan. The NW dispersal area on HOLLANDIA DROME was attacked. One 2/e M/B was destroyed by bombing and strafing and 3 others heavily damaged. A/A positions on the ridge N of the DROMES were bombed and strafed. Several serviceable and many damaged planes in the large dispersal area N of the W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP were heavily strafed and bombed. Exact details of damage unknown, but thought to be severe. Serviceable and u/s planes along the Strip and in the dispersal area N of the E end of HOLLANDIA STRIP were bombed and strafed with results undetermined but bombing was accurate and strafing heavy. Planes on the W end of SENTANI in the dispersal area in the woods between SENTANI and CYCLOPS were heavily strafed and bombed. Supply dumps, ammunition dumps and fuel dumps between the Dromes and HUMBOLDT BAY were strafed with unknown results. Buildings between the dromes and Bay and on Islands in JAUTEFA BAY were attacked as well. Because of the large number of burning and wrecked planes and smoke, accurate and precise estimate of damage done is most difficult. However it is known that this squadron definitely destroyed four Lillys and 1 u/i M/B; probably destroyed or heavily damaged four Tonys, and 6-8 u/i M/B.

d. Interception and A/P's. destroyed.

1. Nil interception.
2. Nil enemy aircraft destroyed.
3. One plane (probably A-20) seen to explode in air just outside HUMBOLDT BAY.
4. 5planes destroyed and 10-12 either destroyed or heavily damaged as noted in Par."D" above.

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

f. Time and location of:

Alert Strip #3 NADZAB 0800/K.
Take off " 0856/K.
Squadron Assembly Over Strip 3 NADZAB. 0902/K.
Group Rendezvous Gusap 0930/K.
Fighter Rendezvous N of Gusap 0935/K.
Attack Hollandia Dromes 1156/K.
Landing Strip 3 NADZAB (6planes) 1450/K.
Landing Saimor (4planes) 2345/K
and three of these returned to base 1645/K.

g. Route

NADZAB GUSAP I.P. TADJI BASE.

2. Airplanes and Pilots Participating.

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Major J.B.BAIRD	A/P	015	1st.Lt.C.B.JORDAN	A/P	019
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	"	347	2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	"	340
2nd.Lt.H.K.PARMER	"	014	2nd.Lt.F.M.RHODE	"	891

THRID FLIGHT

2nd.Lt.W.S.GRAHAM 058 2nd.Lt.A.N.MILES 020
1st.Lt. J.H.MacWILLIAMS 016

Lt.Col.B.A.FRIDGE was the Group Commander in the lead plane of the 501st Squadron. This Squadron flew in the number 4 position of the GroupFormation. Major J.B.BAIRD elected to lead this Squadron.

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Attack

Major BAIRD lead the No.1 Flight and the Squadron Formation to the I.P. in Group Formation. Here he began to take up the attack interval behind the 498th Squadron which was No.2 in the sequence of attack. Major BAIRD gave the signal for squadron front and soonafter turned over the ridge NW of the target and lined up for the run. During this time he saw several fires from burning planes on HOLLANDIA STRIP. Major BAIRD made his initial attack on planes in the dispersal area immediately N of the W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP. He saw several serviceable pla nes among many wrecked and damaged.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

He heavily strafed these planes and dropped 2 clusters of parafrags in this area. Because of heavy smoke from 2-3 burning planes he was unable to determine the damage in the dispersal area N of the center of the strip , he dropped 4 clusters and strafed grounded planes. He observed his bullets striking the planes but was unable to determine the damage. At this time his plane was struck by A/A fire and the left engine immediately began to smoke. He continued his strafing and bombing run and dropped 6 clusters in the wooded area N of the E end of the Strip. He strafed and dropped 4 clusters on a Tony and 2 u/i M/B at the W end of SENTANI STRIP. He continued strafing and dropped the remaining 6 clusters on dispersed fighters in the N dispersal area of CYCLOPS STRIP. During this time the engine continued to smoke and he was unable to observed closely the results of his attack. He led the squadron on the withdrawal over the supply area between SENTANI LAKE and HUMBOLDT BAY. He was unable to strafe with the nose guns because he was occupied in watching the left engine but the turret and waist gunners stayed on the job and strafed supply and fuel dumps.

On reaching HUMBOLDT BAY, Major BAIRD saw A/A bursts in the flight path and turned the squadron to avoid these. By this time the left engine was smoking profusely, oil pressure had dropped and power was dripping. Consequently he feathered the left engine and after gaining speed and altitude he led the squadron down the coast. At TADJI he gave instructions for the number 2 flight to proceed directly to base. The other planes stayed with him to ALEXISHAFEN where he sent the number 3 flight to base. The planes of his own flight accompanied him to SAIDOR where a successful landing was made. The crew of thisship returned to base in the other 3 planes which also landed at SAIDOR.

Lt.ALGER flew on Major BAIRD'S right wing throughout the attack. He strafedand dropped 8 clusters in a string among the planes at the W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP in the dispersal in the dispersal area. He strafed and attempted to release bombs on planes in the dispersal area N of the center of the strip. How ever, a malfunction made it necessary to salve t he remaining bombs. He heavily strafed the A/A position in the garden area between HOLLANDIA and SENTANI STRIPS. He strafed 10-12 S/E Fighters in the dispersal area N of SENTANI STRIP and saw his bullets sticking home. He strafed the wooded area S of CYCLOPS STRIP. During the withdrawar he heavily strafed the supply areas a nd buildings between SENTANI LAKE and HUMBOLDT BAY.

Lt.PALMER flew on Major BAIR D'S left wing. He began dropping clusters of parafrags as he reached the cleared dispersal area at the NW end of HOLLANDIA STRIP, stringing 16 clusters through this area and along the old runway. He saw many airplanes, most of which were severely damaged, but several as yet appeared serviceable. Lt.PALMER strafed intermittantly through the wooded area N of

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HOLLANDIA and across the cleared area W of the Gardens. He noticed that the heavy A/A position at this point was firing rapidly so he strafed it but due to rack malfunction no bombs could be released. As Lt.PALMER neared SENTANI DROME he spotted 3 apparently serviceable LILYS in the norther n extremity of the main dispersal lane of this strip, which he placed under heavy fire. All three were were smoking as he passed over them and the turret gunner reported that they were burning fiercly shortly afterwards. He saw 6 SAP's apparently serviceable in the dispersal lane S of th e NW end of CYCLOPS in a wooded area, but was unable to strafe them as they were to the right of his line of flight. Lt.PALMER then followed Major BAIRD in the breakway to the East.

Lt.JORDAN was leader of the second flight. His flight path took him just south of HOLLANDIA STRIP, across the dispersal area at the south end. Here Lt.JORDAN strafed and dropped two clusters of parafrags into several parked t/e Bombers . Continueing the run, he strafed and bombed, with 10 clusters the dump area south of the center of SENTANI STRIP.On the way out to the coast, Lt.JORDAN strafed supplies Bordering the track and also dropped 4 more clusters of frags.

Lt.SELBY was Lt.JORDAN's right wingman and was in the last position on the right of the Squadron formation. He began his run over the target in the cleared area South of HOLLANDIA DROME gradually moving in towards the main strip. He strung six para-frag clusters starting at the SE end of this Strip extending through the cleared area into the woods, strafing all the time. He strafed intermittantly as he continued his run but saw no further targets until he neared the dispersa l area immediately S of the SE end of SENTANI. Here he spotted four 2/e Bombers which he strafed and bombed with 6 more clusters, however no visible results were apparent. During this time his navigator saw several medium bombers along the S side of the strip partially covered with camouflage materialand apparently serviceable. Closer inspection, however, revealed that mos t of these had already been severely damaged and were actually U/S. Lt.SELBY attempted to drop the remainder ofhis bombs in a string E of SENTANI but they hungup due to rack malfunction. He then followed his flight leader out over SENTANI LAKE.

Lt.RHODE flew in the No.3 position of the second flight. He strafed several planes parked along both sides of HOLLANDIA STRIP but 2 of these were burning and several were wrecked so he saved his bombs.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

He strafed and dropped 14 cl usters in the dispersal area at the E end of HOLLANDIA where several Lilly's and Tony's were parked. He was unable to release the remaining bombs because of a malfunction and had to salvo them. He continued strafing and concentrated most of his fire on planes parked at the W end of SENTANI STRIP. On the withdrawal he strafed villages and buildings but had no opportunity to strafe the supply areas.

Lt.IRISH in O16 was flight leader of the 3rd.Flight and was assigned the position on the North side of HOLLANDIA STRIP with instruction to hit anti-aircraft gun positions. The initial part of Lt.IRISH's run took him over the Northwest dispersal area. This area contained several enemy planes, so Lt.IRISH strafed and dropped 4 clusters of parafrags. His bullets from strafing guns were seen hitting the parked aircraft. Continuing on, Lt.IRISH strafed and bombed, with 12 clusters of parafrag the A/A position along the base of the ridge N of the runways. Sweeping on out to sea, he strafed supply dumps on track along the north shore of the eastern part of LAKE SENTANI. Two more clusters of frags were dropped also / Lt.IRISH dropped his remaining 4 clusters among supplys east of LAKE SENTANI and strafed on way out to the Coast/

Lt.GRAHAM was right wingman in the third flight. When the NW dispersal area was strafed, Lt.GRAHAM directed his fire at a Lily and saw smoke emitting from the plane as he flew nearer. After passing over the plane saw members in the rear of Lt. GRAHAM's plane saw flames rising from the same Lily, so this plane is claimed destroyed. Continuing his run, Lt.GRAHAM scattered 14 clusters of parafrags through machine gun installations, N of and parallel with HOLLANDIA STRIP. Lt.GRAHAM then strafed and bombed with 4 clusters of parafrags, a native villa ge 3000 feet North West of the West end of SENTANI STRIP, The remainder of the bomb load which consisted of 4 clusters were released on a known A/A position North of CYCLOPS STRIP, Lt.GRAHAM then strafed supply dump s on out to the coast.

Lt.Niles made his attack on Lt.IRISH's left wing. He was carrying para-demos and assigned to attack the A/A positions N of the target. He made his initial attack on 4 M/B in the extreme NW dispersal area of HOLLANDIA DROME. He strafed and dropped 6 parademos here. One Lilly was definitely damaged by the bombing. He strafed and dropped 12 parademos in a string starting at the A/A position on the ridge N of the W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP, and continuing through the reported medium positions at the foot of the next ridge

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He strafed this area as well. He dropped 6 parademos on the heavy A/A position on top of this ridge and heavily strafed it. He had no bombs left but he strafed intermittently toJAUTEFA BAY whereHhe strafed buildings on the Islands.

Lt.MacWILLIAMS flew number four position in the third flight on Lt.MILES left wing and was the outsede man in the Squadron "line abreast" formation. The first target in his line of flight was the extreme NW dispersal area of HOLLANDIA DROME in which he saw four 2 engine bombers. One of these three were apparently undamaged Lt.MacWILLIAMS dropped four parademo bombs at the group. Results were not observed but he was certain that if the planes were not destroyed they were severely damaged. He spotted the first heavy A/A position on the ridge N of the NW tip of HOLLANDIA DROME which he placedunder fire, releasing a string of 6 parademo's as he passed over it. These bombs were seen to butst along the top of the ridge but their effect on the position was not determined. He also saw the next heavy position clearly and attacked it with strafing guns and 4 parademo's. He then pulled up a bit and swung slightly to the north over the hills. He saw a truck and several piles of supplies in a valley approximately 3500 feet N of the NW end of CYCLOPS DRO ME at which he unloaded four more bombs. He then began to bear to the right toward SENTANI LAKE, releasing his last four bombs at several huts E of the SE end of CYCLOPS, before following the flight leader in the break away from the target.

b. A/A fire

Caliber: Heavy and medium.
Intensity; slight moderate and heavy.
Accuracy; accurate - inaccurate.
Altitude: Over the dromes heavy bursts observed behind the formation at 8000 feet. Probably from the heavy position located near the GARDEN between SENTANI and HOLLA NDIA DROMES since this was the only position actually observed firing.
Heavy A/A observed from 2 Gun Boats off Cape DJAR. Bursts on le vel at 3000 feet, behind and to left of formation.
Heavy A/A from N shore of HOLLANDIA BAY (Note: These positions possibly on 2 Islands in this area) and Cape SGEADJA. 10-12 bursts on level behind and to left of formation.
M/G fire moderate from PENINSULA at JAUTEFA BAY.

c. Fighter Cover reported as excellent.

d. Details of Damage to A/P's. in the air.

1. Damage to own Planes.

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Plane 015 which landed at SAIDOR had cylinder of left engine shot out, hole in left inboard wing tank, hole in wheel nacelle, hole in right engine cowling, rocker box shot off right engine, several holes in right wing several holes in Bomb-Bay doors, three large holes in left elevators 3 holes in right rudder and hydraulic lines severed.

Plane #47 had landing light shot out and various minor holes in wings and fuselage.
Other planes sustained minor damage from A/A fragments.

Nil E/A destroyed in air.

There was no injury to personnel of this squadron.

4. The crew of Major Baird's plane will be recommended for an appropriate award.

5. Tables

See Incl. #1.

6. Sightings

2 luggers in N part of JAUFETA BAY.
At least 10-12 planes burning on HOLLANDIA STRIP.
1 A/A position probably medium in cleared area S of SENTANI STRIP. Ammo dumps supplies and gas dumps, supplies and gas dumps throughout area between SENTANI LAKE and HUMBOLDT BAY. Sightings as reported in previous reports confirmed, these sightings were reported by first six planes and are as follows:
Fires and white smoke 5-600 feet on S shore of SENTANI LAKE, due south of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
Many huts built out in lake in inlet SE of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
2 burning M/B's on N side center of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
1 Nell observed in NW dispersal area HOLLANDIA STRIP.
Probable bomb dump just N of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
Large fire and smoke on W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
3 camouflaged M/B at 6242.
Several wrecked, camouflaged planes on S side of SENTANI STRIP. Several, silver, S/E fighters on S side of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
2 large fires, black smoke up to 2000 feet from area N of SENTANI STRIP (Seen after leaving Target).
Scattered supply and gas dumps (small) in wooded area N of E end of HOLLANDIA STRIP.
Several camouflage nets erected 1 mile E of E end of SENTANI STRIP. Unable to determine purpose.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Supplies between track and N shore of SENTANI LAKE at E end of Lake.
Estimated 500 gas and oil drums ½ mile inland from W side of Jautefa Bay.
Approximately 40 large boxes (size of B-25- Engine Crates) 3 miles E of E end of SENTANI LAKE on track running from HOLLANDIA Town to HOLLANDIA DROMES.

Possible radar station on hills W of HOLLANDIA TOWNSHIP.
CAMOUFLAGED VESSEL (Unknown Size) in S part of Jauteia Bay.
U/I plane exploded 1000 feet in air 11 miles east of CAPE DJAR.
P-38's strafing HOLLANDIA DROME.

7 Photo Interpretation

Photos: 16-0-390, 16-0-394, 16-0-395, Plane 015

Photos confirm crews report of flight line over dispersal area immediately N of W end of HOLLANDIA STRIP. Smoke allows only partial confirmation of bombing in area. However, many parafrags seen dropping among planes.

Photos: 8-0-141, 7-0-172.

Confirm crews report of flight line and accurate bombing in dispersal area N of E end of HOLLANDIA STRIP 4-5 planes reported here are partially hidden by trees. Photo 7-0171 shows one of camouflage nets refered to in "Sightings"

Photos: 6-0-123 6-0-37.

Confirm flight line but show little else besides underground shelters and two A/A guns with a possible range finder.

Pat E. Goforth

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: Incl. #1 - Tables.
Incl. #2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl. #3 - Route to and from Target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No. Bombs Car.	Weight	Type	No. Dropped Target	Returned	Sal.
015	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	22		
347	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	10		12
014	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	16	6	
019	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	8		14
340	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	12		10
591	22	69 lb.	Parafrags	22		8
TOTAL: ~~164~~ * 154		Dropped on Target		44 Salvoed	6 Returned	
016	22	100 lb.	Para Demo	22		
020	22	100 lb.	Para Demo	22		
164	22	100 lb.	Para Demo	22		

TOTAL: 66 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs dropped.

* Note: Plane #058 should be included in with 6 other planes, this plane's bombs are included in the total.
Carried 22 Parafrag Bombs 69 lbs. each and were all dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	No. Rds. Car'd.	No. Rds. Fired	Gun Fail	.30 Cal.
015	4200	2915	Nil	500
019	4200	1855	Nil	1200
020	4200	1855	Nil	1200
164	4200	1590	Nil	600
340	4200	2120	Nil	
591	4200	2650	Nil	1200
347	4200	1590	Nil	1200
058	4200	2915	Nil	
014	4200	2120	Nil	1200

TOTAL: 19610 X.50 Cal. 7100 X.30 Cal. Expended in Strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

Airplane No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude
019	K-21	30	Minimum
591	K-21	30	"
015	K-21	30	"
020	K-21	30	"

TOTAL: 120 K-21's.

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

FFO: 94-E
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
Altitude: Minimum
Time Over Target: 11:56/K
Order Over Target: 3rd
Photos Taken
3 April 1944

MAP REF: SHIP SIGHTINGS
MAP (Intelligence)



NOTE:

SHIPS #164, #020, #016, #[redacted]
DROPPED PARADEMOS
FIRST TWO RED DOTS DENOTE 1-100# DEMO PER DOT
THE THIRD DOT AND ALL OTHERS WERE 2 BOMBS PER DOT

SHIPS: #014, #015, #347, #591, #019, #340
DROPPED PARAFRAGS
FIRST TWO RED DOTS, DENOTE 1-CLUSTER PER DOT
THE THIRD DOT AND ALL OTHERS WERE
DOUBLE CLUSTERS PER DOT

MISSION NO. [redacted] DATE 3/4/44
SQUADRON NO. 44th GROUP 345th
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET 3rd
ALTITUDE MINIMUM FT.
TIME OVER TARGET 11:56/K
(BLUE) CREW OBSERVATION BOMBING EFFICIENCY
(RED) CREW REPORT OF BOMB HITS
(RED) BOMB HITS SHOWN ON PHOTOS
(BLUE) PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
(BLACK) OTHER PLANES. ALL PLANES TO BE SHOWN AT BEGINNING OF RUN

MAP REF:-
HOLLAND DROME AND
SENTANI DROME
SCALE: 1:20000 (APPROX)

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499
96-D
5 Apr 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
Office of the Intelligence Officer
APO. 713-1

5 April, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 96-D, performed 5 April 1944 by 9 planes of this Squadron. Objective: HUMBOLT BAY, NEW GUINEA (02°35' S., 140°50'E.)

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. OF S., A-2, A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929, A-2 V Bomber Command, APO. 713-1, Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1,

1. General

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike along the shore of HUMBOLT BAY, bombing and strafing supplies and shipping with particular emphasis placed on the procurement of low oblique photographs of the target.

Plan of Attack

9 planes of this Squadron were to participate in the strike in conjunction with three Squadrons of the 345th Group, and four Squadrons of the 38th Group. Take off was scheduled for 0828/K, and rendezvous with 345th and 38th Groups over MADZAB and the LEROMA RIVER 10 to 15 minutes later. Fighter Escort was to be picked up at GUSAP at 0915/K, after which the entire strike force was to proceed directly to the target. The 38th Group was assigned to lead the wing formation, and this Squadron was to fly number three position in the 345th Group formation. A high altitude attack on HOLLANDIA TOWNSHIP and adjacent areas was to be completed prior to the low level strike by medium bombardment. Upon reaching TAMI DROME, approximately 4 miles E of CAPE DJAR, three squadrons of this Group were to execute a 360° turn to the right, followed by an by an attack on the drome and coast line N to CAPE DJAR. At this point a 270° turn to the right was to be accomplished,

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and a second run made on the E shore of HUMBOLT BAY. This Squadron was to break away from the rest of the Group at the beginning of their first turn, following the 38th Group in a direct run on the S and W shores of HUMBOLT BAY, bombing, strafing and taking photos. Both Groups were to rallyover the water N and E of the target to re-form the wing for the return trip. A low level attack by light bombardment, on the same target was then to follow.

b. Rendezvous

Rendezvous accomplished with the 345th Group over NADZAB at 15[illegible]0 feet, the 38th Group overLE[illegible]NE RIVER at 200[illegible] feet, and with Fighter Escort over GUSAP at 3000 feet.

c. Attack

The wing formation reached the vicinity of HUMBOLT BAY accordin to plan, but about 15 miles E of the target the heavy bombardment strike was observed to be in progress. This Squadron consequently maintained position in the group formation to wa it for the completion of the high altitude attack. Flights were spaced at proper interval in trail and followed the third Squadron of the Group across TAMI DROME strafing the drome and coast to HUMBOLT BAY. The ridge E of the Bay was crossed and the assigned attack was then begun. 8 planes of this Squadron made the run in two-three plane an d one 2 plan e flights in trail at 30 second intervals, bombing, strafing and taking photographs of the shore of HUMBOLT BAY as ordered. Direct hits on WAAB VILLAGE completly demolished three huts and inflicted severe damage on others nearby. The N.W. half of the peninsula seperating HUMBOLT and JAUTEFA BAYS, including CAPE TJEWERI were bombed and strafed, but no specific results could be reported. Bombs were seen to la nd in TOBADI VILLAGE, but extent of damage was unknown. Huts, villages and piles of supplies along the W. coast of HUM OLT BAY from C[illegible] PI[illegible] TO CAPE JOGOEB,

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including KAMADI and EMTSJAU ISLAND, were bombed and strafed but again no definite results were discerned. Bombs were released at a lugger and several medium sized barges along the N. shore of CHALLENGER COVE which were believed to have caused considerable damage and destruction. 3 large barges and several smaller ones at the deep water docks on the E shore of IMBI BAY were bombed and strafed, as wasIMBI VILLAGE. Breakaway was made over the peninsula at the N end of HUMMOLT BAY.

d

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed

(1) Nil interception encountered.

(2) Nil allied aircraft observed lost.

(3) Nil enemy aircraft known to be destroyed on the ground on this mission.

e. Time and Location of:

Alert	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0750/K
Take-off	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0830/K
Squadron Ass.		Over NADZAB	0835/K
Group Rendz	:	Over LERONE RIVER	0840/K
Fighter Rendz.		Over MUSAU	0914/K
Attack	:	HUMBOLDT BAY	1156/K
f Landing	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	1450/K

f. Route Out: NADZAB - GUSAP - TARGET - AITAPE - BASE. -

2. Airplanes and Pilots Participating in the Attack :

The 498th Squadron was assigned to lead the 345th Group Formation. This Squadron flew in the number three position of the Group Formation and followed the trail squadron of the 38th Group over the target.

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Major J. B. BAIRD elected to lead this Squadron. Flights were as follows;

FIRST FLIGHT

Major J.B. BAIRD	A/P 058
2nd Lt. W.A. SELBY	A/P 037
2nd Lt. H.F. RHODE	A/P 347

SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT.	
1st Lt. T.R. [illegible]	A/P 591	2nd Lt. H.N.ALGER	A/P 016
2nd Lt. W.E. [illegible]	A/P 340	1st Lt. A.S.MILES	A/P 020
1st.Lt.J.H. [illegible]	A/P 164	2nd Lt. H.A.PALMER	A/P 014

Note :
Major BAIRD was forced to turn back at ANNABERG. Lt. SELBY then took the lead position in the Squadron, Lts. RHODE and PALMER moved into number two and three positions respectively in the first flight.

3. Details of the Mission:

A. Details of the Attack :

Lt. SELBY assumed the command of the Squadron Formation when Maj. BAIRD was forced to turn back because of engine and prop trouble. On reaching the vicinity of the target, the Group began circling to allow the B-24's to clear the target. For this reason Lieut. SELBY held his position instead of breaking off as planned. When the B-24's had cleared the target Lieut SELBY gave the signal for attack formation and after flights took up positions in trail, approached HOLLANDIA BAY from E to W. over TANAMERAH. Lieut. SELBY followed the No. 3 squadron of the Group across the drome strafing the drome and area to SUNTANI. He topped a ridge just S E of the bay and began the attack on the assigned target. Because of a malfunction he was unable to release his bombs. However he strafed throughout his run which is shown on the attached diagram.

Lt. RHODE made his run on Lieut. SELBY'S right wing and held this position throughout. He dropped one bomb at a pile of fuel drums near CapeTJOBERI. The bomb overshot and hit in the water. He continued his run and dropped 4 bombs on EMBI VILLAGE. He strafed supply and fuel dumps during the entire run.

Lt. PALMER was Lt. SELBY'S left wingman in the attack. As he topped the ridge S of the bay he saw a large cluster of huts at WAAB VILLAGE, all of which appeared in good condition. He strafed heavily and dropped 3 bombs in the

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VILLAGE, destroying three huts and causing extensive damage to others nearby. A large cloud of dirt and debris was seen in the air after the explosion. Lt PALMER then went over JAUTEFA BAY. He saw the large fires and huge column of smoke in the area E of JARREMOH HILL, and swung to the S of the hill to avoid it. As he broke out over CHALLENGER COVE he saw a lugger and several barges along the N shore. He at once opened fire on them and dropped 2 bombs as he passed over. He did not notice the results but reportedthat both bombs were well placed and believes considerable damage and destruction resulted. At this time he and the navigator both noticed a freighter estimated at 2,000 tons, near the stone jetty at HOLLAN DIA TOWNSHIP. He passed to the left of the 4 gun A/A position on the point at the W side of the mouth of IMBI BAY, noticing that it was firing steadily. The only burst that any of the crew saw, however, was one directly under the empennage of the plane as it passed over IMBI BAY. Shrapnel from this burst holed the tail in two places. Lt. PALMER next saw three large type barges estimated 100 feet in length, and several smaller barges and luggers around the deep water docks on the E shore of IMBI BAY and many piles of canvas covered supplies and boxes nearby. He placed the barges under heavy fire securing many hits but saw no other evidence of damage inflicted.

Lt. KELLEY led the second flight. His course brought him over the Peninsula between JAUTEFA and HUMBOLT BAYS. He strafed huts along the coast and dropped one bomb at piles of supplies on CAPE TJEMEMI, but was not able to observe any results. His second bomb went at the unnamed village 1 mile N of CAPE PIE and the third near the 6 gun position W of HAMADI ISLAND. He flew right through the smoke from the fire between JARREMOH HILL and the shore, emerging over CHALLENGER COVE. At this point he noticed the same 4 gun position mentioned above, firing consistantly, but none of the bursts came near his plane. As he neared the deep water docks he saw three very large barges close by. As the barges were slightly off his line of flight, Lt. KELLEY tried to throw his last two bombs at them but both fell short and burst in the water. He then led his flight across the peninsula and out over the water to rejoin the Squadron Formation.

Lieut. GRAHAM flew in the number two position on Lieut. KELLEY'S right wing. He made the greater part of his run over the water in order to give the K-17 camera the best coverage. He dropped one bomb on HAMADI ISLAND but a malfunction caused his remaining four bombs to release unarmed. He heavily strafed the docks and nearby barges on the E shore of IMBI BAY, after which the attack was broken off.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Lt. Mac WILLIAMS flew on Lt. KELLEY'S left wing throughout the mission. He released his first two bombs at some huts and piles of supplies on the peninsula between JAUTEFA and HUMBOLDT BAYS, but could not determine the damage caused. He crossed over the mouth of JAUTEFA BAY an d let two more bombs go at TOBADI VILLAGE, both of which were seen to land in the village, but the explosions were not observed. His last bomb was dropped near the 6 gun position inland from HAMADI ISLAND. He also flew throught the smoke from the large fire to the right of JARREMDH HILL, emerging over CHALLENGER COVE. Hithen noticed the 4 gun position at the point on the W side of the mouth of IMBI BAY firing at him. The bursts appeared to track his plane several bursting to the right and in front, on 2 others to the left and rear. One burst was within 50 feet of his right wing and another 25 feet off the left. The position fired at him only on approach, the last burst being considerably to the rear of the plane as he approached the p osition. He flew directly over the emplacement, strafing it but was not able to silence it. He also strafed the b arges at the deep water docks, before following Lt. KELLEY in the breakaway.

Lt. ALGER lead the third flight, which consisted of only two planes, since one of his wingmen filled the vacant space left when Major BAIRD dropped out of the formation. Lieut. ALGER followed Lieut. KELLEY'S flight at an interval of 30 seconds and strafed supplies and dumps to a point W of CA PE TJOBERI, where he dropped one bomb on a fuel dump. He observed a hugh fuel fire burning in this area between the hill and CAPE JOGOER. The dump he attacked was one of several scattered throughout this area. Continuing his run he dropped two bombs in the village on EMTSJAU ISLAND. He then attacked a group of 2 luggers and several nearby barges near the docks on the E side of IMBI BAY.

Lt. MILES made his attack on Lt. ALGER'S right wing, and dropped one bomb on an unnamed costal village S W of HAMADI ISLAN D. He dropped another bomb on huts near the 6 gun position W of HAMADI ISLAND and observed the position to be apparently deserted and demolished. He strafed throughout the dump area betw een CAPE JOGOER and CAPE TJOBERI. He turned right over the Bay and dropped three bombs on IMBI VILLAGE.

b. **Anti-Aircraft Fire:**

Calibre	:	Heavy and medium
Inten sity	:	Moderate
Accuracy	:	Accurate to inaccurate
Altitude	:	75 - 300 feet
Location	:	On point at mouth of IMBI BAY on E side.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. Fighter Cover :

Fighter escort provided by one Squadron of P'38's was reported by all crews as excellent throughout the mission.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air:

1 A/P 014 sistained two small holes, one in the left rudder and one in the horisontal stablizer as a result of A/A fragments. Nil other damage to our aircraft.

e. 2 Nil enemy A/P's shot out of air.

e. Nil injuries to personnel on this mission.

4. Recommendations for Awards:

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendations for awards will be submitted a s a result of this mission.

5. Tables:

See incl. # 1.

6. Sightings :

Possible emergency strip 5 miles south east of JAUTEFA BAY. It was grass covered and marked by cloth strips. Pile of fuel drums 50 yards long, piled 3 deep on tip of CAPE TJEWERI. Nearby stores piled under trees.
Small fire from the vicinity of the 6 gun position near HAMADI ISLAND. A/A position appeared to be deserted.
Large fire, with flames up to 300 feet, black smoke up to 5 or 6,000 feet, with intermittend explosions, between JARREMOH HILL and W shore of HUMBOLDT BAY. Several smaller fires observed in this vicinity. Smoke visible 30 minutes after leaving target. 3 camouflaged pits, possibly gun positions deserted near shore E of JARREMOH HILL.
Good sized M/V possibly 2,000 tons at Stone Jetty, west end of CHALLENGER COVE.
Deep water dock at IMBI appeared newly constructed.
Suppl ies and canvas covered boxes near deep water docks, on wi th-drawl, small fire on CAPE PIE.
Oil fire at AITAPE: fire 10 miles north west of HUT.
Fire on KAIRIRU ISLAND.

7. Photo Interpretation:

Photographs of this mission not received at time of submitting this report

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

Pat E Gofurth
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl: 1 Tables.
2 Bomb Assessment Chart.
3 Route to and from Target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of A-2.
1 copy A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force APO. 929.
2 copies A-2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO. 713-1.
1 copy Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group APO. 713-1
1 copy File.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

*** BOMBING TABLE ***

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Height	No. Dropped on Target	
097	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	Nil	Rack malfunction
347	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
014	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
591	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
340	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	(4 bombs dropped safe due to rack malfunction)
164	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
016	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
020	5	8/11	Min. Alt.	5	
TOTAL:	35 x 500 lb. 8/11 sec delay bombs dropped. 5 returned to Base.				

***STRAFIN TABLE ***

A/P	No. Rds. Car'd.	No. Rds. Fired	Gun Failures	.30 Cal.
097	4200	1060	Nil	
347	4200	1690	Nil	
591	4200	213	Nil	500
340	4200	2120	Nil	
164	4200	2385	Nil	200
016	4200	795	Nil	
020	4200	1325	Nil	
014	4200	2120	Nil	200
TOTAL:		13,515 x 50 cal.	700 x .30 Cal.	

*** PHOTO TABLE ***

A/P	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude	Remarks
591	K-20	0	Min.	Half.
	K-21	30	Min.	
164	K-21	30	Min.	
340	K-17	97	Min.	Half.
014	K-21	0		Half.
016	K-20	0		
TOTAL :	60 K-21's	97 K-21's.	5 K-20's	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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

FFO: 96-D

345th Bomb Group	499th Bomb Group
Time Over Target	11:56/K
Order Over Target	Followed the 38th BombGp
Altitude:	Mimimum
Photos Taken	5 April 1944

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

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HOLLANDIA TOWN
JETTY
HOLLANDIA BAY
MADOER
HAMADI ISLAND
VILLAGE
TOBADI
CAPE PIE
CAPE TJEHEK
ENGROS
PIM JETTY
VILLAGE

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

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HAMADI ISLAND

VILLAGE

HUMBOLDT BAY

TOBADI

CAPE PIE

CAPE TJEIVER

ENGROS

Full Copy
5/7/97
Foo

JAUTEFA BAY

169 Ord

K-17

2nd FLIGHT

LLAGE

JETTYS

WAAB 3rd FLIGHT

1st FLIGHT

HOLLANDIA TOWNSHIP
AREA

V BOMBER COMMAND

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/97

499
99-D
8 Apr 44

SECRET

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
APO 713-1.

ejc

9 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission APO 99-D, performed by 8 planes of the 499th Squadron on 8 April, 1944. Objective at BRANDI PLANTATION, WEWAK, NEW GUINEA (03°37' S. - 143°42'E).

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. OF S., A-2, A-2 Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General.

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike on HOLLANDIA, with BRANDI PLANTATION as a secondary target. The attack on the secondary target in conjuction with 2 Squadrons of the 345th Group and 4 Squadrons of the 38th Group, was to be made from minumun altitude with 300 lb. 8/11 sec delay demolition bombs and strafing guns on supplies and personnel in the South half of BRANDI PLANTATION. The 38th Group was assigned the lead of the wing formation and this Squadron to fly number three position in the 345th Group.

b. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous accomplished with the wing formation over the LEROWE RIVER at 2000 feet and with Fighter Escort over ANNANBERG at 2500 feet.

c. Attack.

The 8 planes of this Squadron followed the Group formation to BRANDI PLANTATION, the secondary target, after bad weather prevented reaching HOLLANDIA, the primary target. The attack was made at minimun altitude by flights in trail

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

at 30 second intervals, our headings of 330° and 340° and 360 . In spite of rain and poor visibility each flight made one pass over the target ar ordered, bombing and strafing wi th excellent results. A total of 44 x 300 lb 8/11 sec delay demolition bombs were dropped, of which 95% were reported in the target and the remainder in closely adjacent areas. The target, BRANDI PLAN TATION N of the M/T rpad and the E coastline of CAPE MOEM were heavily strafed with a total of 12,435 x .50 and 800x.30 cal.ammunition. 1 large fuel fire started immediately after bomb bursts sending grey-black smoke up to 1000 feet. several smaller fires were started also and were burning throughout the plantation after the attack. 1 small fire in MUM PLAN TAT ON on the tip of CAPE MOEM resulted from strafing.
Withdrawal was made over water N and E of CAPE MOEM.

d. Interception and Aircraft Destroyed.

1. Nil interception encountered on this mission.
2. Nil enemy airplanes destroyed in the air on on the ground by this Squadron.

e. Time and Location of:

ALERT:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0805/A
Take Off	Strip 3 NADZAB	0837/K
Rendezvous	Group over LERONE RIVER	0857/K
	Fighter Escort; ANNA.BERG	0950/K
Attack	BRANDI PLANTATION	1055/K
Landing	Strip 3 NADZAB	1250/A

f. Route

NADZAB - LERONE RIVER - ANNAMBERG, - POIN. S O. TADJI - SEC NDARY TARGET - GUSA. - NADZA.

2. Planes and Pilots in the Attack.

a. The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation. ajor J.B.BAIRD elected to lead this Squadron which was third in the sequence, of the attack.

b. lanes and Pilots .

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The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation. Major Julian B. Baird elected to lead this Squadron which was third in the sequence of attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Maj. J. B. Baird	A/P	058
1st Lt. H. M. Slinay	"	322
2nd Lt. HF Rhode	"	347

SECOND FLIGHT

1st Lt. T. R. Kelley	A/P	087
1st Lt. R. W. Spear	"	019
2nd.Lt. W.W. Graham	"	379

THIRD FLIGHT

2nd Lt. H. N. Alger	A/P	340
1st Lt. J. H. MacWilliams	"	014
1st Lt. A. S. Niles	"	020

NOTE: Lt. Mac Williams was forced to turn back shortly after take-off due to serious leak in main gas tank.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of the attack.

Maj. Baird led the first flight with Lt. Slinay and Lt. Rhode in number two and three positions respectively. He led the Squadron in the approach from N to E over the water, making a wide circle to the right to allow flights to space themselves at proper interval. He began his run from a point SE of the target but was forced to pull up and make a 360 deg. turn to the left when a flight of B-25's from another squadron crossed the target in front of him. He executed this turn in a valley S of the target and then proceeded to make his pass in a Northwesterly direction across the target. He was unable to release any bombs but strafed heavily across BRANDI PLANTATION and continued strafing the length of CAPE MOEM, breaking away to the right over the water. He then re-formed the Squadron and returned to base without further incident. Lt. Slinay, who flew on Mar. Baird's right wing, crossed the N part of the plantation. He strafedh heavily throughout his run but saw only bomb craters and stripped palm trees in his line of flight so did not release any bombs. Lt. Rhode, the left wingman strung 8 bombs across the target at several already damaged huts and possible stores. He also strafed CAPE MOEM.

Lt. Kelley led the second flight on the mission with Lt. Spear on his right wing and Lt. Graham on his left. He also led his flight across the target toward the NW but at a slightly greater angle than the first flight. He dropped his 8 bombs in a string through the target, strafing continually and breaking away over the water E of CAPE MOEM. Lt. Spear also released his bombs in the assigned area, staying close to Lt. Kelley during the run. Lt. Graham carried only 4 bombs in his plane but reported that all went in the target. His strafing guns were in action during the entire period of the attack.

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Lt. Alger was the leader of the third flight with Lt. Miles on his left wing. He crossed the target from SW to NE, unloading 8 bombs on the target fro in train across the assigned area and strafing heavily throughout the run. Lt. Miles also laid his bombs across the target causing a large fire. He reported that it flared up immediately and later sent a column of grey-black smoke to 2000 feet.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire.
Nil A/A fire encountered

c. Fighter Cover.
Fighter Escort provided by one Squadron of P-38's was reported as excellent by the crews in spite of bad weather.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.
1. Nil damage to own aircraft.
2. Nil enemy planes observed shot down.

e. Nil injuries sustained by personnel on this mission.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS.
In view of the information currently at hand, no recommendations for awards will be submitted.

5. TABLES.

BOMBING TABLE

A/C	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target
819	8	500# G/P	Min. Alt.	8
820	8	"	"	"
838	8	"	"	All returned to base--Malfunction
827	8	"	"	8
840	8	"	"	8
847	8	"	"	"
878	4	"	"	4
888	4	"	"	All returned to base-Pilot error

TOTAL 56 carried. 44 dropped on target. 12 returned to base. Total expended 44

STRAFING TABLE
(Next Page)

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STRAFING TABLE

A/C	No. Hits. Gas'd	Rds Exp. Fired	Gun Failures	.50 Fired
819	4200	2000	Nil	800
820	"	1500	"	Nil
821	"	1325	"	"
827	"	1825	"	200
810	"	1000	"	200
847	"	1100	"	Nil
879	9000	1800	"	"
881	"	1000	"	"

TOTAL 13,325 X .50 rnds expended in strafing. 400 X .30 expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/C	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude Minimum	Remarks
819	K-21	20	"	
820	K-21	20	"	
821	K-20	27	"	
827	"	14	"	
881	"	18	"	

8. SIGHTINGS.

Garden areas near Momak and Borem Dromes appeared larger and more regular than on missions in the past. Gardens very well kept. New gardens have appeared.

5 trucks (1½ton type) along road in N. dispersal area of Borem Drome.

Bomb craters observed throughout Brandi Plantation.

2 barges beached on E. Coast of Cape Moemi Serviceability doubtful.

3 luggers in Bay E. of Cape Warbu, on Munchu Island. 1 lugger definitely U/S, 1 possibly serviceable and 1 freshly camouflaged. Foliage still green.

Damaged huts containing piles of boxes in S. half of Brandi Plantation.

Bridge across Brandi River appeared in good condition.

A/A position on W side of CAPE MOEMI observed and appeared deserted.

Scattered fuel drums seen in E. half plantation.

1 large building in center of the S. half BRANDI PLANTATION--still intact.

Crashed S/E F, silver, in large Kunai patch between C/ SAMBIN AND CAPE WARBU on S. side MUNCHU ISLAND.

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7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photos 58, 67, 91-94 ; A/P 058 show sections of coastal road to be in fair condition. Damaged huts in area E. of BRANDI PLANTATION. Water-filled bomb craters visible in the plantation.

Photos 135; A/P 340 shows thin smoke over N tip of CAPE MOEM.

Photo 136;A/P 340 shows several small barges, apparently serviceable on the E. side of the neck of CAPE MOEM.

Photos 105 and 106 from A/P 340 confirm crews report of fires in target.

For the Squadron Commander.

Pat R. Gofforth
PAT R. GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:
Incl. #1 - Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl. #2 - Route to and from Target Overlay.

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

345th Bomb Gp. FFO; 99-D
TIME OVER TARGET: 10:55/K
ORDER OVER TARGET 3rd
ALTITUDE: MINIMUM
PHOT: TAKEN ON ATTACK
8/4/44

MAP REF; SHIP SIGHTINS
MAP (INTELLIGENC No 16



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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
100-G
9 Army

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ejc.
APO 713-1.

10 April, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 100-G, performed on the 9th of April '44, by 9 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective: - At AITAPE, NEW GUINEA (03°10'S., 142°20'E.).

TO : Commanding General, Fifthe Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. OF S., A-2 Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO. 929. A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1. Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

1. General.

a. The purpose of this mission was to attack supply and personnel areas in the vicinity of AITAPE and TADJI, on the N coast of NEW GUINEA. The 345th Group led by this Squadron, was to conduct the strike in conjunction with the 38th Group. ST ANNA MISSION and the area immediately adjacent thereto was designated as the specific target for this Squadron, to be attacked with 6x500 lb instantaneous demolition bombs per plane, from medium altitude.

b. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous with the 345th Group over the LERONE RIVER, with the 38th Group enroute to GUSAP, and with the Fighter Escort at ANNANBERG.

c. Attack.

9 planes of this Squadron carried out the attack as ordered, bombing ST ANNA MISSION and the immediate vicinity from 4,000 feet on a heading of 290° at 200 M.P.H., I.A.S. Formation over the target consisted of three flights of 3 planes "V" 1's in close trail, javelin down. Bombing was good with a total of 29x500 lb. instantaneous demolition bombs in the

in the target, starting two large fires. The resulting column of greyish smoke from buildings and possible supplies ros e to 800-1000 feet. The fires were plainly visible 30 minutes after the attack from the planes, which were circling N of the target to gain altitude. 18 x 500 lb bombs were dropped approximately 1,000 yards W of ST ANNA MISSION when a malfunction of an intervalometer delayed the release of our flight. A small fire was started in this area, which was seen to burn almost 20 minutes. Following the attack, considerable difficulty was experinced breaking through bad weather for the return to the base. One flight became seperated from the rest of the Squadron and broke out of the weather at MUSCHU ISLAND. This Island was consequently strafed, particularly an unnamed village on the S E corner, from minium altitude. No specific results could be determined, however.

d. Interception and Aircraft Destroyed.

1. Nil interception encountered.
2. Nil allied aircraft observed lost.
3. Nil enemy aircraft observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

e. Time and Location of.

Alert	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0300/K
Take-Off	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0841/K
Group Rendezvous	:	LEROME RIVER	0907/K
Fighter Rendezvous	:	ANNANBERG	1000/K
Attack	:	ST ANNA MISSION	1104/K
Landing	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	1415/K

f. Route.

NADZAB - ANNANBERG - TARGET - GUSAP - NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating

This Squadron, led by Major J.B. BAIRD, was selected to lead the Group Formation. Flights were as follows;

FIRST FLIGHT

Major J. B. BAIRD	A/P 410
2nd Lt. W. A. SEBBY	A/P 340
2nd Lt. A. K. PALMER	A/P 014

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SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
1st LT. T.R. KELLEY	A/P 379	1st LT. J.W. IRISH	A/P 249
1st LT. H.W. SPEAR	A/P 019	1st LT. E.R. SLINEY	A/P 058
2nd LT. W.W. GRAHAM	A/P 097	1st LT. J.H. MacWILLIAMS	A/P 020

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the Attack.

Major BAIRD led the first flight on the mission with Lt. SELBY on his right wing and Lt. PALMER on his left. He made his approach from SE to NW and brought the Squadron across the target at 4000 feet altitued on a course of 290° at 200 MPH, IAS. All 18 bombs of this flight were seen to drop directly in the target area. Major BAIRD then swung to the right over the water and attempted to find a hole in the surrounding clouds, which were towering to 17,000 feet, through which the formation could be led. One was found at 14,000 feet, although it closed in so rapidly that part of the formation became separated. With the remainder of the Squadron, Major BAIRD then picked his way around the thunderheads, returning to this base without incident.

Lt. T.R. KELLEY was the leader of the second flight with Lts'. Spear and GRAHAM in number two and three positions respectfully. He followed the first flight in close trail across the target, but for an undetermined reason was not able to drop bombs at the proper release point. After attempting to signal this fact to the wingman without success, the bombardier continued to work the switches and the bombs finally fell. Bothewingmen unloaded their bombs at the same time and the 18 bombs dropped in a pattern approximately 1000 yards W of the mission. Lt. KELLEY followed Major BAIRD in the breakaway and climb, but became separated in the weather at 14000 feet. He decided to try to return below the clouds and began a ~~gradual~~ let-down shortly thereafter. He broke out over the weather heading E and directly W of MUSCHU ISLAND. He led his flight on a cross the island at minium altitude, strafing intermittantly to keep down possible ground fire, concentrating particularly on an unnamed village on the SE corner.

Lt. IRISH led the third flight with Lt. SLINEY as his right wingman and Lt. MacWILLIAMS ON the left. He also followed in close trail over, but found that his bombs would not release. He and the bombardier quickly signaled to the wingmen, who then dropped on the lead flight. The 11 bombs dropped ~~on~~ by

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CONFI

this flight were observed to supplement the pattern of the first flight's bombs across the target. Lt IRISH , although with some difficulty, followed Major BAIRD back to the base without further incident.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire.

Nil A/A over target. Flight which strafed MUSCHU ISLAND received slight inaccurate 20 m m fire from the vicinity of the Japanese Encampment on the inlet at the W side of the Island. Tracers were observed considerably in the front of the formation and small bursts were seen giving the appearance of 20 m m shells bursting at extreme range.

c. Fighter Cover

Fighter escort, provided b one Squadron of P-47's was reported as excellent up to the target. They were not seen thereafter probably due to weather conditions.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air

1. Nil damage to our aircraft
2. Nil enemy aircraft observed shot down.

e Nil injuries sustained by personnel .

4. Recommendations for Awards.

In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for awards will be submitted as a result of this mission.

5. Tables.

See incl. # 1.

6. Sightings.

Bombing around Tadji Dromes appeared excellent. One fire in ST. ANNA MISSION was observed closely and seen to originate froma large white topped building. The other fire originated from a wooded area on the NW edge of the mission site.
Strips at TARJI were cratered by bombs.
2 U/S S/F on S side of the main runway at TADJI.

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1 small fire at mouth of RAIHU RIVER on N shore.
Fire in BRANDI PLANTATION and from CAPE MOEM burning at 1230/K.
Considerable amount of debris in water 1 mile N. CAPE BORAM
2 oil slicks just E of RAIHU RIVER mouth.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photos 6-V-105 - 6-V-108, Planes 014, confirm crews report of flight line. They show bombs bursting along N. side of assigned target, near ST. ANNA MISSION. Nil stores visible. Covered bridge over SAINT ANNA CREEK.
Photos 4-V-65 --- 4-V-68, plane 080 and photos 3-V-49 -- 3-V-50 confirm crews report of bombs from 3 planes over shooting target when malfunction of lead plane caused delay in release. Bombs bursting in swamp Forest at extreme W edge of ST. ANNA PLANTATION.
Nil enemy activity shown.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

Pat E Goforth jest
PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl: 1. Tables.
2. Bomb Assessment Chart .
3. Route to and from Target.

DISTRIBUTION;

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ATTENTION OF: A.C. of A.- 2.
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APO. 713-1
1 copy File.

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*** BOMBING TABLE ***

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Targets
410	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6
348	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6
014	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6
379	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6 (W of MISSION)
019	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6 (W of MISSION)
097	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6 (W. of MISSION)
249	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6 (6 bombs rpt. to Sand Hill.)
058	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5
020	6	Inst. Demo	500 lb.	6

TOTAL : 81 x500 lbs. dropped on target
18 x 500 lbs. dropped 1,000 yards W of target.(ST. ANNA MISSION)

*** STRAFIN TABLE ***

A/P	No. Rds. Carr'd.	No. Rds Fired	Gun Failure
097	4200	1590	Nil.
379	4200	1060	Nil.
019	4200	2585	Nil.

TOTAL: 5,035 x .50 cal. expended .
Only 1 flight (no.2) strafed Musshu Island.

*** PHOTO TABLE ***

A/P	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude
014	K-21	30	4,500 ft.
058	K-21	30	4,000 ft.
020	K-21	30	4,000 ft.

TOTAL: 90 exposures taken.

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

FFO 100-G April 9, 1944.
499th Bomb. Sqdn., 345th Bomb. Group
Time over target: 1104/K
Altitude : 4.000 feet.
Took Photos

Map Ref: Ship Sightings:
Map (Intelligence No. 168)

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

FFO. 100-G April 9, 1944
499th Squadron 345th

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By RAB/IM NARA, Date 4/22/97

499
103-D
12 Apr 44 ARR

SECRET

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
APO 713-1

13 April, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 103-D, performed 12 April, 1944 by 9 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at HOLLANDIA DROME, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attn of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General.

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike, in conjunction with twoother squadrons of the 345th Group and four squadrons of the 38th Group, on personnel and supply areas North of the center of the old strip at HOLLANDIA Drome. The attack was to be made at medium altitude (8000 - 10000 feet) with 5 x 500 lb instantaneous fused demolition bombs per plane.

b. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous accomplished with other two squadrons of 345th Group East of LERONE RIVER, with 38th Group just West of LERONE RIVER, and with fighter escort at ANNANBERG.

c. Attack.

Nine planes of the 499th Squadron followed the 500th Squadron in the attack on the assigned objective, personnel and supply area N of center of old HOLLANDIA strip. The bomb run was made at 8000 feet on a heading of 340° at 200 mph IAS. from a point S of Drome. Formation consisted of three 3 plane "V"'s stacked down in trail. Bombing was excellent with 42 out of 44 x 500 lb bombs in the target. Direct hits were scored on two houses by bombs of lead ship. The remainder of the squadron's bombs covered target thoroughly, blanketing it with smoke and dust. Extent of damage was not ascertained due to this factor. Breakaway was made to the N over CYCLOPS MOUNTAINS to the sea; thence to wing rally point near mouth of TAMI RIVER.

SECRET

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d. Interception and Aircraft Destroyed.

1. Nil interception encountered.
2. Nil Allied A/P's observed lost.
3. Nil enemy aircraft known to be destroyed in air or on ground.

e. Time and Location of:

ALERT:	Strip 3 MADZAB	0855/K
Take Off	Strip 3 MADZAB	0930/K
Wing Rendesvous:	LEROME RIVER	0945/K
Fighter Rendesvous:	ANNEMBERG	1040/K
Attack	HOLLANDIA	1214/K
Landing	Strip 3 MADZAB	1515/K

f. Route

MADZAB - LEROME RIVER - ANNAMBERG - TARGET - GUSAP - MADZAB.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating in the Attack.

The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group on this mission. This squadron was second in sequence of attack, led by Maj J. B. Baird. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Maj J. B. Baird	A/P 165
1st Lt A. L. Miles	" 020
1st Lt E. M. Sliney	" 016

SECOND FLIGHT

Capt W. M. Parks	A/P 249
2nd Lt H. K. Palmer	" 014
2nd Lt H. F. Rhode	" 347

THIRD FLIGHT

1st Lt H. N. Alger	A/P 374
1st Lt J. H. MacWilliams	" 379
1st Lt W. W. Graham	" 340

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of the Attack

Maj J. B. Baird led the first flight with Lt Miles on his right wing and Lt. Sliney on his left. He made his approach from the SW over land, spacing the squadron approximately 30 seconds behind the lead squadron of the formation. Swinging to the left at a point slightly S of HOLLANDIA Drome he brought the squadron in on the bomb run at 8000 feet on a course of 340° at 200 mph IAS. Maj Baird observed his bombs

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

to score direct hits on two houses in the S part of the target and the remainder of the squadrons bombs to form a pattern completely blanketing the target with smoke and dust. Immediately after the bomb release he began to take evasive action to avoid the heavy A/A which was bursting around the formation. He made a slight turn to the right then swung back to the left as he neared the peaks of the CYCLOPS RANGE. Shortly thereafter he led the squadron to the right through a hole in the clouds over the mountains and down to the ocean. He rejoined the Group near the mouth of the TAMI RIVER and proceeded back to base without further incident.

Capt W. N. Parmeled the second flight with Lts Palmer and Rhode in number two and three positions respectively. As he followed the first flight in close trail throughout the mission his actions closely emulated those of the squadron leader's.

Lt H. M. Alger was the leader of the third flight with Lt MacWilliams as his right wingman and Lt Graham as his left. He also followed in close trail so his actions were very similar to Maj Baird's.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

Calibre: Heavy and medium
Intensity: Slight
Accuracy: Inaccurate
Altitude: 8000 feet

A/A was reported correct as to altitude but wide on all sides, with the majority of the 20 to 25 observed bursts to the rear of the formation. Two crews reported hearing one burst but none were actually felt. Only one white puff, considerably below the squadron, was seen, and was thought to be medium A/A exploding at extreme range. Two flashes were observed from the known heavy position on the ridge N of the W end of HOLLANDIA strip. Flashes also observed from what was believed to be 2 heavy positions on ridge NW of HOLLANDIA Drome and E of the Japanese encampment area. Exact locations, however, could not be pinpointed.

c. Fighter Cover

Fighter escort, provided by one squadron of P-38's, was reported by all crews as excellent, remaining with the formation from the time of rendesvous throughout the entire mission.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.
(1) Nil damage to own aircraft.
(2) Nil enemy aircraft shot down by this squadron.

e. Nil injuries sustained by personnel on this mission.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS.

In view of the information currently at hand, no recommendations for awards will be submitted.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

5. TABLES.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No Dropped on Target
165	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
020	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
016	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
249	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
014	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
347	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
374	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5
379	4	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	2 (2 dropped safe)
340	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb	5

TOTAL - 42 x 500 lb bombs dropped on target.
2 x 500 lb bombs dropped safe due to rack malfunctn.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	No Exposures	Altitude
165	(K-20	50	8000 ft
	(K-21	30	8000 ft
374	K-20	12	8000 ft
249	K-20	14	8000 ft
014	K-21	15	8000 ft
016	K-21	30	8000 ft
020	K-21	30	8000 ft

6. SIGHTINGS.

Bombs of another squadron bursting along ridge approximately 1000 yards N of W end of HOLLANDIA strips, possibly covering the heavy A/A position.

1 small fire from area 1000 feet S of the new HOLLANDIA strip.

Several SSF's in extreme NW dispersal area at HOLLANDIA Drome, serviceability undetermined.

1 2/E M/B, silver, in dispersal area N of W end SENTANI strip, probably serviceable.

Reddish smoke, thin, up to 5000 feet from tip of CAPE SOEDJA.

Layer of smoke over HOLLANDIA Drome at 5000 feet, probably result of preceding heavy bombardment attack.

3 large sized barges on E side of bay at WANILO.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photo #5-V-61: First bomb from lead ship shown clearly, bursting at S end of target.

Photo #5-V-62: Second bomb of lead ship bursting in road at corner of large building in S part of target.

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Photo #5-V-63: Pattern of bombs beginning to form in S third of target. One burst seen near cluster of buildings in center of target.

Photos #3-V-39 and 3-V-40 501st squadron photos: Large cloud of bomb smoke and dust from this squadron's bombs beginning at S end of target extending along W side of road through to center of target.

For the Squadron Commander:

Pat E. Gofurth

PAT E. GOFORTH,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer

Incls:
Incl 1 - Overlay of Target Area.
Incl 2 - Overlay showing route of squadrons.

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By RLB/IMM NARA, Date 5/20/97



LEGEND

References: Ship Sightings Map (Intell. No. 168)
Squadron: 499th Bomb Sq., 345th Bomb Gp.
FFO: 103 D , 12 April, 1944.
Squadron order over target: 2nd.
Altitude: 8,000 feet.
Time over target: 1214/K
Took Photos.
Bomb Hits: Fires: Explosions:

A-2 FIFTH BOMBER COMMAND

TARGET INFORMATION MEMORANDUM.

TO:

DATE:

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

HOLLANDIA



499th SQUADRON
FFO 103 - D 12 April 44
Order over Target: #2
TOT: 1214/K
Alt. 8000 ft
T Took Photos
Fires
Explosions

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
106
15 Apr 4

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

16 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 106-1, performed 15 April, 1944 by 9 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at TUMLEO ISLAND (03°05'S; 142°25' E.) near TADJI, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attn of: A.C. of S, A-2.

1. General.

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike on the TADJI Area in conjunction with the 500th and 501st Sqdns., of the 345th Group. A bombing attack was to be made on stores and personnel on TUMLEO, ARI and SELO ISLANDS from medium altitude with 4 to 6 x 500 lb. instantaneous demolition bombs per plane, this Squadrons assigned target being TUMLEO ISLAND. Following the bombing attack a strafing run was to be made on the N. coast of NEW GUINEA between AITAPE AND TADJI with particular emphasis placed

b on obtaining low oblique photos of their coastline.

b. Rendesvous.
Rendesvous accomplished with 2 Squadrons of the 345th Group over MADZAB and with Fighter escort over ANNENBERG.

c. Attack.
9 planes of this Squadron reached the target and carried out the assigned attack. This bombing run on TUMLEO ISLAND was made on a heading of 325° from 4000 feet at 200 mph IAS. Bombing was excellent with 39 out of 47 x 500 lb instantaneous demolition bombs on the target. 6 went in the water. The lead plane of the second flight, unable to release all bombs on the first pass, made a second run over the target, dropping the last 2 bombs short of the target. 1 building was definately destroyed and several others badly damaged by near misses. One plane dropped a bomb S of ACONCHA VILLAGE during the strafing run which started a large fire. The strafing run was made at 50 - 150 feet from NW to SE along the coast between AITAPE and the mouth of the NIGIA RIVER. Photos of the shoreline were

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taken as ordered and the entire area was thoroughly strafed, setting several native huts on fire.

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed

1. Nil interception encountered.
2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.
3. Nil enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground or in the air on this mission.

e. Time and Location of:

ALERT	Strip 3, NADZAB	0730/K
Take Off	Strip 3, NADZAB	0805/K
Group Rendezvous	Enroute to GUSAP	
Fighter Rendezvous	ANNANBERG	0920/K
Attack	TADJI AREA	1020/K-1030/K
Landing	Strip 3, NADZAB	1252/K

f. Route.
NADZAB - ANNANBERG - TARGET - point near mouth of SE IK RIVER - GUSAP - NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating in the Attack :
This Squadron was number one in the Group Formation followed by the 500 and the 501st Squadrons. Major J.B.BAIRD was the Squadron and Group formation leader on the Mission. Flights were as follows

FIRST FLIGHT

Maj. J.B.BAIRD	A/P 382
1st Lt. E.M.SLINEY	A/P 591
2nd Lt. H.F.RHODE	A/P 347

SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Capt. P. GATH	A/P 374	1st Lt. T.R.KELLEY	A/P 185
2nd Lt. H.E.SUMMERS	A/P 016	1st Lt. R.N.SPEAR	A/P 249
1st Lt. E.H.MacWILLIAMS	A/P 080	2nd Lt. W.A.SHELLY	A/P 340

3. Details of the Mission;
a.
a. Details of the Attack;
Major BAIRD led the Squadron and Group formation to a point 15 miles S of BUT DROME where he crossed the mountains and skirted the N edge of the mountaint to a point [illegible] of

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TADJI where squadrons broke off for runs over assigned targets. Major BAIRD led the squadron on a run from S to N over TULEGO ISLAND at 5,350 feet indicated altitude. He made an excellent bomb run and the bombardier released his bombs accurately on the SE part of the ISLAND. The indicator lights showed all bombs out so the bombardier closed the bomb bay doors and gave Major BAIRD a signal to turn. Major BAIRD led the flight on a wide circle to the west and slow decent in order to prevent fogging of the camera lenses. After losing altitude he began the strafing and photo run at 100 feet and 200 mph IAS. He made an excellent run over the coastal area between the RAIHU RIVER and DRILIP CREEK. As planned his gunner tripped the camera switch at the RAIHU RIVER and allowed the entire roll of film to be exposed. During the strafing run, Major BAIRD pull ed up in order to start another strafing run and in so doing a bomb crashed through the bomb bay doors and exploded just S of ACONCHA VILLAGE and started a good sized fire. (It was later found that the bomb released armed but tangled with a bomb hoist cable which had been inadvertantly misplaced. Because of the safety device the bomb did not explode until after leaving the bomb bay and allowing the propeller arming device to rotate. Major BAIRD continued the run to a point E of the DRILIP CREEK and broke off the attack. He then turned left and made one wide climbin 360° turn at a moderate speed allowing the Squadron and Group to assemble. Five minutes after the initial attack the Group was on course to the base and pulling into formation

Lt. SLINEY flew number two on Major BAIRD throughout the bombing and strafing run. He released his bombs on the lead ship with all bombs bursting in the same area as the lead ship. He notified the gunner to start the camera roll ing 25 seconds after crossing the RAIHU RIVER as planned - thus giving an overlap in order to cover the assigned 3 miles of coastline. He strafed hut and coconut grove accurately and heavily, which resulted in setting fire to a native building.

Lt. RHODE flew in the number three position of the first flight. His bombs dropped accurately in the target with those of the other two planes. As planned he notified the gunner to switch on the camera 15 seconds after crossing the RAIHU RIVER. He strafed throughout the run, which was almost directly over the coastline, with no visible results

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Capt P. GATH led the second flight. He followed Major BAIRD in the bomb run but was able to release only 4 of the 6 bombs carried on this pass. He reported that the Squadron's bombs formed a pattern beginning at the water's edge covering the S portion of TUNLEO ISLAND. He saw one building demolished by a direct hit and others damaged by many near misses. He broke out of formation after the initial run and led his flight in a tight 360° turn to drop his other 4 bombs at the same target. Both of these, however, he believed fell short of the ISLAND. He was able to take onto the third flight for the strafing and photo run, following them at a considerable interval. He strafed buildings and huts all along the shore from AITAPE to NIGA RIVER . He followed the third flight in the breakaway and assumed his proper position in the Squadron formation at the rally point. Lts' SUMMERS and McWILLIAMS Capt. GATH'S right and left wingmen, remained in formation throughout the mission and their actions emulated those of the flight leader's.

Lt. T.R.KELLEY led the third flight with Lts. SPEAR and SELBY in number two and three positions respectively. Lt. Kelley followed the second flight across the target in the bomb run, releasing his bombs at approximately the same point as the other flights. When the second flight dropped out, Lt. KELLEY moved up to number two position in the Squadron formation where he remained during the strafing run. He dropped back to number three at the rally point and returned to base without further incident.

b. Anti - Aircraft Fire

Nil A/A encountered.

c. Fighter Cover:

Fighter escort provided by one squadron of P-40's, were reported to have flown somewhat wide, but were present durning the entire mission.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air:

A/P 382: Bomb-bay doors smashed when bomb fell through them from racks due to malfunction.
A/P 591: Left elevator slightly damaged by fragment from bomb bay door of A/P 382.
Nil other damage.
(2) Nil enemy planes shot down.

e. Nil injuries sustained by personnel on this mission.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

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4. Recommendations :

In view of the information currently at hand, no recommendations for awards will be submitted.

5. Tables:

See incl. -

6. Sightings:

Large fire, black smoke up to 2,000 feet from S tip of SKLEO ISLAND seen enhour to attack. Flames up to 300 feet.
Large column black smoke approximately 30 miles from TUMLEO ISLAND on a bearing of 45° (348° from WEWAK). Origin unknown.
5 or 6 barges on scaffolding possibly under repair at MMLIA VILLAGE.
Large barge (flat, no superstructure) in mouth of DRELIP CREEK
25 or 30 native outrigger canoes in coast between MAIMU - NIGA RIVERS.
White smoke from ALI ISLAND seen after attack.
Bare hill near ST. ANNA MISSION, gun position or O.P., with sand bags around position.
Observation revealed no trenches, defense systems or gun positions on coast.
3 suits of long white underwear on line near WAPIL VILLAGE.
2 shacks burning in PRO VILLAGE on approach to target.
1 u/i plane circling near large column of smoke in sea E of target reported above.

7. Photo Interpretation:

Photo 17-V-871 (K-20) is only print received showing bomb bursts on TUMLEO ISLAND - 5 or 6 shown bursting in water, 1 or 2 bursting among buildings at shore line and 10-12 bursting in plantation. All of these at S end of Island. Remainder of prints (6 K-28's and 3 K-17's) show coastline between AITAPE and NIGIA RIVER. No evidences of defenses discovered.

For the Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl: 1. Tables
2. Comb Ass. Chart
3. Route to and from Target.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

5. TABLES

BOMB NO TABLE

A/P	NO. BOMBS	TYPE	WEIGHT	NO. DROPPED IN TARGET
382	4	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	4 (see footnote)
591	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5
347	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5
374	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6 (2 in water)
016	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5 (2 in water)
020	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5 (1 in water)
165	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6
249	6	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	6
340	5	Inst. Demo.	500 lb.	5 (1 in water)

* Note on 382 - 1 Bomb failed to release over target. Indicator latch showed release. During pull up on strafing run bomb crashed through bomb bay door.

Total : 39 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target.
8 X 500 lb. bombs dropped in water (1 of these 8 dropped on mainland).

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	NO ROUNDS CARRIED	NO ROUNDS FIRED	GUN MALFUNCTION
382	2900	1590	Nil.
591	4200	2185 X .50 500 X .30	Nil.
347	4200	2185	Nil.
016	4200	2915	Nil.
374	1080	75	Nil.
020	4200	1590	Nil.
165	1050	75 X .50 300 X 30	Nil.
249	1050	100	Nil.
340	4200	1800	Nil.

TOTAL: 10,385 X .50 Cal expended
800 X .30 Cal expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Remarks
340	K - 17	30	Fogged Lens.
016	K - 21	30	
020	K - 21	30	
347	K - 21	30	
382	K - 21	30	
591	K - 21	45 // 30	
374	K - 20	30 // 45	
165	K - 20	45	

TOTAL 150 K - 21
30 K - 17
95 K - 20's

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 74505
By RLB/LM NARA, Date 5/20/11

ROUTE OVERLAY
499th Squadron
FFO 106-I 15 April 1944
TOT 1020/K - 1030/K Alt. 4000 & 50-150
Ref. Fighter Grids



DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB (IM NARA, Date 5/20/91



499TH SQUADRON
FFO 106-1 15 APRIL 1944
ORDER OVER TARGET: NO. 1
BOMB RUN TOT: 1020/K, ALT: 4000 FT.
STRAFE RUN TOT: 1030/K, ALT: 50-150 FT
ALL PLANES TOOK PHOTOS
CREWS REPORT BOMBS
FIRES
(REF: AITAPE EAST, PROV., 1/63360)

499
107-E
16 Apr 44
aR 9

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1.

ejc.

17 April, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 107-E, performed on 16th of April, 1944 by 9 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of A. C. of S, S-2 .

1. General.

A. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a medium altitude strike in conjunction with two other Squadrons of the 345th Group and four Squadrons of the 38th Group, on personnel and supply areas on the W shore of JAUTEFA BAY. The 38th Group was assigned to lead the wing formation and this Squadron to fly number three position in the 345th Group. The specific target for this Squadron was an area about 500 yards by 500 yards wide on both sides of a road approximately one mile W of PIM VILLAGE, to be attacked with 10 X 260 lb instantaneous fragmentation bombs per plane.

B. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous accomplished with 345th Group over the LERONE RIVER, with the 38th Group and with Fighter escort over BURIU DROME

C. Attack.

Nine planes of this Squadron reached the target as ordered, bombin from 7,000 feet on a heading of 85° at 202mph IAS. 28 bombs were observed to fall in the assigned target along the road 1 mile E of PIM VILLAGE.

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8 bombs fell in a string along the S side of the road just W of the designated target. 16 bombs went in the swamp area S of this road. 15 more burst along the road and shore in the vicinity of PIM VILLAGE, w hile another 15 exploded in the water just offshore. 4 bombs were salvoed in HUMBOLDT BAY after rack malfunction prevented release over the target. One or two small fires were started S of the road in the assigned target, but the extent of further damage could not be ascertained. Breakaway was down to water level and to the E.

c.

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed.

1. Nil interception encountered.
2. Nil Allied planes observed lost, however many calls to rescue service heard over fighter frequency. A/P 080 of this Squadron made water landing after running out of fuel due to bad weather. Crew was picked up by rescue plane but further details unknown at time of submitting this report
3. Nil enemy aircraft known to be destroyed in air or on ground.

e. Time and Location Of.

Alert	Strip 3, NADZAB	0410/K
Take-Off	Strip 3, NADZAB	1005/K
Group Rendezvous	LEROME RIVER	1015/K
Fighter Rendezvous	BURUI DROME	1140/K
Attack	HOLLANDIA	1320/K
Landing	FINSCHAFEN	1620 - 1630/K
Landing	Strip 3, NADZAB	1645 - 1845/K

f. Route Out.

NADZAB • BURUI DROME • TARGET.
Return: TARGET - AITAPE - point 30 miles W of MADANG - BOGADJIM - FINSCHAFEN - NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating in the Attack :

The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group ...ation. Capt R. BAKER was selected to lead this Sqdn. ... number 3 in the sequence of attack. Flights ...ows.

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt R. BAKER	A/P	382
2nd Lt. H.G.SUMMERS	A/P	097
2nd Lt. H.F.RHODE	A/P	347

SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
1st Lt. G.W. IRISH	A/P 165	1st. Lt. H.M.ALGER	A/P 249
1st LT. R.W. SPHAR	A/P 01 9	1st. Lt. W.W.GRAHAM	A/P 340
1st Lt. E.N. SLINEY	A/P 59 1	1st. LT. J.H.MacWILLIAMS	A/P 020

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the Attack.

Capt. R BAKER led the first flight with LT. SUMMERS as his right wingman and Lt. RHODE as his left. He followed the 501st Squadron in the approach from S to N swinging to approximately a 29° course for the bomb run at a point approximately 2 miles W of JAUNEPA BAY. He led his flight across the target at 7000 feet this altitude on a heading 29° at 202mph IAS. All of his flight's bombs were seen to burst in the assigned target starting 1 or 2 small fires. He broke away to the right in a sharp descent, going out over the water where he reformed the Squadron and headed toward the base. Landfall was made near SISSANO LAGOON. Capt. BAKER was at this time flying at 5000feet Shortly after this he observed 5 u/i fighters approximately 30 miles inland from TADJI. He dodged around clouds taking no chances, since the planes appeared to be heading toward HOLLANDIA. They disappeared almost immediately and were not seen again. Capt BAKER proceeded on across the SEPIK RIVER to AMNANBERG. At approximately 40 miles NW of DUMPU a front, solid from ground to unknown height, was encountered forcing Capt BAKER to turn toward BOGADJIM in an attempt to skirt it. He came out over ASTROLABE BAY at about 6,000 feet with clouds so thick below that only occasional glimpses of water were possible. He flew NE for three minutes to assure clearance of shore and then took up a heading of 120° , letting down steadily until he was just over the water. At this point the Squadron formation broke up and individual flights made their way along the coast to FINSCHAFEN. Visibility ranged from 0 to 800 feet, the shoreline being just barely visible through heavy rain. He broke out of the weather about 20 miles NW of FINSCHAFEN. He landed at FINSCHAFEN to refuel.

The other two planes of this flight also landed here. Capt. BAKER damaged a wingtip while taxiing out to take off, and returned to this base with oneof his wingmen shortly thereafter.

Lt. IRISH was the leader of the second flight with Lts'. SPEAR and SLINEY in number two and three positions respectively. He followed the lead flight over the target in close trail, but bombing independently from them. Only 8 of this flights bombs were estimated to have landed in the target area, the remainder having fallen targetpattern extending through the swamp S of the target . Lt SPEAR was able to release only 8 bombs due to rack malfunction so he salvoed the remaining four in the water of HUMBOLDT BAY during the descent and breakaway. Lt. IRISH remained with the Squadron Formation until the extremly bad weather was encountered. At this point the flights seperated, each picking its own way along the coast. All three of this flights landed at FINSCHAFEN, to refuel before returning to base.

Lt ALGER led the third flight with Lt GRAHAM on his right wing and Lt MacWILLIAMS on his left. He also crossed the target in trail, but bombed independently. His bombardier experienced d ifficulty with the intervalometer which resulted in this flights bombs overshooting. It was estimated that 15 bo mbs burst in the vicinity of PIM VILLAGE and the remainder just offshore in JAUTEFA BAY. Lt. ALGER rejoined the Squadron Formation over the water and proceeded with them to BOGADJIM where the Squadron Formation split up. He followed along the shoreline with Lt. GRAHAM on his l eft wing. Lt. MacWILLIAMS, however became seperated and was last seen heading NE toward BAGABAG ISLAND. Lt ALGER was able to fly to the base, but Lt GRAHAM being very low on fuel stopped at FINSCHAFEN. Lt. MacWILLIAMS was forced to make a water la nding when his plane probably ran out of fuel and was p icked up by a rescue plane with his entire crew sometime during the morning of 17 April. Further details are not known at time of preperation of this report as Lt MacWILLIAMS has not yet returned to base.

b.

b. Anti Aircraft Fire

Nil A/A encountered.

c. Fighter Cover.

Fighter escort provided by 1 Squadron of P-38's was reported as excellent remaining with the Squadron until the front was encountered.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

(1) Three K-21 cameras thoroughly soaked and ruined by heavy rain through which planes flew on return trip.
(2) Nil enemy aircraft observed shot down.

e. Nil injuries known to have been sustained by personnel on this mission. This does not include crew of the plane which water-landed as they have not yet returned to base.

4. Recommendation for Awards.

Investigation is being conducted to determine elegibility of crew members for awards. Results will be forwarded as soon as possible.

5/ Tables

See incl.

6. Sightings.

Large fire with black smoke up to 5,000 feet from stores area at W tip of inl at 3/4 miles S of PIM VILLAGE.
5 moderate fires on penninsula seperating JAUTEFA and HUMBO SADT BAY.
1 good sized fire on CAPE TJEWERI.
1 fire with visible flames and smoke up to 1,000 feet fro m area along shore of JAUTEFA BAY 1/2 mile NE of PIM
1 good sized fire from TOBADI VILLA GE.
1 large fire emitting quantities of black smoke from point on W side of IMBI BAY.
1 u/i M/V of unknown tonnage and 1 barge near deep water docks in IMBI BAY.
A/A position inshore from HAMADI ISLAND appeared heavily battered by bombs and deserted.
20 or 30 large canvas covered piles just E of KORJABOE VILLAGE.
Possible supplies along E shore SENTANI LAKE.
Low buildings different from native types dispersed individually.
2 large oil slicks in mouth of JAUTEFA BAY.
At u/i point (within radius of 10 miles of ARSO VILLAGE) 4 red roofed European type buildings, 10 to 12 native type buildings with 12 large rectangular, canvas covered objects nearby.

5 u/i radial engine planes in trail just 3 of TADJI seen after leaving target. Could have been P-47's but crew states enemy planes more probable. Planes headed toward HOLLANDIA. Disappeared behind cloud almost immediately.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Prints of photos taken not received at time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron COMMANDER

Pat E Goforth
PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl: 1. Tables.
2. Bomb Ass. Chart
3. Route to and from Target.

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 copy	A-2 Advance Echelon V Air Force, APO 929
2 copies	A-2 V Bomber Command APO 713-1
1 copy	Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group APO 713-1
1 copy	Squadron Files.

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5. **Tables**

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. Bombs Released Correct	
381	6	Inst. Dmse	500 lb	6	
097	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
347	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
165	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
013	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	(4 salvoed in water)
381	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
349	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
348	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	
030	10	Inst. Dmse	500 lb.	10	

* Bombs on 013 - 4 bombs failed to release over target due to malfunction and were salvoed in the water.

TOTAL: 16 X 500 lb bombs dropped on the target.
16 X 500 lb bombs dropped in water
16 X 500 lb bombs in VICINITY OF PEK VILLAGE
16 X 500 lb bombs in enemy SHAF Target.
TOTAL 64 X 500 lb bombs expended on this Mission.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Remarks
347	K - 21	30	
097	K - 20	25	
165	K - 20	5	
381	K-21	30	Cover off camera when ship landed at this base . Pictures may be ruined.

TOTAL: 60 K - 21's
30 K - 20's.

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
73
88
N
Tobadi
JAUTEFA
BAY
Metoe Debi
Island
Dock
Pim
Jetty
Village
Plantation
347
391
382
020
165
297
019
346
499th Squadron
FFO. 107-E 16 April 1944
TSD 1320/K Alt. 7000 (True)
Took Photos: T
Crews report Bombs: 0
Fires: 0
70
93
REF. Hollandia Bay Spec. 1/20,000
& Jautefa Bay Spec. 1/20,000



ROUTE OVERLAY
499th Squadron
FFO 107-E 16 April 1944
TOT 1320/K Alt. 7000 (tune)

m REF. Fighter Grids

0899 499 108-J 17 Apr 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
APO 713-1.

ejc

18 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Search Missions FFO 108-J, 108-L and 108-P. Performed by this Squadron on 17 April 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 928.
ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General.

a. This Squadron on the 17th of April 1944 was ordered to participate in searches for missing planes in the BISMARCK SEA, HUON GULF area and centeral NEW GUINEA, as follows:

1 B-25 D-1: FINSCHAFEN E to 149°. ARAWE - CAPE WARD HUNT - Costal area to LAE.

1 B-25 D-1: SAIDOR - 147°- 04°00'S - 145°00'E -04°00' S - N Coast of NEW GUINEA near 145°00'E - SE along coast to SAIDOR.

1 B-25 D-1: NADZAB, SORONG, NAKOM, WANTOAT, MATOKA, BUNDI, KEGLSUGL, WABAG, MT. HAGEN, OGELBENG, KEROWAG, KORIGU, SHINBU, GOROKA, BENA-BENA, KIAMANTU, AIYURA, NADZAB.

Each plane carried packages of supplies, rations and emergency equipment as well as messages. In event of location of grounded planes, packages & messages were to be dropped and positions were to be reported by radio using the "Fighter Grid" coordinates. In event of locating crews in water, life rafts and emergency supplies were to be dropped and positions on "Fighter Grid" given to patroling Catalinas.

b. Rendezvous.

Each plane was assigned a different sector to search indivdually therefore there was an rendezvous.

c. Attack.

With the exception of straffing personnel on MANAM ISLAND by o e turret gunner, there was no attack. In this attack one Japanese soldier in a plantation on the E side of MANAM ISLAND was observed to be hit.

d. Interception and A/P's Destroyed.

1. Nil Interception .
2. Nil allied planes observed destroyed.
3. Nil E/A observed destroyed.

e. Time and Location of.

	FFO 108-J	FFO 108-L	FFO 108-P
T.O.	NADZAB 0900/K	0900/K	0900/K
Land	SAIDOR	1400/K	
Land	FAITA		1220/K
Land	BASE 1321/K	1530/K	1315/K

f. Route.

Missions 108-J & 108-L were as given under 1 A above. FFO 108-P flew route as follows: NADZAB - SORANG - NAKOM - WANTOA T - BOGADJIM - FAITA - BOGADJIM - BASE.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating/

FFO 108-J

2nd Lt. W.A.SELBY A/P 340

FFO 108-L

Maj. J.B.BAIRD A/P 016

FFO 108-P

1st. Lt. T.R.KELLEY A/P 591

3. Details of Mission.

a. Details of Execution.

1. Lieut. SELBY was ordered to search the sea and costal area as noted under 1 A above. He accomplished the mission 100% as ordered, flying generally at 1,000 feet without making any important si htings.

2. Major BAIRD was ordered to search the area described in 1 A above. He accomplished the mission 100% as follows. He took off from NADZAB and followed the Mountain Range, searching enroute and crosing the range Sof CAPE RIGNY. Here he

turned down the coast without sighting anything of importance until reaching a point approximately 20 miles W of SAIDOR. Here he sighted two airplane wheels in the water 300 yds off shore and approximatel y 500 yds apart. Major BAIRD circled several times and found that they were apparently B-25 wheels. He attracted the attention of 3 barges in the vicinity and lead them to near the spot. Shortly afterward an L-5 arrived and began circling . Maj. BAIRD then proceeded to SAIDOR circled the field once and proceeded to CROWN ISLAND, which he circled.once without seeing anything of importance. He continued the prescribed search, investigating many objects in the water, none of which proved to be important, and finally arrived at MANAM ISLAND where he circled twice, It was during the first circle that personnel on the E side of the ISLAND were strafed. Several natives were seen in well kept huts and two mission buildings on the S side of the ISLAND, but no evidence of missing planes. He proceeded to HANSA BAY and staying out of A/A range thoroughly searched the harbor. At LILAU VILLAGE he spotted a camouflaged serviceable truck with almost new tires parked in a coconut grove. He proceed down the coast to ULIGAN HARBOR, which he approached closely to search thoroughly. When over the HARBOR mouth and approximately 1/2 mile off shore 2 bursts of heavy A/A fire were received from position listed under 3 B. No further sightings were made to MALAS VILLAGE, where an A-20 was observed on the beach. The plane was on the N side of the river and had made an excellent crash landing with a minimum of damage to the plane. Two crew members were observed lying under the life raft and apparently not seriously injured. Three passes were made dropping one bag of equipment 15 feet from the men. One man stepped over and picked up the bundle and waved. The other continued to lie on the ground, but waved as well. Soon after 3 P-38's were seen in the area so Major BAIRD proceeded to MARAAR ISLAND, tried to radio the A-20's position but the radio was inoperative. He proceeded down the coast over MADANG, ALEXISHAFEN & BOGADJIM to SAIDOR where he landed and called "Fighter - Sector" and gave the A-20's position. He returned to base by way of FINSCHAFEN without further sightings.

3. Lt. KELLEY was ordered to search the land area as in 1 A above. He took off from MADANG and proceeded to SORANG where he dropped one of the prepared messages. From there to MAKOR and WANTOAT dropping one message at each place. At WANTOAT he encountered bad weather and was unable to reach MATOKA. He detoured to BOGADJIM, where he found a burned B-25 with wing tips, and turret and tail in good condition. He circled and tried to get the number but close scrutiny proved that the numerals had been scorched off, together with all other distinctive markings.

he sighted an L-5 circling the area so he proceede to FALTA. There he sighted 3 A-20's and 1 B-24. Two of the A-2 0's were apparently flyable but the other A-20 had sustained a damaged nose wheel. The B-24 had made a belly landing in good shape. He also sighted a man standing on a parachute approximately 5 miles away. He dropped 3 bags of equipment, but the man was apparently injured, since he made no attempt to retrieve the bags. Accordingly Lieut. KELLEY decided to try a landing on the decidedly inadequate strip. He was barely able to land safely in the mud and extremly short runway. He contacted the A-20 pilots and discussed the possibilities of the A-20's taking off. He advised against this proceedure an contacted the Australian authorities who had sent a patrol to search for the missing man, but in an entirely i correct direction. Lieut. KELLEY pin-pointed the man's position and he Australians dispatched another patrol. With considerable difficulty Lt. KELLEY took off and attempted to carry out the rest of his mission. However bad weather forced him to return to BOGADJIM and from there to base.

b. A/A. Fire

2 bursts of heavy A/A from 307370 (WAIALA E Prov. 1' to 1 mi.) at ULIGA HARBOR. Bursts came from two separate guns. One burst was 30 yards of the tail at 7 o'clock, at the same altitude as the plane. This burst shook the tail surfaces. The other was 60 yards at 8 o'clock, which would have been very near the plane had the pilot not taken immediate eva sive action, turning down and toward the positions and then taking advantage of the terrain.

c. Fighter Cover.

Fighter Cover was "Area" type. Three flights of four P-38's eac h were sighted during the missions.

d. Details of Damage to A/P's in the Air.

1. Own - nil.
2. Enemy - nil.

4. Recommendiations for Awards.

Eligibility of Lieut. KELLEY'S crew for award is under investigation.

5. Tables.

1. Bombing - nil.
2. Strafing - A/F 016 fired 50 x .50 cal.
3. Photo - nil.

6. Sightings.

FFO 108-J.

Nil.

FFO 108-L.

1 M/T, stationary, at LILAU VILLAGE. Vehicle appeared to have brand new set of tires.
Costal track where observed showed normal usage.
Nil shipping sighted in HANSA BAY.
Native huts on W and SW side of MANAM ISLAND Appeared in good shape. Several new buildings among them 2 mission buildings on S tip of ISLAND appeared to be in use. Native huts on E side appeared battered and deserted.
15 - 20 M/G pits in semicircle along shore of MEDIBUR VILLAGE.

FFO 108-P.

3 A-20's , 1 with damaged nose wheel and two apparently serv ceable at FAITA.
1 B-24 which had crash-landed at FAITA.
1 burned B-25, 3 miles due W of BOGADJIM. Wing tips and tail section only part not burned. 1 L-5 was circling this B-25.
Possible tail of A-20 in woods in the vicinity of AT VILLAGE. Sighted by one gunner only from a distance. Exact location could not ve pinpointed.
1 u/s truck on road between BOGADJIM and BRIMA.
Many villages and trucks in area W of MADANG give appearance of unusual amount of activity.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Nil.

For the Squadron COMMANDER

PAUL GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.

Incl:

Incl. #1 - Route and Sighting Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 copy	Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.
1 copy	Squadron's files.

Incl:

Incl. #1 - Route and Sighting Overlay.

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

LEDGEND

Search Missions
FFO 108-J, 108- L & 108-P
3 B-25 D-1s, 499th Sqdn. 17 April 1944
Map REF. EAST. New Guinea NAV. Chart
Scale 1/2,315,000

Mission FFO 108-J: ———
Mission FFO 108-L: ———
Mission FFO 108-P ———
Search Areas: - - - -


N
149°
4°
KARKAR I
CAP SEARCHING
CROWN I
LONG I
CAP GLOUCESTER
B-25 WHEELS
Spider
SUPPLIES MAN NEAR PARACHUTE
WAPIOPAT
NAKOM
SCRANG
DROPPED MESSAGES
OPAUWE
GARAGASSIA
LEGEND
Search Missions
FFO 108-J, 108- L & 108-P
3 B-25 D-1s, 499th Sqdn. 17 April 1944
Map REF. EAST. New Guinea NAV. Chart
Scale 1/2,315,000
Mission FFO 108-J:
Mission FFO 108-L:
Mission FFO 108-P
Search Areas:

499
112-A
21Apr44

CONFIDENTIAL

493th Bombardment Squadron ( ) AAF.
345th Bombardment Group ( ) AAF.
APO 713-1.

April 22, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission No 112-A, performed by this Squadron on 21 April, 1944 with objective at RABAUL, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Forces, APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General.

a. The assigned mission was to attack the wooded area immediately N of TABAL DROME from an altitude of 4500 feet, bombing from E to W. All bombs were to be concentrated in the wooded area, the objective being to blast out the trees and clear the area.

b. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous with the 345th Group was accomplished enroute to the target past Dobu. There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. Attack.

The attack was executed on a 30 degree run of 240° from 4400 feet indicated altitude over the center of the Group target (the center being the 493rd target - the 500th & 501st bombs on either side). A total of 48 - 500 lb instant demo bombs carried, 42 were dropped armed in the target and 3 were salvoed in the target. However, it is thought the 3 salvoed bombs exploded on impact. Bombing was superior and bursting in excellent pattern. Generally, bomb bursts and bomb smoke in the target area were the only results observed. However a column of black smoke from the Group target was seen to rise to 200 feet and to grow in intensity. The exact point of origin was undetermined because of distance and angle of observation.

d. Interception & A/A's encountered.

1. Nil interception.
2. Nil allied planes observed destroyed.
3. Nil E/A observed destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Time and Location of.

Took Off: NADZAB Strip 3. 0635/Z
Time over Target: MADJI 0941/Z
Land: NADZAB Strip 3. 1037/Z - 1050/Z

2. Route.

1. To target - direct.
2. Return - Target down coast to point 18 miles N WEWAK - BASE.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating.

a. The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation and Capt. [illegible] BAKER was assigned to lead the Squadron formation.

b. Composition of Squadron Formation.

1ST FLIGHT

Capt. [illegible] BAKER	A/C No	574
1st Lt. [illegible] BLANEY	A/C No	164
2nd Lt. [illegible] SUMMERS	A/C No	591

2ND FLIGHT

1st Lt. J.R. [illegible]EY	A/C No.	165
2nd Lt. E.A. [illegible]EY	A/C No.	84
1st Lt. W.A. [illegible]	A/C No.	71

3RD FLIGHT

Capt. P.A. [illegible]NA	A/C	259
1st Lt. [illegible]	A/C	016
1st Lt. [illegible]	A/C	011

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of Attack.

Capt. BAKER assembled the squadron above the overcast at base and soon after fell into formation with the 500th Squadron. After circling once at 6000', the two squadrons "tacked on" to the 501st squadron and proceeded to the target without incident. The formation enroute was a Group "V" with squadrons "Javelin Down" when approximately 5 miles from the target. Capt BAKER signaled for attack formation of "V" of V's". He maneuvered the squadron to attain a signed altitude and interval behind the lead squadron. He made his run on a course of 290° with [illegible] BLANEY & SUMMERS on his wings. Capt BAKER's bombardier released two bombs accurately but the remaining three "hung up" and had to be salvoed. Lts' BLANEY & SUMMERS toggled their bombs when the first bomb cleared the bomb-bay of Capt

BAKER'S plane. A total of 12 bombs dropped by this flight hit in the center of the assigned target.

Lieut KELLEY lead the 2nd flight in the No 2 position of the "V" on Capt BAKER'S right and close in. His bombardier set up dropping angles and trail and released independently of the lead flight. Lieuts SELBY & GRAHAM (#2 & 3 respectively) released "on" Lieut KELLEY. A total of 15 bombs of this flight hit slightly to the right and N W of those of the first flight in an excellent pattern.

Lieut BRIGHAM (Ass't Group Operations Officer) lead the third flight on Capt BAKER'S left in a tight formation. His bombardier also bombed independantly of the first flight . Lieuts' IRISH & SPEAR dropped on the flight leader with excellent results. A total of 15 bombs of this flight dropped in the target to the left of those dropped by the lead flight.
After "bombs away" Capt BAKER continued the run for thirty seconds in order to obtain photographs of the bomb bursts and then turned right over the water. When the lead Squadron "let down" to strafe, Capt BAKER maintained bombing altitude and kept the lead Squadron in sight. Return to BASE (as shown on "route overlay" incl. # 2) was accomplished without incident except that Lieut KELLEY experienced difficulty with the right engine cutting out. Consequently he was forced to slacken his speed and return to BASE alone. The engine stopped running entirely after landing. It was later found that the intake manifold had come loose.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire.

1. Nil anti-aircraft fire of any calibre.

c. Fighter Cover.

Fighter cover was "Area Type" and was not observed. However , communication on "V H F" was established.

d. Details of Damage to A/P's in Air.

1. Own - nil.
2. Enemy - nil.

e. Injury to Personnel.

There were no injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. Information known to this office at present, provides no basis for recommendation of award.

5. Tables.

See incl.

6. Sightings.

Probable u/s, s/e f, grey color no roundels on wings on N center of South Strip.
M/T on costal road 2,ooo feet W of KOROCO VILLAGE
Crashed s/e on beach just N of VOKAN VILLAGE.
Large white house in good repair on S end ALI (probably mission) not damaged by bombs.
Bldgs on S part TUMLEO ISLAND badly damaged, Many bomb craters in area.
U/S lugger at mouth MIGIA RIVER.
5 miles E of target 8 mounds earth spaced 500 yards apart could have been gun emplacement but observer doubts.
Pile of sand bags on N tip of ALI ISLAND (pictures taken).
Close observation not possible.
Servicable lugger at NAPA RIKE VILLAGE (approx 25 miles E TADJI).
Servicable barge in River 3 miles W of BUT strip.
B 25, 30 miles due S of WEWAK was weather beaten, tmails around. Seen by radio man, could not give exact position. Plane was in Kunai pa tch.
Black object in water 1 1/2 miles S of SELEO ISLAND. Object dissappeared and many bubles rose to surface, (seen by one man - could give no further information).
501st bombing was excellent.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Fortunately one of the 2 F-21's dispatched, obtained an excellent set of exposures showing bombs in air soon after release and continuing until after all bombs had exploded.
Photos No 5-V-68 A/P 164 show entire bomb run and confirm crews report of excellent bombing. Showing also the eastern end of the N Runway.
F-29 Photos: A/P 591 show bombs bursting E of N Runway, the extreme E end of the Runway, TUMLEO, ALI & SELEO ISLANDS. These photos confirm crews report of bombing and sighting of undamaged state of Mission Building on ALI ISLAND.
Because of inadequate equipment and the small detail of the photographs of ALI ISLAND, the pile of sand-bags reported under "Sightings" is not discernable.

For the Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1. Tables
2. Route to and from Target.
3. Bomb Ass. Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. copy COMMANDING GENERAL, V Air Force, APO 925, ATTENTION OF A.C of S, A-2.
1 copy A-2 Advance Echelon V Air Force, APO 929.

2 copies A-2 V Bomber Command APO 713-1.

1 copy Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group APO 713-1.

1 copy Squadron Files.

5. Tables.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No Bombs in Target.
374	5	Inst Demo	500	2 (mal. & other 3 salvoed.)
164	5	Inst Demo	500	5
591	5	Inst Demo	500	5
165	5	Inst Demo	500	5
347	5	Inst Demo	500	5
971	5	Inst Demo	500	5
259	5	Inst Demo	500	5
019	5	Inst Demo	500	5
016	5	Inst Demo	500	5

* Note on 374 Bad Release A-2 caused three bombs to be salvoed.

Total: 42 x 500 lb Inst Demo bombs dropped in the target.
3 x 500 lb Inst Demo bombs salvoed due to malfunction.

Photo Tables

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Remarks.
164	K-20	20	Shutter bad
	K-21	12	
21	K-20	0	No photos at all
	K-22	10	all bad

20 x K-20 exposures - all bad
12 x K-21 exposures
10 x K-22 exposures.


Hollandia
Tadji
Wewak
HANSA BAY
AlexshaFen
MADang
NADZAB
LAC
MILNE BAY
N
ROUTE OVERLAY
499th Sqdn. 345th Group
FFO 112-A 21 April 1944
TOT 0841/K Alt. 4400 Feet.
Map Ref. Fighter Grids
Incl. # 2

Pro Mission

Pro

BABELSBERG

STRAIT

N

49

04

5

Korake

Wapil

NOR

Rilia

Coral surfaced fighter strip

TADJI DROMES

Bomber strip

42 Bombs this Area
(3 Salvoed)

Bombs seen falling

Lemiend Hamlet

RIVER

NIGIA

347 144
091

259 019
014

145 347
321

46

LEGEND:

FFO 112-A 21 April '44 499th Squadron
Order over Target: 2nd
Bomb Run TOT: 0841/K Alt. 4400 Ft.
Map Ref: Special Map TADJI DROME
1/20000

99 Took Photos: T
Crews Reprot on Bomb Bursts;
Fires: Observed in vicinity of Target (Black Smoke)

Incl: #8

499
113-E
22 Apr 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

ejc

23 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 113-E performed 22 April 1944 by 6 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at TENDAYNE ISLAND (03°08'S; 143°12"E) with secondary target at HANSA BAY, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force APO 925, ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General.

a. The purpose of this mission w as to attack supplies and personnel on the SE quarter of TENDAYNE ISLAND. The secondary target was designated as the personnel and stores area approximately 1,000 x 2,000 feet, adjacent to the E bank of the SAKULA RIVER and 2,000 to 4,000 feet inland from the mouth of the river. The strike was to be conducted in conjunction with two other Squadrons of the 345th Group and four Squadrons of the 38th Group from medium altitude with 6 x 500 lb instaneous demolition bombs per plane.

b. Rendezvous.

Rendezvous accomplished with the 500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th Group over NADZAB and with the 38th Group W of the LERONE RIVER.

c. Attack.

Weather conditions prevented the strike force from proceeding to TENDAYNE ISLAND so the secondary target, the personnel and supply area on the E bank of the SAKULA RIVER at HANSA BAY was attacked. 6 planes of this Squadron bombed this target from an altitude of 3,000 to 4,000 feet on a heading of 30° at 200 mph IAS. A total of 29 x 500 lb instantaneous demolition bombs were dropped, of which 20 were in the target, 4 were just S of the target and 5 on the W bank of the river. Results other than bomb smoke could not be discerned due to the

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to the ammount of foliage in the area and lack of visible targets in the clearings. Breakaway was made in a descending turn to the right over the water E of HA NSA BAY.

e. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed.

1. Nil.interception encountered.
2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.
3. Nil Enemy planes destroyed in air or on ground.

e. Time and Location of.

Alert	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0840/K
Take Off	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0920/K
Rendezvous:		LEBONE RIVER	0948/K
Attack	:	HANSA BAY	1139/K
Landing	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	1315/K

f. Route:

NADZAB - ANGORAM - WEWAK - HANSA BAY - GUSAP - NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating in the Attack.

Lt. Col. B.W.FRIDGE was the Group Commander and led the Group Formation on the mission. Capt W.N.PARKE was selected to lead this Squadron which was third in the sequence of attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt W.N.PARKE	A/P	382
2nd Lt H.G.SUMMERS	A/P	C97
1st Lt. E.M.SLINEY	A/P	058

SECOND FLIGHT

1st Lt H.N.ALGER	A/P	374
1st Lt W.W.GRAHAM	A/P	971
1st Lt R.W.SPEAR	A/P	164

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the Attack.

Capt W.N.PARKE led the Squadron Formation and the first flight with Lt SUMMERS on his right wing and Lt. SLINEY on his left. At WEWAK a front was encountered, compelling the strike force to turn back to the secondary target at HANSA BAY. Capt PARKE consequently led the Squadron in the approach from NW to SE to a point several miles S of HANSA BAY before swinging to begin the attack. He brought the first flight

across the target at 4,000 feet altitude on a heading of approximately 30° at 200 mph IAS. It was estimated that 4 bombs from this flight landed S of the target with the remaining 10 forming a pattern across the target. Due to foliage and bomb smoke the extent of damage inflicted could not be determined. Capt PARKE then headed toward the ocean E of HANSA BAY to the Squadron and Group rally point and returned to base without further incident. As t he two wingmen remained in close formation with Capt PARKE, dropping their bombs simultaneously with his their actions are in every degree similar to these of the flight leader.

Lt. H.N.ALGER led the second flight with Lt. GRAHAM in the number two position and Lt SPEAR in number three. Lt ALGER led this flight over the target on the same heading as the first but at considerably lower altitude. His flight dropped 15 bombs , 10 ow which went in the target and 5 on the W bank of the SAKULA RIVER. Again it was not possible to report damage inflicted. Lt ALGER then followed the first flight to the right in the breakaway, and thence to the rally point.

b. Antiaircraft Artillery Fire.

Nil A/A encountered by this Squadron on the mission.

c. Fighter Cover.

Fighter escort was last from view shortly after leaving BUSAF and was not seen again during the mission.

d. Details of Damage to A ircraft in t he Air.

1. Nil damage to own Aircraft.
2. Nil enemy planes observed shot down.

e. Injuries to Personnel.

Nil injuries sustained by personnel on this mission.

4. RRecommendations.

Information known to this office at present provides no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. Tables.

See incl.

6. Sightings.

H/B bombing AWAR PL.NTATION resulting in small column of black smoke.
7 bursts of heavy A/A around heavy bombers.

Heavy position near EKU VILLAGE firing; ceased firing after bombing by H/Bs'.
Either bomb bursts or heavy A.A gun on W side of Cape Moem
1 large flash observed - probably A/A.
Small column black smoke from S end NEW NUBIA STRIP.
M/T sighted on road thru POTSDAM PLANTATION, was moving S E
Road well traveled between POTSDAM PLANTATION & BOGIA.
Villages at POTSDAM PLANTATION appeared in good condition.
8 bombs bursting in water after Squadron left target.
Few bombs burst in water just offshore NEW NUBIA STRIP.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photos 3 - 0 - 19 and 3 - 0 - 20:
Bomb smoke visible just S of Target.
Bombs bursting on both sides of SAKULA RIVER in target area.
Photo 3 - 0 - 28:
Bombs bursting on both banks SAKULA RIVER. Two bridges at mouth of river, both apparently serviceable.
Photo 3 - 0 - 30:
Approximately 11 underwater bomb craters just S of the mouth of SAKULA RIVER. Careful inspection proves that they were made previous to t his Squadrons bomb run, due to t ne lack of spray or turbulence of the water at tht point.

For the Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl.

1. Bomb Ass. Chart
2. Route to and from Target.
3. Tables.

Distribution.

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force APO 929, ATTENTION OF A, C OF S, A-2
1 copy A-2 Advance Echelon, V Air Force APO 929
2 copies A-2 V Bomber Command APO 713-1
1 copy Intelligence Officer, 345th Group APO 713-1
1 copy Squadron files.

5. Tables.

Bombing Table

A/F	No Bombs	Type	Weight	No in Target
382	4	Inst Demo	500	3
097	5	Inst Demo	500	3
058	5	Inst Demo	500	4
374	5	Inst Demo	500	5
971	5	Inst Demo	500	5
164	5	Inst Demo	500	0

Total of 29 bombs expended ;
20 x 500 lb bombs in target
9 x 500 lb bombs outside of target area.

Photo Table

A/F	Type Camera	Exposures	Remarks.
058	K - 21	30	
981	- 17	1	

Total: 30 x K-21 exposures
1 x K-17 exposure.

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

MISSION OVERLAY FFO 115-E
22 April '44, Secondary Target
499th Squadron. 6 B-25's,
Altitude: 3-4000Feet.
Total Bombs in Target: 20
Fires - Order over Target: 3rd.
Time Over Target: 1139/K
T Took Photos

TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY
HANSA BAY

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

ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
113-E
FFO: [redacted] DATE-22 APRIL
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1134/A
ALTITUDE: 3-4000 FEET

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. ADAM A. GWIAZDA

499
114-J
23 Apr 44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (L) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1.

e.c

April 24, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FEC 114-J. Performed by 499th Squadron on April 23, 1944 with Objective at HANSA BAY, NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force APO 925 ATTENTION OF: A. C. of S., A-2.

1. General.

a. The objective of this strike was to destroy A/A positions in and around HANSA BAY. The target for this squadron was A/A Position 29-B on the S shore of the Bay.

b. Rendezvous.

The group and wing rendezvous with the 498th leading was accomplished over the LEBON RIVER near MADANG. Area fighter cover of P-47's joined the formation enroute over HOLLANDIA.

c. Nine planes, each carrying 8 x 500 lb instantaneous demolition bombs, attacked the assigned target from 7,000 feet on a course of 70°. A total of 45 bombs were dropped, of which at least 90% and possibly more, dropped on the target and nearby. Bombs dropped in an excellent pattern completly blanketing the target with bomb bursts and bomb smoke. Other than this, results were indiscernable.

d. Interception.

1. Nil attack by A/A.
2. Nil allied planes observed lost.
3. Nil enemy planes observed lost.

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e. Time and Location Of.

Take Off	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0745/K
Grp and Wing Rendesvous:		LERON RIVER	0810/K
Fighter Rendezvous	:	GUSAP	0820/K
Time Over Target	:	HANSA BAY	0912/K
Land	:	Strip 3 NADZAB	1030/K

f. Route.

BASE - GUSAP - TARGET - BASE.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating in the Attack.

a. The 498th Squadron was ordered to lead the Group and Wing Formation to the target - this Squadron to lead on return while the 498th Squadron executed a sweep down the coast to MADANG - employing B-25-H's against land targets.

b. Capt RICHARD BAKER was assigned to lead the Squadron Formation which was composed as follows:

First Flight

Capt R BAKER	A/P 374
2nd Lt H.G.SUMMERS	A/P 097
1st Lt E.M.SLINEY	A/P 058

Second Flight

1st Lt. T.A.KELLEY	A/P 249
2nd Lt. W.A.SELBY	A/P 347
1st Lt. W.W.GRAHAM	A/P 971

Third Flight

Capt. W.N.PARKE	A/P 165
1st Lt. H.N.ALGER	A/P 164
1st Lt. G.W.IRISH	A/P 016

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of Attack.

Capt. BAKER assembled the Squadron in one wide circle of the field ater Take Off from S to N. He brought the Squadron into the number 2 position of the Group Formation over the LERON RIVER and proceeded to t he target. On reaching the I. P. S E of HANSA BAY, Capt BAKER took interval behind the 498th Squadron and made his run as planned. His bombaridier released his bombs accurately on the target, starting near the coastal road and training through the target. (Note - Target was A/A position and area 250 yards on all sides)

Lieut's. SUMMERS & SLINEY were flying # 25-D-1's consequently they released their bombs "on" Capt BAKER. Each released all 5 bombs in the area covered by Capt. BAKER.

Lieut. KELLEY lead teh 2nd flight in tight "javelin down" formation. His bombardier released independently of the first flight. Lieut's. SELEY & GRAHAM released their bombs on Lieut. KELLEY. A total of 15 bombs from this flight landed in the target, with the first bombs striking just short of the first bombs dropped by the lead flight and ending just over the A/A position .

Capt. PARKE, with Lieut's. ALGER & IRISH on his wings, had no bombsight in his pl ane. Consequently he released his bombs on Lieut. KELLEY. Capt. PARKE held his flight in the No. 3 position of the "javelin down" formation. Because of the position in the formation and lack of a bombsight a few of this bombs hit S of the road and the rest trained across the road and ended short of the A/A position. After "bombs away" Capt BAKER led the Squadron in a circle to the "Rally Point" just S of HANSA BAY, reassembled the Group, which was now minus the 403th Squadron (on costal sweep) and returned direct to base in short order.

b. A/A Defense.

1. Nil positions observed firing.
2. Nil bursts in air.

c. Fighter Escort.

Fighter escort was "Area Type" at medium altitude and was reported as excellent.

d. Details of Damage to A/P's.

1. Nil damage to own planes.
2. Nil damage to enemy planes.

e. Injuries to Personnel.

No injuries sustained by personnel of theis Squadron.

4. Recommendation for Awards.

In view of information currently a t hand, no recommendations for awards of decorations are warranted.

5. Tables.

Bombing Table

A/P	No Bombs Carr'd	Type	Weight	No in Target.
[illegible]	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
097	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
058	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
249	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
347	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
971	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
165	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
164	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5
016	5	Inst Demo	500 lb	5

TOTAL : 35 x 500 lb Inst Demo bombs in Target.
5 x 500 lb Inst Demo bombs along road N of Target and S of it.

Photo Table

A/P	Type of Camera	No. Exposures	Remarks
058	K - 21	2	Mal. (Timing)
347	K - 21	30	Mal. (Timing)
971	K - 22	10	

Total : 32 x K - 21 photo exposures.
10 x K - 22 photo exposures.

6. **Sightings.**

Nil A/A seen to fire. Nil A/A bursts observed in Air.
Other 345th Sqdns' bombing appeared excellent.
Bombs seen to fall in water off AWAR PLANTATION.
Pattern of bombs also seen to fall across AWAR POINT.
[illegible]th Squadron observed strafing coast at POTSDAM PLANTATI N.
Large white object possibly parachute with yellow square beside it approximately same size on top of foothill on N side of MARKHAM Valley approximately 20 miles S E of GUSAP. Reported by one gunner

71 Photo Interpretation.

Of the 32 K-21 exposures made, only two were printed because of camera malfunctions.

Photos 4-V-31 and 4-V-32, 499th Squadron A/P # 053 show less than half of bombs dropped (camera was in # 2 plane first flight) Bombs bursting along road # of target and some just S of target. Photos are numbered in reverse order - # 32 was exposed before # 31.

K-22 mounted in A/P 971 , third of 2nd flight one exposure worthy of printing. Photo 3-0-29 - oblique showing bomb smoke over target area but distance and angle of shot leave much to be desired in determing bombing accuracy. Some of this bombsmoke is undoubt smoke from the 499th Squadron bombing since this Squadron followed that Squadron over the target.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl.

1. Bomb Ass. Chart
2. Route to and from Target.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A. C. of S., A - 2

1 copy A-2 Advance Echelon APO 929.

2 copies A-2 Fifth Bomber Command APO 713-1

1 copy Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group APO 713-1

1 copy Squadron Files.

23 April,44.
499th Squadron.
FFO 114-J.
9 B-25's.
Order Over Target: 2nd.
Altitude: 7000 Feet.
Time Over Target: 0912/K
Heading--70 Degrees.
Took Photos.
Crews Report on Bomb Falling.





ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 114-J. DATE-23/4/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0912/K
ALTITUDE: 7000 FEET.

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. AD. A. GWIAZDA

499
115-J
24 Apr 44
ARC

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

25 April,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 115-J. Performed on 24 April,1944 with Objective at HANSA BAY, N.G.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL , Fifth Air Force, APO 925.,
A TTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General

a. The mission was to attack the HANSA BAY area from medium altitude with intent to destroy supplies, personnel and one possible medium A/A position.

b. Rendezvous

Rendezvous with units other than the 345th Group was not accomplished.

c. Attack

The attack was executed with excellent results although cloud cover over the target presented considerable difficulty. Of 29 bombs carried,a total of 29 were dropped in and immediately near target 9-D. Cloud cover hid the target from cameras and observation. However, known information is sufficient to reasonably assure accuracy of bombing. (The fact that none of the bombs were dropped in the water, none on CONDOR POINT, none short of target, or to side, together with pictures showing the bombs dropping to within 500-1000 feet of ground, indicate all bombs in target).

d. Interception

1. Nil attack by E/A.
2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.
3. Nil E/A destroyed in the air.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

e. Time and Location of:

Take Off	: NADZAB, Strip #3.	0820/K.
Time Over Target:	HANSA BAY	1005/K.
Landed	: NADZAB, Strip #3.	1115/K.

f. Route:

Base direct to Target - BOGADJIM - Base.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating.

a. The 498th Squadron, because of their speed, was ordered to lead the Group Formation. Capt.W.N.PARKE was selected to lead the Squadron Formation.

b. The Squadron Formation was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P	No.249	Capt.R.BAKER	A/P	No.382
1st.Lt.E.W.SLINEY	"	" 058	1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	972
1s tLt.W.A.SELBY	"	" 374	2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	"	168

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of Attack

Capt.PARKE successfully formed the Squadron and joined the Group Formation in the number two position with the Squadron "Javelin Down" to the I.P. Southwest of HANSA BAY. He then took interval behind the 498th Squadron and began his run. He saw the 498th sheer off to t he N. probably because of weather. Capt.PARKE continued the run but was likewise forced off the target by obscuring clouds. He circled right and began a second run, on which his bombardier was able to orientate himself by brief glimpses of the target and released his bombs. Lieuts.SLINEY and SELBY, No.1 and 2 respectively, released their bombs on Capt.PARKE only a fraction of a second after the release of Capt.PARKE's first bomb. The lead plane carried only 4 bombs which accounts for 14 bombs dropped by the entire flight.

Capt.BAKER, with Lieuts. GRA HAM a nd SUMMERS on his wings followed the lead flight in the "dry run" and circled for a second bombing run. During the turn he dropped down 1000 feet and on the course flown by the lead flight. His bombardier released his bombs in a manner similiar to that employed by the lead bombardier. The two wing men toggled on Capt.BAKER 's Bombardier. A total of 15 bombs of this flight were dropped - in all probability on the target.

After bombs away, Capt.PARKE circled right, reformed the Squadron and seeing no other Squadrons in the area, took a curse to Base via BOGADJIM. As he was leavi ng the target he obtained a fleeting glimpse of bomb smoke which covered the area around target 9-D and observed some bomb smoke over CONDOR PT. - some of which was undoubtedly result of other squadrons bombing. Capt.PARKE led the Squadron to base without further incident.

b. Anti-Aircraft

1. Nil positions seen firing.

2. Nil bursts in air.

c. Fighter cover not definitely seen. Al though 4 u/i planes were observed at a considerable distance S of the target.

d. Details of damage to A/P's in Air.

1. Nil damage to own planes.

2. Nil damage to E/A.

e. Nil injuries to Personnel of this Squadron.

4. Recommendation for Awards.

No recommendations, in the opinion of this officer, are warranted as a result of action performed on this mission.

5. Tables

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target
249	4	Inst.	500 lb.	4
088	5	Inst.	500 lb.	5
374	5	Inst.	500 lb.	5
382	5	Inst.	500 lb.	5
971	5	Inst.	500 lb.	5
165	5	Inst.	500 lb.	5

Total: 29 X 500 lb. Inst. Fuse Bombs dropped on Target.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude
382	K-21	30	7000 feet.
971	K-21	30	7000 feet.
058	K-21	30	7000 feet.
Total:	90 K-21		

6. Sightings

2 small fires on CONDOR POINT. 1 large fire - heavy flames and black smoke from 664435 (NUBIA EAST Prov.1" to ½ mile)
String of bombs in water running N to S just off CONDOR PT.
5 barges on SW side LIANG ISLAND in water not on beach, possibly serviceable.
1 crew member reported boat of undetermined size or type in water at 678431. Definate w ake behind boat.
38th Group 's bombing of target 22-D a ppeared excellent.
1 barge afloat, probably serviceable, just inside AWAR RIVER.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photos 2-V-12 thru 2-V-2-9 Airplane No.971.
Show flight line approximately 110 ° show bombs falling to apparently within 500 to 1000 feet of the ground. Thick clouds obscure's bomb burst. By approximation bombs hit in North side of target 9-D.

For the SQUADRON COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl.#1 Bomb Ass.Chart.
Incl.#2 Route to and from Target.

Distribution:
1 copy: COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A- 2 Advance Echelon, APO 929.
2 " A- 2 Fifth Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.
1 " Files.

LEGEND:

4[illegible]h Squadron.
F[illegible] 115-J, 24 April,1944.
Altitude; 7000' to 8000'.
Order over Target: 1st.
Time over Target: 1005/K.
Heading: 110 Degrees.
7 Took Photos. 0 Fires.
--- Crews Report on Bomb Falling.

Map Ref: Condor Drome & New Nubia Drome (Special 1/20,000).




N
ADMIRALTY IS.
Wakde
Hollandia
Aitape
Wewak
NEW GUINEA
Hansa Bay
Annanberg
Madang
Bena Bena
NADZAB
LAE
PORT MORESBY
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: 115-S DATE- 24/4/44
345th BOMB GROUP
BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1005K
ALTITUDE: 7-8 000 FT.

499
119-B
28 Ag
1/14

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

29 April,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 119-B performed 28 April,1944 by 6 planes of this Squadron. Objective at SAWAR DROME, N.G. (01°55'S - 138° 45'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General

a. The purpose of this mission was to conduct a strike in conjunction with 498th, 500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th Group on airplanes, personnel, supplies and installations at SAWAR DROME, New Guinea. The strike force was to proceed from MADZAB to GUSAP the afternoon of 27 April and rem in overnight, refueling and taking off the morning of 28 April for the attack. Fighter escort was to be met over HOLLANDIA before proceeding to SAWAR. The target was to be attacked with strafing guns and 22 clusters of 3 X 23 lb. parafragments per plane from minimum altitude. Formation over target was to be 6 planes abreast. Squadrons in trail at 30 to 45 second intervals.
All planes were to land at GUSAP on the return trip, and to come direct to base from there.

b. Rendezvous accomplished with the three squadrons of the 345th Group enroute from GUSAP and with Fighter Escort over HOLLANDIA.

c. Attack

6 planes of this Squadron reached the target, attacking the coastal area between MAFFIN and SAWAR DROMES as ordered. This Squadron was fourth in the sequence of attack making the run from E to W at minimum altitude, 6 planes abreast. 22 clusters were dropped in the S dispersal area of SAWAR DROME.

(Attack Con'td)

34 clusters were dropped on houses and M/T's between the dromes and 32 more on SAWAR runway and the fringe of trees between the strip and coast. A total of 88 clusters of 3 X 23 lb. parafragmantation bombs were released in the attack but the extent of the damage caused could not be determined. The entire area was also thoroughly strafed. Withdrawalwas made to the right over the water. The second flight strafed a lugger and 3 barges at the S tip of VANOEMOEAR Is. during the breakaway. Many hits were scored but no visible damage could be discerned.

d. Interception and Aircraft destroyed.

(1) Nil Interception encountered.

(2) Nil Allied aircraft observed lost, however, calls to "Gardenia" were heard on the common fighter frequency indicating that at least one plane of this strike force was damaged and was considering an emergency landing.

(3) Nil enemy airplanes known to be destroyed in the air or on the ground by this Squadron on the mission.

e. Time and location of:

Take off	Strip 3 NADZAB	1700/K/27
Landing	GUSAP	1735/K/27
Alert	GUSAP	0755/K/28
Take off	GUSAP	0830/K/28
Rendesvous (Fighter)	HOLLANDIA	1106/K/28
Attack	SAWAR DROME	1148/K/28
Landed	GUSAP	1445/K/28
Take off	GUSAP	1510/K/28
Landed	Strip 3 NADZAB	1545/K/28

f. Route out:

NADZAB-GUSAP-HOLLANDIA-TARGET

Return:

TARGET-HOLLANDIA-GUSAP-NADZAB.

2. Pilots and planes participating.

The 500th Squadron was assigned to lead the Group Formation on the mission. Capt.R.D.REINBOLD was selected to lead this Squadron which was fourth in the sequence of attack. Flights were as follows:

First Flight		Second Flight	
Capt.R.D.REINBOLD	A/P 014	Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P 347
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	" 591	2ndLt.H. G.SUMMERS	097
2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	" 019	1st.Lt.W.G.IRISH	016

3. Details of the Mission

a. Details of the attack.

Capt.R.D.REINBOLD led the Squadron Formation and the first flight on the mission. He circled several miles E of SAWAR to attain an interval of approximately 45 seconds behind the preceeding Squadron, then came in on the approach along the shore line with flights in shallow "V". The second flight was placed to the left on and slightly behind the first. He climbed to about 1200 feet to pick up air speed before descending to minimum altitude for the run. He brought the Squadron over the target from E to W at 220 mph I.A.S. Capt.REINBOLD made his first four releases dropping six clusters at several huts between MAFFIN STRIP and the WOSKE RIVER. He strung out 12 more clusters starting at the E end of SAWAR STRIP and extending through to the center. His last four went along the coastal track near SAWAR CREEK at several M/T's parked there. He also strafed heavily throughout the run. Immediately after releasing the final Capt.REINBOLD swung to the right over the water where he re-formed the Squadron and followed the remainder of the group in the return to base.

Lt.ALGER flew on Capt.REINBOLD's right wing during the attack. He strafed several houses and areas showing signs of activity between MAFFIN and SAWAR Dromes. He dropped a total of 22 clusters of parafrags on the area between SAWAR DROME and the coast starting at the E end of the Drome and extending through the West end. The only visible target for his attack was a truck which was well with in effective range of his bombs. Lt.ALGER strafed the drome area and turned off the target in formation with the flight leader.

Lt.SELBY flew the number 3 position on Capt.REINBOLD's left wing. He dropped his entire bomb load successfully. A part of his bombs were dropped on houses between the two dromes. The larger part of his bombs was dropped on the S side of the runway at no specific targets. In addition he thoroughly strafed buildings and wooded areas showing M/T activity. He turned off the target in formation with the flight leader over the inlet at the W end of SAWAR DROME.

Capt.W.N.PARKE led the second flight off and slightly behind the lead flight. He began strafing at MAFFIN DROME continuing intermittantly to the S dispersal area of SAWAR STRIP. He strung his 22 clusters of parafrags through the center of the dispersal area from one end to the other. He saw several small piles of stores in this area but could not be certain if his bombs inflicted damage on them. He broke to the right slightly wider than the lead flight crossing over VANDOEMORAR Is. He saw a lugger at the S tip of this island which he strafed heavily. Other than seeing many hits scored no results could be discerned. He then rejoined the first flight and headed back toward the base.

Lt.SUMMERS flew on Capt.PARKE's right wing in number two position, but had difficulty with the bomb release switches and consequently dropped no bombs. He strafed revetments and small piles of sup plies in the dispersal area along the S edge of the runway but did not observe any specific results. He also strafed the lugger off the tip of ANDOEMORAR Is. scoring a few hits but again observing no damage.

Lt.Irish flew number three position in the second flight on Capt.PARKE's left wing. He strafed the S edge of the dispersal area but for a n undetermined reson was not able to release any bombs. On the breakaway he saw three barges near the S tip of the same island which he strafed but other than bullets striking the barges he could observe no results. Believing that portion of bombs were armed, he salvoed all of his bombs in the water after making the run over the target.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

Intensity: Slight
Caliber : Medium and Heavy
Accuracy : Inaccurate.
Location : Medium A/A possibly from position near coasts 1 end of MAFFIN., STRIP. Heavy A/A seen considerably to the left of the formation and 2 more of the same to the rear.

The heavy bursts were very large, noticeably larger than usual.

3. Fighter Cover

Fighter escort provided by 2 squadrons of P-38's were late for Rendesvous but furnished excellant cover over the target.

4. Details of Damage to Aircraft in Air.

(1) Nil damage to own planes.

(2) Nil enemy planes seen shot down.

5. Nil injuries sustained by personnel.

6. Recommendations for Awards

In view of information currentl y at hand, no recommendations for awards will be forwarded a s result of this mission.

5. Tables

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Dropped	Remarks
014	22	Clusters	3 X23 lb.	22 Target	
016	22	Clusters	3 X23 lb.	22(Salvoed)	
019	22	Clusters	3 X 23 lb.	Nil	Returned
097	22	Clusters	3 X23 lb.	22 Target	
347	22	Clusters	3 X23 lb.	22 Target	
591	22	Clusters	3 X23 lb.	22 Target	

TOTAL: 88 Clusters 3 X 23 lb. Dropped on Target.
22 Clusters 3 X 23 lb. Salvoed.
22 Clusters 3 X 23 lb. Returned.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	Gun failure
014	4200	1590	Nil
016	4200	1590	Nil
019	4200	1855	Nil
097	4200	2915	Nil
347	4200	2120	Nil
591	4200	2650	Nil

Total: 12730 X.50 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

PLANE NO.	TYPE CAMERA	ALTITUDE
014	K-21	Minimum altitude
019	K-21	Minimum Altitude
016	K-21	Minimum Altitude
347	K-22	(Malfunction- no pictures taken)

TOTAL: 90 K-21's taken.

6. Sightings

Gas truck N center of SAWAR DROME. Many huts and buildings between MAFFIN and SAWAR DROMES appeared neglected and in poor condition. Truck activity inland 1 mile from MAFFIN BAY. Heaviest activity in SAWAR AREA appeared to be between drome and WOSKE RIVER. Considerable activity in SAWAR area appeared at E end of drome. Large oil fire in S center of S dispersal area. Explosion and flames up to 100 feet. Smoke up to 1500 feet. Small fires nearby. 3 U/S medium bombers on SAWA R RUNWAY. Small fires nearby. Setd. and small amounts of supplies in dispersal area at SAWAR. Taxi strips and dispersal area at SAWAR appeared well kept.

7. Photo Interpretation

Photos 4-O-98, - 99, -101 and 102. Approximately 4 clusters of parafrags dropping at S edge of cleared area at W side of MA FFIN DROME. Many trees have been cut down, stripped and dragged off the runway. 4 or 5 piles of logs with M/T tracks all around them. Tracks also are clearly evident over the strip. Some trees lie in the strip and a few are still standing. Stumps have not yet been removed. Approximately 20 native type huts in the clearing appear well kept with considerable evidence of activity around them. Several cul tivated areas ca n be seen interspersed in the area.

Photos 4-O-106 and 107

Smaller cleared area just W of previous one, containing huts of same type but fewer in number. Large well-kept garden in this area.

Photos 5-O-112 and 113

Bridge across WOSKE RIVER in excellent condition. Road leading up to it appears well used.

Photo 4-O-112

1 cluster of parafrags dropping near near large native type ~~village~~ building on M/T ~~track~~ just W of the WOSKE RIVER.

For the SQUADRON COMMANDER:

Jack C. Hoopes

JACK C.HOOPES
1st.Lt., Air Corps
ASS'T.INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl. 2
Incl.1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl.2 Route to and From Target

Distribution:

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
1 " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, A PO 713-1.
1 " Files



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 119-B DATE-28/4/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1148/K
ALTITUDE: 75-150 FEET.

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. ADAM A. GWIAZDA

6 B-25-D-1's
FFO 119-B, 28 April.44.
Squadron 499th. 6 B-25D1's
Order Over Target 4th
T.O.T. 1148/K
Altitude 75-150 Feet.
Photos Taken T
Bombs dropped
Fires.

SAWAR & MAFF
DUTCH NEW G
C.U. PHOTO REF 25-30/91W
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

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
120-6
29 Apr 4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1.

30 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 120-G performed 29 April, 1944 by 6 planes of this Squadron. Objective at SAWAR and SARMI on the N coast of NEW GUINEA (01°50' S 138°45' E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force APO 925. ATTENTION OF A. C. of S, A-2,

1. General.

a. The purpose of this Mission was to conduct a strike on costal A/A positions at SAWAR DROME and SARMI VILLAGE from minimum altitude with strafing guns and 22 clusters of 3 X 23 lb parafragmentation bombs per plane. The attack was to be made by two flights of 3 plane "V's" in trail in conjunction with the 500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th Group. The run was to be made from E to W along the coast and this Squadron was assigned to fly third in the sequasence of attack.

b. Definite rendezvous with two Squadrons of the 345th Group was not accomplished, although Squadrons proceeded to the target on approximately the same course and reached the target at the same time. Rendezvous with fighters accomplished at HOLLANDIA.

c. Attack.

6 planes of this Squadron reached the assigned target bombing, strafing and taking photos of the costal area from the TOR RIVER to a point 3 miles N W of SARMI. A total of 98 clusters of 3 X 23 lb parafragmentation bombs were released during the course of the attack by the two 3 plane flights of this Squadron. The run was made from E to W along the coast , the flights being in trail at approximately a one minute interval. 2 clusters went at the A/A position between MAPPIN STRIP and the MOKO RIVER. 40 clusters were strung along SAWAR DROME and the area immediately adjacent thereto, extending through the garden areas of SAWAR CREEK

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

14 more clusters were dropped in FORMAOE PLANTATION while another 18 were scattered through the unnamed village on the E side of the ORAL RIVER and across through the garden areas on the W side. 8 clusters were released across the base of SARMI POINT and 6 on a costal village approximatel y 3 miles W of SAWAR. Crews were unable to observe results for the main part but one truck w ith driver was seen to sustain a direct hit with one bomb and 4 to 6 huts in the village NW of SAWAR were seen to be demolished by direct hits after the planes had turned N over the water at the completion of the run. The entire area was also heavily strafed by all planes. Withdrawal was accomplished by swinging to the right over the water.

d. Interception and Aircraft Destroyed.

(1) Nil interception encountered.
(2) Nil allied planes observed lost.
(3) Nil enemy pl anes known to be destroyed in t he air or on the ground.

e. Time and Location Of.

Alert	;	Strip 3 NADZAB	0530/K
Take-Off	;	Strip 3 NADZAB	0622/K
Fighter Rendezvous	;	HOLLANDIA	0926/K
Attack	;	SAWAR - SARMI	1012 - 1017/K
L anding	;	Strip 3 NADZAB	1335/K

f. Route.

NADZAB - HOLL ANDIA - TARGET - WAKDE - HOLLANDIA - NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating.

The 500th Squadron was assigned to head the Group Formation on the Mission. 1st Ltl T R KELLEY was selected as the leader of this Squadron which was third in the sequence of attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st Lt. T R KELLEY	A/P 591	Capt. R BAKER	A/P 016
2nd Lt. P W FOX	A/P 014	1st Lt. E M SLINEY	A/P 058
1st Lt. W W GRAHAM	A/P 971	2nd Lt. H G SIMMONS	A/P 382

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the Atta ck.

1st Lt. F R KELLEY led both the Squadron and the first flight. Due to a layer of overcast, Lt KELLEY was unable to rendezvous with the remainder of the Group and led the Sq uadron to the target as an individual unit. 'ighter escort was met at HOLLANDIA after which Lt. KELLEY headed directly for the ta rget. He approached from the S E over land climbing slightly to obtain a general view of the target. He dropped down to minimum altitude as he crossed the TOR RIVER and began strafing. He flew over the center of SAWAR DROME dropping several clusters of parafrags along the strip and in the garden areas, W of itat the A/A position there. Several more clusters were strung across the unnamed village on the E bank of the ORAL RIVER. He attem pted to fing the 6 gun medium A/A position near the shore just E of SARMI POINT, but was unsuccessful. He continued across the point and along the shore W of it. Approximately 3 miles W of SARMI he dropped his remaining bombs at a small village on the shore. He swung out to sea following this final attack and his crew was able to observe the results of the parafrags. Direct hits were seen to destroy 4 to 6 of the huts there. Lt KELLEY then reformed the Squadron and returned to the base without further incident.

Lt. H.N.FOX flew on Lt KELLEY'S right wing in number two position of the flight. He strung the majority of his bombs along the sea ward edge of SAWAR DRO E and along the costal track W of it a short distance above SAWAR CREEK. The remainder he released on both sides of the ORAL RIVER at buildings and huts. He followed Lt. KELLEY through the completion of the run, strafing continually.

Lt. GRAHAM was the left wingman in the first flight. He ma de his first release between MA PIN STR P and the WOSKE NIVER at the A/A position located there. He was unable to de termine the effectiveness of these bombs however. Lt GRAHAM also bombed SAWAR and the costal area W as well as the installations along the ORAL RIVER.

Capt R BAKER was the second flight leader on this mission. He throttled back on the approach as he neared the target to create a safe interval between the flights for the attack. He began strafing as he neared MAFFIN STRIP and released his first spring of parafgags along the S edge of SAWAR DROME. He dropped several more near the garden area in an attempt to cover the A/A position there, but could not report an y specific results. Capt BAKER swung

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

He strafed the plantation and made another release at the group of buildings and huts along the ORAL RIVER. He broke out over the water E of SARMI POINT, crossing the base of the point. He unloaded the remainder of his bombs at A/A positions located here. He then swung to the N over the ocean where he fell in behind the first flight for the return trip.

Lt SLINEY was the number two man in the second flight on Capt BAKER'S right wing. Due to unexplained difficulties with the bomb release switches he did not release any bombs on the mission. He remained on Capt BAKER'S right wing, however strafing heavily during the entire run.

Lt Summers was the left wingman of the second flight in number three position. He began stringing parafrags across the S dispersal area at SAW AR and continued westward attempting to blanket the A/A position near the garden area. He followed Capt BAKER around the hill and dropped several more clusters on FORMAOE PLANTATION. He tried to drop the last two in the vicinity of the medium A/A position E of SARMI but they hung up in the bomb bay and had to be salvoed.

b. Anti Aircraft Fire.

Intensity - slight.
Calibre - light, medium and heavy.
Accuracy - accurate to inaccurate.
Location - Ridge W of TOR RIVER, W of MAFFIN DROME, vicinity of SAWAR STRIP and SARMI POINT.

Slight, light and inaccurate A/A fire from ridge just W of TOR RIVER seen on approach. Slight, medium and apparently inaccurate A/A fire observed directed at preceeding Squadron from position Between MAFFIN DROME and the WOSKE RIVER. Several bursts of heavy A/A from position near garden area W of SAWAR was accurate as to altitude but considerably short. Several other bursts of heavy A/A believed to be from one of the positions near SARMI POINT, were very accurate as to range but slightly high. One of these bursts holed one airplane. Flashes from one or two M/G's were reported from center of the seaward side of SAWAR STRIP.

c. Fighter Cover.

Fighter Escort provided by two Squadrons of P-38's was reported as good by the crews.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

(1) A/P 971 had left windshield broken by A/A fragment over target. Nil other damage to our planes.
(2) Nil enemy aircraft observed shot down

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

e. 2nd Lt. PEYER E. TARANUK O-688871 sustained minor lacerations on left arm from flying glass. No other personnel injured.

4. Recommendations for Awards.

In view of information currently at hand, no recommedations for awards will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. Tables.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No. Bombs Carr'd	Type	Weight	No Dropped.
591	22 (clusters)	Inst Para.	69 lb.	22
014	22 (clusters)	Inst Para.	69 lb.	22
971	22 (clusters)	Inst Para.	69 lb.	22
016	22 (clusters)	Inst Para.	69 lb.	22
058	22 (clusters)	Inst Para.	69 lb.	0
382	12 (clusters)	Inst Para.	6911b.	12

Total: 98 X 69 lb clusters dropped in target.
2 X 69 lb clusters salvoed in water.
22 X 69 lb clusters returned to base due to diff. with release switch.
Note - Each cluster is composed of 3 X 23 lb. bombs.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	No Rnds Car'd	No Rounds Fired	Malfunctions
591	4200	1855	Nil.
014	4200	1325	Nil.
971	4200	1855	Nil.
016	4200	2120	Nil.
058	4200	2385	Nil.
382	4200	1855	Nil.

TOTAL: 11,990 X .50 calibre cartridges expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	No Exposures	Malfunctions.
591	K-21	30	Nil
971	K-21	30	Nil
016	K-21	30	Nil
058	K-22	50	Nil

Total: 90 X K-21 's exposures . - 50 X K-22 exposures.

6. Sightings.

Shacks along coast from SAWAR to ORAL RIVER appeared different from local native type huts, poss ibly containing supplies.
Tractor on E end SAWAR STRIP.
2 grey smoke fires, small from center of target 9 X.
Several small grous of huts in N S part POEMAOE PLANTATION.
Several buildings around inlet just W of SARMI POINT. Cleared spaces near by and several piles of logs along coast.
2 la rge bar es and 4 smaller ones seen in cove in vicinity of jetty on S E side SARMI POINT.
2 definite dummy guns in emplacements on W side SAWAR CREEK
1 appa rently serviceable barge, large type at E end PODENA ISLAND.
1 poss ibly serviceable 2 engine bomber on W end WAKDE STRIP.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Photo 2-0-138 Large cloud of dust or smoke over center of SAWAR DROME. Huts at W end of drome are considerably battered.

Photo 2-0-139 More extensive view of same area. One hut seen burning fiercly. Size of spout from bomb burst in water near W end SAWAR DROME indicates that the bombs was a larger type than the 23 lb parafrags carried by this Squadron.

Photo 2-0-170 Smoke from several parafrags bursts seen along beach E of SARMI. 1 large native type building seems to be catching fire. Native type canoes drawn up along beach.

Photo 2-0-171 Buildings in palm trees on E side ORAL RIVER appear to be in excellent condition. Small native dugout canoes along the beach on both sides of the river mouth.

Photo 2 -0-141 Costal road between SAWAR and SARMI appears in good condition. Cloud of smoke or dust over SAWAR DROME still apparent.

Photo 1-0-59 Cleared area probably E of ORAL RIVER. 1 M/T road and many footpaths indicate considerable activity . Several well kept gardens also visible.

Photo 1-0-63 Beached 1 ugger, apparently serviceable E of SARMI.

Photo 1-0-66 Beached barge Type "A", E of SARMI near base of penninsula.

Photo 1-0-98 Beached lugger, apparently serviceable with approximate 45° list to starboard about 1 mile W of SARMI.

For the Squadron COMMANDER.

JACK C. HOOPES
1st Lt., Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer.

Incl.
1. Bomb Ass. Chart.
2. Route to & from Target.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 120-G DATE-29/4/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1012-1017K
ALTITUDE: 75-150 FEET

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. ADAM A. GWIAZDA

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91



499
120-G
29 Apr 44



...nad
...th Squadron
...shoot FFO 120-G 29 April 1944
...bing Alt: 75 to 150 Ft.
... 1012/K 1017/K
...ler Over Target: 3rd.
...ding: 300°
...ok Photos: T
...ws report Bombs: ◯
...ea: [illegible]

...Ref: Sowar-SARMI Area V Bomber Command A-2 Section

1999
120-6
29 Apr 44




ANSANMANOEAR
SARMI TOWN
CLUSTERS
VANDOEMOEAR
18 CLUSTERS
FOEMAOE PLANTATION
14 CLUSTERS
GARDEN AREAS
40 CLUSTERS
SAWAR A/D
1/2 0 1 MILE

Ledgend
499th Squadron
Mission FFO
Bombing Alt:
TOT 1012/K
Order Over Tar
Heading: 300°
Took Photos:
Crews report B
Fires:

Map Ref: Sawa



DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745045
By RLB/IMM NARA, Date 5/20/97

Ledgmad
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 120-G 29 April 1944
Bombing Alt: 75 to 150 Ft.
TOT 1012/K 1017/K
Order Over Target: 3rd.
Heading: 300°
Took Photos: T
Crews report Bombs: ◯
Fires:

Map Ref: Salwar-SARMI Area V Bomber Command A-2 Section



DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
128-A
7May4

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

8 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 128-A performed 7 May,1944 by 5 planes of the 499th Squadron. Objective at MAFFIN BAY, DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General

a. The purpose of this mission was to attack personnel and stores in the area between MAFFIN DROME and the WOSKE RIVER with 6 B-25-D-1's from minimum altitude with strafing guns and 20 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay demolition bombs per plane. The strike was to be conducted in conjunction with the 498th, 500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th Group, this Squadron being third in the sequence of attack. The run was to be from E to W, flights of 3 plane "V"'s in trail.

b. Rendezvous

Squadron assembly took place over NADZAB and rendezvous with 3 Squadrons of 345th Group accomplished over the LEBRONE RIVER at 2000 feet. There was no fighter or wing rendezvous.

c. Attack

5 planes of this Squadron reached the target attacking the area adjacent to the coast between MAFFIN DROME and the WOSKE RIVER as ordered. The run was made on a heading of approximately 300 at 210-220 mph IAS by the lead flight of 3 planes in a shallow "V" and the trail flight of 2 planes abreast at an interval of 30 seconds.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

A total of 110 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay bombs were dropped throughout the western part of the assigned target and the area just South. Due to thick foliage and the delay fuse there were no visible results. The entire area was heavily strafed by all planes. Withdrawal was made over water and to the right where the Squadrons and Group assembled and reformed for the return trip.

d. Interception and Aircraft Destroyed.

(1) Nil interception encountered.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed lost.
(3) Nil enemy aircraft known to be destroyed in air or on ground.

e. Time and location of:

Alert	Strip 3 NADZAB	0530/K
Take Off	" " "	0620/K
Gp.Rendezvous	LERONE RIVER	0636/K
Attack	MAFFIN BAY AREA	0951-58/K
Landing	Strip 3 NADZAB	1345/K

f. Route: NADZAB HOLLANDIA TARGET.
HOLLANDIA NADZAB.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating.

The 501st Squadron was assigned to lead the Group formation on this mission. Capt.W.N.PARKE was selected to lead this Squadron which was third in the sequence of attack. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P	971	Capt.A.BAKER	A/P	347
1st.Lt.E.M.SLINEY	"	014	2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	"	019
2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	"	058	1st.Lt.R.M.ALGER	"	164

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of the attack.

Capt/W.N.PARKE led the Squadron and the first flight on the mission. He assembled the Squadron over the base shortly after take off and joined the Group Formation over LEIRONE RIVER at 0636/K. The route to the target was then covered without incident. As the Formation reached a point about 15 miles E of the target Capt.PARKE began to drop back to attain the necessary interval between Squadrons. He saw the lead Squadron proceeding upthe coast so he swung slightly to the left, inland, going between two large hills just E of the WOSKE RIVER, one of which served as an effective screen against A/A from the target. Capt.PARKE continued accross the WOSKE RIVER before turning, to make his axis of attack different from those of the first two Squadrons to add to the difficulties of the enemy A/A. He noticed that the bursts appeared fairly accurate at the lead squadron but much less so at the second over the target. All bursts were high and most of them considerably wide. Only a few bursts were observed directed at this Squadron which were 200-250 feet above the formation. Capt.PARKE came across the target just above the tree tops on a heading of 30° at about 215 mph IAS. He began strafing before he reached the assigned area and continued on across the width of it. All of his bombs were released in a string starting S of and running through the target but due to the density of the trees and the delay of the explosions no results could be discerned. Capt.PARKE continued out over the water breaking slightly to the right where he reformed the Squadron and rejoined the Group Formation. As WAKDE ISLANDwas passed, one burst of heavy A/A was seen about 100 ft. above the water 300-400 feet to the left of the formation. The remainder of the return trip was accomplished without further incident.

Lt.SLINEY flew number two position in the first flight and remained on Capt.PARKE'S wing throughout the entire, mission. He strafed the target heavily and drop ped all bombs in the designated area. During withdrawal he saw several scattered bursts behind the Squadron at a considerable distance, apparently a poor attempt to track the formation. He also saw a large fire near the coast between MAFFIN DRONE and WOSKE RIVER started by the following Squadron. He reported a column of black smoke from this fire up to 2000 feet.

Lt.SUMMERS in number three position flew on Capt.PARKE's wing on this mission and his actions were very similar to those of the flight leader. He strafed and released all bombs in the target.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Capt.K.BAKER led the second flight as he passed between the two hills SE of the target he began dropping back to get a safe interval between flights. His course led him slightly to the left of the lead flight along the E bank of the WOSKE RIVER where he released all of his bombs. He also strafed heavily throughout the run. Capt.BAKER made his breakaway over the water and to the right where he rejoined the first flight for the return trip.

Lt.SELBY was Capt.BAKER's right wingman on this mission and his actions closely emulated those of Capt.BAKER. He strafed the target and strung his 22 bombs across it. Due to the high gas consumption of his plane enroute, he dropped out of the formation and landed at HOLLANDIA at 1048/K to refuel. He took off at 1210/K returning to the base alone and landed at 1455/K.

b. Anti-Aircraft Fire

Intensity : Slight.
Calibre : Heavy.
Accuracy : Inaccurate.
Location : Not definitely ascertained but believed to be from known position in clearing W of NE end of MAFFIN STRIP. 6-7 heavy bursts directed at the Squadron over the target 250 to 300 feet above tree tops. 8 bursts at 300 feet trailing the lead Squadron on approach to target, tracking fairly well but considerably high. After leaving the target 15 bursts seen in rapid succession over the coast between the WOSKE RIVER and MAFFIN DROMES. Bursts appeared to be more rapid than could be fired from the 2 heavy guns reported in the known position mentioned above.
A/A fire apparently confused by diversity of approaches by individual squadrons, Fire at initial squadron was fairly good becomming increasingly poor with succeeding squadrons. Apparently having difficulty in trying to follow attacking planes and then swing back on planes attacking from different angles.
1 burst of heavy A/A from an undetermined position on WAKDE IS. after withdrawal from target. Burst was at 9 o'clock from the formation about 100 feet above the water and 300-400 feet from the nearest plane.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

c. Fighter Cover

Nil Fighter escort on this mission.

d. Details of Damage to Aircraft in the Air.

(1) Nil damage to own aircraft.
(2) Nil enemy A/C's observed shot down.

e. There were nil injuries sustained by personnel on this mission.

4. AWARDS

There will be no recommendations for citations or awards as result of this mission, since no individual action is worthy of such.

5. Tables.

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No. Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. on Target
971	22	Demolition	100 lb.	22
014	22	Demolition	100 lb.	22
058	22	Demolition	100 lb.	22
347	22	Demolition	100 lb.	22
019	22	Demolition	100 lb.	22

TOTAL: 110 X 100 lb. demolition bombs dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	Rds Car'd.	Rds. Fired	Gun Fail.
971	4200	2120	Nil
014	4200	2650	Nil
058	4200	1325	Nil
347	4200	1060	Nil
019	4200	2120	Nil

Total: 9275 X.50 Cal.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

PHOTO TABLE

A/F No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken	Altitude
[illegible]	K-21	30	[illegible] - 100 feet.
547	K-21	30	75 - 100 feet.
918	K-21	30	75 - 100 feet.

TOTAL: 90 K-21's

6. Sightings

Roads and tracks in target area near WOSKE River showed signs of heavy use. Several huts in this area but no definite signs of supply dumps, or other worthy targets.

8 black bursts A/A fire at 300 feet trailing 498th Squadron on approach to target. Tracking fairly good. Altitude [illegible].

Immediately after leaving target several scattered bursts near Rehinduar formation at considerable distance. Apparently trying to swing guns to follow our formation. Very inaccurate.

7. Photo Interpretation

Photo 2-G-19:
Small clearing in heavy rain forest E of Woske River on coastal road. Several native type structures around the edge, all obscured from direct view.

Photos 4-G-70,72,73,74,75, 84,85:
This serial confirms flight line as reported by pilot of A/F 547. Native buildings along WOSKE RIVER and coastal road. Coastal road appears in good condition Garden area along road seems well kept. Rain forest in areas whereno attempt at clearing has been made is extremely dense.

PAT H.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
(Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.

Incl: 2

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

LEGEND:

FFO: 128-A, 7 May,44.
Order Over Target: 3rd.
Time Over Target: 0951/K - 0958/K.
Altitude: 75 to 100 Feet.
○ Crew's Repor t on Bomb Falling.
Fires.
T Took Photos.





ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 128-A DATE-7/5/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0951/K
0958/K
ALTITUDE: 75-100 FT.

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. ADAM A. GWIAZDA

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NNB 714505
By RLB/TM NARA, Date 5/20/91

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499 132-E 11 May 44 JH

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

12 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 132-E, performed on 11 May,1944 with objective at WAKDE ISLAND. (139°E - 1°55'S)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General

a. On 11 May,1944, this Squadron leading the Group Formation which consisted of the 499th 500th, and 501st Squadrons was to attack WAKDE ISLAND with intent to destroy supplies. Target for this Squadron was area S of the E end of WAKDE DROME. Each squadron was to employ 9 B-25's bombing from medium altitude making a run from E to W. Bomb load for B-25-D's was 4 X 500 lb. instnt. demo bombs, for D-1's and D's - 5 X 500 lb. instant. demo bombs.

b. Rendezvous

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished at the LERON River at approximately 0800/K at 2000 feet. There was no "Fighter or Wing rendezvous".

c. Attack

Nine planes took off and 9 planes attacked the assigned target as planned. A total of 43 bombs were dropped from 5000 feet on a heading of 185° and at an IAS of 200 mph. Formation over the target consisted of 3, 3 plane flights in close "V" and each flight in trail at 10 second intervals. The lead plane of each flight was equiped with a D-8 sight and made it's run independently of the rest of the formation. 40% of the bombs hit in the Western end of the target, 40% of bombs hit just over the western edge of the target, 10% of bombs on the N edge of the S side of the Drome, and 10% West and to the left of target. A large explosion occurred quickly after the bombs exploded and resulted in an intense fire which lasted 2-3 minutes, after which black smoke rose skyward. Later the color of the smoke changed to grey.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

The short duration of the fire, the nature of the explosion andthe fact that the smoke did not rise to great height (as would be the case in an oil fire) indicates that an ammo or bomb dump was destroyed. There were no further results visible.

d. Interception and A/P's destroyed.

(1) Nil interception occured.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed lost.
(3) Nilenemy A/P's destroyed in air or on ground.

e. Time and Location of:

Take off: NADZAB, Strip 3 at	0750/K.
Gp.Rendezvous LERON RIVER	0800/K.
On course for Target	0805/K.
TOT: WAKDE ISLAND	1055/K.
Land at Base	1430/K.

f. Route

Out: Base via MARKHAM, RAMU and SEPIK Valleys and GRIME PLAIN (SW of HOLLANDIA) to target.
Return: Same.

2. Pilots and Planes participating.

a. This Squadron with Lt.Col.B.A.FRIDGE (Deputy Gp.C.O.) in the lead plane, was selected to lead the Group Formation.

FIRST FLIGHT

Lt.Col.B.A.FRIDGE	A/P 454 *
2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	" 014
2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	" 347

SECOND FLIGHT			THIRD FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	A/P	379 *	Capt.R.D.REINBOLD	A/P	374 x
1st.Lt.E.A.SLINEY	"	058	2nd.Lt.J.F.FOX	"	591
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	"	971	1st.Lt.W.G.IRISH	"	340

* - D-3's
x - D's
Others D-1's.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

3. Details of the Mission.

a. Details of Attack.

Col.FRIDGE assembled the Squadron enroute to the Group Rendezvous Point where he assembled the Group. Flight to the WAKDE ISLAND area was without incident - weather providing no difficulty. Col.FRIDGE approached WAKDE ISLAND from the SE and made a light left turn to make a run parallel to the runway from E to W. He was indicating 210 mph on the approach and after leveling out on the bomb run he cut the speed to 200 mph. He made a long approach in order to give his bombardier sufficient time to sight on the target. The bombardier released his 4 bombs and observed them to hit just beyond and slightly to the left of the target. After bombs away, Col.FRIDGE continued straight and level for a short time and then began a slow turn to the right to assemble the Squadron and Group.

Lt.PALMER flew on Col.FRIDGE's right wing throughout the mission. Over the target he held the plane in close formation and released his bombs as he saw the first bomb dropped from the lead plane. Three of his bombs were observed to hit long and tw o just on the W edge of the target.

Lt.SELBY flying in the number 3 position on the Col's. left wing, also rele ased "on" the lead plane. All five bombs dropped just over the W edge of thetarget.

Lt.ALGER leading the second flight made his run directly behind the "leading flight" at 4900 feet. His bombardier purposely dropped his bombs late, thus making sure none were to hit in the water. 2 bombs were observed to hit in the target area and the other 2 fell just W and slightly to the right of the target. He then followed a parallel course with the strip and turned out to sea, and joined the first flight for the return home.

Lt.Sliney number 2 man of this flight kept close formation withhis leader since he dropped his bombs "on"the lead plane. His bombs were reported to have hit the West end of the target causing large explosion which was believed to be the ammo dump. He followed his leader on the route out from the target.

Lt.SALTERS left wingman,likewise, followed his leader closely and dropped his bombs immediately after seeing the first bomb of the lead plane "away". His bombs were believed to be in and in the near vicinity of the assigned target, no results were observed however.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Capt.REINBOLD led the third flight on a run in trail at approximately 100 yards behind the second flight. His bombardier released his bombs in the Western edge of the target and observed them to be accurate as to deflection but slightly long for range. A large explosion resulted from this flights bombs.

Lt.FOX flew in the number 2 position and dropped his bombs "on" Capt.REINBOLD. His bombs were observed to hit on the S side of the runway and to the West of the target.

Lt.IRISH flew in the number 3 position and also released his bombs on the flight leader. His bombs hit in the same area as did those of the lead plane.

The squadron and Group then re-assembled and returned to base without incident.

b. ANTI*AIRCRAFT FIRE.

1. Nil A/A fire encountered.

c. Fighter Cover.

Nil fighter cover provided.

d. Details of damage to Airplanes in air.

(1) Nil damage to friendly planes.
(2) Nil damage to enemy planes.

e. Personnel injuries.

1. Nil injuries to personnel.

4. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for award of decorations.

5. Tables

(See page 5)

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.On Target
454	4	Demo	500 lb.	Nil
014	5	Demo	500 lb.	Nil
347	5	Demo	500 lb.	Nil
379	4	Demo	500 lb.	2
058	5	Demo	500 lb.	5
931	5	Demo	500 lb.	5
374	5	Demo	500 lb.	5
591	5	Demo	500 lb.	2
340	5	Demo	500 lb.	2

Total number of bombs in assigned target: 21 X 500 lb. Inst.Demo.

Note: The remaining 22 bombs were not in target, but in the near vicinity, and proved to be very effective, since photos show that fires were started by all 3 flights, in and around assigned target as well.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken	Altitude
014	K-21	30	5000 Ft.
574	K-21	30	5000 ft.
591	K-21	30	5000 ft.
379	K-21	30	4900 ft.

TOTAL: 120 K-21's.

6. Sightings

NE tip of WAKDE ISLAND bombed by B-24's, excellent results, small fires and small amounts of smoke resulting.
Extreme S tip WAKDE ISLAND bombed by B-24's. Small fires and smoke resulting. Excellent bombing.
W end of strip and area just S heavily bombed by unknown units. Strip from center to E end appeared in fair condition - no craters.
On return from 5,000 ft. approximately 15 miles SE of WAKDE ISLAND on coast, a village of 8 good sized, well kept buildings a jetty and barge.
On return from 4000 feet at BANGOF VILLAGE, 6-8 large European Type houses and 8-10 smaller sized. Village showed signs of much use, was well kept. Good road in excellent condition showing signs of recent and frequent use. Large gardens to S of Village.

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

On return from 5000 feet in SEPIK RIVER area - track (easily could accomodate jeeps) running almost due south from TIMBUNKE VILLAGE to AMAMBONWARI - YIMAS VILLAGE. Track previously uncharted. At 0930/K a lone P-38 with blue stripe around fuselage, usual color paint on remainder of plane was seen 20 miles W of LAKE KARAMAMBO, headed S.

7. Photo Interpretation

P hotos: No.5-V-55,58,59,63,64, A/P 014 First Flight: Shows flight's bombs hitting to West and to S of target.

Photos No.7-V-88,89,92,93. Second Flight A/P 379, show first flights bomb smoke and apparent fire. Show own bombs burst and co nfirm report of instantaneous explosion from own bombs.

P hotos No.6-U-70,72,73, Third Flight A/P 374 show smoke from fires and bombs of 1st., and second flights. S how own bombs starting apparent fire W of Target and show 5 bombs hitting on S side of runway.

Photos 4-U-38,39,45,46,. Third Flight A/P 591 show 1st. and 2nd. flights bombing results, and also own bombs hit area W of target and adjacent to runway starting fire. Previous photos show possiblestores (small boxes) in area bombed by this flight.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl; 2

Distribution:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of; A.C. of S., A-2.
2 " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929 .
1 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IMM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Wakde Island A/D



DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 132-E DATE-11/5/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1055/K 1101/K
ALTITU. 15000 FEET

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. AD A. GWIAZDA

7-14
135-D
14 May 44
JCK

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

15 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 135-D. Performed on 14 May,1944 with Objective at TAKAR VILLAGE. (139°10'E ; 02°00'S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. General

A. On the morning of 14 May,1944 this Squadron together with the other 3 Squadrons of the 345th Group was ordered to attack TAKAR VILLAGE in the WAKDE ISLAND Area. Each Squadron(with the exception of 500th, which employed six) employed 9 B-25's. Bomb load for the three B-25-D-2's, which led each flight, was 4 X 500 lb. Instantaneous bombs. Bomb load for the 6 B-25-D-1's was 8 X 500 lb. instant demo bombs. The manner of attack was one bombing run at medium altitude and one strafing run at minimum altitude.

B. RENDEZVOUS

Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute at DUMPU. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

C. ATTACK

Nine planes took off as scheduled and attacked the primary target as ordered. A total of 42 X 500 lb. instantaneous fuse bombs were dropped from 5300 feet on a course of 138° at an IAS of 200 mph. Each of the 3 lead planes was equiped with a D-8 Bombsight. Formation over the target consisted of 3,3 plane "V's" in trail at 10 second intervals, each flight bombing independently. Of the 42 bombs dropped, all but 10 are considered to be in the target. Five of these were dropped on the beach with no possible damage resulting and 5 were dropped S of the target on a clearing. After bombing each flight turned left, losing altitude and made a low level strafing run over the target with flights in trail at 30 seconds. A total of 11395 rounds were fired on the run.

CONFIDENTIAL

Four-six huts were observed burning but further results were undetermined. However it was noted that 8-10 huts in the village proper, were still intact after the bombing.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AI R.

1. Nil interception occurred.
2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.
3. Nil enemy A/P's observed lost.

E. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	NADZAB, Strip 3	0720/K.
Gp.Rendezvous	DUMPU enroute.	0812/K.
Bombing Attack,	TAKAR VILLAGE	1035/K.
Strafing attack	TA KAR VILLAGE	1040/K.
Land at Base		1405/K.

F. ROUTE

Out: BASE - DUMPU - ANNANBERG - TARGET.

Return: TARGET direct to base . via GRIME PLAINS, SEPIK, RAMU AND MARKHAM VALLEYS.

2. PILOT's and PLANES PARTICIPATING.

A. The 498th Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation and Capt.RICHARD BAKER was selected to lead the Squadron Formation.

B. Flights were composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.R.BAKER	A/P 454
2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	" 097
2nd.Lt.F.N.FOX	" 058

SECOND FLIGHT

1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	A/P 379
2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	" 971
1st.Lt.W.G.IRISH	" 016

THIRD FLIGHT

Capt.P.GATH	A/P 382
2nd.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	" 591
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTERS	347

Note: Each lead plane was B-25-D-2. Wing planes were B-25-D-1's.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack

Capt.R.BAKER assembled the Squadron soon after take off and took up the number 2 position of the Group Formation at DUMPU. Flight to the target was without incident. Approximately 20 miles SE of the target, the Group Formation crossed the coast and sighted the Islands off the coast near the target soon after. On sighting the target Capt.BAKER brought the squadron in a position 30 seconds in trail of the lead Squadron and followed in a left turn over water onto a course of 132° over the coastline. He experienced no difficulty in locating the target by using the BIER RIVER and the nearby Islands as check points. Capt.BAKER made a run over the coconut plantation S of TAKAR VILLAGE in order to allow his number 3 man to place his bombs on the village. The village was too close to the water for all 3 planes to bomb it. Capt.Baker's Bombardier purposely sighted on the coconut plantation to insure that nobombs dropped in the water. This flight dropped a total of 14 bombs in the coconut plantation just S of the Village. Lts.SUMMERS and FOX, number 2 and 3 respectively, dropped their bombs "On" the lead plane. Their bombs hit in the same area as that hit by the flight leader. The flight then turned left in a diving turn to make the strafing run. After descending to 300 feet and completing a 360° turn the flight began a strafing run which covered the coastal area 2 miles on either side of the target.

Lt.GRAHAM leading the second flight across the target in trail close behind the lead flight, dropped two bombs in the south part of the target and the remaining two in the pla ntation immediately adjacent. Lt.SELBY, #2 man, dropped all five of his bombs in the plantation outside of the target also, while Lt.IRISH in #3 position scored 100% by dropping his 5 bombs in the target near the shore. This flight dropped a total of 14 bombs. The flight then swung wide out over the sea, letting down all the while, and made a minimum altitude strafing run in the same direction, thoroughly spraying the coa stline from about one mile NE of the target to one and one-half mile SE of the target. Bombing and strafing were both considered excellent although no results were observed.

Capt.GATH leading the third flight, made his bombing run at approximately 5000 feet. His approach on the target was short, but sufficient to line up with the target. His bombs hit in the village area. Results of his bombing were unobserved. He then circled out to sea and dropped to minimum altitude for the strafing run, hitting the coast approximately 1 mile above the target and strafed area from approximately 1000 yards above village to theSend of the target.

Lt.HOTZ right wing man swung wide to the target on the approach, and all his bombs were dropped in the clearing South of the target. He also circled out to sea and made a long strafing run, strafing both N and S sides of target and target as well.

Due to the short approach, Lt.SALTERS #3 position, was forced to make his run just left of the target, and his bombs fell in the wa ter, his strafing run was/made along the edge of the coast from approxi mately 1000 yards N of the Village to ANOEMFOM CREEK.

The squadron reassembled North of the target and returned direct to base.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Very slight small arms fire encountered in target area from unknown positions.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil Fighter Cover.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN AIR.(Nil)

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for award of decorations.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.on Target
454	4	500 lb.	Inst.	4
097	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
058	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
379	4	500 lb.	Inst.	4
971	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
016	5	500 lb.	Inst.	5
382	4	500 lb.	Inst.	~~5~~ 4
591	5	500 lb.	Inst.	Nil
347	5	500 lb.	Inst.	Nil (Water)

TOTAL BOMBS DROPPED: 42 X 500 lb. Inst.
TOTAL IN TA RGET: 32 X 500 lb. Inst.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P	No.Rds.Card.	No.Rds.Fired	Gun Failure
454	4200	1060	Nil
097	4200	1060	Nil
058	4200	1855	Nil
379	4200	3530	Nil
971	4200	1590	Nil
016	4200	1590	Nil
382	4200	795	Nil
591	4200	1590.	Nil
347	4200	1325	Nil

TOTAL: 11395 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
097	K-21	30
379	K-21	30
016	K-21	30
347	K-21	30
347	K-22 17	40
382	K-21	30
591	K-21	30

TOTAL: 180 K-21 40 X K-22 17

6. SIGHTINGS

Road leading NW from Takar Village observed from 100' and appeared rutted and suitable for M/T.
Bridges along road in good condition.
From 100' small amount of stores in coconut plantation immediately S of target.
10-12 huts in target area appeared intact after bombing attack.
Most of huts apparently survived bombing attack.
Coastal road running SE from target well used in spots, overgrown with weeds at other points.
No signs of unusual activity in target area.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

K-21 Photos, s econd flight A/P #379 :
Photos 3-V-76-77,81,82,83,84,85, 86,90,91,92,93,95, 96,100, 101 show bomb smoke (probably from lead squadron bombing) ½ mile NW of target on coast.
Show own bomb hitting in clearing just S of coconut plantation at TAKAR VILLAGE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

K-21 Verticals: Photos third flight A/P #382.
Photos No.6-V-143, 144,145,146,163 and 164, show bomb smoke from previous flights. Show own bombs hitting on beach near the NW end of the village.

K-21 Thrid Flight A/P 016.
Excellent photos 4-0-106,107,108,109,112,113,124,126. Show coastline but little information of value.

K-17 Obliques, Third Flight A/P 347.
LO-4,28,29,31. Excellent photos but show little of value.

For Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Route to an d From Target.
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

Distrubution:

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attentipn of: A.C. of S., A-2.
2 " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


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Sawar & Maffin
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Hollandia
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Hansa Bay
Annanberg
Madang
Bena Bena
NADZAB
LAE
NEW GUINEA
PORT MORESBY
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO:
DATE-
345th BOMB GROUP
BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET:
ALTITUDE:
GROUP PHOTO
A. GWIAZDA


WENTOR RIVER AREA
Legend
14th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.-135-D
Altitude- 5300- Minimum
T.O.T.- 1035 - 1045/k
Order over target- 2nd.
Heading- 132 Degrees
Took photos- T
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Reference- Wendor River Area-
1/20000
PACIFIC OCEAN
Strafing Run MINIMUM ALT.
Bombing Run ALT. 5300'
Black Sand Beach
5 Bombs on Beach
TAKAR
Bombing Area
18 Bombs
19 Bombs SCATTered outside inner circle
CK.
PRAROMFON
ANDEMFON
38
7800
PATCHES of Sago Swamp
To Strafing Run
454
058
097
379
Oblique Photos 100' Vertical Photos 5300'
Oblique Photos 100'
016
971
347
382
591
To Rally Point
N
03
04
NATIVE COCO PTN.
TG.

499
136-E
15 May 4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

16 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 136-E. Performed on 15 May,1944 with Objective at FOE MAOE PLANTATION, SARMI, DUTCH N.G. (138°45'E - 01° 50'S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL' Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

A. This squadron with the other 3 squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group, was ordered to attack Target 6 X at FOE MAOE PLANTATION in the SARMI VILLAGE area on the morning of 15 May, 1944. Each Squadron to employ 6 B-25's bombing and strafing from minimum altitude.

B. RENDEZVOUS

Group Rendezvous was not accomplished because of an emergency landing which delayed take off and because strong winds necessitated reversal of take off direction. There was no Wing or Fighter rendezvous.

C. ATTACK

Six planes took off and six attacked the primary target. This Squadron employed one B-25-D-2 which was loaded with 4 X 500 lb. S/11 second delay fuse bombs and 5 B-25-D-1's whichwere loaded with 5 X 500 lb. S/11 second delay fuse bombs each. Of the 29 bombs carried, 29 were dropped in the target and a total of 7,155 rounds of .50 Cal. ammo was fired. Results of the attack were generally unobserved. However six buildings are known to have been destroyed and possibly more. Several bombs were dropped very near to two small fuel dumps with the probable damage resulting. Approach to the target was from SW to NE and formation over the target consisted of six planes abreast.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AIR.

1. Nil Interception occurred.
2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.
3. Nil E/A observed lost.

E. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	NADZAB Strip 3	0621/K.
TOT	POE MAOE PLANTATION	1149/K.
Landed	NADZAB Strip 3	1515/K.

F. ROUTE

BASE - DUMPU - ANNANBERG - TARGET.
BASE via GRIME PLAINS, SEPIK, RAMU AND MARKHAM VALLEYS.

2. PILOTS and PLANES P ARTICIPATING.

A. The 500th Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation. This Squadron was led by Capt.R.D.REINBOLD.

B. Flights were set up as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.R.D.REINBOLD	A/P	4564	Capt.P.GATH	A/P	971
1st.Lt.E.M.SLINEY	"	097	2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	"	014
2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	"	3475	2nd.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	"	301

* B-25-D-2.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION:

A. Details of the attack.

Capt.REINBOLD took off immediately behind the second flight of the 500th Squadron and followed in this position throughout the mission. The lead flight of the 500th Squadron and other two Squadrons were not seen for reasons stated under (Par.1 B.) Capt.REINBOLD followed the 500th flight to the SARMI Area and on sighting the target led the squadron to a descent from 9000 ft. to 1000 feet. His course from a point 20 miles SE of the target and several miles inland from the coast, was roughly parallel to the coast. Capt.REINBOLD led the squadron behind a range of low hills S of the target and then turned on to the axis of attack from SW to NE. He placed his second flight in echelon to the right and prepared for the attack. He led his flight across the Western part of the target over the reported Headquarter Area and roughly parallel to the coral surfaced M/T road.

He dropped his bombs at buildings with unobserved results. (8/11 second delay fuses made accurate observation impossible). He strafed the entire area and after crossing the coast near the ORAL River mouth turned right strafing a possibly serviceable lugger off shore of VANDOEMOHAR IS. He then assembled the Squadron and returned to base directly and independently of other Squadrons.

Lts. SLINEY and SELBY, number 2 and 3 respectively, stayed in close formation with the flight leader throughout the run with the exception of one time when Lt.SLINEY's throttles slipped and he forged ahead of the formation. He quickly remedied this situation and fell back into formation.
Lts. SLINEY and SELBY each dropped 5 bombs. Lt.SELBY's concentrated in the Hq.Area where two bombs were seen to crash through a building and explode among a group of 4 buildings. Lt.SLINEY's bombs were dropped at buildi ngs and were widely spaced than Lt.SELBY's.

Capt.OATH leading the second flight lined up to the right and abreast with the first flight for his bombing and strafing run. His flight had an excellent run along the entire right side of the target. All his five bombs were dropped in the target at shacks with good results. His strafing along the entire run was successful as well, tracers were seen hitting the huts and slaks in the target he also strafed a lugger which was anchored on the beach of the small Island N.E. of the ORAL RIVER mouth.

Lt.Pal mer and Lt.BOTZ right and left wingmen respectively, stayed in close formation with Capt.OATH. Lt.PALMER made his run along the right edge of the target and dropped all his 5 bombs in the target, results were unobserved however.
Lt.BOTZ hit area on the right side of the "Coral Surfaced" road dropping 4 bombs at shacks, one of which was seen to hit directly between 2 of them, the other comb was observed to hit in the road. Both wingmen heavily strafed along the entire run.

After the bombing and strafing run, Capt.OATH turned r ight, out to sea, assembled his flight and joined the first flight for return direct to base.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Nil A/A fire observed.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil Fighter cover provided.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN AIR & ON GRD. UNK.

1. Nil damage to Friendly Planes.
2. Nil damage to A/B.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. SITUATIONS

1. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. In Target
454	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4
097	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4
347	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4
971	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4
014	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4
[illegible]	4	M/11 Sec.	500 lb.	4

TOTAL: 24 x 500 lb. M/11 sec. delay bombs dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
014	4800	795
097	4800	1385
347	4800	1385
454	4800	1060
591	4385	1385
971	4385	1285

Total Rds. Fired 7155 M. 50 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
454	K-21	30
097	K-21	30
591	K-17	54
014	K-21	30

TOTAL: 90 K-21 54 K-17

6. SIGHTINGS

Bivouac Area at 553567. Numerous buildings, signs of activity an d many slit trenches.
Medium A/A position #16 was observed to be covered with foliage and apparently unoccupied.
2 luggers and 3-4 barges on beach near jetty at SARMI.
From 3000 feet at position 138°20' 40" E - 2°15' 30"S, a group of 35-50 European type houses and native huts observed.
Near Main building a flag pole with a Japanese flag flying. Bridges and roads on coast in this vicinity well used.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos 10-G-874 thru 10-G-878, A/P No.87First Flight, confirm flight line over target and show bomb bursts near building areas but damage not assessable. Photo 10-G-874 on the right margin of the photo in a cleared area shows objects on ground spaced regularly in rows. Possibly a garden. A poor track leads to the area but no huts are in the vicinity.

Photos No.8-G-807 thru 8-G-810 A/P #214 Second Flight show bombs exploding in building areas, damage not assessable. Photos 8-G-809-809-810-811-812 show many shelter trenches, a sawmill and 5 or 6 tracks nearby.

A-17 Photos 1-G-2 thru 116, show bomb bursts near building areas and four trucks near main road and possible camouflaged dump nearby. Also 11 scattered piles of barrels in West side of road .

For Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.

Distribution:
(1 copy) Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of: A.G. of S., A-2.
2 " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
" A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Gp. APO 713-1.


53
58
PACIFIC OCEAN
N
Legend
15th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.- 136-E
Altitude- 50 - 100 Ft.
T.O.T.- 1149-1150/k
Order over target- 4th
Heading- 30 Degrees
Took photos- T
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Reference- Sarmi Area
ORAL RIVER
55
59
SAGO SWAMP
T.G.


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Bena Bena
NADZAB
LAE
PORT MORESBY
ADMIRALTY IS.
NEW GUINEA
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: 136-E DATE-15/5/44
345th BOMB GROUP
499 BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1149/K
ALTITUDE: Minimum
PHOTO
3DA

499
137-F
16 May 44
JCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

17 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 137-F. Performed on 16 May,1944 with objective, Jetty on TOR RIVER, SARMI, DUTCH, N.G. (138°55'E 01°55'S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 713-1. (Attention of:A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL

A. This Squadron and the other three Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group, were ordered to attack targets on the TOR RIVER on the morning of 16 May,1944. Each Squadron was to employ 6 B-25's bombing from medium altitude and then strafing from minimum altitude. The target for this Squadron was a Jetty on the W bank of the river near the mouth.

B. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute. to GUSAP. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

C. ATTACK

Only five planes of this Squadron took off when mechanical difficulties grounded the sixth. All fives the planes taking off attacked the target as planned. The approach was from SE overland to NW on a course of 345° at 5000 feet. Formation over the target consisted of two flights "javelin down" with 3 planes in the first flight and two in the second. The lead plane of each flight was equipped with a D-8 bombsight with the wing planes bombing "on" the respective flight leaders. Bomb load for the two lead planes (B-25-D-2's) was 4 X 500 lb. instantaneous fuse bombs and for the three wing planes (B-25-D-1's) 5 X 500 lb. Instant. fuse bombs. Of the 23 bombs carried, 23 were dropped in the target. One direct hit and several very near misses were scored with the result that approx imately 20 foot section of the jetty was destroyed and damage to the rest. On the strafing run a total of 6,195 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended with no visible damage resulting.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AIR.

1. Nil Interception occured.
2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.
3. Nil Enemy planes observed lost.

E. TIME AND LOCA TION OF:

Take off:	Strip 3 NADZAB	0713/K.
Op. Rendesvous	LERON RIVER	0730/K.
Bombs Away,	Target	1040/K.
Landed	Base	1350/K.

F. ROUTE

Out: Base - GUSAP - ATEMBLE - LAKE KARAMAMBO - Pt. 25 Miles SW HOLLANDIA - TARGET.

Return: Reciprocal of "Route Out".

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

A. This Squadron, led by Capt.P.GATH, led the Group FORMATION.

B. Flights were set up as follows:

First Flight		Second Flight	
Capt .P GATH	A/P 382 *	2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	A/P 454 *
1st.Lt.R.W.GRAHAM	" 971	1st.Lt.E.M.SLINKY	" 016
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTERS	" 097		

* D-2's.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

A. Details of Attack.

Capt.GATH approached the target from the SE and used as his I.P. a point 10 miles upstream on the TOR RIVER. He observed a formation of B-24's cutting across his axis of attack and in order to clear them he made a 360° turn which allowed the "Heavy Bombers" to clear the area. He followed the river and gave the Bombardier plenty of time to make his calculations. In spite of cloud cover over the target, the bombardier released his 4 bombs directly on the target scoring one direct hit.

Lts.GRAHAM and SALTER, number 2 and 3 position respectively, released their 5 bombs as the first bomb dropped from the lead plane. Their bombs were more closely spaced than those of the lead plane and consequently their bombs landed approximately 100 feet short of the target where the second bomb of the lead plane hit. After "bombs away", Capt.GATH led the Squadron in a wide 360° circle to the left crossing the coast above SARMI VILLAGE to avoid A/A positions which are scattered between the target and the village. He let down to approximately 1000 feet and turned on a course of 60° at a point 2 miles South of SARMI. Just before reaching MAFFIN DROME the flight began it's strafing run and strafed the area thru the bombing target with nil visible results. Capt.GATH then turned out to sea climbing slowly and made one, 360° turn to Rally the Squadron and Group. When the squadron had resumed formation he proceeded on course to base. The return was without incident.

Lt.SUMMERS with Lt.SLINEY on his right wing, flew directly behind the lead flight on the bombing run. His bombardier dropped his bombs indepently of the first flight and Lt.SLINEY released "on" the lead plane. All 9 bombs exploded within effective range of the bridge but with no direct hits. After making the bombing run, Lt.SUMMERS followed the lead flight in trail at 30 seconds interval and strafed the area covered by the lead flight with similar results. Lt.SUMMERS resumed formation as Capt.GATH was circling and returned to base without mishap.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

At a point just S of SARMI the formation received 3 bursts of medium fire from unobserved positions. The bursts were accurate but not close enough to cause serious damage. The number 3 plane of the lead flight sustained minor damage. Bursts were at 900ft. just under and to the left of the formation from positions near SARMI VILLAGE. 3 bursts ~~light~~ MED. A/A fire received from positions near MAFFIN DROME. Bursts were at 75 feet to left and above formation out of range and inaccurate.
This Squadron received no Heavy A/A fire possibly because fire was directed at B-24's in the area at 6-7000 feet. A total of 17 bursts were observed accurate as to height but inaccurate to one side of the formation.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil fighter cover provided.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/Pls IN AIR.

1. Nil E/A damaged.

2. One plane this squadron sustained minor damage to undersurface of left wing from medium A/A fire.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendation for awards will be forwarded.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bombs Carr'd.	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target
382	8	500 lb.	Instant.	6
971	8	500 lb.	Instant.	8
097	8	500 lb.	Instant.	4
454	4	500 lb.	Instant.	4
016	8	500 lb.	Instant.	8

TOTAL: 28 X 500 lb. Instant. bombs were dropped.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Carr'd.	No.Rds.Fired
382	4200	1795
971	4200	530
097	4200	1855
454	4200	1325
016	4200	1690

TOTAL: 6195 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
382	K-21	30
971	K-21	30

TOTAL: 60 K-21 photos taken.

6. SIGHTINGS

Several buildings under construction in target area.
Bridge over Oral River in good condition.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos: 5-V-22, 29, 41 and 42 show bomb run, bombs dropping and bomb bursts. Confirm crews reports.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT R.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Distribution:

1 copy:COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
" " Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 928.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.


To Strafing Run
23 Bombs
Bombing Run
FLAT COASTAL PLAIN
48
73
Village
TOR RIVER
382
097
T971
454
T016
2ND. Flight 35 Yds
Behind Lead Flight
Strafing Run
Legend
17th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.- 137-F
Bombing altitude- 5,000 Ft,
F.O.T.- 1040/k
over target- 1
ing- 345 Degrees
Took photos- T
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Reference- Tor River Area
Scale 1/20,000
N
45
75
IBRIM RIVER
TOR RIVER
TOR RIVER
0
500
1000
2000 Yds
Ginnelly


N
Manokwari
Ransiki
Moem
Sagan
Nabire
Timoeka
Sawar & Maffin
Wakde
Hollandia
Aitape
Wewak
Hansa Bay
Annanberg
Madang
Bena Bena
NADZAB
LAE
PORT MORESBY
ADMIRALTY IS.
NEW GUINEA
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: 137-E DATE-17Th
345th BOMB GROUP MAY
499Th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1040/K
ALTITUDE: 5,000 FT.

499
138-E
17 may 44
JCH

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

18 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 138-E. Performed on 17 May,1944 with objective at SARMI, DUTCH, N.G. (138° 45'E-001° 50'S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. The assigned mission was to attack supplies and installations in FOE MAOE PLANTATION at SARMI on 17 May,1944. All four Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group were to participate in the "Strike" each employing 8 B-25's bombing from medium altitude and then descending to strafe from minimum altitude. All squadrons had as a target an area approximately 3500 yards by 1700 yards located just E of the coral surfaced M/T road 1 mile from the coast.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the LERON RIVER with a minimum of time and maneuver. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and attacked the target from medium altitude. The approach was a course from SE - NW parallel to the coastline, approximately 10 miles inland and then turning right onto the axis of attack along the ORAI RIVER. Formation over the target consisted of two three plane "V's" javelin down. The lead plane (B-25-D-2) of each flight was equipped w ith a D-8 Bombsight and loaded with 4 X 500 lb. instantaneous fuse demo bombs. The wing planes (B-25-D-1's) had no bombsight and were loaded with 5 X 500 lb. instantaneous fuse demo bombs. All bombs were dropped outside the assigned target. Crews report a small fire with a column of black smoke to 150 feet resulted from bombing of the lead flight. One "Native Type" building was definitely destroyed and several others were destroyed or severly damaged as a result of bombing by the #2 Flight.

The Group Leader (For unknown reasons) ~~deigned~~ did not to make a minimum altitude attack therefore, this squadron followed his example.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil Interception occurred.

2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

3. Nil Enemy planes observed lost.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF;

Take off	Strip #3 NADZAB	0710/K
Group Rendezvous	LERON RIVER	0726/K
On Course for Target		0737/K
Over LAKE KARAMAMBO		0900/K
T.O.T.	"SARMI"	1028/K
Landed:	BASE	1352/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE LERON RIVER GUCAP ANNAMBERG LAKE KARAMAMBO TARGET.

In : Reciprocal of Route Out.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. The 501st Squadron led by Major MARSTON (Asst. Group A-3) led the Group Formation. The 500th Squadron flew in the #2 position; the 499th Squadron in #3 position and the 498th Squadron in the #4 position.

b. Squadron

1. Capt.RICHARD BAKER was selected to lead the Squadron Formation.

2. Flights were set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.R.BAKER	A/P	454*	2nd.Lt.W.A.SELBY	A/P	382 *
2nd.Lt.P.N.FOX	"	016	2nd.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	"	058
2nd.Lt.B.K.PALMER	"	014	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	"	097

* B-25-D-2

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

Capt.R.BAKER assembled the Squadron soon after take off and joined the Group Formation at the LERON RIVER. He held the Squadron in this position until the target was sighted. As the Lead Squadron turned on to the bomb run, Capt.BAKER led the Squadron in a slightly wider turn to obtain the proper interval between the two Squadrons. He made an excellent bomb run exactly on the prearranged altitude of 6500 feet and airspeed of 200 mph. His bombardier sighted incorrectly, however, and all bombs were dropped 50 - 100 feet outside the target area (see Incl.1).

Lieuts. FOX and PA LMER (No.2 and 3 respectively) released their bombs"on" the lead plane, thier 5 bombs (each) making a total of 14 bombs dropped by this flight.

After "Bombs Away" Capt.BAKER prepared to descend to strafing altitude but noted that the Group Leader remained at bombing altitude. Capt.BAKER followed the lead Squadron on a 180° turn and another run over the target where bombs were released by the "Lead Squadron". Capt.BAKER then followed the Lead Squadron when it pulled off the target on course for base. The return flight was without incident.

The second flight led by Lt.SELBY made it's bombing run on the same altitude a nd approximately 200 yards behind the first flight. He dropped 4 bombs on the left side of the coral surfaced road with unobserved results. After the bomb run, he cut slightly to th e left and began dropping altitude for the strafing run, but seeing the first flight did not make any attempt to prepare for the strafing run, he cut back to the right, followed the first flight on the turn and second pass over the target then headed direct to base.

Lts.HOTZ and SALTER, No.2 and 3 positions respectively, kept close formation with Lt.SELBY and dropped their bombs "on" the lead plane, all bombs dropped outside the assigned target. Lt.HOTZ's bombs were observed to hit and possibly destroy 4 "Native Type" buildings, other results of bombing were unobserved.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Nil A/A fire encountered.

c. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil fighter cover provided.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil casualties to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

In view of information currently at hand, no recommendation for awards will be made.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Carried	No. Dropped in Target
* 454	4 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil
016	5 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil
014	5 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil
* 382	4 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil
058	5 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil
097	5 X 500 lb. Inst. demo.	Nil

TOTAL: 28 X 500 lb. Inst. demo bombs dropped.
All bombs were in Target 6 X, but none were in the target assigned to this Squadron.

* B-25-D-2's.

PHOTO TABLE

Plane #382 wasonly plane to take pictures (30 K-21 photos)

6. SIGHTINGS

Bivouac area reported on 15 May at 550570 (ORAI RIVER Hasty Map 1-20,000) occupied by many tents on that date. Only 3 tants reported in same area this date.
Bridge across ORAI RIVER still intack - in good condition.
Damaged lugger attacked off VANDENOEAR ISLAND on May 15 was observed on fire, burning with black column of smoke. No activity of any kind observed in landing area with exception of friendly surface vessels.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos 3-V-82,83,85,86, A/P 382, No.1 plane 2nd.Flight.

Show bomb bursts from bombs dropped by both flights. With the possible exception of 1 bomb all bombs are bursting outside the portion of target 6 X which was assigned but still within the outer limits of 6 X.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PEG/rjl.

PAT E.GOFORTH
CAPT., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-2 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.


Scattered Patches of Sago Swamp
PACIFIC OCEAN
To Rally Point
58
53
Legend
17th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.-138-E
Bombing altitude- 6500 Ft. Ind.
T.O.T.- 1028/k
Order over target- 2nd
Took photos-
Heading- 25 Degrees
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Reference - Orai River Area
Scale - 1/ 20,000
Sago Swamp
ORAI RIVER
14 Bombs
14 Bombs
ANOEAR CR.
Sago Swamp
014 T T 54 To 16
097 T T 382 To 58
55
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
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Manokwari
Ransiki
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Sawar & Maffin
Wakde
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Aitape
Wewak
Sagan
Nabire
NEW GUINEA
Hansa Bay
Timoeka
Annanberg
Madang
Bena Bena
NADZAB
LAE
PORT MORESBY
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: 138-E DATE- 12th MAY
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1028/K
ALTITUDE: Bombing 10,000'
Strafing 50-150'
GROUP PHOTO
L. GWIAZD

4499
JCH 139-A
18 May 44

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (L) AA F
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

19 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 139-A. Performed 18 May,1944 with Objective at WEWAK, NEW GUINEA. (03°35' S - 145° 005'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERA L, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. The assigned mission for the 345th Group was to attack objectives in the WEWAK Area each using 6 B-25-"s bombing from medium altitude and then descending to strafing altitude to sweep BUT, DAGUA, WEWAK and BORAM Dromes. Two Squadrons were to bomb the WEWAK-BORAM Area and two Squadrons to bomb the BUT DAGUA Area . Specific bombing targets were not directly assigned but rather, four possible targets were assigned and the selection made by the bombardiers during the a ttack.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accom plished enroute to the target. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

2. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and six attacked as ordered. The target selected by the two bombardiers was V Bomber Command Target #27-D, just W of MISSION PT. The approach was from E to W along the coastline. Formation over the target consisted of two, 3 plane "V's" attacking individually at an indicated altitude of 6500 feet. The lead plane of each flight (B-25-D-2) was equipped with a D-8 Bombsight and the two wing planes (B-25-D-1's) bombing "on" the lead plane. Bomb load for the two lead planes was 2 X 1000 lb. instantaneous fuse bombs, and for the wing planes, 3 bombs of the same type and weight. Of the 16 bombs carried, 16 were dropped. However a malfunction of the Bombsight (cross trail wire out of alignment) and a rack malfunction caused 11 bombs to be dropped in the water off shore.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Five bombs were dropped accurately in the N part of Target 27-D with nil visible results. During the strafing a total of 23,000 rounds of ammunition were fired. Five trucks were heavily damaged, supplies were shot up and 3 enemy personnel were killed. Extent of damage to installations, buildings and supplies is impossible to determine but probably substantial.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.
2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.
3. Nil Enemy Planes observed lost.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off:	STRIP #3 HADZAB	0900/K.
Gp.Rendezvous	Enroute	
T.O.T.	WEWAK	1100/K.
Land at BASE		1255/K.

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE ANNANBERG MOUTH SEPIK RIVER TARGET:
In : DIRECT TO BASE.

g. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

a Group:

The 498th Squadron led by Lt.TURK was assigned to lead the Group Formation with the 499th,500th and 501st Squadrons in #2,3 & 4 positions respectively.

b. Squadron:

1. Lt.E.M.SLINEY was selected to lead this Squadron.

2. Flights of this Squadron were set up as follows:

FIR ST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1s t.Lt.E.M.SLINEY	A/P	4 54 *	2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P	379*
2nd.Lt. P. L.NELSON	"	097	2Nd.Lt.F.N.FOX	"	014
1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	591	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	"	058

* B-25-D-2's.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of attack:

Lt.SLINEY assembled the Squadron in a wide 180° turn after take off and flew in loose formation with the lead Squadron to the mouth of the SEPIK RIVER where he pulled into close formation in the number two position. He led the Squadron on a run from E to W just inland from the coastline. His bombardier selected the area just W of MISSION POINT and made his calculations during a 1 eng approach. He attempted to release his bombs but was able to do so only after working the release switch several times. For this reason his bombs as well as those of the two wingmen, dropped in the water. After bombs away, Lt.SLINEY flew up the coast over the water to the vicinity of BUT DROME and descended to strafing altitude and began strafing along the coastline from W to E. Lt.SLINEY with Lieuts.NELSON and GRAHAM (#2 & 3 respectively) attacked grounded U/S planes on all four dromes, scattered piles of supplies and buildings in the entire run which was not broken off until a point 15 miles E of BRAM was reached. The damage inflicted by this flight was generally unobserved but many hits were scored on various targets with probably damage resulting. After breaking off the attack, Lt.SLINEY circled once, gaining altitude, and assembled the Squadron. Return to base was without incident.

Lt.PALMER leading the second flight, followed the Leading Flight in for the bombing run, but released his bombs only after breaking away slightly to the left of the First Flight when it headed out towards WEWAK PT. He dropped his 2 bombs on the road which runs parallel to the coast in the Northern part of Target 27-D, results on his bombing was unobserved. He then proceeded South of WEWAK PT. following the coastline to a point just West of BUT DROME, where he circled to the left, dropping altitude for his strafing run. He strafed BUT and DAGUA Strips, 3 "Barrack Type" builings at WEWAK MISSION then made a run across BORAM STRIP and heavily strafed 3 M/T and a gas dump at the fork of roads on the East end of Boram Strip. Lt.PALMER then circled once to reform his flight and followed the First Flight direct to base.

Lt.FOX left wingman dropped his bombs "on" the lead plane with unobserved results. Lt.SALTER right wing, dropped his bombs late, and all 3 bombs were seen to hit in the water. Both Lieuts. FOX and SALTER followed the flight leader on the second run and strafed heavily along the entire run with unobserved results.

h. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE.

1. This Squadron was subjected to no known A/A fire.

2. Gun flashes were observed from a position on a small ridge probably E of BORAM DROME. The position of 3 guns (probably 20 mm) was manned by 6-8 personnel.

g. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil fighter cover observed.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR.

1. Nil E/A damaged.

2. Nil planes of this Squadron damaged.

e. 1. Nil personnel of this Squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission provided no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. dropped on Target
454 *	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil (Bombsight Malfunctior
097	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil
591	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil.
379*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	Two
014	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	Three
058	4	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil (Late releasing, all bombs in water).

TOTAL: 16 X1000 lb. bombs dropped. 5 Bombs in Target.
Due to malfunction stated above, all bombs of the first flight were dropped in the water.
* B-25-D-2's.

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired.	
014	4200 rds.	3445	
058	4200 rds.	2385	2500 Rds. .30 Cal.
097	4445 rds .	3445	1600 Rds. .30 Cal.
454	4200 rds.	1326	2000 Rds. .30 Cal.
379	4200 rds.	2915	
591	4200 rds.	3445	

TOTAL Rds. Fired 16960 X.50 Cal. 6100 X.30 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
591	K-20	40
379	K-21	30
097	K-21	30
014	K-21	30

TOTAL: 90 K-21 40 K-20 photos taken.

6. SIGHTINGS

30 - 35 slit trenches at SE end of DAGUA STRIP.
3 M/T and large number of fuel drums at 374045
(WEWAK WEST 1" - 1 mile Prov).
4 -5 barrack type buildings on West side of WEWAK TOWNSHIP on side of cliff between water' edge and top. Buildings in usable condition.
6 rows of square piles of bags (possibly sand bags) each stacked 6-10 deep between MISSION POINT and CAPE BORAM 1/8 mile inland from shore.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

K-21 vertical 6-V-127 A/P 379 second flight. Shows 2 fuel fires. One probably a burning barge and the other of undetermined origin. Shows former S/L position just NW of the W end of BORAM DROME near the coast. Damage from previous raids and other information shown is already a matter of record.

K-21 Obliques 5-O-116, 117,120,121, A/P #14 Second flight shows part of strafing run but no assessable damage. 1 M/T is shown.

K-17 Obliques 8-V-9, 14,22,23,24,29,30,32,35,36,37, 39,40. A/P #591 first flight. Show strafing run from vicinity of main village (between But &Dagua) to point of Boram Drome. Photos of Drome areas plainly show devasted condition.
Photos 2-O-29 Vicinity SMAIN VILLAGE shows M/T parked on road with nearby shelters.
2-O-14 DAGUA - Known information.
2-O-22 Cape PUS - Roads leading into trees. Supply dump area?
2-O-24 Possible former campsite in trees between road and coast now deserted.

(Photo Interpretation Con'td).

2-0-29 Bridge over unnamed River midway between CAPE WOM and WEWAK PT. destroyed.
2-0-30 HAUIRE VILLAGE.
2-6-32 SE dispersal area WEWAK STRIP. Several M/T scattered supplies and one DINAH in apparently good condition.
2-0-35 SW corner of W end of BORAM DROME - M/T with derrick, arrangement just behind cab.
2-0-36 Rise S of Center BORAM DROME location of former A/A position - stack of supplies on road just S of former position. Ammo? Wrecked M/T.
2-0-37 S side of BORAM DROME. 3 M/T.
2-0-38 Area S of BORAM DROME.
2-0-40 Showing position from which gun flashes observed. At SW end BRANDI PTN. Former S/L position.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PEG/rjl

PAT.E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:- 1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:- 2 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:
(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO ~~X~~13-1
1 " Intelligence Officer, 345th Bomb Group (M), APO 713-1.

MAP REF:-
EASTERN NEW GUINEA
NAVIGATION CHART
[illegible] Scale:- 1:2,045,[illegible]
[illegible] 2 Naut. Miles = 1 inch
[illegible]ercator Projection

MISSION NO. 139-A DATE 18th MAY "19
SQUADRON NO. 499th GROUP 345th
SQUADRON LEAD OVER TARGET 2nd.
ALTITUDE Bombing 6500' Strafing 50-150 ft.
TIME OVER TARGET 1100-1115 K
T (BLUE) PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T (BLACK) OTHER PLANES (ALL PLANES TO BE [illegible]
AT BEGINNING OF RUN.)

345th B.G.-5-2
Baldwin-

Legend

18th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.- 139-A
Bombing Alt.-6500 Ft. Strafing Alt. 50-150 Ft.
T.O.T.-1100-1115/k
Order over target- 2nd.
Heading- Bombing E.to W. Strafing-W. to E.
Took photos- T
Crews report on bombs falling- ⬭
Fires-
Map Reference- Vicinity of Wewack
1/25,000



DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
OK
JCH -
20 May 44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

21 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 141-D. Performed on 20 May,1944 with Objective at BANAK and KOFI Villages (03°25'S - 143°25'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

A. The assigned mission for the 345th Bomb Group was to attack objectives in the BUT-DAGUA area, on the morning of 20 May,1944. Each Squadron was to employ 6 B-25's bombing at medium altitude and then descending to make a strafing attack covering DAGUA DROME and the coastal area to BOIKEN VILLAGE. No specific targets were assigned, however the best targets were suggested and final selection left up to individual Squadrons. This Squadron selected the coastal area between BANAK and KOFI Villages where several hundred barrels were reported to be located.

B. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendesvous was accomplished over the LERON RIVER. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

C .ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and after flying through weather with some difficulty reached the target where cloud cover was only moderate. Approach to target was from E to W over to the coastline with formation being 2, 3 plane "V's" in trail. The lead plane of each flight (B-25-D-2's) was equipped with a D-8 bombsight and wingplanes (B-25-D-1's) were to bom b "on" the Flight Leaders. The aiming point for the first flight was a lagoon just E of KOFI VILLAGE. Aiming point for the second flight was a point midway between the two villages. The bombing altitude was 5000 feet (true). The bomb load for B-25 D-2's was 2 X 1000lb. instantaneous fuse demolition bombs and for B-25-D-1's 3 bombs of the same type.

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Of the 16 bombs carried, 16 were dropped in the target in excellent pattern. However the bombs fell some 150 feet farther inland than desired. Otherwise bombing accuracy was excellent. After bombs away the squadron turned out to sea and then made a descending left turn to execute the strafing pass. During this turn 2 large explosions were observed in the target subsequent to our own bomb bursts and at first were thought to be bomb bursts from other planes. However observation failed to reveal other planes over the area as confirmed by a subsequent check on reports. Small fires resulted and a moderate amount of grey smoke rose skyward. Definitely not an oil fire as would be expected but probably ammunition or explosives of some nature. The fires were of short duration but the smoke persisted for some time. On the strafing run a total of 12,565 rounds were expended with no visible results.

D. INTERCEPTION and A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil Interception occured.

2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

3. Nil Enemy planes observed lost.

E. TIMES AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	Strip #3 NADZAB	0710/K
On Course in	Group Formation	0736/K
Bombs Away -	Target	0904/K
Strafing Run	Target	0915/K
Break off	Attack Target	0920/K
Land at	Base	1100/K

F. ROUTE

Out: BASE LERON RIVER ANNANBERG MOUTH SEPIK RIVER TARGET.
In : Direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PLANES & PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

a. Group

This Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of the 499th, 500th, 501st, and 498th in 1,2,3,4 positions respectively.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

b. Squadron

Capt.RICHARD BAKER was selected to lead the Squadron Formation which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.R.BAKER	A/P	#454 *	Capt.P.GATH	A/P	#379 *
2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	"	014	2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS		391
1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	971	2nd.Lt.F.L.NELSON		016

* B-25-D-2's.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of the Attack

Capt.BAKER assembled the Squadron in tight formation six minutes after take off and proceeded to the LEBON RIVER where he assembled the Group and departed on course for the target. In the GUSAP area the Group formation broke up when it was necessary to climb through the overcast. This and unfavorable weather conditions along the route to the target, made it necessary that each Squadron proceed individually. Capt.BAKER brought the Squadron in on the bomb run as planned from E to W on the coast and at the specified time. While on the approach he observed several A-20's crossing the target at minimum altitude. However he saw that his bombs would clear the formation and continued on his run. Lieuts. PALMER and GRAHAM number 2 and 3 position respectively, released their bombs "on" Capt.BAKER. The flight dropped all eight of their bombs on the target area just inland from BAWAK VILLAGE. After the bombing attack, Capt.BAKER led the flight out to sea then let down in a left turn for the strafing run. He began strafing at the E end of BAGUA and strafed Villages and the road down to and including BOIKEN VILLAGE. Lieuts. PALMER and GRAHAM followed his example and broke off their attacks at BOIKEN VILLAGE. Capt.BAKER then turned left, out to sea and rallied the Squadron in a slow, wide turn. Return to base was without incident.

Capt.GATH, leading the second flight made his bomb run at 5000 ft. approximately 3000 yards behind the first flight. Observing the leading flight's bombs to be in the West end of the target, his bombardier determined to drop his bombs on the Eastern end.

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His bombs were dropped in the target area with unobserved results, however, smoke was observed in the target area and was believed to be results of the bombing by the first flight. After the bomb run he led his flight on out to sea, making a 180° turn West of DAGUA and dropped to minimum altitude for the strafing run. He strafed DAGUA STRIP heavily and the target as well, and continued his run to KARAWOP PTN. where he made another circle out to sea to join the first flight for his return to base.
Both Lt.SUMMERS and NELSON #2 and 3 positions respectively, dropped their bombs "on" the lead plane of their flight with unobserved results. Lt.SUMMERS strafed entire area from S.W. end of DAGUA STRIP toKARAWOP PTN. with unobserved results. Lt.NELSON's strafing run was limited since he was crowded off the coastline several times, however on the turn out to sea, he observed a "Church Type" building on the Western tip of KARASAU IS. and strafed it heavily, no fire was started, but building was damaged.
Both wingmen followed the Flight Leader on the route out from the target.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

At the beginning of the strafing run, moderate, accurate to inaccurate H/G fire was received from a position near the coast at the W end of DAGUA DROME. One plane sustained minor damage. Crew members who observed the fire from this position express the opinion that 3 guns were firing.

On the strafing run, 2 bursts of heavy A/A appeared at 100 feet altitude, ahead and to the right of the formation. The bursts were at a point 1 mile E of DAGUA VILLAGE.

Gun flashes were observed from a ridge 1½ miles SW of Cape KARAWOP. Two tracers crossed in front of the formation. The actual gun position was not observed.

On return to base over WEWAK 2 gun flashes were observed at the rear of WEWAK MISSION. Observation revealed no bursts of A/A in the air.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil Fighter cover observed.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's in THE AIR.

1. Nil E/A damaged.

2. One plane of this Squ adron damaged. Sustained one small hole (probably .303) in rudder. Minor damage.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil personnel of this Squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

1. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

8. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target
454*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
014	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
971	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
379*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
591	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
016	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3

Total: 16 X 1000 lb. Inst. Bombs dropped on target.
* B-25-D-2's

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds. Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
454	42 00	1590	
014	42 00	2650	1000 X.30 Cal.
971	42 00	2915	500 X.30 Cal.
379	42 00	795	
591	42 00	1325	
016	42 00	1590	

Total: 10965 X. 30 Cal. 1500 X.30 Cal. expended.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
014	K-21	30
454	K-21	30
971	K-17	20

TOTAL: 60 - K-21's 20 K-17's

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

6. SIGHTINGS

White smoke to 1000 feet at SMAIN VILLAGE (Thought to be result of A-20 attack).
Road between KARAWAP PLANTATION & BAGUA DROME used recently (fresh M/T tracks on road left wet by rain).

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Vertical 1-0-4: Shows bomb bursts from both flights 2nd. flight has turned slightly left after bomb release and are shown trailing the lead flight. Shows bombs falling farther inland than reported (K-17)

Vertical 1-0-10 Dagua Village and Lagoon.
Vertical 1-0-15 Kofi Village and Lagoon showing smoke over area, South of Benak Village.
Vertical 1-0-12 Boiken Ptn. Smoke over area W of the Mission.

Vertical 5-V-165 & 166 show this squadron's bombs bursting. Show also object on bottom of photo in clearing near coast. Possibly camouflaged dump or installation. Possibly canvas stretched over 2 poles which are visible. Photos are not clear enough to ascertain further details. No tracks or other signs of activity visible. (K-21)

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" -2 Route to and From target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1 .



Legend

20th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.-141-D
Bombing Faltitude- 5,000(True)
T.O.T.-0905/k
Strafing-Run-0915/k
Order over target - 1
Heading- 270-Degrees(bomb) 90(strafing)
Took photos- T
Crews report on bombs falling- O
Fires-
Map Reference- But East
Scale- 1/63,360

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By RLR/lm NARA, Date 5/20/91

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/97



ROUP PHOTO
GWIAZDA

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
142-C
21may44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

22 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 142-C performed on 21 May,1944 with objective in BUT DRUM Area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a The assigned mission for the 345th Bomb Group was to attack objectives in the BUT-DAGUA area on the morning of 21 May,1944. Each Squadron was to employ 6 B-25-'s bombing at medium altitude and then descending to make a strafing attack covering the coastal area from BUT DRUM to CAPE KARAWOP. No specific targets were assigned however, targets were suggested and final selection left up to individual squadrons. This Squadron selected an unnamed village S.E. of LOANEM VILLAGE where considerable activity was reported.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the LERON RIVER. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and six planes attacked the target as planned. The approach was from E to W over the ranges South of the target area then turning 180° to make the specified run from W to E over the village. The formation over the target consisted of 2, 3 plane "V's", javelin down at 5900 feet indicated altitude and 200 mph on a course of 85°. The lead plane of each flight (B-25-D-2's) was equipped with a D-8 bombsight and the wing planes, (B-25-D-1's) were released "on" the lead planes, Bomb load for the lead planes was 2 X 1000 lb. instantaneous demolition bombs and for the wing planes, 3 bombs of the same type. Of the 16 bombs loaded, 16 were dropped, just to the North of the village at Japanese encampment and one at a point 1½ mile S.W. of BAGNA DRUME. Because of difficulty in locating area of target, the Japanese encampment area was mistaken for the selected target. No photograph of the target were available consequently bombardier had to rely on a 1 inch to 1 mile map.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Results of the attack were generally unobserved. After the bomb run, the squadron took interval between flights in a descending turn. In this turn, one flight of the 498th Squadron passed over head and attacked in front of the lead flight. The second flight observed planes flying low over the coast and did not attack until all planes were clear. The coastal area was thoroughly strafed as ordered. With the exception of a small oil fire which was started at the E end of DAGUA DROME, results of the strafing attack were not apparent. The lead plane of the second flight was severely damaged by A/C fire. This plane and two wingplanes landed at SAIDOR. For further details refer ; Par.3 B and 3 D.

d. INTERCEPTION and A/P's destroyed In The Air

1. Nil Interception occurred.

2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

3. Nil enemy planes observed lost.

e. TIME & LOCATION OF:

Take off	SIRIP #3 NADZAB	0742/K
Rendezvous	LAE-MADANG RIVER	0750/K
On Course	FOR TARGET	0801/K
BOMBING ATTACK		0937/K
STRAFING ATTACK		0943/K - 0952/K
LANDED	BASE	1150/K

f. TARGET

Unit: MASS LOW LEVEL ATTACKS MOUTH SEPIK RIVER TARGET.

In: Direct (First Flight) Second Flight: Target down the coast to SAIDOR - Base via FINSCHHAFEN.

2. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS ATTACKING.

a. Group

The 500th Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of 500th, 501st, 498th, 499th in 1,2, 3, and 4 positions respectively.

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b. Squadron

Capt.P.GATH was selected to lead the squadron formation which consisted of the following planes and pilots.

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.P.GATH	A/P	379*	1st.Lt.E.E.SELNEY	A/P	429*
2nd.Lt.F.X.[illegible]R	"	014	2nd.Lt.H.E.SUMMERS	"	340
2nd.Lt.F.L.NELSON	"	591	2nd.Lt.R.R.HOPE	"	371

* B-25-D-2's

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack

Capt.GATH assembled the Squadron soonafter take off and joined the Group Formation at the LAUNCH POINT. Flight to the target was without incident. On reaching the target area, Capt.GATH broke away from the Group Formation which flew N over the target, out to sea and then turning left on to the bomb run from N to E. Capt.GATH after leaving the Group, flew over the coastal range and then turned right on the bomb run as was originally planned. Hisbombardier released his bombs just short of the village, because the village was observed to be mostly destroyed by previous strikes. Lt.RALSER and Lt.NELSON, number 2 and 3 position respectively, released their bombs as the first bomb dropped from the bombay of the lead plane, making a total of eight bombs dropped in this area. Results of bombing by this flight were not apparent. After bombs away, Capt.GATH turned left and descended to strafing altitude. In this turn one flight of the 498th Squadron passed in front of the lead flight. Capt.GATH followed this flight in on the strafing run. He checked the area for other planes but did not see two flights which had started a run approximately 5 miles up the coast from BUT [illegible]. Capt.GATH led the flight in ahead of these planes with ample clearance and made his run down the coast with his flight in a loose"V". He strafed down the coast and broke off the run at a point just S of [illegible]. He then circled for the second flight to join the formation. However the second flight was not seen after breaking off the attack. Capt.GATH circled once again in the [illegible] A/A but was still unable to locate this second flight.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

Lt.SLINEY, leading the second flight with Lts. SMITH and HOTZ on his wings followed Capt.JAMES with a good deal of interval. His bombardier released one bomb on the area just to the N of the village. The two wingmen released at the same time making a total of 7 bombs in this area. The lead plane dropped one bmb in the area near the SW corner of BUT DROME. After bombs away, Lt.SLINEY followed the lead flight on the approach to the strafing run. However, just before turning on to the attack he observed other planes approaching to intercept his course. Since he was some distance behind the first flight he was unable to attack without exposing his flight to fire from the approaching planes. Consequently he turned back and out to sea then circled until all planes were clear of the target. He began his attack 2 miles N of BUT DROME and strafed down the coast. Lt.HOTZ observed fire from a position on the N side of BUT DROME and placed it under fire silencing the gun. At the E end of BUT DROME Lt.SLINEY shot up a pile of fuel drums with a resultant fire. At the same time he was under fire from a A/C position located on a cliff-side just SE of the drome. The intense A/C fire struck the right engine severing fuel, hydraulic and emergency air lines. It was immediately necessary to feather the prop on the right engine. After getting the plane under control and getting rid of all excess ammunition and equipment, he began to gain altitude. His flight escorted him to SALBRIS where an emergency landing was made, with minor injuries to the crew, in spite of the damage to the plane. On the landing, the nosewheel strut was damaged and one of the main gear struts was also damaged. Otherwise the plane was not damaged in landing, but on investigation it was found that the right engine sustained considerable damage. The crew returned to base in the other two planes of the flight.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

A/C fire was received from a position at the North side of the center of BUT DROME between the runway and the coast. From the volume of fire, only 1 gun is indicated. The gun ceased fire when strafed. Fire from the gun was slight, light, inaccurate.

Intense, accurate A/C fire was received from a position on a cliffside, 1 mile SE of BUT DROME. The plane severely damaged.

c. [illegible]

Nil Fighter Cover provided.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR.

Plane #429 damaged by A/C fire which struck the right engine severing oil lines, hydraulic lines, fuel lines, emergency air brake lines which were literally selved. The engine sustained further damage which could not be ascertained in the brief inspection which followed the landing at SAIDOR. In addition, control and wing surfaces, nose section, and fuselage were holed. On landing the nosewheel strut was damaged beyond repair and one of the main gear struts was damaged.

e. CASUALTIES.

1. In the emergency landing at SAIDOR, S/Sgt.HAROLD F.STRICKLAND, ASN 35316695, sustained a badly wrenched knee and ruptured blood vessels. These injuries necessitated hospitalization.

4. CITATIONS

a. Lt.E.K.BLISS and crew will be recommended for award of the D.F.C. for extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight.

b. In the event that S/Sgt.STRICKLAND is not awarded a Purple Heart while in the hospital, his recommendation will be initiated in this unit.

5. Bombs

BOMBS DROPPED

A/P No.	No. Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target
379*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
014	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
591	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
429*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	1 (1 bomb off target)
340	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
971	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3

TOTAL: 16 X 1000 lb. Inst. demo bombs dropped.
15 X 1000 lb. Inst. demo bombs dropped on target.
* Lead A/C's.

AMMO EXPENDED

A/P No.	No. Rds. Car'd.	No. Rds. Fired.
379	4200	1325
014	4200	2385
591	4200	2650
429	4200	700
340	4200	2650
971	4200	2965

Total: 12675 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
345	A-10	20
014	A-21	25
379	A-21	30
971	K-21	30
Total:	85 K-21's	20 A-17's.

6. SIGHTINGS

Crash landed plane, twin engine, unknown type, (A-20 or B-25) on side of ridge near A/C position which damaged our plane. Plane was not extensively broken up nor was it burned. 2 crew members made this sighting during strafing run consequently only a glimpse was possible.
On return, from 1 mile off coast of Wewak, at 600 feet a fire with black smoke up to 500 feet originating S of Boram Strip.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

K-21 Verticals: #2-V-30,31,34 & 35, A/P #379, first Flight, are numbered in reverse order of exposure. Photos clearly show truck, village, terrain and creeks at a Jap camp area 2 miles SW of [illegible]. Show first flight's bomb smoke over area just N. of Village on hillside.

K-21 Obliques: #1-O-6, 7,10,11,17 and 18. A/P #014 First Flight taken from very low altitude show previously known damage at DA[illegible]. Photos 17 & 18 show 7 or 8 bombs in a pit at E end of the drome on the S side.

A-17 Obliques: 9-O-254,58,59,61,64,68.
54-58: High angle oblique looking up coast toward Tadji showing But Drome and bomb smoke. No damage can be seen.
59-64: Show coastline during strafing attack.

256: On east side of creek S of road a Jap in a possible M/G Pit. To left, barrels and other objects (possible wrecked plane) are seen.

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT [illegible].GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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By RLB/Int NARA, Date 5/20/97



21 May, 1944
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 142-C
Bombing Altitude: 5900 ' Ind.
Bombing Run: 0937/K
Strafing Run: 0947/K - 0952/K.
Order over Target: 1st. Flight following 498th.
Second flight last over Target.
Heading 85°.
Took Photos
Crews report on bombs falling.
Fires.
Map Ref: But West Scale: 1/63360

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 142-C DATE- 21 May '44
345th BOMB GROUP
489th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET:

IP PHOTO

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499
143-D
FFO
23 May 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

23 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 143-D performed on 22 May,1944 with Objective in the DAGUA DROME Area. 3°25'S - 145°20'E.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

I. GENERAL

A. The assigned mission for the 345th Bomb Group was to attack objectives in the BUT - DAGUA Area on the morning of 22 May,1944. Each Squadron was to employ 6 B-25's bombing from medium altitude and then descending to make a strafing attack covering the coastal area from BUT DROME to CAPE KARAWOP. The two targets assigned to this Squadron were reported M/G positions - one at DAGUA VILLAGE and the other at the W end of KARAWOP PLANTATION on the coast.

B. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished at the LERON RIVER. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

C. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and six attacked the assigned targets as ordered. The approach from SE to NW out to sea then turning left onto the bomb run from W to E. Formation over the target consisted of two, 3 plane "V's" in trail. The bombing altitude was 5200 feet at an airspeed of 200 mph. This squadron was number 3 over the target. The lead plane of each flight (B-25-D-2) was equipped with a D-8 bombsight and the wing planes (B-25-D-1) released "on" the lead planes. Bomb load for the lead planes was 2 X 1000 lb. instantaneous fuse demolition bombs and for the wing planes, 3 bombs of the same type. The first flight dropped eight bombs starting at the W edge of KARAWOP PLANTATION and trailing E into the plantation approximately 300 yards.

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The bombs were 2-300 feet inland, within effective range but further inland than desired. The second flight dropped 8 bombs just S and W of DAGUA VILLAGE which is considered to be excellent. There were no visible results of the bombing other than bomb bursts and bomb smoke. After the bomb run the squadron turned right and flew behind the coastal range to a point 5 miles S of the mouth of the ANUMB RIVER (W. of BUT) and then executed a descendingright turn to strafing altitude. The coastal area including BUT & DAGUA DROMES and villages was thoroughly strafed with 17510 rounds of ammunition. Results of the strafing attack were not apparent.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.

3. Nil enemy planes observed lost.

E. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	STRIP #3 NADZAB	0650/K
Group Rendezvous	LERON RIVER	0705/K
On Course for Target.		0705/K
Bombing Attack	TARGET	0845/K
Strafing Attack	TARGET	0858/K - 0906/K
Landed at Base		1100/K

F. ROUTE

Out: BASE LERON RIVER ANNANBERG TARGET.

In: DIRECT.

II. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

A. Group

The 501st Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of the 501st, 498th, 499th, and 500th. Squadrons were in No.1,2,3, and 4 positions respectively.

B. Squadron

Capt.RICHARD BAKER was selected to lead the Squadron Formation which consisted of the following planes and Pilots.

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.R.BAKER	A/P	379*	Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P	410*
2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	"	016	2nd.Lt.T.M.FOX	"	347
2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	"	014	2nd.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	"	058

* B-25-D-2

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III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. Details of Attack.

Capt.BAKER assembled the Squadron soonafter take off in a wide circle and proceeded to the LERON RIVER where the Squadron assumed it's assigned position in the Group Formation. Flight to the target was without incident. The Group approached the target from SE to NW, parallel to the coast and out to sea. N.W. of the target a left turn onto the specified bomb run was executed. Capt.BAKER made his run over the M/G target with Lieuts. SUMMERS and PALMER (#2 and 3 respectively) in close formation. The flight dropped all eight bombs on the target. The bombs were seen to burst in a string from the W end of the plantation to a point 300 yards to the E. Other results were unobserved. After "Bombs Away", Capt.BAKER began searching for the preceeding squadron in order to obtain proper spacing and sequence of attack. However he was unable to locate the formation since his bomb run carried him approximately 8 miles beyond the target of the preceeding squadron. Since he did not know the position of the preceeding squadron he made a wider circle than planned to insure that his attack did not interfere with that of other formations. He began his attack approximately 3 miles up the coast from BUT DROME and continued strafing down the coast to KARAWOP PLANTATION and broke off the attack. Damage resulting from the flight's attack was not apparent. Capt.BAKER then joined the Group Formation which was circling out to sea. After all squadrons had resumed positions the formation returned to base without incident.

Capt.PARKE leading the second flight, followed the lead flight in the approach and maneuver onto the bomb run. His flight dropped all eight bombs in the designated target covering the area very effectively. After "Bombs Away", Capt.PARKE led his flight in trail behind the lead flight and strafed the coastal area thoroughly with unobserved results. He then rejoined the Squadron and Group Formation and returned to base without further incident.

B. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

During the strafing run over a ridge 3 miles W of DAGUA DROME, 3 bursts of medium A/A appeared to the right and rear of the formation from an unknown position. The bursts were 100 yards from the formation and only 20 feet above the ridge. Slight, medium, inaccurate.

During the strafing run over the E. end of BUT DROME, M/G flashes were observed among the trees on the S side of the drome. Slight, light, inaccurate.

During the strafing run over the coastal bridge 3 miles W od DAGUA VILLAGE, several bursts of M/G fire were received from a position near the W end of the bridge. Moderate, light, inaccurate. The position was silenced when placed under fire.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil Fighter cover provided.

D DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR.

1. Nil A/P's of this squadron damaged.

E PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

IV. CITATIONS

A. The details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

V. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target
379*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
016	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
014	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
410*	2	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
347	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
058	3	1000 lb.	Inst.	3

Total: 16 X 1000 lb. Inst.Fuse bombs dropped on target.
* B-25-D-2

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
379	4200	1855	
016	4200	3180	880 Rds. 30 Cal.
014	4200	2500	1800 Rds. 30 Cal.
410	4200	2120	
347	4200	1855	600 Rds. 30 Cal.
058	4200	2600	2000 Rds. 30 Cal.

TOTAL: 14110 X .50 Cal. - 5200 X.30 Cal. expended in strafing.

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By RLB/lm NARA, Date 5/20/91

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 74 5005
By RAB/DR NARA, Date 4-20-92

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
379	K-21	30
410	K-21	30
014	K-21	25
347	K-21	20
Total:105	K-21 Photos taken	

VI. SIGHTINGS

During the bombing and strafing attacks a small fire with white smoke up to 1000 feet and 2small explosions resulting, was seen at the W end of DAGUA DROME.

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos: 3-0-34,35,38,39,40,43,41,42, A/P #014, First Flight.
Show strafing run at W end of DAGUA DROME.
Photo 3-0-38 shows a probable A/C position just S of road. A gunner is seen probably feeding ammunition into gun. The pit is very small and the loader is entirely exposed. Across the road under the trees are seen several boxes. Near the top of the picture in the coconut trees and just S of the road is another possible gun position.

Photo 3-0-40 shows a dump with many barrels in 2 piles. A small fire is burning nearby and is interesting in that the smoke arising is not from an oil fire. Photo definitely confirms crews report. Near the bottom of the photo is a pit containing barrels but a tree top obscures details. The area surrounding the fuel barrels appears to have been burnt over.

Photo 3-0-42 Right side of picture between the road and the coast three A/P engines apparently salvaged from wrecked planes. Under tree behind the engines a shed is seen.

Photo 3-0-43 Shows clearly the tail markings on two single seat fighters.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: - 2
" - 1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" - 2 Route to and From Target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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By RLB/Lm NARA, Date 5/22/01



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By RAB/Em NARA, Date 4/28/97



DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/22/91

499
145-D
24 May
JCH

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A PO 713-1

25 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 145-D performed on 24 May,1944 with objective at KARAWOP PLANTATION. (3°25'S - 143°25'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A. C. of S., A -2.

I. GENERAL

A. On the morning of 24 May,1944, the 499th and 500th Squadron of the 345th Bomb Group (M), were ordered to conduct a medium al titude bombing and minimum al titude strafing strike against the reported Jap 18th Army Hq. at KARAWOP PLANTATION in the WEWAK area. Based on a P.W. Sketch, the target was pin-pointed just at the most southern part of the plantation between 2 small hills. Each squadron was to employ 6 B-25's bombing from medium altitude and then descending to strafe the coastal area from MATAPAU VILLAGE through the Hq. Area - including BUT and DAGUA Dromes, r eported bivouac and stores areas and reported gun positions.

B. RENDEZVOUS

The two Squadrons effected the rendezvous at the LERON RIVER. There was no Wing or Fighter Rendezvous.

C. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base and six planes attacked the target as planned. The formation of two, three-plane "V's" javelin down, approached the target from CAPE MOEM around the N tip of KAIRIRU ISLAND, over the W tip of KARASAU ISLAND and over the target. The bombing altitude was 4000 feet at an airspeed of 200 mph. Each lead plane (B-25-D-2's) was equipped with a D-8 bombsight with each wingplane (B-25-D-1's) releasing "on" the flight leader. The lead plane of the first flight was loaded with only 2 X1000 lb. instantaneous fuse demolition bombs because of a bombay gas tank installation. Each of other five planes were loaded with 3 bombs, of the same type. Both flights dropped their bombs exactly in the assigned target - a total of 17 bombs one of which dropped safe. Although the accuracy is excellent, the bombs could have been spaced at greater interval, both in depth and width, covering a larger area effect instead of entirely destroying a small area.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/22/91

After bombing the squadron turned right and flew NW using the coastal range as a screen in order to obtain surprise and thereby increase the effectiveness of attack. In view of the present situation, i.e. a concentration of retreating troops scattered throughout the area, surprise is essential in order to catch the troops out of slit-trenches and fox-holes. Consequently by using this means, surprise was acheived, as evidenced by four reports of having seen personnel running for shelter at four different places between MATAPAU VILLAGE and CAPE KARAWOP. Even though the sightings were of only one man in each case, this is 100% more activity than is observed when the approach is from sea to land in full view of all troops along the 20 miles of coastline. No specific or visible results of the strafing were obtained. Since the area covered by strafing varied from the coastline to three miles inland and covered a distance of twenty odd miles at low altitude over very difficult terrain, it is almost impossible to assign a great number of targets and expect them to be thoroughly strafed in one pass. Of course readily visible and accessable targets such as the airdromes and villages on the coast and those villages and bivouac areas on ridges may be assigned with reasonable assurance of coverage but even so in the majority of cases, the target will receive fire from only one plane per flight. The strafing attack on this mission bears out the above statements. The #3 plane covered the airdromes, villages and other likely targets on the coast. The flight leader was able to hit some of the coastal targets but was generally limited to targets farther inland. The #2 plane, farther inland still, was greatly handicapped by the ridges and hills which lie just inland along the coast. Both the #1 and #2 planes were forced to pick targets of opportunity as they progressed down the coast. Their reports follow a monotonous pattern which is generally one of the following: "I was unable to hit here because I saw the target too late to slide over". or "I was unable to hit here because the target is in a ravine". or "I saw this but on a ridge and placed it under fire but in doing so, I had to pull wide and missed the next target." Consequently the phrase "The coastal area was thoroughly strafed". is ambiguous in a sense. It is true that thousands of rounds of ammo are expended (in this case 20905 for this squadron) but few targets receive a heavy concentration of fire in this method of attack.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.

3. Nil E/A observed lost.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	Strip #5 NADZAB	0840/K
Rendezvous	LERON RIVER	0857/K
Bombing Run		1032/K
Strafing Run		1040- 1053/K
Landed	Strip #3 NADZAB	1250/K.

II. ROUTE

Out: BASE GUSAP ANNANBERG WEWAK KAIRIRU IS. TARGET.

In : Direct.

III. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

A. Group

This Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of the 499th and 500th Squadrons in number 1 and 2 positions respectively.

B. Squadron

Capt.W.E.PARKE was selected to lead the squadron formation which consisted of the following pilots and planes.

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.W.E.PARKE	A/P No.410*		Capt.P.GATH	A/P No.454*	
2nd.Lt.P.L.NELSON	"	347	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	"	591
2nd.Lt.E.K.PALMER	"	014	2nd.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	"	059

* B-25-D-2's.

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. Details of attack.

Capt.W.E.PARKE assembled the squadron soonafter take off in a wide 180° turn and proceeded to the LERON RIVER where the 500th Squadron joined with a minimum of delay. Capt. PARKE did an excellent job in picking the route through the weather which, while not hazardous,presented some difficulty and necessitated frequent alterations of course.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

The 500th Squadron stayed close in excellent formation throughout theflight in compliance to recent Group Orders to concentrate on good formation flying (preparation for future missions where interception is probable and expected). Capt.PARKE crossed the N coast just S of CAPE MOEN and circled to the N of KAIRIRU where he turned left on the planned approach over the tip of KAIRIRU & KARASAU Islands and direct to the target. During the long approach the bombardier was able to pick out the target and make only slight corrections. Lieuts.PALMER and NELSON, number 2 & 3 respectively, began toggling their bombs as the first bomb dropped from the lead plane's bomb-bay. All eight bombs landed squarely in the target but as noted previously, the formation was too close to allow proper dispersion of bombs.After bombs away, the flight continued straight ahead toobtain good photos and to get out of view from the coast,before turning as soon as the flight was beyond view Capt.PARKE began a descending right turn to an altitude (approx.2000 ft) lower then the hills. He flew NW behind these hills to a point S of the Strafing Run I.P. at MATAFUA VILLAGE. Here he broke over the hills and turned right onto the attack route. He began strafing near MATAPAU VILLAGE and continued down the coast strafing huts and areas near BUT & DAGUA Dromes but for the most part, wooded areas at unknown points were hit targets. He made a special effort to strafe the Jap Hq. Area at the end of the run climbing up and right over the hills in attempt to strafe "with" the valley in which the target was situated. However, he was unable to climb high enough or turn inland enough to make this run. He was only able to strafe the ridges on either side. Lieut.NELSON's flight path was generally over the coast. He concentrated fire, a s much as possible in huts and villages and especially in the dromes with no visible results. He was forced out over the sea several times in order to let the other two pla nes clear ridges and hills. At the end of the run he saw that it would be impossible to strafe the Hq. Area and consequently strafed KARAWOP PLANTATION, with a sweeping fire. Lt.PALMER 's attack was generally limited to ridges and hill tops with no specific targets. However when the other two pl nes were forced out to sea by terrain he strafed along the coast scoring hits in huts without visible results.

Capt.GATH leading the second flight followed the lead flight in the approach to the target with only enough interval to allow his bombardier complete freedom to make corrections. His bomb run was identical with that of the first flight. Bombs from all three planes were aimed to drop just short of the area covered by the first flight.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

The bombs dropped accurately as aimed but here again were too closely spaced for effective coverage. The only other flaw in an otherwise perfect run was the fact that one bomb from #3 plane dropped "safe". After the bomb run, Capt.GATH followed the lead flight and stayed low behind the hills until time to turn onto attack route. He allowed sufficient interval between himself and the lead flight as a safely factor and began the strafing run. This flight's attack was a repition of that of the first flight, strafing the domes, huts and hilltops without specific targets or results. The only worthy target actually seen was what Lt.HOTZ maintained was a "Dodge" truck model 1939. Unfortunately the truck was wide of his flight line and he saw it too late to alter his course to cover it. An unsuccessful attempt was made to strafe the Hq. Area at the end of the run. After breaking off the attack Capt.GATH assembled the flight and joined Capt.PARKE who was circling out to sea. Capt.PARKE then led the squadron to base through weather which had thickened and built up in some cases to 15000 feet. He did an excellent job of picking the holes and skirting thunderheads and returned the Squadron safely to base without incident.

B. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Nil A/A fire encountered.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil fighter cover provided.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR.

1. Nil A/P's of this Squadron damaged.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil personnel of this Squadron injured.

IV. CITATIONS

A. Even though execution of the mission was excellent, the details of action provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

V. TABLES

See Next Page.

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target
410*	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	2
347	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	8
014	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	8
454*	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	8
891	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	8
058	8	1000 lb.	Inst.Demo	8 (1 bomb dropped safe)

Total Bombs Dropped 17 X 1000 lb. Inst.Demo
* B-25-D-2's

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No. Rds.Fired	
410	4800	2120	
347	4200	2120	
014	4200	2915	1500 X.30 Cal.
454	4200	2120	
891	4200	2915	300 X.30 Cal.
058	4200	2915	4000 X.50 Cal.

Total Rds.Fired. 15105 X.50 Cal . 5800 X.30 Cal .

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
410	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
058	K-17	40

TOTAL: 60 K-21's 40 K-17's

VI. SIGHTINGS

During strafing run at approximately (9423) Ref: 4 miles - 1 inch Strat. Map "Hewak"; extending along N side ridge below crest a camouflaged covering approximately 200 yards long. at E. extremity of covering was a group of several dug outs. During the strafing run at approximately 968837 (Mut E. 1 mile to 1 inch) a pit containing one canvas covered gun. Apparently of heavy caliber and serviceable. During the strafing run a fire with white smoke among large number of fuel drums at W end of Dagua. Fire of same type, at same point as reported on 22 May. On this date reported as possibly phosphorus burning and definitely not oil.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

K-21 Photos 2-V-10,11,12,13, and22, A/P #410; First Flight are numbered in reverse order with legend upside down. Confirm crews report of bombing.

K-21 Photos 3-V-33 A/P #014 First Flight. Show beginning of strafing run approximately 3 miles NW of N. MATAPAU VILLAGE.

K-17 Photos 5-O-70-76-81-92-93-94-96-99-104, A/P No.058. Second flight.
Photo 5-O-70 high angle oblique confirms crews report of bombing.
Photo 5-O-92 during strafing run showing a cloud of white smoke in village on the coast. Possibly result of strafing by first flight.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PHQ/rjl

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
2 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:

(1 cop y) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 928.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.

DECLASSPIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

MAP REF:-
EAST[illegible] GUINEA
NAVIGATION CHART
Equatorial Scale:- 1:2,315,000
31.72 Naut. Miles = 1 inch
Mercator Projection

MISSION NO. [illegible]-D DATE 29th May-1944
SQUADRON NO. 499th GROUP 345th
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET 1
ALTITUDE 9,000 Ft. (Bombing) FT.
TIME OVER TARGET 1032/K-(Strafing)1040/K-1053/K
T (BLUE) PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T (BLACK) OTHER PLANES (ALL PLANES TO BE SHOWN AT BEGINNING OF RUN.)





DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NLB 74-506/5
By RLB/lm NARA, Date 5/30/91

499
146-E
25May4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

26 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 146-E performed on 25 May,1944 with Objective at BUT DROME. (5°25'S 143°15'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

I. GENERAL

A. On the morning of 25 May, this Squadron together with the other three Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group, were ordered to conduct a minimum altitude bombing and strafing mission against targets in the BUT-DAGUA Area. This Squadron, employing 6 B-25's, was assigned a M/G position and stores area at the E end of BUT DROME near the coast.

B. RENDEZVOUS

This Squadron joined the lead squadron at the LERON RIVER and accompanied that squadron to the target. The 501st and 498th Squadrons were delayed in take-off by fighters which had a priority take-off. The 501st joined the formation while enroute to the target but the 498th with their slower "H's" were not located.

C. ATTACK

Six B-25-D-1's of this squadron attacked the assigned target as planned being number 3 in the sequence of attack. The two 3 plane "V's" spaced at a 30 second interval approached the target from SE to NW over the water and at a point NW of BUT turned left to attack down the coast. The bomb load for each plane was 22 clusters of 3,23 lb.parafrag bombs (the first two stations of each plane were loaded with single clusters of 3 bombs each and the other 10 stations with double clusters of 3). A total of 111 clusters were unloaded at the E end of the Drome and in the target between the Drome and the coast. A total of 21 clusters were dropped on MUSCHU ISLAND when a malfunction prevented release over the target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The target and adjacent areas were thoroughly covered by the bombing but visible results were nil. BUT & DAGUA Dromes, a Jap Encampment S of DAGUA, suspected Bivouac areas in the wooded hills, huts on the coast, the coastal road and the W tip of YERO ISLAND were strafed with 15,440 rounds of ammunition. Results were not visible.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AIR AND ON GROUND.

1. Nil Allied Planes observed lost.

2. Nil interception occured.

3. Nil E/A observed destroyed in air.

4. Nil E/A observed destroyed on the ground.

E. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	STRIP #3 HADZAB		0737/K.
Rendesvous With Lead Squadron Enroute LERON RIVER			0750/K.
Attack	BUT AIRDROME	0934 -	0950/K.
Landed	BASE		1115/K.

F. ROUTE

Out:
BASE LERON RIVER ANNABERG TARGET.

In: DIRECT.

II. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

A. Group:

The 500th Squadron was ordered to lead the Group Formation which consisted of the 500th, 501st and 499th Squadrons in number 1,2, and 3 positions respectively. Note:The 498th Squadron proceeded to the target alone.

B. Squadron:

Capt.P.GATH was selected to lead the Squadron Formation which consisted of the following pilots and planes.

(See next page)

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.P.GATH	A/P	#058	1st.Lt.E.M.SLINEY	A/P	340
1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	097	2nd.Lt.H.D.WARVEL	"	016
2nd.Lt.H.K.SUMMERS	"	014	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	"	033

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. Details of attack.

Capt.GATH assembled the Squadron soonafter take-off and joined the lead squadron prior to reaching the rendezvous point. He held the squadron in close formation during flight to the target. On reaching the vicinity of MUSCHU ISLAND, Capt. GATH with Lieuts.SUMMERS and GRAHAM on his wings, took up interval behind the 501st Squadron and followed at a close interval during the turn onto the target. His flight began strafing at the W end of BUT DROME and carried their fire through the target. Capt.GATH and Lieut.SUMMERS dropped all their bombs but Lt.GRAHAM was able to release only one cluster because of a malfunction. The flight then spread apart to give greater coverage in strafing and continued strafing down the coast. Lt.GRAHAM flew inland over the foothills and ridges. He strafed the camp area S of DAGUA and other areas which seemed likely to contain troops. Capt.GATH strafed along the side of the hills with no particular targets. Lt.SUMMERS strafed along the coastal road covering huts on the shoreline and DAGUA DROME. Shortly after strafing the drome, all but one of his guns stopped firing and he turned off the target out to sea. Capt.GATH and Lt.GRAHAM strafed opportune areas to BOIKEN VILLAGE where a left turn over the water was made. Capt.GATH strafed a wooded area on YOU IS. with no visible results. Shortly after Lt.GRAHAM and Lt.SUMMERS resumed formation and while passing over MUSCHU ISLAND, Lt.GRAHAM tried once more to release his bombs with success. However, no results were observed. A former staging area on the SE part of the Island was partially covered by the bombs but damage was not visible. Capt. GATH then made one circle to pick up the second flight and proceeded direct to base independently of the rest of the Group.

Lt.SLINEY, leading the second flight, took his proper interval for the bombing and strafing run during the long turn for the approach. He led his flight to an excellent run over the target, allowing both his wingmen as well as himself to drop all their bombs well in the target.

One cluster "hung up" and was dropped "salvoed", results of his bombing were general ly unobserved, except for the fact that all bombs were seen to hit in the target. He strafed villages, wooded areas , 1 M/T, from the bombing target down to KARAMOP PTN., with unobserved results.
Lt.SLINEY then circl ed to the left, out to sea, where he joinmd the first flight on a direct route back to base.

Lts.WARVEL and SALTER, No.2 and 3 positions respectively, dropped all their bombs in the target area. Lt.WARVEL, strafed along entire run but at no specific target, Lt.SALTER did very little strafing since he was forced out, to the water, practically along the entire strafing run.

B. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. M/G muzzle flashes were seen in woods at 4 or 5 different places along a ridge S of BUT DROME. Although positions were afforded excellent deflection shots on a level with the planes, the fire was inaccurate possibly due to strafing of these areas first by nose guns and then by turret and waist guns.

2. Along a ridge S of DAGUA a similar situation (B-1 above) was encountered.

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. No fighter cover provided.

D. Details of Damage to A/P's in the Air.

1. One plane of this Squadron sustained loss of turret cover. Probably blown off since canopy was cracked on previous mission.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. S/Sgt.ARTHUR F.TACY, 20106906, turret gunner of A/P #340, sustained minor lacerations when the turret canopy was blown off.

IV. CITATIONS

A. The details of this mission provided no basis for recommendation o f awards.

V. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/F No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	No.Dropped on Target	
058	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	22	
097	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	1	(Others dropped Muschnu Is.
014	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	22	
340	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	22	(1 salvoed)
016	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	22	
034	22	3 X 23 lb. Frags.	22	

Total No.Bombs dropped on targets 111 3 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs.

STRAFING TABLE

A/F No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired.	
058	4800	3180	600 X.30 Cal.
053	4200	1855	
016	4100	3180	200 X.30 Cal.
014	4200	2885	400 X.30 Cal.
340	4200	2885	600 X.30 Cal.
097	4200	1850	400 X.30 Cal.
TOTAL:	15340 X.50 Cal.	21 X.30 Cal .	

PHOTO TABLE

A/F No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
058	K-21	30
016	K-17	40
097	K-21	30
Total:	K-17 = 40	
	K-21 60	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

K-61 Obliquest 2nO-33,37,38,40,41,42,43,44,45,58,59.
A/F #616 - Second Flight.
Do not give adequate coverage to fully confirm crews report of bombing. Photos 58 & 59 show several streaks which could possibly be tracers. Several other items of interest but questionable significance are seen.

K-17 Obliquest 1-O-12,13,26.
Show parafrag bursts in the rget area as well as scattered fuel drums.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PHS/jrjl.

PAT M.SOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl-2 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, Fifth Air Force, APO 929.
2 " A-2 V Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
1 " OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

31
83



LEGEND

25 May,1944
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 146-E
Bombing Altitude 100-150 Ft.
Bomb Run 0934-0950/k " "
Strafing Run " "
Order Over Target: Third.
Heading 105°
Took Photos T
Crews Report on bombs falling. O
Fires.
Map Ref: But East.
Saale: 1/63360
1 cluster 3 X 23 lb.
Parafrag bombs.
20 clusters dropped on
Muschu Is.due to malfunction.



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 146-E DATE-25th MAY
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0934 - 0950 1/2
ALTITUDE: 100' - 150'

DRAWN BY - GROUP PHOTO

499
147-D
26 May 4
JCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

27 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 147-D performed on 26 May,1944 with Objective at BOIKEN PLANTATION. (3°25' S - 143°30'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

I. GENERAL

A. On May 26th this squadron with the 501st and 498th Squadrons was ordered to participate in a medium altitude bombing and minimum altitude strafing strike against land targets in the area between BUT DROME and BOIKEN PLANTATION. The bombing targets were located near KARAWOP and BOIKEN PLANTATION. This Squadron selected as it's target a Japanese Naval Bivouac Area located near the southern most part of BOIKEN PLANTATION. After bombing, all squadrons were to execute a strafing run starting at SOWAN VILLAGE and sweeping some thirty miles of coastal area down to KENGEN VILLAGE. Since the coast proper is more or less deserted, the areas inland from the coast were to receive the greater amount of fire.

B. RENDEZVOUS

1. This Squadron arrived at the Rendezvous Point prior to the arrival of the other two squadrons and circled until they arrived. The rendezvous was accomplished over the LERON RIVER, twenty minutes after take-off.

C. ATTACK

Six planes took off and six arrived at the target according to plan. The approach was from SE to NW over WEWAK at an indicated altitude of 3000 feet and 200 mph airspeed. Each lead plane (B-25-D-2's) was equipped with a D-8 Bombsight. The two wingplanes of each flight (B-25-D-1's) were to release "on" the lead planes. The bomb load for the D-2's was 2 X 1000 lb. instantaneous fuse demolition bombs and for the D-1's, 3 bombs of the same type. The lead flight made the prescribed run and dropped all sight bombs, which were reported to have burst in excellent pattern covering the target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Crews were briefed to space bombs at 300 feet in depth with a lateral interval of 100 feet between planes to obtain more effective coverage of the target. The damage was impossible to ascertain because of bomb smoke.

The second flight experienced difficulty in locating the target which was by no means readily evident. For this reason the bombardier took the only alternative and sighted on KARAWOP PLANTATION. Crews reported all bombs in the target but photos show an entirely different picture. The evidence is that two bombs burst on the beach and the other six in the water at quite some distance. Bomb smoke over the immediate area probably confused the crews in their observation.

Although no fires resulted from strafing, results are believed to have been far better than on any of the strafing runs over this area on previous strikes. The immediate coast was neglected with all planes covering the foothills where numerous huts, and villages were strafed. Is is in these areas that troops are thought to be bivouacing. On previous strikes the coastal area has been heavily strafed from end to end with the result that the villages and coastal installations have been destroyed or severly damaged. On this mission ridges and valleys hitherto neglected were thoroughly searched out and found to contain numerous buildings and villages in good repair and other evidences of current occupation and use. The only instance of visible damage was the strafing of 2 M/G's S of SMAIN VILLAGE which were firing. Definite hits in the pits were scored with the result that the guns were silenced. A total of 19140 rounds of ammunition were expended in the attack.

2. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR AND GROUND.

1. Nil Interception occured.

2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost in the air.

3. Nil E/A observed lost in the air.

4. Nil E/A observed lost on the ground.

3. Time and Location of:

Take Off	Strip #3 NADZAB	1035/K.
Gp.Rendezvous	LAMUN RIVER	1055/K.
Bombs Away	First Flight	1236/K.
Bombs Away	Second Flight	1237/K.
Strafing Run		1242/K.

F. Route:

Out: BASE LEROM RIVER GUSAP ANNABERG WEWAK TARGET.
In: TARGET - MURIK LAGOON DUMPU BASE.

II. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

A Group.

Col.C.U.TRUE, leading the 501st Squadron, led the Group Formation which consisted of the 501st, 498th and 499th Squadrons in number 1,2 and 3 positions respectively.

B Squadron.

Capt.W.N.PARKE was selected to lead the squadron formation which consisted of the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P	#382*	1st. Lt.H.R.BRIGHAM	A/P	#454*
2nd.Lt.H.K.[illegible]	"	016	1st. Lt.E.M.SLINEY	"	097
2nd.Lt.N.R.BOTZ	"	058	2nd.Lt.F.L.NELSON	"	033

* D-2's.

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

A. Details of the Attack.

Capt.PARKE assembled the Squadron in a wide 180° turn and proceeded t o the LEROM RIVER where he circled until the other two squadrons arrived. He assumed the number 3 position and flew in close formation on the lead squadron to the target without incident. The planned bombing altitude was 5600 feet but as is often the case, cloud cover over the target necessitated circling down to 3000 feet over WEWAK and getting under the clouds. Capt.PARKE gave his bombardier a long run to allow him sufficient time to locate the target which could only be distinguished by reference to BOIGEN PLANTATION and a ridge - poor check points in any case. However by c areful check against an excellent vertical photograph the bombardier released his bombs accurately.

Lieuts.PALMER and HOTZ, flying in number 2 and 3 positions respectively, maintained an interval of 100-125 feet between their own and the flight leader's plane in order to give wider dispersion to the bombs. All crews reported excellent coverage, of the target. However the pictures taken failed to confirm the report. (The only two prints received show bomb smoke from another squadron's bombs).
After bombs away, Capt.PARKE established a safe interval behind the 498th Squadron and followed in trail out to sea and up the coast to the vicinity of SAWAM VILLAGE. During this maneuver he led the flight in a constant descent to a strafing altitude. At a point just NW of SOWAM VILLAGE he turned left to begin the attack down the coast. Capt.PARKE took special care to place the entire flight inland from the coast. Capt.PARKE strafed areas in the foothills where tracks indicated activity but for the most part was unable to locate definite targets. Lt.PALMER in the number two position was more fortunate however. His run was farther inland over the foothills and he thoroughly strafed several huts and small villages as well as a Mission and an encampment area SW of DAGUA DROME. On previous missions he had noted the inaccessability of this area because of the location in a valley. This time he planned his attack to cover this area and by diving into the valley he was able to throw quite a few bursts through the area. Concentrated fire was impossible though since he was forced to pull up sharply to clear the ridge. Lt. PALMER's attack was undoubtedly the most effective of the day. Lt.HOTZ strafed parts of the coast but generally he flew over the base of the ridges just inland from the coast. He strafed a few huts but the greater part of his fire was concentrated in wooded areas. In a clearing on a hillside ½ mile S of SWAIN VILLAGE, his alert turret gunner spotted two pits containing two M/G's which were firing. According to instructions he had brought his guns to bear on the hills to cover such action. He let go with a good long burst which swept through the positions and silenced the gun, probably killing or wounding the gun crew. Damage to the guns was not visible. Lt.HOTZ also thoroughly strafed the known piles of fuel drums at the E end of BUT DROME and at the E end of DAGUA. Even though he literally poured bullets into the drums no fire or even smoke resulted. For this reason he expressed the belief thatthe greater part of the drums are empty. All three pilots saw more targets than they attacked but were unable to bring fire to bear because of the terrain. The flight broke up the attack near KARAGOP PLANTATION and turned out to sea to assemble the Squadron and rejoin the Group Formation.

Lt.BRIGHAM followed the first flight in on the bomb run at a somewhat lower altitude - 400 feet lower to be exact. The bomb run itself was good but the bombardier had difficulty in locating the target . Consequently he waited to see the bombing by the first flight. Somehow the first flight released their bombs without his knowledge and he erroneously concluded that they were making a "Dry Run". When he did discover his mistake it was too late for accurate calculations and all but two of the flights bombs dropped in the water off KARANOS PLANTATION. Even though the target was the most difficult type to locate, such a wide margin of error is without excuse. Bombing poor. After bombs away, Lt.BRIGHAM led the flight in trail behind the first flight and descended steadily to strafing altitude. The flight began strafing just W of BUT DROME and strafed the hills inland in much the same fashion as executed by the first flight - concentrating on inland areas but without visible results. The only visible results were scored by Jap M/G and small arms fire - scoring one hit on each of three planes. After breaking off the attack the flight joined the Squadron Formation and proceeded to base without incident.

B. ANTI AIR CRAFT FIRE.

1. During the strafing run two M/G's located ½ mile S of SMAIM VILLAGE in a clearing on a hillside fired moderate, light, accurate to inaccurate. The positions were so located that an excellent field of fire could be covered toward the coast - on the other hand the positions are highly vulnerable to strafing as evidenced by abrupt cessation of fire when strafed by only one turret.

2. During the last few missions more and more M/G fire is reported from the ridges S of BUT and DAGUA DROMES. No doubt many of the sightings are duplications but when allowances are made, the fact still remains that a great number of M/G's are located on these ridges.This is a further inducement for strafing planes to concentrate on the inland areas and for turret and waist gunners to be on the alert to neutralize such fire.

3. While much fire from many different positions have been reported, only a few prepared positions have been seen. Most of the sightings are reported as gun flashes and tracers emonating from wooded areas. For this reason it is believed that the fire is originating from troops other than regular A/A units which are bivouaced in these areas. In other words, every CLARENCE and WILBER who has access to a gun is personnaly attempting to uphold the glory of the empire by shooting down "Twenty-five of the twenty-four planes which were summarily repulsed by our ground defenses without loss to our side".

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. None provided.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

1. 2 planes were holed each by one small arms missile. One plane was holed, the missile passing from left to right through the fuselage, through the outboard wing flap, into the aileron and cracking the aileron actuating arm. Minor repairs were necessary.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

IV. CITATIONS

The details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

V. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.On Target
382*	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	2
016	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
058	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	3
454*	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil.
097	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil.
033	8	1000 lb.	Inst.	Nil

Total: 8 X.1000 lb. Inst.Bombs Drop ped on target. Other 8 bombs by second flight were either in water or on beach.

* B-25-D-2

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
016	4200	2385	
033	4200	2386	1200 X.30 Cal .
058	4200	3180	400 X.30 Cal.
097	4200	2385	1200 X.30 Cal.
454	4200	1855	1200 X.30 Cal .
382	4200	2950	

Total: 15140 X.50 Cal. 4000 X.30 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/F No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
382	K-21	30
016	K-21	30
454	K-21	30

TOTAL: 90 K-21 photos taken.

VI. SIGHTINGS

A. At the beginning of the strafing run 4 pits containing four guns were observed 200 yards W of BUT DROME and some 200 feet inland from the coast. The pilot who made this sighting states that the guns could possibly have been dummies. The pilot has observed this area several times before without seeing the guns and wonders why they were not visible since the guns are located in a low flat cleared area.

B. During strafing run at approximately 952222 (But E, 1 mile - 1 inch) a stretch of camouflage covering approximately 20 yards long possibly covering an excavation. (This is thought to be same camouflage reported 25/5/44 to be 200 yards long).

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

A. Poor coverage of bombing was obtained.
Photos 5-V-81, and 82. A/P #382, First Flight.
Show bomb smoke and dust over the area reported to contain Jap 18 th Army Hq.
Photos are numbered in reverse. Bomb smoke shown is evidently result of other squadrons bombing since the plane is not yet directly over the bombed area and since the photos would show the bombs bursting not afterwards. These bombs have burst sometime before. Theoretically the bombs should for all practical purposes hit directly under the plane. These are probably bombs dropped by the 50th Squadron which reported bombing in this area.

Photos 4-V-44,45,48,49 - Show second flight's bombs, two on beach and four in the water. Shows bomb smoke from bombing by other Squadrons.

Photos 3 V-22,23,28,29,30,31,32,33,36 and 37, A/P #016. First Flight. Show run, by Lt.PALMER, over Jap Encampment area. Showing almost complete destruction in the areas near the road. One village NW of the heavily bombed area is in good repair.

Photos 3-0-36 and 37.
Show mission which Lt.PALMER heavily strafed. Some damage to the roof is shown but the real damage is not seen because of the angle. Lt.PALMER strafed on level with the houses and battered the sides of the buildings to pieces.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PEG/rjl.

PAT E.GOPORTE
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-2 Route to and From Target.

Distribution:

(1 copy) COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.
" " A-2 Advance Echelon, APO 929. Fifth Air Force.
2 " A-2 V Bom Com., APO 713-1.
1 " OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, APO 713-1.


N
ADMIRALTY IS.
Manokwari
BIAK
Ransiki
Moem
JAPEN
Sawar & Maffin
Wakde
Sagan
Hollandia
Aitape
Wewak
Nabire
NEW GUINEA
Hansa Bay
Timoeka
Madang
Bena Bena
Nadzab
Lae
PORT MORESBY
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: 147 - D DATE - 26 Th
345th BOMB GROUP MAY
499Th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1235-1242/E
ALTITUDE: Bomb - 3,000 /
Strafing - 10
UP PHOTO


PACIFIC OCEAN
#3 Plane
Dagua Drome
Dagua
#2 Plane
Jap Camp Area
Banak
Kofi
2 Bombs on Beach
Karawop
Karawop Pln.
Wisling
Karasau I.
25
15
yuo I.
mission
Boiken
Momiken
R.C. Mission
BOGIM HARBOR
Kengen Suau
Boiken
Boiken Pln.
Cholial
Kalimboa
Yungo
Kwangen
Kumudu
8 Bombs
Koanumbo
Cpl. Ginnolly
016
382
058
097
454
033
N
18
97
Legend
20th Map 1944
479th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.C.-147-D
Bombing altitude-5,000 Ft.
Bombing run---1st. Flight -295°
2nd. Flight -330°
Strafing run-100-150 Ft.
Order over target-3rd.
Took photos-
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Reference- Dagua East
Scale - 1/63,360

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499
JH 149-I
28 May 44
1

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

29 May,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 149-I, performed on 28 May,1944. With objective on the DANDRIWAD RIVER (3°20'S 143° 50'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

A. On the morning of 28 May, this Squadron was ordered to conduct a minimum altitude strike against a reported enemy troop concentration at the junction of the DANDRIWAD and DAMEIM Rivers. The first squadron was to take-off at 0700/A and the second, third, and fourth squadrons at 20 minute intervals. Each Squadron was assigned a different target and assigned a TOT and a time to break off the attack. In view of the close proximity of our troops (~~on the~~ W ~~bank~~ of the DANDRIWAD RIVER) all squadrons were ordered to attack from W to E making two passes over the target. The first run was a bombing and strafing attack only. Two alternate targets (SUAIN and LUAIN VILLAGES) were assigned in the event that the primary target could not be attacked.

B. RENDEZVOUS

1. There was no rendezvous other squadrons.

C. ATTACK

Six planes took off from base at the prescribed time and proceeded to the target. The squadron approached the target from the SE at medium altitude and swung out to sea to lose altitude and maneuver to attack from NW to SE. During the left turn attack formation of single planes in trail was assumed. On the first run the target was accurately bombed with 24 X 500 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse bombs and heavily strafed. A rack malfunction caused the return of one plane's bombload of 5 to base. Another plane had to salvo one bomb for the same reason. All planes executed a 360° turn to the left to make a second pass.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

During this maneuver, the area along the way was strafed with particular attention to SUAIN VILLAGE and LUAIN VILLAGE and Mission. On the second run all six planes strafed the target and areas to the E along the withdrawal route were heavily and thoroughly strafed. During the attack, a total of 10600 rounds of ammunition were expended. The results of the attack were meagre. The only actual results apparent were bomb craters in the target.

D. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR & GROUND.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil Allied Planes observed lost, in the air.

3. Nil E/A lost in the Air.

4. Nil E/A destroyed on the ground.

E. Time and location of:

Take off	STRIP #3 NADZAB	0800/K
TOT		0956/K
Break off attack		1015/K
Land at Base		1155/K

F. ROUTE

Out:
BASE DUMPU ANNANBERG BUT TARGET.

In: Target direct to base.

II. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

A. Major B.T.MARSTON lead the Squadron Formation which was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
MajorB.T.MARSTON	A/P	No.016	Capt.W.N.PARKE	A/P	019
2nd.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	"	" 591	2nd.Lt.F.L.NELSON	"	335
1st.Lt.W.W.GRAHAM	"	" 971	2nd.Lt.F.N.FOX	"	033

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

A. Details of the attack.

Maj.MARSTON assembled the Squadron five minutes after take off in one circle over the field and proceeded to the target without incident. Maj.MARSTON lead the Squadron to the vicinity of BUT AIRDROME and then took up a heading for the target which was approximately 25 miles W. He maintained a good altitude in order for all pilots to survey the area and pin point the target. As he passed over the target area hesobserved another Squadron in the vicinity. As soon as these planes cleared the area he placed all planes in trail and descended to strafing altitude and commenced the attack from W to E. He released all five bombs in the target between the two rivers, strafing all the while. After releasing the bombs he took advantage of a valley which ran Eastward and flew out to a point where he could cross over a low "saddle back" and turn for the second pass. He strafed the valley area intermittently during this maneuver. Perceiving that the other planes were clear he made his second run strafing the target and the valley area in much the same fashion as on the first run. On the break-away from the target he strafed SUAIN and LUAIN VILLAGES. He then circled out to sea to rally the squadron.

Lt.SUMMERS followed Maj.MARSTON's lead at an interval of approximately thirty seconds and released his five bombs in the target. He maintained his interval behind the leader and made his second pass on the same pattern as executed on the first pass. He swept the valley with his fire and then joined Maj.MARSTON out to sea.

Lt.GRAHAM was the third man in the "traffic pattern" and he followed the number two man closely on the initial attack. He successfully dumped his bombs in the target but without visible result. His guns ran away while strafing the valley and he was forced to swing slightly out of the pattern until his guns were brought under control. This was soon accomplished and he resumed his original position by turning inside the flight path of the two preceeding planes. On the second pass he again strafed the target and the areas, he crossed on withdrawal. He then joined the flight out to sea.

Capt.PARKE lead his flight to the target but on taking up attack formation he lost his entity as a flight leader and became the number four man in the string of planes. He followed Lt.GRAHAM'S flight path and attacked the target with his strafing guns. At the proper moment he began releasing his bombs- four of which were observed to burst in the target. However the fifth had to be salvoed when a malfunction prevented normal release. His second pass, strafing was well directed but without visible result. At the end of his run, Capt .PARKE turned out to sea to assemble his flight and join the first flight.

Lt.NELSON was number five in the sequence of attack. He followed the same line of attack as flown by the preceeding pla nes. The results of his attack, if any obtained, were confirmed to those obtained by strafing for he was forced to return all 5 bombs to base when a rack malfunction prevented release.

Lt.FOX was "Tail End Charlie" in the string and he executed both passes successfully dropping all five bombs in the target and strafing the area well. When Lt.FOX joined his flight, the squadron was in formation and heading on course for base.

Major MARSTON led the squadron to base and landed without incident.

B. ANTI AIRCRA-T FIRE

2lg During the second pass over the target one crew member observed light, slight, inaccurate M/G fire originating from an unobserved installation in the woods and on a hill approximately 2 miles W of the target. Own troops?

C. FIGHTER COVER

1. Nil Fighter Cover provided.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A LLIED A/P's.

1. Nil damage to A/P's of this Squadron.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

IV. CITATIONS

The details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

V. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.on Target
016	5	500 lb.	8/11 sec.	5
591	5	500 lb.	" "	5
971	5	500 lb.	" "	5
019	5	500 lb.	" "	4 (1 salvoed)
335	5	500 lb.	" "	Nil(Rack Mal)
033	5	500 lb.	" "	5

Total No.Bombs Dropped on Target: 2 4 X.500 lb. 8/11 sec. delay

STRAFING TABLE

A/P No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
016	4200	2120
591	4200	1060
971	4200	2385
019	4200	1325
335	4200	1325
033	4200	2385

Total: 10600 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

A/P No.	Type Camera	No. Photos taken
016	K-21	30
335	K-21	30
019	K-21	30
033	K-21	30

Total: 120 K-21 Photo taken

VI. SIGHTINGS

Sightings were made but after evaluation proved to be of no value.

VII. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Prints not received at the time this report was prepared.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PA T E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-2 Route to & From Target.


N
ADMIRALTY IS.
Manokwari
BIAK
Ransiki
Moem
JAPEN
Sawar
Maffin
Wakde
Hollandia
Aitape
Wewak
Nabire
NEW
GUINEA
Hansa
Bay
Timoeka
Madang
Nadzab
MORESBY
ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO: DATE-
345th BOMB GROUP
BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET:
ALTITUDE:

Legend
28th May 1944
499th Sqdrn.
Mission F.F.O.-149-I
Bombing Alt.-150
Bombing run- °
Strafing run- ° —— Area
Order over target -1st-
Took photos-
Crews report on bombs falling-
Fires-
Map Ref[illegible] Aerial Post
Scale 1" = 1 Mile

60

33

Rally

CHEMAU

ORIMBOI

BABIANG

MARUBIAN

DANDANAIN RIVER

033
019
335
971
591
016

24 500 LB. Bombs

SUAIN PLT.

SUAIN

LUAIN

DAMIDRIWAD RIVER

HAMEIM CREEK

DANIMUAL RIVER

DINAGUM CREEK

ANGLIP

BALUN

DANMAD

IKAM CREEK

HABABEL CREEK

RIVER

ALBU

26

40

SUAIN EAST
SCALE 1"=MI.

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

499
8Jun4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 713-1

9 June,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission to BIAK ISLAND performed on 8 June,44., with objective at SORIDO DROME. (1°10'S 136°5'E)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

I. GENERAL

a. On 4 June,44 the 345th Bomb Group was ordered to WAKDE ISLAND for possible action against a Japanese Naval Task Force which was operating in the vicinity of the HALMA-HARAS. The Group was placed under the operational control of the 310 Bomb Wing. The Group landed at WAKDE during the noon hours and remained on Ground Alert until 1630/K when the planes and combat crews were ordered to HOLLANDIA leaving Intelligence, Armament, Engineering and Medical personnel on WAKDE.
At HOLLANDIA the Group was alerted for a possible mission during the night, however no attack was ordered. Early the next day, the fifth, the Squadron turned back from a raid on BIAK because of unfavorable weather conditions. On the next day, the sixth, the squadron remained on Ground Alert for action against the Jap Task Force should it come within range but again the Task Force chose to stay in "safer" waters and be whittled down by our night reccos. On the seventh of June, the squadron was ordered to attack SORIDO DROME and area 500 yards inland. Nine planes were to attack from minimum altitude bombing and strafing. After performing the mission the Group was to land at HOLLANDIA refuel and proceed to NADZAB.
Subsequent paragraphs deal with the execution of the mission.

b. RENDEZVOUS

There was no Group or Fighter Rendezvous, squadrons proceeded to the target individually.

c. ATTACK

8 planes of this Squadron took off and 8 planes attacked the assigned target from E - W at minimum altitude. Each plane carried 2 X 1000 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse bombs. A total of 16 bombs were dropped.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

All bombs were in the target and the area was thoroughly strafed with no visible results. However the "Ground Control's expressed complete satisfaction with the results of the Group Attack.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil E/A observed destroyed.

3. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	HOLLANDIA DROME	0630/K
TOT	BIAK	0830/K
Landing	HOLLANDIA DROME	1025/K
Take Off	HOLLANDIA DROME	1116/K
Landing	Strip 3 HADZAB	1411/K

f. ROUTE

Out: HOLLANDIA WAKDE TARGET.

In : TARGET WAKDE HOLLANDIA HADZAB.

II. FORMATION, PILOTS, AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. Group

The 501st Squadron with Col.C.H.TRUE leading made the initial attack with the 498th, 499th, and 500th Squadrons following in that order.

b. Squadrons

Capt.R.D. Reinbold, the Squadron Commander, lead the Squadron Formation which consisted of the following:

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.R.D.REINBOLD	A/P	#382*
1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH	"	971
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	"	379*

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SECOND FLIGHT			THIRD FLIGHT		
Capt.P.GATH	A/P	#340	1st.Lt.T.A.KELLEY	A/P	#591
Capt.O.J.DANIEL	"	454*	1st.Lt.W.G.IRISH	"	097
2nd.Lt.E.K.PALMER	"	014	1st.Lt.E.A.SLINEY	"	0848

* B-25-D-2's
@ Take off delayed by P-40 priority landing. Did not reach target.

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Attack

Capt.R.D. REINBOLD assembled the squadron soon-after take off from HOLLANDIA DROME and proceeded to t he target. he reached the target area as the 498th Squadron broke off the attack and placed his flights in echelon to the r ight. He led the squadron in the attack from E-W with 8 planes abreast. Capt.REINBOLD, with Lieuts. RUSHWORTH and ALGER in number 2 & 3 positions respectively,made his attack over SORIDO DROME. The flight dropped six bombs in the target and strafed from the E end of the Drome to the coast West of the Drome. The attack was accurate and thorough but no visible results were observed.

Capt.GATH with Capt.DANIEL and Lt.PALMER in number 2 & 3 positions respectively, made his attack over the area just N of the Drome. His flightpath was parallel and just to the N of that flown by the lead flight. His flight dropped 6 bombs and strafed in the target with no visible results.

Lt.KELLEY with Lt.IRISH on his left wing flew to the right and abreast of the second flight. The flight strafed from the be-ginning of the run through SORIDO VILLAGE on the coast. The two planes dropped 4 bombs but with no visible results.

After completion of the run all flights turned left and assembled over the water S of BIAK ISLAND. Capt.REINBOLD led the squadron back to HOLLANDIA, landed, refueled and then returned to base at Nadsab.

b. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. During the attack a lone M/G ppsition on the north side of the center of SORIDO DROME fired slight, light, inaccurate.

c. FIGHTER COVER

1. Fighter cover of P-47's patroled over the target during the strike.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO ALLIED A/P's

1. Nil damage to A/P's of this Squadron.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

IV. CITATIONS

The details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

V. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

A/P No.	No. Bomb s Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on Target
014	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
097	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
340	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
254	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
379	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
971	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2
384	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	Nil (Salvoed in Wat
591	2	8/11 sec.	1000 lb.	2

Total: 16 X 1000 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse bombs dropped on target.

Note:#382 A/P should be included in with bombing t able.

Strafing Table

A/P No.	No. Rds. Car'd.	No. Rds. Fired
014	4200	1325
097	4200	3180
340	4200	1325
254	4200	1855
379	4200	795
971	4200	1325
382	4200	1590
[illegible]	4200	1855

Total: 13250 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

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By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/91

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PHOTO TABLE

No photos were taken.

VI. SIGHTINGS

Nil important sightings.

VII PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Nil photos received.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.HOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-2 Route to and From Target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DECLASSFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB (IM NARA, Date 5/30/91

Legend
8th June 1944
499th Sqdrn.
T.O.T.- 0835/k
Bombing Alt.- 100-200 Ft.
16 1000 Lb. Bombs in target. O
2 " " " " "
1st. Flight. ——
2nd. " ——
3rd. " ——
Took photos- T
Map Reference- Besnek
Scale-1/63,360

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 745005
By RLB/IM NARA, Date 5/20/97



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 160 DATE- 8 Th June
345th BOMB GROUP
499Th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0835 I/C
ALTITUDE: 100-200 FT.

499
168-E-8
JLH
16Jun44

499TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

20 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 168-E-8, performed 16 June 1944 by three (3) airplanes of the 499th Squadron. Objective: SAMATE and JEFMAN Airdromes.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary objective: SAMATE and JEFMAN Dromes to be bombed by three (3) planes.

Bomb Load: 12 x 100 lb. inst. parademo bombs per plane.

b. Five (5) airplanes of this squadron were to take off on this mission. However, an accident on the taxi strip caused two of these planes not to be able to take off on the mission. Planes were to take off from HOLLANDIA, form with the 345th Group, rendezvous with the 38th Group at WAKDE, rendezvous with the fighters at MOSWAAR Island, and proceed direct to the target.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Three (3) planes reached the target approaching from the southwest to northeast and dropped 18 x 100 lb. inst. parademo. bombs in the dispersal area and the area towards the east end of the strip. The SAMATE Drome was strafed also. A transport, probably a THELMA, was strafed on the SAMATE Strip, but did not burn. Leaving this area, the three (3) planes approached JEFMAN Drome strafing target 5-X enroute. Just as the squadron came over JEFMAN Drome, the airplane on the left wing, No. 019, was hit by ack-ack and was seen to veer off to the north flip over and explode as it hit the water just north of the center of the island. On JEFMAN six (6) bombs were dropped in the dispersal area northwest of the strip. At least 2 bombers are considered hit by these bombs. A twin engine bomber was strafed and set on fire at the southeast corner, and a twin engine fighter was strafed and damaged in the center of the strip. The buildings in the northwest dispersal area were par-

CONFIDENTIAL

ticularly heavily strafed, and the entire island was strafed with 4200 x .50 caliber and 1100 x .30 caliber ammunition. (Note: Bombs and ammunition expended by A/P 019 are not included in the above).

(2) All four (4) squadrons of the 345th Group participated in this mission. The 38th Group led the attack followed by the 501st, 498th, 499th, and 500th.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) Our squadron was not intercepted. However, at least 5-6 fighters, OSCARS and HAMPS, were over JEFMAN, but they made no passes at our squadron. The P-38's were seen to shoot down at least three of these planes.

(2) As mentioned above, A/P 019 of this squadron was hit by ack-ack fire and was seen to crash and explode when hitting the water. In the opinion of crews witnessing the crash, there could have been no possible survivors on this plane.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From HOLLANDIA from 0910-0912/K.
Rendezvous: With 38th Group at WAKDE at 1022/K.
With fighters at MIOSWAAR Island at 1207/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA at 1745/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-MIOSWAAR ISLAND-CROSS PENINSULA-TARGET-VOGELKOPH PENINSULA-WAKDE-HOLLANDIA.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 499TH SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Marston, Group Operations Officer, led the group and Captain Reinbold, squadron commander, led our squadron. Flight was as follows: Capt. Reinbold, in A/P 971; Lt. Rushworth, in A/P 097; and Lt. Selby, in A/P 019.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Captain Reinbold led the squadron on to the target coming from the southwest on a heading of approximately 22 degrees. He released six of his bombs in the SAMATE area strafing a transport there, strafed personnel area 5-X, and continued dropping his six remaining bombs on JEFMAN Island. The six bombs dropped in the dispersal

area southwest of the strip falling among several bombers in the area. At least two are considered hit by these bombs. Lt. Rushworth, in #2 position, dropped his 12 bombs on the east end of SAMATE Strip and in the dispersal area just south of the strip. He too strafed heavily there as well as in the personnel area 5-K, and continuing to JEFMAN strafed a twin engine bomber in the southeast corner of the strip and set it on fire. A twin engine fighter towards the center of the strip was strafed and damaged but did not burst into flames. Buildings in the northwest dispersal area were particularly heavily strafed. Lt. Selby, in A/P 019, in all probability released his bombs in the SAMATE area, but as he approached JEFMAN, his plane was hit by heavy ack-ack fire and was seen to veer off to the left, crash and explode upon hitting the water just north of the center of the island.

b. Light M/G fire was received from the east end of SAMATE Drome. As the planes approached JEFMAN Drome, 5-6 aerial burst phosphorus bombs were seen to explode over the drome at an altitude of 500 ft. Intense M/G fire from the northwest coast of JEFMAN from vicinity of position 1-W was seen as well as 75 mm. fire from position 5-W. As the planes left the target and continued southeastward, a cruiser off DOOM Island fired on them, with shells falling short of our planes.

c. Fighter cover, provided by four squadrons of P-38's, was described as being particularly excellent.

d. A/C 41-30019 seen to crash into the sea just north of the center of JEFMAN Island and was seen to explode upon hitting the water.

e. In the opinion of witnesses, there could have been no survivors in this crash. Crew members are as follows:

Pilot	2nd Lt.	William A. Selby	0-738263
Co-pilot	2nd Lt.	Robert M. Gribble	0-829004.
Radio Opr.	T/Sgt.	Merton E. Voigt	39236540
Engineer	S/Sgt.	George L. Whittier	11021886
Gunner	S/Sgt.	David P. McManus	13136948

4. In the opinion of this Officer, Lt. Selby and his crew for their heroism and extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight should be awarded posthumously the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Narrative Report on Mission 168-E-8, cont'd.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Two serviceable BETTY bombers were seen at position 4-V in SAMATE Drome. 5-10 other unidentified planes were seen in this area. An operations building with 8 trucks parked in front of it was observed in the area north of the west end of SAMATE Drome.

b. Capt. Reinbold observed a lugger just north of SAMATE Drome. On JEFMAN strip two TONYS were seen on the northeast end of the strip and fuel fires in the vicinity of 3-X and 2-X there. A large fire and column of black smoke, probably a burning plane, was seen in the center of JEFMAN Drome, as well as a fire at the southwest end of the strip and several small fires at the north end of the strip.

c. Ack-ack was observed by Lt. Rushworth's crew as coming from CHREEK Island. This crew also saw 2 enemy fighters go down, one in the water several miles northwest of SAMATE Drome and one 4 miles northeast of BAM Island. Both crews reported 10-14 unidentified vessels seen close to the shore of islands north and west of BOOM Island. On the route home, 3 ack-ack burst were seen 8 miles south of BOME HOEM BAI at 13232-E--0050-S. 2 barges were seen at CAPE ASI at position 13140-E--0045-S.

7. 5-20 photographs were taken of the target and show several of the planes as reported in the SAMATE dispersal area.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

1 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
971	12	para-	100 lb.	12		
097	12	demos		12		
Total	24			24		

STRAFING TABLE #2

	.50 Caliber			.30 Caliber		
A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
971	4400	2200	none	2000	1100	none
097	4400	2000	"	2000	none	"
Total	8800	4200		4000	1100	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
971	K-20	25	5

APPENDIX A.

499
169-E-
JCH
17 Jun 44

499TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

21 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, performed 17 June 1944 by four (4) airplanes of the 499th squadron. Objective: JEFMAN Strip and Dispersal Area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary objective: JEFMAN Strip and dispersal area to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude. Bomb load: 12 x 100 lb. 4/5 sec. delay parademo. bombs per plane.

b. Four (4) planes were to take off from HOLLANDIA, form with the 345th Group, rendezvous with the 38th Group at WAKDE and fighters at MIOSWAAR Island.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Only three (3) planes reached the target. One plane turned back at MIOSWAAR Island at approximately 1235/K due to failure of its fuel transfer system. The three planes approached JEFMAN Island from north to south and hit the western part of the island and the small personnel area 5-X. 20 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs hit in this personnel area which was strafed and a fire with black smoke, probably fuel, was started there. Being unable to drop their bombs on this small area, 6 bombs were dropped farther south on SANERI Village, 10 bombs were dropped in gardens south of this village, which was also strafed. A sailboat, 4 miles southeast of WARIR Island was strafed. On their original approach to the target, a lugger 3 miles northwest of CAPE SORONG was heavily strafed. Personnel were seen to be jumping overboard, one of which was definitely killed. In all 6200 x .50 caliber and 1000 x .30 caliber rounds were expended in strafing.

(2) All four squadrons of the 345th Group participated on this mission. The 499th and 498th hit JEFMAN, while the 500th and 501st hit SAMATE simultaneously.

Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, cont'd.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From HOLLANDIA from 0950-0953/K.
Rendezvous: With 38th Group at WAKDE at 1103/K.
Fighters at MIOSWAAR Island at 1205/K.
Attack: SARATE from 1355-1400/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA at 1745/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-MIOSWAAR ISLAND-VOGELKOPH PENINSULA-TARGET-RETURN.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 499TH SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Kelly led the 499th Squad on on the attack. Flight was as follows: Lt. Kelly, in A/P 340; Lt. Irish, in A/P 097; Lt. Palmer, in A/P 048; and Lt. Pollis, in A/P 064.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Kelly led the squadron approaching the target from the north to south. The planes covered the western end of JEFMAN Island but concentrated their bombs on the small area designated 5-X to the southwest of JEFMAN. The three (3) planes of this flight flew abreast. Lt. Kelly dropped six of his bombs at this target and his remaining 6 on SAN MI Village. Lt. Irish dropped 12 bombs on target 5-X and started a fire there with black smoke indicating probably a fuel dump. Lt. Palmer when north of CAPE STRONG heavily strafed a lugger there and personnel were seen to jump overboard. One was definitely killed by strafing. Lt. Palmer dropped two of his bombs on 5-X, and the remaining 10 in the gardens south of YAMKERI Village. A sailboat, 4 miles southeast of YARIP Island, was strafed by Lt. Irish.

b. Moderate, inaccurate and fairly intense M/G fire came from 2-3 positions on the west end of JEFMAN Island.

Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, cont'd.

c. Fighter cover was provided by four (4) squadrons of P-38's and was excellent.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Approximately 10 unidentified luggers and medium vessels were seen in the vicinity of DOOM Island. One lugger was seen to be blown up by the 38th Group near DOOM Island. A large explosion was seen in the vicinity of the KENIOM Village, which is 13 miles due east of JEFMAN Island. Lt. Irish reported seeing 4 barges north of CAPE NUJEW.

7. Mission was photographed by K-20, K-21, and K-22 cameras. Photographs confirm bombing as reported by the crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

1 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.

Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, cont'd.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
340	12	para-	100 lb.	12		
097	12	demo		12		
048	12	4/5		12		
Total	36		100 lb.	36		

STRAFING TABLE #2

	.50 Caliber			.30 Caliber		
A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
340	4400	1500	Nil.	2000	none	
097	4400	3200	"	2000	1000	nil
048	4400	1500	"	2000	none	
Total	13,200	6200		6000	1000	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
340	K-20	25	5
097	K-21	30	2
048	K-22	20	1
Total		75	8

APPENDIX A.

499
182-K-7
30Jun44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
APO #713-1
Temporary APO #565

July 1, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FPC 182-K-7 performed on 30th June, 1944, with objective at KAMIRI AIRDROME, NOEMFOOR ISLAND (134-50' E - 00-58' S.)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO #713-1. ATTENTION OF A.C., Ops Br, A-2.

1. GENERAL.

a. The assigned Mission for the 345th Bomb Group was to attack the wooded area immediately S of KAMIRI AIRDROME, with intent to destroy supplies and personnel in preperation for "D" Day. Two squadrons (500th & 499th.) employing 6 B-25s each were to execute the attack from minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous:

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over NOEMFOOR BROAD, enroute to the target.

c. Attack.

The 499th Squadron approached the target from the N and attacked at minimum altitude in 2 elements of three planes "Vs". The second element in trail at 45 seconds. Two planes were loaded with 4 x 500 lb S/11 sec delay demo bombs. The remaining four were loaded with three bombs of the same types. During the attack a total of 20 bombs were dropped, of which 18 were in the target and 2 in the dispersal area S E of the target. Other than bomb bursts and bomb smoke, no results of the bombing were visible. The target and surrounding area was thoroughly strafed with a total of 11,395 x .50 and 2,000 x .30 cal ammunition. Several widely scattered fuel drums S of the center of KAMIRI AIRDROME were strafed with the result that one barrel exploded and burned. Nil other results. In general , the assigned target was heavily wooded with grass huts as the only visible targets.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Time and Location of;

Take Off HOLLANDIA DROME 1010/K
T.O.T. NOEMFOOR ISLAND 1318/K-1322/K
Landing HOLLANDIA DROME 1528/K-1536/K

2. Route to and From Target:

Route Out: HOLLANDIA - WAKDE IS. - BIAK IS. - TARGET.
Route In : TARGET - WAKDE IS.- HOLLANDIA.

2. FORMATION - PLANES and PILOTS PARTICIPATING:

A. Group:

The 500th Squadron led by LT AMES was number one in the sequence of attack, followed by the 499th Squadron.

B. 499th Squadron:

This Squadron led by Lt. RUSHWORTH , consisted of the following Pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st Lt. RUSHWORTH	A/P #033	1st Lt. GRAHAM	A/P #097
Lt. SUMMERS	A/P #058	1st Lt. MURPHY	A/P #084
Lt. FOX	A/P #591	Lt. PETTY	A/P #082

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION:

A. Details of Attack:

Lt RUSHWORTH took off immediately behind the 500th Sqdn. and assembled the squadron in 180°turn. He joined the 500th squadron soon after and proceeded to the NOEMFOOR ISLAND AREA without incident. The weather along the route over water was excellent. However, several rainstorms 15 miles inland from C. D'URVILLE were noted. On arrival in the target area, a rain storm covering the S W end of the target and a good dealof the centeral part of the ISLAND made target recognition difficult. Lt RUSHWORTH followed the 500th sqdn on the approach from the N E to a point 3 miles W of the target. Meanwhile he had spotted the target and seeing that the 500 th had not been able to do so, made a 360° turn and again approached the target from the N E . During this turn Lt. GRAHAM spaced his flight 4-5 seconds behind the first flight (the large interval as a precaution against poor visibility).

Lt. RUSHWORTH led his flight in attacking as planned from N E to S W parallel to the runway. His flight dropped 10 bombs in the target with no specific targets or results visible. At the end of the run, on the S bank of the mouth of the KAMIRI RIVER, the flight spotted 2 barges and threw a couple of hundred rounds at them. However rain made accuracy and observation impossible. Lt RUSHWORTH then turned right and in a wide circle picked up the second flight. The return to base was without incident.

Lt. GRAHAM led his flight on the same axis of attack followed by the first flight. His flight dropped a total of 8 bombs in the target, but like the first flight, no specific targets or results visible. Because of the poor visibility over the lower part of the target, Lt. GRAHAM dropped 2 bombs early. These bombs fell N E of the target in the dispersal area.

All planes carefully avoided dropping bombs on the beach or in the water as ordered.

b. Interception, Airplanes Destroyed in the Air and on the Ground:

1. Nil interception.
2. Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
3. Nil Enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
4. Nil Enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties:

Nil personnel of this Squadron injured.

d. Damage to own A/Fs:

Nil airplanes of this Squadron damaged.

4. CITATIONS:

Details of thismission provide no basis for recommendations of awards.

5. ARMAMENT and ORDNANCE:

A total of 20 x 500 lb 8/11 sec delay fuse demo bombs were expended. No malfunctions.

A total of 11,395 x .50 and 2,000 x .30 cal ammo were expended. A minimum of gun stoppages occured.

6. SIGHTINGS:

There were NIL sightings of Intelligence.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION:

Photos confirm crews report of bombing, but show little. [illegible] of Tulip [illegible] bomb bursts.

PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Inclosures:

1. Route Overlay to and from Target.
2. Bomb Assessment Chart.

Distribution:

1. 1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL Fifth Air Force, APO 713-1.
2. 1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL 310th Air Wing ATTENTION OF A C of S A-2. APO #565
3. 2 copies A-2 , Fifth Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
4. 1 copy INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 345th Bomb Group, APO 713-1.
5. 1 copy Squadron files.



FFO-182-E-7
499th Sqdn, 345th Gp.
June 30,44.
T.O.T.: 1318/K-1322/K
Altitude: Minimum
Bomb Bursts:
Took Photos:
Order over Target: #1 over KAMIRI
Map Ref: ~~KAMIRI~~ NOEMFOOR ISLAND
Prov. 1/63360



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 182-E-7 DATE-30 JUNE '44
345th BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1318/K
ALTITUDE: MINIMUM

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO

499
184-E-1
25 Jul 44

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] SQUADRON (M) AAF
[redacted] GROUP (M) AAF
713-1
APO # 565

July 3, 1944.

[redacted] FO 184-E-12, performed on the [redacted] ep

[redacted]th Air Force A P O #713-1. ATTENTION

a. On the morning of 2 July this Squadron together with the 500th Squadron was ordered to conduct a barge sweep in the MAROKWARI AREA. Each Squadron was to employ 6 B-25D-1's. Since no fighter cover could be provided it was decided that the 500th Squadron would sweep the coast from CAPE BONPEE to MAROKWARI while the 499th flew fighter cover for them. At MAROKWARI the 499th Squadron was to begin the sweep while the 500th Sqdn. covered them. Each squadron was to confine its attack to an area 1 mile off shore in accordance with current bombing and strafing restrictions and to skirt around known A/A positions.

b. Rendezvous:

The Group Rendezvous was not accomplished because because dust on HOLLANDIA DROME slowed up take off intervals and poor visibility, due to haze and darkness, prevented planes finding each other. Consequently the two Squadrons proceeded individually to the target.

c. Attack:

This squadron arriving first at the target, flew along the area assigned to the 500th in an endeavor to locate that squadron, but without success. Since this area was assigned to the 500th thorough search was not made. This squadron began to search at CAPE MOSPI, and continued down the coast to NAVI BAY, where the sweep

CONFIDENTIAL

was broken off. The only targets sighted were huts and buildings (which were damaged by previous raids, and a barge of questionable serviceability. Bombs were observed to hit in a group of buildings just S of SIS VILLAGE, but low altitude and distance prevented observation of damage. Huts at various points on the coast were thoroughly strafed without visible damage. Due to mech. failure 1 plane failed to take off.

4. Time and location of:

Take off HOLLANDIA Drome	:	0635/-
Search for 500th Sqdn CAPE SORONEN	:	0900/-
I C T CAPE HOMFI - KAMI BAY	:	0920 - 0945/-
Land at HOLLANDIA DROME	:	1255/-

5. Route:

Out : HOLLANDIA - SAMBER ISLAND - CAPE D'URVILLE - JAPEN STRAITS - TARGET.

In : KAMI BAY - JAPEN STRAITS & CAPE D'URVILLE - SAMBER ISLAND - HOLLANDIA.

6. Formation - Plans and Pilot Participating.

a. Group.

The 499th Squadron, led by Lieut [illegible], was ordered to lead the Group Formation. The 500th Squadron was to fly the Number 2 position but as noted above, the rendezvous was not accomplished.

b. Squadron.

The squadron formation was as follows:

Lead Flight		Low Left Flight	
1st Lt. [illegible]	A/C #614	1st Lt. [illegible]	A/C #633
1st Lt. [illegible]	A/C #597	2nd Lt. [illegible]	A/C #630
2nd Lt. [illegible]	A/C #633	*2nd Lt. [illegible]	A/C #591

* Mechanical Failure - did not take-off.

7. Action of the Aircraft.

a. Enroute to Attack.

1st Lt. [illegible] took off first and flew directly out to Sentani Lake in order to allow ample time for succeeding planes to join. However poor visibility did not allow the

two flights to rendezvous until reaching WAKDE ISLAND. Here it was noted that Lt. Fox was absent. From here a flight to target was without incident. After a fruitless search for the 500th squadron, the formation skirted MAR-OEMARI (out of A/A range but still close enough to observe the area) and proceeded to CAPE MOEMI . The first flight of three planes iniated the attack here, strafing huts along the coast to MAMI BAY where Lt. MOSER dropped 2 x 250 lb 4/5 sec delay bombs on a group of buildings near SIB VILLAGE The bombs were observed to hit accurately, but results could not be determined

Lt WAIVE dropped one 250 lb 4/5 sec delay bomb at the same point with similar results. The flight turned off the target here, circled to pick up the second flight and returned to base without incident.

The second flight consisting of two planes followed the first flight in trail at a safe distance. Lt. RUSHWORTH did not sight any worthy targets, consequently he returned all bombs to base.

Lieut BOWMAN dropped 6 x 100 lb para demo bombs on a beached barge of questionable serviceability. The bombing was accurate but low altitude and a screen of trees prevented the observation of results. At the mouth of the WARIPI river Lt BOWMAN dropped 2 x 100 lb para-demos at a hut built out over the water. Both bombs missed with nil damage resulting. He also salvoed 2 x 100 lb para-demos in this vicinity. Both planes strafed down the coast and broke off the attack near SIB VILLAGE. The planes then joined the first flight and returned to the base.

b. Interception - Airplanes destroyed in the air and on the ground:

1. Nil interception.
2. Nil Allied planes observed damaged or destroyed in the air.
3. Nil Enemy planes observed damaged or destroyed in the air.
4. Nil Enemy planes observed damaged or destroyed on the ground

c. Flak

Near round [illegible], both flights observed gun flashes from flakships position # 20. No heavy caliber bursts were observed over the area just N.E. of the E end of [illegible] 2 bursts were felt by the plane but no damage resulted.

d. Losses to own A/C.

a. Nil.

e. Personnel Casualties:

1. Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. ARMAMENT, ORDNANCE and PHOTO REPORTS:

1. 10 x 100 lb para demos and 3 x 250 lb 4/5 sec delay bombs expended.

2. 7,500 x .50 & 1,000 x .30 ammo expended.

3. All five planes were equipped with K-21 cameras. One plane did not find targets for photos. One camera became loose and vibration prevented use. One camera was damaged by explosion of a 500th plane on the ground and details on the remaining camera are unknown.

6. SIGHTINGS:

Several square pits, probably 5 feet deep, each containing approximately 12 fuel drums were observed at the E end of MOEMI DROME. The drums were apparently not damaged. Exact position of the pits could not be determined.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION:

Nil photos received by this Squadron.

FOR THE SQUADRON COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

DISTRIBUTION.

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL Fifth Air Force APO 713-1.
1 copy 310th Bomb Wing A-2, APO # 565.
2 copies Fifth Bomber Command A-2 , APO # 713-1.
1 copy Intelligence Officer 345th Group APO 713-1
1 copy Squadron files.

499
188-E8
6JL/44

CONFIDENTIAL

499th BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF.
345th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF.
APO # 713-1
Temporary APO # 505.

July 8, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative report on MISSION PFO 188-E-8, performed by the 499th Bomb Squadron on July 6, 1944. Objective Barge and Shipping Search E. Coast of VOGELKOP PENNINSULA and WAIGEO ISLAND. Executed on 6 July,1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force. APO# 713-1. ATTENTION OF A. C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 6 July '44 this Squadron together with the 500th Squadron executed a barge sweep and Shipping sweep along the E coast of VOGELKOP PENNINSULA and around WAIGEO ISLAND. Each squadron employed 6 B-25 D-1s'. Leadplanes of each flight were loaded with 3 x 500 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs and the wing planes with 4 x 250 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs. The two squadrons proceeded to WAIGEO , where this squadron escorted the 500th during their sweep of the south coast, after which the 499th swept the N coast. After breaking off the attack here the squadron proceeded to N coast of VOGELKOP and conducted a sweep along it.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The two squadrons accomplished the Rendezvous enroute to WAIGEO Island. Rendezvous with one squadron of P-38s' was accomplished as planned in the vicinity of CAPE DEMBANE.

c. ATTACK

The squadron sighted no targets on the N coast of WAIGEO ISLAND until reaching SOMI HARBOR. On an unnamed island in E part of HARBOR, a jetty with a boat house at its seaward end and a well kept village of 10 houses were attacked

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRS FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT.	
1st Lt. RUSHWORTH	A/P # 033	1st Lt. ALGER	A/P # 058
1st Lt. PALMER	A/P # 014	1st Lt. GRAHAM	A/P # 097
1st Lt. SUMMERS	A/P # 016	1st Lt. FOX	A/P # 084

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack.

The formation arrived at WAIGEO ISLAND without incident. The weather was not what could be termed desirable, but provided no serious obstruction to the accomplishment of the assigned task. WAIGEO ISLAND itself was covered with cumulo nimbus with a ceiling of approximately 1000 feet over the shoreline. Just before going under the overcast, two O/I S/E planes flying at 15,000 feet leaving vaper trails and heading west, were seen. At the same tim e the P-38 escort was heard on the radio discussing intent to give chase. The escort was never seen afterwards. While the 500th conducted a sweep of the S coast, the squadron flew close cover for them to guard against suprise attack by enemy planes. At the W end of the Island this Squadron was forced to fly through a rain storm to reach the N coast of the Island. During this time the 500th Sqdn became seperated and flew back along the S coast.

Lt. RUSHWORTH, with Lts' PALMER and SUMMERS on his wings swept up the coast followed by Lt ALGER with Lts' GRAHAM and FOX on his wings. No targets were sighted until reaching BOMI HARBOR. Here an unnamed Island in the N part of the Harbor containing a a village and jetty were observed. Lt RUSHWORTH led the attack from NW to SE. He thoroughly strafed the village but did not release his bombs - saving them for his sweep along VOGELKOP. During the two runs over the village Lieut PALMER dropped 1 bomb on the jetty scoring a hit. Lieut SUMMERS dropped 1 bomb on the jetty which destroyed the boat house, and three in the village.

Lt. ALGER led his flight in a run following the first flight at a safe distance. He dropped all three of his bombs on the village observing hits. Lieut GRAHAM dropped two bombs on the jetty and one in the Village. Lieut FOX did not release his bombs here. All six planes thoroughly strafed the area.
After making 2 runs the formation continued with the sweep along the coast. At CAPE SAOBAS a serviceable barge was spotted on the beach. All planes strafed the barge and Lieut FOX dropped 1 bomb which skipped over the barge. Farther E, two other barges, p probably D/S were strafed. After strafing the last barge the flights pulled out to sea where Lieut FOX salvoed 3 bombs and Lieut GRAHAM salvoed 1 bomb which failed to release. The flights re-

The jetty and boat house were destroyed as well as five of the houses in the village. There is every indication that the village and the Island is occuppied by Japs. The substantiating facts are the well kept condition of the village and roads, the sightings of uniforms hanging on clothes lines, and the appearance of a flag pole in the photographs. Unfortunately no flag was flying. The area was thoroughly strafed in two passes, and 8 x 250 and 3 x 500 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs were dropped here. At CAPE SOABAS 1 bomb was dropped at a barge. The bomb skipped over the barge and probably did some damage. This barge and 2 probably U/S barges farther N were thoroughly strafed. Enroute to base, 2 barges in the vicinity of CAPE BRABARAN (N coast WOLEAI) were attacked. 3 x 500 lb and 2 x 250 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs were dropped. During the strafing run by the first flight, an explosion in the trees 100 feet to the rear of the barges, occurred. Cause is unknown. Since the planes were running low on fuel, only one pass was made and observation of damage was not made. Even if the bombs failed to damage the barges the strafing was sufficiently heavy and concentrated to render the barges U/S. It was noted by several crew members that the N coast of WAIGEO ISLAND provides few barge hideouts because of the rocky cliffs which prevail along most of the coastline.

4. TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take Off MOLLUSCAN DROME 0735/A
Sweep N coast of WAIGEO ISLAND 1115/A - 1145/A.
Attack CAPE SORABRAN 1250/A
and at Base 1545/A

- C. D'URVILLE - BIAK - C. GOOD HOPE - WAIGEO I.

...it.

...ATING

...d to lead the formation while
...on javelin down.

...was set up as follows:

)

S E C R E T

formed and joined the SOUTH squadron at the E end of WAIGEO ISLAND. The formation then crossed over the N coast of VOGELKOP to continue the sweep. No targets were sighted until reaching CAPE BRANDAWAH.
Here Lieut RUSSWORM spotted a motor boat (small size) camouflaged with paint to blend with the walls of a cut in the cliff in which it was berthed. However he was directly overhead when sighting was made and because of a shortage of fuel could not afford to make a circle to attack. Just E of this two barges were sighted on the beach and the first flight converged their fire on them. During this strafing and explosion of low order, followed by a puff o black smoke occurred in the trees 100 feet to the rear of the barges. Lieut RUSSWORM released all three of his bombs and Lieut [illegible] released two of his with unobserved results. The flight did not alter its course after the attack but continued straight ahead - again to save gas. Just E of CAPE BORORER, Lieut [illegible] dropped his remaining bomb on an apparently U/S barge, thinking this course better than salvoing in the water. As he crossed the tip of CAPE BORORER, he saw to his dismay, a lugger sitting in close to shore. Since all bombs had been expended the lugger was attacked onl, by heavy strafing with no visible results. The squadron reformed and returned to base without incident. The crews landed after being in the air eight hours and twenty minutes.

b. INTERCEPTION - AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON THE GROUND & IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception.
2. Nil allied planes observed damaged or destroyed in the air.
3. Nil a/a observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. GROUND OPPOSITION.

1. Nil a/a fire received.

d. DAMAGE T a/c & PERSONNEL.

1. Nil damage to a/pe of this squadron.
2. Nil injury to personnel of this unit.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

1. BOMBARDMENT

6 x 500 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs expended.
10 x 250 lb 4/5 sec delay fuse bombs expended.

2. AMMUNITION.

11,250 x .50 cal. ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

2 A/I B/A planes at 15,000 feet 10 miles NE of the E end of MAJURO ISLAND, heading W leaving vapor trails. P-38s seen in area and conversation heard discussing the 2 planes. Apparently intending to give chase.
Village attacked in BOAT HARBOR (WALDRON) showed signs of occupation and activity. Roads were well used, uniforms hanging on clothes lines and well kept condition of village and surrounding areas.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

1 set of prints received and noted by this office. No attempt made of interpretation because of lack of information shown in prints.

FOR THE SQUADRON COMMANDER.

PAT E GOFORTH
Capt. Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION.

1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force APO 713-1 ATTENTION [illegible] of L., A-2.
1 copy [illegible] COMMANDING GENERAL 310th Bomb Wing APO # 565.
2 copies V Bomber Command, APO # 713.
1 copy INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 345th Group APO 713-1
1 copy Squadron Files.

(5.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

208-C-10
27 Jul 44

OK
ABR

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (L) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (L) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

28 July,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 208-C-10, performed on 27 July,1944 with objective at GALELA, HALMAHERA. (1° 50'S - 127°45'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. This mission was a coordinated strike on the GALELA AIRDROMES in the HALMAHERAS by the 345th and 38th Groups. Three squadrons of the 345th (501st,500th and 499th) employed 9 planes each while the 38th Group employed 6 planes from each of 4 squadrons. This strike was the first time the HALMAHERAS have been attacked in such force. While a good deal of information was available, many details which can only be ascertained by low level observation, were lacking. For months the combat crews have been eagerly looking forward to hitting the HALMAHERAS - anticipating "nice juicy" targets which every strafer pilot dreams about. Unfortunately their "dream" mission was a disappointment. Even though this mission was the best since HOLLANDIA in April, it was considerably inferior to some of the notable missions of the past. In other words the crews expected to find GALELA a bastion of Japanese strength but instead , found that it was just another Airdrome.

b.Rendezvous

1. The Wing Rendezvous was accomplished over the water S.W. of Sorido Airdrome.

2. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished in a wide, slow turn after take-off.

3. The fighter escort was picked up at AJO IS. as planned.

c.Attack

This squadron employed 9 B-25-D-1's, each loaded with 18 X 100 lb. 4/5 sec. delay parademo bombs, in the attack. This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack following the 501st Squadron. The 345th leading, approached the GALELA Area from the E around the N tip of the E peninsula and altered course for the target making landfall near the [illegible], S.E. of GALELA

TOWNSHIP. Just before turning, the squadron took interval behind the 501st Squadron and crossed the mountains S and SE of GALELA LAKE at approximately 3000 feet and on reaching a point 4 miles S of the dromes turned right on to the axis of attack which was from S to N parallel to the runways. In this turn the number 2 and 3 flights pulled up abreast of the number 1 flight making a 9 plane front across the target. The #1 flight flew directly over the runways and the #3 flight crossed the dispersal area to the W of the runways where practically all of the planes were parked. The #2 flight was assigned the area to the E of the runways to cover planes which were reported to be parked in that area. However, visual observation indicates the presence of only 3 planes in the entire E side of both strips. Consequently the greater part of damage done was accomplished by the first and third flights. Although a heavy growth of coconut trees prevented observation of specific results of it's attack, it is believed that damage to planes in this area was considerable. A tabulation of the damage in no wise to be considered complete, follows:

Tower #2 strip destroyed. 3 trucks damaged.
1 steam roller destroyed. 1 steam roller damaged.
1 plane set afire, 3 others damaged.
1 of 3 medium A/A guns either damaged beyond repair or destroyed.

The above are known results. The results of the 30 bombs which were dropped in the W dispersal areas are unknown. A total of 72X100 lb. parademos were dropped in the drome Area. 18 bombs were dropped NE of the target near the coast. 10 because of mechnical failure and 12 due to "cockpit trouble".

D. Interception

1. Nil interception occured.
2. Nil damage to own A/P's.
3. Nil damage to E/A in the air.

E. Time and Location of:

Take-off	Mokmer Drome, Biak Is.	0731/K.
On Course	Rani Island.	0759/K.
T.O.T.	Galela	1133-1135/K
Landed	Mokmer Drome	1438/K.

F. Route

Out: Base - Rani Is. Ajoe Is. N.tip of E penninsula Halmaheras. Target.
In : Reciprocal except near Biak Is. a large rain squall, forced planes to circle N of the island and approach from the E.

8. Formation, pilots and planes participating.

a. 345th Group.

The #1 squadron, the 501st was led by Lt.Col.COLTHORP with the 499th in the #2 position and the 500th Squadron in the #3 position of a "V" formation.

b. 499th Squadron

This squadron led by Capt.R.D. Reinbold was set up as follows.

FIRST FLIGHT

Capt.R.D. REINBOLD	A/P	#014
2nd.Lt. H.H.BUDDE	"	347
2nd.Lt. M.J.OPIE	"	084

SECOND FLIGHT			THIRD FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	A/P	#097	1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	A/P	033
1st.Lt.R.H.HOTZ	"	058	2nd.Lt.E.L.NUNES	"	016
2nd.Lt.P.M.TARANUK	"	164	2nd.Lt.A.H.MOSSER	"	591

3. Details of the Mission.

Details of attack

Capt.REINBOLD took off and assembled the squadron in a right turn after take-off and joined the Group Formation near SORIDO DRIVE at Biak. After rendezvous with the 38th Group and Fighters, the composite formation proceeded to the target without incident. Just before making landfall SE of GALELA TOWN, Capt. REINBOLD maneuvered the squadron to take interval behind the 501st Squadron. After crossing the mountains at the lowest possible altitude of 3000 feet, he began to increase speed and lose altitude. In the meantime the #2 & #3 flights pulled abreast of him. Capt. REINBOLD turned the squadron onto the axis of attack and lined his flight up with the runways.
Capt.REINBOLD opened fire on the area at the S end of #2 strip and continued strafing along the right side #2 strip until he reached the N end where he started toggling his bombs. The bombs continued from here down the W side of #1 strip to the center. As a result of these bombs, a good size fuel fire was started in the area between the S end of #1 Strip and the N end of #2 strip. Near the N end of #1 strip he heavily strafed 2 trucks. These trucks were his last targets so he broke off the attack.

Lt.BUDDE in #2 position of the first flight strafed along the E side of #2 strip but found no targets in his flight path. Near the S end of #1 strip he bombed and strafed two trucks with unknown results. Near the N end of #1 strip he strafed and bombed a steam roller and a truck. Damage to the truck is unknown but the steam roller was observed by one crew member to be destroyed. He stayed close on Capt.REINBOLD'S right wing during the run and after breaking off the attack.

Lt.OPIE made his run along the W side of #2 strip being slightly farther from the flight leader than usual. He bombed and strafed the tower on #2 strip with resulting destruction. In a hardstand at the N end of #2 strip he strafed an U/Iplane which, as a result, began to emit black smoke. Lt.OPIE strafed the dispersal area (no definite targets) near the W side of #1 strip and broke off the target with Capt.REINBOLD.

Lt.SUMMERS, with Lt.HOTZ and Lt.TARANUK as wingmen, lead his flight across the target area about 500 ft to the east of the runway. Lt.SUMMERS dropped 2-3 bombs on what was believed to be a medium A/A position and both he and crew members saw steel fragments from the gun position fly through the air. The remaining 7-8 bombs were dropped within the dispersal area. Lt.HOTZ while placing 2 bombs in the immediate vicinity of a large grass-roofed hut opposite #1 runway and also strafed this same building resulting possible fire since smoke was seen coming out of building. Remaining 8 bombs were dropped near the shoreline away from the target.
Because of a malfunction of toggle switch, the bombs of Lt.TARANUK's plane did not release with in the target area necessatating subsequent salvoing about 3000 ft from the shore. Lt.TARANUK however, did strafe the entire dispersal area, silencing a light A/A gun east of the south end of No.2 Runway.

Lt.Alger leading the third flight cut away to the left of the leading flight on the last turn before reaching the target and lined his flight for a perfect run along the dispersal areas on the West side of both strips.He dropped all his 10 bombs in the dispersal area where 10-15 2/e fighters were parked. Results were generally unobserved however, due to the fact that planes were well hidden by coconut trees. He strafed during the entire run over the dispersal area and many tracers were observed to hit the parked planes, although no fires were started.

Both Lt.NUNES an d Lt.MOSSER right and left wingmen respectively, likewise dropped 10 bombs each in the dispersal area and strafed heavily with unobserved results other than 1 2/e fighter seen smoking as results of strafing.

Lt.ALGER then made a long turn out to sea and rejoined the Squadron Formation for the return to base. Lt.ALGER's plane ran low on gas and he landed at NOEMFOOR IS. to refuel. He returned to base and landed some 30 minutes after the other planes.

Capt.REINBOLD slowed his speed after breaking the attack in order to regroup the formation. During the right turn off the target all planes resumed formation. Then Capt.REINBOLD relayed the Weather Report to the Fighter escort on VHF. Return to BIAK was without incident. However a rain squall NW of BIAK made necessary a detour to the W and then around the N end to approach MOKMER from the E. In the resulting "Rat Race" around Mokmer Drome, this squadron was fortunate in having only one plane cut out of the pattern.

b. Details of Interception.

Nil interception occured.

c. A/A Fire

3 to 4 bursts, medium slight, inaccurate received from positions 1500' E of S end #2 Strip.
3-4 bursts heavy slight, inaccurate A/A fire received from unknown positions.
3 M/G's firing slight and inaccurate from position near known heavy gun positions E of S end of #2 Strip.
3 M/G's firing from pans. just E of N end #1 Strip. exact position undetermined.
Note: Heavy A/A positions E of S end #2 Strip were occupied but no personnel were in or near the gun emplacements.

d. Damage to own Planes.

1. Nil damage to A/C's of this Squadron.

e. Personnel Injuries.

Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

In view of information currently at hand no recommendations for awards will be forwarded.

5. Tables:

All planes carried 10 X 100 parademo bombs and 78 were dropped in the target. 18 bombs were dropped near the shoreline 10 of which could not be dropped due to Toggle Switch Malfunction.

Note: Due to present conditions with recent movement here, and lack of communication lines and transportation, no ammunition report has as yet been given to this office.

6. Sightings:

1 S/C near wharve at GALMLA TOWNSHIP.
1 lugger nearby. 1 ship probably S/C in cove N of TOBMLO Point.
1 large fuel fire burning fiercely W of Center #2 Strip.
Heavy A/A pans. E of S and #2 Strip observed but no personnel manning guns.
1 la r ge splash in water 10 miles NE of GALMLA DROMES. possibly a plane.

7. Photo Interpretation.

Prints have not been received at the time of preparation of this report.(0800/K/23/7/44.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl;-1

Bomb Assessment Chart.

F?.208-C-10
499th Bomb Squadron.
27 July,1944.
Ti over Target: 1133-1135-K.
l. ude: Minimum.
Crews Report on Bomb Falling.
Took Photos.



BOMBER COMMAND
A-2 Section 70C

499
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30 Sep

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

31 July,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative report on MISSION FFO M12-G-6, performed by the 499th Bomb Squadron on 30 July,1944. Objectives: Primary - Support landing "TYPHOON" Secondary - Barge Sweep SELE STRAITS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 30 July 44, this Squadron was assigned the task of supporting the "TYPHOON" landing at CAPE O'MARAI. Ground support being unnecessary at the landing, a barge sweep through the SELE STRAITS was to be carried out as a secondary target. The squadron employed six (6) B-25-D-1's with the lead planes of each flight carrying 2 X 1000 lb. 8/11 sec. delay bombs and each wing plane carrying 12 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay bombs. The Squadron proceeded to the Cape of GOEDE HOOP, but suitable targets were lacking so a barge sweep was begun extending from DORE BAY west to CAPE SORONG and South through the SELE STRAITS. The sweep was broken off at SELE STRAITS and planes returned to base via Cape WAMONEET.

b. RENDEZVOUS

6 planes made Squadron Rendezvous at 0700/K over CAPE of GOED HOOP. Note:Planes proceeded from base to CAPE of GOED HOOP individually.

c. ATTACK

The squadron attacked one u/s barge West of CAPE SANASAR, dropping six (6) 100 lb. bombs, but no damage was observed. A second barge was bombed and strafed in DORE BAY and left u/s. Another was attacked just N of MANAK IS. three strafing passes being made and six (6) bombs dropped. The barge was left burning. About this time it was noticed that one of the planes, piloted by Lt.HOTZ, was no longer in the squadron, but in the general excitement and ensuing eagerness to press the attack, little attention was paid, everyone figuring that Lt.HOTZ would subsequently rejoin his flight.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The sweep was therefore continued unabated, and a fourth barge, loaded with personnel, was bombed and strafed near SERIHOBERI VILLAGE on the KLAMONO RIVER, a total of 10 X 100 lb. bombs being dropped, leaving the barge heavily damaged if not destroyed. Another, was located near SISI IS. and was heavily strafed and 6 bombs were dropped, this barge was also left unserviceable. Six (6) X 100 lb. bombs and one (1) X 1000 lb. bomb were then dropped on a village on JEF LIO IS. The 6 X 100 lb. bombs hitting and damaging several buildings. The 1000 lb. bomb mission completely. A sixth and final barge was damaged by strafing just E of MAK MAK IS. Oil slick being observed on water.

About 400 feet S. at the terminal of the JEF LIO OIL WELL CO., a 10 ton loading crane was sighted on a jetty extending out in the water about 100 yards. A pass was made, dropping a 1000 lb. bomb but the target was missed. A second pass was made, this time at an oil dump consisting of several hundred drums extending along the road back into the woods. A direct hit was scored with a 1000 lb. bomb and a fire was started. Additional strafing passes were made and another 1000 lb. bomb was dropped, starting three or four more large fires with heavy black smoke up to 1500 feet. It is estimated that at least 1/3 of the dump was destroyed in this attack.

At SELEWAM VILLAGE opposite KAZAKABOE IS. 4 small boats and one barge were sighted near two wharves. A 1000 lb. bomb was dropped without a hit but the boats and barge were heavily strafed, with resulting damage. Before the attack was broken off at CAPE SELE because of lack of bombs and ammunition. The oil storage tanks, buildings and piers at JEF KESIM terminal were strafed but damage was undetermined.

d. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception occured.
One Allied plane missing.
Nil enemy planes observed lost.

e. TAKE OFF: MOKMER AIRDROME 0530/K
ON COURSE: (Squadron Formation. 0700/K
OVER CAPE GOODE HOOP 0700-0730/K
ATTACK 0820-0849/K
LANDED BASE 1110/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE * CAPE GOODE HOOP * CAPE SAWASAR * DORE BAY * NABAR SERIHOBERI VILLAGE * SISI IS. CAPE SELE.

Return: CAPE WAMONKNT direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS and planes participating.

1st.Lt.SUMMERS was selected to lead the Squadron Formation composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT:			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.H.C.SUMMERS	A/P No.	097	2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P No.	014
2nd.Lt.H.R.MARVEL	"	591	2nd.Lt.H.H.BUDDE	"	016
2nd.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	"	535	1st.Lt.R.R.HOTZ	"	068

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Attack

Lt.SUMMERS assembled the Squadron at the Cape of GOEDE HOOP and called "Sanaspan" the ground controler at 0705/K. The ground controler stated no opposition to landing and that the Squadron was to leave the area at 0730/K. The Squadron orbited at the Cape until 0730/K and then departed W along the coast. At a point just W of C.SAWASAR, Lt.SUMMERS strafed a barge but noticed during the attack that it was u/s. At D BE BAY he spotted another barge and left it u/s as a result of his attack. During these attacks, the formation had broken up and in order to reform Lt.SUMMERS circled inland E of C.SORONG. After reforming the Squadron, he led the six (6) plane formation to the KLAMONI RIVER where a barge loaded with personnel was spotted near SEMIKOHERI VILLAGE. Lt.SUMMERS made one pass but due to the nature of the terrain he was unable to release bombs or register hits with his guns. Lt.SUMMERS noted the intensity of heavy A/A fire coming from SORONG and consequently kept out of range as he was directed at briefing. He dropped one bomb on JEF LIO ISLAND at village but missed. He continued down the coast to MAK MAK IS. and on reaching there he saw the jetties at on the mainland shore at the terminal of the JEF LIO Oil Wells Road. His original attack was made with intent to knock out the jetties and a large loading crane. However, while making the run he spotted several hundred oil drums scattered along both sides of the road. He made several strafing runs and dropped one X 1000 lb. bomb which was a direct hit. His attack resulted in a large fire among the oil drums. Just N of this point Lt.SUMMERS strafed and damaged a barge. He also strafed two barges near the jetties. After breaking off the attack here, Lt.SUMMERS did not sight further targets until he reached JEF KASIM where he strafed the buildings and oil storage tanks with undetermined damage resulting. He broke off the attack at C.SELE due to lack of bombs and ammunition. He continued to C.WAMONET looking for other planes and not finding them returned to C.SELE where he assembled the Squadron with the exception of Lt.HOTZ.

Lt.SUMMERS had every reson to believe that Lt.HOTZ had become separated and returned to base. Consequently he returned the Squadron to base by direct route across VOGELKOP PENNINSULA.

Lt.WARVEL flying #2 on Lt.SUMMERS made no attacks until he spotted a barge near SISI ISLAND. He strafed it heavily and released 6 X 100 lb. bombs. The barge was left in an unserviceable condition. He followed Lt.SUMMERS attack on JEF LIO IS. Village and seeing Lt.SUMMERS bomb skip over the village, released his remaining six bombs on the village. The bombs were observed to be direct hits with resulting destruction and damage to several buildings. He made no other attacks and when Lt.SUMMERS circled at C.SELE, he joined him there.

Lt.TARANUK flew #3 and made his initial attack on the barge loaded with personnel near SE IKOMERI VILLAGE. He made 3 strafing runs scoring hits each time and dropping one bomb on the first pass. On his second pass all eleven of his remaining bombs fell out of the bomb-bay because of a malfunction. Tall trees along both banks of the river prevented observation of bombing results. Other planes were attacking the same barge so Lt. TARANUK broke off and proceeded to JEF LIO Terminal where he made 2 strafing runs over two small luggers which were pulled up close to shore. He scored hits but the extent of damage was not visible. He also made two strafing runs over the oil drums along the road, succeeding in starting another fire in the dump.
Lt.TARANUK then flew down the coast to KARARAOE IS. He strafed and damaged a barge 1/4 mile N of SELERAM VILLAGE, jetties and made 2 strafing runs on a small lugger at the jetties with undetermined damage. He made no other attacks and rejoined the formation at C.SELE.

Lt.PALMER, leading the Second Flight, made 3 passes on a well-camouflaged barge on the KLAMONO RIVER, strafing it heavily on each run. Numerous hits were scored and the barge was left unserviceable. Lt.PALMER then proceeded south along the coast until he sighted another barge E of MAK MAK and about 400 feet N of some jetties lying off the JEF LIO OIL TERMINAL. Three passes were made on this barge and an oil or gas slick was observed on the water in the vicinity of the vessel. A pass was made at a large heavy duty crane of about 10 tons on a jetty extending about 100 yds. into the water. A 1000 lb. bomb was dropped but missed the jetty. On the second pass another bomb was dropped, this time aimed at a row of oil drums lining both sides of the road which extended from the jetty into the woods. This bomb scored a direct hit and a large fire was started. After making three more passes at the oil dumps starting several smaller fires, Lt.Palmer broke off the attack and followed the first flight to C.SELE.

Lt.BUDDE, flying #8 in the 2nd.Flight dropped his first string of 4 X 1000lb. bombs on a u/s barge beached in the vicinity of O.SANGAPER but missed his target. After they had passed over the barge they saw that is was already u/s. Just N of NAHAH IS. Lt.BUDDE sighted another barge. He circled and made a pass, dropping his six remaining bombs and scoring two near misses. The barge was also heavily strafed in two other passes resulting in smoke and sparks when last observed. The whole stern was afire. At the JEF LIO TERMINAL, Lt.BUDDE strafed the crane and the oil dump but results were unobserved. He then broke off the attack.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

In the SORONG Area, intense, heavy, A/A fire was received but since the planes were almost completely out of range, the A/A was inaccurate. Only two bursts came close and they were about 200 yards behind and 1000' above with the formation flying at about 500 ft. Slight, light and inaccurate A/A fire was received from barges near SISI IS., with 4-6 white puffs being observed.

C. FIGHTER COVER

Nil Fighter Cover.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR.

Nil enemy aircraft downed or encountered.
One plane AAF#N 41-800-58 failed to return to base. It was last seen on the approach to the SORONG AREA. Search was subsequently conducted with no result. It is believed that this plane sighted an enticing target in the SORONG AREA and left formation, thereby, coming within range of A/A fire from positions at SORONG.
No other planes were damaged.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

The following personnel are members of crew of missing plane.

1st.Lt.E.R.HOTZ -	O-668334	Pilot
2nd.Lt.J.C.GRICE -	O-713411	Co-Pilot
1st.Lt.J.(NMI) CIARMELLA	O-682069	Navigator
S/Sgt.V.J.GOEBEL	18184126	Engineer-Gunner
S/Sgt.R.E.ARUTA	39128338	Radio-Gunner
S/Sgt.F.E.BENNET	13068361	Armorer-Gunner

F. CITATIONS.

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of award.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No. Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target.
097	2	1000 lb.	S/11	2
591	12	100 lb.	S/11	12
336	12	100 lb.	S/11	12
014	2	1000 lb.	S/11	2
016	12	100 lb.	S/11	10
058	12	100 lb.	S/11	Unknown

Total: 4 X 1000 lb. bombs dropped on target.
34 X 100 lb. bombs dropped on target.
2 X 100 lb. bombs returned to base.

ARMAMENT

No individual report available total of ammunition expended was 12300 rds. .50 Cal.

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
097	K-20	40
	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
Total:	60 K-21's	40 K-20's.

6. SIGHTINGS

4 M/V's (3 small of undetermined size and 1 large of probably 6000 tons) in Sorong Harbor.
Signs of activity at many points along E shore of Sele Straits from Sorong Harbor.
3 cleared areas with stacks of logs at 3 unknown points between Kamoem River and Selebam Village.
Installations at Jef Kasim unchange except for sighting of a loading crane on Jetty.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Prints not received at time this report was made. 1400/2/31/7/44.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499

212-C-20
30 July 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

1 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 212-C-20 performed on 30 July,44 with objective at SELE STRAITS in the SORONG AREA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. This mission was performed in the afternoon following a previous strike earlier in the day with the same objecti e. The mission was was assigned as a result of a sighting by this Squadron, of 4 M/V's just N of SORONG HARBOR. The general plan being as follows:
The 500th Squadron was to send 3 planes to a point N of the harbor to spot the ships and if the ships were still in the area, to return to DORE BAY and pick up this squadron's six planes. The nine planes wer e then to attack from E-W in a 9 plane front. The 498th and 501st Squadrons were to comprise the second wave, attacking as soon as the first was cleared the target. In case the ships had departed, a barge sweep of the SELE STRAITS was to be executed. The mission was not executed as planned since the 498th and 501st Squadrons did not take-off. The bomb load for lead planes was 2 X 1000 lb. 8/15 second delay bombs and the wing planes 3 X 500 lb 8/15 second delay fuse bombs.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. No Group Rendezvous was accomplished.

2. No fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

One plane of this squadron failed to take-off because of mechanical failures - leaving 5 planes to conduct the Strike. The M/V's had departed, therefore the alternate plan was followed. The 5 planes swept the area from SORONG to C.SELE with the following results: 1 small barge sunk, off TSIOF ISLAND; Buildings damaged at JEF LIO; fuel fire started in oil dump at JEF LIO.
It seems that small shipping had got the wing up and either left the area or "Lid Out" during the eight, odd hours interval between the strikes. At any rate activity was much less than during the morning mission and targets were fewer. The oil dump at JEF LIO Terminal was noticeable razed and damaged by the earlier attack.

D. INTERCEPTION AND PLANES DESTROYED.

1. Nil interception.

E. TIME and LOCATION OF:

Take-Off	Mokmer Drome	1550/K
T.O.T.	SORONG -SELE STRAITS	1750/K-1810/K
Land at Base		2005/K

F. ROUTE:

Out:- Biak - C.Goede Hoop - C.Dore to Sorong Area.

In : Reciprocal.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

Capt.R.D.REINBOLD, the Squadron Commander, elected to lead the formation which was set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt.R.D.REINBOLD	097	1s.t.Lt.F.W.FOK	016
2nd. M.J.OVIE Jr.	591**	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTERSOL4	
2nd.Lt. A.H.MOSSER	336	2nd.Lt.E.L.NUNES	164

** Did not take-off.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack.

After take off, Capt.REINBOLD assembled the Squadron immediately proceeded to the SORONG-JEFMAN IS. area where four M/V had been previously sighted and where Lt.HOTZ's plane was last seen. Enroute the Squadron encountered heavy clouds and scatterd rainstorms. When approximately 5 miles E of C.SORONG, Capt.REINBOLD turned inland and flew due S to the RAMOE RIVER making a 360° circle encompassing the area off MANAH and MOE IS. The KLOAMEN River mouth and RENIOE VILLAGE. Nothing was seen here of M/V or Lt.HOTZ, so the squadron proceeded West from Manah Is, straffing and destroying barge about 3 miles off MANAH IS. just S of TSIOF IS. The squadron then headed N between JEFMAN and TSIOF IS., searching the area throughout in the hope of finding some trace of Lt.HOTZ's crew or the 4 M/V's. About seven miles WNW of C.SORONG, Capt.REINBOLD swung inland toward the New Guinea Coast making another great circle southward again searching the SORONG area just out of A/A range.

When this second reconnaissance failed to reveal further targets or signs of the missing plane, Capt.REINHOLD lead the Squadron along the coastline to the JEF LIO OIL WELL AREA E of MAK MAK Is. At this point, 1 X 500 lb. bomb was dropped, scoring a hit on the oil dump and starting a fire accompanied by heavy black smoke. The squadron then continued S of JEF MAJOR OIL TERMINAL where another 500 lb. bomb was believed to have fallen within the area, though results were unobserved. Capt.REINHOLD then doubled back, heading north to the JEF LIO area where once again he hit the oil dump with a 500 lb. bomb, starting another fire. Since t is last attack exhausted the bomb load, Capt.REINHOLD broke off and headed back to base.

Lt.COX and Lt.HOOVER in number 2 and 3 positions kept in close formation throughout the entire run over the targets. Lt.COX followed Capt.REINHOLD closely during the fruitless search in the SOUTH area and then strafed the barge which Capt.REINHOLD attacked W of MAK MAK Is. At JEF LIO he dropped 1 X 500 lb. bomb and pulled up sharply. The bomb exploded prematurely and a small fragment penetrated the upper surface of the wing.

Finding no suitable targets in his Flight Path, Lt.HOOVER did not make any attack until reaching JEF LIO OIL STORAGE AREA, on the first pass he dropped 1 X 500 lb. bomb on a marsh gas near an oil dump and scored a direct hit. He then followed his Flight Leader through MAK STRAITS but made no attack there. He dropped another bomb on the second pass over JEF LIO Scoring a direct hit on 40-50 oil drums resulting in a fire. He a so strafed the same area heavily starting another small fire in that area. The remaining bomb which he kept for possible targets after JEF LIO, was later salvoed in the ocean since no suitable target was found..
Lt.COX followed thi Flight Leader closely during the fruitless search in in the SOUTH area and then strafed the barge which Capt.REINHOLD attacked W of MAK MAK Is. At JEF LIO he dropped 1 X 500 lb. bomb and pulled up sharply. The bomb exploded prematurely and a small fragment penetrated the upper surface of the wing.

Lt.FOX with Lt.HOOVER on his wing followed the 2nd Flight during the search of the waters around SOUTH and then began an independant search for barges but still keeping the Flight Leader in sight. A, MOK ISLAND Lt.FOX strafed a lugger which he found to be u/s. In the sweep down to MAK MAK Is., no further targets were sighted. Therefore he dropped his two, one-thousand pound bombs among several buildings, along the JEF LIO AREA causing destruction and damage which could not be accurately ascertained. He then made 3 strafing runs over the fuel dump.

Lt.REINHOLD regrouped his flight formation and made his attack at JEF MAJOR, where he dropped 2 X 1000 lb. bomb at Oil Storage Tanks, but missed and hit nearby barracks and pipe line installations. No results ot er than flying debris was observed.

Note: Line #2 last paragraph should read 2 X 1000 lb. bombs.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

Slight, medium, inaccurate A/A fire received by formation which was flying N over the water just W of TEIOF IS. Muzzle flashes were observed along the SW tip of the Island followed by medium bursts at a distance 3000 feet behind the planes.
Splashes in the water were observed at the same time indicating the presence of a C/D gun on the Island. Crews are certain that the source of this fire was not located on JERSEY.
Moderate, medium, inaccurate A/A received from unknown positions at SOUTHAMPTON. 10-15 bursts were noted in the air.

c. FIGHTER COVER

Nil fighter cover provided.

d. DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO A/P's BY THE AIR.

One plane this squadron sustained minor damage from fragment of own bomb which burst prematurely causing a slight hole in the skin of the wing.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil casualties to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS.

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of decorations.

5. TABLE

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No. Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No. Bombs dropped - Target
097	3	500	S/A	3
501	3	500	"	1
335	3	500	"	2 (1 salvoed)
016	2	1000	"	2
164	2	1000	"	2

Total: 4 X 1000 lb. bombs dropped in target.
6 X 500 lb. bombs dropped in target.
1 X 500 lb. bomb salvoed and 2 returned to base.

AMMUNITION USED: 3305 X.30 Cal. expended.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. [redacted]

Nil sight ops were made.

7. [redacted].

Nil photos received.

For The Squadron C [redacted],

[redacted]
Capt., Air Corps
[redacted]

I c.:-1
Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


JEFMAN-DOOM ISLAND
AREA MAP
10 0 10
MILES
2nd. FL.
162
016
341
087
335
Tg DOR
DORE MOEN I.
1st FL.
Tg Sorong
DOOM IS.
Tg. NOEJEW
TIOF I.
JEFMAN I.
SAMATE
WARIR I.
JEF LIO IS.
3X500 lb. Bombs
2X1000 lb. Bombs
JEF LIO OILFIELD
Fire Started Here
JEF KASIM I.
KASIM
3X500 lb. Bombs
2X1000 lb. Bombs
Sele No.1
SELE NO. 2
P
E
G
K
O
N
FFO 212-C-20 30 July,44.
499th Bomb Squadron
T.O.T. 1730/K - 1810/K
Altitude: Minimum
Crew's Report on Bombing
Took Photos

499
217-C-13
4 Aug 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

6 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 217-C-13 performed on 4 August, 1944. Mission - Shipping Search N.Coast Ceram Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 4 August,1944, six (6) B-25-D-1's of this Squadron were assigned to conduct a search for shipping along the North coast of CERAM ISLAND. The mission was carried out as ordered but without any particularly gratifying results. The mission, as it developed, was the usual barge hunt during which several small craft were damaged or destroyed. No interception nor A/A fire occured to hinder the conduct of the mission. The planes flew roughly 1000 miles through mild weather to carry out this mission.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. Nofighter cover provided.

c. ATTACK

Six B-25-D's, each loaded with 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay fuse demolition bombs, took off from base and six planes began the search at C.TANDOEROE-Besar and worked the coastline eastward to C.BALANSOI. The formation broke up into three, 2 plane elements to make the search. This proceedure was used as protection against air attack which easily could have sprung from NAMLEA, LIANG, or HARUKOE AIRDROMES. In the execution of the mission the following "score" was "chalked up":
Two, 30-40 ft. sailboats were destroyed.
Three, 30-40 ft. sailboats damaged.
One, type "A" barge destroyed.
Undetermined damage to isolated villages which were bombed and/ or strafed.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

1.
Nil Interception.
Nil E/A shot down.
Nil own A/P's destroyed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME Biak Is.	0754/K.
T.O.T.	N.Coast CERAM	1025-1130/K.
Landed at base.		1545/K

f. Route:

Out: Base to E end MACCLUER GULF - point 20 miles S of MISOAL IS. to C.TANDOERROE.

In : C.BALANSOI, direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, and PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

1. 1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER, Squadron Operations Officer, was selected to lead the two "V"'s of three planes each.

2. Pilots, planes and position in formation were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	A/P #014	1st.Lt.W.E. HUSHWORTH	A/P 055
2nd.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	" 016	1st.Lt.H.H.BUDDE	" 340
2nd.Lt.A.H.MOSSER	971	2nd.Lt. M/J/OPIE	" 084

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack.

Lt.ALGER brought the Squadron to CAPE TANDOERROI wit out incident and gave the signal for the formation of two-plane teams. Lts.ALGER and JOHNSON, HUSHWORTH and MOSSER; BUDDE AND OPIE made up the teams.

Lt.ALGER searched the coast until he reached C.OELI where 3 sailboats of 30 odd feet in length were located. Lt.ALGER bombed and strafed the boats but his three bombs missed with no apparent damage. Just E of C.OELI at SOEKARADJA VILLAGE he heavily strafed another sailboat with probable damage resulting because of the intensity and accuracy of his strafing. He strafed huts and buildings on BESAR ISLAND and then proceeded to C.HEWAL where he damaged a sailboat at anchor near a jetty, with 1 bomb. He thoroughly strafed nearby WAHAI VILLAGE. He searched eastward to C.BALANSOI without discovering further targets.

Lt.C.T.JOHNSON "stuck" with Lt.ALGER throughout the sweep, but his attacks were not successful. He dropped 1 bomb at the 3 sailboats near C.OELI but missed. However, he thoroughly battered the boats with his guns.

He continued to follow Lt.ALGER, strafing villages on the way, to C.HEWAL where he scored another miss on the jetty. He salvoed his two remaining bombs due to lack of target and then rejoined the flight leader.

Lt.MOSSER teamed up with Lt.RUSHWORTH and conducted the search in that position. He strafed down the coast to C.OELI where he dropped two bombs on the three sailboats attacked by preceeding planes. One of his bombs carried away the gigging off one boat and the second bomb scored a direct hit on another, destroying it. He made strafing attacks on villages along the coast and missed a sailboat on the E side of SELEMAN BAY with one bomb. At C.HEWAL he spotted an object colored slate grey which had the appearance of a vehicle of some sort. The object was located near the end of the jetty there, and when LtMOSSER made his run he dropped one bomb. The explosion was seen to be close to the target but the damage gould not be ascertained. Lt.MOSSER broke off the search with Lt.RUSHWORTH and then resumed his original position in the formation.

Lt.RUSHWORTH leading the second flight, kept his flight together until the turn for the search was made, where the formation went in 2 planes elements, he then left his 2 wingmen and made the entire run along the coast with Lt.MOSSER of the first flight.
He followed the first 2 planes along the coast, sighted 3 sailboats, on W. side of CAPE OELI but did not attack them on the first pass, he made a circle out to sea then came in and attacked the sailboats, dropping 2 bombs resulting on a direct hit which destroyed 2 and damaged the third. He dropped 1 more bomb on a sailboat on E side of CAPE OELI but missed his fourth and last bomb was dropped at a barge at CapeHEWAL with unobserved results. He also strafed the coastal area heavily.

Lt.BUDDE #2 man made his run directly behind his leader with Lt.Opie on his wing, on his first pass over Capt OELI, he sighted the 3 sailboats and dropped 2 bombs, but missed, he then dropped a third bomb at a barge near CAPE HEWAL scoring a direct hit. His last bomb was dropped at another barge further down the coast, but also missed.
Lt.Opie made his run on Lt.BUDDE's wing. He dropped 1 bomb at TANIWEL VILLAGE with unobserved results. His 2 other bombs were dropped at barges, but both missed. His last bomb was dropped at buildings on BESAR IS. but also missed.

At C.BALANSOI, Lt.ALGER cut a 360° circle. At the completion of the circle all planes were in proper formation and on course for base. The flight to base was without incident.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. No A/A fire or even samll arms fire received.

c. DETAIL OF DAMAGE TO A/P's in the AIR.

1. Nil friendly A/P's damaged.

2. Nil E/A damaged.

4. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

1. Nil injuries to personnel.

4. CITATIONS

1. Details of this mission are not favorably considered as a basis for awards of decorations.

5. TABLES.

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No. Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on Target	
016	4	500 lb.	4/5	2	(2 salvoed)
053	4	500 lb.	"	4	
340	4	500 lb.	"	4	
014	4	500 lb.	"	4	
971	4	500 lb.	"	4	
084	4	500 lb.	"	4	

Total: 22 X 500 lb. bombs over target - 2 X 500 lb. bombs salvoed.

ARMAMENT TABLE

Plane No.	No. Rds. Carried	No. Rds. Fired	
016	4200	1855	700 X.50 Cal.
053	4200	2650	500 " "
340	4200	1325	600 " "
014	4200	2650	Nil.
971	4200	2386	1200
084	4200	1855	1855
Total:	12720 X.50 Cal.	4655 X.50 Cal.	

PHOTO TABLE

K-20 - K-21 Photos were taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. Sightings.

All villages on N.coast well kept and in excellent repair.
Many navites fishing off shore.
In vicinity of C.Oeli at strip of land 4000 feet long, gave appearance of old landing strip. Was located among coconut groves and overgrown with grass. Could easily be cleared.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

1. Nil photos received at date of preparation this report.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: -1
Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bomb Squadron.
FFO: 217-C-13
August, 4, 1944.
T.O.T.: 1026-1130/K.
Altitude: 100-300 Feet.
⬭ Crew's Report on Bomb Falling.
Took Photos.

Map Ref:
Australian Aeronautical map n-5
1/1,000,000.



499
218-C
5 Aug 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 290

7 August, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO Z18-C-6 performed 5 August, 1944. Primary Target: NAMLEA DROMES - Secondary: Shipping Search N.Coast Ceram Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A. - 2.

1. GENERAL

a. The mission assigned the 345th Bomb Group was to attack objectives in the NAMLEA TOWN-OLD NAMLEA AIRDROME area on the morning of 5 August, 1944. Each of the Squadrons were given definite areas to cover, the 499th Squadron being assigned the northern half of OLD NAMLEA and the eastern portion of NAMLEA TOWNSHIP, the former to be strafed, the latter bombed. A barge sweep and shipping search along the north coast of CERAM Is. was selected as an alternative target.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over DORIDO DROME and The fighters picked up at PISANG Is.

c. ATTACK

Seven (7) planes of this squadron took off from base and succeeded in getting through to a point in the neighborhood 127° 20'E -2° 55'S, a location approximately 10 minutes flying time from the primary target. Here, however, they encountered a heavy front extending through the MANIPA STRAITS and blocking them off from NAMLEA. Since it was impossible to accomplish thier primary mission, the Group turned back and began it's sweep along the northern CERAM coastline. The search began at C.TANDOEROE-besar and terminated at at CAPE BALANSOI just W of SOELA.
The planes of the 499th Squadron carried 12 X 100 lb. parademo bombs with 4/6 second delay fuses. 71 X 100 lb. bombs being dropped on targets and shipping along the coast; 12 being dropped safe, not exploding and one slavoed. In this connection three or four bombs, from another squadron were reported as having burst in the air before impact.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

This apparently not infrequent occurrance with this type bomb. In addition, 10336 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition were fired at various targets along the route, though damage was occasioned, results were not believed to commensurate with the bombs and ammunition expended.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil Allied planes observed lost.

3. Nil enemy planes observed lost.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

T.O.	MOKMER DROME	0715/K
On Course in Group Formation		0720/K.
Turned Back		1035/K.
T.O.T.		1050-1152/K
Landed	MOKMER DROME	1425/K

f. ROUTE

Out: Direct to PISANG Is. across GEELVINK BAY and WESTERN NEW GUINEA due W through CERAM SEA 30-40 miles off N coast of CERAM.
In : CAPE BALANSOI - JAPEN Is. BASE.

2. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN MISSION.

a. Group Formation.

The 501st Squadron was selected to lead the Group with the 500th 499th, and 498th Squadrons in the number 2, 3 and 4 positions respectively.

b. Squadron Formation.

2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER was selected to lead the 499th Squadron which was composed of the following Pilots and Planes:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P No.014	1st.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	A/P No. 097
2nd.Lt.E.L.BUNKS	" 340	2Nd/Lt.P.E.TAGAN K	" 184
2nd.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	" 016	Capt.G.B.JORDAN	" 035
		1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	" 971

3. DETAILS OF MISSION.

a. Attack

Lt.SUMMERS lead the second flight.

Lt.H.K.PALMER assembled the Squadron soonafter take-off and then pulled into the #3 position of the Group Formation. Flight to the MACCLUER GULF was without incident. From this point on, the weather became worse. Frequent thundershowers were encountered over the CERAM SEA. When at a point 40 miles NE of NAMLEA, Lt.PALMER heard "Possum" "Copper" and "Clover", the fighter escort, discussing intention of returning to base. He also heard "Thunder 1", the Group Leader, urge continuance of the mission. However, the fighters elected to return. For this reason the Squadron turned off to conduct a shipping sweep along the N coast of CERAM IS.
Lt.PALMER began the search at the NW tip of the Island and flew eastward. He bombed and strafed three small villages along the coast with damage unobserved. On a small island just E of BESAR ISLAND he spotted a small oil fire burning in a village. He made a bombing and strafing run on the fire itself and had the satisfaction of seeing the fire increase greatly in size and intensity. The fire spread and ignited 4 or 5 of the huts nearby. As he left this area he noted that the smoke column was heavy, black and extending up to 1000 feet. Up to his attack on this island he had experienced difficulty in finding a target which was not already under attack by other planes of the Group. After leaving the Island he continued eastward along the coast making attacks on small villages. There were only huts for targets and some of these were damaged. However, the damage done is of little importance.

Lt.NUNES scattered eight bombs and heavily strafed several u/i villages along the coast without observed damage. He dropped 4 bombs at EUROPEAN type buildings on BESAR ISLAND but here again the damage was unobserved. At CAPE MALANSOI he broke off the attack and resumed his original place, #2, on Lt. PALMER's right wing.

Lt.WARVEL's account is almost identical with that of Lt.NUNES. He bombed and strafed villages along the coast at unidentified points without finding a suitable target or causing damage of any significance. However he dumped 2 bombs among the European type buildings on BESAL ISLAND causing some damage. The extent of damage could not be ascertained during the one attack he was allowed before other planes crowded the area. He resumed the search along the coast but without sighting further targets. He broke off the attack and joined the flight in the #3 position.

Lt.SUMMERS lead the second flight bombing and strafing the villages of TANIWEL, SOAHOEWE, SOEKAPADJA and LISABATA along with BESAR IS.
Capt.JORDAN and Lts.TARANEK and ALTER following the leader throughout the entire bomb run.
Two launches, lying just ofs shore were bombed and strafed in the vicinity on an unnamed Island E of BESAR Is. and a direct hit was scored exploding on one of the launches. The other was seen to turn over as the No.2 plane piloted by Lt.TARANEK registered a near miss. Just N of two small unnamed islands off C.NAMAS, a small, blue-colored barge beleived to be carrying coconuts was strafed and several bombs were dropped by Lt.SALTERS.

A near miss was scored and as the plane left, a trail of white smoke was seen arising witnessing definitely the damage done. After strafing and bombing several more villages without observed results, the flight was broken off E of CAPE BALABSOI.

b. A/A FIRE

There was no A/A fire encountered.

c. FIGHTER COVER

Fighter cover was last seen just prior to meeting the front before turning back.

d. DAMAGE TO PLANES.

Nil E/A damaged.
Nil planes of the squadron damaged.

e. INJURIES OR CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL.

No personnel of this Squadron were injured.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Type	Weight	No. Bombs dropped on target.
035	12	4/5 sec.	100 lbs.	12 (Dropped safe)
340	12	"	"	12
014	12	"	"	12
971	12	"	"	11 (1 bomb salvoed)
164	12	"	"	12
016	12	"	"	12
097	12	"	"	

TOTAL: 71 X 100 lb. bombs in target 12 X 100 lb. bombs in target - dropped safe.
1 X 100 lb. bomb salvoed.

ARMAMENT TABLE

PLANE NO.	NO.RDS.CARRIED	NO.RDS. FIRED
035	4200	1855
340	4200	1855
014	4200	1855
971	4200	265
164	4200	2120
016	4200	530
097	4200	1855

Total Rds.Fired 10335 X .50 Cal.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. SIGHTINGS :

A thin column of grey-black smoke about 1000' high, believed to be the result of another squadron's attack was observed in the vicinity of Namiali. White smoke and fire were observed on one island off Cape NAMAA and a 500 ft. Column of black smoke from an oil fire was evident on another island immediately to the N. As the attack was broken off E of C.BALAMSOI, two fires, accompanied by considerable non-fuel type smoke.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

No photos have yet been received.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-1
Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


CERAM SEA
11 X 1001b BOMBS
5X1001b BOMBS
4X1001b BOMBS
33X1001b BOMBS
8X1001b Bombs
4X1001b BOMBS
CX1001b BOMBS
SOAHOEWA
LISABATA
SELITTA
3°
129°
LIANG
BANDA SEA

499
RKaba
221-0-
8 Aug 4

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

10 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 221-0-8,performed 8 August,1944. Primary Target: Shipping - WASILE BAY. Secondary: Shipping search- barge Sweep North Coast WAIGEO Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. The target assigned for 8 August, was the WASILE - MAOR BAY area at HALMAHERA IS. The specific purpose being to attack merchant shipping reported in these waters. An alternate plan was a shipping search and barge sweep along the coast of WAIGEO IS. Each plane carried 2000 lbs. of 4/5 second delay bombs, some carrying a combination of 1 X 1000 and 2 X 500 lb. bombs and some carrying 2 X 1000 lb. bombs. Because of bad weather encountered about 50 miles off the HALMAHERAS bombers and fighters turned back in the vicinity of 1° 30' N 129° 30' E.
Adopting the alternative target as instructed, the 500 and 501st Squadrons sweeping the South and the 499th the N. Coast of WAIGEO Is.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Rendezvous with the fighter escort was accomplished off RANI Is. at 1042/K.

c. ATTACK

The run over the target was in two plane elements in trail. A total of 6 X 1000 lb. and 8 X 500 lb. bombs being dropped on KABARRI VILLAGE in KABARRI BAY. Several bamboo huts were destroyed but results are not in view of the explosives dropped.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

d. INTERCEPTION AND DAMAGE TO ENEMY A/C.

Nil enemy planes encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	MOKMER DROME	1033/K
T.O.T.	WAIGEO Is.	1415-1440/K.
Landed	MOKMER DROME	1612/K.

f. ROUTE:

Out: Base to within 50 miles of HALMAHERA Is.
Approximate heading of 290°.

Return: SCHOUW Is. W. to CAPE MOMFAPA, BASE.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, AND PILOTS PARTICI PATING IN MISSION.

Lt.SUMMERS was selected to lead the 499th Squadron, which comprised of the following:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1st.Lt.H.G.SUMMERS	A/P 097	2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P 014
2nd.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	" 164	Capt.C.D.JORDAN	" 971
2nd.Lt.E.L.NUNES	" 340	2nd.Lt.J.H.WALDO	" 084

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack.

Lt.SUMMERS lead the squadron with Lt.TARANUK as wingman, Lt.PALMER and CAPT.JORDAN made up the second element with Lts.NUNES and JOHNSON bringing up the rear. The planes, in trail, followed the coastline from SCHOUW Is. to KABARRI BAY without finding a target. In the southeastern part of KABARRI BAY, the flight bombed and strafed KABARRI VILLAGE causing smoke and fires . Considerable debris was observed. All of Capt.JORDAN's bombs (2 X 500 lb. and 1 X 1000 lb.) dropped safe. The squadron then continued along the coast without further attacks and broke off at C.MOMFAPA and headed direct to base.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

No A/A fire or small arms fire received.

c. DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES TO PLANES OR PERSONNEL.

No damage or casualties sustained.

4. CITATIONS.

1. Details of this mission are not favorably considered as a basis for awards of decorations.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No. Bombs Carried	Type	No. Dropped on Target.
097	5	2 X 500 lb. 1 X 1000 lb.	5
164	5	2 X 500 lb. 1 X 1000 lb.	1 X 500 lb. others returned.
014	5	2 X 500 lb. 1 X 1000 lb.	5
0971	5	2 X 500 lb. 1 X 1000 lb.	5 bombs dropped safe.
084	5	2 X 500 lb. 1 X 1000 lb.	1 X 500 lb. dropped other 2 bombs returned.
340	2	1 X 1000 lb.	2

Total: 8 X 500 lb. bombs dropped.
5 X 1000 lb. bombs dropped.
2 X 1000 lb. bombs returned.
2 X 500 lb. bombs returned.

ARMAMENT TABLE

Plane No.	No. Rds. Carried	No. Rds. Expended.
097	4200	1325
164	4200	2190
014	4200	2190
0971	4200	1655
084	4200	795
340	4200	1855

TOTAL: 10010 X. 50 Cal. expended in strafing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. SIGHTINGS

Nil Sightings.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos were taken but no interpretation was made since photos not yet received.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-

Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bomb Squadron - 8 Aug 44
T.O.T.: 1415-1440/K
Altitude: 100 feet.
Crew's Report on Bombing.
Took Photos.
Map Ref: WAIGEO ISLAND * MAP 4 a.



OK ORA 499 222-C 9 Aug 4

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

10 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 222-C-6 performed on 9 August,1944 with objective as shipping in WASILE BAY (Lolabata Area) HALMAHERRA Is. 128° 10' E - 01° 10'N.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 9 August,1944 this Squadron employing 6 B-25-D-1's, together with the 500th and 501st Squadrons each employing 6 planes, took off to attack shipping in WASILE BAY. On this day the mission was carried out to completion,after fruitless attempts on the two previous days.
Each plane of this Squadron carried 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs.
The general location of the shipping was known prior to take-off and the exact location was to be obtained by the fighter escort and relayed to the attacking planes by radio.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute to the target. This Squadron joined the 501st Squadron soonafter take off but the 500th did not join until after the fighter rendezvous.

2. Fighter Rendezvous - Rendezvous with fighters was accomplished at AJOE Is. as planned.

c. ATTACK

Apparently "Thunder 1", the Group Leader did not hear the fighters report the position of the shipping for no reply was given. However this Squadron heard the report on VHF and acknowledged the message..At a point 10 miles N of LOLOBATA, the Squadron took interval behind the 501st Squadron and followed along their attack route across the neck of the penninsula.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Formation over the target consisted of two, three plane "V"'s in trail. This formation was found to be unsatisfactory for this type of target, since the flight leader was the only plane of each flight which could attack and even he did not possess the desired maneuverability. The wingmen were unable to make a run over the boats. Their bombs fell wide of their targets and furthermore they restricted the maneuverability of the flight. As a result the flight leaders were only able to make one attack whereas if a two plane formation had been used, each flight could have turned sufficiently to included all three of the boats in their attack. It is notable that the only definite and decisive hit scored was by a single plane which had swung wide of his flight to act independently. Granted that a two plane element is more vulnerable to air attack, it is nevertheless adequate to cover any enemy planes which might eludo the excellent fighter protection which was provided on this occasion. In summing up the above evaluation of the attack it should be said that the lesson to be learned from this mission is: When positive of adequate fighter cover, formation should break into 2 plane elements and attack in that manner.
A tabulation of the damage inflicted by this squadron is as follows:
One Fox Tare Charlie hit by 1 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bomb which skipped into side of vessel and 1 bomb of the same type which was a direct hit. Debris was thrown high into the air and a later observation revealed the boat to be afire. Near misses were scored on a Sugar Charlie with possible damage.
One small unidentified craft, probably a large barge, was probably destroyed by 2 near misses.
One power launch attacked on withdrawal from WASILE BAY. Launch was heavily strafed and bombed with 2 bombs and soon after seen to blow up. However at time of explosion, of another squadron were strafing the launch. Under these circumstances, no definite claim can be made. A large oil fire with black smoke up to 500 feet was started by bombing and strafing at the base of Pier "B".
One bomb was dropped on an A/A battery which was firing from a small hill N of Pier "B". Position probably the new M 5/? located in this area. The second flight observed the bomb explode apparently in the center of the battery. The following flight received no fire from this position.

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.
2. Nil enemy planes destroyed or damaged.
3. Nil friendly planes damaged or destroyed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off:	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	1005/K.
T.O.T.	WASILE BAY	1335/K.
		1337/K.
Landed at Base:		1712/K.

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE - AJOEIs. - C.LELAI (Halmaherra) along coast to target.

In: Reciprocal.

8. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

a. Group:

The Group formation led by the 501st Squadron consisted of the 501st, 499th and 500th Squadrons in number 1,2 and 3 positions ina "y" of three, six plane elements.

b. Squadron:

This squadron led by 1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND F LIGHT		
1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH	A/P	033	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTERS	A/P#	971
2nd.Lt.M.J.OPIE	"	591	1st.Lt.G.P.VOITIER	"	614
2nd.Lt.H.H.SUDDE	"	164	2nd.Lt.I.A.MOSSER	"	016

9. DETAILS OF THE MISSION:

a. Details of Attack.

Six planes led by 1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH arrived in the vicinity of C.LELAI (On N tip of the E cenninsula of HALMAHERRA) without incident and turned SW along thecoas.. During the flight along the coast, Lt.RUSHWORTH heard the fighters call on VHF stating "Bandits at Darling" - meaning "Shipping in WASILE BAY" However "Thunder 1", the Group Formation Leader, apparently did not hear the information for he did not reply. Lt.RUSHWORTH then acknowledged the receipt of the message.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

When 10 miles N of LOLOBATA, Lt.RUSHWORTH signalled for attack formation. He maneuvered his flight to take interval behind the 501st and Lt.SALTER took interval behind Lt.RUSHWORTH. Lt.RUSHWORTH seeing the gun flashes from LOLOBATA AIRDROME cut inside the 501st Squadrons turn and made his approach farther inland from N to S instead of the NW to SE approach of the 501st. In so doing it was necessary to cut down his airspeed somewhat but in this case "the means justified the end". His first sight of the shipping was obtained as he topped a small rise just N of Pier "B". His first glance revealed a M/V which is thought to be a Fox Tare Charlie and he ear marked this for his main target. First, however, he found it necessary to strafe and drop one bomb on an A/A battery which was firing from a small hill just N of Pier "B". He dropped another bomb at the base of Pier "B" starting an oil fire. He then made a run on the Fox Tare Charlie and dropped two bombs but because he could not turn quickly enough to make a proper run, his bombs missed the ship. Damage if any, was not apparent for the ship was still intact and in good condition for Lt.MOSSER's attack which is narrated below. After releasing his bombs he turned right to take advantage of the "dead spot" over the c enter of WASILE BAY which A/A from LOLOBATA and from GOERONA could not reach. In this way he withdrew Westward into KAOK BAY heavily strafing a power launch with undetermined results. He then turned N and followed the channel, passing LOLOBATA to the West and out of A/A range. After passing out of effective A/A range he assembled the Squadron and returned to base.

Lt.OPIE, number two on Lt.RUSHWORTH's right wing, stayed in position throughout the attack. As he flew over Pier "B" he released one bomb at a Sugar Charlie which was slightly out of his flight path. The best he can report is a near miss with possible damage. When Lt.RUSHWORTH attacked the Fox Tare Charlie he was in a turn which Lt.RUSHWORTH was making in an attempt to line up on the F.T.C. Consequently Lt.OPIE was forced off the target and his bombs missed. He heavily strafed the power launch with undetermined results.

Lt.BUDDS,in number three position, suffered the same misfortune which befell Lt.OPIE. Lack of maneuverability forced him wide of the Fox Tare Charlie and his bomb missed cleanly. Finding no further targets he salvoed his bombs to conserve fuel.

Lt.SALTER lead the second flight, strafing Piers"A" and "B" and a small craft in the vicinity of each pier. In addition he dropped 2 X 500 lb. demolition bombs at the Sugar Charlie anchored just off Pier "B" but both fell wide of the mark and did little damage. He then followed the squadron leader around the WASILE BAY shoreline strafing innumerable small craft which scurried about the bay in this area in an effort to escape.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Several of these smaller craft were hit but damage, was generally unobserved.Lt.SALTER saved for later targets in the area, but malfunction of the racks resulted in dropping them late.

Lt.VOITIER, flying #2 position in the s econd flight, dropped 2 X 500 lb. bombs at shipping off Pier "B" with unobserved results. He then continued around WASILE BAY and headed out into KOAE BAY proper. About 2½-3 miles E of BOLEO POINT a v essel believed to be a large barge was seen heading towards the KAOE Administration Area. Lt.VOITIER aligned his plane and went in on the barge, strafing as he went on the approach, tracers were observed to strike home. He then dropped his remaining 2 X 500 lb. bombs, scoring a direct hit with one.As the plane pulled away, the vessel was seen to explode. Before the squadron broke off the attack and tusned N, Lt.VOITIER strafed another small barge without apparent results.

Lt.MOSSER just after leaving land, on the N approach to WASILE BAY, became momentarily separated from his flight. He thought they were below him and in trying to locate then, he sighted a large, steel clad M/V riding high in the water about 2000 feet SE of Pier "B". Being unable to locate his flight, he made his run alone, approaching the vessel at about 220 miles per houb. Lt.MOSSER toggled 3 X 500 lb. bombs at minimum altitude, one scoring a direct hit; two near misses. The vessel was seen to blow up, and pieces of debris flew through the a ir. He dropped his fourth and last bomb at a barge in the middle of the bay but missed.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE..

1. Heavy, Intense and inaccurate from known positions around LOLOBATA DROME. The inaccuracy is accounted for by the fast that the flight leader kept the Squadron out of effective range. Several bursts appeared relatively close to the planes at correct altitude but mostly trailing.

2. Heavy, moderate, inaccurate from positions on the S shore of WASILE BAY. Crews report guns located on small hill near shore at Tjekali Pt. however, this fire could have originated from known positions at GOKROEA BAY.

3. Ten or twelve bursts fired from a position just N of Pier "B" before silenced by attack. This position thought to be new, M 5/7 position 1700 ft. N of Pier "B".

4. Heavy and medium, intense and very inaccurate fire from vicinity KAOE AIRDROME. Here again inaccuracy accounted for by extreme range. Distance of observation made pin pointing of positions impossible.

5. Several bursts received from probable Fox Tare Charlie which was attacked. 1 gun firing from stern and one from bow. Caliber is unknown for bursts were not seen. Probably heavy or medium for rate of fire was fairly slow and no tracers were observed.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT

1.Nil interception.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

1. Even though A/A fire was plentiful, no planes of this Squadron sustained the slightest damage.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

No personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

Lt.MOSSER's crew will be recommended for an appropriate award if mission photographs confirm his account of the attack on the armed M/V.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Type	Weight	No.Dropped
164	4	4/5 Sec.	500 lb.	4
016	4	"	"	4
971	4	"	"	4
591	4	"	"	4
033	4	"	"	4
014	4	"	"	4

Total: 24 X 500 lb. bombs dropped. Of these, 10 bombs were effective - Other bombs were misses.

ARMAMENT REPORT

Plane No.	No.Rds.Carried	No.Rds.Fired.
164	4200	1080
016	4200	2880
971	4200	3180
591	4200	1200
033	4200	1680
014	4200	2640

TOTAL: 12,560 X.50 Cal. ammunition expended.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No.	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
391	K-21	30
164	K-21	30
033	K-21	30
971	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
016	K-21	30

Total: 180 X K-21's taken.

6. SIGHTINGS

Several barges in vicinity of Pier "B".
Several barges in Tjakali Pt.
2 S/C 10 miles S of Kaoe in center of Kaoe Bay.
2 large u/i M/V's with only masts above water just S of Bolee Pt.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos not received when this report was written up, therefore, no interpretation was made.

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT E.GOFOR TH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: - 1
Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



FPO 222 - C - 6
D A TE 9, August 1944
T ARGET SHIPPING IN WASILE BAY
T.O.T. 1335 - 1337
BOMBS FALLING
PHOTOS TAK EN
MAP REFERENCE MOL UCCAN ISLA NDS 1 125,000

4994 3RD

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
224-A-4
11 Aug

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

12 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 224-A-4, performed on 11 August, with objective as Shipping in BULI and KAOE BAYS and in the TERNATE ISLANDS Area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 11 August,1944, this squadron leading the 501st and 500th Squadrons took off to strike shipping targets of opportunity. The three squadrons were to sweep BULI BAY (E. side HALMAHERA) then S part KAOE BAY, and finally TERNATE Is. area progressing from each area until a suitable target was found. BULI BAY was 9/10 covered by cumulus from 500 to 8000 feet. Consequently BULI BAY was passed up in preference for KAOE BAY. Each Squadron employed 6 B-25-D-1's loaded with 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay fuse bombs. No shipping targets were found but a very successful attack was executed against F/P's and stores areas.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Squadron assembled in a wide turn, directly after take-off.

2. Group: The Group Rendezvous was not accomplished as planned. The 500th Squadron was #2 in the take-off sequence and joined the formation during the wide 180° turn after take-off. The 501st Squadron's take-off was delayed and did not join the formation until the withdrawal from KAOE BAY.

3. Fighter: The fighter rendezvous was accomplished as planned and the cover provided was excellent.

c. ATTACK

Note: All attacks occured on the N half of the E shore of KAOE BAY.
The first Area to be searched, BULI BAY, was not covered because of bad weather.

The formation broke out over KAOE BAY in the vicinity of Cape JARVAL at 8000 feet (On the E side of the Bay - This and all references "KAOE BAY", Map #10, Terrain Study #81). In this area the weather was CAVU therefore from the vantage point of 8000 feet, the Formation Leader was able to observe the entire Bay. Finding no large ships present the squadron made a 360° turn to lose altitude and attack 7-8 F/P's on the E side of BABING ISLAND. which were located on the E shore. The F/P's were anchored fairly close together. This allowed only one plane to make a bombing run. However, two planes thoroughly strafed all of the planes the greater proportion of which were single, float, single engine, low wing monoplanes (Probably Rufes) and the rest were single engine biplanes (probably Alper Daves). One bomb was seen to toss one plane into the air. The falling debris knocked a wing off another. The resultant fires and excellent strafing by following P-38's destroyed the rest (Confirmed by the 501st Formation Leader who passed over the scene after the attack).

At WASILE VILLAGE near the jetty one bomb and heavy strafing left a lugger listing against the jetty and on a second pass it was noted that mooring lines possibly prevented the lugger from keeling over completely. The lugger can be claimed as damaged. No details which indicate actual sinking can be brought to light.

In the area surrounding the jetty at WASILE VILLAGE, large piles of stores, supplies and ammunition were attacked. Six bombs and heavy strafing started fires which grew into the largest conflagration that experienced crew members have had the satisfaction of observing in this theater. The P-38's again followed up and put in their "Two cents Worth" by dropping their belly tanks and strafing. Crews report the P-38 attack as very effective.
A lugger midway between BABING ISLAND and WASILE VILLAGEwas bombed with 2 bombs and strafed with unobserved results.
A lugger 2 miles W of C.MITI was bombed and strafed. The bomb was observed to be a direct hit but unfortunately the bomb plowed entirely through, skipped and exploded an estimated 100 feet beyond. No further observation was made and the lugger can only be claimed as damaged since a hasty withdrawal was necessary in face of A/A fire which was beginning to burst a good distance to the front of the plane.

The formation had split up to allow more maneuverability but reformed soon after the attacks. This procedure is not considered unwise under the circumstances. The circumstances being of course, "Agate" and"Copper" the P-38th Cover. Furthermore the Jap Airforce, as usual in the past six months, has shown a reluctance to engage in interception even though fighter planes are present in sufficient strength.

After breaking off the attacks near the mouth of KAOE BAY, the Squadron turned S to sweep the SE, S, SW and W parts of the Bay. However, no worthy targets were "flushed" and at a point 10 miles S of KAOE DROME, the 500th Squadron joined. The formation headed toward the S portion of the Bay climbing to 8000 feet enroute in order to clear the mountains and clouds. In the vicinity of WADJOI VILLAGE (SE part of KAOE BAY), one plane dropped 4 bombs armed. The pilot was forced off each target and rather than salvo his bombs, he dropped them. Without a bombsight and from 8000 feet, his accuracy was, no doubt poor.
After the 500th Squadron joined the Formation and Squadrons were on course for return, smoke from fires which were started at WASILE VILLAGE, could be seen rising above the thin overcast at 8000 feet.

The 501st Squadron had joined the formation in the meantime but when one of it's planes developed a rough engine, the 501st leader called "Thunder 1", the Group Leader, and gave notice of intent to drop back and escort the "lame duck". The ensuing flight to base was without incident.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged.

3. Nil Friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME	Biak Is.	0935/K
On Course for Target.			0946/K
Fighter Rendesvous	AJOE IS.	1132--	1141/K
Arrive Target	KAOE BAY		1245/K
Leave Target	KAOE BAY		1335/K

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE AJOE IS. BULI BAY KAOE BAY.

In: KAOE BAY, direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.H.N.ALGER	A/P #	033	1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	A/P #	164
2nd.Lt.G.P.VOITIER	"	014	2nd.Lt.E.L.NUNES	"	016
2nd.Lt.I.A.MOSSER	"	591	2nd.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	"	097

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Individual Attack.

On arriving over KAOE BAY, Lt.ALGER's Radio Operator spotted the F/P's at BABING ISLAND. Lt.ALGER led the Squadron in a 360° turn in order to observe the entire bay. Since the weather was CAVU, from 8000 feet he was able to take in all portions of the Bay. Finding no sizeable ships present he considered the F/P's a worthy target and began a descent which would bring the Squadron down to strafing altitude and on a course from SW to NE. During this descent he spotted the jetty, lugger and dumps at WASILE VILLAGE farther up the coast. Since Lt.SALTER's flight was on the right in #2 slot, he gave him the F/P's as a target. He then led his flight on a run over the targets at WASILE VILLAGE. He opened fire at approximately 1000 yards and observed his shots taking effect among several tarpaulin covered dumps, large crates similar to out A/P engine crates, and ammunition stores. The ammo boxes, for the mostpart, were similar to the cases which we use for packing mortar shells.
Lt.ALGER released 3 bombs which were seen to explode among the dumps. Lt.ALGER then swept N to C.MITI and circled while the rest of the squadron completed their attacks. After the Squadron had re-assembled, he led the squadron on a flight at 1000 feet which covered the remainder of the coastal area (see attached diagram). After this thorough search and with the knowledge that no shipping was hiding in close to shore, he salvoed his remaining bomb. At a point 10 miles E of HATOEBOELA Pt. (Some 12 miles SW of KAOE) where the 500th had been attacking small shipping, he began circling for altitude. During this time he observed splashes in the water 3 miles S of KAOE. The splashes had the appearance of bullets (M/G) being too small and too numerous for heavier caliber guns. Possibly an unobserved plane firing. But try as he did he could not ascertain either the source or exact nature of splashes. Meanwhile the 500th Squadron had joined and the two squadrons cleared the KAOE BAY shores at 8000 feet and headed for base at 1335/K. It was at this time, some 50 minutes after his initial attack, that the fire was observed at WASILE VILLAGE. Even at a distance of approximately 25 miles the fire could be seen clearly. It had increased in size and was still burning fiercely. The smoke, blue-grey in color, was billowing up to and pushing through a thin layer of clouds at 8000 feet indicated altitude.
With the exception of the radio message from "Thunder 3" concerning the "Lame Duck", the return trip was without incident.

2 Man
Lt.MOSSER experienced a slump from his excellent batting average of a couple of days past. (It was he who hit and sank a 2500 ton S/B in WASILE BAY on the 8th.) He was forced off almost each target he tried to attack. He was able to strafe sporadically but to no great degree of success. However, he was able to corroborate the reports of other crew members. He had the opportunity and pleasure of watching the P-38's "rat race" over the various targets.

3 Man
Lt.VOITIER found himself in a position where he was unable to get a stab at the float planes and so dropped 3 X 500 lb. bombs on two small sailboats. No damage was evident to either. He next strafed the supply area at the shore end of the pier and crewmen believe they saw smoke and flames. Lt.Voitier was unable to release his fourth bomb in time, and so subsequently salvoed it.

Lt.SALTER, following his Lead Flight lead the second flight into KAOE BAY to reconnoitre. From his vantage point in the middle of the bay, Lt.SALTER sighted some seven or eight float planes at anchor just off shore in the vicinity of B ABING IS. and immediately circled left to attack. Strafing as he made his run, he dropped 2 X 500 lb. bombs among the floatplanes, definitely destroying at least one and probably two. One plane was actually seen to lift out of the water and a part of a wing and considerable debris flew all over. As Lt.SALTER pulled away a series of explosions occurred accompanied by fires and black smoke rising to 5000 ft. Then, following the coastline Lt.SALTER proceeded N to WASILE VILLAGE where he dropped a 500 pounder on and simultaneously strafed a lugger tied up to a pier. The results were not immediately observed, but on a second pass, this time at a supply and storage dump at the foot of the pier, the vessel was listing perceptibly, The coressensus being that only its proximity to the pier prevented complete capsizing. Along with heavy strafing a final 500 lb. bomb was dropped in the supply area with damage unnoted. Here having exhausted his bomb load, he broke off the attack and rejoined the lead flight.

Lt.HUBBS, flying in the number 2 spot, was unable to get a good shot at the seaplanes because of a hill, but instead aimed 2 of his 500 lb. bombs at a lugger lying off shore just beyond the seaplane base. His second attack was a strafing and bombing attack on the lugger mentioned previously as being tied up at the WASILE VILLAGE Pier. Two more bombs were dropped here, but as in the previous attack, no damage was observed. Continuing his attack he strafed the sup ly dump at the land end of the pier but again without apparent results.

Lt. JOHNSON flying in the number 3 position in the second flight, made his run on the 7-8 F/P's at BABING IS. he was able to strafe the planes quite thoroughly by pulling wide of the flight and converging his fire with the flight leader's. However, at the point for bomb release his flight path was wide due to the small area covered by the F/P's and he did not release any of his bombs.
AT WASILE VILLAGE he made a bombing and strafing run on the supply area near the jetty. During his strafing attack he noted his bullets to team into piles of supplies and start several small thin columns of smoke skyward - contributing to the total effort which resulted in the aforementioned inferno.
His two bombs which he released among the dumps also had a telling effect.
At a point 2 miles W of C.BITI he detached himself from the flight and made an individual attack on a lugger. He thoroughly strafed the lugger but observed a bomb which his own crew and that of another plane observed to crash through skip and explode without apparent damage to the lugger.

At this time, Lt.JOHNSON observed the A/A bursts over WASILE BAY and promptly turned out of danger. Soonafter he rejoined his flight and the squadron.

b. A/A FIRE

1. Moderate, medium and light inaccurate A/A fire was received from known positions around GOERONA BAY. 10-15 bursts were directed at the planes in a futile attempt to reach beyond the effective range of the guns. However one plane which ventured nearer than the rest was holed by probable 20 mm. projectiles, (For details see "D" below).

2. Slight, inaccurate M/G fire was reported from WASILE VILLAGE by one crew member.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil combat occured.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

One plane #014 sustained damage to the wing. The projectile entered from below, passed upward and passed out near the leading edge. The smoothness and size of the hole indicates 20 mm. Damage was not severe - requiring sheet metal repairs of no consequence.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

In view of information on hand, no recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

5. TABLES

See Incl. #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

At BASING I. P-38's seem to blow up 3 F/P's.
P-38's drop belley tanks on WASILE VILLAGE Area and strafe.
On West of #1 Strip at Kase, several tarpaulin covered dumps.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Nil photos received at time this report was written up.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2

Incl: 1 Tables
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

No.Plane.	No.Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No.Dropped over Target	
083	4	500 lb.	4/5 sec.	3	1 salvoed
014	4	"	"	3	1 salvoed
591	4	"	"	4	All bombs away at 8000 ft.
164	4	500 lb.	"	4	
014	4	500 lb.	"	4	1 salvoed
097	4	500 lb.	"	4	

Total: 24 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs dropped 3 of which were salvoed.

ARMAMENT TABLE

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rd's. Fired
083	4200	720
014	4200	2160
591	4200	720
164	4200	2400
014	4200	2160
097	4200	2160

TOTAL: 10320 X. 50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

All planes were equipped with K-21 Cameras - total of 180 exposures taken.

Incl:-1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Mission [illegible]

11 August,1944
Kaoe Bay
Time over Target: 1245-1335/K
Altitude:- Minimum
Crews Report on Bomb Falling
Fires
Took Photos T
Map Ref: Kaoe Bay Map #10 Terrain Study #81


Hatetaba Ko
CAPE LOLOBATA
LOLOBATA
WAISILE BAY
KAOE
DODAGA
CAPE LOLEO
GOEFASA
HATOEBOELA PT.
CAPE TABOBO
TAOLAS B.
CAPE BIRA
1x500lb.
CAPE TOBALIEN
9x500lb
WAISILE
8x500lb
BABINGA
AKESELAKA
CAPE JAWAI
5x500lb
ROMI I.
KAOE B.
CAPE TOTONGO
MAIYIN
CAPE SAOLAT
4x500lb
DODINGA BAY
BOELI
Boeli Bay
MABOELI I.
N
SCALE 0 MILES
5 0 5 10 15

499
OK 225
ARM 2Ag

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

13 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 225-A-12, performed 12 August,44. Objective NABIRE AIRDROME, Dutch New Guinea.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the afternoon of 12 August, this Squadron employing two (2) B-25-D-5's and four (4) B-25-D-1's, attacked the Airdrome at NABIRE with the object of rendering the runway unserviceable. Each plane carried 2 X 1000 lb. 1/10 second delay demolition bombs.

b. RENDEZVOUS

As this Squadron was the only unit assigned, this mission and as it operated without fighter escort, there was no rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

The Squadron adopting a formation of two, 3 plane "V"'s in trail, flew the most direct route to NABIRE and dropped it's 12 X 1000 lb. bombs on the Airdrome, leaving the runway unserviceable. They then proceeded directly to base.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception occurred.
2. Nil enemy planes destroyed or damaged.
3. Nil friendly planes destroyed or damaged.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	1400/K
Time Over Target	NABIRE DROME	1500-1502/K
Landed	MOKMER DROME	1600/K

f. ROUTE
Out: Base - Nabire
In: Reciprocal

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

This Squadron led by Lt.H.K.PALMER was composed as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P	401	1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P	184
1st.Lt.H.H.BUDDE	"	847	1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	871
2nd.Lt.I.A.MOSSER	"	097	2nd.Lt.M.J.OFIE	"	891

3. DETAILS OF MISSION

a. Attack:

Six planes lead by Lt.PALMER arrived in the vicinity of NABIRE AIRDROME without incident. Lt.PALMER manuevered his flight to approach the drome from the SE, circling the runway to the E and making the bomb run on a SE to NW heading at an altitude of 6000 feet indicated, airspeed 195 miles per hour. With the bombs in each flight being dropped on the lead planes each of which was a B-25-D-5, 90% of the bomb load was seen to fall in the middle third of the runway in a compact pattern, in the vicinity of the largest revetments, commencing at the E side of the strip and running diagonally across it and terminating at a point on the W side approximately one-third of the distance from the E end. Leaving the unserviceable runway behind, Lt.PALMER continued his flight out over OKEL VINK BAY and headed directly for Biak.

b. A/A FIRE

Nil A/A fire encountered.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT
Nil interception encountered.

d. DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

No damage sustained.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil casualties.

4. CITATIONS

In view of information on hand, no recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. TABLES

All six (6) planes dropped 2 X 1000 lb. 1/10 second delay bombs in target. Since mission was carried out from medium altitude, no ammunition was expended.

8. SIGHTINGS

Nil Sightings.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

No photos received when this report was written.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


BAY
GEELVINK
Nabire Mission
Nabire PTH
Japanese Barracks
12 X 1000 lb. BOMBS DROPPED HERE
PTH Hospital
NABIRE AIRDROME
NABIRE
N
FFO 225-A-12
12August,1944
Nabire Drome
Crews Report on Bomb Falling
Time Over Target: 1500-1502/K
Altitude: 6000 feet
Took Photos
Ref: Nabire Drome 1/20000
347
27
164
097
571

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
OK 226.0-4
aRA 13 Ag 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

15 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 226-A-4 performed 13 August,1944., with objective at WASILE BAY, HALMAHERA.

To : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 13 August,1944, this squadron together with the 501st and 500th Squadrons conducted a strike against the WASILE BAY area in the HALMAHERA ISLANDS. The Target being supply dumps which were brought to light in the excellent photos of the shipping strike on 8 August,1944. Each squadron employed 6 B-25's with a bomb load of 12 X 100 lb. parademo bombs.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The squadron, Group and Fighter Rendezvous were accomplished as planned.

c. ATTACK

Two plans of attack were set-up in case bad weather intervened. One attack route was to make land fall at Buli Bay and cross the mountains toward KAOK BAY, turning at the proper time to attack the supply areas near Piers "A" and "B", from SE- NW. The alternate plan was to skirt around LELAI POINT on the N tip of the E. Penninsula, follow the coastline to the LOLOBATA area and attack from NW to SE. The latter plan was put into effect since a front of large cumulus clouds covered the E side of the E Penninsula. The Group attacked from NW to SE, crossing overland to the E of LOLOBATA DROMES and directly onto the supply areas on the N shore of WASILE BAY. The 500th led followed by the 501st and 499th Squadrons in that order. The formation over the target consisted of two "V"'s of 3 planes each. The second flight trailing the first flight by approximately 30 seconds. A total of 60 bombs were dropped in the target area beginning just E of Pier "B" and extending to Pier "A". Crews were well engrossed in keeping watch on the A/A and observation of damage inflicted was correspondingly limited. However, photographs indicated that bombing was as a rule accurate.

No fires resulted but damage was probably considerable. This can be said with a reasonable degree of surety since the supplies, buildings; etc., were not well dispersed nor protected by revetments and since a large number of bombs are known to have dropped among these targets. A/A fire is discussed to greater lengths under Par.3-E but here it should be noted that the positions overlooking the bay and supply areas, have an excellent field of fire, which commands the open water area S and SE of the jetties. This situation, while at all times a threat to low flying aircraft over exposed areas, is somewhat alleviated by the bombing and strafing of succeeding waves. To illustrate this, photos taken by the first flight of the 499th, show personnel in the 6 gun heavy position (Flakintel #1), crouching against the revetment walls and in the case of the CP where parademos are falling the personnel are hastily abandoning their posts. Then the second flight of this squadron, being last, was entirely exposed with no covering fire from the rear to distract the gun crews. It is noticeable that this flight was shot up more than any other in the Group. One plane shot down and the other two holed by fragments. From From this it should be taken as SOP that the last flight should make strafing and bombing of A/A positions their primary concern. Of course on targets where terrain or other obstructions provide a defiladed area through which a safe withdrawal may be made, more bombs could be allotted to other targets.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DAMAGED OR DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged.

3. Plane #084 this Squadron shot down by A/A fire.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take off	MOKMER DROME Biak Is.	0856-0859/K.
On Course For Target		0905/K
Fighter Rendezvous	Ajoe Is.	1100/K
TOT	Wasile Bay	1231-1340/K
Landed at Base		1653/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BIAK AJOE IS. Point 30 miles E of BULI BAY CAPE LELAI TARGET.

In : TARGET CAPE LELAI, DIRECT TO BASE.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION

a. Group: The Gro p Formation enroute and on return led by the 501st Squadron consisted of the 501st, 500th and 499th Squadrons in number 1,2,and 3 positions of a "V" of three 6 plane flights with flights javelin down.

b. Squadron: This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.H.H.SUMMERS consisted of the following pilots and planes:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt. H.H.SUMMERS	A/P No.033		Capt.G.D.JORDAN	A/P No.591	
2nd.Lt. J.B.BOYD	" " 347	*	1st.Lt.G.P.VOITIER	" " 084	
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	" " 164		2nd.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	" " 340	

* This Plane Shor Down.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of the Mission.

Lt.H.H.SUMMERS with Lts.BOYD and TARANUK on his wings made his run on the target following the last flight of the 500th Squadron. Just before crossing the target he ran into the A/A barrage which almost completely covered the target and the area S of the jetties. The flight was so ungrossed in dodging the A/A fire that none of the pilots could pick individual targets and consequently began toggling bombs at the beginning of the target area and continuing until all bombs were away. The flight dropped 30 bombs in the target. After attacking the target the flight began taking evasive action which no doubt prevented damage and dasualties. After breaking out of the barrage area near the jetties, the A/A began tracking and bracketing tactics which woul d probably have been successful had it not been for the evasive action taken. The flight withdrew to the W into the mouth of WASILE BAY and it was here that Lt.SUMMERS noted the absence of one plane. By this time the second flight had cleared and turned once again into the Bay to locate and assist if possible the downed crew. The downed plane was located and 3 crewmen were observed. For the greater part of 1 hour and 15 minutes, the five planes remained in the area circling the downed plane to prevent a boat party from reaching the plane before "Daylight" 1, the"Rescue Cat", could arrive on the scene. During this time repeated but futile attempts were made to contact "Daylight" on both VHF and Liasion sets. The A/A continued to hammer away all during this time and several times succeeded in bracketing the planes. However, for the most part the flight leaders kept their flights outside the range of the guns. Finally with fuel running low and no word of "Daylight 1", Lt.SUMMERS led the formation out of the Bay and returned to base. Lt.TARANUK landed at NOEMFOOR on return to replenish his fuel supply. He landed at base 30 minutes behind the other planes.

Capt.JORDAN lead the 2nd. Flight with Lts.VOITIER and JOHNSON flying No.2 & 3 positions respectively. On the approach, this flight with Lt.VOITIER on the bay side away from the A/A and Lt.JOHNSON inshore followed the lead of the first flight taking violent evasive action avoiding the A/A which by this time had reached optimum intensity. Despite the most strenuous evasive maneuvers however, the flight experienced great difficulty in avoiding the A/A and Lt.VOITIER's plane, with the left engine on fire was seen to crash into the water at a point near shore a mile below the personnel area. Both Capt.JORDAN and Lt.JOHNSON dropped their 100 lb. bombs in the target area, strafing as they went, one of Capt.JORDAN's gunners taking some shots at a small cabin launch which lay just off shore. No results were immediately observed but when the flight circled the center of the bay, looking for signs of the striken plane, a thin column of white smoke was observed about 1000 feet high. It could not be determined whether or not this was a result of this flight's attack however. It is not known whether or not Lt.VOITIER disposed of his bombs before crashing. No additional passes were made at the target.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

1. In general the A/A fire was much more intense and accurate than on previous occasions. As many as 20 puffs seen bursting simultaneously in one area. Which gives rise to the possibility that positions undiscovered as yet, exist in the area. From crews reports indicate that positions could possibly be located to the SE and S of the Piers near Targets 23 X or 24 X. (Spec. Target Map 1/20.000 Masile Bay).

2. The known positions around the DOLOBATA DROMES were no doubt responsible for the barrage over the target., having with all probability swung their guns to follow preceeding flights. This is very likely the case since little or no fire was received in the Drome Areas nor were gun flashes seen as would have been true if the guns were firing toward the planes on the approach. Several reports indicate a good deal of M/G fire from the target area which was not encountered on the strike of 8 August.

3. The 6 gun heavy position (Flakintel #1) is without a doubt responsible for the tracking fire which followed the planes out over the water during the break-away. Photos definitely show all six guns pointed toward the route of withdrawal where the planes were in full view. Only distance obstructed observation by the gun crews. It is also quite evident that each gun in this position was firing independently without fire control data, from the CP since the C.P. was evacuated due to our attack. This is a sure indication of well trained and experienced crews reminiscent of the days when WEWAK was in it's "Hey Day". Flight personnel report that the bursts were following just to the rear of the formation and bursting low on the water. This trailing fire crept up and burst lifted the wing of one plane. Fortunately the flight was soon out of range.

4. The known positions around GORIOKA BAY brought rapid and trenking fire to bear on the planes during the withdrawal and on the return flight into the bay. The planes were at extreme range but the bursts were fairly close. Fire from this position can be avoided by flying over the center of VASILE BAY where a dead spot seems to exist.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT

1. Nil Aerial Combat occured.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

1. Plane #084 Pilot 1st.Lt.G.P.VOITIER was shot down by A/A fire. The details of the incident are not know.

2. Plane #087 sustained damage which resulted in the plane's being turned over to the SERVICE SQUADRON for repairs which will require several days.

3. 2 other planes sustained superficial and minor damage which was readily repaired.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Listed below is names of crew members of Plane #084 now missing in action.

1st.Lt.G.P.VOITIER	0-750489	P
2nd.Lt.C.D.BROMAN	0-756167	CP
T/Sgt.A.(NMI) SANTILLO	32577601	RO
S/Sgt.A.A.SMITH	31155960	RO
Sgt.D.S.HRAPS	36459270	G
S/Sgt. D.E.ESTEP	6294063	Photographer

No other casualties were sustained.

4. CITATIONS

Eligibility for certain crew members for award, on willful return into A/A fire to aid the downed prewmen, is under consideration.

5. TABLES

See Inclosure #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

1 Sugar Charlie just off Pier "B".
9 barges between pier "B" and Capo Lolobata, several luggers in pier area.
One small fire with white smoke up to 1000 feet from vicinity of target 22 X. This is only fire resulting from this strike. (Crews observed area for 1 hour 15 minutes).

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Due to lack of laboratory facilities this squadron did not receive prints of negatives taken on the mission. Only a cursory examination of the 346th Group 8-X prints was possible.

For The Squadron COMMANDER

PAT K.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incls:-2

Incls:-1 Tables.
Incls:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target
891	12	100 lb.	Para Demos	12
084	12	" "	" "	? (Crashed)
840	12	" "	"	12
035	12	" "	" "	12
847	12	" "	" "	12
164	12	" "	" "	12

Total No.Bombs dropped: 60 X 100 lb. Para Demo bombs.

Armament Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
891	4800	1680
840	4800	1920
035	4800	1920
847	4800	960
164	4800	1200

Total: 8680 rounds of .50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTOS

Note: All planes took photos - equipped with K-21 Camera.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



LEGEND

FFO 226-A-11
TARGET WASILE BAY (SUPPLY AREA)
T.O.T. 1231/K
SQUADR N 499th
DATE AUGUST 13,1944
PLANES TOOK PHOTOS +
MAP REFERENCE WASILE BAY 1:20,000
August 13, 1944

ATTACK ROUTE A ND A/A ZO NES
ENCOUNTERED.

LEGEND

FFO 226 - A - 11
TARGET SUPPLY A REA WASILE BAY
T.O.T. 1231/K
DATE AUGUST 15, 1944
SQUADRON 499th SQUA DRON
REF: DODAGA (HALMEHARA SP ECIAL)
1, 125,000
A/A ZONES -
ATTACK ROUTE
TARGET
PLANE SHOT DOWN
AREA WHERE GUNS WERE ACTUALLY
SEEN FIRING.



499
15Ag44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

17 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 228-A-4 performed on 15 August. with Objective as Shipping on the West Coast of the HALMAHERA and Secondary as TERNATE TOWNSHIP, TERNATE ISLAND.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 15 August,1944 six B-25-D-1's of this Squadron conducted a search for shipping from the S tip of HALMAHERA ISLAND along the coast to TIDORE ISLAND. No worthy bombing targets were encountered and all six planes bombed targets at TERNATE TOWNSHIP.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group and Fighter rendezvous were accomplished as planned. Group rende,vous over water south of MOKMER DROME, rendezvous with fighters at AJOE ISLAND at 1015/K.

c. ATTACK

The squadron searched the W coast from C.LIBOBO to TIDORE ISLAND. During the sweep, one lugger and personnel were strafed. The lugger was damaged but casualties among personnel which were abandoning ship, were unobserved. A sailboat was strafed and damaged.
No further targets were spotted and the squadron attacked TERNATE with the following results:
1,200 ton wooden lugger was bombed and strafed. One near miss was reported to have damaged and set the craft afire. However, no photos confirming this action were obtained.

1 lugger was destroyed by a direct hit (direct hit confirmed by photos).

1 direct hit destroyed a section of the #1 Jetty.

2 large buildings were destroyed by direct hits and 1 heavily damaged by a near miss.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

One 150 foot fuel barge was observed at the end of Jetty #1 and strafed. This barge was reported afire after the attack. However the craft shown in photographs is probably not a fuel barge but some type of harbor craft which would give the appearance of a fuel barge when only limited observation is possible. Further more the observer which reported the boat on fire could have been confused by other fires on shore since the observation was made from quite a distance.

A total of twenty-four bombs were expended in the attack as follows: 17 bombs dropped on buildings in Ternate Township, 2 bombs at a sailboat, 3 bombs at lugger, 1 on jetty and 1 dropped in water.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil Interception.

2. Nil E/A destroyed.

3. Nil Allied planes destroyed in the air.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOMMER DROME- BIAK IS.	0801/K
Arrive C.LIBOGO and begin search.		1137/K
Break off search at TIDORE IS.		1215/K
TOT	TERNATE	1240/K
Land at base		1548/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE AJOK IS. C.LIBOGO TIDORE IS. TERNATE.

In : TERNATE DODINGER BAY KAOE BAY BULI BAY and direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

a. Group:

The Group Formation led by the 501st Squadron proceeded to C.LIBOGO in a "V" Formation of three, 6 plane elements with the 501st, 500th and 499th Squadrons in number 1, 2 and 3 positions respectively. At C.LIBOGO Squadrons broke up and followed each other at intervals.

b. Squadron:

This squadron led by 1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH, flew in the #5 position of the Group Formation with two, 3 plane flights javelin down. The formation was composed as follows:

(See next page for Flights)

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.W.E.HUSHWORTH	A/P	055	2nd.Lt.R.L.HUNES	A/P	540
2nd.Lt.M/J.OPIE	"	016	2Nd.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	"	164
2Nd.Lt.G.E.BOYD	"	591	1st.Lt.H.N.HODGE	"	547

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

Details of Attack:

Lt.HUSHWORTH led the Squadron to G.LIBOGO without incident and here he pulled ahead of the second flight and began the search. Lts.BOYD and OPIE, #2 and 3 respectively, made attacks in formation with Lt.HUSHWORTH. Therefore no attempt was made to separate the individual attacks. At a point designated as128° 15'E - 00° 55'S, the flight strafed a sailboat with undetermined results. The flight then proceeded to the vicinity of BONORA LAKO Is. (128° 05'E - 00°40'S) where a lugger was attacked. All three planes damaged the lugger by strafing. Personnel which were diving overboard were included in the attack but casualties are undetermined. No further targets were found enroute to TIDORE IS. and the squadron reformed. Lt.HUSHWORTH led the two flights around the S tip of TIDORE IS. and approached TERNATE TOWNSHIP from the South, he then detached his flight and prepared to make a run over the Township area. His first target was a 800 ton wooden vessel, 3000 feet S of the #1 jetty. He released one bomb which the gunner observed to hit within 10 feet of the vessel. (a later report indicates this vessel afire). Lt.HUSHWORTH then made a run over the warehouse area and released his remaining three bombs. The results were undetermined. Soonafter releasing his last bomb he turned right and out to sea where he circled to reform the Squadron. Throughout this action he was trailing the other Squadrons and after reforming the squadron off TERNATE, followed the other squadrons over DODINGA, BAOE AND BULI BAYS, joining the 500th Squadron enroute. The 501st had fallen back to observe one of their planes which had crashed. The return flight was without incident.

Lt.BOYD made his attack on TERNATE in the #2 position on Lt.HUSHWORTH's right wing. He dropped 1 bomb at the wooden lugger attacked by the flight leader but his bomb missed. He dropped his second bomb on the jetty scoring a direct hit and demolishing a section near the shore. He dropped his third bomb on a warehouse and his fourth hit in the water just offshore. He turned off the target with his flight leader.

Lt.OPIE being in the number 3 position, was over the land during the run on TERNATE TOWN and he dropped all four of his bombs at buildings in the area. He dropped his first bomb at the S edge of the warehouse area and trained his remaining three through to the #2 jetty. One of his bombs scored a direct hit on a large tin roofed building which was literally blown to bits.

Lt.NUNES lead the second flight along the N coast of the HALMAHERAS from G.LIBOGO to TIDORE ISLAND without locating any worthwhile targets. He did however, strafe several unnamed villages along this coast without observed results. Shortly after the start of the search, Lt.BUDDE, flying #3 position sighted and strafed a two masted sail boat at a point approximately 125° 15'E 00° 55'S. Tracers were seen to strike the target. In this same flight, Lt.JOHNSON, flying in the #2 slot, not being able to get a shot at anything interesting observed his ammunition. When the lead flight broke off at TODORE IS. circling to approach TERNATE TOWN from the South, Lt.NUNES followed. On the attack each pilot of the second flight aimed a 500 lb. bomb at a lugger lying just S of the town, one bomb scoring a very close near miss and exploding within a few feet of the port side causing visible debris and lifting the boat from the water. The other two bombs fell wide of the target about 100' off the mark. The identity of the plane scoring the near miss could not be determined. The attack then continued into the town proper, each pilot scattering the remainder of his 3 X 500 lb. bombs within th e target area. Accurate observation of results was not possible because of smoke and dust from previous bomb bursts which by now covered the area.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Only one crewmember reported seeing two white puffs of smoke in the air over TERNATE TOWN. These puffs could have been 20 mm bursts but there are no further details to allow more definite conclusions.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil aerial combat.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN AIRPLANES.

1. Nil damage to A/P's of this squadron.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

The details of this mission show no reasons for recommendation of any awards or citations.

5. TABLES

See Incl:#1

6. SIGHTINGS

2 masted sailboat in Sabang Bay on Batjan Is.

Good sized tin roofed building and M/T road on N tip of KOREON IS. 127° 45'E 00° 20'S.
Long ling of large warehouses and great deal of activity of TOLOA VILLAGE. (SE tip Tidore Is.).

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

In general the photos tend to confirm crews reports. Direct hit on lugger confirmed, bombs shown exploding near buildings. Photos of the stockade show dummy guns and outdated cannon. No further anti-aircraft positions are seen.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:- 2

Incl:-1 Tables.
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No. Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. Dropped
016	4	4/5 sec.	500 lb.	4
891	4	"	500 lb.	4 (1 bomb missed - in water)
033	4	"	500 lb.	4
164	4	"	500 lb.	4
340	4	"	500 lb.	4
367	4	"	500 lb.	4

Total: 24 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No. Rds. C'd.	No. Rds. Fired
016	4000	1680
891	4000	2160
033	4000	2400
164	4000	2400
340	4000	1200
349	4000	1680

Total: 11520 X.50 Cal. Rds. expended in strafing.

Photo

All planes were equipped with K-21 cameras and took photos.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Mission FFO 228-A-4
15 August,1944
Ternate Township
TOT 1240/K
Altitude: Minimum
Crews Report on Bombs Falling
Took Photos

Ref: Ternate Isla nd 1/20000



499
229-A
17 Aug 44

O.K.
AGRN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

17 August, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 229-A-4 performed on 16 August, with objective at MITI A/D, MITI ISLAND in the HALMAHERA GROUP. (128° 03'E 01° 55'N)

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 16 August, 1944, six B-25-D-1's airplanes of this squadron took off to attack MITI A/D with intent to destroy some 16 aircraft reported there. Three Squadrons of this Group and squadrons of B-24's were to participate. The secondary target was designated as KAOE A/D and Village (127° 50'E 01° 12'N). The Tertiary target AJOE Is. (131°10'E 00° 30'N). The Squadron arrived at MITI ISLAND but were unable to attack. Consequantly, enroute to base, the Tertiary Target was attacked.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Group and Fighter Rendezvous were accomplished as planned.

c. ATTACK

Six planes, each loaded with 72 X 27 lb. parafrag bombs, took off but one plane developed a fuel leak after leaving AJOE IS. and another plane accompanied this plane to base. Four planes continued on to the target but due to a late take-off this squadron was unable to complete it's attack before B-24's began bombing. The Squadron Leader veered off just short of the target and circled to make a second run. However, the two squadrons (500th and 501st) left the area immediately and rather than lag behind with only a four plane flight for defense the squadron rejoined the Group Formation. Enroute to base at AJOE IS. the four planes attacked the Tertiary Target with undetermined results. The squadron was using the new R-2 parafrag racks for the first time and inexperienced personnel committed errors in loading which resulted in malfunctions.

One plane released 5 banks, but was unable to release the sixth. Two planes released 5 banks each and 3 banks "hung up". One plane released 1 bank and failed to release 5 banks. This leaves a total of 144 bombs dropped and 114 bombs which failed to release. The bombs were dropped on a plantation with unobserved results. The racks were studied on return and it was found that faulty leading and not mechanical failures, were responsible for the high percentage of non-releases. It is thought that this experience will prevent future recurrences of this nature. Responsible personnel have a high opinion of the racks and expect excellent performance in the future.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil Interception encountered.

2. Nil E/A Planes destroyed.

3. No planes this Squadron damaged or destroyed.

e TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take off MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	0713/K
Arrive MITI IS.	1050/K
Attack AJOE IS. (Tertiary)	1515/K
Landed at base	1420/K

f. ROUTE

Out: Base Ajoe Is. Vicinity Cape Lelai (128° 40'E 01° 57N)
Miti Island.

In: Reciprocal.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

a. Group

The Group Formation led by the 500th Squadron consisted of the 500th, 501st and 499th Squadrons in number 1,2,3 positions respectively.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER was composed as follows:

First Flight		Second Flight	
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	A/P 591	*2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P 014
2nd.Lt.M.J.OPIE	" 016	2nd.Lt.I.A.MOSSER	" 164
1st.Lt.H.N.BUDDE	" 347	*2nd.Lt.C.E.BOYD	" 340

* Planes which turned back.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of attack.

On reaching the vicinity of MITI ISLAND, Lt.SALTER took interval behind the 501st Squadron and placed his flight in echelon to the left. He had rolled out of a right turn and was approaching the target from the S when he saw bombs bursting on the Island. He then saw B-24's high over the target releasing their bombs. Consequently he veered away and decided to circle until the "Heavies" had cleared the area before he made another attempt. However, the other two squadrons were heading out for base and rather than remain behind without fighter escort and with only a 4 plane flight for defense, he rejoined the formation. At AJOE ISLAND he placed Lts.BUDDE and MOSSER in echelon to the left and with Lt.OPIE on his right wing, he made a run on an unindentified plantation. All planes attacked at the proper height of 120'. The bombs were observed to burst in the plantation but since their were no targets of note in the plantation, the results were negligable.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

Nil.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.
Nil damage sustained.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission show no bases for recommendation of awards.

5. TABLES

See Inclosure #1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6. SIGHTINGS

On arrival at MITI 2 fires with black smoke up to 2000 feet. One of these fires from near the center of the island and the other at the NE part of the island.

A string of bombs dropped by B-29's hit accurately on NE part of MITI ISLAND.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Nil photos were taken.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incls:- 2

Incls 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Chart and Course.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A -L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No. Bombs Carried	No. Dropped	
591	6 Banks	5 bank s dropped	1 returned
016	6 Banks	3 banks dropped	3 salvoed
347	6 Banks	3 banks dropped	3 salvoed
164	6 Banks	1 bank dropped	5 salvoed

Total: 12 banks dropped.
11 banks salvoed.
1 bank returned.

Note: Each bank compri sed of 12 X 33 lb. para demo bombs.

No a mmunition was expended in strafing.


PACIFIC OCEAN
PITOS
GALELA
MITI
KAO
LOLOBATA
HALMAHERA
DROPPED HERE
AJOE IS.
DAJEI.
HALMAHERA
SEA
0°
0°30'
WAIGEO I.
DAMPIER STR.
NEW
GUINEA
SORONG
Mission FF0229-A-4
499th Squadron
Miti Airdrome
Arrive Miti Is.1050/K
Attack Ajoe Is.1315/K
Altitude: Minimum
Crews Report on Bombs falling
Map Ref? Aust.Air.Chart.

OK ORM 499 230-A May

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 929

18 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 230-A-1 performed on 17 August, with objective as HAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME, BOERON ISLAND. (127° 05' E 08° 15'S).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the 17th of August, the 499th, 500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group and one Squadron of the 38th Bomb Group, took off to attack HAMLEA TOWNSHIP AIRDROME. This mission was part of a coordinated effort against airdromes in the AMBON area which involved B-25's and B-24's. The B-25 strike on HAMLEA is considered a total success with the Airdrome and dispersal area thoroughly and efficiently covered with parafrag bombs.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished in the vicinity of MOMMER DROME as planned.

2. The Fighter Rendezvous at PISANG ISLAND was accomplished as planned.

c. ATTACK

Six (6) planes of this squadron led the attack approaching from the E and turning slightly to make a run over the Drome at a slight angle to the runway. The two flights went down on the deck when still several miles out to sea and approached low behind a ridge which fringes the coast E of the Airdrome. The formation topped the ridge and gained complete surprise. The formation over the target consisted of two, 3 plane "V"'s with the second "V" in echelon to the right, giving a six-plane front. Each plane carried 72 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs in the new R-2 racks. A total of 396 bombs thoroughly covered the NW half of the runway and the NW dispersal area.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The results were unobserved since actual targets were few. The airplanes were few and so well dispersed that they could not be spotted until too late to alter course for attack. However, a group of planes (approximately 6 planes) in the dispersal area just off the NW corner of the runway were possibly damaged by the second flight which flew directly over this area. The entire drome area was strafed with a total of approximately 7000 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition.

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil Interception occured.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in aerial combat.

3. Nil friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed in aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Island.	0850/K
On Course in Group Formation		0917/K
Fighter Rendesvous	PISANG ISLAND.	1100/K
TOT MAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME		1346/K
Group Rally	10 miles NE Mamlea	1500/K
Landed at base		1615/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE MANVI BAY BIRA VILLAGE (132°10'E 02° 10'S) PISANG ISLAND (131°30° E 02° 40'S) TARGET.

In : RALLY POINT JEF PELE IS. (136° 15'E 02° 15'S) E tip JAPEN ISLAND BASE.

2. PILOTS, PLANES AND FORMATION.

a. Group

This squadron led the Group Formation which consisted of the 499th, 500th and 501st in number 1x2, and 3 positions while one squadron of the 38th Group flew in number 4 position. The formation enroute was a box with flights javelin down.

b. Squadron

This Squadron, led by 1st.Lt.F.N.FOX was composed as follows:

First Flight		Second Flight	
1st.Lt.F.N.FOX	A/P No.055	1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P No.016
2nd.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	" " 591	2nd.Lt.LANDON	" " 892 (500th)
2nd.Lt.C.E.BOYD	" " 164	2nd.Lt.MACADAMS	" " 401 (501st)

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Attack

Lt.FOX led the squadron and Group at an altitude of 1500 feet and then pulled ahead, diving down to the "deck". He experienced difficulty in lining up on the target because of his low altitude, haze and slight ridge which fringes the coast to the E of the Drome. He echeloned the #2 flight to the right just before making landfall. By using this particular approach and low altitude he achieved the element of complete surprise, for not a single shot of A/A fire was directed at the formation. He began dropping his bombs at a point 1000 feet north of the center of the runway and strung all 72 bombs along his path which took him directly over the revetment area NE end of the runway. This run was executed as planned but no planes were parked in this area. His speed over the target was 245 mph and for this reason, three or four of his last bombs dropped in the water just W of the Drome.
Lts.JOHNSON and BOYD in number 2 and 3 positions respectively, made their attacks in close formation with the flight leader and each dropped 72 bombs in the same area covered by Lt.FOX.

Lt.FOX took slight evasive action while withdrawing to the SW over the water. He continued on across KAJELI BAY to CAPE WAOPOK where he began a slow turn eastward out of the bay. He made this wide turn to allow his second flight and the rest of the Group to catch up. At a point 10 miles NE of MAMBER he circled once to rally the Group and then took a course to base. Weather over VOGELKOP PENNINSULA necessitated a climb to 10000 feet and rainstorms and thunderheads S of NOEMFOOR ISLAND forced the formation to skirt around to the S over JAPEN ISLAND. From here, a direct course brought the formation to base.

Lt.NUNES led the second flight with Lt.LANDON of the 500th Squadron and Lt.MCADAMS of the 501st Squadron flying in the No.2 and 3 positions respectively. On the approach to the target this flight, flying at about 245 mph, swung to the right tocome up abreast of the first, but at this juncture the lead flight suddenly changed its angle of approach and Lt.MCADAM had to swing wide and climb fast to avoid being hit by Lt.LANDON's plane on his left.

This manuever caused him to lose ground and he was unable to regain his proper position until the squadron had pulled clear of the target. Lt.HUNES and Lt. LANDON, however, stayed abreast of the lead flight and each dropped his complete load of 72 parafrags in the target area. Lt.LANDON dropped one bank of 12 bombs in the vicinity of fighter planes but because of their speed, no accurate assessment of damage was possible. Lt.MEADAN, in spite of the fact that bomb fragments from preceding planes holed his ship in 2 places, managed to drop half his bombs in the target, the other half hanging up through failure in the bomb release mechanism. As the flight circled back to the east, the target area was seen to be covered with a solid blanket of white smoke and dust rising to about 500 feet.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Because of surprise achieved, no A/A fire was directed at this squadron. However 10 to 12 bursts were observed at an altitude of 800-1000 feet over the target. Also a few bursts were higher apparently directed at P-38's.

2. One crew member reported seeing the heavy A/A position at the W end of the runway. The position was definitely not firing.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND AERIAL COMBAT

Nil interception secured.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

1. Nil planes of this squadron damaged.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil injuries to personnel of this squadron.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for award or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

See Incl:No.1

6. SIGHTINGS

9 fighters and 5 camouflaged J/e bombers were seen on the Drome in the NW dispersal area. One of the 9 fighters was painted black, except rudder which was white.

1 pit containing 1 gun,probably medium, located in vicinity of N dispersal area. Exact location unknown.

Heavy gun position at N end of the runway was observed closely and definately did not fire at this squadron.

Nil shipping in harbor.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos #2-O-27,28,30,31,35, and 35.
Lead plane #033 1st.Flight - show parafrags bursting in excellent coverage in the NW Drome area.

Photos #1-O-9,10,11,12,16,& 17.
Lead plane#016 second flight show parafrags bursting among a group of 9 planes - 4 J/e and 5 s/e. 3 of these planes are definitely u/s. The serviceability of the others is questionable. Brush used as camouflage makes accurate assessment difficult. However the parking area show no signs of activity and brush growing around planes indicates that planes are non-operational at present.

Photos 3-O-55, 56.
Plane 591 #2 flight. - Show excellent coverage by parafrag bombs.

Photos 4-O-65,66,68,73,74.
Plane 592 - show parafrags bursting through planes parked in a wood overgrown area approximately 2000 feet NW of the NW end of the runway.

For The Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E.GOFORTH,
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2
" 1 Tables
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.bombs car'd.	Type	Weight	No.dropped on target
883	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72
891	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72
184	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72
816	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72
892	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72
893	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72

Total: 576 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.

ARMAMENT REPORT

No ammunition was expended on this mission.

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
883	K-21	20
816	K-21	20
891	K-21	20
892	K-21	20

Total: 180 K-21 photos taken.


BOEROE
ISLAND
396 Bombs
Flat Coastal Plain
3X
Lake
3W
2X
NAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME
2N
1X
1Y
NAMLEA
Cape Namlea
Cape Kabau
592
016
401
591
033
164
LEGEND
FRO 230-A-1
AUGUST 17,1944
899th BOMB SQUADRON
TARGET NAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME
T.O.T. 1246/K
TARGET AREA
TOOK PHOTOS
MAP REFERENCE NAMLEA TAR GET MAP 1,20,000

499
233-A
20 Aug 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

23 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 233-A-1 performed on 20 August,1944 with objective at KARAKELANG IS. in the TALAUD GROUP. (126° 50'E 04° 20'N).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 20 August,1944, 6 planes of this Squadron took off to attack reported weapon pits near RAINIS VILLAGE on KARAKELANG ISLAND. This mission was the longest (some 730 statute miles from BIAK ISLAND) flown to date. The 499th,500th and 501st Squadrons of the 345th and the 823rd Squadron of the 38th Group comprised the Strike Force. The 500th and 823rd. Squadrons were to strike BEO VILLAGE on the W coast. The 499th and 501st were to attack RAINIS VILLAGE on the E coast. All six planes of this squadron accomplished the eight hour and forty minute flight without difficulty. However, because of the lack of adequate target photographs and Maps, there is some question as to whether or not the target attacked was at RAINIS VILLAGE.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the water 10 miles SW of MOKMER DROME on course for the target.

2. No fighter rendezvous (no fighter cover provided).

c. ATTACK

Six planes, each carrying 12 X 100 lb. parademo bombs, reached KARAKELANG ISLAND making land-fall just above CAPE TOADOEWATA and turning S to attack along the coast from N toS.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

A total of 53 bombs were dropped in the area which all crews firmly believe to be just N of RAINIS VILLAGE. The results were not visible because of a heavy growth of coconuts blocked the view.
The description of the target area given by the crews does not seem adequate enough to definitely fix the place of attack. However the description of the surrounding hills, narrative of the attack route and withdrawal indicates that the target attacked was at RAINIS VILLAGE. Crews were interrogated closely on two separate occasions with the same result. It is unfortunate that photographs taken by this squadron fail to confirm or refute the claims. Since more concrete evidence is lacking, the point of attack must be left indefinite. If not at RAINIS VILLAGE, thencertainly within 10 miles to the S.
The target could not possibly be located N of RAINIS.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR.

1. Nil Interception.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged.

3. Nil friendly A/P's destroyed or damaged.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOKMER DROME Biak Is.	0700/K.
Over Target	KARAKELANG IS.	1109/K.
Landed at base.		1535/K.

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE ASIA ISLANDS (131°20'E 01° 5'N) to target.

In : TARGET -MOROTAI IS.-(128° 30' E 02° 50'N)
ASIA IS. -BASE.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. Group.

The Group Formation, led by the 500th Squadron, consisted of the 500th, 823, 499th and 501st Squadrons in number 1, 2, 3, and 4 positions respectively.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.H.N.SUMMERS consisted of the following:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.H.N.SUMMERS	A/P	#033	1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P	591
2nd.Lt.G.T.JOHNSON	"	335	2nd.Lt.H.H.BOYD	"	097
2nd.Lt.I/M.MOSSER	"	016	2nd.Lt.H.H.BUDDE	"	971

3. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK., MISSION

a. Attack

The Group flew to a point some 15 miles NE of the RAINIS VILLAGE and here the 490th and 823rd Squadrons broke off to cross the Island and attack, HHO. The 499th leading the 501st. Squadron turned S and crossed the coast near MANGGARAS Pt. (5 miles NW of Toadoewata Pt). Lt.SUMMERS led the first flight around a 1437 ' mountain and flew along the coast until he spotted a coconut grove containing sever al tin-roofed buildings. Thinking this to be RAINIS he dropped his bombs in the area just N of these buildings. The flight dropped 20 bombs in this area and strafed. Shor tly afterward a ridge made a sharp left turn necessary. This turn pla ced the flight over the water and in order to cut down on fuel consumption the remaining 16 bombs were salvoed. Lt.SUMMERS then proceeded toward MOROTAI ISLAND and found that he was some distance ahead of the other squadrons. Consequently he circled once and joined the Group Formation.

Lt.NUNES leading the second flight, took interval behind the first flight and attacked the same area attacked by the first flight. His run, however, was slightly further inland and the flights 35 bombs were dropped at buildings in the area. He also was forced to turn sharply to the right in order to clear the ridge. 5 bombs were salvoed by the flight. Several crew members reported seeing trenches along the coast but these were no more than defense trenches There were no M/G's or even wire in the area.

b. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil aerial combat occured.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Nil damage sustained.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

1. Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for awards or citation will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. SIGHTINGS

A Group of trenches along coast between BATANE VILLAGE and RAINIS VILLAGE. Trenches were zig zag type but no barbed wire or other obstructions. Another similar trench in approximate vicinity of BINALANG VILLAGE 8 miles North of target.

6. TABLES

See Incl. #1

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Only 3 cameras of the 6 dispatched obtained photos and these obtained are entirely inddequate to shed any light on theresults of the strike or the location of the target.

For The Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-1

Bomb Assesment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No. Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No. Dropped on target.	
033	12	100 lb.	Parademos	6	(6 Salvoed in wate)
335	12	100 lb.	Parademos	4	(8 Salvoed in water)
016	12	100 lb.	Parademos	10	(2 Salvoed in water)
591	12	100 lb.	Parademos	12	
097	12	100 lb.	Parademos	9	(3 salvoed in water)
971	12	100 lb.	Parademos	12	

Total: 53 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on target.
19 X 100 lb. parademo bombs salvoed in water.

Armanent Table

Plane No.	No. Rds. Car'd.	Wt. Rds. Fi'rd	Type
033	4000	1440	.50 Cal.
335	4000	1680	
016	4000	1200	
591	4000	960	
097	4000	1200	
971	4000	720	

Total: 6900 X.50 Cal. expended.

Photo Report

All planes were equipped with a K-21 Camera, however Planes #016 335 and 591 were only planes to take photos.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
234-A-1
QK 21Aug44
aRM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bomb Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bomb Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

23 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FPO 234-A-1, performed 21 August,1944, with objective at KAOE DROME, HALMAHERA Islands.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the 21 August,1944, the 500, 501st and 499th Squa drons of the 345th Group and the 823 Squadron of the 38th Bomb Group atta cked KAOE AIRDROME as part of a coordinated effort against the KAOE BAY area. The attack provided some basis for the assessment of information recently received from P.W.W.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished in the vicinity of MOKMER DROME.

2. The fighter rendezvous was accomplished at AJOE ISLA ND.

c. ATTACK

Five planes of this Squadron, 1 plane having turned back because of malfunctioning in the fuel transfer system, flying third in the Group Formation made their approach run over land leaving the water in the vicinity of DO RO VILLAGE and flying South on the deck to take a dvantage of the cover afforded by a five hundred foot range of hills which lie about 2-3 miles N of the airdrome. The approach was made a little too close to the shoreline, however, and the flight went around rather than over the foothills.
Each plane carried 72 X 32 lb. parafr ag bombs in R-2 racks, 3 planes bombing and strafing #1 Runway and 2 planes the area E of #2 strip, reported as containing a fuel dump.

A total of 216 parafrags were dropped in the #1 Runway area, many of these falling on and around approximately 10 SSF, which were subsequently recognised as cleverly constructed dummies. On the #2 runway area, 12 X 23 lb. bombs were dropped and 132 in the neighborhood of the reported fuel dump. In all 360 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped, but there was no specific damage observed. Since it is believed that the path of the second flight carried them slightly to the West of the area reported as containing the fuel dump, it is entirely possible that no bombs fell in this particular area.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in aerial combat.

3. Nil friendly A/P damaged or destroyed in aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take Off MOKMER DROME	0815/K
On Course - Group Formation	0830/K
Fighter rendezvous AJOE IS.	1028/K
TOT KAOE AIRDROME	1148-1150/K
Landed at Base-	1510/K

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE AJOE IS. ASIE IS. around E Peninsula of HALMAHERAS TARGET.

In : RECIPROCAL

2. PILOTS, PLANES AND FORMATION.

a. Group

This Squadron was third in the Group Formation which consisted of the 500th, 501st, and 499th(along with 823 Squadron of the 38th Bomb Group) in that order. The formation enroute was a V of 3's with flights javelin down.

b. Squadron

This Squadron was third in the Group Formation which led by 500th Squadron. Lt.J.A.SALTER led the Squadron formation composed as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	A/P	033	2nd.Lt.I.M.MOSSER	A/P	016
2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	591	*1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	347
1st.Lt.A.L.NILES	"	382	2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	"	164

* Returned to base.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Attack

At the I.P. (Approx. 10 miles NE of KAOE) Lt.SALTER attempted to take interval behind the #2 Squadron and make his run number 3 in the sequence of attack. However, the #4 squadron crowded him from the right and prevented his taking interval. Consequently he maneuvered the squadron under the #2 Squadron and pulled wide to take his interval and allow time to attain a proper interval. He placed his second flight in echelon to the right and with Lts.ALLENSON and NILES on his wings in #2 and 3 positions respectively, made his run over the target, #4 in the sequence of attack.
Lt.SALTER experienced difficulty in spotting the #1 runway and when he did locate it, he found a right turn necessary to line up with the strip. He easily made a right turn and rolled out in line with the runway. He began dropping his parafrags before reaching the N end of the runway and strung them through to a point just S of the N end. His bombs were observed to fall and burst but no targets were observed to be hit. Lt.SALTER continued his flight path over the Drome and straight out over the water. He made a slow 180° left turn over the water just S of KAOE and assembled the squadron. He then led the squadron past LOLOBATA, staying out of A/A range and joined the Group just N of LOLOBATA.

Lts.ALLENSON flew over the target on Lt.SALTER's right wing and dropped his bombs accurately along the W side of the strip. His bombs dropped directly among 3 or 4 SAP which he observed to be clever mock-ups. Had the planes been genuine, his bombs would have rendered each unser viceable.

Lt.NILE's run was along the E side of the runway where four of these dummy planes were parked. His bombs dropped accurately among these "dummies" with, of course, no visible damage.

Lt.MOSSER led the second flight (Two planes only)(Lt.JENKINS having previously turned back because of a failure in the plane's fuel transfer system). into the target area at about 100 ft. and began to toggle his bombs direct by barracks area in the center of the gardens to the E of No.2 runway stopping after he had exhausted his first bank at a point just past the buildings. The balance of his bombs were dropped in a continuous string running parallel to and approximately 1500 feet E of the runway commencing at a point about two-thirds the distance from the N end of the strip, trailing along through the area SE of the strip and termination the the N outskirts of KAOK Village. Lt.MOSSER STRAFED throughout his run.

Lt.BOYD flying on Lt.MOSSER's wing traversed an identical path but covered an area about 75 feet to the left of the lead plane. Lt.BOYD commenced toggling his bombs at a point about half way down and E of the runway and finished just NE of the town. The area in the path of this flight on the inland side, was thoroughly strafed, but as was the case with the bombs, no specific damage were noticeable.

b. A/A FIRE

Three or four bursts of heavy A/A fire were received from LOLOBATA AIRDROME on the approach to KAOK, but because of extreme range bursts were inaccurate falling short. Two heavy bursts were received at a point 4 miles N of LOLOBATA, these fell shor t by approximately 500 yards.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception occurred.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Nil planed damaged.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. TABLES

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Type	No.Dropped on Target
591	72	23 Lb.Parafrags	72
055	72	23 lb.Parafrags	72
382	72	23 lb.Parafrags	72
016	72	23 lb.Parafrags	72
164	72	23 lb.Parafrags	72

Total: 360 X 23 lb. Parafrag bombs dropped.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
591	4000	1680
055	4000	1440
382	4000	960
016	4000	1440
164	4000	1440

Total: 6960 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

Photos

All planes were equipped with K-21 Camera and took photos.

6. SIGHTINGS

On withdrawal from target, three or four Sugar Charlies and six or seven barges were seen concentrated in the W WASILE BAY area between the two piers. One crew member had glasses and states that the aft stacks were clearly defined. It could not be determined whether or not these vessels were all serviceable.

Most of #1 runway appeared unused, actually having a covering of weeds throughout most of its length. It is thought that fighters might possibly find it serviceable.

One black vehicle was sighted in what appeared to be a M/T park adjacent to a tin roofed building on a road about 3500 feet E of the #2 runway.

Three or four pits in the vicinity of Flakintel positions #4 and 5, E of the S end of #1 runway, had logs arranged to resemble guns. The exact position of the pits is uncertain but the guns were definitely dummies.

Directly over the target, at about 4000', 4 bursts of heavy A/A were seen. It is thought this was directed at the fighter cover, which had joined the attack.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos #9-0-220, 21,22,23,23, 24,25,26,26, 28, 34,35,36,37.

Lead Plane #033: Show parafrags bursting on and among a group of seven dummy SBF. These imitations are very skillfully done and would certainly be deceptive from any distance. Two apparently serviceable trucks and a native style building are shown in the latter prints of this series.

Photos # 8-0-176,77,84,85,90, 91, 96,97, 201,02,05,06.

Lead Plane- 2nd.Flight.

Shows parafrags bursting in area which is substantially that assigned. Indication would seem to be however, that the stick of bombs fell just to the W of the position assigned to the fuel dump.

For The Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: - 1

(1) Bomb Assessment Chart.


591
4033
382
124
OIL
12 Bombs
6X
5X
DJATI
IV
2V
72 Bombs
72 Bombs
9X
72 Bombs
72 Bombs
12X
DUMMY PLANES
60 Bombs
4X
3X
KAOE
BAY
KAOE
1X
KAOE
RIVER
Boela Pt.
FPO 234-A-1
21 August,1944.
KAOE AIRDROME
Time Over Target:1148-1150/K
Altitudes: Minimum.
Crews Report on Bombs Falling.
Took Photos
Ref: Target Photo Kaoe Drome
1/20,000

Photo #154

Includes 5 or 6 exposures on same frame. One hazy strip shows the burst of the bomb dropped by A/P #016 which was reported to hit in this position. Confirms claim of damage.

Photo #155

Shows 2 bombs dropped by A/P #164. One of which is possibly close enough to damage the hull.

Photo #156

Shows the OH a FTG (which was seen listing and smoke from a schooner type vessel, in the background. Possibly result of another Squadron's attack. Definitely not this Squadron.

Plane #340

Photos #9-O-175,176,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192.

Photos # 175 and 176; confirm report of bombing on an freighter in the BANGKA STRAITS. One bomb burst is so close that water on both sides of the bow. This is same vessel attacked by all squadrons in the BANGKA STRAITS but is heading 180° to original course.

Photos 9-O-185,186.

Photos confirm bombing of a 500 ton E/A freighter on the E end of the town. One bomb has crashed through super structure and hit within 10 feet of starboard side. Also show A/A firing from hill in background. 5 other smaller vessels in same area. One of which possibly damaged by 1 bomb burst.

Photos # 187 and 188.

Show the above vessels and 2 additional vessels near a jetty. Piles of lumber and logs. Several large thatch roof warehouse type buildings. A flagpole. One small building roveted.

Photos # 189 and 190.

Show bombs bursting at E/A freighter, A/A position on hill, several drums, numerous slit trenches.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on target
016	4	A/S Gas.	500 lb.	3 (1 returned to base.)
097	4	"	"	4
591	4	"	"	4
014	4	"	"	4
164	4	"	"	4
340	4	"	"	4
TOTAL:				2 (2 salvoed)

21 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on targets.
2 X 500 lb. bombs salvoed.
1 X 500 lb. bomb returned to base.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Expended.
016	4000	1525
097	4000	1525
591	4000	1855
014	4000	1060
164	4000	1525
340	4000	1890

Total: 9430 M.G. Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Planes 016, 014, 340 and 591 took photos, planes were equipped with K-21 Cameras. Plane 016 had K-20 camera, but camera was not used.

Photos # 191 and 192.

More comprehensive coverage of area. Personnel in slit trenches. Bomb Bursts entirely encompass E/A freighter. Smoke from smallcraft shown in photos of A/P #016.

Plane #014

Photos # S-O-157,158,167,168, and 170 of A/P #014.

Photos # 157, 158, 167, and 168.

Show attack on E/A freighter shown in many other photos. Possible damage.

Photo #170

Excellent view of LOMBEN STRAITS. Showing smoke from OIL, PTC and township. Smoke above top of peninsula from close proximity of S/C which was attacked by 5 planes and claimed sunk.

Photos Plane 097.

Photos 11-O-201, 206, 211, and 216. Show bombing of same E/A freighter in BANDA STRAITS by the 3rd. element of this squadron. Bomb shipped, shown in air. Also shows hole where 380th Squadron bomb entered on starboard side and hole at water line on port side where bomb emerged.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT R.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incls: - 8.
" 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Charts.
" 5 Route to and From target.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
237-

PK.
ERA 24 Aug

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

28 August, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 237-A-1 performed on 24 August, with objective a reported convey NW of MANADO (125° 15'E 1° 30'N).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. At approximately 1530/K on 23 August, 1944 orders were received to prepare 6B-25-D-1's for flight to C.SANSAPOR to remain overnight. At 1600/K word was received that the target was a convey but no position was given. Crews were hurriedly issued maps and fighter grids to cover entire operational area.
The destination was changed to NOEMFOOR ISLAND and at approximately 1750/K the planes departed. The strike was staged from here the following morning.
On the 24 August, six(6) planes carrying 4 X 500 4/5 sec.delay fuse bombs each, conducted the shipping sweep in the area N of MENADO. An "engines aft" freighter of probably 300 tons was found underway in the BANGKA STRAITS just S of BANGKA ISLAND and was attacked. Following this attack a successful attack was executed against shipping and shore installations in the S part of the LEMBEH STRAITS.
The results achieved are unusually excellent when it is considered that on "shipping attack", only 4 planes dropped a total of 9 bombs.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendesvous was accomplished just NW of NOEMFOOR.

The Fighter Rendesvous was not accomplished since Group flew S of rendesvous point to investigate report of shipping . However fighters were present in target area.

c. ATTACK

In the BANGKA STRAITS the squadron formed three, 2 plane elements, and attacked an engines aft freighter just S of BANGKA ISLAND. All bombs of the two leading squadrons with the exception oftwo very close ones, missed as did the first two planes of this squadron. However, the second element placed anear miss on either side of the freighter. The third element missed but observed the vessel to be breaking up on the port side.

This element also obtained photographs which show that hatch covers were blown off and also nearness of the 2nd.Flight's bombs.
The vessel eventually sank as a result of cumulative damage from bomb bursts of all squadrons and no definite claim can be established by this Squadron.
In the S part of the LOMBOK STRAITS a minelayer of the ITSUKUSHIMA class was attacked. 5 bombs were dropped and crews reported one direct hit just aft of amidships and 2 near misses (1 very near).
Photos show dimly the bomb hit near the stern and a near miss over the vessel. However, the 3rd. bombwas probably too far over to be effective. The bomb hit on the stern definitely damaged the vessel. Definitely damaged because of the location of the bomb burst and that on circling back over the area after the attack, the CM was listing 30 degrees to port and burning.

Approximately one mile S of the CM, a large Sugar Charlie of approximately 1000 tons was attacked by two planes scoring 2 direct hits (one amidships) and one on the stern. During a second pass over the target this vessel was seen burningand settling swiftly by the stern. This vessel was claimed as sunk.

Another plane attacked a boat which is probably the same boat as the large S/C attacked by the lead element.The following planes saw this bomb hit at the stern and the following explosion which blew off part of the hull. The planes then circled and observed the vessel to be sinking and burning, this is further proof that vessel was sunk.
An engines aft freighter of approximately 500 tons was attacked near a jetty in the N portion of the town. Two bombs were dropped, 1 short and a near miss of 30 feet the other crashed through the super structure tearing off debris in passing and came to rest approximately 10 feet over the vessel. Photos show these two bombs to lift the bow up in the water. Succeeding pictures provide grounds for claiming the vessel probably sunk. Two 500 lb. bombs dropped this close to this type of vessel would in all probability damage the hull to such an extent that the vessel would sink in short order.

6 bombs were dropped among buildings and warehouses in the township. Description of results include small fires and debris flung into the air. However, no specific results were observed. In the attack a total of 21 X 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay fuse bombs were dropped on targets, 2 bombs were salvoed due to malfunctions and 1 was returned to base.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil Interception secured.
2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in aerial combat.
3. Nil friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed in aerial combat.

e. Time and Location of:

Take Off	KOEMASOEMB DROME Noemfoor Is.	0800/K
Attack	BANGKA STRAITS	1210/K
Attack	LEMBEH STRAITS	1230/K
Landed	BIAKPOOR IS.	1615/K
Landed	BIAK IS.	1745/K

f. ROUTE:

Out: Noemfoer Is. Buli Bay (Halmahera) to point 80 miles E of Majoe Is. Banka Straits Lembeh Straits.
Int Lembeh Straits Kaoe Bay(Halmahera) Buli Bay Noemfoer Is. Biak Is.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

a. Group

The Group Formation enroute consisted of the 500th, 501st and 499th Squadrons in #1,2,and 3 positions of a "V" formation with individual Squadrons javelin down.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by Maj.RICHARD D.REINBOLD , Squadron Commander, consisted of the following planes and pilots:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major R.D.Reinbold	A/P No.016	1st.Lt.R.E.BUSHWORTH	A/P No.097
1st.Lt.H.H.BUDDE	" " 014	1st.Lt.H.E.MARVEL	" " 581
2nd.R.E.BOYD	" " 164	1st.Lt.A.L.MILES	" " 340

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. Details of the attack.

At a point approximately 60 miles E of BULI BAY at 0930/K a radio message was received stating that2 M/V's were located S of MAJOE IS.. A Course wasplotted to intercept these vessels but on arriving in this generalarea, rainsterms and a ceiling of approximately 500 feet precluded further search. This deviation from course prevented the scheduled rendesvous with fighters cover "Agate" "Thunder" 1, the Group Leader called Maj.REINBOLD (Thunder 5") and both agreed to proceed to the target after notifying "Agate".

On arrival in the area just N of the BANGKA STRAITS, the two lead squadrons began taking intervals and forming two plane flights. Accordingly Maj.REINBOLD retained Lt.BOYD on his right wing, sent Lt.BUDDE to pair with Lt.HILES and left Lt.RUSHWORTH to lead the third element consisting of himself and Lt.WARVEL.

Maj.REINBOLD followed #1 and #2 squadrons (500th and 501st) in the sequence of attack on an M/A freighter in the BANGKA STRAITS just S of BANGKA ISLAND. Maj.REINBOLD saw their bombs burst at distances varying from near misses to "clean misses". He and Lt.BOYD then attacked the freighter which was still underway each strafed and dropped 1 bomb however, both missed. Lt.BUDDE dropped 2 bombs which straddled the vessel and both bombs burst so close that the concussion turned the craft almost 180° to its original course. Lt.HILES did not release any bombs but both pilots thoroughly strafed the vessel. Lts. RUSHWORTH and WARVEL attacked immediately behind the second element and observed the port side to be breaking open. The vessel was also"dead"in the water. (Third element's attack below). The vessel eventually sank and on the basis that the 500th Squadron's photos show a hole in the port side, that squadron should get credit for the sinking.

After the attack Major REINBOLD saw the 501st Squadron turn left to the N and planes of the 500th Squadron attack installations on the N tip of GELASSAS. He led this squadron to the S and on rounding a hill he observed a PTC, A CL (actually a CM) and a SB (actually a large S/C). He immediately warned the following planes of the warship (thinking it a CL with heavy concentration of A/A guns). He prepared to attack and gave Lt.BOYD the choice of "sticking" or staying out of range. Lt.BOYD stuck. The first vessel (PTA) was listing and down at the stern and gave a generally w/o appearance. This vessel was avoided entirely. When approximately 1 mile away from the warship, Maj.REINBOLD pulled up sharply to approximately 1000 feet and then made a diving turn to the left. Just after this turn the warship fired a salve from its main battery and other guns. The salve passed to the right of the planes in the original flight path. Maj.REINBOLD and Lt.BOYD then began strafing, spraying the vessel from stem to stern which resulted in subduing some of the A/A. A formation of personnel had just broken up on the stern and individuals began running pell-mell forward. Major REINBOLD strafed them and carried his fire through to a point near the after mast where an object, which he thought to be a catapault plane, was located. He concentrated his fire on the object and crew members of both planes observed an explosion at this point. The flame from this explosion encompassed part of the personnel who halted and began running to the stern. They were strafed once again. Maj.REINBOLD released one bomb which the portside near the water line just aft of amidships. Lt.BOYD dropped 2 bombs both of which were long. 1 of these possibly caused damage. Maj.REINBOLD's bomb definitely did cause damage for during the circle over the area the CM was seen listing to the port side and a moderate sized fire was burning on the stern portion. Maj.REINBOLD continued the flight and attacked a large S/C which was located near a point of land at the S end of the Straits. He and Lt.BOYD each dropped one bomb. Maj.REINBOLD's navigator looked back over the tail and saw the bombs burst at the side of the ship.

The spray thrown up evidently contained oilsince the spray was a dark color, where in other cases the spray is white.During the circle the navigator and other crew members saw a fire burning and the vessel sinking rapidly by the stern.

Lt.BUDDE followed the lead element at quite some distance, he saw Maj.REINHOLD's attack on the S/S in the S part of the Bay, but he did not see the attack on the SM. Lt.BUDDE's initial attack in this area was on an S/A Freighter near the shore of a cove at the northern extremity of the town. He dropped two bombs which were observed to straddle the vessel very closely but no further sightings were made. However, photos show both bombs to be extremely close, so close that the destruction of the boat is almost certain. Lt.BUDDE strafed the township and then broke off theattack.

Lt.RUSHWORTH led the second flight while enroute to the target, but during the attack the squadron adopted a formation of three, 2 plane elements, Lt. RUSHWORTH leading the last unit. His first attack was on a Sugar Charlie just S of BANGKA IS. but his 500 pounder landed about 20 yards astern thus doing the vessel little or damage. No further targets were sighted until well into the LEMBEH STRAITS. Here Lt.RUSHWORTH flying "on the deck" made a bombing and strafing run on somewarehouses on the unnamed promontory at the extreme SE end of LEMBEH STRAITS. This time Lt.RUSHWORTH did not miss, scoring a direct hit on one of the warehouses, two near misses on another, and starting a fire accompanied by smoketo the height of 500-1000 feet.

Lt.WARVEL, wingman in this flight, made his first run on the same Sugar Charlie that Lt.RUSHWORTH attacked, and also dropped 1 X 500 lb. bomb, missing the vessel by 40 or 50 feet, likewise, inflicting no damage. Lt.WARVEL followed the lead plane down into LEMBEH STRAITS but he too was unable to get in a shot at another target until the group of warehouses were sighted.Lt.WARVEL aimed his bombs at the jetty adjoining the warehouses but although he missed it, he did a score a hit on the warehouses resulting in flamesand white smoke. He then proceeded across the straits and circling back over the S extremity of LEMBEH , dropped his remaining bomb on an unidentified native village (believedto be PARIMPANDJANG) again starting a small fire. Following this he broke off the attack and rejoined his flight.

Lt.WILES, flying #3 enroute, flew as Lt.BUDDE's wingman when the squadron changed formation for the attack. Lt.WILES dropped his first bomb atn high-stern,aft engined freighter lying just off a jetty adjacent to a large warehouse on the above mentioned promontory. His bomb was off the target and hit the warehouse area without observed damage. His second bomb was dropped on a heavily camouflaged vessel which lay just off-shore in proximity to the cape (thought to be S/S attacked by Maj.REINHOLD) and scored a direct hit resulting a terrific explosion and a large burst of flame.

The smoke was still rising as Lt.HILES pulled off over LEMESOS , a hill obstructing further observation. Lt.Hiles subsequently discovered that he had two bombs left but it was too late to make effective use of these and they were salvoed.

Maj.REINHOLD circled back over the S portion of LEMESOS STRAITS making observations noted above. During this circle the squadron reformed and then departed on course for base. Maj.REINHOLD notified "Agate" he was on course for base and further told "Agate" to pick up the other two squadrons which were to some extent split up. The return to base was without incident.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. Heavy, medium and light, intense and mostly inaccurate from the CM. Evasive action undoubt is responsible for the lack of casualties. As each manoever of evasive action was completed, the A/A burst passed through the path which the planes would have followed had they continued straight and level.
The following is a diagram of evasive action and the A/A bursts:



2. Medium, inaccurate from 2 small hills near the coast at the E end of the town.

3. Intense, light, accurate to inaccurate from several unknown points along the waterfront of the town.

4. A/A fire of unknown caliber was received from 2 points along the W side of the straits. Positions cannot be pin-pointed but one is located generally on the small peninsula of LEMESOS ISLAND at the S entrance to the Straits. The other was located 1½ miles to the NE on the coast of LEMESOS ISLAND.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil aerial combat.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

1. One plane sustained damage to 1 blade of the propeller from a small caliber projectile. Will necessitate prop change.

2. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil personnel of thisSquadron injured.

4. CITATIONS

A. Recommendations for appropriate awards will besubmitted for the crew of plane#016 and 014.

5. SIGHTINGS

4-6 F/P's mostly biplanes and 2/e S/P of Catalina Type near shore at central part of town on W side of LEMBEH STRAITS.

One Fox Tare Able just N of the OM. The FTA appeared rusty and had generally u/s appearance.

Many petrolcraft, barges and harbor brafts in target area.

6. TABLES

See Encl. #1.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Plane #016

Photos #7-O-148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156.

Photo # 7-O-148: Subject is E/A Freighter attacked in the BANKA STRAITS by all three Squadrons of the Group. These photos are poor due to mechanical failure in the camera. One bomb hit short and skipped over the stern, hitting again approximately 20 feet over, causing possible damage. 2 bombs dropped late both skipping. No possible damage. A close scruting revealss hole in the port side near the water line. One Jap hanging over the stern been apparently lifeless. One Jap clinging to side of vessel on the stern port side.

Photo #152: Shows OM with personnel scattered from bow to stern. Smoke from vicinity of after guns where explosion reported to occur as result of strafing. A triple barrel 25 mm A/A gun is manned on starboard side of the bridgehouse. Range finder on bridge. A S/L just forward of funnel. 3 large caliber guns probably 5,5 inch and 1,3 inch .



ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO: 237A-1 DATE: 8-24-44
345TH BOMB GROUP
499 BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1220
ALTITUDE:

-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-082



LEGEND

FFO 237 - A - 1
August 24, 1944
T.O.T. 1210 - 1220/K
Target Shipping in LEMBEH STRAITS AREA
499th Bombardment Squadron
Planes No 164 & 591 did not take photos
Other 4 planes did.
Map Ref MENADO, CE'EBES 1-200,000

499
242-
OR
ORN 29 Ag

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

30 August,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 242-A-1 performed on 29 August,1944 with Objective at KAOE TOWNSHIP, HALMAHERA Is. (127° 55'E - 01°11'N).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 29 August,1944 six (6) B-25-D-1 A/P's of this Squadron participated in a strike on KAOE TOWN. The attack was carried out, as usual, from low altitude. Three Squadrons of the 345th Group and one Squadron of the 38th Group comprised the entire strike force on this target. Even at the height of it's defensive fighter strength, the HALNA ERA ISLANDS Area never attempted interception and now that only two or three fighter planes are present, chance of interception was very small indeed. For this reason no fighter escort was deemed necessary. The mission is considered successful in every respect and the results achieved were commensurate with those expected from a target of this type. The flying distance of 1200 miles is average in the present time of extended ranges and far flung targets.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the water SW of MOKMER DROME, BIAK IS.

c. ATTACK

Six planes, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse parademo bombs, crossed the W shore of KAOE BAY in the vicinity of DORO Is. and approached the target from the N staying on the tree tops to prevent A/A observation as long as possible.

The bombing and strafing run was made from N to S. Since the target is very narrow and located directly on the shore line, flights of 3 planes each attacked in succession at approximately 40 second intervals. This squadron was number 2 in the sequence of attack. A total of 62 bombs were dropped in attack of which 40 were dropped in the town and the rest were dropped in the immediate vicinity of the town. In addition to the sixty bombs dropped, 10 were salvoed probably due to mechanical failure. Observation of results are inadequate to make an assessment of damage. The 8/11 second delay on the bombs allows planes to travel approximately ½ mile past the target before bombs explode. This distance coupled with low altitude and screening vegetation prevents accurate observation. Some debris was thrown into the air by bomb bursts but whether this debris was by parts of buildings or merely trash, is unknown. However the Town and adjacent areas were observed to be well covered by bomb smoke. Observation of the township during the attack indicate that the #1 Squadron damaged or destroyed several buildings. A tower near the KAOE jetty was thoroughly strafed by this squadron and the one man on duty was probably killed. This tower was similar to the one photographed at WASILEBAY near Pier "B". It is thought that the loading and unloading of barges or other craft might be supervised from such towers as these. Both towers were equipped with flag poles.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil Aerial Combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME Biak Is.	0743/K.
T.O.T.	KAOE Halmaheras Is.	1107/K.
Landed at Base.		1415/K.

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE AJOE IS. CAPE LELAI (N.Tip of E Penn. Halmahera Is.) to target.

In : Direct.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN THE STRIKE.

a. Group

The Group Formation led by the 501st Squadron consisted of the 501st, 499th, 500th and 823 Squadron in #1,2,3 and 4 positions respectively and attacking in that order.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by Lt.J.A.SALTER was composed of the following pilots and planes:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	A/P	591	1st.Lt.E.L.HUNES	A/P	164
2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	373	1st.Lt.A.L.NILES	"	161
2nd.Lt.J.M.TAFT	"	014	1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	347

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Attack.

Lt.J.A.SALTER with his two wingmen, Lt.ALLENSON and Lt.TAFT, spaced themselves behind the second flight of the 501st Squadron when just NE of DORO ISLAND. The second flight then took interval behind Lt.SALTER's flight. Lt. SALTER crossed the coast and flew on the tree-top parallel to the shoreline. He received no A/A fire and experienced no difficulties whatsoever in lining up with the target. He opened fire on the "GARDEN AREA" N of the town to test his guns. At approximately 2000 feet he opened fire on the N part of the town and strafed the town area from end to end. He then released all of his bombs in the N part of the township in a string just to the W of the jetty. However, only his first two bombs exploded, the remaining ten released but dropped "safe". Lt.SALTER observed no particular targets of importance - only the buildings and several of these were damaged. He continued over the target and pulled out over the water at BOLEO PT. He used evasive action until out of A/A range where he made a wide 180° turn to the left. The second flight joined during the turn and both flights proceeded N out of the Bay to the Group Rally Pt. E of MITI ISLAND. Here the Squadron tacked on to the 501st Squadron and returned to base.

Lt.ALLENSON, #2 on Lt.SALTER's right wing flew fairly close in this position during the attack. He dropped all 12 bombs in the same area covered by Lt.SALTERS. His bombs exploded however, on the W edge of the town, and probably did little damage to the buildings therein.

He broke off the attack with his flight leader and continued the flight in the #2 position.

Lt.TAFT, flying #3 in the lead flight proceeded along a course almost due S beginning his attack shortly after hitting the coastline about 1200 ft. above KAOE VILLAGE. He began dropping his bombs at a point just N of the jetty and continued along the coastline; toggling his final bomb in the area just S of KAOE, aside from numerous buildings, the only noteworthy object was a flat topped tower in the jetty area. Lt.TAFT, like the others, was unable to spot specific results.

Lt.NUNES led the 2nd. Flight in a path practically due N-S approximately 1500 feet E of the #2 Runway, strafing sporadic targets all the way from the garden area to the town. He began to drop his bombs as soon as he had entered the village proper, toggling at regular intervals until bomb supply was exhausted. Lt.NUNES's 12 X 100 lb. bombs covered the inshore extremity of the lower two-thirds of KAOE TOWN but no results were observed other than the bomb bursts themselves.

Lt.NILES, being unable to locate any worthwhile targets in his portion of the area covered by the second flight, spread out wide to the right and toggled his bombs in a compact string beginning at a point just S of the #2 Strip. Four bombs were aimed at what appeared to be two heavy A/A guns about 2000 feet below the runway and were seen to strike in the general vicinity of the position. No results were observed.

Lt.JENKINS, flying in the #3 position in this flight, made his run S through the center of the garden area E of the strip; across the road which parallels the coast about 1000' inshore, down the bay side of the village, and out over the water at BOLEO Pt. Lt.JENKINS dropped his first bomb on a couple of native buildings at a point about 1000' S of the garden area and his last two at a towerson BOLEO PT, The balance being dropped on intervening targets as the opportunity offered. One of these targets, the jetty on the upper third of the town, was definitely missed, the two bombs aimed at it falling harmlessly in the water. Lt.JENKINS topped off his attack with a strafing pass and bombing run on the tower at BOLEO Pt. As the case with all the other crews, no definite damage was observed.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT.

In general A/A fire was sporadic, inaccurate and entirely ineffective - firing a couple of bursts at each succeeding flight with out any serious attempt to concentrate on any one formation.

(Par. 3 B Cont'd.)

3 bursts heavy, inaccurate over water S of BOLEO PT. Bursts were high and trailing.
Over Target, 1 burst heavy inaccurate 3-400 feet high and 1000 feet to the left.
Slight inaccurate M/G fire from jetty in N part KAOE TOWN.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT

Nil Aerial Combat.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

Nil damage to own A/P's.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission provide no information as to any deed worthy of any citation or recommendation of any awards.

5. TABLES

See Incl/#1.

6. SIGHTINGS

1 crew member reports seeing a possible F/P opposite Doro Island. Sefinitely saw a red roundel painted on an apparent fuselage.

2 bursts heavy A/A seen over land 1½ mile NE of #2 Drome.

After leaving target, 3 bursts of heavy A/A at 3-400 feet above #2 runway. No positions actually seen to fire.

2 guns seen in pits in position 1W. Other pits were not observed.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos obtained are insufficient in coverage to assess damage but generally confirm crews reports of flight lines over the target. With the exception of two bombs dropped in the water by A/P #343, photos generally indicate accuracy of reports.

Photos A/P 591

4-O-82, 83 show bomb bursts and bomb smoke but little else.

Photos A/P #347

6-O-101, 102,107,108,109,114,122, 123,124.

Photos # 108 and 109 show 2 long trenches which terminate in a hexasonal revetment similar to A/A pits. Possibly C/D positions. No guns visible. Position is approximately 2000 yards due N of the jetty and close to the beach.

Photo #6-O-114 shows a partially loaded barge with an M/G mounted at bow. A watch tower, pile of supplies and nearby buildings probably used for storage.

Photos A/P 164

5-O-91-92-93 and 94., show area approximately 1500 feet SW of jetty and parademos dropping but little else.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PEG/rjl.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Tables
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	No.	No.Dropped on Target
591	12 X 100 lb.	Parademo	12	10 bombs dropped, safe.
014	12 X 100 lb.	"	12	
373	12 X 100 lb.	"	12	
164	12 X 100 lb.	"	12	
161	12 X 100 lb.	"	12	
347	12 X 100 lb.	"	12	
			12(2 bombs hit in water)	

Total: 72 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Carried	No.Rds.Fired
591	4000	2130
014	4000	1590
373	4000	795
164	4000	1590
161	4000	1325
347	4000	1590

Total: 9010 K.50Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
591	K-21	20
347	K-21	30
114	K-21	20
164	K-21	20

Total: 90 K-21 photos taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



FFO 242-A-1
29 August, 1944.
499th Squadron.
Target: Kaoe Township.
T.O.T. 1107/K.
Altitude: Minimum.
Crews report on bombs falling.
Took photos.

REF: Kaoe Target Map 1: 20.000

2 SEP 44

The balance of the unit being too far inland to do any damage. The pilot of the one plane in position attempted to toggle his bombs, but was able to release only two of them. He does not know why the balance failed to release.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

There was no interception of this squadron, but one of our aircraft attacked and drove off one of two ZEKES which had been strafing a plane from the 500th which had been downed in the water off BANGKA IS.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	0630/I	
T.O.T.	LEMBEH TOWN, Celebes.	1100/I	
Landed	MIDDLEBURG	1415/I	(2 planes)
Landed	BASE	1600/I	" "
Landed	KORNASOREN DROME, Noemfoor Is.	1530/I	" "
T.O.	" " " "	1600/I	(1 plane)
Landed	BASE	1630/I	" "
T.O.	KORNASOREN DROME " "	1935/I	" "
Landed	BASE	2005/I	

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE MIDDLEBURG TIFORE LEMBEH STRAITS.

In : Direct.

2. FORMATION, PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN STRIKE.

a. Group:

The Group Formation was led by the 500th Bomb Squadron with the 501st and 499th following in that order.

b. SQUADRON

This squadron was led by 1st.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON and consisted of the following pilots and planes:

Pilot	Plane No.
1st.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	033
2nd.Lt.R.A.PRENTICE	335
2nd.Lt.J.N.TAFT	034
2nd.Lt.I.A.MOSSER	097

3. DETAILS OF MISSION.

Details of Attack.

Lt.JOHNSON led the flight with Lt.PRENTICE ~~with Ltg.~~ PRENTICE and Lt.Taft flying in the #2, and 3 positions respectively and Lt.MOSSER in the slot. Following the Group Leader, the flight approached LEMBEH STRAITS from the S going into LEMBEH STRAITS from the S going into LEMBEH BAY from the MOLUCCA SEA. As the formation hit the bay, however, they were met by intense, heavy, and medium A/A fire from a C/M which at that moment was coming out of the bay. In attempting to skirt this fire - parafrags being entirely useless against such a target @ the flight was forced too far inshore and only Lt.PRENTICE's plane was in position to get his bombs on the target. He too, however, was unable to drop more than a few of his bombs owing to an unexplained failure of the load to release when toggled. Lt.PRENTICE was also unable to strafe effectively because of malfunctioning nose and packet guns but he did the best he could with those that would work. The flight continued N along the W shore of the straits and pulled up over TONGKOKO HILL at the far end of the run.

Lt.MOSSER, bringing up the rear, saw the 500th plane down in the water about 5 miles E of BANGKA IS. at the same time perceiving an enemy fighter heading in the same direction. Without hesitation Lt.MOSSER increased his speed and changed his course to intercept the enemy fighter, now definitely described as a ZEKE. As the ZEKE made a pass at the members of the crew now floating defenseless in the water, Lt.MOSSER made a pass getting in several bursts with his guns and probably scoring some hits. The ZEKE did not attempt to retaliate but continued on over the stricken ship breaking the attack. By this time LtMOSSER was running low on gas so, having called the group's attention to the downed plane's plight and having vainly tried to contact the rescue "Cat", he headed to base.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

Intense, heavy and medium A/A was received from the CM from the time the airplanes came into range until the time they cleared TONGKOKO HILL at the N end of the Straits. The field of fire was excellent for this vessel throughout the run. The planes of this flight were fortunate, the closest bursts coming no closer than approximately 100 feet to the rear.

Intense to moderate, medium and light fire was received from the known positions along the shore, one located about one-quarter of the distance from the promontory to end of the built-up area, an other about two-thirds of the same distance and a final position on the side of TONGHOKO HILL approximately two-three hundred yards inland and about 1/4 of the distance to the summit. This position especially was effective against planes attempting to top the hill, because of loss of speed consequent upon the climb.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

Lt.MOSSER (See 3 a. above) flying B-25 A/P No.097 attacked a single ZEKE while ZEKE was attempting to strafe the crew of a downed B-25. As the ZEKE dived at the crew in the water, Lt.MOSSER made his pass from 5 o'clock firing several bursts without observed results. As the ZEKE pulled up, Lt.MOSSER stuck with him firing several more bursts, this time observing some to strike home in the lower fuselage. The ZEKE then pulled off and raced away and Lt.MOSSER returned to the stricken plane.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO ~~OWN~~ A/P's.

One plane received a single machine gun hole with little damage as result.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

There were no injuries to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS

Lt.MOSSER and crew are being considered for a suitable award.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	No.Dropped on target
533	72	X.23 lb. Parafrags	Nil.Bombs returned.
535	72	X.23 lb. Parafrags	2 (70 Salvoed due to Mal.
214	72	X.23 lb. Parafrags	All bombs salvoed.
397	72	X.23 lb. Parafrags	All bombs salvoed

Total: 2 bombs dropped on target.
214 Bombs salvoed and 72 returned to base.

STRAFING TABLE

PLANE NO.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
014	4000	1680
097	4000	1680
033	4000	960
335	4000	1225

Total: 5545 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

Note: Plane #097 was only plane to take photos.

6. SIGHTINGS

1 warship (CM or DD) in S entrance to Lembeh Straits approximately 8055 (Map Ref: Menado 1/200,000).

1 E/A freighter in same general area.

1 large oil fire in Lembeh Town (possibly a crashed B-25).

1 B-25 make an excellent water landing approximately 5 miles E of BANGKA ISLAND (N of Lembeh Straits) 5 crew members seen in water. Plane sank in less than 2 minutes. Life raft was afloat.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Nil photos received, prints did not show any important information, therefore were not distributed.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PEH/rjl.

PAT E.COFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


Bangka
Ditched B-25.
Kupang
Straits.
499th Bomb Squadron
FFO 264-A-1
2 September, 1944
Lembeh Town
T.O.T. 1100/I
Altitude: Minimum.
Celebes
Lembeh Straits
Lembeh
Oil Fire
A/A Fire From This Area
Target Area
Area in Which A/A Fire Was Heavy
E/A Freighter
Warship
097
335
014
033

499
OK ORM
249-A
5 Sep 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

6 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 249-A-2 performed on 5 September,1944 with objective at DJAILOLO, HALMAHERA Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 5 September 1944, the 345th Bomb Group took off to conduct a strike against a new Airfield in the DJAILOLO AREA. The field was so new in fact that it's existence was not known until the latter part of August. The Airdrome was kept under observation for several days without sightings of airplanes on the drome. However, in the event that planes were actually there, airplanes were the primary target while personnel and stores areas were next on the target priority list. Two runs over the target were planned in order to insure adequate coverage of the target both from a photographic and a destructive standpoint.
Two runs over the target is an exception, to the surprise "hit and run tactics", but it was considered necessary in this instance because of a lack of adequate target maps and photographs. The general location of the airdrome was known but crews had the added responsibility of actually finding the target before attacking. The target was difficult to locate as anticipated but attacked successfully nevertheless.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the sea S of Mokmer Drome soonafter take-off.

2. No fighter cover was provided.

c. ATTACK

Six B-25-D-1's of this squadron took off to participate in the strike but one plane returned to base when the airspeed indicator failed to function properly. The five planes reached the DJAILOLO BAY area and being number two in the sequence of attack followed the lead squadron during the approach flying N over the E part of DJAILOLO BAY and taking care to avoid known A/A at DJAILOLO VILLAGE. The Formation cleared the hills along the N shore of the Bay at approximately 1800-2000 feet and then turned W picking up the LAMO RIVER which flows past the airdrome. With the river as a guide the formation continued to the W and saw the airdrome simultaneously with observation of the lead squadron's parafrags falling. The Squadron dropped 144 X 23 lb. parafrag and 24 X 100 lb. paradamo bombs most of which fell in the area E of the N half of the runway with a few bombs falling to the W of the runway. After the bombing and strafing run a 360° circle was executed around the mountain S of the airdrome and a strafing run was on an axis of attack almost identical to that of the initial run.
Results of both bombing and strafing were unobserved and few targets were seen. The entire area gave little evidence of activity which would be readily apparent if the airdrome were being used. Apparently the project was started with serious intentions of using the airdrome but the development before the intentions were realised.
The area willprobably bear watching but until further development is undertaken, other targets would undoubtedly be more lucrative.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil interception occured.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take-Off	MOKMER DROME	Biak	0730/I.
T.O.T.	DJAILOLO		1115/I.
Landed at Base.			1435/I.

f. ROUTE:

Out:
Base Ajoe Is. Weda Bay Djailolo Bay Target.

In:
Direct.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS, AND PLANES PARTICIPATING ON MISSION.

a. Group

The Group Formation led by the 501st Squadron consisted of the 501st, 499th, 500th and 498th in number 1, 2,3,and 4 positions of a diamond type formation.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES consisted of the following:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P	033	1st.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	A/P	591
2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	097	2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	555
2nd.Lt.J.N.TAFT	"	014	* 1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	"	164

* This was plane which did not reach the target and returned to base early due to malfunction of airspeed indicator.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

Details of attack.

Lt.NUNES maneuvered the Squadron into position behind the lead squadron while flying N of DJAILOLO BAY and as he began his turn to the W he placed the #2 flight into echelon and all 5 planes went over the target abbeast. Lt.NUNES and his right wingman crossed the area N of the N end of the runway. Lt.NUNE's left wingman passed over the N end of the runway and the other two planes over the S half of the runway. Lt.NUNES dropped all 72 of his bombs in the area to the N of the Drome. Lt.DRAPER's bombs failed to release because of a malfunction and they were returned to base. However he thoroughly strafed the area and scored hits on several huts which came under his guns.

Lts.TAFT, WARVEL and ALLENSON flew in that order on Lt.MUNN's left wing. All three were under the impression they had dropped their bombs on the N portion of the airdrome starting at the NE and trailing off at the LAMO RIVER on the W, but photographs of the runs indicate that practically all bombs were dropped E of the point reported, in the area between the hills and the strip. There were no targets on the strip itself and the bombs were dropped on the native huts.

After reaching the coast the second element dropped back into javelin down formation and Lt.MUNNS lead the squadron around and approached the target in the same manner as in the initial attack. Again the five planes passed over the target abreast and thoroughly strafed the area. The strafing run included the area between the runway and the coast. Several native type buildings were hit but the results were unobserved. The attack was broken off at the coast and the squadron resumed the #2 position, in the Group Formation and returned to base without incident.

B. A/A FIRE

Nil A/A fire received.
No gun pits were seen on either of the two runs over the target.

C. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil interception.

D. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Nil damage to A/P's of this Squadron.

E. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil injury to personnel of this Squadron.

4. CITATIONS.

No recommendation for awards of citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

5. TABLES.

See Incl. #1

6. SIGHTINGS

Runway overgrown with weeds.
Airdrome area appeared to be deserted with almost no indication of activity. No vehicles observed. No signs of work recently done.
No planes seen on drome.
After leaving target white smoke covering a good sized area but not rising to above 200 feet was seen in vicinity of target.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photographs show little information of value and do not warrant comment. However photos confirm crews reports as to condition of the runway and the lack of activity.

8. Due to the fact that suitable maps or photos of the area attacked were not available, no Bomb Assessment Chart can be made, however, 1 overlay of approximate area attacked and route is attached. (See Inclosure #2.).

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: - 2

Incl:-1 Bombing and Strafing Tables.
" 2 Overlay

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds. Fired	
591	4000	2640	200 rds. .30 Cal.
014	4000	1680	200 rds. . 30 Cal.
335	4000	1440	
097	4000	1440	
033	4000	2880	

Total: 10,080 X. 50 Cal.
400 X. 30 Cal.

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	No.Bombs dropped
033	72 X 23 lb. Parafrags	72
097	72 X 23 lb. Parafrags	All bombs returned to base due to malfunction.
014	12 X 100 lb. parademo	12
591	72 X 23 lb. Parafrags	72
335	12 X 100 lb. parademo	12

Total: 144 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.
24 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on target.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
033	K-21	30
097	K-21	25
014	K-21	30
591	K-21	30
335	K-21	30

Total: 145 K-21 Photos taken

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Map Ref: Molukken Islands 1-100,000.
Sheet No. 98 XV and 99 XV

FFO: 249-A-2.
Date: 5 Sept.1944.
Squadron: 499th.
T.O.T. 11115/I.
Altitude: Min.
7 Planes - Took Photos.



C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
250-A
6Sept44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

7 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 250-A-1, performed on 6 September, 1944, with objective at BUAYAN A/D, Philippines Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Attention of: A.C, of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL.

a. On 6 september, 1944 six (6) B-25-D-1's of this Squadron attacked BUAYAN AIRDROME and enemy installations in a town 3 miles to the west. The 499th Squadron was alone in attacking the drome but followed the 500th Squadron in the attack on the town, both attacks being pressed at minimum altitude. A single P-38 squadron furnished cover. The Squadron staged from MIDDLEBURG IS. taking off from base before dawn and land back at base late the same afternoon, logging in excess of 12 hours for the mission. The bombing was good and the photographs were excellent.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group rendezvous was accomplished over water off MIDDLEBURG Is., and Fighter rendezvous over the target itself.

c. ATTACK

Six planes, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse parademo bombs, followed the 500th Squadron N into DAVAO GULF, making a 90° turn inland just beyond the entrance. Picking their path through the mountains which here parallel the coast, the squadron headed SW to approach BUAYAN from the N. This approach was skillfully executed and the planes were well within the target area before receiving any A/A. The attack was made at tree top height, in two flights of 3 planes each.

A total of 70 bombs and 10,500 rounds of ammunition being expended. Of the bombs dropped, 54 were in the airdrome area and 16 were dropped in the town. Two bombs were returned to base.
At the airdrome, two hangars about 3000 feet E of the lower end of the strip, were definitely destroyed by a direct hits.
Photographs taken immediately after the bomb hit show one of these hangars consumed by fire. The second is contigous and constructed of such material as to preclude all doubt of its subsequent destruction.
Twenty minutes, after the attack a column of smoke 5000 feet high was seen in this area. Crewmen estimated the entrance to these two buildings to be approximately 40-50 feet wide indicating,almost definitely, their use as hangars. Bombs were dropped at trucks and planes in this same area without noticeable damage but it is believed that strafing may have resulted in some destruction. The A/A position,previously mentioned as an unreported 3 gun heavy position, has now with the aid of photographs, been pin-pointed as the known 4 gun heavy position at the water's edge almost due S of the runway. One of the guns in this battery was strafed and damaged tracers beeing observed to ricochet off the piece. On the second run over the town, 12 bombs were dropped on buildings N of the reported motor pool area scoring direct hits on several buildings and starting several small fires in addition to those already set by the bombs of the 500th Squadron.
The remaining bombs were dropped in the motor pool area without observed result.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil aerial combat .

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Initial Take Off	MOKMER DROME	0410/I.
Landed	MIDDLEBURG Is.	0540/I.
Take off	MIDDLEBURG Is.	0700/I
T.O.T.	BUAYAN AIRDROME	1050/I.
Landed	MIDDLEBURG Is.	1425/I.
T.O.	MIDDLEBURG Is.	1507/I.
Landed	MOKMER DROME	1637/I.

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE MIDDLEBURG AJOE IS. BUAYAN.

In : DIRECT

2. FORMATION, PLANES, AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING ON MISSION.

a. Group:

The Group Formation consisted of the 500th and 499th Squadron. The 500th led enroute to and from the target, each squadron going over it's assigned area as individual units/

b. Squadron:

This Squadron led by Lt.RUSHWORTH was composed of the following pilots and planes.

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.R.E.RUSHWORTH	Plane	033	1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	Plane	591
2nd.Lt.J.N.TAFT	"	014	2nd.Lt.R.L. SMELLEY	"	097
1st.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	"	335	2nd.Lt.R.A.PRENTICE	"	164

3. DETAILS OF ATTACK.

Lt.RUSHWORTH led the squadron across the target at minimum altitude aligning his plane with the runway on the approach. Perceiving no targets on the runway itself he turned off into the revetment area to the E of the strip, dropping his bombs in a string running from the near end of the runway across the revetment area exhausting his bomb load about 1000' from the river bank at a point just below the far end of the strip. Lt.RUSHWORTH strafed throughout the run endeavouring especially to hit the planes in this area but no actual results were noticed. He then proceeded out into SARANGANI BAY making a 180° turn where just out of A/A range, and coming back in to attack his second target. This attack was made on a NW-SE axis in order to cover both assigned areas. Since all bombs had been expended on the initial attack Lt.RUSHWORTH was limited to strafing. After thoroughly strafing the concentrated building areas, broke off the attack and headed out to sea.

Lt.TAFT, flying on the #2 position of the lead flight, followed his leader traversing an almost identical path but about 25-30 feet to the right. Two of his bombs were aimedat the trucks about 3000 feet SW of the hangars but damage was unobserved. The trucks were strafed, however, and tracers were seen to strike home. Lt.TAFT toggled the balance of his bombs through the revetment area without apparent result. Like Lt.RUSHWORTH, Lt.TAFT having exhausted his bombs on the first run, was forced to rely solely on his guns for his second attack. No noticeable damage resulted.

Lt.JOHNSON flew in the #3 position on his flight leaders left wing which placed him in excellent position to attack the hangars enabling him to score direct hits. He dropped 4 bombs on these two buildings setting them afire and causing subsequent explosions. As he pulled away from this area smoke was already reaching 2-3300 feet and personnel of the second flights planes witnessed a solid square of flames 20-25 feet wide at one end of the hangars. He dropped four more bombs in the airdrome area before breaking off to make the 2nd. run, but again no specific results were sighted. The second target area, Lt.JOHNSON added two more bombs to those dropped previously by the 500th Squadron on the buildings in the vicinity of the reported M/T pool. Both of these hit in the assigned area but because of fire and smoke made accurate observation impossible. The extent of the damage was not determinable.

Lt.TARANUK leading the second flight, covered a slightly different path than Lt.RUSHWORTH, approaching the target area at a greater angle, straightening out, and then heading almost due S. Failing to observe any targets worthy of bombing he wisely conserved his bomb load for the second run, contenting himself with strafing several native huts and a barge-type structure near the beach. On the second run, Lt. TARANUK dropped 8 bombs in the northernmost enemy concentration and 4 bombs in the area where the motor vehicles were reported as being concentrated. He also strafed both areas and the native huts enroute but because of fires and smoke resulting from attacks by the 500th squadron no accurate assessment of damage was possible. Several new fires were seen to have started however, as the plane was pulling off the target and out into the bay.

Lt.SMELLY, flying #2, on Lt.TARANUK's wing, concentrated his bombs in the area along the N half of the runway just about 50-75 yards E of the strip. He toggled 10 bombs in this area without observed results. At the end of his run he strafed one gun of the known 4 gun heavy position on the shoreline but again results were unobserved. He did, however, present the gun from being manned as the gun crew was observed lying prone in the pit as the plane passed over. On the second run, Lt.SMELLY dropped his remaining two bombs in the southern most portion of the area reported as containing some 75 small motor vehicles of uncertain usage. He strafed through the entire area, but here again accurate assessment of damage was impossible.

Lt.PRENTICE flew the #3 position on the 2nd.Flight. He came directly down the river bed on the right bank strafing the blazing hangars as he came in, concentrating on the W end because the other end was already burning furiously. He dropped four bombs just before reaching the hangars with unobserved results and although he saw the planes S of the hangars in time to drop his bombs he was unable to get his plane aligned soon enough, owing to a slight deviation from his flight path necessitated by the flames from the burning hangars. His eight bombs landed in the area between the planes and the runway about 25 yards from the aircraft and an equal distance from two trucks parked to the W of the planes. Lt.PRENTICE's side gunner strafed these aircraft in passing, with results unobserved. This waist gunner also strafed one of the guns in the 4 gun heavy battery on the shore-line S of the runway. Member of the crew observed his tracers ricochet off the barrel. Lt.PRENTICE made his second run without bombs, but strafed the assigned areas thoroughly.

b. A/A FIRE.

In general, A/A fire was nil on the approach; slight, light and inaccurate over the target; and intense medium and heavy accurate going away from the target.

Over the target the A/A was from M/G positions; 1. W of N end of the runway. 2. W of center of runway and about 500 feet SW of S end of the runway. Over the water S of the target in SARANGANI BAY intense, medium and heavy tracking fire was received two planes being shaken by bursts beneath the planes. Most of the bursts were to the rear the formation but some bursts ahead. The altitude of the bursts was accurate, only vigorous evasive tactics preventing more damage. The 6 gun heavy battery located on the shore approximately 7000 feet S of the runway is believed to be the source of most of this fire. On the end of the run, no bursts were seen over the target but flashes indicated M/G and 20 mm fire. The withdrawal witnessed a repetition of that from the first target with intense medium and heavy accurate fire from the same positions.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

One plane #591 was holed by flak in bombay and by m/g bullets in the right wing and horizontal stabilizer.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil injuries to personnel of this squadron.

4. CITATIONS.

Details of this mission provide no suitable basis for awards or decorations.

5. TABLE.

See Incl: #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

2 revetments just E of N end of runway were empty, the third contained fuel drums.

Runway serviceable but giving appearance that it is not used often or constantly maintained.

Several M/T's in supply areas S of hangars.

Several piles of supplies and buildings in wooded area S of hangars and along the river.

An E/A freighter or a S/C was seen blazing from stem to stern at Kamanga Pt. Probably result of P-38's attack.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

The pictures obtained are excellent both in quantity and quality and in general confirm reported results.

Photos A/P 035

2-O-36,37,43,44,45,46,48,49,54,55,57,64,65.

Photo #44 shows an apparently serviceable, heavily camouflaged, Sally. #48 shows two more planes just S of the Sally but neither of these appear serviceable.
Photos # 57, 64 and 65 show one bomb wasted as it explodes in the river.
Note: See following page for photos #36 and 37.
Photos A/P #014

1-O-11,12,13,14m, 19,20,23,24,27,28,29,30,34,35.

Photos #11-14 give excellent coverage of revetment area E of the center of the runway. Of the 5 revetments shown, the lower two each contain one biplane resembling the Dave and Val with conventional landing gear.

Both appear serviceable. A third revetment contains a gas truck. The contents of the remaining two are not disclosed.
Photos #19 and 20 show bombs of #033 bursting S of the southernmost revetment. The bombs closest to the revetment being still in the air. (See photos #2-O-36,37 taken by A/P 033, below).

Photos #36 and 37 A/P 033.

Photos #36 and 37 show bombs dropping in the vicinity of revetment area and reveal the presence of a third serviceable biplane in the southernmost of the 6 revetments.

Photos #23 and 24 show bombs bursting and two steam rollers both in good condition. 27-30 show a clear view of the control tower.

Photos A/P #335.

5-O-132-137.

Photos #132,133, give excellent close-up of the two hangars.

Photos #135, 137 show bomb of #033 bursting at open end of revetment apparently off one corner and outside the revetment probably doing little damage to revetted plane.

Photos A/P #691.

6-O-148,155,156,158,159,161,162,165,166,167,174.

Photo # 148 shows medium A/A position.

Photos #155-174 give excellent coverage of 2nd. area of attack, 3 miles W of Buayan Airdrome.

Photos A/P #097.

3-O-70-71,74,75,78,79,96,97.

Photos #70 and 71 show empty revetment adjoining river.

Photos # 74 and 75 show unserviceable airplanes.

Photos # 78,79,96 and 97 give overall picture of bomb bursts.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Photos A/P #164

4-O-105,06,09,10,12,13,15,16,25,26,and 127.

Photos # 105-116 show extent of damage to hangars and airdrome in general. In this respect it is worthy of note that no evidence can be adduced from the photos taken by A/P 335 to show that it's bombs set the hangars afire although this is a fact definitely established. Failure of a particular planes photos to reveal bomb hits is merely indicative, never probative.

Photos #125, 127.

These photos pin point the 4 guns heavy A/A position known to be in this area.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PEG/rjl.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

" 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Charts.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	Type Bombs Carr'd.	No.	Weight	No.Dropped
035	Parademo	12	100 lbs.	12
014	Parademo	12	100 lbs.	12
335	Parademo	12	100 lbs.	12
591	Parademo	12	100 lb.	10
097	Parademo	12	100 lb.	12
164	Parademo	12	100 lb.	12
			100 lb.	12

Total: 70 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Carried	No.Rds.Fired.
035	4000	1855
014	4000	2650
335	4000	1885
591	4000	1235
097	4000	1550
164	4000	1325

Total: 10810 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken

All six planes were equipped with K-21 Camera and took a total of 180 exposures. 3 planes were equipped with a K-20, photos were also taken with this type camera.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

6 September, 1944.
FPO 250-A-1
499th Squadron.
T.O.T. 1050/I.
Altitude: Minimum.
Bombs Dropped
Took Photos

Ref: Buayan (Mindanao Photo
A-2 Section V Rom Com
Photo 822-B.

014
033
335

6 September,1944.
Mission FPO 250-A-1
499th Squadron
T.O.T. 1050/I
Altitude: Minimum
* Bombs Dropped
T Took Photos

Ref: Photo 247-Z-1 Dadjangas to
Seroken (3 Sept.,44.



499
252-G
8 Sept 44
OK
aRM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

9 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 252-A-1 performed on 8 September,1944 with objective at GALELA A/D Area, HALMAHERAS IS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 8 September,1944, five (5) B-25-D-1 A/F's of this Squadron in conjunction with B-25's of three other Squadrons of the 345th Group, took off to attack enemy personnel and supply installations concentrated in the GALELA AIRDROME area. This squadron led the attack, the 498th, 501st and 500th following in that order.

A supplementary object of the mission was to obtain photographs of the two runways. Each plane carried 12 X 100 8/11 sec. delay fuse, paradamo bombs, all 60 bombs of this squadron being dropped in the drome area. With the exception of a damaged A/A battery and of several fires, results were generally unobserved. Photographs were obtained giving partial coverage of the strips but because of the angle of approach, these were necessarily not as complete as they would have been on an axis of attack more nearly paralleling the strips.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The group rendezvous was accomplished at an altitude of 1500 feet just off MOKMER DROME. There was no fighter cover.

c. ATTACK

In GALELA BAY NE of the target the squadron formed two flights, the first consisting of three, the second of two planes, the approach being made from E to W, following the N bank of the TIABO RIVER. On the attack the squadron made a 90° turn and came down on the target almost directly from the North.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The dispersal area immediately W of the No.1 runway was strafed and bombed, 9 canturies falling in this area, starting at least four fires which were accompanied by smoke to an approximate altitude of 700'. Ascending columns of smoke were still apparent in this vicinity as the planes were leaving the target. To the E of No.1 runway, 5 X 100 lb. bombs were dropped in a line extending on a 45° angle from a point 1/3 the way down the runway to a distance of 3000 feet without observed result. Just North of this area on the same side of the strip three, t/e bombers, one already unserviceable, were strafed, again without apparent damage.
One plane dropped two bombs on the 3 gun heavy A/A position (Flak Intel #2) about 1200 feet East of the S end of runway No.2 blasting debris high in the air. This, coupled with a thorough strafing is sufficient to indicate probable damage to this battery. In the area approcimately 2000 feet E of the S end of No.2 Runway, an unidentified motor truck was strafed and blew up. The balance of the bombs were dropped in the area between the No.2 runway and GALELA LAKE without any definite results observed.
The disparity as to disposition of bomb hits between here reported and those previously reported id due to incorrectly estimated flight paths on the part of three of the five crews interrogated. It should be noted that the specific results of destruction done remain unchanged only the relative location of the targets differing.

d. INTERCEPTION AND DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception occurred.
Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in the air.
Nil freindly A/B's damaged or destroyed as result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	MOKMER DROME,	Biak Is.	0729/I.
Attack	GALELA AIRDROME		1052-54/I.
Landed	BASE		1405/I.

f. ROUTE.

Out: BIAK IS. ASIA IS. S.MOROTAI IS. GALELA.

In : Reciprocal.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING ON MISSION.

(a) Group

The Group Formation enroute consisted of the 499th, 498th, 501st and 500th Squadrons with the 499th Squadron leading. The balance following in the order named.

(b) Squadron

This squadron led by Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH acting Squadron Commander, consisted of the following:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.W.E.RUSHWORTH	A/P	033	2nd.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P	014
1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	097	2nd.Lt.W.REEL	"	164
2nd.Lt.G.A.ALLENSON	"	335			

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

(a) Details of attack.

Prepartory to the attack, Lt.RUSHWORTH, leading the Group formed his unit over the water in GALELA BAY, approaching the general target area from the NE, cutting almost due E upon reaching landfall, then proceeding along the N bank of the river (Tiabo) until almost due N of the airdrome proper. Here he made a 90° turn attacking the target from N to S. As he came in Lt.RUSHWORTH strafed and bombed through the dispersal area 2500' W of No.1 runway starting a minimum of 4 fires and causing smoke columns to as high as 700 feet. This smoke was still ascending as the plane turned west to break off the attack. Lt.RUSHWORTH dropped 6 X 100 pounders in this area. His second specific target was a building which had the appearance of a machine shop or small hangar and though failing to bomb it he did manage to strafe it. It could not be determined whether or not any damage resulted from this attack. Two more bombs were dropped on the N shore of GALELA LAKE in the wooded area at the W end and the balance of 4 were dropped on the lake shore. Because of the thickness of the foliage on both sides of the lake in neither case could specific results be observed.
Upon reaching the S shore of GALELA LAKE, Lt.RUSHWORTH broke off his attack and headed out to sea, hugging BIG TARAKANI MT. to avoid the reported A/A to be SE of GALELA.

Lt.JENKINS, flying #2 position of the lead flight, flew close on Lt.RUSHWORTH's wing during the run over the dispersal areas on the N side of the #1 runway. He dropped 8 bombs in the area S of No.1 runway without results. When approximately half way through the run he saw the #2 gun heavy A/A position (Flakintel #1) firing. He turned sharply right and placed the position under fire. He succeeded in silencing the battery by strafing and he released his remaining bombs at the position. However, because he was in a turn at the time of release, his bombs were wide of the target (Note: This A/A position was reported by Lt.JENKINS to be W of #2 runway but further investigation has placed the position as noted above). Lt.JENKINS strafed the buildings on the shore of GALELA LAKE and then broke off the attack.

Lt.ALLENSON, flying in the #3 position, followed Lt.RUSHWORTH's path but in order to obtain maximum coverage of the runway with his camera, remained about 2000 feet on the flight leader's left. Lt.ALLENSON strafed three t/e airplanes on the E side of No.1 runway without observed damage. It was noted at the time however, that one of these was already in an unserviceable condition. Three of Lt.ALLENSON's bombs were dropped in the dispersal loop W of the N third of the No.1 runway, five in the area E of the center half of this same runway and his final four in the heavily wooded area on the N shore of the W end of FALELA LAKE. In none of these cases could he observe specific results. His bombs having been exhausted, Lt.ALLENSON then broke off the attack and started to follow Lt.RUSHWORTH out into the Bay. He did not escape without injury, however, for at this junction, his plane was holed by 20 mm A/A which burst directly under his seat, slightly wounding him and the navigator. Lt.ALLENSON maintained his composure and succeeded in catching up with his flight over GALELA BAY.

Lt.PALMER, leading the second flight with Lt.REEL on his right wing, made his run over the dispersal area without sighting a suitable target. As he crossed the center of #2 runway he spotted the A/A position which Lt.JENKINS strafed. He also strafed the position and released two bombs. Lt.PALMER's gunner reported the bombs to fall apparently on the gun pits. The bomb bursts threw up debris which the gunner believes to be from the gun positions. Lt.PALMER dropped his remaining ten bombs in the buildings area near GALELA LAKE without visible results.

Lt.REEL dropped his 12 bombs at intervals between the #2 runway and GALELA LAKE. One of his first bombs was observed to skip under an M/T and explode, resulting in the destruction of the vehicle. His results of his remaining bombs were not visible.

b. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

1. There was no fire received on the approach, indicating complete surprise.

2. Over the target 6-7 bursts of heavy fire were received from Flakintel Position No.1. No other bursts were sighted in the airdrome area but fire was moderate to intense, light and medium, accurate.

3. Leaving the E shore of GALELA LAKE, heading out towards GALELA BAY, just one of the planes was hit by a single burst from a 20 mm piece located at the side of BIG TARAKANI MT. The projectile entered first section of the window/entered the plane and exploded in the pilot's seat cushions. The angle of fire was almost perpendicular the flight path of the plane.

4. All of the foregoing fire was received at an approximate altitude of 100 feet.

5. On leaving the shore and while heading into the bay 5 white bursts were seen about 1000' over water below and behind the flight.

c. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Three members of this squadron sustained minor flesh wounds resulting from A/A fire.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

One plane #335 was hit by a 20 mm projectile, puncturing left window and destroying two seat sushions and cutting the cable of the command set.

4. CITATIONS.

Recommendations for the award of a Purple Heart will be submitted on the three members of A/P #335 who were wounded as a result of enemy fire.

5. TABLES.

See Incl: #1.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Ten to twelve fires of assorted sizes were observed as the planes were leaving the airdrome area. As the planes pulled out over GALELA BAY, a tall thin column of black smoke was sighted in the area between the two volcanoes. Apparently an oil fire, its cause was undetermined.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Plane No.033

Photos #6-0-124,5,6, 130,4,7,9,9, 144,5,155.

Photos 6-0-124,125 show an apparently serviceable t/e Lily in the dispersal loop W of the N end of No.1 R/W.

Photo #126 shows a second t/e Lily on the same area. it is prpbably serviceable.

Photo 130 shows an unserviceable transport "Topsy". This is located in the dispersal area just below the 2 t/e Lilys.

Photo 133 and 134 she bomb pitted strip with machine gun bullets evident throughout the area.

Photos 137-139 indicate little more than throughness with which this area was covered by machine guns fire. Wisps of smoke being observed throughout.

Photos 144-45 evidence old enemy ruse of employing simultated gun positions. Although effective in the deception of high altitude attacks and reconnaissance, it is of doubtful effect against minimum altitude missions.

Photo #154 gives indication of widespread damage wrought by bombing.

Plane #097

Photos #7-0-160,1,2,4,5. 179,180.

Photo #160 shows a destroyed t/e Sally and a probably unserviceable Oscar.

Photo 161-162 show an additional two t/e Lilys two SSF Sonys and a Zeke MKII, all being apparently serviceable.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Photos #164,165 pin point another Lily. It can not be determined whether or not this is serviceable.
Photos#179-180 cover a deserted gun position and several slit trenches.

Plane #555

Photos #5-0-94,95,102,103.

Photo #94 reveals another t/e Lily heavily camouflaged, preventing accurate assessment as to its serviceability.
Photo #95 reveals in addition to the t/e Lily a position of the fuselage of an unidentified SSF.
Photos #102 and 103 show one unserviceable Lily, one unserviceable SSF and a second Lily of undetermined serviceability.

Plane #014.

Photos #4-0-71,73,84 and 87.

Photo #4-0-71 reveals a heavily camouflaged Nick which is apparently unserviceable because of a damaged prop on the left engine, and a probably damaged under carriage.
Photo #73 again shows a bomb pitted airdrome with two more centuries enroute to make their marks.
Photo #87 again portrays the destruction resulting from this bombing attack.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2

Incl:-1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

PLANE NO.	NO.BOMBS CAR'D.	TYPE	WEIGHT	NO.DROPPED ON TARGET
164	12	parademo	100 lb.	12
097	12	"	"	12
335	12	"	"	12
014	12	"	"	12
035	12	"	"	12

Total: 60 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs dropped on target.

STRAFING TABLE

PLANE NO.	NO.MIS.CAR'D.	NO.MIS.FIRED.	
164	4000	1325	800 Fds.(50) Cal.
097	4000	1325	
335	4000	1060	200
014	4000	1060	
035	4000	1325	800

TOTAL: 5145 X.30 Cal. 1800 X.30 Cal. expended in Strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

Note: All five (5) planes were equipped with K-21 camera and took a total of 140 exposures.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


IRA RIVER
Tiebo RIVER
164
014
097
033
335
Runway No 2
Runway No 1.
8 September,1944
FPO 928-A-1
499th Bomb Sq.
T.O.T. 1052/I
Altitude: Minimum.
Bombs Dropped
Took Photos
Ref: GALELA PHOTO
(Mal Mission #728-A
N
Galela
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Lake

499
254-A
10Sept44
OK
ARN

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

11 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 254-A-2, performed on 10 September,1944 with objective, NAMLEA TOWN, Boeroe Island. (03° 15'S - 127° 07'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On September 10,1944 six airplanes of this Squadron participated in a coordinated strike on the NAMLEA AREA. The 345th Group led the attack striking NAMLEA TOWN and the 38th Bomb Group followed with a strike on OLD NAMLEA DROME. The mission can hardly be counted as success because of a large percentage of bombs dropped outside the target area by the 345th Group. The factors responsible for the error are discussed in detail under Panl c. below. The mission required seven hours, ten minutes flying time from take off to landing.

b. RENDEZVOUS

(1) The Group Rendezvous was accomplished on course 10 miles S of MOKMER DROME over the water.

(2) There was no fighter rendezvous (No fighter cover provided).

c. ATTACK

Five (5) B-25-D-1's and one (1) B-25-C-1, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. S/15 second delay bombs participated in the strike being number three in the sequence of attack. The first flight of 3 planes preceeded the second flight by approximately 40 seconds. The two flights took interval over the water E of the target and followed the flight path of the preceeding Squadrons and approached at the lowest possible altitude to prevent observation by A/A positions for the greatest length of time.

The axis of attack was from NE to SW. In the attack a total of 72 bombs were dropped. Of which only 14 fell in the target. A total of 56 bombs were outside the assigned target in the area between HAMLEA TOWNSHIP Runway and the N edge of the Town itself. Two bombs were dropped in the water W of the target. Unfortunately there were no targets in the area S of the runway and the bombs undoubtedly did little damage with the exception of the many small craters. The results of the bombs dropped in the town could not be ascertained because of the heavy pall of dust and bomb smoke which covered the area. The following factors, are considered to have contributed largely to the inaccuracy of bombing:

(1) The attack route should have been more from E to N than NE to SW and the initial attack should have been on the S part of the Town. This would have given better orientation with the S coastline as a guide, would have kept farther out of range of the heavy A/A guns N of the Drome, and would have allowed the following squadrons to take interval more easily. As it turned out the succeeding squadrons, in taking interval, turned N and this forced their attack route to be N of that flown by the lead Squadron. However, this could have been corrected except for "2" below.

(2) Very restricted visibility. A combination of low altitude, high speed, a terrific amount of bomb smoke and dust, and the fact that the target was located in a depression and could be seen at all, are responsible for the incorrect bomb run. The area covered by the bomb smoke was naturally taken for the target by this squadron and the approach was made accordingly. The 499th Squadron Leader noted the mistake prior to reaching the runway and turned left in an attempt a correction. However, only the #3 man of each flight crossed the N edge of the town.

Needless to say it is most important that the target be visible to planes attacking from low altitude because once a formation is committed to a run the axis of attack cannot be quickly and sharply altered. Prominent check points would suffice in lieu of actual observation of the target but here no such check points existed. Even the runway cannot be seen until almost directly underneath the plane.

After crossing the W shoreline the formation continued out into the KAJELI BAY at low altitude and when out of A/A range turned left and rejoined the Group Formation over the water E of the target.

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.

Nil A/P's this squadron destroyed or damaged as result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	1030/I.
T.O.T.	HAMLEA, Boeroe Is.	1407/I.
Landed	BASE	1740/I.

f. ROUTE:

Out: Base - E end of Maccluer Gulf - Daram Is. (02°S10' - 130° 55'E) Target.

In: Reciprocal.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS, AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

(a) The Group Formation led by the 501st Squadron consisted of the 501st,500th,499th and 498th Squadron in that order, in a "diamond" formation. Over the target the formation was succeeding flights of 3 planes each.

(b) This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES consisted of the following:

First Flight		Second Flight	
1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P 033	1st.Lt.H.H.WARVEL	A/P 097
2nd.Lt.R.A.PRENTICE	" 164	2nd.L.E.REEL	" 014
2nd.Lt.H.L.SMELLY		2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	" 812

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of attack.

Lt.NUNES maneuvered the squadron to adopt the proper interval behind the second flight of the 500th Squadron and according to SOP followed that flight over the target. With Lts. PRENTICE and SMELLEY in #2 and #3 positions on his wings he crossed the E shoreline approximately three-fourths of a mile N of CAPE KARBAU.

From such a low altitude he could see no identifyable points, but the bomb smoke ahead. He kept his flight low on the deck because heavy A/A was bursting over the runway. Just prior to reaching the runway, he saw that the bomb smoke and dust was over the area N of the target and he altered his course to bring his flight over the correct target. He flew to the S of the smoke but was unable to turn sufficiently to pass directly over the target. Lt.SHELLEY in #3 position passed over the N edge of the town and placed 8 bombs in the target. Lt.NUNES saw that he would miss the target and accordingly dropped his bombs in the only possible area - just S of the runway. Lt.PRENTICE dropped his twelve bombs in the same area. All three planes strafed where possible but without results. After breaking away from the target Lt.NUNE's gunner notified him of the A/A bursting to the left rear of the formation and Lt.NUNES accordingly did not turn until safely out of range. Lt.NUNES "Tacked onto" the second flight of the 500th Squadron which was for unknown reasons far behind the rest of the Group. The leading flights executed a 360° turn during which this Squadron and the second flight of the 500th Squadron joined the Group.

Lt.WARVEL, leading the second flight, followed the path traversed by the first flight, entering the cloud of dust and smoke just before getting to the strip. As soon as soon as he perceived the strip emerging through the dust, Lt.WARVEL knowing he would have little time to get his bombs away and not wanting to find himself off the target without having exhausted his bombs, began to toggle the 100 pounders. All of these landed in the area between the north third of the runway and the bay completely off NAMLEA TOWN, the assigned target. Because of the smoke and dust resulting from attacks of preceeding squadrons, it was impossible to observe results. Lt.WARVEL circled 180° to the left to join the lead flight.

LT.REEL flew in the No.2 position of this second flight and followed a path similar to his leader's but farther north. He dropped 10 X 100 lb. bombs on about eight, apparently serviceable, t/e bombers in the northeast dispersal area. He was not able to see the results. His last two bombs were dropped south of the far western corner of the runway, again without visible result/ It.REEL broke off his attack at the waters edge, following the lead ship out into the bay.

Lt.DRAPER on the left wing of the second flight saw that they were going to miss the town and so dropped his first six centuries in the north dispersal area just before he reached the runway.

His bombs trailed across the strip ending up at a point on the south side of the easternmost third of the runway. Lt.DRAPER's final six bombs were toggled in the area at the far eastern tip of the town. Several buildings on the extreme edge of the town were strafed by the waist gunner in passing, but due to the distance it is believed with little damage. At this point, Lt. DRAPER broke off the attack banking left to join his group.

b. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN COMBAT.

Nil interception.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

Nil A/P's of this Squadron damaged.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

e. A/A OPPOSITION

On approach to target 2 of the runway tracers cut across in front of formation but rapidly fell behind. 8 bursts probable medium at 100 feet (below formation) short and to rear.

Over the Drome at 1000 feet 6 bursts heavy A/A seen (above formation).

Over water just E of NAMLEA TOWN approximately 10 bursts of heavy at approximately 4000 feet. After leaving target 15-20 bursts ranging from 1500-2000 feet scattered over drome and township.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. SIGHTINGS:

At position 01° 50'S - 132°28'E from 1500 feet at 1610/I, 1 P-38 seen down. Parachute spread close to plane. Pilot not seen. Plane appeared to be in good condition. Surrounding terrain marshy but plane comparatively dry ground.

Over Target 1 B-25 of the 498th Squadron seen to pull up apparently to clear bomb smoke and dust. Plane pulled up into A/A bursts and was apparently hit for flame and smoke trailing from one engine. Plane then rolled over and crashed in N part of NAMLEA TOWN.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3-4 S/e planes in area N ofrunway of which 1 possibly serviceable. Revetments at SW end of runway were empty.

6. TABLES.

See Incl.#1.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photos obtained were generally obscure by smoke and dust and consequently few prints were made. Prints which were received confirm crews report of flight line and show the smoke and dust which caused the difficulty.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

Incl: 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Type	Weight	No.Dropped Target
033	12	Parademo	100 lb.	Nil
164	12	Parademo	100 lb.	Nil
197	12	Parademo	100 lb.	8 4 outside target.
097	12	Parademo	100 bl.	Nil.
014	12	Parademo	100 lb.	Nil.
812	12	Parademo	100 lb.	6 6 outside target.

Total; 72 X 100 lb. bombs dropped 14 of which were in target.

STRAFING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Rds.Carr'd.	No.Rds.Fired
033	4000	530
164	4000	1030
197	4000	1590
097	4000	795
014	4000	530
812	4000	100

Total; 4580 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

All planes were equipped with K-21 Camera, a total of 110 photos were taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

014
197
164
033
097
3V
4 Lakes
2V
NAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME
NAMLEA
1V
499th Bomb Squadron
FFO 254-A-2
10 September, 1944.
Namlea Township
T.O.T. 1407/I
Altitude: Min.
Ref: NamLea Target Map
1/20000

499
256-A-3
12 Sep 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

13 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 256-A-3, performed on 12 September,1944 with objective at GALELA, Halmahera Islands.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925,. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 12 September,1944, the 345th Bomb Group took off to attack enemy personnel areas in the vicinity of GALELA AIRDROME, Halmahera Islands. The plan of attack on this mission was in the nature of an innovation for it involved breaking the Group into two elements, each to approach the target from opposite directions and each to make the run at approximately the same altitude. A slender time interval between each run required careful synchronization on the part of both elements. One element, that attacking on a S to N axis, consisted of three squadrons led by the 499th, the other of a single squadron, the 500th, attacking from N to S.
The attack was executed as planned, negligible A/A fire indicated varying methods of attack are efficacious.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Group rendezvous was accomplished over the water S of MOKMER DROME a few minutes after take-off.

No fighter cover was provided.

c. ATTACK

Five (5) B-25-D-1's of this squadron participated in the attack, a sixth plane - after a delayed take off caused by "Snafu" bomb loading - having turned back at AJOE ISLAND when unable to catch the formation.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The five planes that reached the target area led the two other squadrons across the target from S to N as planned,one flight swinging wide to attack personnel concentrations on the West end of GALELA LAKE, and the other cutting sharply to the right to attack its target located on the SE shore of LAKE NGIDIHO. The formation flew between two 3000 foot hills, SE of GALELA.PLAIN, at about 1300 feet elevation, dropped behind a 650 ft. ridge, topped this and came down on the target. The attack was made at between an I.A.S. of 230 - 250 m.p.h. at an altitude between 75 and 100 feet. The squadron dropped 56 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse parademo bombs in the general airdrome area, and a good proportion falling in the assigned personnel areas. Because of the speed at which the area was covered, the nature of the terrain and the heavy foliage, results were generally unobserved, but several bombs were seen to fall in the water. The few targets that were visible as the planes covered the area, received a thorough strafing. There was little activity evidenced.

d. Interception and Airplanes Destroyed in Aerial Combat.

Nil interception encountered.

Nil A/P's this Squadron destroyed or damaged as result of aerial combat.

e TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	0806/I.
T.O.T.	GALELA DROME	1133-36/I.
Landed at base	4 planes	1550/I.
	* 1 plane	1550/I

* This plane landed at NOEMFOOR to refuel.

f. ROUTE:

Out: AJOE IS. GALELA BAY TARGET.

In: DIRECT.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING ON MISSION.

(a) Group

The Group flew in a diamond formation led by the 500th Bomb Squadron with the 499th, 498th and 501st following in that order.

(b) Squadron

This squadron led by Lt.PETER E.TARANUK consisted of the following:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P	197	**1st.Lt.H.K.PALMER	A/P	033
2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	014	1st.Lt.C.T.JOHNSON	"	373
* 1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	097	2nd.Lt.E.L.REEL	"	164

* This plane returned to base because subsequently unable to catch balance of formation after a late take-off because bombs were not loaded on time.

** Short circuit in fuel transfer system necessitated return stop at NOEMFOOR to obtain gasolene.

3. DETAILS OF MISSION.

(a) Details of Attack.

Lt.TARANUK broke off from the lead squadron just prior to entering GALELA BAY and headed S to approach the airdrome from the SE. After coming through the pass between the mountain at 1300 feet, Lt.TARANUK dropped behind a 600 ft. ridge to conceal his squadron from possible observers at the airdrome and eleminate A/A fire. Topping the ridge he came in upon his target at 240 mph at minimum altitude, bombing and strafing. Six bombs were dropped in the personnel area on the N shore of the western typ of GALELA LAKE and were seen to burst among the buildings right back of the shore. Lt. TARANUK proceeded north and bearing eastward dropped two bombs in the vicinity of some native huts in the area bordering the W shore of NGIDIHO LAKE. Bursts were observed but no specific damage was evident. After leaving this second area no further targets were observed and Lt.TARANUK broke off the attack and headed out into the bay. Here, he discovered that four bombs were still in the plane, and had to salvo them.

Lt.DRAPER flying right wing on the lead flight, made his attack on personnel area on NW shore of GALELA LAKE, dropping all his 12 bombs in that area, 2 of his bombs were observed to hit on the edge of the lake in the water, but others, were in the target, he also strafed the target heavily, but in either case was any specific results observed. Lt.DRAPER stayed in close formation during the entire run, consequently his route out was identical as that of the flight leader.

Lt.REEL, flying #3 in the first flight followed his leader, dropping his first two bombs on a native hut on the S shore of GALELA LAKE. He aimed his next six bombs at the buildings on the N shore and all hit home. In neither case, however, were definite results ascertainable. Being unable to find further targets, Lt.REEL was forced to drop his last four bombs just before leaving the coast N of the TIABO RIVER.

Lt.PALMER, leading the second flight, left the leader just after coming through the pass between the hills, and cut sharply northwards, hugging the volcanoes to insure proper orientation on the assigned target which lies at the foot of "Little Tarakani Mt." on the E shore of LAKE NGIDIHO. Four of Lt.PALMER's bombs were dropped on the N shore of GALELA LAKE just to the E of the watery extension which extends northward. He held the balance of his bombs until he reached the Buildings bordering NGIDIHO LAKE and all eight landed in this area. In no case were specific results observed.

Lt.JOHNSON flying on Lt.PALMER's left wing, followed through in close formation on the approach to the target, but after crossing GALELA LAKE and seeing no worthwhile target in his flight path , swung away from his flight leader and made an individual attack dropping his bombs at shacks and native huts on both sides of unnamed lake. No results of his bombing was observed. Lt.JOHNSON then "tacked on" his leader's wing and joined the formation for the return home.

b. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

As the planes left the airdrome area, five puffs of heavy black A/A were seen about 75-100 yards to the rear of the formation on approximately the same horizontal as the planes. Several flashes from machine guns located on the S shope of Big Tarakani were seen but no tracers.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

Nil A/P's of this Squadron damaged.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

No personnel of this Squadron injured.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. TABLES.

See Incl. #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

One serviceable small barge lying just off-shore at GALELA VILLAGE. One unidentified unserviceable t/e bomber in dispersal area W of the center of No.1 runway.
10-15 bursts heavy A/A observed to bracket 498th Bomb Squadron, over airdrome area at minimum altitude.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photographs reveal little of value. The area traversed contains numerous native huts and gardens, some of which are evidently still in good condition.

Photos #80-210 and 80-227 of A/P #164 indicate that at least two bombs landed in the water, one in the lake area another in the bay area.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

EDWARD T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No. Dropped on target.
197	12	Parademo	100 lb.	8 (4 salvoed in water)
014	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12
033	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12
373	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12
164	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12

Total: 58 X 100 lb. parademo bombs in target.
4 X 100 lb. parademo bombs in water (salvoed)

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd	No.Rds.Fired
197	4000	1855
014	4000	2385
033	4000	1060
373	4000	2120
164	4000	2120

Total: 9,540 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
197	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
033	K-21	30
373	K-21	30
164	K-21,	30

Total: 150 K-21 Photos taken.

Note: K-20 photos were taken, but no prints were received.



PFO 256-A-3
12 September,1944
499th Bomb Sq.
T.O.T. 1133-36/I
Altitude: Minimum.
X Bombs Dropped
All planes took photos

Ref: Galela Target Map 1/20,000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OK 499 aRN 261-A 17Sept4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

18 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 261-A-3 performed on 17 September,1944. Objective at BUAYAN AIRDROME, Sarangani Bay, Mindanao. (125° 15'E - 06° 10'N).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 17th September, 6 B-25-D-1's of this Squadron staging from MIDDLEBURG ISLAND, conducted a strike against A/A positions and installations on BUAYAN AIRFIELD. The purpose of the mission was to provide diversion for the 17th Reccoinaisance Squadron which was given the task of photographing the shoreline of SARANGONI BAY. The strike was timed and coordinated in such a manner that the photo runs would be made simultaneously with our strike.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The 499th and 17th Squadrons's rendezvous was accomplished enroute to the target. There was no fighter cover provided.

c. ATTACK

The attack was executed according to plans formulated by operations of each of the squadrons. On reaching a point approximately 10 miles S of Sarangani Bay the second element of 3 planes dropped back while the lead element of three planes cross the coast at minimum altitude. The six planes of the 17th Recco Squadron kept pace with the lead element at an altitude of approximately 500 feet above the terrain. These three formations flew N over the hills on the W side of SARANGANI BAY. In the vicinity of DUMPAO POINT, 2 planes of the 17th Recco broke off and turned E over the Bay and began the photo run ½ mile off the N shore of the Bay.

At the same time the lead element of this Squadron turned right and approached the target from W to E. The A/A, as foreseen, began firing at the photo planes which were at approximately 1000 feet, and did not observe our approach on the tree tops. The lead element began bombing and strafing soon after the heavy A/A battery (located approximately 3000 feet W of the BUAYAN RIVER MOUTH) began firing. Thus surprising and confusing the A/A gunners. The remaining four planes of the 17th Recco Squadron continued N past the break away, point and made a wide 180° turn and began a photo run with 2 planes on both the E and W shores of the Bay. The second element of 3 planes began its attack simultaneously with the beginning of this second photo run. Again distincting the A/A gunners. With only two A/A positions as targets a good portion of the bombs could not be dropped on these targets and consequently the wingmen were instructed to drop their bombs in the vicinity of the positions to add to the general confusion. Accordingly 50 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse parademo bombs were dropped around the Heavy A/A position and the area just to the North. Eight bombs dropped very near the heavy A/A position and 2 hit just outside the revetment walls. The remaining 10 bombs were dropped prior to reaching the actual target without visible damage. 4 small luggers at a pier W of the target were damaged by strafing and two houses were set afire in the target area. With these exceptions little actual damage was inflicted on the installations. However, the purpose of the mission, that of distracting the A/A was successfully accomplished. Had this diversion not been provided, the A/A would have been able to fire at leisure on the photo planes, which of necessity had to fly a straight course at 1000 feet and ½ mile offshore. In other words, "sitting ducks", for the A/A positions. All six of the planes, each of which carried a bomb load of 12 X 100 lb. bombs returned. Five of the planes dropped 12 bombs each but the sixth salvoed 12 bombs when the "pilot's release" switch failed to function. A total of 8,480 X.50 ammunition was expended in strafing.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

1. Nil interception occured.

2. Nil E/A shot down.

3. Nil Allied planes shot down.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	1430/I/16/9/44.
Take off	MIDDLEBURG Drome	0705/I/17/9/44.
T.O.T.	BUAYAN AIDROME	1044/I
Landed	Middleburg Drome	1440/I
Landed	Mokmer Drome, Biak Is.	1730/I.

f. ROUTE

Out: BIAK MIDDLEBURG IS. TARGET.

In : TARGET MIDDLEBURG IS. BIAK IS.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.F.N.FOX led the mission.

Pilots and planes of this Squadron were as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.F.N.FOX	A/P	373	n2nd.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	A/P	197
2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	014	1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD	"	340
2nd.Lt.E.L.REEL	"	033	2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	335

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

(a) Details of attack.

Lt.FOX approached the W tip of the mouth of SARANGANI BAY at approximately 1500 feet and placed his second flight in trail approximately one minute behind as planned. Lt.FOX, with Lts.DRAPER and REEL in the #2 and 3 positions respectively flew N skimming over the hills on the W shore of SARANGANI BAY at tree top height. On reaching the I.P. or "break away" point he turned due E and approached the target. He kept the flight low and used the large coconut plantation as a screen for his approach. He began strafing at the coconut grove but after only a few bursts, all eight forward guns jammed. Nevertheless he held his course and strung 12 bombs across the area just N of the Heavy A/A position. He observed no results of his bombing, for by the time the 8/11 second delay fuses detonated he was far beyond the target and low on the tree tops. As he was briefed, stayed low and continued E over the land and thus staying out of A/A range.

Then he turned S over the Bay "S" ing to rally the squadron. When the squadron had resumed formation he flew South out of the Bay and rejoined the 17th Recco Squadron S of the Bay. The return flight was without incident with the exception of his own crash landing at MIDDLEBURG Is. as given in detail below. (par. 3 d).

Lt.DRAPER approached SARANGANI BAY in a N westerly direction, and approached the target at minimum altitude up the western side of the bay several miles inland. Just prior to making a turn to the East and starting his pass one bomb was toggled on buildings with unobserved results. The pass was made about 1/8 of a mile from the waterline and the entire area was strafed and bombed. A/A fire against this plane was nil. A pier with 2 or 3 barges along side was noticed by crew members but were not strafed by this plane. Exact details of damage is unknown although 1 large fire was observed just east of the wharf. After target, Lt.DRAPER turned S and then west over the bay and out to rendezvous.

Lt.REEL, flying #3 in the first flight, followed his flight leader across the target traversing a path just about half way between the runway and the shoreline of SARANGANI BAY. When he reached a point slightly SW of the southern end of the strip, Lt.REEL toggled eight of his bombs on what he thought was an A/A position. No results were observed and his r emaining 4 bombs were dropped in the area SE of the strip between the river and the runway. Upon reaching the river and exhausting his bombs, he Lt.REEL,broke off his attack and circled to join the formation.

Lt.SMELLEY led the 2nd.Flight over the target. He spotted his first objective on the approach - two small vessels about 30' long which lay along side a jetty at DADIANGAS VILLAGE. As he strafed these, he released 2 X 100 lb. bombs but missed, the bombs landing on shore at the foot of the jetties with damage unobserved. Just before he turned to make his run on the assigned area, Lt.SMELLEY sighted what he believed to be a medium A/A position so he dropped 2 more of his bombs in the vicinity of the pits but no specific results were obtained and he thinks he missed. In passing he noticed that the position had all the earmarks of a dummy battery. Then in the attack on the assigned target, Lt.SMELLEY dropped the balance of his twelve bombs all in the vicinity of the known 4 gun heavy battery located on the beach directly S of the runway. The pit farthest inland, that is, closest to the strip was bracketed by 2 bombs, but since this pit did not appear to contain a gun, it is not certain that a piece was destroyed. After leaving this area he proceeded E crossing the BUAYAN RIVER and breaking off his attack.

Lt.ALLENSON flying #2 in the second element, made his run along the coastline and dropped all twelve bombs in a string starting at the Western edge of the coconut grove and extending to a point just S of the heavy A/A battery. He observed no visible results of either his bombing or strafing.

Lt.BOYD, flying #3 man, approached the target along the western edge of SARANGANI BAY 5 miles inland at tree top level. The turn into target area was made and the pass encompossed the lower south half of BUAYAN DROME. Bomb mechanism failed but the runway, adjacent buildings and the tower were thoroughly strafed as well as a personnel area, along the eastern shore line of the bay.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

Moderate, accurate M/G fire from scattered positions throughout the wooded area which extends along the W bank of the BUAYAN RIVER from the mouth to 1 mile inland.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

(1) A/P #373 piloted by Lt.FOX, crash landed at MIDDLEBURG ISLAND, when the left main gear collapsed on contact with the runway. The indicator did not function but visual checks by both pilot and engineer revealed gear to be in down position. As an additional precaution the co-pilot used the hand pumps. By skillful control the pilot hadd up the left wing and kept the plane from crashing until the speed had slowed considerably. When the plane came to final rest the jar was only sufficient to shake up the crew. However damage to the plane was extensive and salvage will be the only possibility.

(2) 2 planes were holed by M/G fire. One turret canopy and gun mounts were demolished by A/A fire.

e. DETAILS OF PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

(1) The turret gunner sustained hits on the back of his neck when his turret was hit by A/A fragments. Wounds not serious.

PATSY A.ROMANO 31174387 S/Sgt.

4. CITATIONS

S/Sgt.ROMANO will be recommended for the award of the Purple Heart.

Lt.FOX will be recommended for an appropriate award for exceptional skill displayed while participating in aerial flight.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

5. TABLES

See Incl: #1

6. Approximately 15 bursts of heavy A/A seen over target after leaving. Bursts were at approximately 1000-1500 feet and probably fired at 17th Recco planes.

A 2 gun A/A position (probably medium) located approximately 1 mile due S of the S end of BUAYAN RUNWAY.

1 possible A/A gun of undetermined caliber under camouflage netting near the southwestern-most tip of the coconut plantation which is SW of the airdrome.

At approximately 1010/I at 1000 feet at position 125°10'E 04° 50'N from distance of 15 miles one possible warship was observed. Object sighted was hazy and could have been a small island. However, objects seen which might have been supersturcture.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Camera switches were turned on prior to reaching the target, however, few photos reveal the fact that attack was made on upper part of Sarangani Bay as well as a few bombs hitting near the pier area reported to have been attacked.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

Incl:-1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart and Approach Overlay.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target
373	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	12
033	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	12
014	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	12
335	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	12
340	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	Nil (Salvoed)
197	12	Parademo	100 lbs.	12

Total: 60 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on target.
12 X 100 lb. parademo bombs salvoed.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
373	4000	?	
033	4000	1590	500 X.30 Cal.
014	4000	1590	500 X.30 Cal.
335	4000	1590	500 X.30 Cal.
340	4000	1855	500 X.30 Cal.
197	4000	1855	500 X.30 Cal.

Total: 8480 X.50 Cal.
2900 X.30 Cal. Expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Pictures Taken
373	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
335	K-21	30

Total: 90 K-21 Pictures taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


SILAWAY R.
MAKAR R.
Dulaggabang
Bulvan
Buayan R.
Buayan Pt.
Lapaguna
BAY
SARANGANI
BAY
GLAN
17 Recco
Attack Formation
Assumed Here
Rally With
17th Recco
FFO 261-X-3
Route Over Target
499th



Route To and From Target
499th Squadron Mission FFO 261-A-3


333
1
323
014
4 Past Target
6 Prior To Target
033
348
No Bombs Dropped
Bombs X
Took Photos T
Ref Buayan
(MINDANAO) 8x8
Mission #77 261-A-3
17 September, 1944.
499th Squdron
T.O.T.1044/I
Altitude: Minimum
X Bombs Falling.
T Took Photos
Ref: Buayan (Mindanao 8x8)

499
OK
262-A-4
18Sep44

C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

19 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 262-A-4 performed on 18 September,1944 with objective at LANGOAN A/D, Celebes Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 18th September, 6 B-25 airplanes of this squadron, 5 B-25-D-1's and 1 B-25-G-1, attacked LANGAON AIRDROME to prevent the escape of some ten enemy aircraft which had been left untouched by previous raids. These planes were believed concentrated in the NE dispersal area about 2000 ' from the runway and since reconnaissance revealed the runway to be under repair, it was feared that these planes would soon be able to take-off.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Group rendezvous was accomplished SE of MOKMER AIRDROME.
There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

The attack was not executed exactly as planned because of orientation difficulties experienced on the approach. The mountains, which would ordinarily have supplied reliable landmarks, were at this time cloud covered so that relative heights were indistinguishable and as a result the approach was made farther north than planned. Immediately upon entering the target area, however, the situation was correctly assessed and the planes were "racked" sharply around in time to be aligned on the assigned area. The flight paths of most of the planes just missing the southernmost portion of the dispersal area but completely covering the northern portion.

The formation, consisting of a lead flight of three and a second flight of two planes, cut inland from the MOLUCCA SEA just S of BENTENAN ISLAND and followed along the MOHALO RIVER going between MAWATAK and TEEP mountains. As they came out into the airdrome area they turned sharply E over the dispersal area and KAKAS Town out into LAKE TONDANO.
Three planes were probably destroyed in the northern portion of the southern dispersal loop of the assigned area when tracers were seen to hit all three . Of these, one was thought to be a Sally, one a Dinah and one was unidentified. One plane in this area was burning as the squadron pulled away. Another apparently serviceable twin engine bomber in the same area was believed possibly damaged when a string of parafrags dropped in its vicinity. However, no definite sighting was made on this.
Of the 348 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs carried by the five planes that reached the target, 300 were dropped in the general airdrome and village area, 12 were salvoed and 36 were returned, both latter cases resulting from mechanical malfunction. Of the 300 bombs dropped on the airdrome, 276 or about 90% fell in the immediate vicinity of the area actually assigned this squadron.
A total of 6280 X.50 Cal. rounds of ammunition were expended in strafing the airdrome and KAKAS VILLAGE.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

(1) One plane, failing to reach the target because of electri malfunction turned back in the MOLUCCA SEA area and about 1050/I when just off TERNATE sighted two SSF probably Tony's at about 1500 feet heading in his direction. Immediately the pilot dived to the deck and the Tonys climbed into the clouds after coming in to within 3500 feet. The Tony's were seen following the B-25 through occasional breaks in the clouds, but when 12 P-38's came upon the scene at approximately 1100/I in response to this radioed call for help, the Tonys began circling back. The P-38 radioed that both the B-25 and the target had been sighted and as the B-25 continued on its course, one P-38 was seen dropping its belly tank evidently in preparation for attack.

(2) Nil E/A shot down.

(3) Nil Allied planes shot down.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	Mokmer Drome, Biak Is.	0620/I
T.O.T.	Langoan Airdrome, Celebes	1037-39/I
Landed	Middleburg Is.	1330/I
T.O.	Middleburg Is. (1st.Flight)	1515/I
Landed	Base	1645/I
T.O.	Middleburg (2nd.Flight	1555/I
Landed	Base	1730/I

f ROUTE.

Out: Biak - Waigeo - Southern Penninsula, Halmahera Is. - Langoan.

In : Direct - reciprocal.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. The Group Formation was led by the 501st Squadron with the 500th, 499th and 498th Squadrons following in that order.

b. This squadron was led by 1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES. Pilots and planes were as follows:

	First Flight		Second Flight	
	1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P 033	1st.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	A/P 197
	2nd.Lt.R.L.DRAPER	" 014	2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	" 340
*	1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	" 809	1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	" 164

* Plane turned back just short of target because electrical system was improperly functioning.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

(a) Details of attack.

Lt.NUNES, led his first flight of three planes and a second of only two planes on the approach to the target, and an additional two flights from the 498th Squadron, brought up the rear. Owing to cloud cover on the mountain tops, Lt.NUNES was unable to select the proper route with certainty so rather than risk losing any of his planes, he decided to take the open route just N of the one planned. As he came onto the open area between the hills, he perceived that his path was taking him almost at right angles to his target and immediately swung his plane in the sharpest possible turn in order to properly align himself.

Just as his turn terminated, he recognized the southernmost part of the dispersal area just to his right. He immediately began to toggle his bombs but was not in time, the bombs falling N of the dispersal area believed to contain the serviceable planes. He then continued across the area, strafing as he went, until he reached the town of KAKAS. Here again, however, Lt.NUNES was a little too far N and succeeded only in strafing the NW portion of the village. No specific results were observed in either case. This time they were well out into LAKE TONDANO so Lt.NUNES cut to the E between the hills and headed for the sea. The flight back was without incident.

Lt.DRAPER, flying in the No.2 position of the first flight, followed his leader out and across the target area traversing an almost identical path but since he was on his leader's right he was in a far more advantageous position relative to the target than was Lt.NUNES. As he came in on the target he strafed 3 apparently serviceable t/e bombers dispersed in the NW corner of the lower loop simultaneously dropping his bombs in the same vicinity. Tracers were definitely seen to enter the planes and though it was not certain that the bombs missed, it is thought they dropped somewhat to the left.One of these three planes was a Sally, one a Dinah and the third was not identified. Lt.DRAPER strafed throughout the balance of his run but no other results were observed. He followed the lead plane off the target.

Although scheduled in the second flight, Lt.WILEY flew as #3 man in the first flight taking the place of Lt.JENKINS, the pilot of the plane which turned back. Because of the sharpness of the turn into the target area, Lt.WILEY was unable to line his plane up on the target and had to pass too far to the left as a consequence dropping his bombs in the revetment area on the opposite side of the road. He strafed continually from the time he straightened out over the area until he pulled out over TONDANO LAKE and managed to include the NW tip of KAKAS TOWN again, however, without visible result.

Lt.WARVEL, leading the second flight, could not see anything until he was on top of the target because of trees and effective camouflage in the assigned southernmost loop of the dispersal area. He did, however, observe several serviceable t/e bombers in this loop but could not change his flight path in time to do any damage. He also dropped his bombs to the left of the planes in the northernmost portion of the loop.

Lt.BOYD, bringing up the rear of the second flight followed a path substantially similiar to that of his flight leader, bombing and strafing the target and the town. In addition, Lt.BOYD strafed the inhabited area on the other side of the lake as they came off the target but in neither case were specific results observed.

(b) ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

Machine gun fire was received from the dispersal area itself, that is the loop E of the N third of the runway and in KOKAS VILLAGE. One plane was holed by this fire.

Ten to fifteen small puffs of white smoke were seen in the space between the two flights when the planes were in the area of the runway. These are believed to have come from the estimated serviceable position located about 2000 feet W of the N third of the strip at the turn of the road leading from the airdrome. The altitude was accurate.

(c) DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

One plane No.014 sustained minor damage when it was hit by M/G fire.

(d) DETAILS OF PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

There were no injuries sustained from this mission.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

See Incl. #1

6. Sightings

Unnumerable unserviceable planes of various types were spotted throughout the airdrome area, and the strip, though gutted, appeared to be serviceable. The town of KOKAS contained many European Style buildings which were still in serviceable condition. Several heads of cattle were sighted and many gardens were well kept.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos A/P #014 #2 First Flight

#10-0-253- Unserviceable probable transport.
#10-0-266 & 67:- Show parafrags falling and bursting through dispersal area E of N end of runway.
#10-0-69-10-0-70; 10-0-71 show same bombs falling and bursting as well as planes destroyed on previous raids.

Photos A/P # 345 #2 Second Flight

12-0-306,307,310,311,312,327,328: Parafrags falling at S end of runway also wrecked planes and S portion of runway to be absolutely u/s as result of bomb craters.

Photos A/P #164 #3 First Flight

Show no information of value not covered in the above photos.

GENERAL:

Photos confirm crews reports of flight lines. Photos do not show damage to planes reported probably destroyed. However, photos do not cover the eastern most portion of the dispersal area. Photos also show clouds obscuring tops of mountains to S which were planned landmarks and target orientation factors. In case of future low level attack these photos would be of great assistance in target orientation and recognition.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

Incl: 1 Bombing and Strafing Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart and Route to & From Target.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on target	
033	72	Parafrags	23lb.	60	(12 salvoed)
014	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72	
164	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	72	
197	60	Parafrags	23 lb.	48	(12 returned to base)
340	72	Parafrags	23 lb.	48	(24 returned to base)

Total: 300 X 23 lb. bombs dropped in target.
12 X 23 lb. bombs salvoed.
36 X 23 lb. bombs returned to base.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
033	4000	1060
014	4000	1325
164	4000	1325
197	4000	1060
340	4000	1590

Total:6360 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
014	K-21	30
340	K-21	30
164	K-21	30

Total; 90 K-21 photos taken.

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO 262-A-4 Date: 18/9/44
345th Bomb Group
499th Bomb Squadron.
Time Over Target: 1037/39/I
Altitude: Minimum




Airplane No's
340
197
014
033
164
Bombs 24
Bombs 48
Bombs 24
24 Bombs
2nd Flite
1st Flite
Bombs 24
Bombs 48
Bombs 24
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Bombs

499
263-A-2
1944
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

20 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 263-A-2, performed on 19 September,1944 with objective at SIDATE, A/D. Celebes Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 19th September,1944, four B-25-D-1's of this squadron took off to attack stores and personnel in the SIDATE AIRDROME area in the CELEBES, but because of a leaking oil system, one plane turned back, leaving but three to go on to the target. The oil leak, which first appeared to be minor subsequently developed major proportions and finally caused the left engine to cut out completely. This, coupled with the failure of the propellor to feather, necessitated ventual ditching but all personnel, after spending three hours in the water, were rescued by a Catalina and returned to base. The three planes that succeeded in reaching SIDATE, made two unopposed passes, dropping all their bombs and strafing the area thoroughly. Bombing was excellent and well over the requisite 50% of the bombs fell in the assigned area. Three other squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group participated in the raid, one squadron of P-38's furnishing area cover.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The group rendezvous was accomplished over the water SE of MOKMER DROME.
There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

Three planes, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse demolition bombs, followed the 500th Squadron into the target area but because of screening hills, the runway was not discovered until the planes were considerably south of their target, necessitating a sharp bank to the right on the approach.

The resultant lack of time in which to align themselves on the target not withstanding, the approach was skillfully executed and all but two bombs were dropped within the assigned target area. A total of 36 bombs were dropped and 5035 reunds of .50 Cal. ammunition were fired. All bombs were dropped on the first pass, but the squadron circled out to sea and came back in again this time to make a strafing run from S to N across the same area. Two bombs fell in the water just off shore on the first run, but all others fell in the area assigned. Two bombs fell on houses on the crest of the ridge about 2000 feet inshore from the center of the runway; ten fell along the road running through the personnel and stores area about 1000 feet inshore from the northernmost section of the strip; sixteen more fell within an area on the inshore side of the strip commencing with the hill crest on the S and ending with a point about 1/3 the distance from the N end of the strip; 4 bombs fell on the N end of the runway itself, and the remaining two droppeden the shoreline off the N extremity of the strip. Except for smoke and dust and three holes in the N end of the runway, definite results were not apparent.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil aerial combat occurred.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOKMER DROME	0620/I
T.O.T.	SIDATE AIRDROME	1058-1106/I
Landed	MIDDLEBURG Is.	1445/I
T.O.	MIDDLEBURG Is.	1550/I
Landed	BASE	1720/I

f. ROUTE

Out: Base Noemfoor Waigeo Halmahera Target.

In : Direct.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

(a) Group

The Group Formation consisted of the 500th, 499th 498th and the 501st squadrons in that order.

(b) Squadron

This squadron was led by Lt.P.E.TARANUK and consisted of one flight as follows:

1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P 197	2nd.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	A/P 097
2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	" 033	* 2nd.Lt.E.L.REEL	" 164

* This plane was ditched when left engine cut out because of leaking oil system.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

(a) Details of Attack

Lt.TARANUK led the other two planes of his flight to the target area following the path picked by the lead squadron but by the time the target was seen, this flight was already several hundred yards south of the runway and had to swing sharply to the right to line itself up on the assigned area. Despite the slender time interval allowed for proper orientation as a result of overshooting on the approach, Lt.TARANUK managed to get all twelve of his bombs within a radius of 1000 feet of the assigned personnel area lying farthest inshore from the strip. Six of his twelve bombs fell directly in the personnel area. Since no A/A or interception was encountered, Lt.TARANUK led his flight out to sea and circled back across the airdrome again, this time thoroughly strafing everything in his path. This last pass exhausted his ammunition so Lt.TARANUK broke off his attack and headed SW after the lead squadron.

Lt.SMELLY, flying the No.2 position in this flight, broke sharply to the right on the approach and came in over the target at tree top level about 225 IAS, following a path similar to his leader but about 500 feet to the right. The abruptness of the turn caused him to swing out to Lt.TARANUK's left making it necessary to fall behind slightly in order to cross back again prior to taking up his position to the right of his leader.
As he topped the ridge, Lt.SMELLY dropped his first two bombs on a couple of houses on the crest but due to the the speed while traversing his target, could not determine whether or not the bombs struck home.
On coming down off the ridge, Lt.SMELLY dropped his remaining 10 bombs along the road running through the center of the personnel area, but again without specific result. Like Lt. TARANUK, Lt.SMELLY had exhausted his bombs on this first run, but he continued around for a second pass on which he strafed over approximately the same route.

Lt.ALLENSON flew in the #3 position and came in on the target on the sea side of the flight. He dropped his bombs in a string beginning a few feet before the E dispersal area, trailing across the strip and ending up with his final two bombs dropping in the ocean just offshore. On his second pass Lt.ALLENSON strafed the assigned area covering the same path as the others and then broke off the attack. As in the other cases accurate assessment of damage was impossible because of extremely heavy plantings of coconut trees and speed with which the area was traversed.

b. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

There was no A/A fire directed at this squadron but two or three gun flashes were observed in the vicinity of the reported medium battery S of the strip and one small puff of white smoke was seen wide of the mark as the 501st Squadron passed over the area.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

No damage was sustained by A/P's of this squadron as a result of enemy action but one plane was lost at sea due to mechanical failure in the oil system.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

There were no injuries to personnel of this squadron. All personnel of the ditched plane were rescued.

4. CITTATIONS

Recommendations for suitable awards will be made for the pilot and navigator of the ditched airplane and for the crew of the B-24 which was instrumental in their rescue.

5. TABLES

See Incl: #1.

6. SIGHTINGS.

One SSF was seen in the dispersal area at the inshore side of the S end of the runway, one t/e bomber possibly serviceable was observed at the N end of the strip and a wrecked u/i plane was lying on the shore just off the N extremity of the runway.

The Runway was definitely serviceable.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Few photos received confirm crews observation and reports on the attack. The K-20 photos of surrounding terrain are valuable for target recongnition and orientation.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

Incl: 1 Tables
" 2 Bomb Assesment chart and Route to and From Target Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	Type Bombs	No.Carried	Weight	No.Dropped
197	Demolition	12	100 lb.	12
033	Demolition	12	100 lb.	12
097	Demolition	12	100 lb.	12

Total: 36 X 100 lb. demo bombs dropped 34 of which were in target/.

STRAFING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
197	2000	1855
033	2000	1590
097	2000	1590

Total: 5035 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No	Type Camera		No.Photos Taken	
197,	K-21	K-20	30 K-21's	20 K-20's
033	K-21		30 K-21's	
097	K-21		30 K-21's	

Total: 90 K-21's
20 K-20's

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-IA-L


MAPANGET
LEMBEH STRAIT
MENADO
LAKE TONDANO
AMOERANG BAY
Sidate
LANGOAN
499th Squadron
FTO 265-A-2
Target Approach Chart


499th Squadron
FFO 263-A-2
Route Overlay


A/P 033X
Ref: V Bom Com Photo 827-A
Sidate A/D.
PPO 263-A-2
19 Sept., 1944 - 409th Squadron.
T.O.S. 1056-1106/I
Bombs Dropped
T Took Photos
Minimum Altitude

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
28 FK B-2
23 Sep 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

25 September,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 267-A-2, performed 23 September,1944 with objective at SIDATE AIRDROME. Celebes Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 23 September,1944 five (5) B-25-D-1's of this Squadron took off from MOKMER DROME to attack personnel and stores in the vicinity of SIDATE AIRFIELD, but because of mechnical trouble three of these planes turned back, one making a forced landing for repairs at MIDDLEBURG before returning to base. The two planes which did manage to reach the target dropped well over 80% of their 24 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay parademes in the assigned area.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group rendezvous was accomplished SE of MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Is.

There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

With the exception of the fact that only two planes from this Squadron reached the target, the attack was carried through according to plan. The two A/P's of this squadron composing a single flight, formed the last element of the Group and followed the 500th Squadron into the airdrome area, the attack itself being made from WSW to ENE approximately paralleling the shoreline. In contrast to a similar attack on this same airdrome several days previous, this time little difficulty was experienced in correctly orienting the squadron on the approach and the planes had ample time to align themselves on the target a fact contributing no little to the accuracy of the bombing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Because of the heavy foliage covering a major portion of this area, accurate assessment of actual damage is impossible but judging from the number of bombs which fell into the outlined areas destruction should have been commensurate with the number of bombs dropped.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED.

(1) Nil interception.

(2) Nil E/A shot down.

(3) Nil Allied planes shot down.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

Take Off	WOKMER DROME	0600/I
T.O.T.	SIDATE AIRDROME	1016/I-1018/I
Landed	Middleburg Is.	1346/I
Take Off	Middleburg Is.	1522/I
Landed	Base	1650/I

f. ROUTE

Out: BIAK, WAIGEO, HALMAHERAS, TARGET.
In : TARGET, HALMAHERAS, WAIGEO , MIDDLEBURG, BASE.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

(a) The Group Formation was led by the 498th Squadron.

(b) The Squadron Formation was led by Lt.WARVEL and consisted of the following planes and pilots:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	A/P	197	** 2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	A/P	097
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	340	* 2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	767
* 2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	068	* 2nd.Lt.C.E.MARTIN	"	325

* These planes turned back at various points before reaching the target. All returned due to mechanical trouble.
** This plane did not take off when plane failed to pass preflight.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) Details of attack.

Following the path set by the three previous squadrons on the approach, Lt.WARVEL led his two-plane flight into the target area with Lt.WILEY flying on his right wing.

The target was traversed at minimum altitude at about 250 mph IAS in a WSW to ENE direction, Lt.WARVEL dropping 8 of his 12 bombs and Lt.WILEY all 12 of his within the outlined area, about 2000' in from the center of the runway. Both pilots strafed throughout the run breaking off the attack and cutting out to sea just beyond the E end of the strip. The remaining of Lt.WARVEL's bombs were dropped within the dispersal loop 400 feet N of the assigned target area. No specific damage was observed.

b. A/A FIRE

Slight, medium and inaccurate fire was received probably from reported medium positions. Four to five small white bursts were seen as planes left target, one approximately 200 yards before and three or four about 400 yards behind. Altitude of bursts was correct.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

No damage was done to either plane.

d. DETAILS OF CASUALTIES TO OWN PERSONNEL.

No injuries were sustained.

4. CITATIONS

This strike provides no basis for recommendations of awards or decorations.

5. TABLES

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Bombs Dropped
197	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12
340	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12

Total: 24 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped.
Note: 4 other planes returned all bombs to base.

STRAFING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired.
197	4000	1590
340	4000	1325

Total: 2915 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No.	Type Camera	No. Photos taken
340	K-21	30
197	K-21	30

Totals 60 K-21 photos taken.

6. SIGHTINGS.

One T/E bomber at E end of runway appeared ready to take off from serviceable strip at the time of attack. As the planes came into the area, there was a single oil fire with smoke to about 200 feet located approximately 500 feet inshore from the E end of the runway. It was still burning when the planes pulled off the target.

There were numerous huts and buildings seen through the coconut trees which cover this area but it could not be determined whether or not these were serviceable.

A heavily camouflaged barge over 50' long and another smaller one of unidentified classification were sighted near the shore of an unnamed bay on the E coast of the Celebes between HOKEMEA and BENTOHAU Is. (Approximately 01° 00'N - 124° 55'E).

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photo A/P #197

#12-0-306 shows that some bombs fell in the area off the E end of the runway rather than in assigned target.

Photos A/P 340

#11-0-273,274,289 indicate that bombs burst within assigned area essentially as reported.
#11-0-290 reveals two airplanes, both heavily camouflaged, at the intersection of the two dispersal area farthest E on the strip. One of these is definitely a t/e bomber apparently serviceable, the other appears to be a SBP of u/i classification. Its serviceability cannot be determined.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt.AIR CORPS
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-



Target Approach Map

FFO 267-A-2
499th Squadron
23/9/44
Sidate Airdrome



Mission FFO 267-A-2
23 Sept.,1944
499th Squadron
Sidate Airdrome
T.O.T. 1016/I Altitude: Min.
X Bombs dropped.
Both Planes took photos

Ref: V Bom Com Photo
Sidate Airdrome.



ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO: 267-A-2 DATE: 23/9/44

345TH BOMB GROUP

499th BOMB SQUADRON

TIME OVER TARGET: 1016/I

ALTITUDE: Minimum

N

-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GRN
499
275-A-2
10CT44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

2 October,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 275-A-2 performed 1 October,1944, with objective at BOLAANGOEKI, Northeast CELEBES and KAKAS VILLAGE IN THE VICINITY LANGOAN AREA as alternative.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 1 October,1944, six planes of this squadron took off to attack BOLAANGOEKI, Northeast CELEBES, with KAKAS VILLAGE in the vicinity of LANGOAN AIRDROME the alternate target. Just west of SANSAPOR one pilot was seized by an attack of stomach cramps and his plane had to turn back. After receiving medical attention at SANSAPOR, the pilot returned the plane to base without further incident. The five remaining A/P's went on to attack BOLAANGOEKI but in crossing the NE Penninsula wondered off the planned route and ended up at the W shore about 10 miles NNE of the primary target. Rather than make the approach from this position, they headed for KAKAS VILLAGE, attacking the alternate target.
On the return one plane remained overnight at MIDDLEBURG because of a malfunctioning primer in the left engine and returned to base the following day.

b. RENDEZVOUS

(1) The Group Rendezvous was accomplished on course over the water NW of MOKMER.

(2) There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

Three B-25-D-1's and two B-25-G-1's each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay parademos, approached the target from the SW dropping rapidly from a 3500 foot altitude on the approach to a minimum of 50-75 feet on the attack.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The attack was made in two flights at 40 second intervals, one flight consisting of three, the second of two planes. In the attack 45 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay parademos were dropped, 44 striking the N half of KAKAS VILLAGE and 2 dropping just off-shore in LAKE TONDANO. A church and several other buildings were hit and strafed, and considerable debris and rubble was thrown up. Clouds of smoke and dust were rising as the squadron pulled over the lake. That damage resulted was inevitable but it does not appear, in view of the damage inflicted by previous missions, that there was sufficient activity or serviceable installations in KAKAS to warrant continued attacks. The general unserviceability of the buildings in this village is corroborated by the low altitude photographs.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

(1) Nil interception encountered.

(2) Nil A/P's of this squadron destroyed or damaged as result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	0545/I.
T.O.T.	KAKAS VILLAGE	1111-1113/I
Landed	SANSAPOR	1415/I
T.O.	SANSAPOR (4 planes)	1625/I
Landed	BASE	1810/I

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE NOEMFOOR AJOE IS. HALMAHERA TARGET.

In : HALMAHERA SANSAPOR NOEMFOOR BASE.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

Group: The Group Formation was led by the 499th Squadron followed by the 500th, 501st, and 498th Squadrons in that Order.

Squadron: This Squadron, led by 1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK consisted of the following planes and pilots:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P	197	2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	A/P	033
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	876	2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	340
2nd.Lt.C.E.MARTIN	"	097	*2nd.Lt.C.A.ALLENSON	"	274

* Did not get to target - returned to base early.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of attack.

Lt.TARANUK led the 499th and 500th Squadrons approaching from the SW until opposite the target, than swinging to the right dropping down from an altitude of 3500 feet to the deck and traversing the village on an almost due E heading. Lt.TARANUK covered the N portion of KAKAS VILLAGE stringing his bombs from the inshore edge to the lake shore, his last two dropping in the water just beyond the town. Lt.TARANUK, also strafed this area thoroughly and, though specific results were not determinable, debris was seen in the air.

Lt.WILEY flying in the #2 position, followed his leader but was unable to release his bombs within the target area because of mechanical difficulties and has to rely on strafing alone.

Lt.MARTIN flew in the #3 position on Lt.TARANUK's left wing and, though he managed to drop ~~all~~ 10 of his bombs in the northernmost extremity of the village, he could not do as much damage as he might because only two of his guns were functioning, the remainder having jammed just prior to the start of the run. As in Lt.TARANUK's case, specific damage was unobserved.

Lt.BOYD, leading the second flight, made his run on the north portion of the village and dropped all 12 bombs in the town area. Flying debris, wrecked buildings and a considerable of black smoke were the only observed results. He also strafed heavily throughout his entire run over the target.

Lt.DRAPER flew right wing position in the second flight, and his results were generally unobserved except for the fact that all his bombs hit in the target.

b. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/C's.

One plane of this squadron #876, was apparently hit by a bullet from a machine gun or small arms for when just over the target, the turret gunner felt something crash against the side of his turret causing it to crack and tear off.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

One man of this squadron, the turret gunner, sustained minor injuries about the head and face when an unknown object, probably bullet, glanced off the side of the turret, and hit him in the face, cutting him in several places.

e. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE.

2 bursts of medium (grey-white) A/A were received when directly over KAKAS. One puff was about 300 yards behind the last flight, one about 200 yards before the first flight. Both puffs were at the same altitude as the planes. Automatic or small arms fire from unknown sources smashed turret canopy slightly injuring gunner.

4. CITATIONS.

The turret gunner, S/Sgt.MARTIN KARNEGIE, 31172955, will be recommended for the award of a Purple Heart.

5. TABLES

See Incl. #1.

6. SIGHTINGS.

One possibly u/i airstrip at approximately E 6785(Ref: Katamobagoe Sheet 1/200,000 Celebes Chart). Strip was approximately 3500 feet and appeared serviceable. This observation made by one crew member only. THIS SEEN FROM 3000' W/O FIELD GLASSES. OBSERVER WAS EXPERIENCED NAVIGATOR. SIGHTING BELIEVED MERE CLEARING.

1 large steel tower probably beacon, on PONDANG ISLAND, A.R. Nichols at A 0748 (Ref: Same Map as above). GROUP I O.

Two heavily camouflaged, apparently medium, A/A positions on side of unnamed hill NE of TOELIMEMBAT VILLAGE on SE shore of Lake Tondano. Two gun barrels could be seen plainly, however, breech and mount were hidden by camouflage.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photographs reveal little of value. The target area contains numerous native buildings with evidence of heavy damage inflicted in previous raids.

Photos 89,90, taken by A/P #197 and 143,144 taken by Plane #340 show what are evidently simulated gun positions. Partially camouflaged, shallow pits brought out by low level pictures show that guns are evidently dummy positions.

Photos 89 and 90 also show 2 bomb bursts in the water just off the target. These bombs were reported as such by the pilot of plane #197, from which these 2 pictures were taken.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2

Incl: 1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart and Route Overlay.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

BOMBING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Weight	Type	No.Dropped on Target
197	12	100 lb.	Parademos	10 (2 bombs fell in water
876	12	100 lb.	Parademos	Nil (All bombs salvoed)
097	12	100 lb.	Parademos	10 (2 salvoed in sea)
033	12	100 lb.	Parademos	12
340	12	100 lb.	Parademos	12

Total: 44 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on target.
2 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped outside target.
14 X 100 lb. parademo bombs were salvoed in the sea on return.

STRAFING TABLE

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired.	
197	4000	1060	600 Rds.30 Cal.
876	4000	1000	
097	4000	1060	
033	4000	1060	
340	4000	530	300 Rds.30 Cal.

Total: 4710 X.50 Cal. - 900 X.30 Cal. expended in straffing.

PHOTO TABLE

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken	Altitude
876	K-21	30	Minimum
197	K-21	30	"
097	K-21	20	"
033	K-21	20	"
340	K-21	20	"

Total: 120 K-21 Photos taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



Mission FFO 275-A-2 Kakas Village
10ctober,1944 -
499th Squadron.
T.O.T. 1111-1113/I
Altitude: Minimum.
● Bombs dropped
T Took Photos

Map Ref: Langoan Target Chart
1/20,000


ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
FFO: 275-A-2 DATE: 1/10/44
345TH BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1111-1113/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum
PUERTO PRINCESA
SULU SEA
MINDANAO SEA
BUTUAN
DEL MONTE
VILLAYBALAY
MINDANAO
MALBANG
COTABATO
DAVAO
ZAMBOANGA
SANDAKAN
TALAUD IS.
CELEBES SEA
GALELA
PITOE
MAPANGET
LANGOAN
KAOE
LOLOBATA
TERNATE I.
OBA
AJOE I.
EQUATOR
LABOEHA
OBI ISLANDS
SULA ISLANDS
BALABALAGAN
CELEBES
PARE PARE
KENDARI
POMELAA
SERAM
HAROEKOE
KAIRATOE
NAMLEA
BOETON
LAHA
AMAHA
LIANG
BOELA
PISANG I.
SORONG
SAMATE
MANOKWARI
KANIRI
SORIDO
NAMBER
MOKMER
BOROKOE
RANSIK
MOEMI
MONGOSAH
WAREN
BABO
OTAWIRI
SAGAN
UTAROM
SERUEI
NABIRE
TIMOEKA
DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-OPS.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OK
ERA
499
278-D
4 Oct 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

5 October,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 278-A-2, performed 4 October,1944, with objective at BOLAANGOEKI, N coast CELEBES and Secondary Target atTANDANO.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 4 October,1944, six (6) planes of this squadron took off to attack BOLAANGOEKI, Northeast Celebes. All six planes reached the target dropping their bombs and thoroughly strafing the entire area. Squadron landed at SANSAPOR to refuel then returned to base. One plane was seriously damaged due to a flat tire landing at MOKMER. Crew escaped without serious injury.

b. RENDEZVOUS

(1) The Group Rendezvous was accomplished on course over the water N.W. of MOKMER.
(2) There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

Four B-25-D-1's and two B-25-G-1's, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay parademes, approached the target area in two, 3 plane flights from the N.E. The squadron reached the W coast and continued out to sea just N of BOLAANGOEKI BAY circling S over the CELEBES SEA, simultaneously regrouping into three 2 plane flights for the attack. When opposite their target, the planes banked sharply to the left, came in on the S shore of the bay and then swung around again to the left and came in on the target from E to W flying parallel to the N shore. A left hand pattern was set up, with each of the flights making four passes on the assigned target area.
All 72 bombs were dropped at BOLAANGOEKI BAY but two were released at a large cargo barge lying in an inlet opposite the assigned area and four fell harmlessly in the water on the approach to the target.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The two bombs aimed at the barge scored a near miss and a hit. Since this vessel was not seen on subsequent passes over the S shore, it is believed to have been sunk. The remaining 66 bombs fell in the assigned area starting several fires, one in the warehouses and one in the sawmill, but damage for the most part was indefinite. An expenditure of machine gun ammunition in excess of 10,000 rounds coupled with the four passes indicate conclusively the thoroughness of the strafing.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

(1) Nil interception encountered.

(2) Nil A/P's of this squadron destroyed or damaged as result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME, Biak	0635/I
T.O.T.	BOLAANGOKKI	1110-1130/I
Landed	SANSAPOR	1430/I
T.O.	SANSAPOR	1800/I
Landed	BASE	1740/I

f. ROUTE:

Out: BASE NOEMFOOR AJOE IS. HALMAHERA TARGET.
In : HALMAHERA SANSAPOR NOEMFOOR BASE.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

Group: This squadron took off 30 minutes after the 500th Squadron who hit the same target.

Squadron: This Squadron was led by 1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER and consisted of the following pilots and planes:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.J.A.SALTER	A/P	#033	1st.Lt.I.M.MOSSER	A/P	No.014
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	836	1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	"	" 274
2nd.Lt. C.E.MARTIN	"	340	2nd.Lt.A.S.ALLENSON	"	" 809

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) Details of the Attack.

Lt.SALTER leading the 499th approached the target in a wide turn from SW around BOLAANGOEKI BAY and made his run from ENE dropping to minimum altitude on the turn. He dropped all of his bombs in 3 passes.

All his bombs hit in the target, hitting and firing 2 warehouses. On the 4th pass he also strafed barges in adjoining bay.

Lt.MARTIN flying in the #2 position followed Lt.SALTER and dropped all of his bombs in the target area strafing on all 4 passes as well. Specific results were not observed due to smoke and dust from the bombs, however, bombs were observed falling in or near the warehouses.

Lt.MOSSER led the 2nd. two plane element with Lt.ALLENSON flying wing. Both pilots made four passes in a pattern to the left, the initial approach being made from the sea. Each run was made by swinging out into the bay from the south shore and coming in on the target area from the east. On the first pass, Lt.MOSSER came in at about 230 miles per hour strafing as he attacked. He released two bombs at one of the buildings lying just inshore on the first promontory, both falling just off the end doing little damage. On his second pass Lt.MOSSER spotted a 50-75 feet barge of the large cargo type and dropped two more of his centuries, one scoring a near miss and the other either a very close miss or a direct hit. A spout of water and debris were seen lifted into the air and on coming around for the third time the vessel was no where to be seen. On this third pass, Lt.MOSSER was unable to release his remaining eight bombs and was therefore limited to strafing. Rather than waste the bombs he decided to make one more attack and just when it looked as if the bombs were again going to hang up, he succeeded in freeing them in the assigned target area. Damage on this final run was not observed and Lt.MOSSER broke off his attack and headed out to sea.

Lt.ALLENSON dropped all his bombs on the second run, most of these falling in the area between the string of four warehouses and the personnel buildings at the foot of the ridge. Specific damage was unobserved. With the exception of his third run when another plane got in front of him, Lt.ALLENSON strafed the area thoroughly on the balance of his attacks and then followed his leader out to sea.

Lt.WILEY and Lt.JENKINS formed the third element with Lt.WILEY leading and Lt.JENKINS flying wing. Lt.WILEY dropped all his bombs in the target area hitting the first two warehouses and starting a fire. He also strafed this area on all four passes but without specific damage. Lt.JENKINS dropped his first six bombs on the lumber mill but missed, however, he came back in two more passes, dropping the remainder of his bombs at this same target, finally starting a fire in the left wing of the mill. As the planes pulled off the target on the final pass, the flames were just starting to lick over the thatched roof.

Damage other than this was not apparent and Lt.JENKINS followed Lt.WILEY out over the water to join the remainder of the squadron.

b. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN A/P's.

One plane of this squadron #809 flown by Lt.ALLENSON was completely washed out on landing at home strip. One tire was flat and the plane left the runway about half way down the strip, tearing landing gear off when ti hit a shallow ditch, and finally skidding to a stop off the runway.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Only minor unjuries and shaking up of Lt.ALLENSON's crew.

e. A/A FIRE

Nil A/A fire encountered. One man thought he saw small arms fire from the target area.

4. CITATIONS.

No awards or decerations will be recommended as a result of this mission.

5. TABLES

See Incl. #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

One possible airstrip at approximately Z6206 (Ref: Katamobagoo Sheet 1/200,000 Celebes Chart). This was a grass strip and was observed by several crews. No planes or activity noted and it is believed that it might possibly be an emergency landing strip.

4 or 5 barges were seen in the bay adjoining target area. Brush fires on ridges across Celebes were also seen.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

A/P # 033

Photos #13-[illegible]-268,269 show four bombs bursting or about to burst in the vicinity of a building on the inshore edge of the outermost promontory, previously presumed to be a mill or shop.

A/P #340

The single photo from this plane reveals bomb hit on rear end of the first or second warehouse. It is not determinable whether this is a result of this or previous attacks.

A/P #014

Photos #119,120,122,123 illustrate clearly the wooden boat, building to which the enemy is reduced. The one boat in the foreground apparently closest to completion, has evidently suffered a hit on the port and the remaining two appear anything but serviceable.

A/P #836

Photos #128,129 indicate further the damage done to the enemy wooden ship program.
Photos #133,134 show fires in at least two buildings adjacent to the shipping ways.

A/P #274

Photos #92-95 reveal three bombs to have fallen short of the target and into the water. Indicated also is another building being consumed by fire.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt.,Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:1 Tables.
" 2 Bomb Assessment Chart and Route Overlay.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

&

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Dropped	
033	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	
836	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	
340	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	(4 hit in water)
014	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	(2 dropped at barge
274	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	
809	12	Parademe	100 lb.	12	

Total: 66 Bombs in target.
4 bombs in water.
2 bombs at barge

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
033	4000	1325	1200 Rds. .30 Cal.
836	4000	1325	400 Rds. .30 Cal.
340	4000	2120	800 Rds. .30 Cal.
014	4000	1590	1200 rds. 30 Cal.
274	4000	1325	

Total: 7950 X.50 Cal. - 3600 X.30 Cal. expended.

Phote Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos taken
033	K-21	30
836	K-21	30
340	K-21	30
014	K-21	30
279	K-21	30

TotaL: 150 K-21 photos taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



Mission FFO 278-A-2
4 October, 1944 - 499th Squadron
T.O.T. 1110-1130/I
Altitude: Minimum.
All Planes took photos.

Note: In as much as each A/P made 4 passes, the runs have been generalized and only approximate actual flight paths are shown. The bomb plots are none the less accurate.

Ref: Photo BOLAANGOEKI to VIC.LAIMPANGI BAY (8 Sept., 1944) 99-148

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO: 278-A-2 DATE: 4 Oct.1944
345TH BOMB GROUP
~~499th~~ BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1110-1130/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum



-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ark
ARRY
499
279A-3
500494

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 279-A-3, performed on 5 October,1944 with objective at concentration of buildings of unknown usage approximately 3 miles West of LANGOAN, N.E.Celebes.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.ATTENTION OF: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 5 October,1944, six (6) A/P's (4 B-25-D-1's and 2 B-25-G-1's) from this squadron took off from MOKMER AIRDROME to attack a concentration of buildings of unknown usage approximately three miles west of LANGOAN, N.E.CELEBES. One B-25 was forced to land at MIDDLEBURG Is. when engine trouble developed, and since it was decided that an engine change was necessary, this plane was unable to complete the mission. The remaining five planes continued on to the target, dropping a total of 34 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay parademos in the vicinity of the buildings. One plane was hit by A/A which disabled it's right engine and necessitated immediate withdrawal, one other plane accompanying it off the target. The three planes remaining made two passes each at the assigned buildings and then returned to base. Bombing was fair.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The group rendezvous was accomplished over the water southwest of BIAK ISLAND.

There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

The 5 planes of this squadron followed the 500th in the approach and came in from the southeast in two flights of three, the other of two planes.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

After coming through the pass into the target area they started circling in order to permit the leading squadron to clear the target but the area was found too small for such maneuvering so it was necessary to attack at once. The squadron therefore adopted a three flight formation, two 2 plane elements and one element of a single plane and went in on the target changing formation on the approach. At this time the lead plane was hit by A/A fire and one engine was damaged making it imperative to withdraw. Before leaving, however, the stricken plane strafed the target and released 4 bombs, then continued west off the target, followed by the No.2 plane acting as escort. The other 3 planes each made two passes dropping 30 bombs around the L shaped buildings, scoring hits with at least 4 bombs and starting fires at each end. Bomb craters were observed in the roof but in view of the fact that these fires were no longer visible at the time the last plane left the area it is doubtful that the buildings were destroyed. Both these buildings and the farmhouse behind were thoroughly strafed but on the whole, the target would not appear worth the effort and ammunition expended.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. Nil interception occurred.

2. Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in aerial combat.

3. Nil friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed in aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off	MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Is.	0540/I
T.O.T.	Buildings W of Langoan	1015-20/I
Land	SANSAPOR	1340/I
Take Off	SANSAPOR	1405/I
Landed	BASE	1550/I

f. ROUTE

Out: WAIGEO IS. HALMAHERA IS. TARGET.
In : HALMAHERA IS. WAIGEO IS. SANSAPOR BASE.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING.

(a) Group:

The group formation enroute consisted of two squadrons in "V" Formationjavelin down, the 500th leading the 499th.

(b) Squadron:

This squadron was led by 1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES, and consisted of the following planes and pilots:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.E.L.NUNES	A/P	No.033	1st.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	A/P	197
2nd.Lt.J.C.RIEKE	"	" 274	2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	"	340
2nd.Lt.M.J.OPIE	"	" 836	2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	876

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of the attack.

The five B-25's that reached the target followed the 500th squadron into the target area but were unable to hold back their attack until the 500th cleared the target because of insufficient space to circle. For this reason they had to reform into two plane elements and go into the attack. Lt.NUNES led the first two-plane element with Lt.RIEKE flying on his right wing, but as he dived in from 1200 feet to attack at a minimum altitude, the flight was enveloped in at least 5 bursts of heavy A/A fire from a 2 gun position and one shell burst just off the nose in front of the right engine completely disabling it. Lt.NUNES, nevertheless, continued on his run and managed to toggle 4 X 100 lb. bombs over the assigned target. Rather than attempt an sbrupt turn on one engine, Lt.NUNES stuck to his course continuing E of the target area. Lt.RICKE followed throughout the run but failed to release his bombs. He did, however, strafe both the L shaped building and the farmhouse several hundred feet northeast. Because of their preoccupation with what was happening to the disabled plane in neither case did crewmen observe specific results.

Lt.OPIE flying alone in the second element (his wingman having been forced down at MIDDLEBURG en route) came in on the target at approximately 230 mph (IAS). He dropped 6 X 100 lb. bombs at the "L" shaped building on his first pass just managing to catch one corner and start a fire. On the same pass he strafed both this building and the farmhouse to the W. Lt.OPIE then circled again for a second attack traversing a similar path.

Again 6 bombs were released over the "L" shaped building and again both it and the farmhouse were strafed. This time, however, results were unobserved and Lt.OPIE pulled away from the target area turning out through the pass between the hills to the east of the target.

Lt.WARVEL, leading the last 2-plane element, made his first pass from the southwest, and dropped 6 centuries on the assigned building, scoring two direct hits. As he came around for a second pass, he sighted a truck loaded with lumber parked on the road leading E from the target, and veering slightly from his flight path, opened up on it with his forward firing guns. No specific damage was observed. Returning to his original path, Lt.WARVEL continued around into his second attack strafing as he went in. He was unable to release his bombs on this run because of failure in the drop mechanism, so the bombs were salvoed in the east coast of the CELEBES just across from BENTANAN IS.

Lt.BOYD flying on Lt.WARVEL's wing brought up the rear. On his first attack he dropped 4 bombs and strafed both the "L" shaped building and the nearby farmhouse. Two of the four bombs hit on the corner of the"shed like"building and two missed. As he turned into his second run he again strafed both buildings and dropped the balance of his bombs, causing smoke and debris to fly into the air. On taking one last look before pulling away from the target area, however, no signs of fire were evident.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE

Moderate, heavy, accurate fire was received from a position on unknown distance to the west of the buildings which were the target. Muzzle flashes from two guns were definitely seen, however, and it is believed there were three pits.

c. DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil aerial combat.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

1. One plane sustained damage to it's right engine when a A/A projectile burst in front of it. Preliminary examination estimated the repair time as 24-48 hours.

2. One plane holed in two places, one under nose wheel door, one in navigator's dome. Damage trivial.

e. Nil personnel of this squadron injured.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. CITATIONS.

This mission provides no suitable basis for the recommendation of awards or citations.

5. SIGHTINGS

One u/i F/P in MENADO BAY.

6. TABLES.

See Incl. #1.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Other than providing some excellent pictures of the assigned targets, the photos reveal little of intelligence value. The reported trenches and strong points appear little more than irrigation ditches and the "L" shaped buildings being apparently combination drying and storage warehouses for some agricultural product.

Photos #2-O-24,26 and 27, taken by A/P #836 reveal an extremely prepossessing building for this area. Both grounds and buildings are very well kept.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt.,Air Corps
IN ELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
" 2 Tables.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Car'd.	Type	Weight	No.Dropped on Target
033	12	Parademo	100 lb.	4 (8 Salvoed)
274	12	Parademo	100 lb.	Nil (All bombs salvoed)
836	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12
197	12	Parademo	100 lb.	6 (6 Salvoed)
340	12	Parademo	100 lb.	12

Total: 34 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on target.
26 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped (Salvoed) away from target.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired
033	4000	Unknown (Plane R.O.N.Morotai)
274	4000	1200
836	4000	1325
197	4000	1590 400 rds. 30 Cal.
340	4000	1590 1200 rds. 30 Cal.
Total:	6705 X.50 Cal.	1600 X.30 Cal. expended

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
033	K-21	30
274	K-21	20
836	K-21	30
197	K-21	30
340	K-21	30

Total: 140 K-21 photos taken.



FFO 279-A-3 5 October,1944
499th Bomb Squadron
Langoan Area, Celebes.
T.O.T. 1016-20/I Minimum altitude.
All planes took Photos.
Ref: Photo (256 Z-4) Langoan A/D-Town.
Each Outer linesrepresents 1 element each on approach.
Other lines show run over target.


ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
FFO: 279-A-3 DATE: 5/10/44
345TH BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1015-20/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum
130°
135°
N
DEL MONTE
MALBANG
DAVAO
TALAUD IS.
GALELA
PITOE
MAPANGET
Target
LANGOAN
MITI
KAOE
LOLOBATA
TERNATE I.
OBA
AJOE I.
EQUATOR
LABOEHA
JEFMAN
SORONG
SAMATE
MANOKWARI
KAMIRI
SORIDO
NAMBER
MOKMER
BOROKOE
RANSIK
MOEMI
MONGOSAH
WAREN
BABO
SERUI
SERUI GULF
HAROEKOE
KAIRATOE
PISANG I.
NAMLEA
BOELA
OTAWIRI
SAGAN
LAHA
AMAHA
LIANG
UTAROM
NABIRE
KENDARI
POMELAA
TIMOEKA
-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OK 499 ARG 281-A-5 TOCT4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

8 October,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 281-A-5 performed on 7 October,1944, with objective at Large House West of LANGOAN, Celebes Is.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 7 October,1944, five (5) B-25's (3 B-25-D-1's and 2 B-25-G-1's) of this squadron took off to attack a large house of uncertain employment near LANGOAN. They were accompanied by 5 planes of the 500th Squadron, the 499th leading. One A/P of this squadron turned back short of the target due to excessively rapid fuel consumption, and the balance of four continued on to the target dropping 38 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay parademos in the immediate vicinity. The assigned building was thoroughly strafed and at least one bomb scored a direct hit starting a small fire. The planes then returned to base via SANSAPOR without incident.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The rendezvous with the 500th Squadron was accomplished over water SE of BIAK ISLAND. There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

When over the MOLUCCA SEA just before reaching landfall, the 4 planes of this squadronsregrouped into two-plane elements for the attack, but instead of turning N before Mt.MANIMPOROK, they continued beyond, circling Mt.SEMPOE and came in on the target from the NW leveling off for a W-E pass about 600 yards in front of the assigned building. The building was strafed by three of the four planes - one plane being unable to cover the target due presumably to rough air and sharp angle of attack - and 38 centuries were dropped within a radius of 1000 feet of the target.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

At least one and perhaps three of these scored direct hits and caused a small fire on one wing. Tracers were observed to enter the building. Ten bombs were salvoed - four, because of cockpit trouble, fell several hundred yards E of the building; six, because of mechanical failure, fell 4 miles SE of the area. A maximum of three hits being scored, it is not believed that the building was destroyed. In this connection, it is believed that the substitution of "skip" bombing tactics for the employment of parademos would prove more effective against isolated targets of this nature. Here, of course, the concomitant increase in risk would have to be balanced off against the importance of the target.

d. INTERCEPTION AND DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception occurred.
Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in the air.
Nil friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed as a result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER DROME, Biak Is.	0600/I
Attack	Buildings near Langoan	1021-23/I
Landed	SANSAPOR	1315/I
T.O.	SANSAPOR	1435/I
Landed	BASE	1635/I

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE WAIGEO IS. HALMAHERA IS. CELEBES TARGET.

In : HALMAHERA IS. WAIGEO IS. SANSAPOR BASE.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN MISSION.

a. Group

The Group Formation consisted of 5 planes each from the 499th and 500th Squadrons, with the 499th leading.

B. Squadron

This squadron, led by Lt.P.E.TARANUK, consisted of the following pilots and airplanes.

1st.Flight		2nd.Flight	
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P 836	1st.Lt.I.M.MOSSER	A/P 014
* 1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	" 861	1st.Lt.W.P.JENKINS	" 340
2nd.Lt.J.B.BOYD	" 837		

* Turned back over HALMAHERA IS. at 0855/I because of excessive guel consumption.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of attack.

W.TARANUK Preparatory to attack, just before reaching the CELEBES, ~~the two-squadron formation~~, regrouped the formation into two-plane flights and headed inland at approximately 315°. Instead of cutting N in front of MT.MANIMPOROK as planned, however, he circled both this and Mt.SEMPOE approaching the general target area from the NW. About 600 yards before the building assigned as the target he cut to the E for the attack, simultaneously dropping to the tree tops. Lt.TARANUK thoroughly strafed the building as he came in and dropped six of his 100 pounders across the northern most extremity. Two of these bombs looked as though they would hit the target and at least one definitely did for a a fire was seen as the second flight came over. Lt.TARANUK tried to release all of his bombs over the building but repeated toggling failed to get results and it was not until he was some four miles from the area that he dropped them without apparent results. Lt.BOYD followed Lt.TARANUK but found himself too far to the N of the target to do any effective damage to the building itself and had to be content with bombing and machine gunning the grounds away from the hill-side of the building. No specific results were observed though all twelve bombs were released in the building and grounds area.

Lt.MOSSER, leading the second element of the formation, followed the lead flight over the target, simarly strafing on the way in. He released all twelve bombs in a line likewise crossing the N portion of building but only 1 bomb was believed to hit home causing an explosion at this end of the building. Tracers were seen to strike the edifice.

Lt.JENKINS, bringing up the rear, strafed as he came in for the attack and dropped eight of his twelve centuries across the white building but no definite results were spotted. When outside the target area, Lt.JENKINS discovered he had 4 bombs left and salvoed them immediately without result several hundred yards E of the assigned area.

b. ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

Moderate, light and accurate machine gun fire received from the building area and from the S end of the site of the "L" shaped building which had been razed a few days previously.

c. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Ther were no injuries to personnel of this squadron.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

One plane, No.340, was holed in tail by small caliber M/G bullets.
One Plane, No.837, was holed in leading edge of wing and the radio compass loop was shot off. Damage in both cases was negligible.

4. CITATIONS

This mission supplies no suitable basis for the recommendation of an award.

5. TABLES

Bombing Table

Plane No.	Type Bombs Car'd.	No.Car'd.	No.Dropped on Target
836	100 lb. Parademo	12	6 (6 Salvoed)
837	100 lb. Parademo	12	12
014	100 lb. Parademo	12	12
340	100 lb. Parademo	12	8 (4 bombs salvoed)

Total: 38 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs dropped in target area.
10 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs salvoed away from target.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Car'd.	No.Rds.Fired	
836	4000	1855	500 rds. 30 Cal.
837	4000	1855	800 rds. 30 Cal.
014	4000	1235	1200 rds. 30 Cal.
340	4000	1325	1200 rds. 30 Cal.

Total: 6270 X.50 Cal. - 3700 X.30 Cal. expended in strafing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Photo Report

Plane No	Type Camera	No. Photos Taken
838	K-21	30
014	K-21	30

Total: 60 K-21 Photos taken.

6. SIGHTINGS

A lone u/i plane heading approximately SE at 4000 feet at undetermined speed, was observed at 0055N 12650E. Observing plane was 4 miles distant flying E at approximately same altitude.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

The pictures taken by A/P #014, illustrate clearly the inefficiency of parademos against a single target such as this building. Bombs have been strung out on both sides of the target, but only one or two at most will have done any damage.

Photo #1-O-4 partially reveals the interior and what appear to be beds. There is definite indication however as to its present usage.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
2nd.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1
Bomb Assessment Chart - Route Overlay.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A -L


Amoeran Bay
Amoerang
Kawanghoan
Tondano
Lake Tondano
Kekas
Sempoe
Manimporok
Target
38 x 100 lb Bombs Dropped Here In Radius Of 1000'
4 Bombs Dropped Here
8 Bombs Dropped Here.
Actual Route
Proposed Route
Betaicheh
MOLUCCA SEA
Bentenan
N
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 281-A-5
7 October, 1944.
T.O.T. 1021-23/I
Altitude: Minimum.
Took Photos
Ref: Amoerang - Celebes No. N040-EE2428/40
Scale: 1:200,000


ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
FFO: 281-A-5 DATE: 7/10/44
345TH BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1021-23/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum
DEL MONTE
MALBANG
DAVAO
TALAUD IS.
MAPANGET
LANGOAN
GALELA
PITOE
MITI
KAOE
LOLOBATA
TERNATE I.
OBA
AJOE I.
EQUATOR
LABOEHA
JEFMAN
SORONG
SAMATE
MANOKWARI
KAMIRI
SORIDO
NAMBER
MOKMER
BOROKOE
RANSIK
MOEMI
SEROEI
MONGOSAH
WAREM
BABO
PISANG I.
HAROEKOE
KAIRATOE
NAMLEA
BOELA
OTAWIRI
SAGAN
UTAROM
NABIRE
LAHA
AMAHA
LIANG
ENDARI
TIMOEKA
-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
285-A-2
11 Oct 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

13 October,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for mission FFO 285-A-2, performed 11 October,1944 with at KOEANDANG, N.E.Celebes.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 11 October,1944, six (6) B-25's (4 B-25-D-1's - 2 B-25-G-1's) of this squadron, in conjunction with 12 B-25's from two other squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group, attacked enemy warehouses and personnel concentrated at KOEANDANG, N.E. Celebes. The target was divided into two areas, the first consisting of the residential portion of the town to be strafed, the second consisting of warehouses and supplies to be bombed and strafed. As this squadron, last in the group formation, approached for the attack, several thin, small smoke columns were sighted scattered throughout the area with one large fire burning in the center of the warehouse area. Upon leaving the target however, after strafing the first area and dropping a total of 28 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay parademos and 11 X 500 lb. incendiaries in the second area, at least three additional fires were seen with flames to 100 feet and smoke to 3000 feet. Bombing was excellent with slightly over 80% of the bombs hitting the assigned targets. Of the balance of nine bombs not hitting the target, 2 parademos were released in the residential area, four hung up over the target and were released over OETANGOLA Is., N.W. of the target without results and a single 500 lb. incendiary and 2 X 100 lb. parademos dropped harmlessly in the water off the target area.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished at 1600 feet over water SE of MOKMER AIRDROME.

There was no fighter cover.

c. ATTACK

Overland N of GORONTOLA, the squadron circled 360° regrouping from a two element formation of three-plane flights into three flights of two planes each. The approach was made in the general direction of SE to NW with the squadron dropping from approximately 2500 feet to minimum altitude about 5 miles from the target. The attack itself was made at approximately 250 miles an hour. The residential area was thoroughly strafed by all three elements and one plane dropped two 100 lb. parademos. Several small fires were noted as the planes continued on to the principal target area on the beach. Here 3 planes dropped a total of twelve 500 lb. incendiaries, one of which fell harmlessly in the water, and 3 others planes dropped 30 X 100 lb. parademos, 2 of these also falling in the water. Three warehouses on the left hand side of the road at the far NW tip of promontory were definitely hit by incendiaries, starting fires with flames to at least 100 feet and smoke rising to 3000 feet as the planes left the area. These three warehouses were definitely and completely destroyed and it is quite possible in view of the heat generated and the proximity and structure of the adjacent buildings, that all the warehouse to the right of the road, between it and the water, may have been destroyed. In addition one warehouse of the two larger ones to the left of the road in the center of the warehouse section may have been hit since a string of 12 parademos dropped through this area and a large fire was subsequently seen in the approximate location. Four parademos hung up over the target but the pilot finally succeeded in releasing them over OELANGOLA ISLAND. Other planes reported sighting small fires in this vicinity but it is not definite that these were anything other than bomb bursts.

d. INTERCEPTION AND DETAILS OF AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception occurred.
Nil E/A destroyed or damaged in the air.
Nil friendly A/P's damaged or destroyed as a result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOKMER AIRDROME	0600/I
Attack	KOEANDANG	1055-1105/I
* T.O.	Morotai Island	1345/I
Landed	Sansapor	1445/I
T.O.	Sansapor	1600/I
Landed	Base	1730/I

* 3 planes only - Other 3 planes refueled at Sansapor.

f. ROUTE

OUT: BIAK IS. WAIGEO, HALMAHERA TARGET.

IN : 1st.Flight - HALMAHERAS WAIGEO, SANSAPOR BASE
2nd.Flight - MOROTAI WAIGEO BASE.

2. FORMATION, PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING IN MISSION.

a. Group

The Group Formation enroute consisted of the 498th, 501st and 499th Squadrons in that order.

b. Squadron

This Squadron led by Capt.J.A.SALTERS, consisted of the following:

1st.Flight			2nd.Flight		
Capt.J.A.SALTERS	A/P	274	1st.Lt.H.E.WARVEL	A/P	197
1st.Lt.I.M.MOSSER	"	246	2nd.Lt.C.E.MARTIN	"	097
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	876	2nd.Lt.M.J.OPIE	"	836

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

This squadron followed the 498th and 501st Squadrons into the NE Celebes hitting landfall in the vicinity of GORANTALO. After proceeding inland several miles they circled once to regroup the formation into 2 plane elemants for the attack, dropping down to tree-top lever several miles from the target. and coming in at about 250 m.p.h.. He led the squadron right down the center of KOEANDANG TOWN which lies in a gully with hills on both sides, strafing as he went. He passed over the residential area without observing anything definite, but the smoke and dust from previously attacking squadrons was too heavy over the warehouse area so he elected to hold his bombs and make a second pass rather than waste them by dropping them blindly.

He did, however, strafe the entire area completely on his first run. He then circled to the left and came in for a second attack this time dropping ten of his twelve parademos in the warehouse area 2 falling in the water. As he pulled away on this second run the whole warehouse area seemed consumed in smoke and there were at least 4 large fires visible. After this second pass, Capt.SALTER broke off the attack and circled again, this time to re-form his squadron.

Lt.MOSSER, flying as wingman of the lead flight, dropped two of his bombs in the residential area because the warehouse area appeared too clouded. Where he found out, however, that they were going around again, he held the remainder of his bombs for the assigned target. The residential portion of the target was thoroughly strafed and small fires were started. The warehouse area also received a thorough strafing on the first pass, and on the second run, ten parademos were dropped in this area. Definite destruction from these bombs were not observed, but smoke, fires and general destruction were everywhere evident.

Lt.WARVEL led the second flight of two planes over the target, strafing the residential section and dropping three of his 500 lb. incendiaries on the warehouse area. No hits were actually observed, the speed of the plane being too great, but upon circling the area a second time, large fires were observed in the warehouses in the approximate vicinity where the bombs were released, that is, just before the outer end of the promentory at the foot of the jetty. Lt.WARVEL's last 500 pounder fell in the water just beyond this area.

Lt.MARTIN followed the lead pilot of the second flight, strafing the residential area. He dropped all 4 X 500 lb. incendiaries in the vicinity of the warehouses, aiming at the group on the right hand side of the road. As in the other cases he could not see where the bombs hit but observation from the flight following testify to seeing his bombs land in the warehouse used as a fuel storaged dump. It was this building that was seen to be burning most fiercely with orange flames over 100 feet and billowing black smoke to 3000 feet. There were two large fires directly behind this but their origin is uncertain so far as this particular plane's bombs are concerned.

Lt.WILEY and Lt.OPIE composed the last flight, Lt.WILEY leading and Lt.OPIE wingman. Lt.WILEY strafed both areas and dropped 8 of his parademos in the warehouse portion, but four of his bombs hung up on him and it was only after leaving the target that he succeeded in releasing them. Similar to the others, Lt.WILEY and his crew were unable to sight specific results as to their own A/P's particular bombs.

Lt.OPIE followed a similar path to that traversed by his leader, also strafing both areas but saving his bombs for the warehouses. He, too, traversed the northwesternmost tip but again results were uncertain. Lt.Opie, however, did drop all 4 X 500 lb. incendiaries in the assigned area. He then broke off the attack and followed the rest of the squadrons off the target.

b. A/A FIRE

Machine gun flashes were observed from the area to the W of the road just beyond the warehouses. This area was reported as containing pits of unknown type and purpose. Small arms fire was received from scattered locations in the residential section. In neigher case was the fire severe and in both cases it was inaccurate.

c. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

There were no injuries to personnel of this squadron.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

There was no damage to A/P's of this squadron.

4. CITATIONS

This mission provides no suitable action for the recommendation of any awards.

5. TABLES

SeeIncl: #1.

6. SIGHTINGS

Small, scattered columns of thin smoke were seen in the residential portion of KOEANDANG as the planes of this squadron came in on the attack and one fairly large column was seen in the center of the warehouse.area.

On returning from the target, as the planes of this squadron flew E along the S coast 5 miles offshore at approximately 180 miles per hour and 5000' altitude, three u/i planes were observed following a similar path at the same speed but remaining on the deck close to coast. Theseplanes maintained a 10 o'clock position relative to ours. They were last seen in the vicinity of PONDANG ISLAND where the peninsula turn N.

Along this same coast in the same vicinity 7 /u/i silver colored planes were sighted in formation proceeding E at about 1000 feet. This latter sighting was made by one crew member only and is of uncertain accuracy.

One camouflaged small sized lugger of u/i type was sighted near OELANGOLA IS.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Plane No.274

Photos 9-0-154,55, show residential area and two para-demos dropping.

Photos 9-0-169 reveals fire in small building to left of the road but warehouses still intact.

Photos 9-0-170-171 indicate to some dggree the extent of damage caused by this squadron. The one warehouse on the right side of the road closest to thetip of the promontory is already consumed in flames and the two large warehouses just to the rear are just starting. One incendiary is bursting in the water.

Photos 96 & 97 plane #097 show bomb bursting harmlessly in water.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT.E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2

Incl:-1 Tables.
" 2 Charts.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Bombing Table

Plane No.	No.Bombs Carried	Type - Weight	No.On Target	
274	12	Parademos 100 lb.	10	2 in water
246	12	Parademos 100 lb.	10	2 in strafing target.
876	12	Parademos 100 lb.	8	4 on small island
197	4	Incendiary 500 lb.	3	1 in water.
097	4	Incendiary 500 lb.	4	
836	4	Incendiary 500 lb.	4	

Total: 28 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped in assigned target.
4 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped on small island just off shore.
2 X 100 lb. parademo bombs dropped in personnel area in strafing target, and two were dropped in water.
11 X 500 lb. bombs dropped in target - 1-500 lb. bomb in water.

Strafing Table

Plane No.	No.Rds.Carⁱd.	No.Rds.Fired
274	4000	1250
246	4000	1250
876	4000	840
197	4000	1470
097	4000	2500
S	4000	1050

Total: 8360 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

Photo Table

Plane No.	Type Camera	No.Photos Taken
097	K-21	30
274	K-21	30
246	K-21	30
836	K-21	30

Total: 120 photos taken.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ROUTE OVERLAY

345th Group 499th Squadron
T.O.T. 1055/I-1105/I
Minimum altitude.
Mission FFO 285-A-2
11 October, 1944.





Mission FFO 285-A-2
11 October,1944
Target : Koeandang, N.E.Celebes.
Squadron: 499th.
T.O.T. 1055-1105/I
Minimum altitude.
T Took Photos.

Ref: Photo Koeandang N.E.Celebes (278-Z-3)

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO: 281-A-5 DATE: 7/10/44

345TH BOMB GROUP

499th BOMB SQUADRON

TIME OVER TARGET: 1021-23/I

ALTITUDE: Minimum



FFO: [illegible]A-5 DATE: 7/10/44
345TH BOMB GROUP
499th BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1021-23/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum



-DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

6 November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, mission to ALICANTE AIRDROME, Negros Island. (10°50'N - 123° 00'E). Date 3 November, 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 2 November, 1944, six B-25's of this squadron took off from MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Island and proceeded to MOROTAI ISLAND from which operations were to be staged. Ground personnel consisted of six crew chiefs, 2 armorers, one Intelligence Officer. Late during the night of the 2nd. orders were received from 13th Air Force HEADQUARTERS for a strike against ALICANTE. The original plan (because of a shortage of ordnance personnel to load bombs) was to attack by strafing only. However, it was finally decided that combat crews would load the bombs by hand. Accordingly, 6 B-25-J- of this squadron took off on the morning of 3 November to attack ALICANTE AIRDROME by bombing and strafing and FABRICA AIRDROME (25 miles to the East) by strafing. According to information received from 13th Air Force, little opposition was expected but this was hardly the case - both A/A and fighter interception were encountered at the target. Also only 2 photographs of ALICANTE and 2 of FABRICA were available for the entire group. Regardless of interception prior to reaching the target, this squadron carried out its attack on ALICANTE AIRDROME. However, due to interception FABRICA AIRDROME was not attacked.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over PITOE AIRDROME, Morotai Island.
2. The fighter rendezvous was accomplished on course for the target.

c. ATTACK

The Group approached ALICANTE AIRDROME from the S flying over the GUIMARAS STRAIT to the W of NEGROS ISLAND.

(Attack Con'td.)

This squadron took up attack formation of six planes abreast in trail behind the two leading squadrons. During these maneuvers, enemy fighters were observed taking off from BACOLOD and ALICANTE AIRDROMES and just prior to reaching ALICANTE the first enemy fightermade it's attack. However, defensive fire drove it off and the attack on ALICANTE was carried out. Three enemy planes were burning on the ground as a result of the attack by the two leading squadrons. This squadron dropped a total of 24 X 100 lb. free falling 8/15 second delay bombs. Because of the long delay the results were generally unobserved. However, at least 12 bombs were dropped along the runway where the greater number of planes were concentrated. It was estimated that from 25-30 planes had been destroyed by previous raids and indications are that approximately ten serviceable planes were on the drome at the time of our strike. 4 airplanes were strafed and definitely damaged - extent unknown. Several bombs were dropped in the dispersal areas probably to little effect since targets in those areas were few in number.
3-4 M/T's were damaged by strafing. The target was strafed from end to end but because of difficult operating conditions at MOROTAI, the actual ammunition expenditure is not known. However a conservative estimate of ammo expended on the target at 8000 X.50 Cal. An estimate of ammo expended in interception is somewhere in the vicinity of 2000 X.50 Cal. Fighter cover over the target was excellent considering the fact that the 6 P-38's seen over the target were outnumbered by approximately 3-1. Because of improper coordination our top cover took off late and failed to reach the target. Consequently the fighter cover was too busily engaged to give the bomber formation adequate protection. As a matter of fact, one P-38 pulled up under our wings when ganged up on by enemy fighters.

d. AIRPLANES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

1. One TOJO (or possibly JACK) was probably destroyed in aerial combat by this squadron.

2. One HAMP and 1 ZEKE were damaged in aerial combat by this squadron.

3. 2 u/i fighters were seen destroyed by P-38's.

e. AIRPLANES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED ON THE GROUND.

4 u/i, S/E planes were definitely damaged by strafing.

f. DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

A/P No.201 was considerably damaged in tail assembly in interception. 2 planes holed by M/G fire.

g. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	PITOE STRIP, Morotai Is.	0740/I
Fighter Rendezvous	On Course	0800/I
T.O.T.	ALICANTE A/D, Negros Is.	1214/I
Interception	NEGROS Is. (Northern	1214-34/I
Landed	PITOE STRIP, Morotai Is.	1635/I

f. ROUTE

Out: PITOE SIBUGUEY BAY (Western Mindanao) SIPALAY GUINARAS STRAIT TARGET.

In : TARGET AROUND N TIP OF NEGROS TANON STRAIT ILLIGAN BAY (Mindanao) across MINDANAO into ILLAN BAY (NE part of MORO GULF) following coast of MINDANAO to BORONG then direct to base.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

(a) Group.

The Group Formation consisted of the 498, 501st, 499th and 500th Squadrons in that order.

(b) Squadron.

The Squadron Formation with 1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK leading, was set up as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt. P.E.TARANUK	A/P	163	Capt.W.D.DEEKER	A/P	205
2nd.Lt.J W.RICKEY	"	201	1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	174
2nd.Lt. M.A. SMITH	"	020	Capt.R.F.TODD	"	035

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

Lt.TARANUK assembled the squadron soon after take-off and maneuvered the Squadron into the number 3 position of the Group Formation during the rendezvous. The flight to the target was without incidant. As the Group approached the vicinity of BOCOLOD, Lt.TARANUK maneuvered the squadron into position astern of the two leading squadrons. He then echeloned all six planes into line abreast formation and shortly afterward, concentrated fire from the formation caught the TOJO in it's cone. Lt.RICKEY's turret and waist gunners and tail gunner scored hits on the engine. As a result of this fire the TOJO pulled up almost vertically trailing smoke and fell off heading straight for the water still trailing smoke. Since all the interception occurred only 50 feet above the water this Tojo probably could not have recovered from his dive and is claimed as a probable. No one was able to watch the last stages of the plunge because of another fighter, a Hamp was coming in from ten oclock. This fighter scored hits on the tail section wounding Sgt.VONFLOTOW the tail gunner and peppering the fuselage, elevators and rudders with fragments. By this time, Capt.DEKKER had pulled his flight into close formation. Our formation of six planes and four planes of another squadron made a ~~defensive~~ formidable defensive formation as evidenced by the action of the Jap Fighters. Three to four fighters started individual passes, generally from astern but when the tail turrets opened up the attack was broken off before coming into range. The Jap fighters seemed surprised by the "wallop" which the B-25-J packs in the tail. Lt.Wiley's gunner scored hits on a ZEKE which came in from four oclock. The Zeke fell off when hit but recovered and flew away from the scene of the combat. This pursuit with half-hearted attempts at passes from the stern continued for some twenty minutes. The enemy fighters gave up as the formation turnedand opened fire on ALICANTE AIRDROME. Lt.TARANUK flew over the W side of the runway where the majority of the planes were located. He strafed throughout the area but his bombs failed to release.

Lt.RICKEY flying on Lt.TARANUK's right wing dropped 2 bombs on the East side of the runway and four of his bombs failed to release. He strafed four apparently serviceable planes on the East side of the runway scoring hits on each one but the extent of damage was not visible.

Lt.SMITH in the number three position dropped six bombs and strafed in the East dispersal area with undetermined results since no definite targets fell within his flight path.

Capt.DEKKER, leading the second flight with Lt.WILEY and Capt.TODD on his wings flew over the east dispersal area and the flight dropped 16 bombs in that area with results other than bomb bursts and bomb smoke unobserved.

Three trucks were damaged as a result of strafing by this flight and a fourth was possibly damaged.

b. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION

1. As the formation pulled off the target, Capt.TODD of the second flight droppsd back slightly when his hydraulic line bboke. Capt.DEKKER and Lt.WILEY dropped back slightly to cover him. This placed the second flight some 200 yards behind the first flight. Approximately 10 miles N of ALICANTE a Tojo came in on the first flight from four oclock high and pressed the attack firing up to 200 yards where he broke off the attack and headed south into the straits. In general, the Jap pilots seemed experienced and somewhat eager to press attacks but were puzzled by the tail turret which they apparently did not expect.

c. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Plane No.174 and 035 were both holed by M/G fire. Nose wheel nacelle line on plane 035 broke due to vibration. Plane No.201 was hit by a burst of fire which holed the tail assembly 74 times. Apparently one 20 mm and three explosive 13 mm's. The 13 mm's entered through the lower part of the left rudder. One exploding in the elevator close to the fuselage, and two exploding in the horizontal stabilizer. The resulting fragments peppered the left side of the rear fuselage. The 20 mm hit apparently exploded on striking the bullet deflecting plexiglass over the tail turret shattering the glass and lodging fragments in the right rudder. The hydraulic line in the nose wheel nacelle broke due to vibration.

d. One crew member reported seeing a good deal of M/G fire from the N end of the strip but this was the only A/A noted. A flakintel photo listed some sixteen medium and light guns on the airdrome and crews of other squadrons reported intense medium accurate fire which resulted in shooting down of a 501st plane. Probably the attack by the two leading squadrons demoralized gun crews and caused them to cease firing.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Sgt.Vonflotow, tail gunner of plane 201 sustained serious but not fatal wounds. Fragments of exploding shells penetrated his right forearm and his right thigh. He lost a great deal of blood, that fact and his wounds will require 3-4 weeks of hospitalization.

4. CITATIONS

Sgt.Vonflotow will be recommended for the "Purple Heart" for wounds received in action. He will also be recommended forthe "Silver Star" for gallantry in action. He crawled from his tail gun position which was rendered useless to the right waist gun where he kept enemy fighters at Bay for fifteen minutes when he finally collapsed because of loss of blood and shock.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

24 X 100 lb. 8/15 sec. delay bombs expended.
Approximately 10,000 X.50 Cal. ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Two enemy fighters destroyed as result of our own fighter's attacks.
One medium sized and several small M/V's along W shore of Negros Is.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

The new B-25-J's did not arrive equipped for cameras and because other modifications were more necessary, the cameras have not been installed to date.

Note:, Both Capt.TODD and Lt.RICKEY made emergency landings at base because of broken hydraulic lines. However both made safe landings and the lines were quickly repaired. However repair on the tail section of Lt.Rickey's plane will require several days.

For The Squadron COMMANDER

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



ROUTE OVERLAY

ALICANTE DROME
3 November, 1944.
499th Bomb Squadron
T.O.T. 1214/I Minimum Altitude.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OK
aaa
499
309-A
4 Nov 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

9 November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 309-A, with objective at DALIAO AIRDROME, Davao Area, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 4 November, 1944, five B-25-J's of this squadron participated in a strike on DALIAO A/D. The four squadrons of the 345th Group composed the bomber strike force on this, our second mission staged from MOROTAI.Island. Two squadrons were to attack DALIAO AIRDROME and two were to attack LIBBY AIRDROME as a part of an all out effort to knockout Jap Air-power and in so doing relieve the pressure on our forces at LEYTE ISLAND. The mission was carried out as planned as usual from minimum altitude and had enemy planes been stationed on the two dromes, the results would have been highly satisfactory. Unfortunately no enemy planes were in evidence and damage was restricted to buildings and other insignificant installations. The mission was required only 4 hours thirty minutes of flying time. Since our average mission during the past six months has been 7-9 hours flying time, it can easily be understood how combat crews appreciated the rest.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Group rendezvous was accomplished over PITOE DROME, Morotai Is.

c. ATTACK

Because of a shortage of personnel and ordnance equipment at MOROTAI a very light load of 6 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse bombs were carried in each of the 5 B-25-J's.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The squadron was number two in the sequence of attackon DALIAO and approached the target from the south flying inland passing the airdrome to the W as if proceeding to LIBBY AIRDROME which is only some two miles distant. The squadron then did a sharp turn onto the axis of attack from WNW to ESE. This axis of attack was employed to make certain that the formation would not come within range of the heavy concentration of A/A around DAVAO. The formation over the target consisted of five planes in line abreast, sweeping the runway and dispersal areas simultaneously. In the attack, 30 bombs were dropped in strings starting in the W dispersal area across the runway and including the E dispersal area. The target area was well covered by bomb bursts and smoke but because of a paucity of targets and the long delay fuses, the results were generally unobserved. The target and surrounding area was thoroughly strafed by the nine forward firing .50's of each plane as well as by the defensive armament. Approximately 7,000 X.50 Cal. rounds of ammo were expended in the attack.

d. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	PITOE AIRDROME, Morotai Is.	0705/I
T.O.T.	DALIAO AIRDROME	0920/I
Landed	PITOE AIRDROME	1135/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

(a) The Group Formation was led by the 500th Squadron.
(b) The 499th Squadron was led by 1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK and was composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT			SECOND FLIGHT		
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P	163	Capt.W.D.DEKKER	A/P	#206
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	"	174	Capt.R.F.TODD	"	035
2nd.Lt.M.A.SMITH	"	030			

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. Details of individual actions.

No account of individual action are included since there were no incidents worthy of mention and such account could add nothing to the report which is not covered elsewhere.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND.

1. Nil E/A damaged either in the air or on the ground,

2. Plane #030 of this squadron sustained repairable damage when M/G fire ripped a section of the ventral fuselage skin.

c. DETAILS OF A/A OPPOSITION.

Slight accurate M/G fire from an unobserved position.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil.

4. CITATIONS.

No awards or citations will be given as result of this mission.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE REPORT.

30 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay fuse bombs expended.
Approximately 7000 X.50 Cal. ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

4-5 small boats seen from distance at Davao.
2 dummy A/P's on SW side center of runway.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Nil photos taken.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



Mission FFO 309-A
4 November,1944.
Daliao Airdrome
499th Squadron
T.O.T. 0920/I Minimum Altitude
Ref: Daliao Target Map N 700-E12528/3
Scale: 1:20,000



ROUTE OVERLAY

Mission FFO 309-A
4 November, 1944
Daliao Airdrome
499th Squadron 345th Group
T.O.T. 0920/I Minimum Altitude.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
335-D-2
30 NOV 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

2 December,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 335-D-2, 30 November,1944. Objective DALIAO and PADADA AIRDROMES, MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES ISLANDS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 30 November,1944, 6 B-25-J's of this squadron participated in a Group Strike on DALIAO and PADADA AIRDROMES. The general plan of attack was to strafe and bomb DALIAO with 72 X 23 lb. parademo bombs per plane and then continue down the coast approximately 25 miles and strafe PADADA AIRDROME. The number one and three squadrons were assigned to take photos of DALIAO and the number two and four squadrons were assigned to photograph PADADA. In addition each squadron was to assign one plane to photo the airdrome not covered by any of the other planes in that squadron.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the water just South of MOKMER AIRDROME. There was no fighter cover and no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

This Squadron was number two in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The approach to the target was from South to North over the water in DAVAO BAY to a point approximately 5 miles S of MATINA AIRDROME then turning almost 180° to the left making the axis of attack from North to South. Formation over the target consisted of two three plane "V'S" in trail at approximately 30 seconds.

(Attack Cont'd)

In the attack on DALIAO AIRDROME a total of 324 X 23 lb. parafrags were dropped with the greater concentration in the West dispersal area. The target was thoroughly strafed as well but except for a small explosion neither bombing nor strafing yielded visible results.- Undoubtely due to the scarcity of targets on the drome. After leaving DALIAO the Squadron maintained attack formation on and continued down the coast turning inland approximately 10 miles N of PADADA and then turning on an axis of attack from NW to SE. In the attack a total of 72 parafrags which failed to release over DALIAO were expended, also without visible results. However a 2/e bomber (Identified from mission photos as a "Francis") alerted on the NW end of the runway was heavily strafed which resulted in a burst of flame from ruptured wing tanks. The effectiveness and thoroughness of the strafing is born out by the photographs. The wing of the "Francis" was a mass of flame from tip to tip. In the attack on both airdromes a total of 13,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition was expended and 36 X 23 lb. parafrags were returned to base. The Group rallied over DAVAO BAY SE of PADADA and returned to MOROTAI ISLAND where all planes refueled and then returned directly to BIAK.

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

1. Nil Interception.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Is.	0523/I
T.O.T.	DALIAO AIRDROME, Mindanao	1035/I
T.O.T.	PADADA AIRDROME, Mindanao	1042/I
Landed	MOROTAI Island	1245/I
T.O.	MOROTAI Island	1420/I
Landed	MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Is.	1715/I

f. ROUTE:

Out: Base Asia Island Palmas Island Target.
In : Target Morotai Island Biak Is.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating.

This squadron led by Capt.JAMES A.SALTER was composed of the following planes and pilots:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.J.A.Salter	A/P	014	1st.Lt.C.R.Smith	A/P	185
1st.Lt.I.M.Mosser	"	043	2nd.Lt.A.Browngarth	"	030
1st.Lt.J.B.Boyd	"	948	1st.Lt.J.E.Slaughter		195

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Individual action.

Only Lt.MOSSER's attack yielded results which warrant more elaborations. Action of other planes in the squadron are covered in 1-C and further discussion would add nothing to this report.
Lt.MOSSER flying the number two position in the lead flight bombed and strafed DALIAO AIRDROME without visible results. On approaching PADADA, still a good distance away, he observed a bomber parked at the NW end of the runway. He immediately lined up his sights and open fire at extreme range and poured a continuous stream of bullets into the plane. He pressed the attack until forced to pull up to avoid crashing. As a result of his attack he had the satisfaction of seeing the plane riddled from wing tip to wing tip and a shower of gasoline rise up which instantaneously burst into flames. Lt.MOSSER remarked that the plane was difficult to set afire because he registered hit after hit before finally accomplishing the desired result.

b. A/A FIRE

Nil A/A Fire was encountered.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil interception.

d. DETAIL OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

No planes were damaged.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

A total of 13,000 X.50 Cal. expended.
324 X 23 lb. Parafrags Dropped on Daliao A/D.
72 X 23 lb. Parafrags Dropped on Padada A/D,
36 X 23 lb. Parafrags returned to base.

6. SIGHTINGS

One crew member observed a light A/A gun in a clearing which he places arbitrarily along the S edge of the center of the runway.
At 1020/I from distance of approximately 2½ miles several craters on MATINA A/D appeared to be filled and camouflaged to give appearance of craters.
5 dummy A/P's parked on runway at DORANGO (ELG) midway between DALIAO and PADADA.
Camouflaged revetments in SW dispersal area of DALIAO appeared empty.
1 2/e u/i plane of unknown serviceability just N of Target 10X, covered by camouflage netting.
A tarpaulin covered supply dump located at SE end of PADADA Runway near the river - supplies also covered by camouflaged netting.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos taken by all planes but 043 (Lt.MOSSER's plane) reveal little information outside of attempts to repair DALIAO runway with portable rails and dump cars.
Photos from Plane #043 confirm destruction of a 2/e plane which is clearly a "Francis".

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

NAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Route Overlay
2 Target Overlays

ROUTE OVERLAY



499th Squadron
Mission FFO 335-D-2

30 November,1944
T.O.T. 1035/I - 1042/I

PADADA - DALIAO
AERDROMES


045 *
014*
948*
030
185 *
198
N
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 335-D2
30 November,1944.
Primary Daliao A/D
T.O.T. 1035/I
X Fires
* Took Photos
------ Area Bombed
324 X 23 lb.
parafrags.
Ref: Daliao Target Map
A.C. of S, A-2 5 AF.
1 October,1944.



499th Squadron
Mission FFO 335-D-2
30 November,1944.
Secondary Target Padada A/D
T.O.T. 1042/I Minimum Altitude.

Ref: Padada Target Map
A.C. of S., A-2 5 AF.
Date 1 October,1944.

Legend:

-----Area Bombed
_____Area Strafed
*Took Photos

4991
347-D-
12Dec44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (H) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (H) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

14 December,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 347-D-2, performed 12 December,1944. Objective: PADADA A/D, Mindanao, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL.

a. On the morning of 12 December,1944, 6 B-25-J's of this Squadron along with other 3 Squadrons of the 345th Group participated in a strike on PADADA A/D. Each plane was loaded with 72 X123 lb. parafrags and carried a maximum load of ammunition for the strafing guns. The general plan of attack was to bomb and strafe enemy planes reported in the East dispersal loop of PADADA AIRDROME.

b. RENDEZVOUS

(a) The Group Rendezvous was accomplished on course to the target over the water just South of MOK-MER DROME.

(b)There was no fighter rendezvous.

c. ATTACK

This Squadron was last in the sequence of attack, following the 498th Squadron. Attack was made on a SW-NE run across both dispersal areas and the strip. A total of 2 passes were made. In the attack a total of 348 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped on the target with the greater concentration on the strip and the East dispersal area. The target was thoroughly strafed as well. Only yielded results from this squadron's attack was the fuel fire, probably started by the 498th Squadron, was thoroughly strafed by one plane adding to it's intensity. After crossing the target, a wide 360° turn to the right, was made and a second attack was made.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

This Squadron made the second attack on the extreme South end of the strip and although 84 bombs were dropped, (36 of which were S of the river and not in the target) no visible damage was observed. In general the target was well covered by both bombing and strafing, although no definite results were observed, it is believed that some damage was caused since later photo interpretation showed that 9 serviceable planes were dispersed in the East loop and considering the number of bombs and amount of ammunition expended along with the thorough coverage by the attack, some damage was undoubtedly caused. Parafrag bombs for target as such is believed unsuitable for the fact that there is such a heavy concentration of coconut trees around the strip and dispersal loops and many bombs were seen either to hang up on the trees or explode upon contact with the top of the trees. A total of 12,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition were expended in both passes. The Group then rallied over Davao Bay, went direct to MOROTAI to refuel and returned to BIAK IS.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

Nil Interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	MOKMER A/D	0515/I
T.O.T.	PADADA A/D	1052/I First Pass
		1108/I Second Pass
Landed	MOROTAI	1320/I
T.O.	MOROTAI	1425/I
Landed	BIAK IS.	1755/I

f. ROUTE

Out: BASE ASIA IS. TARGET.

In : TARGET MOROTAI BIAK IS.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

This Squadron was led by Capt.J.A.SALTER and was composed of the following planes and pilots:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.J.A.SALTER	A/P	013	2nd.Lt.M.A.SMITH	A/P	185
2nd.Lt.J.P.POWELL	"	755	2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	"	205
2nd.Lt.J.C.RIEKE	"	948	2nd.Lt.A.BROWNGARTH	"	030

5. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Individual action.

Lt.ANDREWS flying right wingman in the second flight spotted a small fuel fire burning in the area between the Strip and West dispersal loop. He made further attack on this same fire strafing it heavily which resulted in an explosion and greater intensity to the fire. Flames and smoke up to 3000 feet was observed from that same fire on the second pass.
Results of other planes warrant no individual reports of attack, since all other results are covered by Par. 1 c.

b. A/A FIRE

Nil A/A fire was encountered.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil Interception.

d. DETAIL OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Nil damage sustained.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

A total of 13,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition expended.
348 X.23 lb. Parafrag bombs dropped on PADADA A/D.
38 X.23 lb. Parafrag bombs dropped S of Strip out of target.
48 X.23 lb. Parafrag bombs returned to base.

6. SIGHTINGS

Two large galvanized tanks at an undetermined point just E of the runway.

1 apparently serviceable S3F in N dispersal area on S side of taxi strip.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Sightings Cont'd)

1 possibly serviceable u/I A/P at SE corner of runway near junction of runway and taxi strip.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Nil interpretation made since only 2 prints were received.

FOR THE SQUADRON COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2
Incl:-1 Route Overlay
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



Note: Numbers in circles shown in Second Pass Flight Path indicate the number of 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped in that area.
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 347-D-2
Padada A/D.
T.O.T. First Pass 1052/I Second Pass 1108/I
348 X.23 lb. parafrags dropped on target.
12000 X.50 Cal. ammunition expended in strafing.
Refend: Padada Target Map Dated 1 October, 1944.
1/20,000

ROUTE OVERLAY.



499th Squadron
Mission FFO 547-D-2
12 December,1944.
Target: Padada A/D.
T.O.T. First Pass 1052/I Second Pass 1108/I
Altitude: Minimum.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
352-D-
17 Dec 4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

19 December,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 352-D-2, performed on 17 December,1944, with objective at LICANAN A/D, MINDANAO ISLAND.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 17 December,1944 the four Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group conducted a mission on LICANAN AIRDROME. Pre-strike information placed three airplanes on the drome. An extensive barracks area appeared (from target photos) to be a lucrative target. The lead squadron was assigned airplanes on the drome as a target and parafrags as the bomb load. The other three squadrons were assigned the barracks area and due to a shortage of incendiary bombs 100 lb. parademo bombs were used. Finally after three false starts due to weather, the strike was successfully staged from SANSAPOR. Although several buildings were damaged or destroyed, the results (for reasons stated in 1C) were not as decisive as they might have been. The Group returned directly from the target to BIAK IS., logging nine hours fifteen minutes flying time.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished enroute to the target. There was no fixed rendezvous point.

No fighter cover provided hence no Fighter Rendezvous was made.

c. ATTACK

This Squadron was number three in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The approach was over the E side of DAVAO GULF flying N to the N part of the Gulf, then turning to the W almost 180° on to an axis of attack from approximately 10 degrees.

Formation over the target consisted of two, three plane "V"'s with the second element in trail at 30 to 45 second interval. During the attack a total of 66 bombs and 10,800 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition were expended. Two bombs failed to release. Results of 31 bombs were observed to a certain extent but results of the remaining 35 were not visible. The following results were observed but due to poor coverage; photos are inclusive.
A steam roller was undoubtedly damaged by 2 bombs which dropped within 25 feet. Two shacks and approximately six other warehouse or barracks type buildings were destroyed or damaged.
Apparently the axis of attack was not flown as directed with the result that the barracks were screened by trees. Had the prescribed axis of attack been followed, the visibility would have been much better. Another fault was the fact that too many bombs were dropped on the airdrome itself. These bombs actually should have been saved to drop in the barracks area. Photos indicate (in other squadrons as well) that several planes crossed directly over as many as four large buildings in the assigned target after all bombs had been dropped. At present with only skeleton crews of ground personnel available several phases of operations are limited - particularly the photo coverage. It is not possible to use over three or four cameras per squadron and this permits a great deal of the results and general intelligence information to pass by unnoticed.

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DESTROYED.

Nil Interception.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

T.O.	SANSAPOR	0600/I
T.O.T.	LICANAN	0955/I
Landed	BIAK IS.	1513/I

f. ROUTE

Out: SANSAPOR C.SAN AUGUSTINE TARGET.

In : TARGET C.SAN AUGUSTINE BIAK.

3. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

This squadron led by 1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK was set up as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.P.E.TARANUK	A/P	177	Capt.W.D.DECKER	A/P	198
2nd.Lt.A.BROWNGARDTH	"	030	2nd.Lt.J.F.POWELL	"	785
2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	"	205	2nd.Lt.R.A.PRENTICE		180

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Individual Action.

Lt.TARANUK, on reaching the northern part of DAVAO GULF maneuvered the Squadron into position in trail behind the 498th Squadon. In the turn onto the target run he placed the second flight in trail. He followed directly behind the 498th Squadron which made his flight path cross the #2 runway near the center at a slight angle toward SSW. He dropped two bombs at a steam roller E of the runway, 6 in the dispersal area just E of the center of #2 runway destroying 2 shacks and 4 among a group of buildings approximately 2000 feet SW of the S end of #2 runway. He thoroughly strafed the airdrome area and several large barracks without visible results.
Lt.BROWNGARDTH flying on Lt.TARANUK's right wing, stayed in close formation with his leader during the first half of the run over the target, strafing and dropping 4 bombs on the Central West Side edge of the #2 runway with unobserved results. After crossing the drome area he swung a little to the right, strafing barrack type buildings between the Strip and the highway south of the strip. He dropped his remaining 8 bombs on 3-4 warehouse type buildings scoring direct hits. No fires were observed but flying debris seen confirmed the hit. He then took his right wing position and followed his leader out to sea for the return to base.
Lt.ANDREWS flying on Lt.TARANUK's left wing was not able to get over the assigned target with results that he dropped 10 bombs at huts scattered throughout the area just E of #2 R/W. Two bombs failed to release due to rack malfunction, could not be salvoed and were returned to base.
Capt.DECKER leading the second flight made his run N-S along the West side of No.2 Runway. He began his attack just North of the strip where he dropped 2 bombs at several shacks then heavily strafing the A/A position NW of the No.2 Runway. 2 more bombs were then dropped this time at 2 small buildings just NE of the strip, a direct hit was scored and debris from these buildings were seen flying in the air. Coming along the W edge of the strip, no worthwhile targets were observed, therefore he limited his attack to strafing. 4 bombs were dropped S of the strip at buildings observed there, but results were unobserved. 4 bombs were returned to base since no other targets in the assigned area were spotted.

Lt.POWELL flying #2 position in the second flight strafed a wooded area just N of the center of #4 R/W from which tracers were coming, he also dropped 2 bombs with unobserved results. He then turned and flew over the center of #1 R/W dropping 2 bombs near the W edge. He dropped four bombs in two good sized buildings just W of the S end of No.1 R/W scoring direct hits. He dropped his remaining 4 bombs at shacks in the area S of #1 runway with unobserved results.
Lt.PRENTICE flying left wingman made his run east of No. 2 R/W. Only target observed throughout his run was a group of small buildings in a group of trees, all his bombs were dropped there with unobserved results.

b. DETAILS OF GROUND FIRE.

Only tracers reported above were seen.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil interception.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OUR PLANES.

Nil damage sustained.

e. PERSONNEL INJURIES

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be recommended as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

66 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs dropped on target.
6 X 100 lb. Parademo bombs returned to base.
10,800 X. 50 Cal. expended.

6. Buildings in target 11 X appeared only slightly used and in poor condition. Several were observed to have large holes in roof and walls.
Docks at Bunawan appeared in use. One derrick on dock appeared in good condition. Nil shipping of any type observed in the area.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Sightings Cont'd)

2 trucks in motion approximately 4 miles NE of R/W #2.
Nil A/P's observed on drome.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Very little results of this Squadron's attack is shown on prints received, therefore no further interpretation was made.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Route Overlay
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



ROUTE OVERLAY

Mission FFO 352-D-2 | 17 December, 1944 | Licanan A/D
499th Bomb Squadron | T.O.T. 0955/I | Minimum Altitude



Mission FFO 352-D-2 17 December,1944 Licanan A/D
T.O.T. 0955/I Minimum Altitude o Bombs Dropped

Ref: Licanan Target Map 1/20,000

499
354-D-1
19 Dec 44

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

21 December,1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 354-D-1, performed 19 December,1944. Objective; Barges and small shipping DAVAO RIVER MOUTH, MINDANAO, P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 19 December, this squadron along with the 498th Squadron were ordered to conduct a strike against barges at both the DAVAO RIVER MOUTH and the West coast of SAMAL IS. This Squadron was assigned the DAVAO RIVER AREA, while the 498th hit SAMAL IS. Six (6) planes of this squadron participated in the attack, each carrying a load of six (6) 100 lb. free falling parademo bombs and a maximum load of ammunition for the strafing guns. The attack was carried out as planned and was successful. One lugger was hit, 2 barges were sunk and several others were damaged. Planes refueled at MOROTAI on return, then came direct to base.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The 2 squadrons made their rendezvous over the water just south of MOKMER, shortly after take off.

No fighter cover was provided, therefore no fighter rendezvous was made.

c. ATTACK

Heavy concentration of A/A guns and the fact that only one Squadron was to attack, left this squadron with only one choice, to attack from the lowest possible altitude, thus hoping to achieve the element of surprise and catch the gun crews unprepaired. The fact that practically no A/A fire was received and that personnel were seen running for cover during the attack showed that the plan adopted was successful.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Attack Cont'd)

The Squadron in 2,three plane flights, made the attack from SW - NE coming inland just West of MATINA A/D. Both flights made the attack at the DAVAO RIVER MOUTH bombing and strafing barges and small shipping there. A total of 72 X 100 lb. free falling parademo bombs were dropped and 5000 X.50 Cal. ammunition was expended in the attack. Several hits were scored on a lugger leaving it damaged, 2 barges were definitely hit and sunk and several others damaged. A fire with smoke up to 1000 feet (possibly barges) was started on the east bank of the river. Due to the unsually low altitude, terrain and delayed fuse on bombs,the above results were the only ones observed. The Squadron then made a sharp 180° turn to the right and headed down DAVAO GULF for the return to base. Planes stopped at MOROTAI to refuel and returned direct to base.

d. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	MOKMER DROME	0545/I
T.O.T.	DAVAO RIVER MOUTH	1042/I
Landed	MOROTAI	1255/I
T.O	MOROTAI	1355/I
Landed	MOKMER DROME	1655/I

f. ROUTE

Out: MOKMER DAVAO GULF TARGET.

In : TARGET MOROTAI MOKMER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN THE MISSION.

This Squadron led by 1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD was set up as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD	A/P	163	2nd.Lt.J.C.RIEKE	A/P	203
2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	"	013	2nd.Lt.J.F.POWELL	"	014
2nd.Lt.N.A.SMITH	"	185	2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	"	174

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

Details of Individual Action.

Lt.BOYD, leading the first flight strafed and bombed a group of small barges on the river bank and started a fire. Lt.PHILLIP flying on his wing, scored hits on a lugger and damaged it. Lt.ANDREWS flying left wing in the #2 flight scored a direct hit on a barge sinking it. No other details can be listed since the above results were the only results observed.

b . DETAILS OF GROUND FIRE.

Slight, light inaccurate M/G fire from area approximately 2000 yards E of the S end of MATINA A/D. No other fire received.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION.

Nil Interception encountered.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

Nil planes this squadron damaged.

e. PERSONNEL INJURIES.

No injuries or casualties suffered.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be recommended as result of this mission.

5. TABLES

72 X 100 lb. free falling parademo bombs dropped.
5000 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

6. SIGHTINGS

Approximately 6 barges and 2 luggers observed in the mouth of the DAVAO RIVER.
1 twin-engine u/I bomber on West side of the runway approximately 1000 feet N of the S end of the runway with personnel sitting on wings.
2 fighters (one probably serviceable) approximately 2000 feet N of the S end of the runway.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Sightings Cont'd)

1 lugger 100 yards S of the mouth of DAVAO RIVER.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Photos taken show 1 small serviceable freighter (100-150) tons, 2 luggers and approximately 20-25 small barges, which many appear damaged and unserviceable.
Photos also confirm the sinking of at least 1 barge and the fire reported.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Route Overlay.
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I- A-L



ROUTE OVERLAY

Mission FFO 354-D-1
T.O.T. 1042/I
Minimum Altitude

18 December,1944
499th Squadron

Davao River Mouth.



Mission FFO 354-D-1 | 19 December,1944 | 499th Squadron.
Davao River Mouth | T.O.T. 1042/I | Minimum Altitude.

Ref: (Davao Target Map1/20,000).

CONFIDENTIAL

499
366-A-4
31 Dec 44

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

4 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Mission FFO 366-A-4, performed 31 December, 1944 with objective at Airdromes in Northern NEGROS ISLAND, P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 31 December,1944, six B-25-J(s of this squadron took off from TANUAN AIRDROME, LEYTE IS. to attack enemy dromes on NE NEGROS Is. (For particular airdromes see attached overlay) The strike was made in conjunction with 12 other planes from the 345th Bomb Group with this squadron leading. The purpose of the mission was to neutralise enemy air opposition to Allied shipping operations at MINDORO by destroying all possible staging bases. The mission was carried out as planned and eight possible staging dromes were covered. These fields were apparently in disuse, most being bomb pitted and overgrown with grass; many were still littered with debris and unserviceable planes from previous raids. Since no serviceable enemy planes were sighted, damage was restricted to a few buildings, and minor installations. The mission logged four hours and fifteen minutes.

b. RENDEZVOUS

Group Rendezvous was accomplished at 1500 feet over TANUAN AIRDROME, Leyte Is.

c. ATTACK

The squadron maintained a formation of 2 flights with 3 planes each, javelin down, throughout the attack on eight separate airfields. The route of attack was from E to W across the N extremity of NEGROS then S along the W coast breaking off just S of BINALBAGAN AIRFIELD. During the attack, which lasted some twenty minutes, a total of 384 X 23 lb. parafrags were dropped with the following dispersion:

ALICANTE	36 bombs.	TALISAY	60 bombs
MALOGO	24 bombs.	BACALOD	12 bombs
SARAVIA	24 bombs.	LA CARLOTA	12 bombs
SILAY	132 bombs.	BIMALBOGAN	64 bombs

In addition each of these dromes and another, FABRICA, received a thorough strafing from the 9 forward firing fifties in each B-25 so that whatever targets were present received some attention. In general, results were indefinite owing to the paucity of targets, but at SILAY 2 small fires were started and a group of buildings at the NE end of the R/W were hit. At the SW end of the small strip a camouflaged revetment, housing an u/i object, possibly a plane was hit. At BIMALBOGAN several bombs fell in the vicinity of some small buildings W of the strip with undetermined damage.

d. INTERCEPTION

There was no interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	LEYTE	1225/I
T.O.T.	AIRDROMES N.W.NEGROS	1335-1358/I
LANDED	LEYTE	1640/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN MISSION.

This squadron was led by Capt.F.N. FOX and consisted of the following pilots and planes:

First Flight		Second Flight	
Capt.F.N.FOX	A/P 205	Capt.R.E.TODD	A/P 168
2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	" 013	2nd.Lt.W.R.NAAS	" 174
1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD	" 198	2nd.Lt.J.E.SLAUGHTER	" 185

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) Details of individual actions.

In view of the nature of this mission, no account of individual action is included. There were no incidents worthy of mention, and such account would add nothing to the report which is not already covered.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR OR ON THE GROUND.

Nil enemy A/P's damaged either in the air or on the ground.

Three planes of this squadron sustained minor damage. Plane #205 received a jagged hole about 6" radius in the lower portion of the fuselage at the rear hatch. Repairs will require an estimated five days. Plane #174 received a bullet hole in the upper turret and plane #185 was holed by a machine gun bullet in the left engine.

c. DETAILS OF A/A OPPOSITION

Moderate, light and medium, accurate A/A fire was received at SILAY with muzzle flashes being seen from an apparent 25 mm position located about 300 feet from the center of the R/W on the S side. A gun position containing a single medium gun, probably another 25 mm, is located an approximate 500 feet due W of this same R/W. Seven bursts of medium A/A were seen between the first and second flights with one burst very close to the lead plane. It is believed at this point that A/P No.205 was hit. Nothing but small arms fire was received from the balance of the airdromes.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil injuries sustained.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be given as a result of this mission.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE REPORT

384 X 23 lb. parafrag dropped on the target.
36 X 23 lb. parafrags returned to base.
12 X 23 lb. Parafrags salvoed on return.

18,000 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

6. SIGHTINGS

Nil important sightings reported.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos were taken but have not yet been developed.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1 (Map Overlay of dromes attacked.)



499th Squadron
Mission FFO 366-A-4
31 December, 1944.
T.O.T. 1335-1358/I
Altitude: Minimum

To

From



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Jan 15 — Rly
Dr. Order

NOLEX LA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
1-A-1
1 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

20 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission 1-A-1, 1 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL,FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the first mission of 1945 six planes each loaded with 72 parafrags, of the 499th Bomb Squadron were scheduled to strike at LAOAG AIRDROME in LUZON, but owing to a red alert at TACLOBAN AIRDROME at take off time only three planes succeeded in getting into the air. These three took off at five minute intervals commencing at 0130/I with each plane going in on the target alone. Two of the planesreached the primary target but the third be cause of a miscalculated ETA, missed LAOAG and turned back to hit LEGASPI which had been assigned as an alternative drome. Of the twoplanes to reach the primary only one dropped bombs, the other unable to locate a suitable target. Results, both here and at the secondary, where 72 bombs had also been dropped, were undetermined.

2. OBJECTIVE

The primary target was selected as being one of the largest airdromes in N LUZON where it was thought numerous enemy airplanes might be caught on the ground as the JAPS brought in air reinforcements from CHINA and FORMOSA. Airplanes in the revetments and dispersal areas were the specific objects of attack.

3. ATTACK

a. The two B-25-J's which succeeded in reaching the primary, approached LAOAG from the N, making their individual runs on an almost due S heading, one pilot dropping his bombs where he figured he was over the field, the other holding his for lack of sufficient sighting. Bombs were seen to burst but damage could not be determined. Neither plane strafed. At the secondary, all the parafrags of the single plane hitting it were dropped but again results were indefinite.

b. The following pilots and planes completed the mission:

Capt. W.D.DECKER - A/P 198 - 2nd.Lt.B.J.BILLINGS A/P 185 - 2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS 166

c. At LAOAG AIRDROME, A/A fire was heavy, slight and inaccurate flashes bein seen S of the field, at an approximate position 18° 08'N 120° 33'E.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L

(Par.3c Cont'd)

Two large flashes were seen over the target at LEGASPI but whether these were A/A or aerial bombs could not be determined. There was no other oppesition and no damage was sustained by our planes or personnel.

4. COMMENTS

The probable negligibleresults of this mission may in part be due to the fact thatthe crews were new to this type mission and knew not quite to expect. Furthermore, their targets heretofore had been of such type and nature as to stand out from the background, rather than blend with it as do the sod covered R/W's of LUZON .

5. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendations for awards and citations forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0130/I	TACLOBAN
Attack	0502-15/I	Primary
	0535-40/I	Secondary
Landed	0620 - 0855/I	TACLOBAN

b. ROUTE

Out: LEYTE, MASBATE, SE LUZON, W COAST LUZON, TARGET.

In : W COAST LUZON, SE LUZON, MASBATE LEYTE.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover prévided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

CA:/jdj

18 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 1-A-3, 1 January 1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A. C. of S., A-2.

1. Thirteen planes of the 345th Group took off again on the afternoon of New Years Day, and attacking once again the dromes in Northern NEGROS - FABRICA and TALISAY this time. The results were not very gratifying and not worth the loss of one of our planes and crews, which was shot down by A/A fire over FABRICA. At FABRICA 32 100-pounders were dropped starting five fires - one of which was of a fairly good size. Bombs were also dropped in the military camp scoring hits on four small buildings there. Sixty hundred-pounders were dropped at TALISAY with generally unobserved results. A few bombs hit at SILAY and a few at BACOLOD also with no visible results. All strips were thoroughly straffed, results included a truck damaged, and several small shacks set afire.

2. To keep the enemy's air bases neutralized by constant vigilance was the objective of this strike - not so much to render his strips unserviceable, which is an almost impossible task, but to knock out any planes he might bring in to these fields was the specific target.

3. a. Lead by the 501st Squadron with Capt Jones as No. 1 man, the strike force included four B-25-J's from that squadron, seven from the 500th, and two from the 498th. The targets were hit in two-plane elements from a variety of headings, so that each would be well covered.

b. Planes and pilots who participated in this strike were:

501st Sqdn		500th Sqdn		498th Sqdn	
Capt Jones	A/P 016	Lt Symington	A/P 783	Lt McKenny	A/P 044
Lt Stone	A/P 020	Lt Buffington	A/P 033	Lt Cowan	A/P 045
Lt Gross	A/P 041	Lt Schmidt	A/P 127		
Lt Lamar	A/P 009	Lt Thompson	A/P 187		
		Lt Canning	A/P 007		
		Lt Baker	A/P 888		
		Lt Smith	A/P 179		

c. Our planes hit the various strips assigned and included two "extras" for good measure - SILAY and BACOLOD. Results however were generally unobserved, although several small fires and one slightly larger were started at FABRICA. However, all the pilots were of the opinion that they had added little to the previous destruction.

Narrative Report on Mission FFO 1-A-3, 1 Jan 1945 (cont'd)

d. The enemy opposed our strike principally with M/G fire which was slight to moderate, and accurate to inaccurate, and seemed to be coming from the old operations building to the East of the center of the R/W. However, the gunners were accurate in one instance, as one plane No. 179 of the 500th Squadron was shot down over FABRICA. The plane was seen to crash and explode 500 to 1000' North of the North end of the R/W. According to witnesses there could have been no survivors of this crash. The following men are, therefore, listed as "Killed in Action"-:

2nd Lt Roy E. Smith	O-705445	Pilot
2nd Lt John S. Palmer	O-822530	Co-pilot
2nd Lt Harvey W. Stork	O-704619	Navigator
S/Sgt Richard J. Furlong	12033409	Armorer Gunner
Sgt Robert C. Norton	12080938	Radio Gunner
Cpl Earl L. Hardison	14137243	Engineer

4. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions justifying awards on this strike.

5. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off: 1331 to 1334/I from DULAG
Attack: 1438 to 1500/I at FABRICA and TALISAY
Landing: 1608 to 1615/I at DULAG

b. Route: DULAG-NORTH LEYTE-NORTHERN TIP CEBU-FABRICA-TALISAY-RETURN.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

499
2-A-2
2 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

4 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 2-A-2, performed 2 January, 1945. Objective; Primary, PORAC and FLORIDA BLANCA Airdromes. Secondary; BATANGAS A/D., LUZON, P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On 2 January 1945, six B-25-J's from the 499th Bombardment Squadron led 18 additional B-25's from the three other squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group in a strike on three airfields at LUZON ISLAND. The primary target was the two airfields: PORAC and FLORIDA BLANCA; the Secondary was BATANGAS. Three squadrons of P-38's were to supply fighter cover, but weather forced them back in the vicinity of CALAGUA IS. and the bombers had to attack without protection. Enroute one plane of this squadron dropped out of formation about 40 miles NE of POLILLI Is. when an engine cut out,and headed back to base accompanied by a sister plane from the 500th Squadron. The crippled plane ditched forcibly and broke up sinking almost immediately. Four crew members, one apparently seriously injured were last seen in two rafts close together at 15° 00'N - 122° 50'E and were drifting toward JOMALIG Is.(At the time of the report). Search is still being made and no reports of any rescue have yet beenreported. The remaining five planes from this squadron went over the general area of the primary target but were unable to locate it and so continued on to BATANGAS.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was accomplished at 1500 feet over TANAUAN AIRDROME and planes were on course at 0750/I.

Rendezvous with the fighters was accomplished off the NE coast of LEYTE at 0820/I.

c. ATTACK

The five planes which reached the secondary went over the target from land to sea on an approximate ENE-WSW heading, dropping a total of 252-23 lb. parafrags on the airdrome area. Most of these fell on a concentration of general purpose buildings on the E side of the runway just N of the S dispersal loop, with others trailing across the NE third of the runway proper and through the dispersal area.

The attack was made at minimum altitude at an IAS of 250 mph. The entire runway and dispersal area received a thorough strafing but results were undstermined owing to the speed of the planes and the nature of the bomb load. There appeared to be little activity at the airdrome.

d. INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.
Nil A/P's of this squadron were destroyed or damaged as a result of aerial combat.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	Tacloban Airdrome, Leyte Is.	0717/I
T.O.T.	Batangas Airdrome, Luzon Is.	1119/I
Landed	Tacloban Airdrome, Leyte Is.	1415/I

f. Route:

Out: Leyte - SE Luzon - Polillo Is - Florida Blanca - Target.

In : Marinduque Is. - Masbate - Base.

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING IN MISSION.

a. The Group formation was led by the 499th Squadron arranged in two plane elements, javelin down, with the 500th and 498th Squadrons on either wing and the 501st Squadron bringing up the rear. In the attack the formation regrouped into the shallow "V".

This squadron was led by Capt.F.N.FOX and consisted of the following planes and pilots.

First Flight		Second Flight	
Capt.F.N.FOX	A/P 163	Capt.R.E. TODD	A/P 166
2nd.Lt.W.R.NAAS	" 174	1st.Lt.C.R.SMITH	"

Third Flight

1st.Lt.M.J.OPIE	A/P 785 *
2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	" 185

* Plane missing.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. DETAILS OF ATTACK

Capt.FOX regrouped the formation for the attack by making a 360° turn to the left, each squadron attacking planes abreast. Capt.Fox dropped 60 ~~48~~ X 23 lb. parafrags on the target in a line beginning at the buildings NW of the dispersal loop continuing diagonally across the N half of the runway and terminating at the road running NW from the town. ~~60~~ Lt.NAAS, flying on the leader's right wing also dropped ~~48~~ parafrags in a line directly paralleling that of Capt.Fox. Capt.TODD dropped all his bombs in the water when they hung up over the target and none released. Lt.PHILLIPS farthest to the N toggled along the NW side of the runway and dropped a total of 60 bombs. Lt.SMITH, flying on his leader's left wing dropped 72 bombs through the dispersal loop and across the SW end of the strip. The only results observed were hits in the vicinity of some wrecked planes in the dispersal area at the SW end of the runway.

b. A/A FIRE

The only fire received was from machine guns on the NW side of the runway just off the center of the strip. Flashes were seen in this area.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND A/P's DESTROYED IN COMBAT.

Nil interception encountered.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

One plane this squadron was forced down at sea plane was last seen turning and heading to base with one engine out this plane made a crash landing & crew members were seen to board a raft the latest information received this office was that 1 crew member was picked up by a Catalina off the coast of Patnanongan Is. Other crews/members are still missing.

Listed below are names of missing crew members.

1st.Lt. M.J. OPIE	Pilot
2nd.Lt. A.RODEGHIER	Navigator
S/Sgt.L.CURTISS	Radio Operator
S/Sgt.S.D.CALENGOR	Engineer
S/Sgt.J.H.PARKS	Armor-Gunner

Note: Due the fact that service records have not yet arrived this station, Serial Numbers cannot be forwarded.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for any awards or citations will Be forwarded as a result of this mission.

5. ARMAMENT AND AMMUNITION REPORT

252 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.
84 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped in water on return.
24 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs returned to base.

10,450 X.50 Cal. ammunition expended in strafing.

6. SIGHTINGS

Wrecked planes sighted SE in dispersal area and at SW end of the runway at Batangas. Six dummy planes are located on N.W. side of strip at N.W. third of Batangas Drome.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

There is little of value or interest shown in the photographs redeived except that of photo #5-O-119 taken by A/P #174 shows that M/V reported as unserviceable S/C is in fact an unserviceable F/T/D.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Incl:-2
Incl:-1 Route Overlay
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart.



Ref: Aerodrome Status Map Intelligence Summary No.245.

ROUTE OVERLAY

499th Bomb Squadron
Batangas A/D

Mission FFO 2-A-2
T.O.T. 1119/I

2 January, 1945
Minimum Altitude



BOMB ASSESSMENT CHART

Mission FFO 2-A-2 | 2 January,1944 | 499th Bomb Squadron
Batangas A/D | T.O.T. 1119/I | Minimum Altitude

499
3-A-2
3 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

6 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report for Missions 3-A-2, 3-A-4 performed 3 January, 1945. Objective Airdromes N.NEGROS IS. P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 3 January,1945, 5 B-25-J's of this squadron participated with planes from 3 other squadrons in a strike on 9 airdromes located along the NW and N coasts of NEGROS ISLAND. Three planes forming "B" Flight were to hit the five enemy fields of BINALBAGAN, LACARLOTA, BACOLOD, TALISAY and SILAY in the general direction S to N and the other two A/P's or "A" Flight were to strike at MALOGO, ALICANTE, CAROLINA and FABRICA A/D's, proceeding in the general direction W to E, hitting each in the order listed. All 5 planes completed their mission, only SILAY and ALICANTE being missed. All other fields were either bombed or strafed or both.
In the afternoon of the same day, 4 B-25-J's from this squadron took off to again hit the same airdromes, this time with all planes hitting the entire 9 airfields but reversing the pattern of attack, first crossing the N extremity of the island from E to W then heading S to break off at LaCARLOTA. In the afternoon as in the morning, few worthwhile targets were seen, and little specific damage was done. The dromes appearing for the most part to be in disuse the majority being unserviceable.

b. RENDEZVOUS

There was no rendezvous in the morning, each flight going over the target alone. In the afternoon strike, rendezvous with the 498th Squadron was accomplished over water NW of TACLOBAN.

c. ATTACK

In the nine sorties on this day a total of 133 X 23 lb. para-frags and 12 X 100 lb. parademos were dropped on enemy airdromes with the following dispersion:

Fabrica	6 X 100 lb.	24 X 23 lb. parafrags.
Carolina	2 X 100 lb.	12 X 23 lb. parafrags.
Maloga	2 X 100 lb.	Saravia 2 X 100 lb.
Bacalod	12 X 23 lb. parafrags	
Talisay	61 X 23 lb. parafrags.	
Silay	24 X 23 lb. parafrags.	
Alicante	12 X 23 lb. parafrags.	

The only specific damage observed was at FABRICA where 3-4 centuries hit among buildings and a loading platform located on the W side of the R/W opposite the northernmost half of the strip resulting in a small column of smoke as the planes pulled away.

d. INTERCEPTION

Nil Interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

	"A" Flight	"B" Flight
T.O.	Tacloban 0935/I	Tacloban 0930/I
T.O.T.	Maloga -Fabrica 1045-59/I	Binalbagan-Silay 1045-1105/I
Landed	Tacloban 1205/I	Tacloban 1200/I

Second Strike:

T.O.	Tacloban	1500/I
T.O.T.	Fabrica - Bacolod	1545-1615/I
Landed	Tacloban	1745/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING ON MISSION

"A"Flight		"B" Flight	
1st.Lt.C.R.SMITH	A/P 014	Capt.R.E.TODD	A/P 166
2nd.Lt.J.E.SLAUGHTER	198	2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE	" 030
		2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	013

On the afternoon mission Capt.DECKER, the Commanding Officer flying A/P #163 replaced Lt.SLAUGHTER and Lt.Smith flew with the 498th."B" Flight remained intact.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION

No details of individual action is included since results are covered in Par.1 c.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO PLANES IN THE AIR OR ON GROUND

Nil enemy planes damaged either in the air or on ground.

c. DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

A/P #198 sustained repairable damage when a 20 mm hit the left engine and holed the plane in two places on the left side of the fuselage. A/P #013 sustained slight tear in the upper surface of the left wing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-IA-L

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

5. ARMAMENT REPORT

(Morning Mission)

61 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.
12 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. bombs dropped on target.
72 X 23 lb. parafrags salvoed in water.
71 X 23 lb. parafrags returned to base.

(Afternoon Mission)

72 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.
180 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs returned to base.
36 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs salvoed.

7300 X .50 Cal. ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

One SSF believed to be serviceable is located on SW end of BACOLOD runway in dispersal area.
Two M/T in good condition were parked on road E of N end of the same runway.
Five wooden luggers about 50 feet long were sighted in dry docks or ship yards at FABRICA on E side of river.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

The photos conform the general unserviceability of strips and planes as reported by the combat crews. One or two planes might possibly be serviceable but the heavy camouflage makes definite determination impossible.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart Morning Mission.
Incl:-2 Bomb Assessment Chart Afternoon Mission.

C -O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


PANAY
NEGROS
GUIMARAS IS
CABOLINA (2 X 100 lb)
B"FLT
SARAVIA (2 X 100 lb)
MALOGO (2 X 100 lb)
FABRICA (6 X 100 lb)
TALISAY (6 1 X 23 lb)
BACOLOD (12 X 23 lb)
A FLT.
LA CARLOTA (STRAFED)
BINALBAGAN (STRAFED
TAÑON STRAIT
CEBU
BOHOL
SIQUIJOR IS.
Morning Mission
FFO 3-A-2
3 Januarry, 1945.
499th Squadron
T.O.T. "A" Flight 0935/I
"B" Flight 0930/I


N
PANAY
ALLANTE
CAROLINA (12x23#)
(12x23#)
FABRICA (24x23#)
MALOGO (STRAFED)
SILAY (24x23#)
TALISAY (STRAFED)
BACOLOD (STRAFED)
GIIMARAS IS
TANON STRAIT
CEBU
NEGROS
BOHOL
SIQUIJOR IS.
Afternoon Mission
FFO 3-A-2
3 January, 1945.
499th Squadron
T.O.T. 1545-1615/I

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
4-A-3
4 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

5 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report for Mission FFO 4-A-3, performed 4 January,1945. Objective; FLORIDA BLANCA AIRDROME, LUZON, P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 4 January,1945, three B-25's of this squadron participated in a strike on FLORIDA BLANCA AIRDROME, LUZON, P.I. The entire strike force consisting of three squadrons of B-25's with 1 squadron of P-38's furnishing fighter protection. One plane this squadron turned back shortly after leaving base when engine trouble developed, leaving but two planes to complete the mission. These two joined the planes of the 501st Squadron in going over the target. FLORIDA BLANCA was strafed and some bombs were dropped, but the greater part of the bomb load was dropped on PORAC AIRDROME a smaller field about 5 miles N of the assigned target, doing some damage. The nature of the airdromes - their grass covering and the lack of clearly marked runways and boundaries - coupled with the low altitude and high speed with which the planes attacked served to make positive identy of the field extremely difficult and contributed to the confusion of targets. The planes returned to base six hours and fifty minutes after take off.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group Rendezvous was made over the water just NW of TACLOBAN. Fighter rendezvous was accomplished just off the coast SW of MINDORO IS.

c. ATTACK

The two planes of this squadron joined up with 3 in the lead squadron and attacked in a formation of five planes abreast. The attack was conducted from N to S at the lowest possible altitude at about 230 mph, the pilots having to throttle back due to the length of the run. Our two planes dropped 108 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs on the northernmost field, PORAC, and several falling int o the revetment area at the N end of the field and hitting two planes of u/i type. One of these was definitely serviceable.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Twenty-four parafrags were dropped on FLORIDA BLANCA and some of these fell among a concentration of 4 SSF, probably destroying at least one. The enemy fighters were heavily camouflaged but gave the appearance of being serviceable. Both POVAC and FLORIDA BLANCA were thoroughly strafed by both planes, approximately 2200 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition being expended.

d. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	TACLOBAN AIRDROME	0830/I
T.C.T.	FLORIDA BLANCA A/D	1215-18/I
Landed	TACLOBAN AIRDROME	1520/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

a. The Group formation was led by the 501st Squadron with the 500th and 499th participating.

b. The 499th squadron was led by 1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD in A/P #013, 2nd.Lt.W.R.NAAS in A/P #163 turned back and Lt.B.J.BILLINGS flying A/P #030 who along with Lt.BOYD reached the target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Individual action.

Since no individual incidents occurred which would add value to the report, no such account is included.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND.

1. No enemy aircraft were damaged in the air, but 2 and possibly three were destroyed on the ground.

2. There was no damage suffered to planes of this squadron.

c. DETAILS OF A/A OPPOSITION

Slight to moderate, inaccurate M/G fire was received over both fields. Tracers were seen but gun positions were undetermined.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil casualties.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for any awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. Armament and Ordnance Report

132 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on targets.
12 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs returned to base.
2500 rds .30 Cal. expended in strafing.

6. CIVILIANS

A convoy consisting of 3 S/C, 1 FTD and 2 u/i small craft were sighted at 1103/I 9 mile off the W coast of Luzon from Maloma to Dasac. Convoy heading N and traveling 8 knots.
Twelve SCT and 2-3 FBT apparently serviceable were sighted on a sod covered field in the vicinity of Clark Field (Believed to be Mabalacat Airdrome Runway 11).
One small lugger of VA type seen stationary just off coast at Subic Bay.

7. PHOTOGRAPHY

Photos 2-0-26, 2-0-27 and 2-0-29 taken by A/P013 show bombs scoring a hit on a probably camouflaged revetment.

Photos 1-0-5 and 1-0-6 taken by A/P #030 reveals two P/A of uncertain serviceability and one definitely unserviceable.

Photos 1-0-20, 1-0-21 and 1-0-22 from the same plane show the line of bombs falling through an apparent camouflaged dispersal area.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl:-1
Route Overlay

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



Ref: Aerodrome Status Map Intelligence Summary No.245

ROUTE OVERLAY

499th Bomb Squadron	Mission FFO 4-A-3	4 January, 1945
T.O.T. 1216-18/I	Minimum Altitude	Florida Blanca A/D

Due to reasons stated in Par.1a No Bomb Assessment Chart is being forwarded.

497
6-A-2
6 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

8 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 6-A-2, performed 6 January,1945. Objective: FABRICA, BACOLOD and SILAY AIRDROMES, N.NEGROS IS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 6 January,1945, six B-25-J's from the 499th Bomb Squadron, in conjunction with six other B-25's from the 500th Squadron, took off to attack the three enemy airfields of BACOLOD, SILAY and FABRICA, all located in N NEGROS IS. Two planes from this squadron turned back because of mechanical trouble leaving four to reach the target. All but 2 of the 48 bombs carried were dropped within the assigned areas but due to the paucity of targets little damage was observed. The greatest concentration of bombs was dropped on SILAY according to plan and all 3 fields were thoroughly strafed. Except for the continued accuracy of enemy A/A fire over these fields, there occurred little of note. One plane from the 500th Squadron was ditched, but all crewmen were promptly rescued by a "Cat", our planes remaining in the ditching area until help arrived. Because of this the time consumed in the strike was slightly in excess of that contemplated, but all planes were back at base within three hours and twenty minutes after take-off.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The group rendezvous was accomplished over the water just NE of TACLOBAN.

There was no fighter cover.

c. ATTACK

The group flew down the E coast of LEYTE, cut W through the mountain pass inland from ABUYOG, continued on the same heading across CEBU and hit the E coast of NEGROS, just S of REFUGIO IS.

Here they regrouped for the attack and came down the BAGO RIVER between Mt.MANDALGAN and CANLAON VOLCANO, and out on to BACOLOD AIRDROME on an approximate E-W heading. This drome received a thorough strafing and 4 X 100 lb. parademos were dropped across the strip. No specific damage was observed. The planes circled left out over the sea and sped North towards SILAY. At SILAY they again strafed across the field, this time from S-E to NW and dropped a total of 30 X 100 lb. parademos mostly concentrated in the runway and dispersal area. From SILAY they continued out over the water and swung NE following the coastline to CADIZ where they again cut inland and descended on their last target, FABRICA. At this field they dropped 12 X 1001b. parademos on the N end of the runway and through the NE dispersal loop and strafed all the way through. Again, because of scanty observed targets, little damage was visible as the planes broke off the attack and headed back to base. Approximately 8000 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition were expended.

d.INTERCEPTION

There was no interception.

e.TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	Tacloban A/D	0830/I
T.O.T.	Bacolod A/D	0924/I
	Silay A/D	0934/I
	Fabrica A/D	0953/I
Landed	Tacloban A/D	1150/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. The group Formation was led by the 499th Squadron with the 500th Squadron bringing up the rear.

b. The 499th Squadron formation was led by Capt.R.E.TODD and included the following planes and pilots:

First Flight		Second Flight	
Capt.R.E.TODD	A/P 177	1st.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	A/P 163
* 2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	013	2nd.Lt.J.E.SLAUGHTER	" 203

Turned back before hitting target due to engine trouble.

Third Flight

2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS A/P 180 2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE A/P 030

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Individual Action

Because of the negligible contribution of such reporting on this mission, details of individual action are omitted.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO A/P's IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND.

Two of our A/P's were holed by A/A. A/P No.177 was hit in two places by 20 mm., one shell tearing a hole in the leading edge of the right wing, and one hitting over the lower right package gun. This plane will be grounded an estimated 24 hours for repairs. A/P #130 was holed by m/g fire damage received was slight.

c. DETAILS OF A/A OPPOSITION

At FABRICA, medium, moderate and accurate fire was received from the known 20 mm position approximately 500 feet from the NE end of the runway.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil injuries sustained.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be given as results of this mission.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE REPORT

46 X 100 lb. 4/5 second delay parademos dropped on targets.
24 X 100 lb. 4/5 second delay parademos slavoed.
2 X 100 lb. 4/5 second delay parademos returned to base.

8000 X.50 Cal. expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

One A/P from the 500th Bomb Squadron was seen to ditch at 1002/I approximately 1 mile SE of MALOCABOC IS. (N.E.Coast of Negros Is.), at 1100/I the distressed crewmen were rescued by a Catalina.

Three to four revetments loaded with oildrums were noticed among trees about 1000 feet W of the S end of BACOLOD runway.
A S3F and a TEB, both of which were apparently servicaable were observed on the area opposite the North 1/3 of the runway between it and the highway.
Flashes of lighe apparently reflected from mirrors were seen about 2 miles due W of Quezon at the foot of Canlaon Volcano.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photos furnish little information of intelligence value, revetments rectangular shacks, cultivated fields and a bomb pitted runway are the only objects revealed.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

1.T.AUGUSTINE
1s t.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 1 (Overlay Maps)



499th
Mission FFO 6-A-2 2 January 45
Fabrica - Bacolod Silay Airdromes
T.O.T. Bacolod A/D 0924/I
Silay A/D 0934/I
Fabrica 0953/I
Min. Altitude

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
7-A-1
7 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

11 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 7-A-1, performed on 7 January,1945. Objective at Clark Field, Manilla, P.I.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 7 January,1945 three bombardment groups for a total of 132 planes coordinated in an attack on CLARK FIELD. The Strike was spearheaded by the 345th Bomb Group, with the Group Commander, Lt.Col.C.A.COLTHARP, leading the entire formation. The other Bomb Groups were the 312th and 417th, both A-20 units. Ten B-25's from the 499th Squadron participated, with all ten reaching the target. It was planned to have two separate waves coverthe target, one wave to consist of 4 squadrons of B-25's flanked on each side by two squadrons of A-20's. The first wave, that of medium and attack planes made the run in a W-E direction, the second from N-S with sufficient time interval being allowed between attacks to permit the first wave to clear the target. Events did not go entirely according to plan however, because the route chosen as the best approach offering maximum radar evasion led through a mountain pass which upon arrival was found to be cloud obstructed. These clouds clustering around the mountain tops precluded a smooth formation through the pass for the planes had more or less to pick their way from one opening to the next to avoid possible peaks. Thus it was that when the planes reached the target they were still in process of regrouping into a proper formation with the result that coverage was not so thorough as it might have been and possibly some enemy planes escaped destruction which they would otherwise have suffered.

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished at 1500' over the water SE of TACLOBAN, with the 312th Bomb Group over TANAUAN and the 417th Bomb Group off the SE tip of MINDORO.

b. Rendezvous with the fighters and wing assembly was made at Dongan Pt. on the W coast of MINDORO.

c. ATTACK

The approach to the target was made through the pass N of Mt.PINATUBO, the planes crossing the target on an approximate NW-SE axis with this squadron on the right flank of the group formation. As previously mentioned, however, the entire formation was still regrouping as they reached CLARK FIELD, with the result that this squadron traversed a path to the S of the planned route. An additional difficulty was experienced when the faster A-20's in trying to get into their proper position slid under our B-25's causing our pilots to hesitate in dropping their bombs and in strafing. The squadron nevertheless did succeed in getting over the target 10 planes abreast, dropping 480 X 23lb. parafrags on CLARK FIELD between runway #3 on the East and runway #5 on the West, definitely destroying 4 SSP, which were left burning and 1 TEB, probably a BETTY, which was seen to explode and burst into flames. In addition a square-roofed building, probablya work or repair shop was badly damaged by a bomb hit directly on the roof, a serviceable camouflaged TEB was strafed and damaged and a u/i non-combatant airplane was probably destroyed as bombs hit within 10-20 feet. Clark Field was strafed from end to end with 16500 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition and it is probable that considerable more damage was done other than that specifically noted. The low altitude great speed and nature of the bomb load all contributing to the difficulty of complete damage assessment. Twenty-four additional parafrags were dropped at Angeles NE runway without noticeable destruction but as the squadron broke off the attack and headed back to base, at least six to eight spperate columns of dark billowing black smoke some to 2000 feet were seen rising at CLARK FIELD. One notable factor in the attack was the employment by the enemy of aerial phosphorous bombs for the first time against this squadron.As a defensive measure in this case it was certainly ineffective, and in view of the difficulty of spotting low flying targets seems likely to remain so. Fighter cover was adequate, no attack being made by enemy fighters which were seen airborne over the field.

d. AIRPLANES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AERIAL COMBAT

There were no airplanes destroyed in aerial combat.

e. AIRPLANES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED ON THE GROUND.

4 SSF and 1 TEB were definitely destroyed.
1 TEB and an unidentified non operational cabin-type monoplane were damaged with the latter probably being destroyed.

f. DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

A/P #030 was lost over the target.

g. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	Tacloban Airdrome	0655/I
T.O.T.	Clark Field,	1025-30/I
Landed	Tacloban Airdrome	1335/I

f. ROUTE

Out: MASBATE, MINDORO, LUBANG LUZON TARGET.

In : TARGET E TIP OF GOLO IS. TACLOBAN

2. FORMATION, PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING.

a. Group

The Group Formation consisted of the 498,499,500 anf 501st Bomb Squadrons in that order.

b. Squadron

The squadron formation, with Capt.F.N.FOX, leading was set up as follows:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.F.N. FOX	A/P	163	Capt.W.D.DECKER	A/P	352
2nd.Lt.W.R.NAAS	"	013	* 2nd.Lt.A.BROWNGARDT	"	030
2nd.Lt.BJ.BILLINGS		166	2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER		030

THRID FLIGHT

1st.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	A/P	205
2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA	"	948
2nd.Lt.M.R.SMITH	"	014
2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	"	180

* Plane crashed ove target.

8. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of Individual Actions

Capt.Fox assembled the squadron soon after take-off and manuevered into the number two position in the Group Formation during t.e rendezvous. This position was maintained until the wing formation reached the pass between the ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS on the vicinity of POONBATO, at which time the formation was to regroup for the attack. Here, however, the aforementioned clouds around the mountain tops made this maneuver impracticable and the planes had to remain bunched until entirely through the pass. As soon as all planes were safely through, Capt.FOX regrouped his planes into a shallow V of 10 planes almost abreast and went over the target. Capt.FOX led his flight down the center of the CLARK FIELD AREA from NW - SE traversing R/W No.3. The principal dispersal area between this runway and runway No.1 continuing on the same heading over the center of runway No.2 and breaking off just beyond the W end of runway No.5. All seventy-two of his parafrags were dropped within the area between runway No.3 and runway #2, 1 TEB - probably a Betty - was hit and exploded and immediately burst into flames. In this same area he toggled his bombs within 5-10 feet of a serviceable but unidentified cabin type monoplane probably employed as a courier or in reconnaissance. Then, sighting another heavily camouflaged TEB he set his sights, and having exhausted his bomb supply, had to content himself with strafing. The left engine of the bomber was hit by his .50 calibers and as the plane pulled away smoke was seen to break out from there. It is certain that this plane was damaged, if only in that one engine.

Lt.NAAS, flying in the No.2 position on his leader's right wing followeda path almost directly paralleling that of Capt.FOX,but his bombs were not observed to hit among anything other than planes previously rendered unserviceable. He did however, line up on a camouflaged bomber to strafe but again no results were apparent.

Lt.SLAUGHTER flying #3 position in the No.1 flight concentrated his attack on revetment area NE of Camp Stotsenburg where he toggled all his bombs. 4 serviceable planes were definitely hit and set afire and a workshop just E of the dispersal area was also set afire by a direct hit on the roof. He also strafed 1 lone serviceable BETTY in the West end of the dispersal area scoring hits, no fire was started on this one plane but damage was inflicted.

Leading the second flight Capt.DECKER made his run NW-SE coming down on the East tip of Camp Stotsenburg and then east between CLARK FIELD #2 and #4. His attack was limited to strafing, no bombs were dropped for fear that his bombs might hit other Allied planes since at several points along his run A-20's were seen crossing his flight path.

The only observed results yielded from his attack was a house type building set afire by his strafing on the East end of Camp Stotsenburg. Capt.DECKER then made his 180° turn, bringing his flight together and in position with the Squadron Formation for the return home.

Lt.BILLINGS flying on the left wing in the #2 flight followed his leader in on the target and made his run parallel to Capt. DECKER's. He dropped his bombs on 6-7 serviceable 2/e and SSF planes on the taxi strip S of taxi loop just S and West of CLARK FIELD #2. Results of his bombing were not observed. No strafing attack was made by this plane since all guns jammed after firing but a few rounds.

Lt.SMELLY, leading the Third Flight in Plane #205 with Lts.SMITH and DEZONIA on his wings drew up abreast and to the right of the lead flight. This position carried him over the reveted dispersal area lying on the western extremity of CLARK FIELD #2. This area commenced on the South side of CLARK FIELD #3 and terminated just N of CLARK FIELD #1. Then he flew on over the apex of the string of buildings stretching from the western end of CLARK FIELD #2 and running back to taxiway North of CLARK #1 then on down directly over the first N-S taxiway on Western edge of CLRK #4. Here he turned to the right and broke off his attack. He dropped a total of 60 X 23 lb. parafrags in his run releasing the first on the Northern side of the reveted dispersal area between CLARK #3 and #1 stringing them on down through the run. The last one falling on the S side of No.4 strip. Only observed result of his attack was several bombs falling on 4-5 u/splanes just S of Clark No.4. He strafed during the entire run but no specific damage was observed.

Lt.SMITH in plane #014 flew #3 position in the third flight. He flew a parallel course with the flight leader. He scored a direct hit on an u/i single engine camouflaged plane parked in the center of his flight path and midway between Clark No.2 and #4. With this exception the remainder of the damage inflicted on his run was unobserved. He dropped all of his 72 bombs.

Lt.DEZONIA flying #2 man in the last flight made his run along the East end of Camp Stotsenburg his bombs were dropped at different intervals between the NE end of Camp Stotsenburg and S past the building area. Results of his attack were not observed. He returned 12 bombs to base.

Lt.DRAPER, flew on the far right of the squadron formation but only dropped 24 of his bombs in the assigned area for fear of doing more damage to the friendly planes from the squadron of A-20's flying on the right flank, who were forced to fly on a lower level owing to the crowding-up caused by the trip through the cloud covered mountain pass.

b. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

One A/P No.030 caught fire in the right engine while still over the target. Pilot attempted to gain altitude but wing of plane crashed into a church steeple causing it to crash into ground and explode.
A/P No.166 was holed in 28 places. One 6" hole in left aileron, balance was minor small caliber bullet holes. The large hole is believed to have resulted from a 20 mm burst.
Six other A/P's were holed on this raid bet all were minor in extent. The holed A/P's were No.163, 013,014 948,352 and 905.

c. A/A FIRE

From the area between CLARK FIELD R/W #3 and R/W #1, intense light and moderate medium fire was received. Greenish white flashes were concentrated in this vicinity. Two or 3 puffs of white smoke were bursting over this area as the planes approached, the altitude of the bursts being approximately that of the planes. While directly over this stretch another 3 bursts of medium A/A were seen some 300 yards distance. On the NW outskirts of ANGELES VILLAGE a probable 20 mm position threw up more of the green and greenish white flashes previously mentioned.
Within the triangle of buildings at BAU JUNCTION, muzzle flashes were seen from a medium gun position. In the vicinity of GUAGUN, a .50 Cal. machine gun located on the approach to a modern steel cantilever bridge fired as the flight passed enroute to base.

d. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

The following Officers and men were killed when A/P 030 was lost:

2nd.Lt.A.BROWNGARDT Jr.	PILOT
2nd.Lt.J.B.BARTLOW	CO-PILOT
2nd.Lt.H.C.LEBECK	NAVIGATOR
S/Sgt.W.H.NOE	ENGINEER
T/SGT.C.H.GILBERT	RADIO
S/Sgt.ENGELHARDT (NMI) von HEBEL	GUNNER

4. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendations made on the basis of this mission.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

5/ ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE TABLE

504 X 23 lb. parafrags dropped on target.
24 X 23 lb. parafrags dropped on Angeles N.E.Adrm.
144 X 23 lb. parafrags returned to base.
16500 X. 50 Cal. ammunition expended in strafing.

6. SIGHTINGS

As planes left target area 7 Hamps and Tojos seen taking off circling for altitude at FLORIDA BLANCA. Several P-38's were heading for airborne enemy.
2 serviceable TEB not in revetments, not camouflaged, were seen in area between FORT STOTSENBURG and NoLR/W.
A white phosphorous aerial bomb burst just above the ground immediately to the left of B-25 this squadron. (Possible source: Airborne Bogie seen over field by another crew).

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

In general, the photographs corroborate combat reports of widespread damage and wrecked planes at CLARK FIELD antecedent to this mission, scarecely a photograph of this area failing to reveal at least one pile of debris, which at one time had been a serviceable airplane.
Photograph #14-0-386 taken by A/P 163, shows the probable destruction of a cabin-type monoplane, previously unreported and indicates also the low altitude at which this pilot was flying during the attack. Comparison with pictures from other planes on this same mission and same formation indicate considerable variation in altitude, several planes being too high making easy targets for A/A.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 2
Incl:-1 Bomb Assessment Chart.
Incl:-2 Route Overlay

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



499th Bomb Squadron
Mission FFO 7-A-1



499th Bombardment Squadron
Mission FFO 7-A-1 7 Jan.45.
T.O.T. 1025-30/I Min Altitude
Red Area indicates area bombed.
Ref: V Bom Com Target Photos
Clark Field, Camp Stotsenburg, Dau Junction


CLARK FIELD NO. 1
CLARK FIELD NO 2
CLARK FIELD NO. 4
CLARK FIELD NO. 5
BUILDINGS
#203
#013
#180
#352
#166
#163

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
8-A-4
8 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

14 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 8-A-4, performed on 8 January, 1945. Objective; FABRICA A/D, NEGROS IS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the morning of 8 January, 1945, five B-25-J's from the 499th Squadron took off to attack FABRICA AIRDROME, NE NEGROS ISLAND, one of the six planes originally scheduled being unable to get off the ground when accidentally damaged in the hardstand. All five planes reached the target, but one was ~~lost~~ over the target, probably due to enemy A/A fire, and another was totally wrecked when a hung-up bomb exploded just off the target necessitating a crash landing at TACLOBAN. Four of the five planes which reached the target dropped 249 X 23 lb. parafrags on the airdrome with indifferent results. Six planes from the 498th Bomb Squadron also participated on this mission.

b. RENDEZVOUS

The Group rendezvous was accomplished at 1500 feet over the water just S of TACLOBAN.
There was no fighter cover.

c. ATTACK

This squadron led in the attack with the 498th Squadron following. On the first run made on an approximate SE-NW heading, the planes missed the target and passed about 1 mile to the north of FABRICA FIELD. They continued on out over the sea in the vicinity of CADIZ however, and made a 360° circle coming again in over land and driving down on the target almost from E to W. The formation at the attack was 5 planes abreast. They went in at minimum altitude showing an IAS of 235 mph. Each plane strafed the particular area which it traversed and, exclusive of the results of the lost plane, all dropped a total of 248 X 23 lb. parafrags. There were only 3 TEB's seen and these were already unserviceable, but one string of bombs was seen to hit in close proximity to one of these in the NE dispersal loop further ensuring its unserviceability. No other targets were seen and no other results were reported.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

d. INTERCEPTION AND AIRPLANES DESTROYED IN THE AIR.

Nil interception encountered.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF

T.O.	TACLOBAN STRIP	0700/I
T.O.T.	FABRICA AIRDROME	0827/I
Landed	TACLOBAN STRIP	1000/I

f. ROUTE

Out: BILIRAN IS. NW CEBU SALAMANCA TARGET.

In : VICTORIA NE NEGROS TACLOBAN.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

This squadron led by Lt.BOYD, consisted of the following planes and pilots:

1st.Flight		2nd.Flight	
1st.Lt.J.B.BOYD	A/P 352	2nd.Lt.J.C.RIEKE	A/P 205
2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE	" 948	**2nd.Lt.M.R.SMITH	" 163
* 2nd.Lt.R.F.KELLEY	" 018	2nd.Lt.C.E.PHILLIPS	" 013

* Did not take off.

** Crashed over target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Details of the Mission

When just about over the target area, Lt.SMITH was evidently hit by machine gun fire for his right wing tank suddenly burst into flames. He attempted to gain altitude and succeeded in climbing gradually for about 2 minutes but then he slowly began to let down finally hitting into a wooded area about 5 miles west of the airdrome and exploding.
After leaving the target area flying at approximately 900 feet just off the NE coast of NEGROS Is., Lt.Boyd heard his wingman radio that he, Lt.Boyd, had a bomb caught in his bomb bay doors. He immediately opened them and two bombs fell out. A third, however, hung up after the parachute caught and the bomb armed itself and exploded when it swung against the belly of the fuselage. The plane immediately caught fire and his wingman advised him to ditch, so he put the nose down and dropped to the deck. Here, though, he found he still had control of the plane so he again climbed to 1000 feet and headed for base.

At Tacloban, he found both tires to be blown out, but nevertheless succeeded in landing his plane roughly but safely.

b. A/A FIRE

Initial interrogation revealed little A/A fire, only one muzzle flash from a known M position in the SE dispersal area and a single puff about 100 yards ahead of the squadron as it pulled into the target being reported. Subsequently however, it was determined that considerable machine gun fire had been observed along the ravine on the E approach to the runway, and it was evidently this fire which accounted for the loss of our airplane.

c. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION

There was no interception encountered.

d. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES

There was one plane lost over the target, one other crash landed at base and is considered total loss, bomb burst under fuselage and came through the bottom and top of the fuselage making a hole approximately 3 feet in diameter.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

The following named Officers and Enlisted Men were lost in plane that crashed over target:

2nd.Lt.M.A. SMITH	PILOT
2nd.Lt.J.P.WITT	CO-PILOT
2nd.Lt.R.G.RAGAN	NAVIGATOR
Sgt.G.L.YOUNG	ENGINEER
S/Sgt.J.W.McDONALD	GUNNER
Cpl.V.N.WALKER	RADIO OPERATOR

Radio man in plane #352 received serious but not fatal injuries.

4. CITATIONS

On the basis of this mission the crewmen of plane #352 will be recommended suitable awards as results of their actions.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE REPORT

249 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs dropped on target.
26 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs salvoed.
12 X 23 lb. bombs returned to base.
1 bomb rack salvoed.
2800 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

C-O-N-F-I-D- E-N-T-I-A-L

6. SIGHTINGS

B-25 #163 flaming near engine nacelle, right wing crashed in clump of trees and exploded 5 miles W of target.
6 A/P's of dubious serviceability at N end SE dispersal loop Fabrica.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

The photographs reveal nothing of value.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: #1 (Route Overlay)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



499th Squadron
Mission FFO 8-A-4 8 January, 1945
Target: Fabrica A/D

499
9-A
9 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

15 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 9-A, 9 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Before daybreak on 9 January, five planes of six scheduled, took off from TACLOBAN STRIP at 2 minute intervals to provide ground support for General MacArthur's Lingayen landing. Each airplane carried 12 100 lb. parademos. For an alternative target the planes were to strike rolling stock and M/T on the railroads and highways of Central and South Luzon. When no target was assigned at the landing area four of five A/P's flying at minimum altitude dropped 48 centuries on this alternative target damaging 2 locomotives, 15 boxcars and 1 coach and probably damaging 4 boxcars. Five boxcars were definitely destroyed. The fifth plane failed to reach the target because of a defective compass.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. The primary objective of this strike was to provide support for the ground forces invading Luzon, a secondary purpose being to harass and tie up transportation in the rear areas, through which any enemy reinforcements would have to move. Attack groups were assigned similar objectives.

b. Particular targets at the primary were to be assigned by "Halifax" the ground control officer, according to the requirements of the situation. Railroad rolling stock and M/T targets of opportunity were the specific objects of attack in the secondary area, with bridges definitely "taboo". This secondary target was broken down into sections, the 499th Squadron being assigned the SE Luzon Peninsula from CALAUAG BAY to LEGASPI.

3. ATTACK

a. Three B-25-J's went over the secondary target together in trail and one attacked alone. All followed an approximate N-S heading.

b. The following pilots and planes were shceduled for the mission:

First Flight		Second Flight		Third Flight	
Capt.R.E.TODD	014	2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	205	2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	188
2nd.Lt.W.R.NASS	948	2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER	013	2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA	203

Plane #1015 did not take off - no lights in pilot's compartment.
Plane #188 returned to base - deficient compass.

c. One camouflaged locomotive was damaged and possibly destroyed at GUMACA with smoke and debris following a near miss. Then, as the planes followed the tracks SE they destroyed 4 boxcars at DEL GALLEGO with a direct hit and possibly destroyed and definitely damaged two to four more by near misses within 5-10 feet at CATABANGAN. At LUPI two boxcars and a locomotive were strafed and damaged and at SIPOCOT a near miss damaged 4 boxcars and cut the RR track. Finally a lone coach was strafed and damaged at PAMPLONA.
In addition at indefinite locations along the route at least five other boxcars were damaged by strafing and six boxcars at a siding were damaged or destroyed when 6 bombs fell nearby one bomb scoring a direct hit on one boxcar. Mission photos received confirm the severance of the track and reveal the extent to which the enemy has resorted to camouflage as a passive defense.

d. There was no damage to either planes or personnel but medium slight and accurate fire was redeived at a point 2 miles S of CATABANGAN. The consussion was felt and a muzzle flash was seen somewhere in the vicinity of CATABANGAN.

4. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

There are no recommendations for awards being made on the basis of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

a. T.O. at 0430/I from Tacloban.
Group Assembly at 0700/I over SE tip LUBANG IS. at 2000 feet.
Attack 0920-1000/I at SE Luzon
Landing 1130/I at Tacloban.

b. Route Out: LEYTE MASBATE MINDORO LUBANG W coast of LUZON.

Route In : SE LUZON SAMAR LEYTE BASE

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
10-A-1
10 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I- A -L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

15 January,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 10-A-1, 10 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 10 January,1945 six A/P's from the 499th Bomb Squadron took off from Tacloban to attack APARRI AIRDROME on N LUZON but owing to engine trouble one of these turned back shortly after take off leaving five to complete the mission. These dropped 228 X 25 lb. parafrags on the secondary target (M/T and railroad rolling stock in SE Luzon) probably damaging 17 boxcars and possibly damaging 1 locomotive and damaging 1 flatcar and 15 additional boxcars. The secondary was hit because weather prevented the planes from reaching APARRI. All planes returned to base safely.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. Aparri Airdrome the closest airdrome to China and Formosa was chosen and the primary target on this particular day in an effort to prevent airborne reinforcements from reaching Central Luzon particularly LINGAYEN GULF, where Allied Ground Forces were attempting to establish a beachead. It was thought probable that enemy air reinforcements employing this drome as a staging area might be caught on the ground. The secondary target was part of a general movement aimed at overland transportation throughout Luzon, to prevent bringing reinforcements into the invasion area.

b. Specifically the squadron was to attack airplanes at Aparri Airdrome and trucks and railroad rolling stock in the secondary area being careful to let alone bridges culverts and permanent installations difficult of replacement.

3. ATTACK

a. Five B-25-J's from this squadron covered the Manila RR from ALONEROS SE to SIPOCOT flying two flights of two plane elements the fifth plane bringing up the rear. Three other squadrons simultaneously attacked this same railroad with two hitting segments farther north and one the 498th Squadron hitting the most southerly portion.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L

b. The following pilots and planes took part in this attack:

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.W.D.DECKER	A/P	203	2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE	A/P	948
2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	"	013	1st.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	"	205

Third Flight

2nd.Lt.T.F.KELLEY	A/P	165	*1st.Lt.C.R.SMITH	A/P	014

* Turned back oil pressure low in left engine.

c. Attacking SE along the SE LUZON section of the Manila RR from Aloneros to Sipocot, the following results were obtained:
At Galimo 12 parafrags were dropped at 3 boxcars and a camouflaged locomotive with unassessable damage.
At a point three miles NW of Del Gallego 12 parafrags were dropped, several hitting within 25 feet of a single flatcar, and at Del Gallego 10 boxcars and a locomotive were strafed with hits being scored on the boxcars. In addition 36 parafrags were dropped with unobserved results.
Again, five miles S of Del Gallego, 24 bombs were dropped at three boxcars and again results went unseen.
Near Pacolago 12 bombs were dropped at a boxcar without observed damage but the car was seen to be hit when strafed on the approach. In Maghoom two of four boxcars were hit by several of 36 parafrags and all four cars were strafed. Just S of Maghoom 24 bombs were dropped at four more boxcars this time resulting in a small fire.
Between Lupi and Sicpcot two boxcars were damaged by strafing and just S of Sipocot a string of 72 bombs paralleled at an approximate line of 12 boxcars and one locomotive.

d. Photographs show bombs being dropped on a train and engine on a siding opposite Catabangan. This was unreported by crewmen but is believed to be the 12 boxcars and engine reported bombed S of Sipocot.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards are being submitted on the basis of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off	0700/I	Tacloban Airdrome.
Group Assembly	0815/I	Over Tacloban at 1500 feet.
Fighter Rendezvous	"	Over Tacloban at 1500 feet.

b. Route

Out: LEYTE MASBATE SE LUZON POLILLO VALLEY COVE, NE LUZON.

In : POLILLO SE LUZON BASE

c. Fighter Cover

Fighter cover was excellent all the way.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
12-A
12 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

17 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 12-A, 12 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six airplanes from the 499th Bomb Squadron took off on the morning of 12 January,1945 to attack railroad rolling stock and motor transportation in CENTRAL LUZON but five turned back at DINGALAN BAY on the E coast of LUZON when they encountered solid weather. One plane making a late take off, followed the 500th Bomb Squadron over the target but did little except drop propaganda leaflets. All six airplanes returned their bombs.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. The strike was intended to dislocate the enemy transportation system concentrated in the Central Luzon area to prevent reinforcements from being sent N to the scene of the Allied invasion at LINGAYEN GULF.

b. Specifically, all types of railroad rolling stock, motor trucks on the highways and any other similar targets of opportunity such as enemy armored units were to be attacked with permanent installations such as b ridges being left alone.

3. ATTACK

a. Lt.HAAS followed the identical route over the target as the 500th Bomb Squadron strafing revetments at SAN MIGUEL AIRDROME without observed result. No bombs were dropped and no photographs were taken. Slight machine gun fire was received from the SAN MIGUEL AIRDROME but this was inaccurate and no damage was done.

b. The following pilots and planes participated in the strike but only Lt.HAAS completed the mission.

First Flight		Second Flight	
2nd.Lt.J.C.RIEKE	A/P 203	2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	A/P 205
2nd.Lt.W.R.HAAS	" 013	2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA	" 948
1st.Lt.M.A.SMITH	" 014	2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER	" 018

4. CITATIONS

This mission provides no basis for recommendations of awards.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off	1020/I	Tacloban Airdrome
Attack	1330-45/I	Minimum Altitude
Landed	1430	Tacloban

No fighter cover was provided for this mission.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

R.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O- N-F-I-D- E-N-T-I-A- L

499
13-A-3
13 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

17 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 13-A-3, 13 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 13 January,1945 three airplanes from the 499th Bomb Squadron (M), loaded with 100 lb. paradsmos completed a low level attack on enemy transportation in the Central Luzon Valley and succeeded in definitely destroying a locomotive and a truck loaded with enemy personnel and in addition either destroying or damaging 20-25 bomars and three more trucks. There was no damage to our planes. Three other planes returned to base before reaching the target, two because of engine trouble and one to act as escort.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. This mission witnessed a continuation of our attempts to insure the speedy progress of our invading ground forces by harassing and disrupting the enemy's supply and transportation system in the LINGAYEN GULF hinterland. One group of A-20's hit the same area just prior to the B-25 strike.

b. In particular, the 345th Bomb Group wwas to attack moving M/T and rolling stock N of MANILA to the "Whitehead Line" which connects CAMILING, MONCADO, MAMPICUAN, LUPAO AND CARRANGLAN. The most concentrated effort to be placed between Tarlac and Cabantuan and the area directly north. This primary target failing to exhaust all bombs and ammunition a church steeple, employed as an observation and air warning station in the town of Baliuage, was to receive iits share of attention.

3. ATTACK

a. The three B-25 J's which reached the assigned target attacked in a general N-S direction, each plane picking it's own route and targets but remaining in sight of each other in event of an emergency.

b. The following pilots and planes participated with only the first three completing the mission:

First Flight		Second Flight	
Lt.Col.C.A.COLTHARP	A/P 013	Capt.R.E.TODD	A/P 303
2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE	" 948	2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	" 205
1st.Lt.R.L.SMELLEY	" 018	2nd.Lt.T.E.KELLEY	" 014

c. RESULTS

A total of 22 X 100 lb. 4/5 sec. delay parademos were dropped in the assigned area with the following assessed damage.
Six to eight boxcars on a siding at SANTA CRUZ were hit by 10 centuries and all were either destroyed or badly damaged. Two motor trucks in this vicinity were damaged when 2 centuries hit nearby. Outside of SANTA ROSA, an enemy truck similar to our 2½ ton GMC was spotted heading N along the highway loaded with enemy soldiers and attacked. The truck was strafed on the way in and 2 100 lb. bombs hit within six feet of either side completely destroying the truck and killing the occupants. At this time frantically trying to dismount. At SAN ROQUE six boxcars were strafed without specific results but 1 mile N of Gapan 2 motor trucks were strafed with hits damaging one and at GAPAN two bombs of four dropped hit within 25 feet of a locomotive definitely destroying it. Before breaking off the attack, 2 final bombs hit in the vicinity of some 10 boxcars standing in a railroad yard of BALINAG, damaging or destroying at least several.
Incomplete photo coverage preludes confirmation of reported damage.

d. OPPOSITION

No damage was done to our planes despite the medium, slight and inaccurate fire which was received from both BALARA and ZAMLAN A/D's. The planes in both cases apparently being out of range.

4. COMMENTS

Although the pinpointing of results and sightings leave much to be desired, it is believed that this is on the main excusable, in that low altitude, high speed and unfamiliar nature of both terrain and target all make for split-second decisions necessarily based on an initial check point, which if incorrect necessarily invalidates the accuracy of all other sightings. Familiarity with the target and location should do much to improve the accuracy of subsequent reportings.

5. CITATIONS

There are no recommendations for awards being submitted.

6. STATISTICS

T.O.	0930	Tacloban Strip
Group Assembly	0940	Over Tacloban 1500'
Attack	1220-1320/I	100 feet.
Landed	1455/I	Tacloban Strip

Route Out: LEYTE SIBUYAN IS. MINDORO W coast Luzon Target
Return : SE LUZON RAGAY GULF MASBATE LEYTE
There was no fighter cover provided.

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
14-A
14 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

18 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 14-A, 14 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 14 January,1945, six planes from the 499th Bombardmend Squadron each loaded with 72 X 23 lb. parafrags, took off from TACLOBAN to attack APARRI AIRDROME on the N tip of LUZON at low altitude. Two planes turned back for mechanical reasons before reaching the target. The four planes reaching the target did little damage, however, because they were unable to get over the airfield.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. APARRI AIRDROME was selected as the primary target for this strike because it was thought to be employed as a staging drome for enemy air reinforcements from CHINA and FORMOSA, APARRI being the closest field in the PHILIPPINES to both these sources of possible air replenishment.

b. The particular aim of this strike was the destruction of any and all grounded airplanes which might be encountered at APARRI.

3. ATTACK

a. Four squadrons of this group went over the target in two waves, each wave consisting of two squadrons or approximately 12 B-25-J's abreast. This squadron formed the right wing of the second wave, planes from the 498th Squadron completing the formation on the left. The attack was made at minimum altitude on an approximate SE to NW heading.

b. The following pilots and planes participated on this mission:

First Flight			Second Flight		
2nd.Lt.T.B.ANDREWS	A/P	205	*2nd.Lt.R.W.DRAPER	A/P	014
2nd.Lt.W.R.NAAS	"	013	**1st.Lt.B.J.BILLINGS	"	198
2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER	"	018	2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA	"	948

* A/P #014 turned back off N tip of LEYTE at 0740/I because of carburetor trouble.
** A/P #198 turned back in vicinity of LIBUYAN IS. at 0820/I because of oil leak in left engine.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. RESULTS

Results were negligible, all four planes of this squadron passing some 3000 feet to the E of the runway. Pictures confirm lack of bombing objects in flight path of this squadron.

d. OPPOSITION

The only opposition encountered was some slight, light and inaccurate fire from a known position just S of the runway about 1000' in from the E end. There was no damage to our planes or personnel.

4. CITATIONS

There are no recommendations being submitted as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Tables

T.O.	0650/I	Tacloban Strip
Group Assembly	0710/I	Over Tacloban 1500 ft.
Fighter Rendezvous	0710/I	Over Tacloban 1500 ft.
Attack	1036/I	Aparri
Landed	1415/I	Tacloban Strip

b. Route

Out: LEYTE MINDORO LUBANG LUZON TARGET.
In : LUZON MARINDUQUE MASBATE BASE.

c. Fighter Cover

Two squadrons of P-51's acted as escort. Cover was excellent.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
16-A-3
16 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

18 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 16-A-3, 16 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the afternoon of 16 January,1945, six planes from the 499th Squadron, each loaded with 72 parafrags, took off from SAN JOSE AIRDROME, MINDORO to attack targets of opportunity around CALABASAN in LUZON, and though all planes covered the assigned area at minimum altitude, few targets were seen and 3 planes made no attack. One locomotive and seven or eight boxcars were damaged, several probably irreparable. All planes returned to TACLOBAN without opposition.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. The mission was in the nature of a nuisance or harrassing strike to disrupt and dislocate enemy transportation and supply routes in the area between MANILA the point of greatest Jap concentration and LINGAYEN the scene of the Allied invasion, the specific target being railroad rolling stock and all types of motor transportation.

3. ATTACK

a. The general run over the target was made from N to S with the squadron being formed into three flights each of two B-25-J's.

b. The following pilots and planes participated on this mission:

First Flight

Capt.W.D.DECKER A/P 203 2nd.Lt.T.F.KELLEY A/P 198

Second Flight

* Capt.R.W.TODD A/P 205 2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE A/P 948

Third Flight

* 2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS A/P 013 * 2nd.Lt.W.J.BILLINGS A/P 018

* Did not drop any bombs.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par.3 Cont'd)

c. In four passes two airplanes dropped 84 X 23 lb. parafrags on a locomotive, seven or eight boxcars and a similar number of flat cars at a siding about a mile S of MASAPANG scoring several direct bomb hits and thoroughly covering the cars with .50 Calibers. Although some of these cars and perhaps the locomotive were previously damaged, many were until this attack still untouched. Photos confirm the extent of the damage.

4. CITATIONS

This strike provides no basis for the recommendation of an award.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	1350/I	San Jose - Mindoro
Attack	1520-35/I	75-100 feet.
Landed	1715/I	Tacloban

b. ROUTE

Out: MINDORO BALAYAN BAY LAGUNA de BAY TARGET.

In : BATANGAS BAY MARINDUQUE SIBUYAN SEA MASBATE BASE.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided for this mission.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T- I-A -L

499
20-A
20 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

22 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 20-A, 20 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 20 January 1945, weather having prevented a strike on the primary target - troop concentration at BASOBASO - five planes from the 499th Bomb Squadron attacked railroad transportation on the BICOL PENNINSULA, SE LUZON and dropped a total of 48 X 100 lb. parademos on rolling stock. This attack conducted at low level along the rails from SIPOCOT to LIGAO, resulted in the destruction of 3 boxcars and 3 passenger cars and in the damaging of 14 other boxcars. In addition one warehouse was completely destroyed. All our planes returned safely to base.

2. OBJECTIVE

This strike was just one more in continuance of our harassing tactics aimed at immobilising enemy transportation throughout LUZON. Railroad rolling stock and highway motor transport were the principal objects of attack.

3. ATTACK

a. Each squadron of the group was assigned a specific section of the MANILA RR, our B-25-J's concentrating on the area between SIPOCOT and LIAGA. The run was made approximately from N to S with the squadron in two 2 plane elements, and one single plane in the slot.

b. The following pilots and planes participated in the attack:

First Flight

Capt.R.E. TODD A/P 205 2nd.Lt.C.K.PRICE A/P 948

Second Flight

2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS A/P 555 *1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY A/P 014

Third Flight

2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER A/P 644 2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA A/P 549

* Lt.WILEY returned early due engine trouble.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par.3 Cont'd)

c. First blood was drawn at SIPOCOT where three passenger cars were definitely destroyed when six centuries landed in their midst. Proceeding So two to four boxcars were damaged and a warehouse was destroyed at LIBMANAN as two planes dropped 24 bombs. At PAMPLONA six boxcars were strafed and two centuries landed close damaging several. Then as the squadron continued on down the penninsula to AGDAGMAN 4 boxcars were damaged by strafing and at LIGAO 4 bombs destroyed 5 boxcars with direct hits. A final attack was made at BINOGSACAN where 2 centuries dropped near 2 boxcars with unobserved results. Only three mission photos were received, but one shows bombs bursting through concentration of barrack type buildings at an unknowntown. There were no losses to our planes or personnel.

4. CITATIONS

There will not be any recommendation for awards submitted on the basis of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0835/I	Tacloban	
Group Assembly	0845/I	Over Tacloban	1500 feet
Attack	1140/I 1152-I	75-125 feet.	
Landed	1320/I	Tacloban	

b. ROUTE

Out: LEYTE MASBATE MARINDUQUE LUZON TARGET.

In : LUZON MOMPOC PASS BURIAS IS. MASBATE BASE.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided for this mission.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
22-A
COL 22 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

24 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 22-A, 22 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six airplanes from the 499th Bomb Squadron took off from TACLOBAN on the morning of 22 January 1945 to attack enemy ground installations on BATAAN PENINSULA. The attack was conducted at low level, each plane carrying 12 X 100 lb. parademo bombs. In the attack two lighthouses, a large warehouse several buildings and a crane were damaged and excellent pictures were taken. All planes returned safely to base.

2. OBJECTIVE

Primarily the object of the mission was to obtain photographs of any and all enemy military installations on and around BATAAN PENINSULA with anti-aircraft, coastal defense and prepared ground defenses, weapons pits pill boxes and entrenchments on the preferred list. Actual attacks on these installations was secondary importance. The particular target area assigned this squadron was thesection of BATAAN along the route from CARUSIPAN - SAN ANTONIO - SAN MARCELINO - CASTILLEJOS - SUBIC BAY - OLANGAPO around the W coast of SUBIC BAY across to DINALUPIHARI and GRANDE IS. in SUBIC BAY which was also designated a target.

3. ATTACK

Six B-25-J's from this squadron went over the target in three 2 plane elements in trail they approached LUZON from the SW out inland on a NE heading at CARUSIPAN and turned SE towards OLANGAPO. Here they followed along the main highway to ORANI and then doubled back W to OLANGAPO, finally cutting across SUBIC BAY to GRANDE IS. after which they broke off the attack and returned to base.

b. The following pilots and planes participated on the mission;

	First Flight		
Capt.W.D.DECKER	A/P 575	2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER	A/P 544
	Second Flight		
2nd.Lt.L.E.DEZONIA	A/P 549	2nd.Lt.T.F.KELLEY	A/P 205
	Third Flight		
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	A/P 948	2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	A/P 014

c. A specific target of more than usual interest in the area to be covered by this squadron was a radar station reported as being on the N shore of the inlet south of OLONGAPO. Everyone set his sights on this object, determined to destroy it, but after 30 bombs had been dropped in its immediate vicinity, without leveling it, the conviction of most crewmen as to the nature of the object were strengthened. It was certainly of far more substantial construction than the ordinary radar tower. Photos reveal the reported radar tower to be a crane of unidentified type and usage, definitely not a radar tower. In any event it was thoroughly damaged. In this same area at OLONGAPO 12 centuries landed around a lighthouse doing considerable damage and on GRANDE IS. two more were dropped at lighthouse which was also damaged. Again on GRANDE IS. a large metal-roofed, warehouse like structure was strafed. The balance of 14 bombs was expended on a concentration of buildings (4) and an oil or water tank allocated about 1 mile W of HERMOSA TOWN. Smoke to 300 feet was seen as the planes pulled away from the area. Excellent photos were taken of a two-gun coastal defense position on GRANDE IS. Both guns about 8-10 " caliber are in battery and appear serviceable. One of our planes #549 received a slight hole - no other damage was sustained by this squadron.

4. CITATIONS

This mission provides no basis for the recommendation of awards.

5. a. Time Table

Take Off	0700/I	TACLOBAN
Group Assembly	0710/I	TACLOBAN - 1500 feet.
Attack	0925-55-I	80-100 feet.
Landed	1215/I	TACLOBAN

b. Route

In: BATAAN MINDORO SIBUYAN MASBATE TACLOBAN.

Out: MASBATE MARINDUQUE MINDORO BATAAN.

c. Fighter Cover

No fighter cover.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
Sq #23A
23 Jan 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

24 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 23-A, 23 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 23 January 1945, five airplanes of the 499th Bomb Squadron took off from TACLOBAN to attack and destroy FLORIDA BLANCA Town by bombing and strafing at low level. Each plane carried 12 X 100 lb. parademos. Of the five planes taking off two were forced to return short of the target when one developed engine trouble and the other acted as escort. Three however, succeeded in reaching the objective, dropping a total of 36 bombs on the area. Bombing was excellent but results were generally unobserved owing to the pall of smoke and bomb dust.

2. OBJECTIVE

The attack was directed against enemy personnel and installations concentrated in FLORIDA BLANCA TOWNSHIP which is only about 25 miles S of the Allied Ground Forces advancing S from LINGAYAN. Since the civilian population had been evacuated, the squadron was cleared to hit the town proper.

3. ATTACK

a. The 3 B-25-J's of this squadron which completed the mission attacked as a single flight, following the 498th Squadron over the town on a SW-NE heading. In coming back for a second pass, however, they turned inside the 498th Squadron and followed the 501st Squadron over the target this time from N to S.

b. The following pilots and planes participated in the strike, the first three going over the target.

First Flight			Second Flight		
Capt.F.M. FOX	A/P	555	* 2nd.Lt.J.S.POWELL	A/P	203
1st.Lt.C.R.SMITH	"	014	* 1st.Lt.W.J.BILLINGS	"	575
2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER	"	544			

* Turned back at 0755/I in ASID GULF to escort first plane #575 which had to return to base due to bad left engine.

e. The E and W edges of FLORIDA BLANCA TOWN were damaged most heavily with a majority of the 36 bombs stringing out through these areas. Several buildings were seen to blow up here and as the planes broke off their attack after the second pass there were two intense fires, one at the extreme SE the other at the extreme NE corners of the town. In the middle of the town three smaller fires were burning. Mission photos show some bombs falling in a field just outside the W end of the town indicating some inaccuracy on the part of combat crewmen who reported all bombs in the target.

d. One A/P #C14 returned with a small dent on the ventral inboard side of the right engine nacelle probably resulting from enemy machine gun fire at PORAC. Damage is distinctly minor in nature.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards are being submitted on the basis of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

a Time Table

T.O.	0705/I		Tacloban Strip
Group Assembly	0715/I		Over Tacloban 1500 feet.
Attack	0929/I-	0940/I	75-100 feet.
Landed	1215/I		Tacloban Strip

b. Route

Out: BILIRAN MASBATE SIBUYAN LUBANG BATAAN TARGET.

In : MINDORO MASBATE TACLOBAN

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided on this mission.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

E.T.AUGUSTINE
1st.Lt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
24-A-4
24Jan45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

26 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 24-A-4, 24 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 24 January,1945, four planes from the 499th Bomb Squadron, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. parademos, took off from TACLOBAN on a combination reconnaissance and attack mission against enemy installations on the W coast of BATAAN PENINSULA in LUZON. Both pictures and attack were executed at minimum altitude. LIPA AIRDROME, in S LUZON was assigned as a secondary target. All 4planes hit both primary and secondary and though damage was somewhat limited photographs were excellent. At the secondary, one enemy plane was destroyed. All planes returned to base safely.

2. OBJECTIVE

The specific object of this strike was the location, pinpointing and destruction of any enemy installations on GRANDE IS. and along the W coast of BATAAN PENINSULA with this squadron being scheduled to strafe and take photographs of GRANDE IS. and to strafe, bomb and photograph any targets of opportunity along the W BATAAN coastline from OLONGAPO to CABAYO. Particular attention was to be given A/A or coastal defense batteries and ground defenses such as weapons pits, pillboxes and entrenchments.

3. ATTACK

In the approach the 4 B-25-J's from this squadron following the 498th Squadron over GRANDE IS. from N to S, and the 500th Squadron bringing up the rear. Two runs were made on this island and then each squadron headed for the section of the coast specifically assigned. The 499th grouped in two 2 plane elements in trail to the right descending on OLONGAPO from the N and proceeding southward along the coast breaking off at CABAYO to head SE for LIPA AIRDROME.

The following pilots and planes participated on this mission:

First Flight		Second Flight	
1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY	A/P 198	2nd.Lt.J.S.POWELL	A/P 203
2nd.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS	" 018	2nd.Lt.T.F.KELLEY	" 205

(Par. 3 Cont'd)

Sparse target material coupled with retarded observation because of relatively long delay bomb fuses contributed to the paucity of reported results. Just N of MABAYO four centuries were dropped among a concentration of buildings one of these buildings being observed to explode. Then, continuing S along the coast, 10 bombs were dropped at a suspicious-looking haystack thought to be a camouflaged gun position but here again there were no specific results. At LIPA AIRDROME an apparently serviceable SSF parked at the N side of the center of the runway was strafed and destroyed. Just S of this same airdrome, 22 bombs hit among several buildings with unobserved damage. The mission photos, especially those taken by Lt.WILEY in A/P #198, are excellent. In addition they corroborate the statements of crewmen that bombs were not dropped on GRANDE IS. until the second pass was made by which time, the fires on GRANDE IS. were going full blast.

4. CITATIONS

This mission provides no basis for the recommendation of awards.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0700/I	TACLOBAN
Group Assembly	0715/I	TACLOBAN - 1500 feet.
Attack	0920-45/I	BATAAN PENINSULA
	1014/I	LIPA AIRDROME
Landed	1220/I	TACLOBAN

b. Route

In : LEYTE MASBATE MINDORO GRANDE IS. LIPA RETURN TO BASE.

Return: MARINDUQUE SIBUYAN MASBATE BASE.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT. E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D -E-N-T-I-A-L

499
25-A-4
25 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

26 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 25-A-4, 25 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 25 January,1945, four planes, each loaded with 12 X 100 lb. 8/15 second delay fuse bombs, took off to conduct a strike on the W coast of BATAAN PENINSULA. However, one plane returned to base soonafter take off when landing gear failed to retract and another returned early when oil pressure left engine dropped. Consequently two planes carried out the attack, at minimum altitude sweeping the W coast of BATAAN from OLONGAPO to MARIVALES BAY. A total of 16 bombs were expended in the attack. The sum total of known results is possible damage, to one of two large Cargo Type VB's by two near misses. There were no personnel casualties nor damage to planes.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. This mission was a duplication of the mission for the past several days in that the primary purpose seems to have been reconnaisance of the coastline with targets specified as coastal defenses and other installations.

3. ATTACK

a. Two B-25-J's of this squadron, leading the 500th, 501st and 498th in that order, approached the target along the W side of SUBIC BAY flying N to a point opposite OLONGAPO then turned right and began the sweep S along the W coast of BATAAN PENN. To attain greater manueverability, the two planes separated and proceeded in trail with Capt.R.E.TODD in A/P #555 and 2nd.Lt.W.R.HAAS in A/P #205.

b. During the attack one of two large cargo type VB's questionable serviceability lying approximately 100 feet off shore 3 miles S of BAGAC VILLAGE were bombed and strafed. Two of the eight bombs dropped, straddled the VB, each landing within 15 feet and causing probable damage. However because of the long delay fuse the observers were quite some distance away at the time of explosion and accurate observation was not possible. Damage caused by strafing was undoubtedly substantial for many hits were scored.

(Par. 3c Cont'd)

Four bombs were dropped at a stack of straw near MORON VILLAGE with undetermined results. There were no indications which might lead to the conclusion that the stack is being used for concealment of a target.
Four bombs were dropped (whether in desperation or exasperation we know not) at the end of the run in a wooded area just E of COCHINOS PT. with unobserved damage. Several areas along the coast were strafed but in each instance there was no target and probably no damage. One pilot failed to turn on his camera switch and the other tripped the switch too late. Consequently no prints were received.

d. The strike was entirely unopposed either by ground defenses or enemy air action.

4. COMMENT

Actual damage inflicted on the enemy by this strike and similar missions in this area has been slight. However, the lack of enemy activity, defenses and installations along this coast, which our observers have noted, have a negative value of their own.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0710/I	Tacloban Strip
Group Assembly	Nil (Proceeded by	individual squadrons)
Attack	0920-35/I	BATAAN
Landed	1215/I	Tacloban Strip

b. Route:
In: BASE VERDE ISLAND AMBIL ISLAND TARGET.
Returned same route.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil fighter cover provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT. E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D- E-N-T-I-A-L

499
26-A-6
26 Jan 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

27 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 26-A-6, 26 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 26 January,1945 four A/P's of this squadron conducted a minimum altitude strike against C/D positions on CARABAO IS. in the mouth of MANILA BAY. A total of twenty-four 250 lb. bombs were dropped. It is believed that no hits were scored on the positions. Various points on the island were strafed without visible damage.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this Group Strike was to destroy two 12 inch coastal defense guns in uncovered concrete emplacements on CARABAO IS. One of which was located near the center of the island,the other located on the SE tip.

3. ATTACK

a. Four B-25-J's of this squadron were the last planes over the target on an axis of attack from NE-SW.

b. The first wave consisted of 1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY in A/P No.174 and his wingman, 2nd.Lt.T.F.KELLEY in A/P No.203. In each element, the leader's target was the southernmost emplacement while his wingman's target was the position near the central part of the island. The second element was composed of 1st.Lt.C.R.SMITH in A/P No.205 and 2nd.Lt.R.J.SLAUGHTER, his wingman, in A/P #545

c. Indications are that fifty per cent (12 bombs) of the bombs dropped long in the water and similar number were dropped close by the targets. However, no direct hits were scored and probably no damage resulted from this Squadron's bombing. As usual damage caused by strafing was not visible. Three prints of mission photos were received, one print from A/P #205 and two from A/P #203. Two planes turned on cameras too late for photos to be of value.

d. The only opposition encountered was slight,light inaccurate A/A fire from the beach at the N tip of the Island. None of our personnel were injured nor any of our planes damaged.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. COMMENTS

Observation and photos made by the crew of planes 545 and 203, which were the last two planes to cross the N gun position, show conclusively that this position is still undamaged. While pure statistics condemn the bombing accuracy as poor, there are extentuating circumstances. The greatest of these was the fact that terrain shielded the targets from view until too late to effectively alter course. Another factor of importance is the fact that the present "crop" of co-pilots are new and do not yet have the experience so necessary in hitting pin point targets at minimum altitude. To counteract these difficulties pilots suggested a "dry run" to spot the target. In addition, S-2 suggests that when A/A opposition, terrain, and nature of target permit, the axis of attack be made in the same direction as the oblique target photo. For instance an excellent oblique looking to the SE across the target was available and had the run been made in this direction pilots would have been able to pick out the target without difficulty. As it was the run was 90 degrees to the photograph and to the untrained eye, obliques are very misleading.

5. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendation for awards or citations forwarded as a result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0700/I	Tacloban Drome
Group Assembly	0730/I	Tacloban @ 1500 feet.
Attack	0930/I	Carabao Island.
Landed	1140/I	Tacloban Drome

b. Route

Base to Verde Island Passage - Target. Return Route was same.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil fighter cover provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.HOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E- N-T-I-A-L

499
27-A-3
27Jan45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

28 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 27-A-3, 27 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Continuing our almost daily attacks in the BATAAN AREA four A/P's of this squadron conducted a coastal sweep of BATAAN PENNINSULA on the morning of 27 January,1945, expending a total of 48 X 100 lb. bombs on various targets. The sweep was made at low level and all attacks were at minimum altitude. Because of long delay action fused bombs, specific results were not observed. However, it is believed that several buildings were either destroyed or damaged. One plane sustained considerable damage from fragments of unknown origin. In general, results were most satisfactory and bombing accuracy was excellent.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission seems to have been an armed reconnaisance of the E coast of BATAAN PENNINSULA starting at LOS COCHINOS PT. sweeping the E coast to ORANI then overland to OLONGAPO. Targets were generally targets of opportunity, however the ROCK QUARRY installations on the E side of MARIVALES HARBOR and barracks at CABCABEN were to receive special attention.

3. ATTACK

a Four B-25-J's of this squadron leading the Group began to sweep at LOS COCHINOS PT. where the formation split into two-plane elements.

b Lt.R.L.SMELLEY in A/P #C18 lead the Squadron and Group. His wingman over the target was 2nd.Lt.B.J.BILLINGS in A/P #575. 1st.Lt.N.E.WILEY in A/P #174 led the second element with 2nd.Lt.J.S.POWELL as his wingman.

c. Lt.SMELLEY dropped four bombs at 3 barges seen near ROCK QUARRY. Because of terrain and delay fuses his crew could not observe resulting damage. However his photos indicate that two bombs fell near enough to damage a rock laden barge at the Rock Crusher Pier. After sweeping the area to OLONGAPO without further attack, he retraced his route to CABCABEN where he dropped eight bombs among barracks type buildings scoring two direct hits in the center of a large building, 4 very near misses on a group of smaller buildings which either destroyed or heavily damaged the lot, and two near misses, within 10 feet, on a second barracks type building which surely resulted in considerable damage. Other pilots dropped six bombs at similar targets in the same area with bombs bursting near enough to buildings to cause damage but specific damage or results were not ascertained.

(Par.3 c Cont'd)

Sixteen bombs were dropped on barracks type buildings near PANIKIAN VILLAGE (Marivales). Bombs were seen to explode near several buildings but distance of observation and terrain screened specific results. It is believed however that several buildings were severely damaged.
8 bombs were dropped on a pier just E of ALASASIAN PT. Two of the bombs were either direct hits or near misses which caused damage of undetermined extent to the pier-head. All four planes swept the coast from LOS COCHINOS PT. to OLONGAPO and back again.
At CABCABEN on the second pass Lt.BILLINGS released 4 bombs at barracks type buildings and immediately afterward felt three sharp concussions. Shortly afterward the right engine began to lose power. The airspeed dropped off to 150 and the plane began to losecaltitude. Remaining bombs were salveed but turret gas tank was full and could not be emptied. By dropping 8 degrees flaps and by putting maximum power on the left engine Lt.BILLINGS finally reached MINDORO. Several times it appeared that ditching would be necessary. Consequently Lt.SMELLEY returned to AMBIL ISLAND and escorted the rescue "Cat" to the scene. However, three planes landed at MINDORO. The crew of Plane #575 returned to TACLOBAN with the other two planes.

d.No gun flashes, tracers or bursts were seen during the mission. Plane #575 was holed several times by fragments of undetermined origin. Examination of a fragment by the Flakintel Officer disposes of possibility that fragment was A/A or bomb. One cylinder of the right engine was damaged a gas line severed, an intake was smashed, aileron was holed and the fuselage and turret were holed. There were no personnel casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

When using the 8/15 second delay fuse bomb it is most difficult for crews to observe closely the results because at the time of explosion the plane is some distance away. Often terrain shields results as well.

5. AWARDS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0830/I	Tacloban Strip
Group Assembly	0845/I	Over Tacloban
Attack	1028-1105/I	Bataan Penninsula
Landed	1440/I (1 plane)	Tacloban Strip
	1635/I (2 Planes)	" "

b. Route

Base - Verde Straits - Target - Verde Straits - Mindoro - Base.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
295.45

C -O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

30 January,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF No.1 , 29 January,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

The target for our minimum altitude strike on the morning of 29 January was dual purpose guns and barracks areas near CABCABEN STRIP on BATAAN PENNINSULA. Six planes were over the target strafing and dropping 60 X 100 lb. parademo bombs. One plane was forced off the target for reasons stated in Par. 3 A below. In the attack several buildings were hit and damaged but examination of photos fails to confirm reported hits on gun positions. One plane "ditched" in TACLOBAN BAY when an engine failed on "go around". The radio operator sustained facial lacerations but otherwise the crew is safe, thanks to the skill of the pilot and prompt action by harber craft.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the strike was to neutralize enemy installations at CABCABEN where Guerillas reported an enemy garrison. The targets specified were barracks and possible D/P gun pits. The pits appeared to be empty in previous strike photographs but nevertheless were assigned as a target.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's of this squadron were scheduled to be the last squadron over the target. However while approaching the target from the SE and taking interval the squadron preceeding our formation apparently became confused and made a circle for a second run, cutting our second flight. This disruption of the formation forced our second flight to execute a 360 degree turn. In so doing, the number two man on the outside of the turn, fell behind and to avoid bursting bombs he pulled wide of the target and made no attack. The heading over the target was from S to N and the formation consisted of two three-plane elements in trail at an approximate interval of thirty seconds.

b. Capt.P.E.Taranuk in A/P #018 led the squadron with Lt.KELLEY and Lt.J.S.POWELL on his wings in A/P's # 205 and 185 respectively. 1st.Lt.W.E.WILEY led the second element with Lts.C.C.PHILLIPS and J.E. SLAUGHTER on his wings in A/P's #549 and 544 respectively.

c. One pilot reports dropping 10 bombs on D/P pits located approximately 1000 feet NE of the E end of the R/W but photos do not confirm this report. It is possible that the pilot confused the pits on the beach at the E end of the strip with the other pits which were the assigned target. Three buildings were damaged by direct hits and several near misses. At least two other buildings were damaged by near misses. The entire target area was well strafed. After the attack several small grass fires were seen burning and a heavy curtain of smoke and dust hung over the area. As a matter of fact the smoke and dust obscured parts of the target and made observation difficult. In general photographs taken were excellent. Prints were received from four planes. Prints from plane 544 were of course not recovered.

d. One white burst probably 20 mm A/A appeared directly in front of the lead plane at the beginning of the run. No damage to plane. Slight, light inaccurate, tracking M/G fire was spotted from the top floor of a small two storied building approximately 500 feet SE of E end of CAB-6 CABEN STRIP.
On return to base, almost every plane in the group experienced great difficulty on landing. There was no wind and prop wash caused turbulent conditions which hung over the strip. A/P #544 just before landing, was flung off to one side of the runway and when power was applied the right engine ceased functioning. The pilot displayed remarkable skill in controling the plane until forced to ditch in the bay just N of the strip. The radio man sustained a bad cut on his jaw and possible fracture to facial bones.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

The results achieved are considered satisfactory and bombing good. However, the execution of the attack would have been disastrous had this target been heavily defended. It is a well known fact among "attack" units that the element of surprise is of paramount importance. The time consumed in taking interval between squadrons and flights and the unecessary manoeuvering (circling near the target prior to the run) warned the enemy of our attack and our presence well before the first plane began its attack.

5. CITATIONS

No citations will be forwarded as result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

T.O.	Tacloban	0730
Group Assembly	Over Tacloban	0745/I
T.O.T.		0955/I
Landed	Tacloban	1230/I

Route: S tip Mindoro Is. - Manila Bay - Target. Return: Same

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
31 Jan 45
CAV

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

1 February, 1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF FO S-S-E, 31 January, 1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Participating in a Group Strike, four (4) A/Ps of this squadron attacked a purported Repair Yard at BACOLOD TOWN, NEGROS ISLAND on the morning of 31 January, 1945. The squadron made a "dry run" to locate the target and attacked at minimum altitude on the second pass. While all planes flew directly over the objective, few actual targets were seen. In the attack 12 x 500 lb. demolition bombs were dropped and the area was strafed. Little damage was done, mainly because of the lack of targets. A small fire was started in a building and hits were scored on a concrete building. Our losses and damage were nil.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective to be achieved by this strike was to disrupt the R.R. communications system in the BACOLOD AREA by destroying this repair facilities.

3. ATTACK

a. Four B-25 J's of this squadron, being number three in the sequance of attack, flew S in the GUIMERAS STRAITS to PANDAN PT., turned E overland and then turned onto an axis of attack to the NW. The formation over the target consisted of two, two-plane elements in trail at approximately thirty seconds.

b. Lt. N.E. Wiley in A/P #174 led the squadron with Lt. P.G. Simcox in A/P #018 on his right wing. 1st Lt. C.R. Smith in A/P #205 led the second element with Lt. J.S. Powell in A/P #185 on his wing.

c. In the attack 12 x 500 lb. 8/15 sec. delay fuse bombs and 3400 x .50 cal. ammo were expended. Hits were scored on a concrete building and debris was thrown into the air, but further details were not observed. A small fire was started in a building, probably as a result of strafing. Bombing was excellent with all but one bomb in the assigned target area. Only four strike photos were received. Photos confirm crews' reports as to run over target. As usual with 8/15 sec. delay fuses, no details of damage can be seen.

d. There was no ground or air opposition. There were no personnel casualties or A/P damage in this squadron.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4. S-2 COMMENTS

As stated above, the purpose of this mission was disruption of R.R. communications, but it seems that the enemy had themselves accomplished our objective for us. Several crew members reported large sections of track missing from the area near the target and on the line E of BACOLOD DROME which runs NE-SW. There was also a sighting of a large stock of rails on a pier at PANDAN POINT. These facts coupled with the lack of evidence of repair facilities in the target area indicate that the enemy has abandoned the system of tracks.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

No citations will be forwarded as a result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	From Tacloban	0930/I
Group Assembly	Over Tacloban	0945/I
Fighter Rendezvous	Nil	
Attack:		
First Pass		1050/I
Second Pass		1120/I
Landed	At Tacloban	1240/I

b. Route

Base--N tip LEYTE ISLAND to Target. Return: Same.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

2 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF FO 4-E-1, 1 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 1 February 1945, six A/P's of this squadron participated in a Group Strike on targets in Puerto Princessa Town on Palawan Island. During the minimum altitude attack, a total of 64 X 100 pound parademo bombs were dropped. Four buildings were damaged and a Fleet Plane (Jake) of questionable serviceability was damaged probably beyond repair. The strike is considered a success with four planes achieving excellent bombing results and two planes poor. There were no personnel casualties nor damage to A/P's.

2. OBJECTIVE

The attack on this target accomplished two aims - that of neutralising the enemy's installations and impressing him that any attempt to use his airdromes and harbor to any great extent would be both futile and costly. The assigned targets were: The F/P base near the pier, a reported medium 3/3 position on the coast W ed the American P.O.W. Camp, four barracks type buildings approximately ¼ mile E of the P.O.W. Camp and a single building approximately ½ mile E of the P.O.W. Camp.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's were number two in the sequence of attack behind the 498th Squadron. The axis of attack was NE to SW and the attack formation consisted of two, three-plane flights abreast.

b. Capt.P.E.Taranunk in A/P #013 led the squadron. His wingmen were 2nd.Lt.P.G.Simcoe in A/P #205 in the No.2 position and 2nd.Lt.W.R. Haas in A/P #355 on the left wing. Capt.W.D. Decker (Squadron Commander) in A/P #308 led the second flight with 2nd.Lt.T.F.Kelly in A/P #948 on his right wing and 2nd.Lt.L.E. DeZonia in A/P #549 on his left wing.

c. Lt.Simcoe's first mission as first pilot was executed in an excellent manner. His run was along the coast across the F/P anchorage and buildings. He dropped twelve bombs and scored a near miss on a two masted fishing boat, (little probable damage) two near misses on a "Jake" one of which was well within destructive range, a direct hit and a near miss on a building near the base of the pier.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

In addition he made a series of excellent photos which confirmed his results.
Capt.Taranunk dropped twelve bombs on buildings in the town scoring two direct hits and two or three near misses. His tail gunner reported a good deal of debris blown into the air.
Capt.Decker's run was over the single building E of the town which was his assigned target. He dropped only four bombs due to lack of other targets. However his accuracy was superior. One bomb was a direct hit and at least two more within effective radius.
Lt.DeZonia's sole target was a small building on the coast approximately 1 mile SE of the target. He scored a hit which his gunner reported damaging the building.
Lt.Haas was assigned the medium A/A position but his flight leader crowded him slightly and to avoid the P.O.W. Camp he pulled wide and dropped his 12 bombs off the target.
Lt.Kelly's run did not take him over any targets and his twelve bombs were expended uselessly.

3. There was no aerial opposition. Ground fire was weak and ineffective. 3 bursts of medium A/A was seen directed at the 500th Squadron but bursts were short and very inaccurate. An M/G was seen firing slight, inaccurate under and to the rear of the squadron leader. Photos taken by A/P No.355 show a white puff of smoke which can only be explained by assuming that the smoke is a burst of 20 mm. fire. No bursts were observed over the target. This squadron sustained no casualties nor damage.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

As usual the long delay fuse on the bombs prevented accurate and detailed observation of damage but photos/to substantiate the reports of crews. A great deal of difficulty was experienced in spotting specific targets due to screening trees in the area. For this reason several of the bombs were expended uselessly.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

T.O.	0850/I	Tacloban
Attack	1119/I	Puerto Princessa
Landed	1500/I	Tacloban

There was no fighter cover provided for this mission.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
2 Feb 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

3 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF FO 5-E-1, 2 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four A/P's of this squadron led a Group Strike to the Cagayan Valley of Luzon on the morning of 2 February,1945. The Squadron searched the length of the valley from it's South extremity to Aparri on the north tip of Luzon. Throughout its length only two targets were found - at Tuguegarao a group of river craft was attacked by strafing and a total of 26 X 100 lb. parademo bombs were dropped. Two boats were destroyed and at least three others damaged. At Aparri a FTD was attacked with 22 bombs and several near misses were scored but the boat was still "right side up" afterward. (See S-2 comments). In addition pilots took excellent photos and did an excellent job of reconnaisance of enemy A/D's in the valley. Two planes were holed but damage is minor. There were no personnel casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission was to harass the enemy's communications, destroy his installations and through reconnaisance to discover troop movements and the extent to which he is using dromes of this area. The 499th Squadron was assigned the section of the valley lying E of the Cagayan River, and were to attack shipping, A/D's, M/T's and barges.

3.ATTACK

a. Four B-25-J's led the Group Formation to a pass in the Sierra Madre Range near Cape San Ildelfonso (16°N - 122°E) where the squadrons separated to conduct the sweep in two plane elements starting approximately 15 miles S of Echague A/D.

b. Capt.F.N.Fox in A/P #308, the Squadron Operations Officer led the squadron and Group. 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson in A/P #185 was his wingman. 2nd.Lt.C.C.Phillips in A/P #013 led the second element with 2nd.Lt.J.R.Baeta in A/P #203 on his wing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par. 3 c.)

c. The entire E side of the valley was thoroughly searched including Echague, Ilagan, Tuguegarao, Camalaniugan and Aparri Dromes. Two or more passes were made over all the dromes except at Tuguegarao, all planes attacked a group of eight, single masted river boats of approximately 40 feet in length.
Capt.Fox and Lt.Baeta scored direct hits which resulted in the destruction of two boats. Other pilots scored damaging near misses on others. Several passes were made and the boats were heavily strafed on each. At Aparri the squadron flew over the E end of the runway but spotted no serviceable planes. A FTD on the W side of the river across from Aparri was selected as a target and all planes proceeded to make several bombing and strafing passes. A total of twenty-two bombs were dropped, of which four were direct hits and several other near misses. Lts.Baeta and Patterson scored the direct hits. After absorbing all these attacks the FTD was not listing or burning and Capt.Fox concluded that the vessel was possibly resting on the river bottom. The attack was then broken off and the squadron returned to base in Squadron Formation.

d. Opposition to our strike was weak and ineffective. There was no aerial opposition. M/G fire was reported from the FTD but evaluation indicates the tracers were ricocheting tracers from our own guns. One pilot reported gun flashes from an indefinite area just S of Aparri runway and one crew member observed two pits occupied by two apparently light A/A guns. No personnel manning the guns and no fire received. Two planes were holed, sustaining minor damage. Photos indicate A/P #185 was holed by bomb fragments of bombs dropped by a preceeding plane. There were no personnel injuries.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Because of a change of base by Fifth Bomber Command, information of our own recent aerial activity has not been received. For this reason the crews did not know that on a prior strike the FTD at Aparri had been attacked and that at the time of our strike the FTD was resting squarely on the bottom of the river. It was later learned that other squadrons of the group had similar experiences. Pilots were amazed at the apparently "unsinkable" ship. The mission was very satisfactory with excellent bombing results and excellent photography. Crews are to be highly commended.

It's been noticed that on the past 2 missions several bombs break loose from the chute and tail fin when released.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0745/I	Tacloban
Group Assembly		Over Tacloban 0800/I
Attack	1015-1200/I	Cagayan Valley
Landed	1425/I	Tacloban

b. Route

Base direct to Alabat Island (Lamon Bay to Cape San Ildefonso to Cagayan Valley. Return route was reciprocal.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided for this strike.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L

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3F2645

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

4 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF FO 6-E-1, 3 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 3 February,1945 four A/P's of this squadron participated in a minimum altitude strike on Tuguegarao and Aparri A/D's in Northern Luzon. One plane returned early because of engine trouble and another plane acted as escort. Two planes carried out the strike under almost prohibitive weather conditions which practically "socked in" the entire Cagayan Valley. Arriving late at the target after being separated by weather, the squadron made no attacks at Tuguegarao. At Aparri the two planes strung 24 X 100 lb. bombs through the center of the town. The attack was made under a ceiling of 100 feet and visibility one mile. Debris was blown into the air and several buildings were probably damaged but results were generally unobserved because of poor visibility and long delay fuse bombs. There were no personnel casualties nor damage to A/P's.

2. OBJECTIVE

The assigned targets at Tuguegarao were personnel and barracks areas, underground stores and grounded A/P's if found. At Aparri the squadron was cleared to attack any and all targets in the town and on the drome. Strike photos of the previous day revealed the presence of two, 2/e planes on the drome. These planes, the boat yards, warehouses and personnel areas were specifically assigned targets. The purpose seems to have been that of armedrreconnaisance but reconnaisance in such force as to be an effective striking force.

3. ATTACK

a. Two B-25-J's of this squadron approached Aparri from the S and attacked at minimum altitude toward the N. The position of the other squadrons is unknown because contact was lost in weather between Tuguegarao and Aparri.

b. 2nd.Lt.J.O.Reike, Assistant Operations Officer, led the Squadron in A/P #203. 2nd.Lt.T.F. Kelley in A/P #948 flew on his wing. 1st.Lt.C.R.Smith inA/P #649 led the seconf flight with 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe on his wing in A/P #013. Lt.Simcoe returned to base because of a rough engine and Lt.Smith acted as escort.

c. One plane of another squadron having lost his own formation, joined In our attack. Our two planes strafed and dropped 24 X 100 lb. 8/15 sec. delay fuse, free falling demolition bombs. Four of these bombs dropped safe - the shackles going out with the bombs for reasons unknown. Little is known of the results because of bad visibility caused by a heavy rain and a ceiling of 100 feet. Long delay fuses also hindered observation. However debris was thrown into the air and crews report bombs dropping on or near several buildings. Missionphotos indicate near misses on several buildings but add nothing further to damage assessment.

d. During the third circle over Tuguegarao one grey burst of A/A was received on a level with the plane at 400 feet at a distance of 150 yards off the right wing from an unknown position.
At Aparri one crew member reported gun flashes from the NW corner of the runway and shortly afterwards, 3 bursts of apparently medium A/A which was trailing and tracking at a distance of 100 yards to the rear and below the formation. There was no aerial opposition.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Combat crews are to be highly commended for their performance in carrying out the mission under such adverse weather conditions. The Japanese can hardly have been less than amazed at being subjected to an air raid when even the "ducks are grounded".

5. AWARDS

No recommendations for awards will be forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

Time Table

Take Off	0830/I	Tacloban
Group Assembly	0845/I	Over Tacloban
Fighter Rendezvous	Nil	
T.O.T.	1144/I	Tuguegarao
	1208/I	Aparri
Landed	1509-1550/I	Tacloban

Note: Planes were in contact by radio but returned separately due to weather.
Route: Base direct to Alabat Island (Lamon Bay) to Cape San Ildefonso to Cagayan Valley. Return route was reciprocal.

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

6 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 18 AFT FO 8-3-E 1, 5 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, PEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four A/P's of this squadron conducted an anti-shipping sweep of the E coast of Luzon on the morning of 6 February 1945. All possible barge hideouts and anchorages were thoroughly searched from the S tip of Luzon to Baler Bay including Catanduane and Polillo Islands. Targets were relatively few and far between but sufficient to make the mission interesting for our crews. In their attacks a total of 14 X 500 lb. bombs were expended. An assessment of damage includes the destruction of two luggers of 50-100 tons, and damage to 7 type H barges and damage to two small motor boats. All attacks were made at minimum altitude while the search was generally conducted at 500-1000 feet.

2. OBJECTIVE

It is possible that the Japanese are evacuating central Luzon by the only route left open. Since our forces control the main arteries of his road network in the central plains, the only feasible escape route is by water from Baler and Dingalan Bays thence by water along the E coast to the N.Similarly, any attempt to evacuate SE Luzon must necessarily follow a like pattern. To discover such intentions and to destroy vessels engaged in this activity, this mission was dispatched.

3. ATTACK

a. Each squadron in the Group took off at one hour intervals in order to give maximum daylight coverage of the area. This squadron was number two in the order of take off and since the lead squadron was to proceed to the islands N of Luzon, 4 B-25's of this squadron made the initial sweep from Legaspi to Baler Bay.

b. 1st.Lt.Smelley in A/P #018 ledthe Squadron with 2nd.Lt. V.B.Knopp on his wing in A/P #948. 2nd.Lt.J.S.Powell in A/P # 205 led the second element with 2nd.Lt.J.R.Basta on his wing in A/P #166.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par 3 Cont'd)

c. Approximately 30 minutes after take off the formation separated and conducted the sweep in two plane elements. All possible hideouts, staging points and anchorages were thoroughly and systematically scoured. Two apparently unserviceable barges served as "test firing" targets prior to reaching Legaspi.At a point approximately 2 miles W of Magumbuaya Pt. (1348N-12440E) Lts.Smelley and Knapp strafed, damaged anddrove ashore two type "H" barges on two strafing passes each. At Catanaguan (1345N-12358E) 4bombs skipped over 3 type H barges doing little if any damage. However, the barges were damaged by two strafing passes.
At Cavit Island (San Miguel Bay) 4 bombs skipped over a group of 3 beached,type H barges which were subsequently damaged on two strafing attacks.
At Hondagua (Lopez Bay) Lt.Smelley "pitched a strike" on a lugger. His direct hit literally pulverized the vessel. Needless to say farther strafing attacks were made. One bomb was a near miss.
At Cagsiay (1413N-12145E) 5 bombs 1 direct hit, and strafing sufficed to destroy another lugger. Lt.Powell was the pilot with the "Eagle Eye". On his initial run his first bomb crashed through the deck house, tore through the railing and exploded near enough to inflict damage. On his second run, he scored a direct hit at the water line.
At Atiamon (1400N-12155E) the radio man, Sgt.Wade of Lt.Powell's plane, inflicted minor damage on two beached, green colored motor boats by strafing with the waist guns.
The photos received (only 10) were sufficient to confirm the destruction of the two luggers and sightings of storage tanks and tank cars at Hondagua.

d. There was no aerial or ground opposition to our strike. No personnel casualties or damage to A/P's.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Lt.M.J.Opie, recently returned from several weeks with Guerillas following a forced landing, informed us of a guerilla report of the presence of 2 F/P's on Polillo Island. However our thorough search failed to uncover the hideout. As usual, crews were particularly briefed, on current bombing and strafing restrictions and informed of consequences resulting from an infraction of these orders.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off		0830/I		Tacloban
Attack	Legaspi	0926/I		
	Baler Bay	1137/I		
Landed		1410/I	(2 A/P)	Tacloban
		1600/I	(2 A/P)	Tacloban

b. Route

Followed E coast of Luzon to Baler Bay. Return via coast to Lopez Bay then direct to base.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided for this strike.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

8 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report 13 ATF FO 10-3-E-1, 7 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. Continuing the daily "armed recce" four of our planes swept the east coast of Luzon from Legaspi to Dinahican Pt. Minimum altitude bombing and strafing attacks seriously damaged one engines aft freighter and one "Type H" barge and set afire a second type "H" barge. Various other craft were heavily strafed with unknown damage. Of the sixteen five-hundred pound bombs expended few were hits. We sustained no losses, only one plane holed once by a small arms fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

As on previous days the purpose of the mission was to prevent possible water evacuation of Luzon by way of the east coast. The broad term "shipping" between Legaspi and Dinahican Point was specified as the target for our squadron. Other squadrons of the 345th "Air Apaches" were to cover other sections of the coast.

3. ATTACK

a. Four of our B-25's conducted the search in a loose formation of four planes in two-plane elements, breaking off to make attacks singly in trail.

b. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper in A/P #180 led the squadron with 2nd.Lt. L.E. DeZonia on his wing in A/P #308. 2nd.Lt.C.C. Phillips in A/P #013 led the second element with 2nd.Lt.R.F. Kinney on his wing in A/P #205.

c. All four planes began the search by attacking a group of luggers, barges and harbor craft approximately 3 miles SE of Legaspi in a cove. O f the seven bombs dropped here, only Lt.Phillips succeeded in scoring a hit on the stern of an engines aft freighter damaging it beyond repair. Several heavy strafing runs were made on the craft with undetermined amount of damage. At Cauit, on his second pass, Lt.Kinney scored 2 hits on a close group of 2 "Type H" barges. One of the barges was destroyed another set afire and the third was probably damaged, In addition to the hits by Lt.Kinney, 5 other bombs dropped by other planes skipped over the target.

(Par. 3 c Cont'd.)

All planes poured hundreds of rounds into the barges on several strafing runs. All three barges are probably u/s since strafing on this mission plus that of the previous day was concentrated and thorough. Two bombs were ineffectively dropped on a floating crane docked at a pier at Hondagua. No other targets were sighted during the search to Dinahican Point nor at Polillo or Catanduanes Islands. On the return route the coast was again searched at several points and the craft at Legaspi were subjected to final strafing attack as a parting gesture. By judicious use of cameras, co-pilots did an excellent job of photographing the attacks over such a widespread area. However, no substantiating evidence was obtained to support the claims of damage at Cauit Island.

d. Only slight, ineffective opposition on the form of slight small arms fire was ventured. Small caliber gun-flashes from vicinity of storage tanks drew silencing fire from one of our planes. Gun flashes were seen on a hill near the point where attacks were made at Legaspi and from a tower in the SW part of Poliqui Bay. Plane #013 was hit once by small arms fire from an unknown point. Damage was only minor.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

It is apparent from the meager amount of activity noted on these daily sweeps, that evacuation if any, is on a small scale and limited to periods of darkness. The presence of surface craft at the same locations on successive dates, the lack of attempts at camouflage and hiding of craft, and the scarcity of vessels in general seem to preclude the possibility of evacuation by water.
A casual impression of the bombing results would seem poor but full knowledge of the circumstances changes the picture. Many of the bombs which fell within effective range of targets skipped several hundred yards beyond. Had the targets been M/V's for instance, an estimated 80% of the bombs would have been either direct hits or damaging near misses. S-2 judges mission to have been commendably executed.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be given as result of this strike.

6. Statistics

T.O.	1030/I	Tacloban	
Squadron Assembly		Tacloban	1040/I
Attack	1135-1600/I	Legaspi - Polillo Is. and return	
Landed	1715/I	Tacloban	

Route: Tacloban - Legaspi - follow coast to Dinahican Pt. around Polillo Island to Sam Miguel Bay - Legaspi - base.

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT E. HOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

497
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 72

PEG/rjl

9 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, 13 ATF FO 11-3-E-1, 8 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. In a daylight anti-shipping sweep from Legaspi to Dinahican Point on the east coast of Luzon, the "Bats Out'a Hell" again demonstrated the destructive efficience of skip bombing and strafing attack by destroying two luggers, damaging one lugger and probable damage to six barges. During the course of the mission, four planes dropped nine, 500 lb. demolition bombs against nil opposition.

2. OBJECTIVE

Our assignment was to destroy all surface vessels in the specified area, excluding native craft.

3. ATTACK

a. Four B-25-J's of the 499th swept the coast starting at Legaspi and continuing to Dinahican Point in a loose diamond formation, breaking off to make individual attacks.

b. 1st.Lt.R.L. Smelley led the squadron in A/P #018 with 2nd.Lt. T.F.Kelly on his right wing in A/P #308. 2nd.Lt.V.B.Knopp inA/P #948 flew the number three position with 2nd.Lt.J.S.Powell flying"in the slot" in A/P #203.

c. A group of four luggers and several assorted smaller craft in a cove just SE of Legaspi bore the brunt of our attack. Of the eight 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs dropped, five were direct hits and three were near misses. Needless to say such accuracy is highly commendable,
Lt.Smelley opened the attack by strafing and dropping two bombs on a group of beached luggers in the cove just SE of Legaspi. He scored a direct hit on a lugger which crashed through the top and exploded near the stern causing some damage. On his second run he scored another near miss which probably damaged the same lugger.
Lt.Knopp was second to attack. He dropped one bomb scoring a direct hit on a lugger anchored approximately 200 yards from those attacked by Lt.Smelley. The lugger was practically destroyed by the blast.

Lt.Powell followed Lt.Knopp in and dropped one bomb which destroyed the aft section of a lugger beached just N of these bombed by Lt.Smelley. He scored a direct hit on one of the two luggers bombed by Lt.Smelley, causing unrepairable damage and probable damage to a barge close by. On his third run he scored a near miss on the same group of luggers with probable damage to one.
Lt.Kelly was last over the target scoring a near miss on the lugger which Lt.Powell hit. On his second run he scored a direct hit on the remains of a lugger destroyed on 2/7/45 by Lt.Phillips. All planes thoroughly strafed several smaller craft in the area with probable damage resulting. At Nagumbuaya Pt. (Catanduanes Island) two "Type H" barges were strafed but observation revealed the craft to be water filled as a result of Lt.Smelley's attack on a previous mission. At Larap one large cargo barge was thoroughly strafed on several pass by all planes causing probable damage.
No other attacks were made and 7 bombs were returned to base when no other targets were encountered.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Three barges were erroneously reported destroyed on the "Final Report" due to an incorrect report of inexperienced crew members. The mission is considered as highly successful in all respects. Bombing was excellent and photographs were equally as good. Weather was bad during entire search with10-0 conditions at San Miguel Bay and Polillo Is.

5. STATISTICS

Time Table

Take Off	0930/I	Tacloban
Squadron Assembly	0940/I	Tacloban
1st.Attack	1030/I	Legaspi
2nd.Attack	1110/I	Nagumbuaya Pt.
3rd.Attack	1215/I	Larap Barrio.
Landed	1515/I (1 plane)	Tacloban
	1550/I (3 Plane)	

One plane landed early - separated in weather and returned alone.

Route

Base-Legaspi-Catanduanes Is.-coastline to Lopez Bay- Dinahican Pt. Polillo Island -direct to base.

No fighter cover was provided for this strike.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N -T-I-A-L

499
47-D-19
16 Feb 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

20 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 47-D-19, 16 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of the 16 February,1945 six planes of this Squadron attacked a reported food dump near Bagac Town on Bataan Penn. In the minimum altitude attacks 12 X 1000 lb. bombs and 11,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended. Bombing results were excellent with nine bombs in the target. Strafing was concentrated and thorough. A column of blue smoke to 200 feet was observed over the target after breaking off the attack. Other results were not observed because of heavy foliage concealing the target. Probable small arms fire was the extent of opposition we received. Each squadron proceeded to the target individually.

2. OBJECTIVE

The mission was designed to lend support to friendly ground forces operating on Bataan Penninsula. The specified target was a reported food dump 3000 yards ENE of Bagac Town.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's attacked the target from minimum altitude making the runs from E-W in three flights of two planes each with an interval of approximately thirty seconds between elements. Formation to the target consisted of 2, three plane flights javelin down. This squadron was number two in the sequence of attack.

b. 1st.Lt.P.W.Draper led the formation in A/P #018 with 2nd.Lt. C.L.Sisson on his wing. 2nd.Lt.J.R.Baeta in A/P #600 led the second element with 2nd.Lt.V.B.Knopp on his wing in A/P 013. 2nd.Lt.T.F.Kelley led the third element in A/P #549 while his wingman 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton flew A/P #166.

c. Since friendly troops and friendly natives were in the vicinity rigid Bomblines were imposed. Accordingly Lt.Draper made two dry runs over in order to spot the target and avoid any possibilities of attacking friendly forces.

C-O-N-F-I-D- E-N-T-I-A- L

After the dry runs two bombing and strafing passes were made. For good measure two more strafing runs were pressed home. A column of blue smoke to two hundred feet and bomb smoke were the only results visible since the target was concealed in a clump of trees. Bombing was excellent with nine bombs in the target. A total of six passes were made over the target.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

The impossible has happened - a mission of less than two hours duration from take-off to landing. Following several months of eight, nine and longer hour missions this is a decided novelty.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take off	0925/I	San Marcelino Strip
Attack	1000-1015/I	Bagac Town
Landed	1055/I	San Marcelino Strip

b. Route

San Marcelino to target. Return same route.

c. Nil fighter cover provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
49-D-11
18 Feb 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T -I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PEG/rjl

20 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 49-D-11, 18 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 18 February, ten planes of the Bats Out'a Hell Squadron hopped "over the hill" and conducted another short range ground support mission. The target, an enemy concentration concealed in the trees along the Bagac - Balangas road near the center of Bataan Penninsula. In the attack 20 X 1000 lb. demolition bombs and 16000 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition were expended on the target. The target was thoroughly and effectively covered by both bombing and strafing but specific results were not observed because of foliage. A M/G fired one burst at our planes but ceased when thoroughly sprayed with numerous .50 bullets.

2. OBJECTIVE

The mission was in close support of ground forces advancing W from Balangas. The target was an enemy concentration of troops, supplies, etc., located along the Bagac-Balangas road and approximately 1500 yards in advance of our own forward elements.

3. ATTACK

a. 10 B-25-J's carried out the minimum altitude strike being number two in the sequence of attack. The axis of attack was from ENE to WSW and the formation over the target consisted of five, two plane elements. Each element flew in trail at approximately 30 seconds.

b. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper led the squadron in A/P #180 other pilots and planes were as follows:
1st.Lt.J.C.Reike (Squadron Operations Officer) in A/P #013, Capt.W.D. Becker (Squadron C.O.) as co-pilot, 2nd.Lt.L.E.DeZonia in A/P #549, 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson in A/P #166, 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton A/P #575, 2nd.Lt. J.S.Powell in A/P #185, 2nd.Lt.J.R.Basta A/P #600, 2nd.Lt.C.L.Sisson in A/P #177, 2nd.Lt.R.F.Kinney in A/P #018 and 2nd.Lt.B.Knopp in A/P #308.

c. On reaching the vicinity of the target the Squadron Leader contacted the ground controller "Zombie" on VHF radio. "Zombie" directed attack be made on an enemy concentration along the Bagac Road 1500 yds. W of the point where artillery layed a white smoke bomb.

(Par.3 c Cont'd)

Accordingly, attack formation of two plane elements was assumed and five passes were made, expended ammunition was 16,000 rounds of.50 cal. ammunition and 20 X 1000 lb. 8/15 second delay demolition bombs. A M/G firing from a hill just NW of the target silenced and a column of heavy black smoke form the target area were the only specific results visible. Slight, light accurate small arms fire holed A/P $185 three times. Minor damage. There were no personnel casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Crews were briefed on the necessity of accurate attacks because of the nearness of friendly troops. As on added precaution waist, tail and turret gunners were ordered not to fire unless told to do so by the pilot.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarddd as results of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

Take Off	0750/I	San Marcelino Strip
Attack	0820-0905/I	Bagac Road
Landed	0940/I	San Marcelino Stri p

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
49-D-18
18 Feb 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

21 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 49-D-18, 18 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Following up a morning strike in the same area, ten A/P's of this squadron conducted an afternoon strike on the Bagac-Balangas road. Suring several minimum altitude passes made over the target, a total of 20 X 1000 lb. bombs and 22,000 X.50 calibre ammunition were expended. A supply dump was set afire and ten bodies were seen lying in the road. Other results were unobserved.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was almost identical with the morning mission. Again it was designed as close support of our ground forces advancing from Balangas. The specific target was the area 1000 yards on either side of the Bagac-Balangas road near the center of Bataan Penninsula.

3. ATTACK

a. Ten B-25-J's participated in the minimum altitude attacks, first orbiting just E of the target. After contacting the ground controller "Zombie" the squadron assumed attack formation of five two plane elements in trail attacking from E to W.

b. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper led the Squadron in A/P #180, 2nd.Lt.L.E. DeZonia In A/P #549, 2nd.Lt.J.R.Baeta in A/P #600, MajorR.J.Brigham (Group Operations Officer) in A/P #013 and 2nd.Lt.J.S.Powell in A/P #185 led the 2nd. 3rd, 4th, and 5th elemtnst respectively. 2nd.Lieuts.Knopp A/P #308, Sisson A/P #177, Kinney A/P #018, Patterson A/P #166 and Morton in A/P #575 completed the formation.

c. The ground controller directed the attack by radio using Air Support Photo Grid Coordinates to designate the target. Each element of two planes made five attack runs over the target bombing and thoroughly strafing the wooded areas to the N and S of the road. Twenty, 1000 lb. 8/15 second delay fuse bombs were scattered throughout the target area at points which seemed to afford best concealment to troops and supplies.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The amount of ammunition fired bears mute testimony to the thoroughness and heaviness of the strafing. Heavy foliage hindered observation to such an extent that the sighting of a supply dump on fire and 10 apparently lifeless bodies on the road were the only specific results seen.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

The heavy foliage and long delay fuse bombs hinders observation and renders mission photographs almost useless. Consequently we actually know very little of the damage done by our attack. A report from the infantry will probably pro ve most interesting.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	1307/I	San Marcelino Strip
Attack	1340-1417/I	Bagac Road, Bataan Penn.
Landed	1450/I	San Marcelino Strip

b. Route

San Marcelino - San Antonio - Bagac Bay - Target

c. Nil Fighter cover provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
50-D-18
19 Feb 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

21 February,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 50-D-18, 19 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 19 February, six A/P's of the 499th carried out another minimum altitude ground support mission on the Bagac Road, Bataan Peninsula. Twelve, one thousand pound bombs and 12,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended in several attacks. Four small fires (three probably grass and one fuel) were started in the target area. Other results were not ascertained.Against the weight of our attack, no opposition was encountered.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a close support to our ground forces pushing inland along the Bagac-Balangas road from the East. The specific target was the section of road and area 1000 yards to either side, near the center of Bataan Penninsula.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's orbited just E of the target and contacted "Zombie" the ground control which directed to attack the area outlined by white smoke bombs laid down b artillery. After ground to air contact the attack formation of three, two plane elements in trail was assumed and the runs made from E to W. A left hand traffic pattern was established.

b. 1st.Lt.J.B.Boyd in A/P #575 led the Squadron with 2nd.Lt.T.F. Kelly on his wing in A/P #549. 2nd.Lt.J.R.Baeta in A/P #600 led the second flight with 2nd.Lt.Sisson on his wing in A/P #018. 2nd.Lt.J.S.Powell led the third flight in A/P #185 with 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson on his wing in A/P #180.

c. Each element made seven minimum altitude attack runs over the target. The first flight concentrated on the first part of the target, the second flight on the center and the third flight worked over the last part. The wooded areas to the sides of the road were thoroughly covered with 12 X 1000 lb. delay demo bombs and 12,000 X.50 ammunition.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Three (probably grass or brush fires) and one fuel fire were started in the target area. No further results were observed. There were no damage to our planes or injuries to personnel.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Even though seven passes were made over the target no activity, installations or personnel were seen. The "Nips" are undoubtedly widely scattered and well concealed far back in the woods and ravines away from the road. The C.G. of Ground Forces complemented the Group, via radio, on the thoroughness and effectiveness of the strikes stating that targets occuppied by our forces contained many dead "Nips".

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take-Off	0835/I	San Marcelino
Attack	0910-50/I	Bagac Road
Landed	1025/I	San Marcelino.

b. Route

San Marcelino - San Antonio - Bagac Bay - Target.
Return route was same.

c. There was no fighter cover provided on this strike.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
51-D-14
20 Feb 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

22 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 51-D-14, 20 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 20 February,1945, 9 A/P's of this squadron together with the other 3 squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group took off to conduct a minimum altitude strike against targets af Formosa in coordination with the 38th Bomb Group. One plane returned early due to inability to transfer fuel. Because of a low ceiling and poor visibility the Primary Target, Kagi City was not attacked. For the same reason, the full weight of the strike was not centered on Shoshu, the Secondary Target. Rather the strike was "modified" to fit the situation - the attack as executed became an area sweep of the Heito-Choshu, Toko areas. Numerous and varied targets were hit over the entire area. In the bombing and strafing attacks a total of 29 X 500 lb. bombs and 15000 rounds of .50 cal. ammunition were expended with the result that a possible chemical plant was either destroyed or seriously damaged, several buildings in both residential and business districts were destroyed and several more damaged. Fires were started as well. A marshalling yard was bombed and strafed but results were unobserved. Every likely target falling in the flight path of the formation was at least strafed. Anti-aircraft opposition varied from slight to moderate in intensity, light to medium, heavy in calibre and accurate to inaccurate. Two A/P's were holed (One holed from nose to tail) but damage is repairable. There were no personnel casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The primary target was the marshalling yard at Kagi City, the Secondary a somewhat smaller marshalling yart at Choshu. While the primary objective at both Primary and Secondary Targets was to knock out the marshalling yards, other targets were specified and no bombing or strafing restrictions were imposed.

3. ATTACK

a. Eight B-25-J's arrived at the Rendezvous Point at the S tip of Formosa and proceeded inland hugging the W side of the mountains at an altitude of approximately 2000 feet to a point approximately 40 miles South of Kagi where Group leader turned back.

(Par.3 A Cont'd)

This squadron flying in the number 4 position of the Group Diamond, allowed the other squadrons to pull ahead and then assumed attack formation of three, three plane flights abreast with liberal spacing laterally. This formation was employed because of poor visibility and difficulty in spotting the secondary target, Choshu.

b. First Lt.R.L.Smelley led the Squadron in A/P #018. During the attack Lt.Smelley's flight consisting of 2nd.Lt.C.L.Sisson in A/P #166 and 2nd.Lt.J.S.Powell in A/P #185 flew the center position of the formation. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper in A/P #180 led the third flight on the left with 2nd.Lt.S.L.DeZonia in A/P#549 and Lt.T.F.Kelley in A/P #308 on his wings. 2nd.Lt.J.R.Baeta in A/P #600 led the number two flight on the right with 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton on his wing in A/P #205. Lt.B.Knopp in A/P #575 turned back when two hours out on course.

c. After assuming the attack formation the Squadron began attacking at Riko and carried on southward to Kato hitting targets of oppertunity. At Choshu 4 bombs were dropped in the residential district, 2 bombs on a warehouse type building, 1 on a sawmill and lumber yard and 1 on a possible sugar mill with specific results unobserved. However, probable damage resulted because of the closeness of bomb bursts to targets. One bomb was dropped on a plant or factory of some sort which was a direct hit resulting in several distinct explosions, raging fires and two columns of smoke (One yellow and one white) up to 300 feet and ascending steadily. One crew member expressed the opinion that this installation might be a chemical plant. Choshu City was thoroughly strafed.
At Riko two bombs were planted squarely in the center of town. Several buildings collapsed and a great deal of debris was blown into the air. A dense black column of smoke resulted from the bombing and thorough strafing attack.
At Heito 1 bomb was dropped on a road with unobserved results. 2 bombs hit directly in the center of town resulting in a column of black smoke up to 300 feet. Several buildings were seen blown apart. 2 bombs were dropped on the marshalling yards where 2 locomotives and 8 boxcars were seen. Results were unobserved. A barracks type building just S of Heito was destroyed by a direct hit. 1 bomb was dropped on Takeda Town with probable damage to buildings.
2 bombs were dropped at a R.R. line just west of Kato but probably no damage resulted.
7 bombs were dropped on small unidentified towns along the attack route with unobserved results. Practically every worthwhile target which fell in range of our guns was strafed.
There was nointerception - opposition being entirely anti-aircraft fire. While crossing the coast enroute gun flashes were observed in the vicinity of Toko Naval Base and 12 heavy black bursts were observed in the air. However, our formation was out of range and the closest bursts were 400 yards to port beam and at our altitude of 2500 feet.

Several bursts were higher and apparently directed at fighter escorts. Firing seemed sporadic, uncoordinated and inaccurate. Gun flashes observed in the vicinity of the landing ground at Kato but no bursts were observed in the air. One M/G position near the center of the town fired constantly and tracked accurately. Observed fire from Choshu Town and Choshu A/D was moderate, medium and inaccurate with several bursts on altitude at 200 feet but wide and trailing. Small arms and M/G fire was received from almost every town and several points along the main roads.
Plane #018 sustained considerable flak damage from unknown positions. A large hole in the left bomb bay door, several holes in the port flaps, several holes in the port rudder and elevator, and several small holes in the fuselage were the extend of damage. A/P #166 sustained a hole through the propeller tip from a fragment which carried through the ventral portion of the cowling and a cylinder. A small hole found shattered against the tail assembly.

S-2 COMMENTS

Whether the reports of A/A at small towns and along roads indicates a general trend in Formosa or only a localized situation remains to be seen. However, future missions should be planned to avoid "running the gauntlet" as on this mission. The element of surprise will be most difficult to obtain when attacking targets on the western side of Formosa. To off-set this deceptive measure such as feints should be used.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off 0907/I San Marcelino
Fighter Rendesvous Enroute
Strike Force Assembly at 1210/I at S tip Formosa .
Turn back 40 miles S of Target 1240/I.
Attack 1245-1300/I

b.
Fighter Cover was excellent.

c. Route

Base - Cape Bolinao)Lingayen Area) S tip Formosa to target.
Return same as rnute.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O- N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
56-D-22
25Feb45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

26 February,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 56-D-22, 25 February,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 24 February,1945 six planes of this squadron conducted a Ground Support mission against reported enemy defense positions on a ridge near Poombato Barrio, Zambales Province, Luzon Island. In the minimum altitude attack 36 X 250 lb. demo bombs and 11,000 X.50 were expended. Bombing accuracy was good and strafing was thorough and heavy. Specific results were unobserved because of bomb smoke, dust foliage, and long delay fuses. The mission is considered as successful. Only slight ground fire, causing no damage or casualties was encountered.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to soften the defenses lying in the path of our troops and Guerilla Forces which are operating in the Balintawak River area. The designated target was a small ridge running N and S 100 yards W of Poombato Barrio.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's approached the target from the W, flying up the Balintawak River to the target where a circle was made to spot the target exactly.

b. Leading the Squadron was 1st.Lt.J.C.Reike in A/P #180. 2nd.Lt.L.E.DeZonia in A/P #575 flew on Lt.Reike's right wing over the target. 2nd.Lt.T.F.Kelley led the second flight in A/P #208 with 2nd. Lt.R.F.Kinney on his wing. 2nd.Lt.J.R.Basta led the last flight in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton on his wing in A/P #205.

c. After circling the spot(the target) the formation assumed the attack formation as outlined in "B" above and made three bombing and strafing passes from E to W. A left hand traffic pattern was established so that as each two plane cleared the target another flight was beginning the attack. After the third pass Lt.Reike assembled the squadron, circled and made a final strafing run from W to E. Each of the six planes dropped two bombs on each of the three initial runs with at least 75% falling on the ridge. The remainder either dropped short or over.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

As shown in the mission photographs, the target was entirely covered by bomb smoke and dust and augmented with smoke from small fires. No actual defense positions were observed nor were specific results observed because of the smoke, foliage and long delay fuses. The area was thoroughly covered by strafing from the 12 nose guns, 2 waist guns and 4 tail and turret guns.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Either the defense positions were not actually located in the reported area or were masterfully concealed under trees.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0800/I	San Marcelino
TOT	0829-58/I	Poonbato
Landed	0930/I	San Marcelino

b. Route

Base to Balintawak River Mouth to target - return same.

c. Nil Fighter cover provided.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
58-D-23
27 Feb 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/sd

1 March, 1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 58-D-23, 27 February, 1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 27 February, 1945 six A/Ps of this squadron took off to participate in an anti-shipping strike on the China Coast in the Hong Kong area. Four planes reached the search area and swept the coast for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes without sighting any surface vessels any larger than Junks, Sampans and Luggers. As a last resort, a group of approximately forty (40) junks was attacked approximately 50 miles east of Hong Kong Island. In the attack a total of 16 x 500 lb. demolition bombs and 7500 x .50 ammunition were expended. Bombing is not considered good since only one junk was put out of action. Several near misses were scored but probably caused little, if any, damage. Several junks were probably damaged by strafing. There was no interception, A/A fire, nor was there damage or casualties to our own planes and personnel.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was in effect a part of the overall effort to cut sea communications between Japan and her conquered territories in the South. Shipping in the area from position 21 deg 40' N-112 deg 51' E to position 22 deg 35' N--114 deg 55' E was the target

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25 J's took off but only four reached the target, one plane having turned back with engine trouble and one plane acted as escort. The four planes reached the Initial Point SSW of Hong Kong, broke off from the Group formation and searched the coast from the I.P. to the Toming Islands without success. At position 22 deg 20' N--114 deg 40' E the squadron took up attack formation of two 2-plane elements in trail and attacked the group of junks from NE to SW, circling to the right for the second pass.

b. Leading the squadron was Capt. J.B. Boyd in A/P # 198, with 2nd Lt. R.F. Kinney on his wing in A/P # 600. 1st Lt. C.A. Phillips led the second flight in A/P # 180, with 2nd Lt. C.L. Sidson on his wing in A/P # 186. 2nd Lt. R.D. Patterson turned back when approximately one hour and thirty minutes after take off with a rough engine. 2nd Lt. F.A. Thompson acted as escort in A/P # 575. The two planes reached the base safely, but it was necessary to change the engine on Lt. Patterson's plane

Narrative Report on Mission FFO 363-A-1, 27-28 Dec 1944. (cont'd)

Capt Jacobson and Lt Tuftie each dropped 2 x 1000 (4/5 sec delay) demo bombs which missed a vessel lying at anchor with all lights. Two of the A/P's made no attack, and three returned early due to mechanical failure.

d. The only opposition encountered was A/A fire which was both light and medium, intense, and accurate to inaccurate, coming from both vessels and shore installations in SAN FERNANDO COVE.

4. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions justifying awards.

5. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off: at 2200-2245/I/27 from TAMAYAN A/D.
Attack: at 0120-0215/I/28 at SAN FERNANDO COVE and W coast of LUZON
Landing: from 2235/I/27 to 0703/I/28 at TACLOBAN A/D

b. Route: TAMAYAN-MINDORO-WEST COAST OF LUZON-SAN FERNANDO COVE-WEST COAST OF LUZON-MINDORO-TACLOBAN.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

499
60-D-11
1 Mar 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

4 March,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 60-D-11, 1 March,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 1 March,1945, 6 planes this squadron along with other 3 squadrons of the 345th Group took off to carry out anti-shipping strike off the China Coast in the Hong Kong area. 6 planes, each loaded with 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay bombs, reached the target. The "Strike Force" reached Henghai Bay, proceeded up the coast and sighted a Sugar Baker at Swabu but made no attack since ship appeared to be at anchor. Therefore leaving it "Restricted from Attack" planes continued search for other targets and went as far north as Lanshanstung,. No other targets were seen so planes made 180° turn and returned to Swabu where previously sighted M/V was observed with "steam up" and making attempt to leave area, thus leaving all doubts of attack restrictions. Planes then proceeded in the attack and a total of 17X 500 lb. bombs and 11,000 X.50 Cal. were expended in the attack. Three direct hits and a near miss left the M/V (Sugar Baker) in a sinking condition. There was no interception encountered. Only A/A encountered were parachutes slightly smaller than parafrag chutes and having a metal cylinder suspended from shrouds. (Probably 81 mm mortar) Chutes burst 100 yards to rear of planes at a 50 foot altitude. No planes were damaged nor personnel injured.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was in effect a part of the overall effort to cut sea communications between Japanese mainland and her conquered territories in the south.

3. ATTACK

a. 6 A/P's reached Henghai Bay and contacted X B-24 which stated would start sending M.O.'s however no M.O.'s were received and no further contact was possible, squadron then started search along coast to Lanshanstung but no attack was made until planes returned to Henghai Bay area where the Sugar Baker was attacked. 6 planes, in 2 plane elements made 1 pass over the M/V.

b. Leading the squadron was Capt.R.L.Smelly in A/P #018 with Lt.J.E.Powell in A/P #185 on his wing. Lt.T.F.Kelly in A/P #166, with Lt.R.F.Kinney in A/P #940 followed. Lt.J.B.Morton led the third and last flight over with Lt.L.E.DeZonia on his wing.

c. This squadron, led by Capt.Smelly, was the first to attack, Capt.Smelly "let loose" his bombs to score 2 direct hits on the ship one which hit below the water line and lifted the Sugar Baker, his bombs severely damaged the ship and started it sinking with bow going down first. The ship was already damaged badly enough to sink however, another direct hit on the bow by the last flight was scored, further damaging the ship. The Sugar Baker was left in sinking condition, both the squadron photos and reports from squadron which followed our attack confirm the condition which ship was in after this squadron's attack.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Capt.Smelly and his crew who are credited with the sinking of the M/V will be recommended for the Air Medal.

6. STATISTICS

a. Times

Take Off	San Marcelino	0850/I
Attack	Swabu (Henghai Bay)	1309/I
Landed	San Marcelino	1705/I

b. Fighter Cover

Fighters could be heard over radio but not seen in the target area.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L cas.

499
61-D-10
2 Mar 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

5 March,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 61-D-10, 2 March,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C.ofS.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

As a part of a large scale effort against installations on Formosa, this squadron participated in a Group strike on the 2 March. The assigned target, Kagi Airdrome and vicinity was attacked by nine planes in a minimum altitude strike. Several different areas in the target vicinity were attacked but the main weight of the strike was directed against Toyohara Town, Taiga Town and Toyohara Airdrome. A total of 396 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped and 19,000 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing. In addition to fires started in Toyohara Town by preceeding squadrons, this squadron set a large building afire by bombing and strafing. Many other buildings were hit by bombing and strafing but results were generally unobserved. Because they fell behind in a turn three planes could not get over the A/D and attacked Taiga Town and adjacent areas. A factory type building was set afire as a result of both bombing and strafing. A barracks and camp area approximately 2 miles W of Taiga Town was bombed and strafed without visible results. The only definite results ascertained on the A/D was an explosion and black smoke fire which probably resulted from strafing of an unidentified, camouflaged plane at the east side center of the runway. Four of six unidentified, heavily camouflaged, probably unserviceable planes dispersed from E to W across the N edge of the landing area were well strafed. These planes did not burn but damage was definitely inflicted by strafing. Several small towns South and East of the airdrome were bombed and strafed with unobserved results. The results achieved are not deemed commensurate with the amount of damage sustained by our Squadron. Four planes were damaged by A/A (one of which made a crash landing at Lingayen, damaging the plane beyond repair). Two men were injured in the landing. One plane failed to return and was last seen on single engine at 500 feet just South of the Pescadores Islands, heading 240 degrees out to sea. Present status of this plane is unknown. Several conflicting reports only tend to confuse the true status. Rescue operations initiated at Lingayen are now underway.

2. OBJECTIVE

Our mission was a part of a large strike in coordination with one B-25 Group, 4 B-24 Groups, one Fighter Groups, and one A-20 Group. Several vital targets on Formosa were designated.

(Par. 2 Cont'd)

The specific targets on Toyohara A/D for the 345th Group were grounded airplanes. The 38th Group Strike was closely coordinated with our own the target being Taichu.

3. ATTACK

a. Nine B-25-J's flying a diamond formation of 3 plane "V"'s flew up the E coast of Formosa in the number four "slot" of the Group Formation. In the vicinity of the Taiko River Mouth the squadron turned inland to the East and took up interval behind the other squadrons. When approximately 5 miles NE of Toyohara Town a one eighty degree turn brought the squadron onto the axis of attack of approximately 250°. The attack formation was 9 planes in line abreast.

b. Capt.J.B.Boyd led the Squadron in A/P #180 with Lieuts. Thompson (A/P #575) and Sisson (A/P #203) on his right and left wings respectively. 1st.Lt.J.S.Powell led the second flight in A/P #018 with 2nd.Lt.B.V.Knopp in A/P #948 and Lt.R.D.Patterson in A/P #166 on his right and left respectively. 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton in A/P #600 led the 3rd Flight with 1st.Lt.L.E.DeZonia, A/P #549 and 2nd.Lt.T.F. Kelly in A/P #014 on his right and left respectively. Over the target all three flights flew abreast with Capt.Boyd in the center, Lt.Powell on the right and Lt.Morton on the left.

c. In the turn onto the axis of attack Lt.Morton's flight being on the outside was unable to fly over the airdrome proper. The flight shot up small towns and scattered houses from Toyohara Town to the coast. At T iga Town the flight dropped 72 bombs and succeeded in setting fire to a factory type building. Farther W approximately 2 miles 24 bombs were dropped in a barracks area. The camp was well strafed but results were not visible. In addition 24 bombs were dropped with unobserved results on other small unidentified villages south of the A/D. Lt.DeZonia alone of this flight flew over the A/D. He dropped 24 bombs across the SW dispersal area flying over a revetment occuppied by a camouflaged unidentified plane. It is not known whether the plane was damaged. 12 bombs were released with unobserved results on a camouflaged, probably medium, A/A gun position, located approximately 2 miles SW of Taiga. Many buildings between Taiga and the coast were shot up. Capt.Boyd's and Lt.Powell's flights flew over Toyohara Town and Capt. Boyd accidentally released a bank of parafrags in opening the bomb bay doors. The other planes taking this as an example released 72 bombs on the town as well as thoroughly strafing various buildings and installations. One large building was set afire and several were probably damaged as a result of bombing and thorough strafing.

Between Toyohara Town and the Airdrome both flights strafed several buildings and small towns with unobserved results. Capt.Boyd's flight flew squarely over the center of the drome and Lt.Powell's flight flew over the north part of the drome. Altogether a total of 156 parafrags were dropped on the airdrome. An unidentified A/P located at the E side of the center of the runway was bombed and strafed. An explosion with a black smoke fire occurred in this area shortly afterwards probably as a result of the attack on the plane. Lt.Knopp flew over the extreme northern edge of the field where six heavily camouflaged unidentified and probably unserviceable A/P's were parked. Because of a malfunction bombs failed to release. Nevertheless the thorough strafing of 3 of the six planes caused some damage. Capt.Boyd poured several rounds into a 2/e bomber (Betty or Sally) just W of the hangar area. The plane did not burn but was definitely damaged. Several buildings (shops, hangars etc) just W of the field were damaged by bombing and strafing but extent of damage was not ascertained. Four of our planes sustained varying degrees of damage as a result of A/A fire. A/P # 018: explosive .50 entered one bombay door and exploded in opposite door making hole approximately 3 inches in diameter. A/P #600: Medium shell entered dorsal near hatch, making approximately 3 inches, shell hit ammo box and continued through turret dome. A/P #575: Hydraulic system shot out, intake on left engine severed, left auxiliary wing tank seived, emergency nose wheel system damaged, nose riddled, radio transmitter shot out and several small holes in fuselage.

A/P #203: Dropped out of formation just after leaving target and began to climb. Capt.Boyd instructed Lt.Thompson to drop back as escort. Since his radio transmitter was inoperative, Lt.Thompson could not indicate his own critical condition he nevertheless turned and followed #203 to 5000 feet where that plane feathered the right engine and then gained an additional 1000 feet. Then for unknown reasons, the A/P began to descend rapidly and lost altitude to 300 feet in five minutes. At this point, with a continued stream of gas from leaking tanks Lt.Thompson was forced to leave. His last sight of A/P #203 was at 2325N-11930E heading 240° and still under control. Lt.Thompson made a crash landing at Lingayen when nose wheel would not lower and did an excellent job in saving the crew. The airplane was damaged beyond repair but salvage is practical. 3 men sustained minor wounds.

The crew of A/P #203 was as follows:

2nd.Lt.C.L.Sisson	O-764810	Pilot
2nd.Lt.H.B.Galinkin	O-686843	Co-Pilot
2nd.Lt.H.E.Smith, Jr.	O-2072896	Navigator
Sgt.J.V.Fitzpatrick	36619952	Engineer
Sgt.J.E.Messengill	34826477	Radio Operator
Sgt.L.O.Babin	38493263	Armorer Gunner

A large number of photos were received showing a great deal of valuable target information but are of little use in assessing damage.

There was no fighter interception.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

In the report of Mission FFO 51-D-14 Choshu Town, attention was directed to the wide dispersion of M/G and small arms fire. Even more intense and dispersed M/G fire was encountered on this mission. The sighting of larger caliber gun flashes and bursts in areas sometimes 3 miles from Towns and A/D's seems to indicate a definite trend on Formosa. As a result the mission following this day's mission was planned at the recommendation of S-2 to avoid large towns, cross-roads and other vital targets.
The necessity for precise, brief and prompt redio reports for "Air Sea Rescue was forcefully demonstrated on this mission. The chief mistakes noted were:

(1) Much unnecessary chatter and reporting which only succeeded in confusing the radio traffic.

(2) Failure to give full information required on forms provided for this purpose.

(3) Failure to repeat grid coordinates to insure accurate receipt.

(4) Failure to have two planes escort damaged planes.

5. CITATIONS

Lieuts.Thompson and Otey the pilot and co-pilot of A/P #575 will be recommended for meritorious achievement in successfully flying the damaged plane and for escorting A/P #205 when also in perilous condition.

Lt.St.Onge Navigator of A/P #575 sustained minor cuts on face and leg; Sgt.Kay, gunner of A/P #575 , sustained contusions of right arm and contusions and scratches of right thorax but because of existing directions the medical officers certificate stating necessity for treatment by an M/O. cannot be obtained . Consequently no recommendation for award of the Purple Heart will be made.

6. STATISTICS

a. Times

T.O.	0730/I	San Marcelino
T.O.T.	1110-1115/I	Toyohara
Landed	1515/I (6 A/P's)	San Marcelino
	1720/I (2 A/P's	" "

b. Fighter cover was "Area Type" consequently rating of execution cannot be made.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Jont. 499
/ 65-0-7
6 Mar 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

8 March,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 65-D-17, 6 March,1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S.,A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 6 March 1945, this squadron participated in a coordinated minimum altitude strike on Samah Air Base, Hainan Island. Three squadrons of the 38th Group and the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron comprised one division of the strike force. The four squadrons of the 345th Group comprised the second division. Nine B-25-J's of this squadron reached the target but two of these crashed over the target when one plane hit by A/A crashed into another. This collision forced four planes to veer away from the target before completing the attack. As a result only 54 X 100 lb. bombs were dropped. Three planes were able to complete the attack, covering the entire length of the target. Tho other four planes dropped bombs and strafed the highly concentrated service barracks,warehouse and shop area along the beach South East of the airdrome. An unidentified, radial engine single seat fighter in front of the hangars just NW of the NE-SW runway was strafed and damaged and several other planes inside the hangars were strafed. In addition a string of six bombs was dropped on one of the hangars, but specific results could not be seen. In general the results were almost impossible to see because of the dense pall of smoke and dust which covered most of the target area. The seven planes expended a total of 19,440 X.50 ammo in strafing. Several buildings were burning after leaving the target but any attempt to distinguish between those set afire by our attack and those by other squadrons, is futile. This strike was more strongly exposed than any strike during recent months. Not since November had the squadron encountered interception. On this date three enemy fighters made three ineffective passes without causing damage. Anti-aircraft fire was, overall intense and accurate barrage type. In addition to the two planes which crashed over the target two other planes were damaged (one considerably) by A/A fire. Personnel casualties were restricted to the two crashed plane.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this mission was to neutralise Samah Airdrome which is the suspected base for recent night raids against our airdromes at Lingayan and Clark Field.

3. ATTACK

a. On reaching Hainan Island early, the Group Formation circled over Leong Soi Bay approximately 20 miles east of Samah to allow the 38th Group to clear the target.

Being the last squadron to attack; this squadron followed the preceeding squadron's approach which was generally from the east over the mountains and then down onto the target in a nine-plane abreast formation.

b. Leading the squadron in A/P #177 was 1st.Lt.J.C.Reike with second Lieuts. Knopp (A/P #549) and Kelly (A/P #508) on the right and left respectively. 2nd.Lt.J.B.Morton led the second element in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt. T.C.Bronson in A/P #014 and 2nd.Lt.T.B.Mangum in A/P #198 on his right and left. Leading the third flight was 1st.Lt.J.S.Powell in A/P #185 with 1st.Lt.R.A.Prentice in A/P #180 on his right and 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson on his left in A/P #166. Over the target Lt.Morton's flight was to the right and abreast of the lead flight. Lt.Powell's flight was to the left and abreast.

c. On the approach, Lt.Reike saw the barrage of Flak over the hill approximately 5 miles east of the target. The barrage was being layed by guns near installations in the N part of Yu Lin Kan Bay and was bursting around preceeding squadrons. Consequently, Lt.Reike slid to the north slightly and flew through a cut in the hill to avoid the most dense part of the barrage. He was only partially successful, however, for it was here that A/P #205 was hit in the rudder. Just after crossing the ridge, the flight nosed down sharply and descended on the target. However, Lt.Prentice's plane was hit by A/A shortly after and his maneuvers disrupted the formation so that Lt.Reike's and Powell's flights could not turn to line up with the airdrome. Lt.Prentice's plane caught afire and he slid under the formation turning into Lt.Knopp who tried to dodge but without success. Lt.Prentice's plane was on fire and when the two planes collided the wing of Lt.Knopp's plane came off. Both planes crashed into the bay just off the target. Lt.Reike's and Powell's flights dropped their bombs and strafed the buildings area but smoke was so dense that results could not be seen. Lt.Morton's flight being on the right was not affected by the crash of the two planes, and consequently made a good run, directly over the entire area. Lt.Morton's bombs failed to release but he thoroughly strafed several buildings including two hangars at the Southwest part of the NE-SW runway. In the west dispersal area he strafed and damaged a truck. Lt.Bronson dropped six bombs through the N part of the Service Area just east of the SE end of the NW-SE runway and Lt.Mangun dropped four bombs in the same area. The smoke cleared over the runways and Lt.Bronson spotted a single seat radial engine fighter in front of the hangars. He poured round after round into the plane causing damage. He also dropped six bombs on a hangar and thoroughly strafed on an unknown number of planes which he dimly saw inside the hangars. Lt.Mangum's remaining bombs were dropped on M/G and weapon pits on the beach west of the target. As the squadron pulled off the target the five separate and distinct fires as well as several smaller ones were seen in the area.

d. Anti-aircraft opposition was divided into two areas - that received on the approach and that received over the target. Of the two, the opposition on the approach was most effective. An intense barrage of heavy accurate A/A was maintained over a ridge East of the target. The formation was committed to the run taken by preceeding 3 squadrons.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

By the time our formation topped the ridge the batteries near installations in the N part of Yu Lin Kan Bay, at least one battery in the area SE of the drome and possibly warships in Yu Lin Kan Bay had established the range, height and pattern. The result was an effective barrage. Had the squadron not slid to the N and taken advantage of a small cut in the hills, damage would have been more severe. As it was A/P #205 was hit in the right rudder leaving an eighteen inch hole. It is not definitely known in what area Lt.Prentice was hit but indications are that this barrage was responsible. The second area was over the drome itself. Most of the bursts seen were at 1000 feet which was considerably higher than our planes which were on deck. Crews report the medium positions at either end of the NW-SE runway were firing intensely. Many bursts seen over the SW end of the NE-SW runway were probably from these guns. The dense smoke over the target probably accounts for the inaccuracy of A/A over the drome. However, approximately 1 mile W of the drome M/G's on the beach and M/G's in the NW dispersal area created an effective cross-fire which holed A/P #198 several times causing minor damage. Tracers or incendiaries started a small fire in the insulation around the navigators compartment but was quickly extinguished. After pulling up and off the target to avoid the colliding A/P's the Squadron Leader was temporarily alone and two enemy fighters (probably Jacks) flying in a loose two plane element made a pass from four o'clock high and opened fire at extreme range. At the same time the top turret gunner opened up and the pilot turned into the attack and "hit the deck". As a result the enemy fire was high and wide to the left. The fighters veered away to the left and crossed behind the plane at approximately 100 yards. Unfortunately the tail turret was inoperative, the motors having burned out on ammo feed. The enemy fighters were only able to fire the one time because of our evasive tactics. They appeared eager but inexperienced as indicated by the blunder of crossing directly behind the tail of our plane. Three unidentified fighters were seen circling over the airdrome and three over the NW dispersal area. One of the three over the dispersal area broke formation and made a beam attack on the right side of the plane on the extreme right of our formation. When fired on at 3 o'clock the enemy fighter broke shortly left. Our fighter cover was nowhere to be seen but the squadron formation was quickly assumed and the enemy fighters did not attempt further attacks.
Our casualties were restricted to the two A/P's which crashed over the target. the crews lost are as follows.

	Plane #180	
1st.Lt.Robert A. Prentice	0-765967	Pilot
2nd.Lt.Richard A.Ward	0-764531	Co-pilot
2nd.Lt.Hugh W.Curtiss	0-1305207	Navigator
T/Sgt.Alton F.Joyner	34353044	Engineer
Sgt.Stuart R.Loskill	16027897	Radio-Gunner
Sgt.Earl M.R.Salmi	36830992	Armorer-Gunner

	Plane #549	
2nd.Lt.Virgil B.Knopp	0-1686435	Pilot
2nd.Lt.David S.Lem	0-775425	Co-Pilot
2nd.Lt.Steve C.Luka	0-702458	Navigator
Sgt.Elmer D.Farkas	33674261	Radio Operator
Sgt.John L.Jones	35146990	Armorer Gunner
Sgt.Raymond F.Nedeau	31373699	Engineer

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Photographic coverage was insufficient to give a clear picture of the attack.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Information on the target was good but vital information concerning approaches was poor. Contour maps and oblique photos are essential in planning approaches - especially on heavily defended areas. Neither are available which cover current targets.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0915/I	San Marcelina
T.O.T.	1330/I	Samah A/D
Landed	1805/I	San Marcelino

b. Fighter Cover

Fighter cover was not seen over target. Fighters radio conversation prior to our attack indicates fighters turned back because of fuel shortage.

c. Route

Base - SE tip Hainan Island - Target - Return same route.

d. Ordnance and Armament Report

54 X 100 lb. bombs dropped on target.
16 X 100 lb. bombs salvoed off target in bay.
14 X 100 lb. bombs returned to base.
19,440 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: 3
Overlay Maps



ROUTE OVERLAY

Mission FFO 65-D-17 6 March, 1945, Samah A/D


HAINAN
N
SAN JA
YULINKAN BAY
GAALONG BAY
LEVNG SOI BAY
SOUTH CHINA SEA
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWAL
MISSION FFO65 D-17
6 MARCH 1945 SAMAH A/D
ORDER ATTACK - No. 4. MIN. ALT.
9B-25 -Js.

499
79-D-18
20 Mar 45

JCH

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEC/rjl

21 March,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 79-D-18, 20 March,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

On 20 March,1945 six A/P's of this Squadron took off to conduct an anti-shipping search off the Indo China Coast. Two A/P's turned back early and the remaining four completed the mission. An unserviceable vessel was bombed with four 500 lb. bombs and a Sugar Charlie (stack aft M/V of approximately 1000 tons) was bombed with three 500 lb. bombs which missed. The vessel was probably damaged by strafing. The Sugar Charlie was sunk by A/P of the 500th Squadron which was flying with our formation. Two planes sustained minor damage from small arms fire. There were no personnel injuries.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a continuation of the strikes aimed at cutting the only shipping lane remaining between the southern regions and the Japanese Homeland. The specific target was shipping in the coastal waters between Binh Dinh (1347N-10913E) and Cape Varella (1253N-10927E) and nearby area on the Eastern Indo China Coast.

3. ATTACK

a. Four B-25's conducted the search in a four-plane diamond formation at 500-1000 feet. All attacks were executed at minimum altitude.

b. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper led the Squadron in A/P #018. 1st.Lt.J.E.Slaughter in A/P #948, 2nd.Lt.L.A.Mikell in A/P #177, and 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum in A/P #600 flew in number 2,3 and 4 positions respectively. 1st.Lt.J.S.Powell in A/P #185 escorted 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson flying A/P #198, back to base when 198 developed an oil leak, and a smoking rough engine. The two A/P's turned back one hour and twenty-five minutes after take-off.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. The four planes which reached the target began the search at Binh Dinh and on arriving at Qui Nhon harbor (just S of Binh Dinh) spotted an apparently serviceable stack aft freighter of approximately 2000 tons. Just as he released his four bombs Lt.Draper saw that the freighter was unserviceable and resting on the bottom of the harbor. No further attacks were made and the search was continued. At Dang Xuan Harbor (1353N-10913E) Lt.Draper spotted a small M/V. He had no bombs but since the other pilots did not know the location he led the flight in on the approach across the mouth of the harbor from E to W then turned right and attacked on a heading of approximately 45°. Lt.Draper had no bombs Lt.Mikell's bombs hung up and Lt.Mangum's electrical system was not functioning properly. This situation left only Lt. Slaughter to make a bombing run. He dropped three bombs but all three missed doing nil damage. Immediately afterward the 500th A/P sank the Sugar Charlie with a direct hit. In the attack a total of 3200 X.50 Cal. were expended. The remaining coastal area to Cape Varella was searched with nil sightings. There was no fighter interception (with the exception of P-51's chich dove out of the clouds suddenly and departed suddenly when a warning burst was fired). Anti Aircraft fire was received from buildings on a small peninsula at Qui Nhon. Only gun flashes were seen but indications are that this was small arms fire. Two planes sustained minor damage from this fire.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this attack.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	San Marcelino	0700/I
T.O.T.	1125-1140/I	
Landed	San Marcelino	2 A/P's 1255/I
		2 " 1625/I

b. Route

San Marcelino - Binh Dinh - C.Varella - San Marcelino.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
80-D
21 Mar

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

23 March,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 80-D, 21 March,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the afternoon of 21 March,1945, this squadron was called upon to carry out an attack on Carabao Island. Four planes, each loaded with 2 X 1000 lb. 8/15 second delay bombs took off and on arrival at Carabao Island made contact with P.T. boats "Hermit 3 and 4 who assigned the target and after receiving orders to attack 5" coastal guns proceeded with the attack dropping a total of 8 X 1000 lb. bombs scoring 2 hits on one of the guns. No ground or air opposition was encountered.

2. OBJECTIVE

The original plan for this strike was to destroy any boats, rafts or other type equipment which the Nips might use as means of escape from the island or any concentration of Japs on the island itself. P.T. boats Hermit 6 and 7 were to stand by and spot targets and in turn relay information to planes, however, planes arrived at Carabao and Hermit 6 and 7 could not be seen or contacted by radio but other P.T. boats (Hermit 3 and 4) in that area heard our message and requested that attack be made on 2 5" guns on the SE end of the island.

3. ATTACK

a. Four B-25-J's made the attack, the run over the target was individual plane attacks and in trail, dropping 1 bomb on each of the 2 passes made.

b. Capt.R.L.Smelley in A/P #018 led the attack and other planes and pilots were as follows: 2nd.Lt.F.A.Thompson in A/P #014, 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum in A/P #600 and 1st.Lt.R.W. Draper in A/P #185.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. After arriving target and making contact with P.T. boats, Capt.Smelley made 1 "dry run" across the S tip of the island then circled and planes took regular attack interval then made attack.
The runs were made from NE to SW 4 X 1000 lb. bombs were dropped on the first pass and exploded on target on hillside just S of large building. Bursts entirely covered target and gun was believed destroyed. After 1st. run P.T. boat commented on accuracy of attack and directed following run be made on another position just N of large building. On succeeding run 4 more half tonners were dropped in the assigned area but no definite results were observed. Strafing was light due to the proximity of P.T. boats and necessity for early, sharp pull out to clear hill on S end of island. On first run top turret firing cracked plexiglass over over cockpit of A/P #018 and navigator started aft to stop the firing and was caught off balance by sharp pull up and fell heavily against turret mount sustaining severe lacerations and contusions on back. This plane returned early and navigator was rushed to hospital.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	San Marcelino		1550/I
T.O.T.	Carabao Is.		1635-55/I
Landed	San Marcelino	3 A/P	1740/I
		1 "	1725/I

b. Route

San Marcelino - Manila Bay- Target - Return route reciprocal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
81-0-1
22 Mar 45
JCH

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

24 March, 1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 81-D-1, 22 March, 1945.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 22 March, 1945, five airplanes of this squadron conducted a thorough search of the Southeastern Coast of Indo China finding nil targets to attack. Shortly after beginning the search just north of Camranh Bay, one Oscar intercepted the Squadron Formation, using extremely poor tactics which resulted the fighter's destruction in an engagement of only a few seconds duration. There was no anti aircraft fire from the ground. One plane sustained minor damage and a turret gunner sustained minor cut on face during interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was part of a two-squadron strike continuing the effort which is effectively cutting the shipping lanes on the Indo China coast. Targets were specified as "shipping" which includes all surface vessels (both merchant and naval) larger than junks, sampans and small fishing craft found in the area Camranh Bay to Binh Dinh.

3. ATTACK

a. Five B-25-J's conducted the search in javelin down formation with the second flight consisting of two planes only. The search altitude was from 800-1000 feet searching from south to north.

b. Capt.R.L.Smelley in A/P #018 led the squadron with 1st.Lt.J.S.Powell on his right wing in A/P #165 and 1st.Lt.J.S. Slaughter on his left wing in A/P #166. 2nd.Lt.L.A.Mikell led the second element in A/P #177 with 2nd.Lt.R.D.Patterson on his right wing in A/P #014.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c.The squadron made land fall on the Indo China Coast N of Camranh Bay and then turned south to CamranhBay and then turned 180 degrees to begin the search. Just N of Camranh Bay at position 1205N-10913E when the squadron was still in the turn on a heading of 345 degrees, at 600 feet, airspeed 170 mph, one"Oscar" was seen at five o'clock slightly high at distance of approximately 800 yards. The "Oscar" slid into a six oclock position on a level with the formation and began firing short bursts. At approximately 500 yards to the rear of the formation, tail turrets, some upper turrets and waist guns opened up and literally blew the "Nip" apart. One of the first bursts riddled the canopy and the plane immediately stopped firing but continued to press closer. The plane was hit constantly in the cockpit, wing roots and fuselage from 500 yards out to 50 yards. During this time numerous chunks broke off the plane. Finally at 50 yards the Oscar pulled up exposing his belly to a further hail of fire. The Oscar stalled and then crashed head on into the sea. It is believed that the pilot was hit by one of the first bursts and was unable to turn away. The pilot was evidently inexperienced and entirely ignorant of the formidable firepower of the B-25-J. Especially did he seem ignorant of the presence of the twin-fifties in the tail turret. The pilot used no deceptive or evasive tactics and almost no maneuvers. It will be remembered that ignorance of the tail guns was displayed by "Nip" pilots during interception of our strike on Negros Island on 3 November,1944. There was no damage or casualties due to the enemy interceptor's fire. However, empty cartridge cases and belt links falling from the first flight caused minor damage to A/P #014. An empty shell case also holed the top turret and plexiglass splinters inflicted minor facial scratches on Sgt.R.J.Schnitzer gunner of A/P #014.

4. CITATIONS

S/Sgt.B.J."allace, tail gunner of A/P #018 will be recommended for award of the Air Medal for destruction of an enemy plane during aerial combat.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	San Marcelino	0700/I
T.O.T. Area	1055-1150/I	
Interception	Vicinity Camranh Bay	1108/I
Landed	San Marcelino	1620/I

b. Route

San Marcelino Target San Marcelino

c. Fighter Cover

Nil Fighter provided.

d. Armament Ordnance Report

No bombs dropped on targets.

3500 X.50 Cal. expended.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
35-D-25
26 mar 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

27 March,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 85-D-25, 26 March, 1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six airplanes conducted a highly satisfactory ground support mission against Siniloan Town, Laguna Province, Luzon Island on the morning of 26 March. A total of 24 X 500 lb. bombs and 11,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended in the minimum altitude attack. A large fire was started, several buildings destroyed, one A/A position silenced and numerous running Japs were cut down. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the mission was the destruction of a concentration of personnel, supplies and buildings in Sinaloan Town and adjacent coconut groves.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's approachdd the target from the SW over Laguna De Bay, flew N to the W of the target then turned 180° to attack from N to S. Attacks were made in two-plane elements in a "traffic pattern" to the right. Each element made four minimum altitude bombing and strafing passes.

b. 2nd.Lt.L.W.Morton led the attack in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt J.T.Walker on his wing in A/P #198. 1st.Lt.J.S. Powell led the second element in A/P #185 with 2nd.Lt. F.A. Thompson on his wing in A/P #018. 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum led the third element in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.L.A.Mikell on his wing in A/P #014.

c. The first run was more or less a "dry run" to make certain that the proper target was attacked. Of the 24 bombs dropped, one skipped past the target and two hit in the river at the center of town. The remaining 21 bombs were seen to explode in the target.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

One large explosion and fire was seen in the N part of the town but lasted only a short while. Several buildings were destroyed and several others were damaged. The coconut groves were heavily strafed from end to end, undoubtedly causing damage which could not be ascertained because of the heavy foliage. At the N end of town a M/G position was silenced by strafing. At the S end of town an A/A position was destroyed by bombing. On the first run, flashes were seen which indicated 20mm. or larger and location was marked. On next run the position was destroyed and confirmed by the following element. Several Japs were seen running through the town and several were hit by strafing. Meager, light inaccurate A/A did not hinder performance of the mission. We suffered nil damage or casualties.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendation for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	San Marcelino	0700/I
T.O.T.	Siniloan	0758-0810/I
Landed	San Marcelino	0900/I

b. Route

Base to Capones Is. to Carabao Is. to Siniloan.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil fighter cover provided.

d. Armament and Ordnance Report

24 X 500 lb. bombs dropped
11,000 X.50 Cal. expended.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

JCAF/499
87-D-34
28mar45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

30 March,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 87-D-34, 28 March,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 28 March,1945, nine A/P's took off to conduct a minimum altitude attack on a reported convoy off the Indo China coast. However, only five A/P's reached the target. Because of an error in navigation by the lead squadron the convoy was not attacked. Following orders of the Formation Leader the 5 A/P's attacked land installations at Phan Rang as a last resort. Nineteen 500 lb. bombs and 5,000 X.50 cal. ammo were expended in the attack. Four to five large brick-stucco buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged, 1 locomotive engine was rendered unserviceable, two fuel tanks were left burning fiercely, the R.R. line was severed by a direct hit and several R.R.cars and buildings were damaged by strafing. One of our planes was holed 4 times by 13 mm. M/G fire and one man sustained minor facial scratches from flying glass. There was no interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

This strike was a continuation of the almost daily strikes which are aimed at cutting the South China Sea shipping lanes. The specific target was a convoy in the vicinity of Phan Rang Bay. Its size and composition was somewhat undetermined due to varying reports from shadowing subs and airplanes. However, the convoy probably consisted of 14-20 vessels, of various types including escort vessels.

3. ATTACK

a. Five B-25-J's following the Group Leader arrived at Kega Point (1033N-10800E) and still following the lead squadron finally turned N up the coast. During this time the fighter escort called to report the convoy's position but the message was not clear. The Group Leader was notified of the situation but ordered an attack on land targets of opportunity.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par.2 a Comt'd)

The five planes approached Phan Rang Town from the E approximately 4 miles N of the town. Formation consisted of one, 3-plane V and one, two plane element. The first element turned to attack from NW to SE. The second element varied its run to attack from W to E at interval behind the first flight.

b. Capt.R.L.Smelley in A/P #018 led the squadron almost to the target but at 1115/I one engine blew a cylinder and he was forced to limp home escorted by 2nd.Lts.Thompson in A/P #198 and R.D.Patterson in A/P #166.
1st.Lt.R.W.Draper took over the lead in A/P #185 with 1st.Lt. J.S.Slaughter on his right wing in A/P #948 and 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum on his left wing in A/P #600. 2nd.Lt.L.W.Morton led the second flight in A/P #655 with 2nd.Lt.I.A.Mikell on his wing in A/P #014.

c. Just prior to reaching the RR marshalling yards LtDraper dropped one bomb at a good sized building which skipped causing no damage. At the R.R. yard he dropped 1 bomb which severed the tracks in one section. He scored a hit on a large building causing heavy damage. His remaining bomb hit an oil tank car on a siding resulting in a large explosion and fire probably damaging 2 other tank cars nearby.
Lt.Slaughter strafed and dropped one bomb through a small town just prior to reaching the marshalling yards with unobserved results. He dropped 3 bombs across the marshalling yards causing heavy damage to a R.R. Station House and hitting a locomotive engine which emitted clouds of steam followed by an explosion.
Lt.Morton dropped 4 bombs in the R.R. marshalling yards which caused a large explosion destroying one building and damaging two others.
Lt.Mikell dropped 3 bombs in the same area contributing further damage to that done by Lt.Morton.
A/P #014 was holed 3 times in the vertical stabilizer by M/G fire from a small penninsula near Phan Rang Town. At the R.R. marshalling yards one M/G bullet pierced the pilots wind screen and flying glass slightly scratched Lt.Mikell. Excellent photos confirm results with exception of reported setting afire 2 oil storgge tanks.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0648/I	San Marcelino
1 A/P turned back early.		Landed 1040/I
5 A/P's turned back.		1115/I
T.O.T.	Phan Rang	1120-1214/I
Landed	1650/I	San Marcelino

b. Fighter Cover

Fighters not seen.

c. Armament and Ordnance Report

19 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on target.
4 X 500 lb. bombs returned.
8 X 500 lb. bombs salvoed at 1150N-11040E
1 X 500 lb. bomb salvoed 1320N-11400E
4 X 500 lb. bombs salvoed 40 miles off coast Indo China Coast. 5,000 X.50 Cal. expended.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-C-N-F-I- D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JeN 499 88-D-23 29 Mar 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

1 April,1945.

see p. 2

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 88-D-23, 29 March,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the 29 March,1945, nine A/P's of this Squadron took off to attack the reported 12-14 vessel convoy which we failed to locate on 28 March. One A/P turned back early because of mechanical failure but eight A/P's found the convoy under attack by the 501st and 498th Squadrons at approximately 1500N - 10935E off the Indo China Coast. As we attacked, the convoy was just entering a heavy bank of weather and six of our planes attacked a converted minelayer which was left listing by one of the leading squadrons. At least two direct hits, several near misses and heavy strafing completed destruction of the vessel. Two of our planes entered the weather front and attacked a merchant vessel of approximately 2300 tons causing possible damage with one near miss. An escort vessel, probably a sub chaserwwas also attacked but escaped with no damage. Bad weather hampered our attack but also confused anti-aircraft gunners in the convoy and we came off with minor damage to two A/P's and one man hospitalised by a bullet graze across his back. A total of 30 X 500 lb. bombs and 13,270 X.50 cal. ammunition were expended in the attack.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was, in effect, another deep slash in the only shipping artery remaining between the heart and the extremities of the Japanese Empire. The convoy which was attempting to run our air and submarine blockade was the assigned target.

3. ATTACK

a. Eight B-25's of this squadron leading the second two squadron wave arrived at the target area and spotted two burning vessels. The squadron immediately peeled off to the N avoiding the two already damaged escort vessels and flew North in an attempt to locate other targets,

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(Par. 3 Cont'd)

b. Capt.R.F.Todd led the squadron with 2nd.Lt.Lieuts.Bronson and Patterson on his wings in A/P's #000 and #198 respectively. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper in A/P #185 set out to lead the second flight but turned back early. 1st.Lt.J.C.Reike took his flight in A/P #948 with 2nd.Lt.R.F.Kinney and 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum on his wings in A/P's #176 and 600 respectively. 2nd.Lt.L.W.Morton in A/P #115 led the 3rd. flight with 2nd.Lt.I.A.Mikell on his wing in A/P #014.

c. The squadron turned N flying to the east of the burning escort vessels and began searching for other vessels hiding in the heavy rain and instrument weather to the North. Capt.Todd spotted an M/V of 2300 tons in the soupy weather and immediately peeled off to attack. So steep and sudden was his turn that other planes were unable to maintain formation. Capt.Todd and Lt.Bronson made runs on the vessel each dropping one bomb both of which missed with possible damage. Capt.Todd then went on instruments for a short time and on breaking out saw a small escort vessel directly ahead. He dropped one bomb in at a "snapshot" but failed to get a hit. Capt.Todd then flew further north and spotted two more escoft vessels and two large merchant vessels hiding in the weather. He circled several times attempting to contact the other planes., but without success and then he turned south again and joined the other planes a few minutes later.
When Capt.Todd broke off initially, Lt.Reike led the remaining planes in a circle and followed Capt.Todd, dodging in and out in the weather searching for targets for several minutes without success. He then led the squadron back to the south where better weather conditions existed. He saw what appeared to be a stack aft freighter and made a run dropping 2 bombs scoring 1 near miss. However, this vessel on closer inspection was discovered to be one of the converted minelayers which was listing. The fire having been extinguished, Lt.Reike then made a run on the other escort vessel nearby but as he began strafing the vessel sank in front of him. The other planes,excepting Capt. Todd, followed him dropping bombs and strafing. Lt.Bronson and Lt.Morton scored direct hits on the vessel first attacked by Lt.Reike. These hits combined with several near misses by other planes resulted in the final destruction of the vessel.
After circling several times looking for further targets the squadron resumed formation and left the area.
Anti-aircraft fire from the convoy was light, medium and heavy moderate and mostly inaccurate.

One A/P sustained slight damage from M/G fire and the Navigator 2nd.Lt. W.S.James was hospitalized for a bullet crease across his back. Injury was not critical. The mission photographs tend to confirm the action as stated, in this report.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

The soupy weather and poor visibility hampered the effectiveness of our attack and caused a great deal of confusion regarding position composition and disposition of the convoy. It also prevented accurate observation of ship types and damage done. However, the convoy's anti-aircraft defenses were confused as well and as result was ineffective.

5. CITATIONS

Lt.James will be recommended for the award of the Purple Heart for wounds sustained in action.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0735/I	San Marcelino
Attack	1130-1210/I	
Landed	1640/I	San Marcelino

b. Route

San Marcelino - Indo China Coast 1500N-10930E
then returned direct to San Marcelino.

c. Armament and Ordnance Report

30 X 500 lb. bombs dropped on targets - 2 salvoed just off target. 13270 X.50 Cal. expended.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: (1) Overlay



SHIPPING STRIKE

SQUADRON — CAPT TODD — SEVEN PLANES — LT.BRONSON

Mission FFO 88-D-23 T.O.T. 113C-1210/I

29 March,1945 499th Sqd. Minimum altitude

499
89-D-23
30Mar45
JCH

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

2 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 89-D-23, 30 March,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 30 March,1945, five airplanes of this squadron took off to conduct a minimum altitude strike on the remnants of the Jap Convoy attacked on 29 March. The 5 planes searched through the Paracel Islands, area (1630N-11230E) in formation with the 498th Squadron leading. Finding no targets here the search was extended to Yulin Harbor area of SE Hainan Island. Here after a fruitless search for the convoy an Armed Trawler equipped for anti-submarine patrol was attacked with a total of 16 X 500 lb. bombs scoring several damaging near misses one of which lifted the vessel completely out of the water and turned it around. The vessel eventually sank as a result of our attack and attack by one 498th plane. One of our A/P's, presumably, was caught in a bomb blast and damaged to such an extent that ditching was necessary approximately 20 miles SE of Cape Gaalong (1810N-10947E). Three survivors were seen in the water and life rafts were dropped. Our planes circled for one hour attempting to contact rescue subs or "Cats" without success and then returned to base when fuel limit was reached. There was no interception. During initial attack, light, meager, inaccurate M/G fire was received from the trawler.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to find and destroy the remnants of the convoy attacked effectively off the Indo China Coast on 29 March. Land and water targets along the E coast of Hainan Island were designated in the event that the convoy was not located.

3. ATTACK

a. 5 B-25-J's of this squadron made rendezvous with the 498th squadron over North Reef after searching across the Paracel Group.

The two squadrons then spread out widely in "abreast" formation and flew to a point just off Cape Gaalong. This squadron then resumed squadron formation and followed the 498th Squadron across the mouth of Yu Lin Harbor and on to outer Samah Bay. Here the squadron was crowded into the shore defenses and turned back to Cape Gaalong where attack was made on an armed trawler at minimum altitude from West to East.

b. Capt.J.B.Boyd led the squadron in A/P #198, 1st.Lt. R.W.Draper led the second flight in A/P #948. Over the target Capt.Boyd and Lt.Myers of the 498th Squadron in A/P #545 comprised the first element. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper and 2nd.Lt.J.T. Walker comprised the second element. 2nd.Lt.T.C.Bronson in A/P #166 and 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum in A/P #600 comprised the third element.

5. Attack

Capt.Boyd dropped two bombs which missed on the first run and two bombs on the second run, one of which was a near miss causing superficial damage to the superstructure. Lt.Draper made two runs missing with 2 bombs on the first run and getting a near miss on the second. Little bomb damage resulted but his strafing left the stern section smoking. Lt.Walker dropped two bombs on his first run but both were wide and long. Lt.Bronson dropped two bombs on each run. He scored a near miss on the first run. On his second run he placed a bomb within 10 feet of the vessel which was lifted almost clear and heeled completely over on the port side by the burst. Considerable damage resulted but it is believed that the shallow draft of the vessel allowed the full force of the concussion to travel under the bottom. It is doubtful if the vessel would have sunk as a result of this hit, but this damage coupled with that inflicted by the 498th pilot resulted in the sinking . Actual credit should go to the 498th Squadron pilot. Lt.Mangum droppedfour bombs all of which missed. A total of 16 bombs were expended on the target. On the second run Lt.Walker apparently flew into a bomb blast which damaged the plane considerable. He ditched some 20 miles SE of Cape Gaalong. The plane remained afloat only slightly more than a minute before sinking. The life raft for some reason failed to inflate but two others were dropped accurately. The other planes circled for approximately 1 hour attempting to contact rescue subs and "Cats" on 4475 KC's (Voice and CW) and all channels of VHF. No answer to these calls were received. However, while enroute to base a "Cat" at Scarborough Reef was contacted and given full information.

As our planes left the scene of the ditching, two men were in a life raft waving and apparently in good contidion.
The crew of A/P #176 is as follows:

2nd.Lt.H.T.Walker	O-764527	Pilot
2nd.Lt.R.T.Lee	O-765269	Co-Pilot
F/O M/R.Perkins	T-138752	Navigator
S/Sgt.A.Marsili	35798539	Engineer
Cpl. J.S. O'Hop	33610308	Radio Operator

4. S-2 COMMENTS

On numerous missions, including this mission, photographs have shown that a minimum of 50% of bombs dropped on shipping targets have been released too late and consequently dropped long. Such consistent inaccuracy should be remedied - possibly by use of the "sight" or by purposely dropping short and trying for a skip.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0640/I	San Marcelino
Attack	1046/I	Cape Gaalong Area
Circle ditched plane		1110-1200/I
Landed	1555/I	San Marcelino

b. Fighter Cover

Nil fighters observed.

c. Route

San Marcelino Woody Island Yu Lin Harbor Base

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

MCW 499
90-D-24
31mar45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

5 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FPO 90-D-24, 31 March,45.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 31 March,1945 2 B-25-J's of this squadron conducted a highly successful rescue operation off Cape Gealong, Hainan Island. The two planes directed and guided a submarine to the life raft containing three survivors of A/P #176 of this squadron which made an emergency water landing in that locality on 30 March. The two A/P's provided air cover during the rescue driving off three enemy fighters which made several determined attempts to prevent the operation from succeeding. Although our planes were attacked, we came off without damage or casualties. Possible damage was inflicted on one of the enemy fighters.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to effect the rescue of three 499th combat crewmen who survived the ditching of A/P # 176 on 30 March,1945.

3. PERFORMANCE

a. 1st.Lt.R.W.Draper commanded the rescue flight which consisted of two 499th Squadron and two 498th Squadron planes. He flew A/P #018 and 2nd.Lt.R.F.Kinney flew A/P #205.

b. Lt.Draper led the flight directly to the scene of the previous day's ditching. He contacted a friendly sub which was searching the area some 4-5 miles away from the life raft. He directed the sub by radio on 4475 and also "buzzed" the sub in the proper direction. During this period while the sub was still some 2-3 miles away an enemy fighter broke off attack on a PB4Y-2 and made a strafing run on the sub doing no apparent damage. After this incident Lt.Draper ordered the B-25's to set up a defensive circle around the area. As the sub approached the raft, three probable Oscars (possibly Tojos) attempted to break through and attack the exposed crew in the raft.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

One fighter made a pass from 12 o'clock high but broke off at 800 yards when fired upon by Lt.Draper's gunners. Approximately 5 minutes later while the downed crew was being taken aboard the submarine, two Oscars (Or Tojos) came in from 10 o'clock high in trail and with all guns blazing.Lt.Draper's gunners opened up at 500 yards range and promptly discouraged the first Oscar which veered away sharply. The second Oscar came in immediately behind and was able to get quite close while the gunners were firing at the 1st Oscar. However, since Lt.Draper was turning sharply into the attack the enemy planes fire was short causing no damage to our plane. The Oscar banked sharply to the right at 100 yards range and both planes withdrew. Possible damage was inflicted by our defensive fire. Defensive tactict consisted of forming a LUFFBERRY circle at low altitude and turning into the attack. Lt.Draper held the defensive ring until 1140/I when the crew was safely aboard the sub and the sub had submerged. The crew was picked up at 1120/I. No attacks were made on Lt.Kinney's plane. Phosphorous bombs were dropped by the enemy fighters but not at our 2 planes. Lt.Draper left the area on course for base at 1140/I, having successfully accomplished the rescue and thwarted attempted interference by enemy fighters. During the return trip he contacted a Rescue Cat giving data on a 500 KC radio signal he intercepted near North Reef while enroute. The submarine commander informed Lt.Draper that 2nd.Lt.Walker, 2nd.Lt.Lee and F/O Perkins were the three rescued crewmen and that one enlisted man failed to get out of the plane and one had drowned.

5. CITATIONS

Members of both Lt.Draper's and Kinney's crews are to be recommended for an award commensurate with the deed. A letter is being forwarded to the Navy recommending that the Submarine Commander be awarded a decoration.

4. STATISTICS

Take Off	0715/I	San Marcelino
Interception	1120/I	
Rescue	1125/I	
Landed	1540/I	San Marcelino

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

ROUTE OVERLAY



Mission FFO 90-D-24 31 March,1945 499th Squadron

O Circle on map indicates point of rescue and interception.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
JCH 93-D-34
3 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 75 PEG/rjl

5 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 95-D-34, 5 April, 45.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 5 April 1945, six B-25-J's conducted a search for shipping in the HAINAN STRAITS - LIUCHOW PENNINSULA area but because of a compass error which resulted in extra fuel consumption, only 50% of the assigned mission was carried out. The eastern half of the HAINAN STRAITS was searched and an attempt was made to attack the secondary target, HOI HOW TOWN. However, poor visibility, lack of check points and very low altitude threw the flight path one-half mile to the N of HOI HOW. When finally spotted, it was too late to alter course and the formation then searched HOI HOW BAY without finding a suitable target. No attacks were made and we sustained neither damage nor casualties. Anti-aircraft fire from the HOI HOW area was light, medium and heavy, meager to moderate and inaccurate. There was no fighter interception. The P-38 Fighter Cover was excellent.

2. OBJECTIVE

Recent sightings have indicated an exodus of shipping in YU LIN HARBOR. Our mission was designed to intercept this shipping in the event of an attempt to run through the HAINAN STRAITS. The assigned mission was to enter the HAINAN STRAITS from the east, fly through the straits, search the western half of the LIUCHOW PENNINSULA from the tip upwards and return by the same route, covering HOI HOW BAY as well, In case no targets were found in this area, the secondary target, barracks on PALM TREE ISLAND and a fuel dump on a small island just to the east (both in the HOI HOW RIVER AREA) at HOI HOW TOWN were to be attacked.

3. PERFORMANCE

a. Pilots and planes:

Capt.W.D.Decker (Squadron Commander) led the strike consisting of 6 A/P's of each 499th and 500th Squadron, in A/P # 600.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2nd.Lt.T.C.Bronson in A/P #018 and 2nd.Lt.I.A.Mikell in A/P #014 flew right and left wing in the first flight. 2nd.Lt.L.W. Morton led the second flight in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum in number two position in A/P #177 and 2nd.Lt.R.F. Kinney in number 3 position in A/P # 198. 2nd.Lt.F.E.Otey flew on course one hour as a spare in A/P #948 then returned to base.

b. Details of the Mission

Prior to take-off 2nd.Lt.Casler checked the compass of A/P #600 with the master compass and found an errer for which he corrected. But since time only allowed two bearings to be taken, the compass was not fully corrected. As a consequence, land fall was made on the CHINA COAST at HAUCHEUN ISLAND (2125N-11255E) instead of TAYA ISLAND (1950N-11112E). The formation turned west and searched the CHINA COAST to SEIHO PT. (2125N-11115E). Then staying approximately 10 miles off the coast of LIUCHOW PENNINSULA the formation made rendesvous with fighters over the eastern entrance of HAINAN STRAITS. Because of a shortage of fuel Capt.Decker decided to attack the secondary, HOI HOW TOWN. He led the squadron in over HAINAN BAY, (Twenty-five miles east of HOI HOW) and turned West flying overland toward HOI HOW. When approximately four miles away, one brief, hazy glimpse of the area was obtained. At this time the squadron descended from 900 feet to minimum altitude to screen the vision of A/A batteries. As the squadron reached HOI HOW TOWN it was noted that the run was ½ mile to the N of the target. This errer was seen too late to alter course and all planes flew out into HOI HOW BAY making nil attacks. Two vessels approxi-mately two miles W of the breakwater were investigated but proved to be sunken. At this time an A/P of the 500th Squadron ditched approximately 4 miles NW of the breakwater. The squadron imme-diately began searching for a friendly submarine which was contacted at position 1940N-11120E and full particulars were passed to the sub commander. The return flight was without in-cident. Enemy opposition was limited to A/A fire which was generally light, medium and heavy, meager, and inaccurate. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

c. Fighter cover was excellent.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0645/I	San Marcelino
HAUCHEN	1045/I	
Fighter-Bomber Rendezvous	1130/I	HAINAN STRAITS
HOI HOW TOWN	1145/I	
Contacted Sub	1237/I	
Landed Base	1645/I	San Marcelino

b. Armament and Ordnance Report

24 X 500 lb. bombs salveed in HAINAN STRAITS.
1000 X.50 Cal. expended in strafing.

c. Route

BASE HAUCHEN ISLAND HAINAN BAY HOI HOW TOWN TAYA ISLAND BASE.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GUFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JCH
499
96-D-28
(SIX)-6 Apr 45
6 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/sad

9 April, 1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 96-D-28, 6 April, 1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 6 April, 1945, six A/P's took another crack at the convoy which we failed to locate on 5 April, by participating in a Group Strike in the Swatow-Amoy Area. The formation made landfall approximately 20 miles south of Amoy where weather conditions prevented further northward search, and turned south toward Swatow. Just off Kiuk Point (24.10 N—118.00 E) the squadron followed the 501st Squadron in a minimum altitude attack on two heavily armed Frigates(Destroyer Escorts) of approximately 1000 tons. One Frigate was superficially damaged by the 501st Squadron and sunk by this squadron. The other was sinking rapidly as a result of the 501st Squadron's attack, and we hastened the inevitable"Kill" by scoring one very near miss. Strafing resulted in heavy casualties to the enemy seamen. We sustained neither damage nor casualties despite heavy and light caliber A/A fire. There was no fighter interception. In the attack a total of 16 x 500 lb. bombs and 5,560 x .50 ammunition were expended on the target.

2. OBJECTIVE

Several sightings by search planes indicated a convoy movement northward. Our mission was designed to proceed to the point where maximum effort would bring the convoy, and if not found, to search southward down the coast to the limit of fuel.

3. ATTACK

a. Six B-25-J's made landfall approximately 20 miles south of Amoy, and because of bad weather conditions turned south toward Swatow. Just off Kiuk Point to the east, two Frigates (DE's) were found heading on a course of approximately 20 degrees with one leading the other. The squadron, following the 501st Squadron, continued south flying out of range to the east and then turned 180 degrees to make a quartering attack from the starboard stern. The formation over the target consisted of two, three-plane elements, with the second element slightly astern and to the right of the first element. The first element attacked the southernmost vessel while the second element attacked the other almost simultaneously. Breakaway was to the right.
(NOTE: For reference see "Approach and Attack Diagrams").

b. Planes and pilots participating:

Capt. Newton E. Wiley led the squadron in A/P # 174 with 2nd Lt. T.C. Bronson on his right wing in A/P # 355 and 2nd Lt. G.W. Harben on his left wing in A/P # 018.

2nd Lt. L.W. Morton led the second element in A/P # 205 with 2nd Lt. L.A. Mikell in the number 2 position in A/P # 014 and 2nd Lt. F.A. Thompson in the number 3 position in A/P # 600.

c. Details of attack: Bronson

Capt. Wiley spaced the squadron behind the 501st Squadron and chose the southernmost vessel for his target. Lt. Harben stayed on his wing but Lt. Harben dropped back. Capt. Wiley rolled out of his turn and began his run quartering on the starboard stern. However, the DE was turning into his attack and at the bomb release point the vessel was lying 90 degrees to his run. He swept the decks with his nose guns and released two (2) bombs, both of which dropped long. Lt. Harben dropped four (4) bombs scoring a near miss on the stern with his first bomb, but the other three were long. Lt. Bronson followed these two planes and opened fire as the bombs of the first two planes exploded. He dropped four (4) bombs, one of which was a near miss which added further damage to the fatal hit scored on this vessel by the 501st Squadron.

Lt. Morton selected the northernmost vessel for his target, and cutting inside the first flight's turn, attacked his target almost simultaneously with the first flight's attack on the southernmost vessel. He dropped three (3) bombs, the first of which he purposely aimed to hit short. Actually, this bomb was a direct hit amidships near the water line. His other two bombs dropped long. Lt. Mikell, during the sharp turn onto the attack run, switched to the left wing, crowding Lt. Thompson off the target. Lt. Mikell's first bomb was a near miss and probably damaged the stern. His other two bombs were long. As a result of Lt. Morton's attack, the vessel sank outh of sight within three minutes. Mission photos show conclusively that both vessels were sunk---one by the 501st and one by the 499th, with each squadron adding to the damage caused by the other. There was no interception. A/A fire was heavy, moderate and inaccurate from both warships. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. Lt. Bronson escorted a 498th Squadron plane, which had an engine shot out, safely to Laag Strip, NE Luzon. There he landed, picked up the crew and returned to base.

4. S-2 COMMENTS.

None.

5. CITATIONS

Lt. Morton and crew will be recommended for an appropriate award of a decoration for sinking of a warship.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table:

Take off at	0650/I	from San Marcelino, Luzon.
Land fall at	1104/I	at pt. 20 miles SW of Amoy, China.
Attack	1155/I	at Kiuk Pt.
Off target	1155/I	
5 A/P's land at	1545/I	at San Marcelino.
1 A/P land at	1740/I	at San Marcelino.

b. Route.

Base to position 24.10 N--118.00 E---Kiuk Point---San Marcelino.

c. Fighter Cover.

Not observed.

d. Armament and Ordnance.

16 x 500 lb. 4-5 sec delay demo bombs dropped on targets.
7 x 500 lb. 4-5 sec delay demo bombs returned to base.
1 x 500 lb. 4-5 sec delay demo bomb salvoed in target area.
6560 x .50 ammunition expended in strafing.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



LEGEND

Planes & Pilots

1st Element: # 174 Capt. Wiley
018 Lt. Harben
355 Lt. Bronson

2nd Element: # 205 Lt. Morton
014 Lt. Mikell
600 Lt. Thompson

FFO 96-D-28 6 April, 1945.
Shipping China Coast

499th Bomb Sq., 345th Bomb Gp. (M)

Third Squadron to Attack.

Time of Attack: 1135/I

Planes which took photos: X

10 x 500 lb. Bombs Dropped on Vessel No. 1.
6 x 500 lb. Bombs Dropped on Vessel No. 2.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A -L

3k
499
98-D-16
8 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

11 April,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 98-D-16, 8 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 8 April 1945, seven A/P's set out to attack shipping in the SWATOW-AMOY area of the CHINA COAST. However one plane made an emergency landing at LINGAYEN enroute, and one plane became lost in weather just off SWATOW and returned to base. The remaining five planes attempted to proceed up the coast in search of shipping but would get no further than SWATOW. The formation then proceeded to the PESCADORES ISLANDS where the secondary target, MAKO HARBOR was found to be lacking in suitable shipping targets. Accordingly the tertiary target CHOMOSUI AIRDROME was attacked from minimum altitude. A total of 18 X 500 lb. bombs were dropped on targets causing only slight damage at four buildings. The target was thoroughly strafed with 9,000 X.50 Cal. ammunition. A/A fire from MAKO TOWN and the SE tip of GYOO-TO (Island to N of MAKO) was heavy and medium, moderate, mostly inaccurate to accurate. One plane was rocked by bursts. Heavy and light, meager, mostly inaccurate from CHOMOSUI A/D and vicinity. One plane sustained minor damage from small arms fire. There were no personnel casualties. There was no fighter interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a continuation of a long series of anti-shipping strikes aimed at severing entirely, the shipping lane between the INDIES, INDO CHINA, CHINA and JAPAN. The assigned targets were three; A 4-6 vessel convoy sighted in the SWATOW area, searching the coast to AMOY if necessary, MAKO HARBOR shipping as a secondary, CHOMOSUI AIRDROME as a tertiary.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. After one plane made a safe emergency landing at LINGAYEN, six planes reached the vicinity of 2240N-11600E where one plane became lost in instrument weather conditions.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

This plane searched for the formation for approximately 15 minutes and then returned to base alone. The remaining five planes flew to AMOY in extremely poor visibility so SWATOW where the area was entirely "socked in". Further search was impossible and the formation proceeded to the PESCADORES. Flying south between GYOO-TO and BOKO-TO the squadron investigated MAKO HARBOR without finding sufficiently lucrative targets to warrant attack. Therefore the squadron turned NE around the W tip of KOSEI TO. When several miles E of CHOMOSUI AIRDROME the squadron executed a 180 degree turn and attacked at minimum altitude from NE to SW. Formation over the target consisted of five A/P's abreast.

b. Capt.R.L.SMELLEY led the Squadron in A/P #018 with 1st.Lt.C.C.PHILLIPS on his right wing in A/P #600 and 2nd.Lt. R.F.KINNEY on his left in A/P #205. 1st.Lt.W.R.NASS led the second element in A/P #355 with 1st.Lt.P.G.SIMCOE on his wing in A/P #198. Lt.TYREE in A/P #174 made an emergency landing at LINGAYEN and 2nd.Lt.F.E.OTEY in A/P #014 returned to base when lost in weather in the SWATOW AREA.

c. Attack

Capt.SMELLEY echeloned the second flight to the right when approaching the coast some 3 miles E of the Airdrome and the five planes crossed the target abreast. All planes, with exception of A/P #205 which salvoed two, dropped four bombs across the airdrome area. For the most part however, the bombs dropped in open areas skipping badly and mising targets. One bomb clipped the end of a large hangar but crashed through and did little damage. Several buildings were strafed with unobserved results. While flying South between GYOO-TO and BOKO-TO heavy and medium A/A was received from an unreported position on the SE tip of GYOO TO and from knownpositions in MAKO TOWN. Fire was accurate as to altitude and range but trailing. Several bursts were quite close rocking one A/P. In several instances bursts were observed in area where formation would have been had not evasive action been taken. On the approach to CHOMO-SUI A/D approximately 2½ miles to E, 3-4 bursts of heavy A/A in front and above formation. Over water SE of the A/D several bursts heavy inaccurate far to rear. Light, meager accurate to inaccurate small arms fire from several u/i locations around the A/D .

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

#
499
102-0-17
12 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 75

PEG/rjl

14 April,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 102-D-17, 12 April,1945.

To : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2 .

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 12 April,1945 six planes conducted a minimum altitude strike on the reported concentration of troops along the Siniloan (1425N-12127E) Tignuan (1434N-12137E) road on the East coast of LUZON. In the attack a total of 30 X 250 lb. demo bombs were dropped at various points along the road starting approximately six miles SW of TIGNUAN and following along the road to within 1 mile of TIGNUAN. No specific targets nor results were observed because of heavy foliage and tortuous terrain. Also because of deep twisting valleys and high hills strafing was light with a total of 3800 X.50 Cal. ammunition fired. There was no opposition of any type and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

Guerilla reports indicated a concentration of Japanese troops along the LIGNUAN ROAD who had been driven out of the LAGUNA DE BAY area and who were conducting harassing raids on our forward elements in the SINILOAN area as well as brutally killing Filippino Civilians in this area. Our task was to "work over" the wooded areas along either side of the road and if possible to knock out bridges.

3. ATTACK

a. The six B-25-J's took off in flights of three planes each at twenty minute intervals and made the initial attacks ahead of the six [redacted] Squadron planes which completed the strike force. Each formation orbited over the eastern part of LAGUNA DE BAY while calling the ground controller and then picked up the road at SINILOAN and began the attack at the I.P. six miles SW of TIGNUAN carrying through to the NE at minimum altitude.

The second flight made two passes over the area, one of which was a "dry run" to spot the target.

b. Pilots and planes participating.

Capt.R.F.Todd led the first flight in A/P #014 with 1st.Lt.J.C.Hicks on his right wing in A/P #205 and Capt.W.D. Decker on his left wing in A/P #600. Capt.R.L.Smelley led the second flightin A/P #018 with Capt.N.E.Wiley on his right wing in A/P #355 and 1st.Lt.Hall on his left wing in A/P #198.

c. Ten of the thirty X 250 lb. bombs dropped on the target fell in a reported bivouac area approximately 2 miles SW of TIGNUAN. The other bombs were dropped at "area targets" almost to the point of "random bombing". As previously explained no specific targets were sighted and no results other than bomb bursts were observed. Any attempt at damage assessment is impossible. Mission photos show only parts of road, hills and impenetrable forest.

4. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendations for awards or citations forwarded as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

3 A/P's T.O.	0915/I	San Marcelino
3 A/P's T.O.	0940/I	San Marcelino
3 A/P's T.O.T.	0950-1010/I	LIGNUAN AREA
3 A/P's T.O.T.	1030-1035/I	LIGNUAN AREA
3 A/P's Landed	1055/I	San Marcelino
3 A/P's Landed	1110/I	San Marcelino

b. Route

Direct to East part of LAGUNA DE BAY to target. Returned same route.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

3A
499
105-D-20
13 Apr 45

C-O- M-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

16 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 105-D-20, 13 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 13 April,1945, six B-25-J's led a Group minimum altitude strike on TUGUEGARAO A/D in the CAGAYAN VALLEY of Northern LUZON. In the attack a total of 192 X 23 lb. parafrags and 10,800 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended. No serviceable airplanes were seen on the ground but several small fires including one small oil fire were started. Two passes were made and TUGUEGARAO TOWN was strafed on both runs. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. Opposition was limited to M/G and small arms fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

TUGUEGARAO was the suspected staging point for Jap airplanes which raided some of our minor installations in central LUZON in broad daylight. The Group's task was to destroy such airplanes.

3. ATTACK

a. The six B-25's flew N along the E side of the CAGAYAN RIVER at an altitude of 2000 feet. When several miles N of the target, the formation turned 180 degrees and attacked from NE to SW across the A/D at minimum altitude.

b. Leading the Squadron and Group was Capt.N.E.Wiley in A/P #355. On his right wing was 2nd.Lt.H.H.Tyree in A/P #348 and on the left wing 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe. Leading the 2nd. flight was 1st.Lt.C.C.Phillips in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.R.F.Kinney in A/P #205 on his wing and Lt.F.A.Thompson in A/P #014.

c. The first flight angled from across NE to SW on the Eastern section of the dispersal area strafing and dropping parafrags on the first run with unobserved results. The second run was from N to S covering the south east dispersal area which was not attacked on the first run. Several small grass fires and one small oil fire was started in this area as a result of bombing and strafing.

The second flight made it's run from NE to SW across the NW dispersal area strafing and dropping bombs near revetments which were observed to be empty. The flight expended all bombs and ammunition from the airdrome area to and including TUGUEGARAO TOWN consequently no second run was made by this flight.

Anti-aircraft fire was meager inaccurate M/G and small arms fire. There was no interception and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

4. COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this attack.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0830/I	San Marcelino
T.O.T.	0955-1005/I	TUGUEGARAO
Landed	1145/I	San Marcelino

b. Route

Direct.

c. Fighter Cover

There was no fighter cover provided, however P-51's were observed in the area.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

gcf 499
105-D-20
15 Apr 45

C-O-N-F-I- D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

17 April,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 105-D-20, 15 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 15 April 1945, 7 planes of this Squadron flying # 4 position in the Group Formation, attempted to carry out a strike on LAMSEPO A/D in Northern FORMOSA. The Group Formation was forced to turn back however, when bad weather was encountered North of LUZON, and TUGUEGARAO A/D, which was assigned as the secondary target was attacked. A total of 312 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs and 8400 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended in the attack by the 5 planes which reached the target. The attack was consentrated on the W side of the drome, some 20 small fires resulted, three of which appeared to be oil fires; several were burning huts and others were probably grass fires. Opposition was limited to M/G fire which holed 1 plane. Nil casualties were sustained.

2. OBJECTIVE

The primary objective was part of an all out effort to knock out planes and installations in Northern FORMOSA which the Japs are using to carry out attacks on both our shipping and ground forces at OKINAWA.

3. ATTACK

a. The 7 planes flying in the Group Formation encountered bad weather at 1035/I at approximately 1945N-11942E at this point 2 of the 7 planes headed back to base when it was found that nose guns of either planes would not charge. Other planes remained with the Group Formation and turned E tyying to go around the weather front but with no success, planes turned back at 1057/I at position 1920N-12033E, and headed on course for the Secondary Target.

C-O-N-F-I- D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The Squadron made landfall at N tip of LUZON, flew south down CAGAYAN VALLEY and made the minimum altitude attack on TUGUEGARAO A/D, making a NE-SW run on the W side of the drome.

b. Capt.W.D.Decker in A/P #600 led the Squadron Formation with Lt. B.J.BILLINGS andT.C.BRONSON on his wings in A/P's #018 and 948 respectively. 1st.Lt.C.R.Smith in A/P #014 led the second flight, Lt.F.A.Thompson in A/P #198 flew on his right wing and Lt.R.F.Kinney in A/P #205 flew left wing. Lt.H.A.Tyree in A/P #199 flew #4 position in the second flight. Lt.Smith and Tyree did not make the attack however and Lt.Thompson took lead position of the 2nd.Flight when Lt.Smith broke formation and returned to base.

c. The first flight flying in a shallow V made a NE-SW run along the edge of the grove on the W side of the strip, bombing and strafing huts and possible small fuel dump observed there. The 2nd. flight comprising of 2 planes made the run just West of the first flight scattering their bombs at huts in the grove. Damage was believed to be slight due to paucity of targets, only results observed were as mentioned in Par.1. Photos show that area mentioned was thoroughly covered by bombing and strafing. Meager, accurate M/G and small arms fire from woods approximately 1000 feet W of W end of W-E runway was received. Small arms fire was observed from scattered huts in woods to W of the A/D.

4. I.O. COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of thismission.

6. STATISTICS

Time Table

7 A/P's	T.O. 0840/I	SAN MARCELINO
2 A/P's	Turned Back	1035/I
2 A/P's	Landed	1240/I
5 A/P's	T.O.T.	1205/I
5 A/P's	Landed	1424/I

b. Route

Base - Point of Turn Back - CAGAYAN VALLEY - TARGET
Return route was direct.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E -N-T-I-A-L

499
JCH-106-D-
16 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

18 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 106-D-20, 16 April, 45.

To : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Seven B-25-J's conducted a minimum altitude strike on LAMSEPO A/D ~~off~~ Northern FORMOSA on 16 April,1945, dropping 360 X 23 lb. parafrags on the drome and 48 parafrags on buildings 5 miles WNW of TOKEN TOWN. A total of 12,400 X.50 Cal. ammo expended in strafing. The dispersal areas and several buildings were well covered by bombsand strafing but since revetments were either empty or contained dummy planes, little actual damage was done. Two planes sustained minor damage from M/G and small arms fire. One plane was holed twice by either 20 mm or explosive .50 Cal. machine gun. One of these projectiles fatally wounded the navigator of A/P #198, 2nd.Lt.A.H.Barnes O-711514 who died during return to base in A/P #198. This plane remained at LINGAYEN for repairs and engine change. Two planes were moderately damaged by collision with flying fowl just off the target.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission, one of several strikes on Northern FORMOSA Airpower in order to weaken the enemy's efforts against our bases on OKINAWA. The specific target was airplanes on LAMSEPO A/D.

3. ATTACK

a. The squadron proceeded North along the West coast of FORMOSA to a point 10 miles NW of the mouth of the TANSUI KEI RIVER, and then turned south inside a 2000 foot mountain just S of the TANSUI RIVER to avoid TANSUI NAVAL BASE. During this turn, the second flight of three planes (one plane having joined the 500th Squadron which was minus a plane) echeloned to the left. The formation crossed the airdrome with six planes abreast from Northeast to Southwest at minimum altitude and an airspeed of 260 mph. After crossing the A/D the formation turned sharply right and withdrew to the west flying between TOKEN TOWN and TAIEN A/D and then directly out to sea where the Group Formation reassembled.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

Capt.R.L.Smelley led the squadron in A/P #018 with 1st.Lt.B.J.Billings on his right wing in A/P #355 and 2nd.Lt. G.W.Harben on his left wing in A/P #198. 2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum led the second flight in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.F.E.Otey on his right wing in A/P #205 and 2nd.Lt.L.A.Mikell on his left wing in A/P #014. 2nd.Lt.A.H.Tyree joined the 500th Squadron enroute when two of that squadron's planes found it necessary to return to base.

c. Attack

Capt.Smelley led his flight across the NE dispersal area, angled across the #1 strip and across the SW dispersal area in a line parallel with the #2 R/W. The flight dropped 192 bombs and thoroughly strafed the area but because of dust, smoke and speed, results were obscured.

Lt.Mangum led the second flight abreast, parallel and to the West of the first flight. The first half of the run included part of the W dispersal area which was well covered by bombs and strafing. However the remaining part of the run was over fields where several bombs were dropped. Lt.Mikell dropped 12 bombs and Lt.Mangum dropped 36 bombs on buildings 5 miles WNW of TOEN TOWN when release failed over the target. Lt.Tyree (flying with the 500th Squadron) dropped 72 bombs on the target., and Lt.Otey returned all bombs due to a rack malfunction.
Enroute heavy, meager, inaccurate A/A fire was received from SINCHIKO A/D. Eight to ten bursts were seen. The altitude of the bursts was accurate with the first few bursts directly among the Group Formation. Fortunately no planes were damaged here. Over the target meager, accurate M/G and either 20 mm. or explosive .50 Cal. was received holing 3 planes and fatally wounding 2nd. Lt.A.H.Barnas. On the withdrawal 4 bursts of heavy A/A were seen when formation in area just N of TOEN TOWN. One burst was within 200 feet of the formation which was at 100 foot altitude. Moderate 20 mm. and 25.mm. along with .50 Cal. fire seen from vicinity of TOEN TOWN. Many gun flashes were seen and tracers crossed high above the formation which was on the deck. Positions could not be pin-pointed. To avoid A/A fire on the withdrawal all planes flew as low as possible. As a result two planes were moderately damaged by fowl which were startled into flight by the sound of our motors. Mission photos confirm crew reports of flight lines, areas bombed and lack of serviceable A/P's on the ground.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Although an SOP issued by 345th Group Operations several months ago requires crewmen to wear flak suits over heavily defended targets, the point should receive more attention and should be made mandatory on all missions over defended targets whether heavily defended or otherwise.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this strike - Lt.Barnas will automatically be awarded the Purple Heart.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

7 A/P's	T.O. SAN MARCELINO	0810/I
6 A/P's	T.O.T LAMSEPO A/D	1237/I
1 A/P	T.O.T.LAMSEPO A/D	1240/I
5 A/P's	Landed SAN MARCELINO	1635/I
2 A/P's	Landed LINGAYEN	1620/I
2 A/P's	LANDED SAN MARCELINO	1735/I

b. Fighter Cover

Nil fighter cover provided.

c. Route

SAN MARCELINO PESCADORES IS. TARGET.
Return route was same.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



Ref: Photo 116-132 Vicinity Taihoku to Taien.

Mission FFO 106-D-20 ~~18~~ 14 April, 1945 499th Squadron

T.O.T. 1237/I Minimum Altitude 408 X 23 lb. bombs dropped

Red Brackets indicate area bombed by each plane.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
GH 110-0-1
20 Apr 4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 75 PEG/rjl

22 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 110-D-17, 20 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 20 April 1945, six B-25-J's led a two Squadron minimum altitude strike on Japanese artillery and defense positions in the vicinity of NORZAGARAY (1454N-12105E) in northern LUZON. In support of ground troops in that area a total of 24 X 500 lb. demolition bombs and 8400 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended on the target. Results were unobserved because of rough terrain and heavy foliage. No definite targets were sighted. We sustained neither damage nor casualties in spite of a great deal of M/G and small arms fire received.

2. OBJECTIVE

Our task was to destroy dominating artillery holding up our troops in the NORZAGARAY Area. The target area in a N-S line across the ANGAT RIVER approximately 4 miles E of NORZAGARAY, Near the village of SICAN.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The six B-25-J's approached the target from the West and contacted "Snap Uncle", the Ground Controller and obtained permission to attack. Artillery marked the exact target by firing 5 white phosphorous shells and the squadron attacked at minimum altitude from SSW to NNE. This axis of attack was chosen in order that richocheting bullets would not fall in our lines. Formation over the target consisted of single planes in trail at 35 sec. intervals.

b. Leading the Strike Force was Capt.N.H.Wiley in A/P #174. Following in the order of attack was 2nd.Lt.C.E.Rice in A/P #948, 2nd.Lt.R.F.Kinney in A/P #805, 2nd.Lt.L.W.Norton in A/P #800 (Leading the Second Flight), 1st.Lt.B.J.Billings in A/P #555 and 2nd.Lt.F.A.Thompson in A/P #014.

c Attack

On the first run each plane dropped 4 X 500 lb. S/11 second delay demo bombs and thoroughly strafed. The 24 bombs dropped in a string starting approximately 900 yards SW of SICAN and extending approximately 1500 yards NNE from that point.

As usual in attacks on heavily wooded, rough terrain results other than bomb bursts in the assigned area were not visible. On the second run (requested by "Snap Uncle") the target was again heavily strafed from end to end. One small black smoke fire possibly fuel, resulted. Moderate, inaccurate M/G and small arms fire was received from unobserved positions throughout the target area. However, we sustained neither damage nor casualties. Photos confirm crew's reports that bombs fell in area marked with phosphorous shells.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendation for awards or citations forwarded as result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

T.O.	San Marcelino	0945/I
T.O.T.		1027-31/I
Landed	San Marcelino	1115/I

Route

Base to SUBIC BAY along West coast BATAAN PENN. to CORREGIDOR to target. Return same route.

Fighter Cover

Nil Provided.

Operational Data

Total Combat Sorties - 6
Total Combat Hours - 9
Tons of Bombs Dropped - 6
Ammunition Expended - 8400 X.50
Photos Printed - 18

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
JS 13-D
23 Apr 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

24 April,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 113-D, 23 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 23 April 1945, six B-25-J's led the Group to HAINAN ISLAND to take part in a minimum altitude shipping strike on YU LIN BAY in coordination with four squadrons of B-24's which were to bomb A/A positions prior to our strike. However, the strike coordinator reported all shipping in the inner harbor which [redacted] had designated as restricted from attack. Consequently the Group conducted a sweep from CAPE GAALONG to SADDLE ISLAND making all sightings for attacks. Rather than waste bombs at WOODY ISLAND the six planes bombed and strafed land targets of opportunity. In the attack a total of 24 X 500 lb. demos and 14,500 X.50 Cal. were expended. One large, white, cement and stone structure was leveled by direct hits; one two-storied building was seriously damaged; a good sized fire was started in the center of a small town and other towns were bombed and heavily strafed with resulting damage unobserved. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

Recent reports had indicated a large amount of shipping in YULINBAY. Our mission was to attack shipping in the outer harbor, avoiding the inner harbor. Four squadrons of B-24's were to bomb A/A positions just prior to our attack in attempt to lessen the concentration of A/A which could be brought to bear on our formations at minimum altitude.

3. DETAILS

a. The Squadron Formation (leading the Group Formation) arrived off CAPE GAALONG and orbited while contacting the B-24 which was coordinating the strikes. Learning that only two small craft were in the outer harbor, the Squadron Leader directed all squadrons to proceed on a sweep up the coast searching for shipping.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

When the formation arrived at SADDLE ISLAND (1843N-11002E) without finding ships, the leader designated two squadrons to proceed to WOODY ISLAND and retained one squadron to make two squadron attacks on land targets of opportunity. The formation took up formation generally of single planes in trail and proceeded down the coast.

b. Pilots and Planes

Leading the Squadron and Group was Capt.N.E.Wiley in A/P #174 with 2nd.Lt.F.A.Thompson on his right wing in A/P #168 and 1st.Lt.C.C.Phillippe on his left wing in A/P # 855. 2nd.Lt. L.W.Morton led the second flight in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt.Bronson on his right wing in A/P #948 and 2nd.Lt.Mangum on his left wing in A/P #600. 2nd.Lt.Mikell dropped out of formation one hour, ten minutes after take off with a rough engine in A/P #014. The condition of the engine grew steadily worse until it was necessary to feather the prop. The single engine landing was accomplished without damage or casualties.

c. Attack

Capt.Wiley attacked a large white stone and cement structure at CHI LING (1824N-10948E) dropping 4 bombs on the first run and noting on the second run that the building was completely leveled by the bomb blast. Lt.Morton scored a direct hit on a large two storied building at LIAN (1832N-11001E) causing considerable damage.

Lt.Thompson scored a hit in center of KU LOU town (1825N-10946E) starting a moderate size fire which appeared to spread. When last observed greyish-black smoke was rising steadily.

Other pilots bombed and strafed at TUNG LING (1841N-11001E) Ling Sui (1834N-10954E) and several damaged brick or stone buildings at 1850N-10956E) with extent of damage unknown.

There was no interception nor A/A fire and we sustained neither damage nor casualties. Photos confirm damage to large white cement building and two storied building. Other results cannot be evaluated, since only 4 prints were received.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be awarded as result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0845/I	SAN MARCELINO
1 A/P	Turned back	0955/I
1 A/P	Landed Base	1110/I
6 A/P's	Arrive 1808N-10943E	1245/I
Search and attacks		1325- 1345/I
Landed	1725/I	SAN MARCELINO

b. Fighter Cover

Nil fighters seen but radio contact was maintained.

c. Route

Base to GAALONG BAY - SADDLE ISLAND to mouth of TA HO RIVER - base.

d. Operational

Tons of bombs dropped	6
Type bombs dropped	500 lb. 4/5 secdelay.
Total Combat Hours	52
Ammo expended	14500 X.50
Navigation accuracy	good
Bombing Accuracy	Hits 11
	Near
	Miss 9
	Miss 4

4 X 500 lb. bombs salvoed by A/P 014.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
118-D-2
28 Apr 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

FEG/rjl

1 May,1945

SUBJECT: Marrative Report Mission FFO 118-D-20, 28 April,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 27 April,1945 seven of our B-25's proceeded to PALAWAN to participate in a two squadron strike on SAIGON, INDO CHINA. In the late morning of 28 April, five B-25's executed a minimum altitude attack on shipping in the SOIRAP RIVER, two planes having turned back because of mechanical failures. A total of 20 X 500 lb. demo bombs and 12,000 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended on targets with the following results: 5-6 luggers or small engines aft freighters destroyed, probable damage to a floating crane and two barges which total approximately 350 tons, further damage to a merchant vessel of approximately 6000 tons which was left burning by the 501st squadron and sunk as a result of both squadrons attacks, possible damage to at least two large waterfront warehouses, probable destruction of a single-gun 25 mm. A/A position and destruction of two or three small buildings. Our strike was opposed by heavy, medium, and light moderate to intense, mostly inaccurate A/A fire and light interception by one enemy fighter. One of our planes sustained an 18 inch hole in the right outboard section of the wing which necessitates a wing change. There were no personnel casualties. For unknown reasons our fighter cover was delayed and did not reach the target until after our attack.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a continuation of a long series of anti-shipping strikes which have so seriously depleted the Japanese merchant fleet and virtually severed the Shipping Lanes from the southern areas. A second objective was for security and diversion in connection with Allied Operations in the SULU SEA-BORNEO AREA.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The formation of five B-25-J's crossed the coastline at low altitude in the vicinity of PHAN THIET approximately 15 miles South and proceeded overland to a point ten miles NE of SAIGON CITY and then turned onto an heading of approximately 170 degrees (The axis of attack).

The formation over the target consisted of two flights in trail with the first flight consisting of two planes and three for the second flight.

b. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING

The lead element comprised of Capt.N.E.Wiley in A/P #174 with 1st.Lt.B.J.Billings on his wing in A/P #018. 2nd.Lt. L.W.Morton led the second flight in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt.R.F. Kinney on his right wing in A/P #014 and 2nd.Lt.F.E.Otey on his left wing in A/P #165. 1st.Lt.C.C.Philippe in A/P #600 and 2nd. Lt.T.C.Bronson turned back due to mechanical failures.

c. Attack

The lead element's first target was a small engines-aft freighter , a floating crane and two barges located approximately 1 mile E of SAIGON CITY. Capt.Wiley dropped one bomb at the small freighter scoring a near miss which was close enough to destroy the vessel. Lt.Billings dropped 2 bombs which straddled the crane and barges along side, probably damaging these vessels. Shortly afterward both Capt.Wiley and Lt.Billings spotted a large merchantman two miles SE of the city. Both made strafing runs on the vessel but only Lt.Billings dropped bombs. He scored two near misses within 10-15 feet of the bow undoubtedly causing a good deal of damage. Capt.Wiley then flew along the west bank of the river in hopes of finding a target. Six miles south of SAIGON he found a small boat building yard. He dropped a string of three bombs, one of which landed short and exploded within 20-30 feet off a single gun 25 mm. A/A position. The other two bombs exploded among a group of engines aft freighters destroying at least three and probably a fourth. Lt.Morton led the second flight in on the target after taking a thirty-second interval. He dropped two bombs at the same E/A freighter attacked by Capt.Wiley. However, his bombs missed. He dropped two bombs on a group of small buildings farther along the route at an unidentified point with unobserved results. Lt.Kinney dropped two bombs at a large merchantman at the docks approximately 2 miles E of the burning merchantman. One bomb dropped short and the other skipped over into a warehouse area causing possible damage. One bomb was dropped further S in a Group of small buildings with destruction to at least two. Lt.Otey dropped two bombs on the burning merchantman scoring a direct hit and a near miss. A large amount of debris was thrown high into the air as a result. He dropped two bombs at the E/A freighter attacked by Capt.Wiley with unobserved results. The heaviest concentration of A/A fire was received from the area 3-4 miles SE of SAIGON. On the approach there appeared to be a barrage over the area just SE of the city. Only one plane was holed by a medium A/A projectile which left an 18 inch hole in the right outboard wing.

One enemy SSF of unidentified type broke off attacking to the rear of the 501st Squadron and turned back into our formation. The fighter came in from 2 o'clock on a level with our planes at minimum altitude and broke away at 800 yards when fired upon.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Due to lack of accurate information at present, the question on awards or citations is pending.

6. STATISTICS

A. Time Table

T.O. Palawan Is. 0830/I - One A/P turned back [redacted] Palawan0715/I - 1 A/P turned back 0830/I landed Palawan 1030/I.

5 A/P's	T.O.T.	1120-1125/I
5 A/P's	Landed Palawan	1800/I
2 A/P's	T.O. Palawan	1728/I
2 A/P's	Landed San Marcelino	1908/I

2 A/P's R.O.N. Palawan T.O. 0925/I and landed San Marcelino 1125/I

b. Fighter Cover

Fighters were late taking off and did not furnish cover for this strike.

c. Operational Statistics

1. 20 X 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs dropped.
2/ 5 direct hits, 4 near misses, 9 either missed or unobserved.
3. 12000 X.50 Cal. ammo expended.
4. Total combat hours 47½.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

nce: XX Bom Com Target Unit Saigon Area
1:40,000
) 118-D-20 28 April,1945.
20-1125/I Minimum Altitude

M Misses
NM Near Miss
DH Direct Hit


#165 Otey
#205 Morton
#014 Kinney
#174 Wiley
#318 Billings
28 APPROACH
#205 BOMB BAY DOORS
#014 UNDER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
122-0-2
2 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PEG/rjl

3 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 122-D-8, 2 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a mid-morning strike against troop concentrations and supply areas at MADUPAPA on 2 May 1945, six B-25's dropped 72 X 100 lb. paradmoes 100% in the target from minimum altitude on two runs. The target was thoroughly strafed from end to end with a total of 8800 X.50 Cal. ammunition. The entire target was thoroughly covered by both bombing and strafing but other than bomb bursts, smoke and dust no specific results and no actual targets were sighted. There was no A/A fire and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

Reports indicated the presence of some six thousand enemy troops and supplies in a ravine in the MADUPAPA area (1805N-12145E) in the CAGAYAN VALLEY with the possible presence of General Yamashito. Our task was to blanket the area by strafing and bombing - concentrating largely on the sides of the ravine.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The six B-25-J's approached the target from the east along the DUMSUN RIVER at an altitude of approximately 1800 feet. Noting the 498th Squadron's attack route on a target only two miles from our target, the formation turned north and broke off squadron formation at a point five miles NW of the ravine and assumed attack formation of single planes in trail at not less than thirty seconds. The axis of the first attack was from N to S down the length of the ravine and the second from NW to SE at a slight angle. All planes circled to the right after each pass.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating

Leading the Squadron was Capt.R.F.Todd in A/P #355. Other planes in the order ofattack were, 2nd.Lt.T.C.Bremson in A/P #205, 1st.Lt.C.C.Philipps in A/P #600,2nd.Lt.T.H.Mangum (Second Flight Leader) in A/P #198, 2nd.Lt.A.H.Tyree in A/P # 948 and 2nd.Lt.I.A.Mikell in A/P #166.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

In the attack all planes dropped six bombs on each pass and where possible all guns were brought into action to spray the target from end to end. Both tail and top turrets were fired to give greater coverage. Because of the heavy growth of timber and long delay fuses neither specific results nor targets were sighted. However, visual sightings indicate excellent coverage since bomb bursts, smoke and dust were spread over the entire area. There was no A/A opposition and we sustained neither damage nor casualties. Only four prints of the mission photos were received and the coverage is insuffisient to confirm crews reports of coverage and attack routes.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0800/I	San Marcelino
T.O.T.	0920-37/I	MADUPAPA
Landed	1100/I	San Marcelino

b. Route

Base to BALETE PASS to TUGUEGARAO to Target.
Return same route.

c. Operational

Bombs Dropped	72 X 100 lb. paradrops 8/15 sec. delay fuses.
Bombing	Excellent
Hits	72
Combat Hours per plane	5
Ammo expended	8800 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th
124-D-15
4 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 75 PEM/rjl

5 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report FFO 124-D-15, 4 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of; A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the early morning of 4 May 1945, six B-25's conducted a minimum altitude strike against reported enemy troop concentrations and supply dumps at DUGO VILLAGE just south of APARRI. In the attack a total of 72 X 100 lb. parademo bombs and 5000 X.50 Cal. ammunition were expended giving good coverage of the target. A few scattered huts were the only specific targets seen. Results other than bomb bursts and smoke were not visible. The strike was opposed only by light, meager, inaccurate small arms fire. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a part of a Group Strike designed to destroy concentrations of troops and supplies there by lowering the enemy's capabilities in future operations in Northern Luzon. The specific target was a wooded area approximately 1 mile by 3/4 mile in size just S and adjacent to DUGO VILLAGE.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The six planes approached the target from the South flying along the West bank of the CAGAYAN VALLEY at approximately 1000 feet and on locating the target took up attack formation of single planes in trail at a minimum of 30 seconds. The axis of attack was from SW to NE, turning W for a second run on the same axis. The squadron was first over the target, and made all runs over the target at minimum altitude.

b. Pilots And Planes participating.

Major W.D.Decker, the Squadron Commander, led the Squadron in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.Bray in A/P #198 on his right wing and 2nd.Lt.F.E.Otey on his left wing in A/P #208. Capt. R.L.Smalley led the second flight in A/P #355 with 2nd.Lt. Howard on his right wing in A/P #177 and 1st.Lt.G.C.Phillips on his left wing in A/P#014. The order over the target was as follows: A.P #600, 198, 205,355,177 and 014.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Each plane dropped six bombs and strafed on both runs. Of the 72 bombs dropped the larger concentration was in the central part of the target. However, other areas were not slighted since bombs were seen bursting throughout the target area and strafing, while only moderate in intensity, afforded further coverage. Only a few scattered huts were seen in the target. Any supplies and troops were hidden undertrees. A/A was restricted to light, meager, inaccurate small arms fire from a small house NE of the target. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

A decided lack of activity has been noted during several previous missions of this type. Undoubtedly the enemy troops spot the strike force when some miles away and take shelter. The element of surprise, and therefore more effective results could be attained by approaching the target at minimum altitude during a time of day when the enemy is not expecting an attack, such as shortly after daybreak or at dusk. The obvious faults in such a plan are; difficulty in locating the target at such a low altitude and poor visibility. However, there are not insurmountable and these difficulties are cancelled by the increased effectiveness of the attack.

5. CITATIONS

There will be no recommendations for awards or citations as results of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	SAN MARCELINO	0620/I
T.O.T.	DUGO	0740-45/I
Landed	SAN MARCELINO	1000/I

b. Route: Base - BALETE PASS TARGET. Return was same.

c. Operational

Bombs dropped	72 X 100 lb.	Hits	100%
Misses	Nil	Ammo fired	5000 X.50
Photos received		2 prints.	

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
124-D-17
4May45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

6 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, FFO 124-D-17, 4 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On an early afternoon strike against troop concentration and supply areas in the village of CABAGAN on 4 May,1945, 5 B-25's dropped 58 X 100 lb. parademos 100% in the target and two just past the target area. Attack was made at minimum altitude and planes made individual runs. The target was thoroughly strafed with 6400 X50Cal ammunition. Several small shacks were observed burning and one fairly large tin roofed building was destroyed. Bomb bursts, smoke and dust covered the entire area indicating good coverage was obtained, although accurate observation was restricted as planes made their runs. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

Reports indicated the presence of some 2000 enemy troops and considerable supplied in the village of CABAGAN (1725N-12145E) our task was to cover the village area by strafing and bombing.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The remaining five of an original six plane formation (Lt.Mikell returned shortly after take off due to mechanical trouble) approached the target from the Southwest at an altitude of 2000 feet. Capt.Todd spotted the target then led the formation low across the CAGAYAN RIVER in single plane attack at 30 second intervals. The planes all made right turns after each run attacking from SW.

b. Pilots and Planes

Leading the Squadron was Capt.R.F.Todd in A/P #600. Other planes in order of attack were as follows: 1st.Lt.C.R.Smith in plane #014, Lt.J.H.Beata A/P #205, 2nd.Lt.T.C.Bronson A/P #355 and 2nd.Lt.Tyree in A/P #198.

c. Attack

All planes dropped six bombs on each pass and all guns were brought into action to spray the target from end to end. Both top and tail turrets were fired to give greater coverage. Visual sightings indicate excellent coverage since bomb bursts, smoke and dust blanketed the entire area. One plane reported a few bursts of light calibre fire but we sustained no damage. Eight photos received were taken showing many bombs dropping in the area. Due to the delayed fuse the photographed bombs did not have time to explode when the pictures were taken to add further proof of pilots reports but there nearness to the buildings substantiated the visual reports.

4. CITATIONS

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off	SAN MARCELINO	1145/I
T.O.T.	CABAGAN	1300/I
Landed	SAN MARCELINO	1420/I

Route

Base to BALETE PASS to target - return was same.

Operational

Bombs Dropped	60 X 100 lb. parademos
Hits	52
Ammo expended	6400 X.50 Cal.
Combat Hours Per Plane	2;35

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
JCH 126-D-
6 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PEG/rjl

8 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 126-D-20, 6 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the 6 May,1945, 10 B-25-J's made an early morning take off to conduct a minimum altitude bombing and strafing strike on MATO TOWN, Western FORMOSA. One A/P turned back early because of mechanical trouble but nine planes dropped 53 X 250 lb. free falling demo bombs and expended 14,675 rounds of .50 cal. ammo in the target area. Large fires in several factories, warehouse and freight yards indicated a great deal of damage was done. Two A/P's were holed by small arms fire with no injury to personel and all planes returned to base.

2. OBJECTIVE

This was a co-ordinated endeavor by two groups to determine how much damage can be done to a previously unattacked town by this type of attack in which several planes of other squadrons dropped napalm bombs.

3. ATTACK

a. Our squadron followed the lead squadron up the West coast of FORMOSA and started inland just North of TAINAN to be in position for an advantageous land to sea run.

b. At this point Lt.Baeta put his squadron in attack formation of 3 planes abfeast having Lt.Bray in #2 position in plane #198 and Lt.Bronson in #3 position in A/P #174. Leading the second flight across at proper interval was Major Decker in A/P #600 with Lt.Mangun in A/P #177 and Lt.Phillips in A/P #166 on his right and left wing respectively. Leading the third and last flight of our squadron was Lt.Naas in A/P #355 with Lt. Simcoe and Lt.Howard on his wings in A/P's #948 and 014 respectively.

c. Lt.Beata started his E to W run about 1 mile North of the sugar refinery, made a straight pass which carried him over the center of town and angled to the south across the main street. This flight dropped 18 X 250 lb. free falling bombs and expended approximately 4500 rounds of.50 Cal. causing many fires which show plainly in photographs.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Major Decker started his run about ½ mile south of the refinery and held a course south of and parallel to the main street making a gradual turn to the south from the edge of town enabling him to strafe a train of 15 cars loaded with sacks of probably some type of grain. Photos show the engine on fire. Both wingmen started several fires but no specific target can be seen due to dust, smoke and haze.

Lt.Haas lined uphis flight for a very good run starting just North of the refinery,which was burning fiercely from previous bombs, and swept along the North edge of the main street with Lt.Simcoe in good position farther to the north and Lt.Howard to the south. Lt.Haas's pictures show definite fires in several one and two story builings in the heart of town. The wingmen undoubtedly achieved good results but smoke and haze again made definite targets impossible to be seen. No enemy fire was seen but 2 ships were holed however from machine gun or small arms fire. The photos, as a whole, show a good coverage of the target area.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

The original plan was to follow close to the mountains of Formosa up to the target but poor visibility necessitated following the coast up all most to the target area before turning inland. This then made a sharp turn necessary to line up with the target which accounts for some of the planes being further south than originally planned.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as results of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0735/I	SAN MARCELIN
T.O.T.	1044-46/I	MATO TOWN
Landed	1400/I	SAN MARCELINO

b. Fighter Cover

Both fighter cover and rescue was considered excellent.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

999
499
128-D-12
8 May 45

498th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73 PmG/rjl

10 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 128-D-12, 8 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Eight B-25's made a mid-day strafing and bombing attack on rolling stock, bridges and R.R. Stations starting approximately 10 miles North of NHA TRANG and continuing up the INDO CHINA COAST to BINH DINH. A total of 47 X 250 lb. para demo bombs and 22400 rounds of.50 Cal. was expended giving good results on some specific targets. The strike was opposed only by a few bursts of medium A/A fire which holed 1 plane in left stabilizer making change necessary. We suffered no casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was part of a Group strike designed to destroy and disrupt all motor and railroad traffic along the only route serving the INDO CHINA COAST. Specific targets were bridges, R.R. Yards and trains.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The eight B-25-J's formed two four plane flights and at a point approximately 100 miles off the INDO CHINA COAST, four planes of the first flight went in to NHA TRANG and started attack there heading north, planes made the attack "in trail" and reformed in a four plane flight just North of TUYHOA where the attack was broke off. The second flight also attacking "in trail" made the run from TUYHOA north following the railroad to BINH DINH where they reformed and returned to base.

b. Planes and Pilots

Capt.R.L.Smelly in A/P #[illegible]85 led the squadron out and taking 2nd.Lt.Mikell in A/P #166, Lt.Price in A/P #014 and 1st.Lt.C.C.Phillips in A/P #600, broke off from the formation to lead his flight over the target area in that order.

Lt.J.B.Morton in A/P #5[illegible]3 led the Second Flight over the target with the following planes and pilots following in order; 2nd.Lt. Howard A/P #205, 2nd.Lt.Mangum in A/P #171 and 1st.Lt.Simcoe in A/P #948.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

a. Attack

Capt.Smelly started attack at 1210/I and strafed all opportune targets along the route and dropped one bomb on unidentified bridge with undetermined results. At the end ofhis run in the town of TUYHOA he found a 4 track R.R. yard with about 15 boxcars and 1 locomotive into which he dropped the remaining 5 bombs and expended all remaining ammunition. Visual reports with substantiating photosshow 3bombs dropping in vicinity of the cars and two near misses on the locomotive.

Lt.Mikell #2 on the run reported dropping 4bombs at 2 bridges with undetermined results and strafed R/R station and Motor Truck at NINH HOA with good results. Lt.Mikell returned to base with 1 bomb for which he had no available target.

Lt.Price was #3 and dropped his first bomb on bridge North of XUAN TUI with no observed results, the 2nd. bomb was dropped on a R.R. station at TU BONG, Lt.Phillips wol was following in the following plane took on excellent picuture of this hit which show the station house practically demolished. Two more bombs were dropped near a two span steel bridge thought to be at PHU KHE with poor results. Remaining 2 bombs were dropped for possible hit on 6 span R.R. bridge just South of TUY HOA. One bomb landed near the light A/A position at the end of the bridge and the other hit on the bridge.

Lt.Phillips was flying the 4th and last of this flight. His first two bombs were dropped for probable hits on two box cars on siding at unidentified village. Next two bombs on bridge at NINH HOA with no observed results. Last two bombs were dropped in marshalling yard at TUY HOA with no observed results but photos taken show two locomotives verly plainly and Lt.Phillips reports definetly that another locomotive was in building which he strafed heavily. This is same yard in which he made this attack that Capt.Smelly dropped 5 bombs and considerable activity was noted there.

Lt.Morton started his run with the second flight picking up the railroad a few miles North of TUY HOA at 1205/I. First two bombs were dropped on railroad station at PHONG PHU and nearby water tower which was heavily strafed as well.

No results were seen from bombs but water tower was leaking in many places. Two more bombs were dropped on 2 span bridge a few miles North of PHUOC TUONG, with no reported results. Remaining two bombs were dropped for one miss and a direct hit. Direct hit was reported by the next plane to attack. This direct hit was scored on a R.R. station at an uidentified town.

Lt.Howard followed next dropping 3 bombs and heavily strafed rail yards and buildings at PHUOC TUONG, small fires started from strafing but no results of bombing was observed. Next bombdropped on R.R. station at LA HAI and nearby water tower was holed by strafing. Remaining 2 bombs were dropped on a small bridge and R.R. station at VON CANN with no results reported.

Lt.Mangum came third and dropped 2 boubs on bridge at LA HAI. No pictures and no visual results. Two more bombs were dropped on bridge at VON CANN scoring one near miss. Last two bombs were dropped on bridge at THE BAN scoring a direct hit.

Lt.Simcoe was last over the target and dropped hit bombs at same towns and stations reported above further damaging several R/R stations and scoring a near miss on R/R bridge at THE BAN.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

T.O. Base 0745/I T.O.T. 1200-1230/I Landed 1645/I

Route: Base Indo China Coast Target and returned to base dir ct.

For TheSquadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
130-D-17
10May45

493th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 73

PEG/rjl

11 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FPO 130-D-17, 10 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

During the noon hour of 10 May,1945 five B-25-J's attacked KARI TOWN on FORMOSA from minimum altitude dropping 27 250 lb. paradcmos and expended 14,000 K.50 Cal. on targets throughout the town. We contributed considerable damage to a factory at the N end of town by scoring 1 direct hit on the main building and six hits on RR yards and other buildings. Two large barracks type buildings, were heavily damaged from 3 hits. Eight bombs hit among closely packed buildings near the center of town with unobserved results but very probable damage. All planes strafed GAKKO VILLAGE North of target, on the approach with no visible results. During the withdrawal between KARI and the coast, several small villages and isolated houses were heavily strafed setting fire to several. A stationary SCS just off the target at (2305N-12004E) with steam up was thoroughly strafed scoring many hits at the waterline and on aft superstructure. Bombing is considered good and results excellent. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. Opposition was limited to light, meager, inaccurate M/G and small arms fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this mission was to inflict a maximum amount of damage on the whole of KARI TOWN. There were no specific targets assigned.

3. DETAILS

a. The formation of 5 B-25-J's flew N along the West coast of FORMOSA to a point on the coast 5 miles NW of the target then turned inland 80 degrees onto a 180 degree axis of attack. Formation over the target consisted of two flights (1st.flight of 3 planes and second of two planes) at minimum altitude with a 30 second interval between. Breakaway was to the West to avoid A/A fire at TAINAN. Our formation was the #3 squadron over the target.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating.

Major W.D.Decker, the Squadron Commander, led the squadron in A/P #800 with 2nd.Lt.Bronson on his right wing in A/P #365 and 2nd.Lt.Tyree on his left wing in A/P #166. 2nd.Lt.C.H.Rice led the second flight in A/P #563 with 1st.Lt.P.C.Simcox on his right wing in A/P #205.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Major Decker lined up on the smoke stack of the factory in the N part of town and made his run over this area and continuing along the W side of town. He scored a direct hit on the RR yards at the factory and heavily damaged a residence in the N part of the town proper with a very near miss.

Lt.Bronson pulled up to avoid collision with the factory smoke stack causing his bomb to miss the factory. However, his next three bombs made full compensation by scoring damaging hits on two large barracks type buildings at the W edge of town.

Lt.Tyree scored 4 direct hits on the factory, 2 on buildings and two on R.R. yards there. His remaining two bombs dropped among buildings near center of town causing probable damage.

Lt.Rice attempted to drop on the factory but for unknown reasons the bombs failed to release. He succeeded in dropping 3 bombs in the center of the town scoring probable damage. His remaining 3 bombs dropped safe off the target.

Lt.Simcoe scored one direct hit on the factory and 1 hit on the RR yards causing considerable damage and starting a large fire with flames 50 feet high. He dropped one bomb near residence probably causing damage. His remaining two bombs were dropped in the SW section of town with unobserved results.

Lt.Howard returned to base early when his plane #198 developed a gas leak.
All planes strafed during approach and withdrawal with results as described in I above. Over the target gun flashes were seen from an unidentified position to E of town and tracers were received from an unidentified position N of the town. There was no interception and we sustained nil damage, or casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as results of of this strike.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7/ OPERATIONS

a. Time Table

Take off at 0600/I from [illegible].
1 A/P turned back at 1100/I and landed 1245/I
9 A/P's T.O.T. 1215/I [illegible]
8 A/P's landed 1515/I [illegible]

b. Route

Route out and return was direct.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil observed.

d. Operational

Bombs dropped	27 X 250 lb. 5sec. delay.
Bombs salvoed	3 X 250 lb.
Hits	17
Misses	10
Ammo fired	14916 X.30 Cal.
Combat Hrs. per plane	6 hours 10 min tot.
Prints of Mission photos	24

For The Squadron [illegible]:

[illegible]
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499-0.4
131-GH
11 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

18 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 131-D-16, 11 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 11 May 1945, six B-25's proceeded to FORMOSA to participate in a minimum altitude Group Strike on KAGI TOWN. However, because of a navigation error by the Group Leader the town of TAMIO was attacked by mistake. In the attack 36 X 250 lb. paradamos were dropped and a total of 16,000 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended in strafing. One bomb probably damaged a power station, a large radio station was heavily strafed and damaged and several good-size buildings were heavily damaged. Five of the six planes sustained minor damage from M/G and small arms fire. There were no personnel casualties. One plane which became separated from the formation after the attack, escorted a badly damaged 501st Squadron plane to LAOAG. These two planes were intercepted by ten enemy fighters between KOHI and KAGI, on the withdrawal from the target. One fighter made a close pass on the 501st plane and made a weak pass across the tail of our plane. The other enemy fighters did not attempt attack. Nil damage to either side as aresult of aerial combat.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was one of several missions designed to inflict the maximum amount of damage on closely packed, lightly defended towns in FORMOSA. There were no specific targets assigned and no restrictions on any part of the target. The purpose of the mission seems to have had the destruction of the FORMOSAN People's faith in Japanese Capabilities, if such faith exists.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The formation of six B-25-J's flew up the E coast of FORMOSA to a point just S of SASAKI SHIMA and turned inland to a point approximately 5 miles N E of TAMIO then turning onto an axis of NE to SW for the attack. Formation over the target consisted of two, 3 plane flights with 30 second interval between each flights.

b. Leading the squadron in A/P #355 was 1st.Lt.Nass with 2nd.Lt.I.A. Nikell on his right in A/P #166 and 2nd.Lt.Tyree on his left in A/P #198.

2nd.Lt.Mangum led the Second Flight in A/P #563 with 2nd.Lt.Howard in #2 position in A/P #600 and 2nd.Lt.Harben in #3 position in A/P #174.

c. Attack

Lt.Naas led the first flight directly over the central and western edges of the town. The three planes dropped 18 bombs throughout the town scoring several hits on buildings probably causing considerable damage. Lt.Mikell of this flight thoroughly strafed the radio station at the NW edge of town scoring several hits on the buildings and probable damage to radio equipment.

Lt.Mangum led the second flight over the central part of the town slightly to the east of thr run made by the first flight. This flight also dropped 18 bombs with results similar to those of the first flight. Lt.Howard reports a direct hit on apower station and probable destruction resulting. He also reports a direct hit on a large warehouse type building causing considerable damage.

Mission photos confirm crews reports of flight lines and show several bombs exploding among buildings in the town.
As Lt.Harben came off the target he executed several turns to avoid flying over towns and in so doing became separated. Approximately 20 miles SW of the target a lone crippled 501st plane "tacked on" his wing and the two climbed to 2000 feet. Shortly afterwards, they spotted approximately ten enemy fighters, mostly Zekes 52 and at least two Zeke 32. These were seen circling to the E. One Zeke 32 broke off and made a pass at the 501st plane apparently pressing quite close and continued through flying across the stern of Lt. Harben's plane at the same level, and 700 yards eastern. No fire was exchanged between the fighter and Lt.Harben's gunners. Lt.Harben escorted the 501st plane to LAOAG, landed and then returned to base with the 501st crew aboard. Five planes sustained superficial damage due to M/G and small arms fire. There were no personnel injuries.

4. CITATIONS

No citations will be awarded as result of this strike.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O. 0630/I T.O.T. 1004-06/I 5 A/P's Landed 1325/I
1 A/P landed LAOAG 1300/I Landed Base 1655/I

b. Route

Direct.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
133-A-7
13 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO74 PEG/rjl

18 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FEAF 133-A-7, 13 May,1945.

To : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a mid-morning, minimum altitude attack on troop and supply concentrations at MABUPAPA (1805N-12045E) in the upper CAGAYAN VALLEY, six B-25's dropped 72 X 100 lb. demos and heavily strafed the area with 18000 X.50 on three runs over the target. The target area was well covered by both bombing and strafing. Bombing was excellent, however, because of heavy foliage, long delay fuses and low altitude specific results were unobserved. One airplane was holed by M/G fire causing slight damage. There were no personnel injuries.

2. OBJECTIVE

The target, in a ravine bordered by low hills, was reported to contain some 6000 troops, supply and fuel dumps, radio, power and telephone installations. All of these were designated as specific targets with special attention to a cave located near the center of the target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron approached the area from N to S by way of APARRI and circled while two other squadrons cleared the target. The formation then took up attack formation of single planes with a 30 second interval between each plane and the preceeding plane. The axis of attack was generally from N-S at minimum altitude circling right each time for second and third runs.

b. 1st.Lt.C.F.Smith led the squadron in A/P #014. Other planes and pilots in the order of attack were: 1st.Lt.F.G.Simcoe A/P #205, 1st.Lt.C.C.Phillips A/P #355, 2nd.Lt.Tyree in A/P #171, 2nd.Lt Harben in A/P #948,and 2nd.Lt.Bronson in A/P #174.

c. Attack

As each plane attacked the pilot following spotted his bombs and picked a different area as a target in order to insure maximum coverage of the target. All 72 bombs hit in the assigned target area, 68 of which covered an area 400 yards in length in the central portion of the target.

The remaining 4 bombs were outside this central area but still in the target. 4 bombs dropped near the entrance of the cave probably doing no damage. A M/G position firing at the SE end of the ravine was silenced by strafing. No specific targets, other than the cave and M/G position were sighted. Consequently the only results observed were bomb bursts and smoke.

Light meager accurate M/G fire from position at the SE end of the ravine and light, meager, inaccurate from one position at the SW end of the ravine.

One plane sustained minor damage from M/G fire causing slight oil leak from one cylinder. There were no personnel injuries.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No awards will be given as result of this strike.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	Clark Field	0710/I
Arrive Target	Madupapa	0900/I
T.O.T. Attack	Madupapa	0914-30/I
Landed	Clark Field	1040/I

b. Route

Base - LINGAYAN along W coast of LUZON to N tip of the Island - APARRI TARGET. Return was direct.

c. Operational

Bombs Dropped	72 X 100 lb. 8/15 sec. delay fuse.
No. Hits	72 100%
Ammo Expended	18000 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JSM
499
137-A-7
17 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

18 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 137-A-7, 17 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 17 May 1945, six B-25's made an early take off and proceeded to F RMOSA where shortly after sunrise, five of the planes executed a minimum altitude strike on R.R. and highway rolling stock as well as other targets of opportunity. The strike force swept the area from TAITO-DEI to SHINSHI dropping 23 X 250 lb. bombs and expending 13,350 X.50 Cal. ammo on targets.
Three buildings were destroyed, one locomotive engine was blown up, one other damaged by strafing, and another locomotive was attacked but results were unobserved. A M/G position firing from a house was destroyed, several RR yards were attacked damaging several buildings in that area; buildings near a factory probably damaged and two of a group of uniform "camp Type" buildings were damaged. One plane was heavily damaged when it crashed into a high wire and holed 5 times by A/A, another was seriously damaged by fragments of an exploding locomotive with further damage from a high wire which was hidden by the explosion. There were no personnel casualties. Five miles off KOKO, 2 unidentified single seat fighters made a half-hearted interception, firing from extreme range causing nil damage to our planes. Because of the extreme range our gunners withheld fire and did not got an opportunity to shoot.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to knock out whatever rolling stock could be found. The target was divided into two sections with one three plane flight sweeping the area from TAITO KEI to TONAN and the other flight from TONAN to SHINSHI.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The first flight of three planes took off at one minute intervals starting at 0350/I and proceeded individually to the rendezvous point off the mouth of the TAITO-KEI River where formation was joined and the flight turned inland. The RR was picked up just S of TAICHU and the formation turned S to make the sweep at minimum altitude in a loose 3 plane "V".

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The second flight took off at 0530/I and proceeded individually. Two of the planes made rendezvous over SASAGI-SHIMA ISLAND while the third missed the rendezvous point and when engine trouble developed just off ROKKO, this plane salvoed bombs and returned to base. The remaining two planes became separated in the haze and made individual runs on the inland RR starting just S of TONAN and sweeping to the S at minimum altitude.

b. Planes and Pilots participating.

1st.Lt.W.R.Naas led the first flight in A/P #355 with 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe on his right wing in A/P #166 and 2nd.Lt.F.E. Otey on his left wing in A/P #205. 2nd.Lt.Tyree led the second flight in A/P #171, 2nd.Lt.Harben in A/P #018 made rendezvous but became separated. 2nd.Lt.Howard in A/P #198 missed the rendezvous and returnedto base with a bad engine.

c. Attack of first flight

Lt.Naas made his first attack at NAMA where he dropped two bombs and strafed a locomotive with unobserved results. He dropped 1 bomb on a group of buildings and boxcars 6 miles SW of NAMA. Bomb skipped into a building causing damage to roof. At TOROKU he dropped 3 bombs and concentrated his strafing on buildings and boxcars causing a large explosion with a bright flash of flame and smoke. As he pulled up he hit a high wire which caused considerable damage tothe nose, wings, and top turret and threw him violently to one side. He immediately broke off the attack and returned his crippled plane to base.

Lt.Simcoe demolished a two story structure at a small town N of NAMA with one direct hit and silencing at M/G firing from the buildings. At NAMA he dropped one bomb at the boxcars and buildings attacked by Lt.Naas. However, his bomb missed. He dropped two bombs and strafed asmall village just S of NAMA damaging two or three buildings and setting one afire. He dropped one bomb in a group of large buildings and boxcars at an u/i point N of TOROKU with unobserved results. He strafed the town of TOROKU scoring hits on many buildings with no visible results. On an unidentified siding SW of TOROKU he strafed a group of flat cars with damage unobserved.

Lt.Otey was unable to get over atarget during the first part of the run and saved his bombs for later targets. However, when Lt.Naas hit the wire at TOROKU he broke off and returned his bombs to base. He made several strafing attacks along the route with unobserved results.

Second Flights attack.

Lt.Tyree turned in on his run losing sight of his wingman and continued alone.

At HOKYORON during the approach he strafed and dropped one bomb among a group of 15 buildings of uniform construction, with observed damage to two of the structures. Just S of TONAN he attacked a stationary locomotive and 25 flatcars. The engine blew up in front of him and flying fragments tore several holes in the plane. (On return to base he found cable marks on the wings and nose- evidently he hit a wire which was not seen in the debris and smoke). He then flew around to the W of Kagi to avoid A/A fire and dropped 2 bombs on a large factory at an unidentified point SW of KAGI (Possibly the Hansei Butnol Plant). His bombs straddled the factory with the first exploding on the side of the building causing probable damage. He dropped 2 bombs on a small town West of the factory (probably ROKUSO VILLAGE) with unobserved results. Here he turned off the RR toward the coast and just E of BOKUSHI he strafed a locomotive causing steam to escape from the engine. In his final attack he dropped one bomb at a bridge West of BOKUSHI but missed.

Lt.Harben became separated after rendezvous and circled several times East of TONAN in an attempt to locate his flight leader without success. As a last resort he dumped his bombs on GANCHO TOWN. Two of his bombs missed but 4 exploded in the town probably damaging several buildings.

e. Interception

5 miles off TOKO at 2000 feet 2 unidentified SSF took up a course parallel to our own and several thousand feet to the beam. One fighter turned in on the formation on level using no evasive action and opened fire with 2 cowl guns,with fire falling short attack was broken off at 1000 yards. Our gunners held fire until the range was closers However, the fighter turned and slid across to the rear without coming in range.

Anti-Aircraft fire

1 plane was holed twice in left engine cowling and once in right nacelle by meager M/G fire from a position at the SW end of a bridge 5 miles NW of NAMA. 1 M/G position fired 3 bursts from a building from an u/i point just North of NAMA. Gun flashes seen from SW edge of KOBI TOWN with no bursts or tracers seen.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

It is doubtful if either of the two wires hit by our planes were designed for protection against minimum altitude attacks. True the wires were higher than usual but the size of the wires is not great enough to be really effective. A piece of wire caught in the wing of one plane was #8 guage,copper electrical wire . Another point against employment of wire traps in these instances is the fact that one instance occured in open country far from town or installations, the other instance was at a small station where only six buildings and two or there sidings were observed.

17 MAY 46

5. CITATIONS

Nil awards or citations will be awarded as result of this mission.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Kitbag 5

3 A/P's	T.O. 1 minute interval start	0350/I
3 A/P's	Rendezvous Point	0720/I
3 A/P's	T.O.T.	0725-41/I
3 A/P's	Landed Base	1100/I

Kitbag 6

3 A/P's	T.O. 1 minute interval start	0530/I
2 A/P's	Rendezvous Point	0835/I
1 A/P	Off Rokko - turned back	0845/I
1 A/P	T.O.T.	0845-0900/I
1 A/P	T.O.T.	0838-0850/ I
1 A/P	Landed	1215/I
1 A/P	Landed	1230/I
1 A/P	Landed	1305/I

b. Fighter Cover

Nil provided.

c. Operational

23 X 250 lb. 8/15 second delay fuse bombs dropped on target.
7 X 250 lb. bombs returned to base.
6 X 250 lb. bombs salvoed.
13,350 X.50 Cal. expended on targets.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
138-A-5
18 May 45

JC

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

21 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 138-A-5, 18 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a mid-morning, minimum altitude strike on Rolling Stock and targets of opportunity on FORMOSA, six B-25's dropped 31 X 250 lb. demos and expended 16,300 X.50 Cal. ammo on targets between SHINCHIKU (2350N-12055E) and SHINSHI (2305N-12017E). Cumulative results were scattered and varied along the entire route and not confined solely to Rolling Stock. Damage includes: 3 bridges damaged, 1 possibly damaged, 1 locomotive engine damaged, 1 possibly damaged, 1 boxcar destroyed, several others possibly damaged; 1 personnel loaded bus bombed and strafed with probable damage and casualties and 1 M/T set afire; 1 building housing a firing M/G destroyed, 3 buildings left burning, several houses probably severed; and two buildings of a factory either heavily damaged or destroyed. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. A/A fire was light, meager, intense and inaccurate. There was no fighters interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

Although rolling stock was designated as the primary target, other targets such as towns and factories were approved. The Squadron target included the area from SHINCHIKU to SHINSHI and this area was divided into three sections. One section assigned to two planes included the coastal R.R. from SHINCHIKU to TAITO KEI. The second section assignedto two planes covered the westernmost R.R. from TAITO KEI to TONAN. The remaining section assigned to two planes was the R.R. from TONAN to SHINSHI.

3. DETAILS OF ATTACK AND MISSION

a. The squadron formation enroute to the target consisted of two elements of two planes each, and two elements of 1 plane each. Each element flew along the West coast of FORMOSA to the respective I.P.'s which were: 1st. Flight, 5 miles S of SHINCHIKU; 2nd.Flight at mouth of the TAITO KEI, 3rd Flight, N tip of SASAGI SHIMA. At the I.P. each element turned inland picking up the assigned section of R.R. and making the sweep from N to S at minimum altitude.

b. 1st.Lt.C.C.Phillips led the first element in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt.Bray on his wing in A/P #018. 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe led the second element in A/P #306 with 2nd.Lt.Bronson on his wing in A/P #177. Major W.D.Decker (Squadron Commander) made his run singly in A/P #166 when his wingman Lt.Howard in A/P #948 was delayed in take off by a mechanical malfunction. Arriving late at the target Lt.Howard made the sweep alone.

c. Attack

Lt.Phillips made his initial attack on a small R.R. bridge 2 miles SW of CHIKUMAN where he dropped two bombs, one of which was a damaging direct hit on the S end of the bridge. At nearby TAMEUNKO he destroyed a boxcar with a direct hit and damaged a locomotive engine by strafing. In the same area he dropped two bombs on tracks and buildings. The bombs were seen to explode in this target but extent of the damage was not observed. His last bomb was dropped at a small unidentified station and several boxcars between TAITO and TAIKO with the possible damage to both. For good measure he thoroughly strafed several buildings and small towns.

Lt.Bray found few targets and consequently bombed at only two points. He strafed along the entire route and at BYORITSU he dropped 3 bombs in the center of town, probably damaging several buildings. Near TANG-LI he dropped his 3 remaining bombs on a small R.R. bridge scoring one damaging hit which threw debris into the air.

Lt.Simcoe destroyed a building containing an active M/G, between the NISUI RR Junction and TOROKU with one direct hit. He dropped 2 bombs on RR tracks just N of TOROKU scoring one hit probably severing the line. At TOROKU his two bombs and heavy strafing left 3 buildings burning. His last bomb missed a bridge at TORAN.

Lt.Bronson set fire to a truck in TOROKU by strafing. Finding no other targets he dropped one bomb on a sail craft on the coast during the withdrawal, and salvoed the remaining 5 bombs off the FORMOSA COAST.

Major Decker's [redacted] bombing attacks heavily damaged or probably destroyed two buildings of a large factory at ROMPAI, 5 miles SE of KOLI, he heavily strafed several boxcars with nil visible results. 3 miles SE of TAMIO he scored a near miss and a miss on a small bridge probably doing little damage. 5 miles S of KAGI he betteredhis previous run by scoring a direct hit and one miss on a small bridge.

Lt.Howard dropped 2 bombs and strafed a bus loaded with personnel probably inflicting casualties and damage. Just N of ENSUI he dropped 3 bombs on agroup of 10-15 boxcars. His bombs were seen to explode in the area but damage is not known. A near miss on a locomotive engine at an unidentified point between ENSUI and SHINSHI caused possible damage. During the withdrawal 12 miles NW of TAINAN DROME he strafed a moving barge scoring hits but definite results were not visible.
Each three flights encountered light meager inaccurate M/G and small arms fire from various points along the route. At TOROKU intense but inaccurate M/G fire was encountered. There was no fighter interception and we sustained neither damage norcasualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

(First Flight)

T.O.	Clark Field	0600/I
T.O.T.	FORMOSA	0922-37/I
Landed	Clark Field	1315/I

(Second Flight)

T.O.	Clark Field	0605/I
T.O.T.	FORMOSA	0910-30/I
Landed	Clark Field	1305/I

(Third Flight)

1 A/P	T.O. Clark Field	0610/I
1 A/P	T.O. Clark Field	0615/I
1 A/P	T.O.T. FORMOSA	0855/I-0918/I
1 A/P	T.O.T. FORMOSA	0920-35/I
1 A/P	Landed Clark Field	1220/I
1 A/P	Landed Clark Field	1255/I

d. Operational

Bombs Dropped on targets	31 X 250 lb. 8/15 sec.
Bombs Salvoed	5 X 250 lb.
Ammo Expended	16,300 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2H 499 139-A-9 19 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEC/rjl

21 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFC 139-A-9, 19 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 19 May 1945, 6 B-25's conducted a minimum altitude strike on the area between SHINCHIKU and TAIHOKU FORMOSA dropping a total of 28 X 250 lb. demos and firing 13,750 X.50 Cal. ammo on targets of opportunity. The primary target was rolling stock but since such targets were not found, small villages, houses and other targets bore the brunt of our attack. Results were as generally as inconspicuous as the targets attacked. Several buildings were damaged, a fire was started in a small town, a storage tank was strafed (following planes reported a large column of smoke from that area). Two planes sustained minor damage from ground fire and there were no personnel injuries. Following their usual tactics of trailing the formation and making an occaisional half-hearted pass two U/I SSFintercepted. A short burst of fire was exchanged with damage to neither side.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was one of several conducted in the past few days with the disruption of daylight operation of transportation as the objective. The specified target was rolling stock on both highways and R.R. between SHINCHIKU and TAIHOKU.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The six planes approached the area flying N along the West coast of FORMOSA staying offshore to avoid coastal A/A and just above SHINCHIKU turned inland picking up the RR and highway shortly afterward. The sweep was from SW to NE in three two-plane elements with a thirty second interval between flights.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating

1st.Lt.C.R.Smith led the first flight in A/P #014 with 2nd.Lt.Helmns on his wing in A/P #174 . Lt.Tyree led the second flight in A/P #198 with 2nd.Lt.Axmark on his wing in A/P #177. 1st. Lt.C.C.Phillips led the third flight in A/P #306 with 2nd.Lt.Zemer on his wing in A/P #018.

c. Attack

No individual action is so outstanding as to receive seperate treatment. Therefore results are reported as whole. All three flights started their runs just out of A/A range above SHINCHIKU and swept NE along the RR to a point within sight of SHINSHO and then turned out to sea avoiding LAMSEPO AIRDROME. Along the route several small towns were bombed and strafed, destroying several buildings and damaging others. A fire was started in a small town in the vicinity of (2457N-12107E) sending two columns of black smoke 150 feet high. A large reddish column of smoke to 200 feet resulted from attack near CHU HA KAU (2505N-12123E) probably as a result of strafing a storage tank in that area. In all 28 X 250 lb. 8/15 second delay fuse free-falling demo bombs were dropped on targets. In addition, 8 bombs dropped unarmed. A/A fire was generally meager, ineffective and small caliber. On the approach 3-4 bursts of medium A/A appeared 500 yards to beam short and trailing from a 4-gun position at (2453N-12057E). One M/G position at TIONG-LUN (2354N-12059E) fired light meager inaccurate. Another position fired light, meager and accurate from CHURKKI holing two planes.

One mile offshore at SIN-TSNG-A, 3 u/i SSF at 1000 feet approached the formation and maintained a position 1 mile astern until our formation turned in for attack. Then one plane made one pass from 4 o'clock on a level, firing at long range. The formation being in a turn gave the top turret of one A/P a clear shot and when fire was directed at the fighter, he broke off and disappeared into the clouds. Coming off the target one u/i SSF approached the formation from the rear but did not come within range and disappeared shortly after. The enemy pilots were definitely unagressive and did not display commendable skill. It seems that enemy fighters are reluctant to attack even a two plane element and hang back hoping to catch a lone cripple.

4. CITATIONS

Nil.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off - CLARK FIELD 0715/I T.O.T. FORMOSA 1030-45/I
Landed CLARK FIELD 1440/I

Bombs dropped on targets	28 X 250 lb. 8/15 sec.
Bombs dropped unarmed	8 X 250 lb. demos
Ammo expended	13,750

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
140-C-1X
JCrl
20May45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

22 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 140-C-1X, 20 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

I. SYNOPSIS

On morning 20 May 1945, 6 B-25-J's of this squadron conducted a minimum altitude strike against the village of GARET SUR in the CAGAYAN VALLEY. A total of 317 X 23 lb. parafrag bombs and 15,000 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended in the attack. Results achieved were considered good, bombs covered the entire village and adjacent areas. Several buildings were damaged, 2 were definitely set afire and one building, possibly containing ammunition received a direct hit resulting in an explosion and total destruction. (Confirmed by Strike Photos). Enemy opposition was restricted to meager M/G fire, however, one plane received slight damage as result of this fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was part of a continued effort to "soften up" or destroy any Japanese concentrations of both personnel and supplies remaining in the LUZON area.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. This squadron was #4 position in the Group Formation, attack was made from N-S in two,3 plane elsmants, attacking with a 30 second interval between each flight and only one pass was made.

b. Planes and Pilots

2nd.Lt.Rice in A/P #174 led the Squadron with Capt. J.C.Rieke in A/P #198 and Major W.D.Decker in A/P #306 flying #2 and 3 position respectively.
Capt.R.L.Smelley in A/P #018 led the second flight with Lt.Mangum in A/P #177 on his right wing and Lt.F.E.Otey in A/P #563 on his left.

c. Attack

Planes approached the target from the North in a loose "V" formation, and attack was begun at a point just North of GARET SUR at a few scattered buildings then attack carried on through the town area and immediate area south.

Planes started bombing attack early in order to rid all bombs on target or immediate vicinity since target was a little short for the type bombs used, thus by doing so, ensured thorough coverage of target and disposal of greater percentage of bombs. A total of 317 X 23 lb. bombs were dropped on target, results of damage by individual planes is not deemed necessary since only general results were observed and these are already mentioned in Par. 1 of the report. Only individual results observed were Lt.Otey's bombs hit the ammo shed which immediately exploded. Only meager M/G fire was received from an unidentified point in foothills 8 miles SE of GARET SUR when planes made their withdrawal. 1 plane received a hit in windshield and glass was shattered. Nil injuries were sustained.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	CLARK FIELD	1015/I
T.O.T.	GARET SUR	1144/I
Landed	CLARK FIELD	1252/I

b. Operational

Bombs Dropped Over Target	317 X 23 lb. parafrags
Bombs Salvoed Over Target	72 X23 lb. parafrags.
Total Bombs Dropped	389 X 23 lb. parafrags.
Bombs Returned to Base	45 X 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammo Expended	15,000 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
141-G
24 May 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

24 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 141-G, 21 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning 21 May 1945, 6 planes this squadron participated in a Group Strike in NORTHERN LUZON, GONZAGA TOWN was the assigned target for this Squadron. The target was hit as planned and a total of 432 X 23 lb. parafrags along with 15,190 rounds of .50 Cal. ammunition were expended in the attack. Since only one pass was made results were generally unobserved, however bombs were reported to hit in the town area and several fires were seen in the target on the withdrawal, photos received confirm crew's reports and although no actual hits can be seen, bombs are seen dropping over the main part of the town, therefore, the mission is considered successful. Enemy opposition was restricted to small arms fire although none was seen, 1 plane was holed 4 times,causing slight damage. Nil casualties sustained.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was part of a series of missions flown to "knock out" remaining enemy troop and supply concentrations in the LUZON area.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

This squadron flew #3 in the Group Formation enroute to target, however the formation split up south of the target with 499th and 500th Squadrons hitting GONZAGA and the other 2 squadrons hitting their assigned target. The attack was made from SE-NW at minimum altitude and only one pass was made. Planes then made a 180 degree turn to the left and returned to base through the CAGAYAN VALLEY.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating

Capt.Todd in A/P #166 led the Squadron with Lt.Axmark in A/P #018 and Lt.Helms in A/P #174 flying #2 and 3 position respectively.

Lt.Beata in A/P #563 led the second flight with Lt. Cunningham in A/P #205 on his right wing and Lt.Harben in A/P #188 on his left wing.

c. Attack

Capt.Todd arrived to the target area early and made a wide circle to the south of the target then placed his 2 flights in attack formation making a run over the town on a 335 degree heading. Capt. Todd flew directly over the center of town placing his 2 wingmen over the 2 main streets running thru the entire length of town.
Lt.Beata followed at proper interval but carried his flight just East of the first flights run, thus achieving better coverage.
The town was completely covered by bomb bursts, dust and smoke. Several smallfires (probably burning buildings) were seen throughout the town on withdrawal as result of our bombing. Several buildings were heavily damaged from the thorough strafing. No individual results can be assessed since results observed were more or less general. One plane received slight damage from enemy fire no fire was observed by any crew members but damage received indicates it's presence.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be forwarded as result of this mission since no actions are deemed worthy of such.

6. STATISTICS

Time Table

Take Off	CLARK FIELD	1000/I
Time Over Target	GONZAGA	1114-1118/I
Landed	CLARK FIELD	1256/I

Operational

No. Bombs Dropped 432 X 23 lb. parafrags.
No. BombsDropped on target 432 X 23 lb. parafrags.
No.Ammo Rds. Fired 13,191 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
143-A-8
23May45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group (M)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/sad

SUBJECT: NArrative Report Mission FF6 143-A-8, 23 May, 1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925; Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 23 May, 1945, six B-25 J's,led by a 38th Bomb Group bombsight-equipped B-25, dropped 36 x 260 lb. free falling frags on enemy troops concentrations in the Balete Pass area of Central Luzon. Our crews were unable to see the target from medium altitude because of the blind spots peculiar to B-25 J's and because of cloud cover. However, photos indicate 24 bombs in the target and 12 barely outside. There was no opposition, and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The mission was designed to provide direct ground support to our own ground forces which have been stalemated in the rugged, heavily wooded Balete Pass sector and which have at last made a break through. The specified target for the 345th and 38th Groups was enemy troop concentrations in a mountainous, heavily wooded area of 2000 yards x 1500 yards size just east of Santa Fe (16.10 N--120.57 E) and just north of the Vila Verde Trail.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron led the Group Formation to Lingayan where rendezvous was accomplished with two 38th Group medium B-25's. The formation then proceeded directly to Balete Pass where this squadron left the Group Formation and, being led by a 38th Group plane, made two dry runs over the target to be sure that no bombs fell in our own lines only a short distance to the south. As a recognition aid, artillery dropped white phosphorous shells in the target. The third pass was the bomb run on a true heading of 90 degrees at 9300' indicated and airspeed 205 mph indicated. The formation consisted of the 38th Group plane leading two stacked down 3-plane V's.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

Capt. J.R. Hall (Ass't. Gp. S-3) led the squadron (and Group) formation in A/P # 177 with 2nd Lt. Helm on his right wing in A/P # 018 and 1st Lt. Mikell on his left wing in A/P # 166. Maj. W.D. Decker (Squadron C.O.) led the second flight in A/P # 600 with 2nd Lt. Harben in number 2 position in A/P # 198 and 1st Lt. P.G. Simcoe in number 3 in A/P # 306

c. ATTACK

During the bomb run both flights tightened formation and awaited the release signal which was visual observation of the 38th Group plane's first release. Several corrections were necessary because of a 5/10 cloud cover over the target area. Nevertheless, a tight formation was maintained, and on the signal each co-pilot toggled his bomb release switch as rapidly as possible. No crew member was able to see the target on the approach during the bomb run or after bombs away, and only two photographs of the attack were printed. Consequently, evaluation of results is sketchy. Photos show 24 bombs bursting in a deep ravine on a hillside in the extreme eastern edge of the target, 12 bursting on the hilltop east of the target boundary. Damage assessment is impossible. There was no fighter or A/A opposition, and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

A good illustration of the difficulty in making observations from medium altitude in B-25 J's type aircraft is the written report by the lead navigator which stated: "100 % of bombs in Luzon".

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take off at 0910/I from Clark Field.
Rendezvous at 1015/I with 38th Group planes over Honey Strip, Lingayan.
T.O.T. at 1046/I over Balete Pass.
Landed 1150/I at Clark Field.

b. Route.

Clark Field--Lingayan--Target--Clark Field.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil provided.

d. Operational

Altitude 9300' indicated.
Target elevation--average 2500'.
Bomb run--1 minute.
Axis of attack 90 degrees.
Indicated air speed 205 mph.
Bombs dropped--36 x 260 lb. 25/100 nose and instantaneous tail fuse fragmentation bombs.
Bombs in target--66 2/3 %.
Bombs outside--33 1/3 %.
Ammo fired--Nil.
Photos taken-- 130, K-21.
Photos printed-- 2. K-21.

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER


N
PROBABLE AREA BOMBED
TARGET
SANTA FE
OBOLONG
ROUTE 5
DIGRIG R.
71
52
78
50
MAP REF: IMUGAN, 3359-II
1:50,000
MISSION NO: FFO 143-A-8
23 MAY, 1945
TARGET - SANTA FE, LUZON.
BOMB RUN — 80° TRUE
BOMBING ALT. - 9300' IND.
IND. AS - 205 MPH.
TARGET AREA:

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
144-A-3
24 May

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

27 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 144-A-3, 24 May,1945.

To : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 24 May 1945, six B-25-J's led by a 38th Bomb Group, bombsight-equipped B-25, dropped 36 X 260 lb. frag bombs on an enemy bivouac area at FUSINA (Northern LUZON) when the primary target SANTA FE was cloud covered. The bombs fell from medium altitude into an area approximately 1 mile W of FUSINA which showed signs of track activity but other than bomb bursts and smoke no results were visible. There was no opposition and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The mission with enemy troop concentration in the BALETE PASS sector as the target was designed to provide direct ground support to our Ground Forces. The objective to be accomplished at the secondary, FUSINA, was indirect support of Ground Forces pushing into the CAGAYAN VALLEY. The specific target for this and the other three squadrons of the 345th Group was enemy bivouac areas.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Rendezvous with the 38th Group plane was accomplished over HONEY STRIP, LINGAYAN and then the Group Formation proceeded to SANTA FE in Central LUZON. Here an almost complete overcast covered the target and the formation proceeded to FUSINA where the squadron circled until it's turn to bomb. The approach was from the south. Formation consisted of the 38th Group plane alone as a first element with two, 3-plane "V"'s javelin down and in close.

b. Pilots and Planes

1st.Lt.J.Baeta led the first flight in A/P #600 with 2nd.Lt.Campbell on his left in A/P #948 and 1st.Lt.Reed on his right wing in A/P #306. 1st.Lt.Mangum led the second flight in A/P #014 with 2nd.Lt.Axmark on his right in A/P#018 and 2nd.Lt. Zemer on his left in A/P #198.

c. Attack

The formation made the bomb run on a heading of 347 degrees true at 8100 feet indicated with an indicated air speed of 192 mph. Both of our flights maintained a tight formation during the bomb run anticipating the first bomb release of the lead plane,at this signal each plane toggled out the 6 bombs manually as rapidly as possible. Because of the diffimulty of seeing directly below the B-25-J from medium altitude only one tail gunner caught a glimpse of the bomb bursts. However, photos show bombs bursting in and around an area which showed track activity but little of actual value is shown and no assessment of damage can be made. There was no opposition of any type and we sustained neither damage or casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a Time Table

Take Off	0920/I	CLARK FIELD
Primary	1015/I	BALETE PASS
Secondary	1130/I	FUSINA
Attack	1202/I	FUSINA
Land	1340/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Route Out: BASE LINGAYAN SANTA FE (Balete Pass)
Route In : DIRECT

c. Operational

Altitude	8100 feet indicated.
Bomb Run	1 minute.
Axis of attack	347 degrees
Indicated A.S.	192 mph.
Bombs dropped	36 X 260 lb. nose and tail fuse frags.
Bombs in target	100%
Photos printed	6 K-22.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



L-E-G-E-N-D

MAP REF: CAMALANIUGAN, 3665-1V
MISSION NO.--FFO 144-A-3
24 May, 1945
TARGET: FUSINA, LUZON.
BOMB RUN: ——————→

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 8100'.
IND. A.S.--192 mph
TARGET AREA: [--------]

499
146-A-1
26May45
JCH.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

29 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 146-A-10, 26 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 26 May 1945,six B-25's participated in a Group minimum altitude strike on various alcohol, and sugar refineries and other targets at FORMOSA. The primary target CHIKUTO, was weathered in and the formation "went hunting" for clear area and found the KAGI AREA to be flyable. Choosing industrial installations at SHINEI as the target, the strike force dropped 18 X 250 lb. and 12 X 500 lb. bombs on various targets with excellent results. Bombing accuracy was also excellent with every bomb dropped scoring damage. In the attack 14,751 X.50 Cal. ammo was expended.
Results included: heavy damage to Sugar Refinery in SHINEI, destruction of two smaller buildings just S of Main factory, damage to RR tracks and destruction of 1 RR fuel tank car adjacent to main factory buildings, several houses in SHINEI TOWN either destroyed or heavily damaged, heavy damage to large factory W of SHINEI and destruction of a fuel storage tank ½ mile W of SHINEI TOWN, possible damage to buildings and a locomotive at GOKKO 6 miles SW of SHINEI. One plane was holed in wing by A/A fire but damage was minor. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. There was no interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was one of several recent efforts against sugar and alcohol refineries on FORMOSA. The assigned target for this day's mission was the refinery at CHIKUTO (Northern Formosa) and alternate target was at the descretion of the Squadron Leader with attention to current restrictions.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The Squadron Formation flew along the W coast of FORMOSA,avoiding Flak Areas and dodging cloud formations. Near the I.P. just S of SHINCHIKU a solid wall of rain and heavy cloud formations from sea level to unknown heights presented an impassable barrier and the formation turned S to find an alternate target in better weather conditions.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Just S of TOSEKI (2328N-12008E) the formation turned inland on a course of 105° to a point 4 miles NE of SHINEI. By this time interval between the three 2 plane flights had been obtained and the formation turned onto a NE to SW axis of attack using the tall smoke stacks at SHINEI as a guide.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

Major W.D.Decker led the first flight in A/P #600 with 1st.Lt.Reed on his right wing in A/P #198. 2nd.Lt.Rice led the second flight in A/P #174 with 2nd.Lt.Howard on his wing in A/P #166. 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe led the 3rd. Flight in A/P #306 with 2nd.Lt.Harben on his right wing in A/P #563.

c. Attack

Major Decker and Lt.Reed lined up with the smoke stacks of the refinery and approached at minimum altitude. Both flew directly over the main part of the factory to either side and lower than the stacks. Each released a string of 4 X 250 lb. bombs across the factory. Two of the eight bombs dropped just short of the refinery damaging RR tracks and small buildings. Four direct hits caused extensive damage to the buildings and large conduits, apparently leaving a fire. The remaining two bombs dropped just over exploding among buildings with resulting damage. Midway between SHINEI and the second factory 4 bombs were dropped among small buildings but results were not observed. Both planes thoroughly strafed the factory 1½ mile W of SHINEI SCORING HITS BUT no visible damage.
Lt.Rice and Lt.Howard came in directly behind the first flight at approximately 30 seconds interval. They observed smoke and flying debris from the first flight's attack and confirmed reports of damage. Lt.Howard released two, 500 lb. bombs which exploded near warehouse type buildings along the RR tracks at the N end of the factory area causing damage but extent unknown. Lt.Rice dropped three, 500 lb. bombs across buildings just N of the refinery scoring hits and considerable damage with each bomb.
At the second factory, W of SHINEI, Lt.Rice scored a direct hit with a 500 lb. bomb on the factory causing a great deal of damage to a large building. Lt.Howard dropped two 500 pounders on the same factory exploding a large fuel storage tank. A large ball of flames and heavy black smoke was left as evidence of his accuracy.
Lt.Simcoe and Lt.Harben followed closely behind the second flight but neither flew over the SHINEI FACTORY because of the fire and smoke which obscured targets and obstructions. Accordingly each detoured, one to the N and one to the S. Lt.Simcoe released two, 500 lb. bombs on RR tracks and tank cars just N of the factory. One of his bombs exploded a tank car adding a large column of black smoke to those left by the preceeding flights. Farther on in the crowded SW section of town he damaged several buildings with one 500 lb. bomb. Lt.Harben released 4 X 250 lb. bombs across the southern edge of the factory area damaging several buildings, and was unable to turn back onto the run for fear of running into Lt.Simcoe's bomb bursts.

Lt.Simooe released his remaining 500 lb. bomb on the factory W of SHINEI scoring a direct hit on the main building but extent of damage was not observed. Each flight continued SW to the coast after breaking off the attack. Lt.Harben dumped his two remaining 250 lb. bombs on GOOKKO TOWN (2313N-12007E) with unobserved results, and strafed and silenced a M/Gposition at GOKKO. The squadron reformed over water ten miles NW of TAINAN and returned to base without incident. Over the target A/P #600 sustained 2 inch hole in the wing as results of A/A from an u/i position. Two bursts of heavy A/A appeared 4-500 yards above and to beam but origin is unknown. Meager, inaccurate M/G fire from GOKKO TOWN. There were no personnel injuries and there was no interception.

S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

Nil

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0730/I	CLARK FIELD
Turned back	1122/I	Vic.CHINCHIKU
T.O.T.	1215/I	SHINEI
Land	1530/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Route

Direct to FORMOSA along W coast to SHINCHIKU - SHINEA *- BASE.

c. Operational

Bombs Dropped	18 X 250 lb. bombs 12 X 500 lb.
Hits	30
Ammo Fired	14,751 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: Overlay


N
ENSUI & SHINEI
FR YARDS
174
306
166
600
563
499th Squadron
Mission FFO 146-A-10 26 May,1945.
T.O.T. 1215/I Minimum altitude
No.Bombs Dropped 18 X 250 lb.
12 X 500 lb.
Ref: V Bom Com Target Photo
ENSUI & SHINEI TOWNS
Scale: 1:18000

499
147-A-4
27 May 4

JCH.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

30 May,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 147-A-4, 27 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 27 May 1945, six B-25's attacked KOBI ALCOHOL PLANT in a highly successful minimum altitude strike. In the attack 24 X 500 lb. bombs and 12,800 X.50 Cal. ammunition heavily damaged Refinery #1 and associated buildings, warehouses, one large alcohol or fuel storage tank and a second large explosion was either another tank or RR tank cars. One of our A/P's sustained lost of an engine from A/A and debris thrown up by explosions and flew half way to LUZON with a windmilling prop before having to ditch. The five crew members were returned to base five hours after ditching by a very efficient Catalina Rescue Operation. One crew member sustained non-critical cuts on forehead, one had possibly fractured leg, two were bruised but otherwise uninjured. Another plane holed several times by A/A and raining debris from exploding storage tank sustained an oil leak which resulted in loss of an engine which was promptly feathered and the pilot safely landed the crippled plane at LINGAYAN. Another plane was holed numerous times by shell which exploded on the propeller hub showering fragments into nacelle, wing and fuselage.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission was to inflict a maximum amount of damage(proportionate to the capabilities of the two, 6 plane squadrons which participated) to the Sugar and Alcohol refineries at KOBI FORMOSA. The 499th Specific target was Refinery #1 and the warehouses immediately to the E. The 500thSquadron target was Refinery #2 and warehouses immediately East.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron formation leading the 500th Squadron flew N along the west coast of FORMOSA avoiding flak areas to the mouth of SEIRA KEI and turned inland following the river to a point 5 miles NE of the target. During the flight from the coast to this point, attack formation of two, 3-plane "V's" in trail was assumed. At the I.P. each flight turned almost 180° onto an axis of attack from ENE to WSW.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

b. Pilots and Planes Participating

2nd.Lt.Morton led the 1st.Flight in A/P #563 with 2nd. Lt.Campbell on his right wing in A/P #948 and 2nd.Lt.Cunningham on his left wing in A/P #198. 2nd.Lt.Bray led the second flight in A/P # 600 with 2nd.Lt.Zemer on his right wing in A/P 174 and 2nd.Lt.Harben on his left wing in A/P #306.

c. Attack

Lt.Morton maneuvered the flight onto the attack route at an altitude of approximately 600 feet and when straight away dumped the nose to gain speed and leveled off at 30 feet. Using the smoke stacks of the refinery as an aiming point he bored in on the target at absolute minimum altitude to stay under A/A fire. Just E of the factory, the flight pulled up to clear a line of trees. The three pilots sighted a large storage tank in the N part of the factory. All three conveiged fire on the tank which exploded under the first burst. The explosion threw timbers, tin and other debris high into the air. Lt.Morton and Lt.Cunningham's planes were hit by flying debris and rocked by a second explosion when directly over the factory. Lt.Morton released 3 bombs at the factory buildings scoring 2 hits and one over. His fourth bomb hit near R.R. cars loaded with fuel drums. This bomb and strafing by the tail gunner probably ripped open some of the drums but failed to fire them. Lt.Campbell shared credit for the destruction of the storage tank but in avoiding the debris was forced wide of the factory. Consequently he released 4 bombs in a string acoross warehouse type buildings just to the W. One of these bombs heavily damaged one building and damaged another. Lt.Cunningham scored two direct hits on the refinery buildings with unobserved results. His second pair of bombs dropped just over resulting in a large flaming explosion - probably tank cars on the RR tracks.

Lt.Bray and his wingman followed closely behind the first flight and made their runs just to the S of the 1st flight because of the smoke. Lt.Bray released 3 bombs in the warehouse area damagine several. His remaining bomb dropped in the factory building with unobserved results. Lt.Zemer scored two damaging hits on the refinery buildings and dropped two in the W edge of the worker's quarters probably doing damage to three buildings. Lt.Harben released all four of his bombs in the warehouse area with probable damage to several buildings.

Over the target A/P #198 lost right engine as result of A/A fire and falling debris. Lt.Cunningham was unable to feather the prop and was forced to ditch at 2000N-12010E. Less than an hour later the entire crew was aboard the rescue "Cat".

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

List of "ditched Crew":

2nd.Lt.C.J.Cunningham Jr.	O-760585	Pilot
2nd.Lt.T.J.Fitzpatrick	O-725703	Co-pilot
2Bd.Lt.R.H.Gemmill	O-713016	Navigator
Cpl. H.G. Worthington	6924952	Radio -Gunner
S/Sgt.R.J.Wittmore	53796568	Engineer-Gunner

A/P #563 was holed several times by A/A and raining debris, sustaining 8 inch hole in right engine nacelle, 4 inch hole in wing. A serious oil leak resulted in the loss of the right engine but Lt.Morton feathered the prop and made a skillful emergency landing at LINGAYAN with no injuries or further damage. Plane required engine change and extensive sheet metal repairs. A/P #306 was holed 17 times by probable 20 mm shell which exploded on the prop hub showering fragments into the right engine nacelle, wing and fuselage. The first flight did not observe any A/A positions firing but the second flight observed 2 bursts of medium A/A over the target from unknown positions. Other bursts could have been obscured by smoke. There was nil interception.

4. CITATIONS

Members of Lt.Cunningham's crew will be recommended for an appropriate award.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off at 0645/I from CLARK FIELD
T.O.T. at 1015-16/I KOBI, FORMOSA
A/P #198 ditched 1145/I at 2000N-12010E
Crew aboard "Cat" 1235/I
Two planes land at 1325/I LINGAYAN
Two planes land at 1410/I CLARK FIELD
One plane land at 1420/I CLARK FIELD
One plane T.O. at 1430/I from LINGAYAN - Landed Base 1515/I

Operational

Bombs dropped 24 X 500 lb. 8/15 sec. delay fuse.demos.
Ammo fired 12,800 X.50 Cal. (5 planes)

Route

Direct

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
148-A-4
28 May 45
JCH

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

30 May 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 148-A-4, 28 May,1945. CHIKUTO ALCOHOL REFINERY, FORMOSA. (2444N-12105E)

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Taking part in a Group Strike on various Alcohol Refineries of FORMOSA, six B-25's hit the CHIKUTO REFINERY on 28 May 1945 from minimum altitude. The Squadron dropped 33 X 250 lb. demos and expended 13,850 X.50 Cal. on the target with good effect. The main building of the refinery bore the brunt of the attack, at least three direct hits and several near misses heavily damagedthe building and other associated buildings. A fire was started in the main building but extent of damage by fire is unknown, nor is damage to machinery by strafing known. Further assessment of damage of the factory is not possible because of the heavy cloud of smoke which covered the area. Three bombs were dropped in CHIKUTO TOWN when unable to release on the target. These bombs probably destroyed or damaged several buildings. One plane was holed by M/G fire but sustained only minor damage as a result. There were no casualties and there was no interception.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was another part of the extended effort against refineries and related targets by strafer-bombers of the 345th and 58th Groups. The target assigned to this squadron was the CHIKUTO ALCOHOL and SUGAR REFINERY. Other squadrons were assigned different targets.

3. DETAILSOF THE MISSION

a. The six B-25-J's took the usual route north along the west coast of FORMOSA avoiding the well known coastal Flak Areas. At a point on the coast just above CHIKUNAN (2443N-12053E) the formation turned inland to the E and keeping low over the foothills 5 miles S of CHIKUTO. During this time the squadron assumed attack formation of three, 2 plane elements in trail with a 30 second interval between elements.
At a point 8 miles SE of CHIKUTO the lead element turned almost 180 degrees onto the SE to NW axis of attack and the other two elements followed in turn.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

1st.Lt.Haas led the squadron in A/P #174.Over the target 1st.Lt.Worthington was on his left wing in A/P #171. 2nd.Lt.Tyree led the second element in A/P #018 with 1st.Lt.Reed on his left wing. 1st.Lt.P.G. Simcoe led the third element in A/P #205 with 2nd.Lt.Howard on his right wing in A/P #166.

c. Attack

The first element dropped two strings of 6 and 5 bombs, each through the refinery area and 1 bomb in CHIKUTO TOWN. Five bombs exploded among small buildings in the SE part of the target with untold damage. Six bombs dropped i. the main refinery area scored at least two direct hits on the main building and other hits on smaller buildings nearby. When the second element came in the main refinery area was already covered by smoke. The bomb in CHIKUTO probably damaged several closely packed buildings. The second flight dropped two bombs in the SE end of the target scoring a direct hit on a fair sized building which was damaged by the blast as evidenced by flying debris. The remaining ten bombs were dropped in buildings in the main refinery area in the NW section of the target. At least one direct hit on the main building sent debris flying into the air. Other results, particularly in the main refinery area were obscured by smoke from fires and bombs.

The third element dropped 11 bombs across the factory area and two in the town. One bomb dropped long over the refinery and two scored damaging direct hits on probable workers quarters just NW of the main building. The remaining 8 bombs were strung through the target but results were generally obscured by smoke. The two bombs in the town probably damaged two or three residences.

Over the target one plane was holed by light meager mostly inaccurate H/G and small arms fire. Approximately 3 miles NW of CHIKUTO on the river bank, 8 positions fired medium and light moderate and inaccurate. Several bursts seen high and short of the formation and many gun flashes were seen. The withdrawal was to the NW staying well to the N of the flak areas at SHINEHIKU. There were nil interception.

S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

No awards or citations will be awarded as result of this mission.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0645/I	CLARK FIELD
T.O.T.	1032/I	CHIKUTO FORMOSA

b. Route

Direct

c. Operational

Bombs dropped	36 X 250 lb. 8/15 sec. delay.
Hits and near misses causing damage	35
Ammo Fired	13650 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
147AL
29May4
JCH.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

31 May,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 142A6-VF 314, 29 May 45. MAGAPIT, Northern CAGAYAN VALLEY.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 29 May 1945, 6 planes of this squadron participated in a Group Strike on MAGAPIT in the CAGAYAN VALLEY in Northern LUZON. The target was hit by 4 squadrons of this group as planned. This squadron expended a total of 36 X 250 lb. 4/5 sec. delay paradamo bombs and 15,110 rounds of .50 cal. ammo in the attack. Of the 36 bombs expended in thes attack 33 hit directly in the target area and 3 hit in the edge of a clearing just south of the target. Two passes were made by this squadron but due to the nature of the terrain results were generally unobserved. However, bombswere reported hitting in the target and on withdrawal several shacks were observed on fire and several brush fires were burning. Photos received confirm crews statements as to fires although no actual hits can be seen. Enemy opposition was restricted to meager small arms fire which caused neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was a continuation of a series of missions flown to liquidate remaining enemy troop and supply concentrations in the LUZON area.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. This squadron flew #4 in the Group Formation enroute to and over the target. The attack consisted of 2 bombing and strafing passes. The first pass was made from NW to SE, then turning to the left and making the second run from N to S. Both runs were made at minimum altitude. Upon termination of the second run the planes continued on a southerly course through the CAGAYAN VALLEY and back to base.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

b. Planes and Pilots Particiapating.

Lt.Morton in A/P #171 led the squadron with Lt.Mangum in A/P #174 and Lt.Mikell in A/P #166 flying #2 and 3 positions respectively.
Maj. W.D.Decker in A/P #014 led the second flight with Lt.Esay in A/P #C18 on his right wing and Lt.Campbell in A/P #205 on his left wing.

c. Attack

Lt.Morton began placing his two flights in attack formation just south of and to the west of the target area then made his runs over the target on the following headings. The first run was made on an azimuth of 77° and at its termination, Lt.Morton made a 180° to the left with his flights and made the second pass on 180° heading. He flew directly through the center of the target area and with his wingmen, his flight covered the entire width of the target, throughout his runs. The second flight, led by Major Decker followed at proper interval and in general, the same course as Lt.Morton. The target was thoroughly strafed and 90% of the bombs fell in the target. Scattered bomb bursts and clouds of dust and smoke were observed. Several small fires possibly shacks and a few brush fires were seen on withdrawal as a result of the bombing. No individual results can be assessed since results observed were more or less general and a total of 24 planes had bombed the area on this strike.

4. CITATIONS

Nil.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	CLARK FIELD	1010/I
T.O.T.	MAGAPIT	1130-1147/I
Landed	CLARK FIELD	1255/I

b. Operational

No. Bombs dropped	36 X 250 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs.
No. Bombs on target	33 X 250 lb.
Ammo Fired	15,110 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
150-A
30 May 45
JCH

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

3 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 150-A, 30 May,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 30 May 1945, two planes, from an original four which took off, participated in a minimum altitude strike on the TAINAN AREA (2300N-12011E). The mission as planned called for twelve planes (4 from each of 3 squadrons) abreast over the warehouses in SHINEI CITY. However, because of an error by the formation leader the run was made across the area just S of TAINAN CITY. The two 499th planes which reached TAINAN flew on the extreme left edge of the formation and were unable to get over the selected target when other planes crowded them. Rather than salvo or return bombs to base, the two planes dropped 8 X 500 lb. demos on targets of opportunity S of TAINAN. The TAINAN SUGAR MILL just SE of TAINAN DROME was the target hit, with a direct hit scored on a large building either office building or large residence. Small shacks in the flight path were also bombed and strafed with one destroyed. There was no damage nor casualties sustained to either planes or personnel. (See 500th and 498th Squadron's Narratives for details of damage and casualties suffered on this mission).

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to destroy the warehouses immediately N of the Sugar REFINERY at SHINEI FORMOSA, but due to reasons mentioned above, the intended target was not hit.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The two B-25-J's flew with the 498th Squadron to the target approaching overland from the S and paralleling the mountain range. The formation leader made an understandable mistake in pin pointing his position since the check points are very similar, at a point approximately 10 miles NE of TAINAN the formation turned back to the S thinking the I.P. at SHINEI had been by-passed. The axis of attack was from ENE to WSW at minimum altitude. The formation over the target was line abreast with the two 499th planes on the extreme south end of the line.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

1st.Lt.Rice in A/P #174 turned back early because of engine trouble and 1st.Lt.Worthington turned back when guns failed to charge. 1st.Lt.P.G.Simcoe in A/P #505 and 2nd.Lt.Campbell in A/P #177 reached the target.

c. Attack

In the target area Lt.Simcoe was flying close formation on the left wing of a 498th Squadron plane with Lt.Worthington on his left. Lt.Simcoe saw the target selected by the formation leader off to his right and was unable to turn because of the plane on his right. Consequently both Lt.Simcoe and Lt.Worthington attacked targets of opportunity. Lt.Simcoe dropped 3 bombs on the TAINAN SUGAR MILL scoring one hit on a large residence, probably destroying the building and two misses. He dropped his remaining bomb on UAN-LAO (5 miles SSE of TAINAN) with unobserved results. Lt.Worthington was less fortunate. The only targets in his path were isolated huts and the small village of PEQ-SUA-LUN. He bombed and strafed, several shacks destroying one. Results of strafing at PEQ-SUA-LUN were unobserved.
A/A was received from a 4 gun 20 mm. position in the N edge of the TAINAN SUGAR MILL and a 4 gun 20 mm. position in the SE edge of the same installation. Both positions were in open fields and the position at the SE edge fired light moderate inaccurate to rear of planes. Our two planes sustained neither damage nor casualties. However, other planes of the same formation were holed, one mal killed, one man wounded.

4. CITATIONS

Nil.

5. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

4 A/P's T.O.	0845/I	CLARK FIELD
2 A/P's Turned Back	0900/I	
2 A/P's Landed	0910/I	CLARK FIELD
2 A/P's T.O.T.	1140-42/I	TAINAN
2 A/P's Landed	1540/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Operational

Bombs Dropped 8 X 500 lb. 8/15 sec. delay fuse.
Hits 2, misses 4 unobserved 2 5600 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
152-A-1
1 Jun 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PEG/rjl

2 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 152-A-6, 1 June 1945. IPIL AREA, LUZON.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 1 June 1945, six B-25's attacked enemy troop and supply concentrations in the IPIL area LUZON. In three minimum altitude passes over the area a total of 72 X 100 lb. demos and 11,550 X.50 Cal. were expended. As usual only targets sighted were small houses and shacks, two of which were destroyed by direct hits and two by fire. One oil fire and three to four small grass fires also resulted from the attack. We sustained neither damage nor casualties. There was no A/A or fighter opposition.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was designed to give indirect support to our Ground Forces in their newly won positions in the northern approaches to the BALETE PASS. The specific targets were: THE IPIL TOWN and adjacent woods, a wooded area just to the N of IPIL.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron proceeded directly to the IPIL area from the South. On reaching a point approximately eight miles East of the target, attack formation of single planes in trail was assumed. The axis of attack was from SW to NW with four planes attacking the area just North. Each plane circled to the right for the second and third passes.

b. Pilots and Planes

Capt.R.F.Todd (Group Air Inspector) led the squadron in A/P #166. Following in the order or attack were Lt.Gamble in A/P #600, Lt.Harben in A/P #948, Lt.Rice A/P #177, Lt.Worthington A/P #171 and Lt.Simcoe in A/P #205.

c. Attack

Lts.Worthington and Simcoe attacked the northern target and the remaining pilots made their runs on IPIL TOWN.

(Par. 3 c Cont'd)

A total of 72 X 100 lb. 8/11 second delay fuse, free falling demos were dropped in the area. Several of which skipped outside the target. The pilot following Capt.Todd reported an explosion and oil fire resulting from Capt.Todd's bombs on IPIL TOWN. Two houses were destroyed by direct hits from Lt.Worthington's and Harbaw's attacks. Two houses were set afire and left blazing but individual credit cannot be placed. The majority of the bombs were seen to explode in the target but no specific results were observed. There were no signs of activity. We sustained neither damage nor casualties and there was no opposition.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil

5. CITATIONS

Nil

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0815/I	CLARK FIELD
T.O.T.	0905-20/I	IPILTOWN
Landed	1015/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Operational

Bombs Dropped	72 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse. Free Failing Demos.
Ammo Fired	11,550 X.50 Cal.

c. Fighter Cover

Nil

For the Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
154-0-3
CMB 3 Jun 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEQ/rjl

5 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 154-D-59, 3 June,1945. BAGGAO, LUZON.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 3 June, 6 planes this squadron carried out a strike against BAGGAO TOWN, in LUZON. In the three minimum altitude bombing and strafing passes a total of 72 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay, free falling, demos and 15,400 rounds of.50 Cal. were expended. All bombs were dropped in the town or immediate vicinity. Only results observed were as follows; 1 shack on hillside just E of target set afire by strafing, 2 huts destroyed by direct hits and one fire started in the town, further results were obscured by bomb smoke and dust or not visible due to long delay fuses.
Enemy opposition was restricted to light and inaccurate small arms fire, causing neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The object of this mission was to "knock out" Jap troops and supply concentrations reported in the town of BAGGAO.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. This squadron took off 30 minutes after the 498th Squadron and proceeded to the target alone following the CAGAYAN VALLEY up to SINGAYAN a point approximately 4 miles South of BAGGAO, where a 360° turn was made and the squadron assumed attack formation of single planes in trail. Attack was made from SE to NW with planes turning to the left for the 2nd. and 3rd passes which were also made on a SE to NW course.

b. Pilots and Planes

Lt.Smith (Asst.Operations Officer) led the Squadron in A/P #018. Other planes followed in this sequence; Lt.Zemer A/P #600., Lt.Harben A/P #174.,Lt.Bray A/P #355., Lt.Campbell A/P #948 and Lt.Simcoe A/P #306.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Lt.Smith made his run in the central part of town coming in from the SE, other planes following the same course but making their bombing and strafing passes either to the right or left of Lt.Smith's run in order to cover as much of the town as possible. A 360 degree turn was made after the first pass and then a second and third pass was executed. Planes dropped bombs on all three passes. Only individual results observed were by Lt.Harben who scored a direct hit on two small shacks and Lt.Bray's strafing set fire to a shack on a hillside just E of the target. Another fire was reported in the town but no individual credit can be given.
In the attack a total of 72 X 100 lb. bombs were dropped but several skipped and did not hit in the town area. The entire town and adjacent areas were heavily strafed, and the target was well covered by smoke on the withdrawal.
Light, meager inaccurate small arms fire was received from the Northern section of town.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0900/I	CLARK FIELD
T.O.T.	1030-40/I	BAGGAO TOWN
Landed	1215/I	CLARK FIELD

Bombs Dropped	72 X 100 lb. demos.
Ammo Fired	13,400 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C1173

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

15 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 163-A-3, 12 June,1945. Highway #5, 4 miles S of TUGUEGARAO.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF. APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Seven of our B-25's attacked Troop and Supply Concentrations along Highway #5, 4 miles S of TUGUEGARAO on up to APARRI, on 12 June, dropping 396 X 23 lb. parafrags, from minimum altitude. Results in general were unobserved since only one pass was made over the target and bombs were dropped at buildings amongst trees. No fires were reported as result of our attack. One plane returned to base early due to engine trouble. Enemy resistance was held down to meager M/G and small arms fire heling 1 of our planes.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was another in the series flown in that area, to disrupt and destroy remaining enemy troop and supply concentrations.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron flying #4 of the Group Formation proceeded to a point approximately 4 miles South of the target, made a 360° turn to the left and assumed attack formation of 2 plane elements. Attack was made from North to South with each element trailing at 30 second intervals.

b. Pilots andPlanes.

Lt.L.W.Morton led the Squadron in A/P #563 with Lt.Axmark in A/P #205. Lt.Bronson in A/P #556 with Lt.Mangum in A/P #600 comprised the second element. Lt.Mikell in A/P #166 led the third element with Lt.Helms in A/P #174 flying on his wing. Lt.Simcoe in A/P #306 made his run along since A/P #948 piloted by Lt.Campbell had turned back early.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Coming in on a heading of approximately 350 degrees in 2 plane elements, 7 A/P's dropped 384 X 23 lb. parafrags along highway #5, four miles SE of TUGUEGARAO. No actual targets were seen but assigned area was thoroughly covered by bombing and strafing, further results were not visible and photos received proved of no help to evaluate damage done. After bombing this area, the planes picked up Highway #5 and followed the highway to APARRI strafing buildings along the way damaging several, no actual results were observed. 12 X 23 lb. bombs were dropped on buildings just N of ALCALA with unobserved results. Meager, inaccurate M/G and small arms fire was received from area 4 miles S of TUGUEGARAO. One plane suffered minor damage as result of enemy A/A. We suffered no casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

8 A/P's	T.O.	0805/I	CLARK FIELD
1 A/P	Turned Back	0830/I	Landed 0850/I
7 A/P's	T.O.T.	0920-40/I	
7 A/P's	Landed	1200/I	CLARK FIELD

Operational

396 X 23 lb. parafrags dropped on targets.
108 X 23 lb. parafrags returned to base due to malfunction.
19,900 X.50 Cal. expended.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O- N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
166-A-8
15 Jun 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

16 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 166-A-8, 15 June,1945. Target: OKASEKI A/D, Northern FORMOSA.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 15 June 1945, six B-25's attacked OKASEKI A/D of NORTHERN FORMOSA (2455N-12105E) at minimum altitude. In the attack 216 X 23 lb. parafrags and 15,750 X.50 Cal. ammo covered the target well. However, only 5 A/P'sof questionable serviceability were seen in the area just W of the N-S runway. These were probably damaged by strafing as were a truck and a staff car. The majority of the bombs dropped, were concentrated in the area NE of the NE end of the main runway where planes were reported to be hidden. Two of our planes sustained minor damage from A/A and one man was slightly injured by a grazing bullet. There was no fighter opposition.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission was to destroy A/P's on OKASEKI which are believed to be staging against our forces on OKINAWA.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The six B-25-J's flew North off the West coast of FORMOSA avoiding flak areas and arrived at a point 5 miles SW of TANSUI (2511N-12126E) and turned inland and took up a S heading. The formation passed near LANSEPO A/D to the E and passed tothe West of SHINSHO. The formation picked up the TAIHOKU TRAM LINE and the TANSUI RIVER and followed these into the target flying on the deck. Formation over the target consisted of two, 3-plane "v"'s with an interval of 30 second between the two elements.

b. Pilots and Planes

1st.Lt.R.W.Horton led the Squadron in A/P #563 with 2nd.Lt.Campbell on his right wing in A/P #946 and 2nd. Lt.Helms on his left wing. 1st.Lt.Mangum led the second flight in A/P #177 with 2nd.Lt.Harben on his right in A/P #018 and Lt.Mikell on his left wing in A/P #166.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Lt.Morton followed the preceeding two squadrons down the RR and river and observed their bombs string across the area NE of the NE end of the main R/W. To provide better coverage he took his flight over the area between the areas attacked by the other squadrons. However, because of rack malfunction the flight released only 92 bombs with unobserved results. Lt.Morton observed personnel running for a trench when two miles from the target. He lined his sights on the trench and when curious heads raised above the trench he let go with all eight guns. Those curious ones paid dearly for their curiosity. Farther on he thoroughly strafed a wooded section reported to house a couple of planes. Results were unobserved. The other two planes assisted materially in covering the target by strafing across the entire drome. Lt.Harben strafed and probably damaged 5 A/P's of undetermined serviceability in the area just E of the N-S R/W. A black column of smoke from this area indicates damage.

The second flight altered the run slightly to cross the main runway at a slight angle. This flight dropped 120 bombs a part of which were in the areas at either end of the main runway. Lt.Mikell strafed and damaged a loaded truck 1 mile NE of the drome and also a staff car on the road ½ mile NE of the drome. No other results were reported by this flight but thorough strafing probably caused damage to other targets. A/A from LAMSEPO DROME was meager, medium, inaccurate from 3 positions which fired eight times. Only one burst was seen in the air on correct altitude, but short of the formation. Over the target meager, mostly inaccurate M/G and small arms fire caused minor damage to two planes. One man was slightly injured by a grazing bullet which caused a "burn" on his leg. There was no fighter opposition. Photographs confirm crews reports of flight lines and except for 12 dud parafrags dropped by a preceeding flight little else is shown.

4. CITATIONS

The man injured by A/A fire is not considered by the medical department to be sufficiently wounded to receive the Purple Heart.

5. S-2 Comments

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	CLARK FIELD	0720/I
T.O.T.	OKASEKI A/D	1120/I
Landed	CLARK FIELD	1610/I

No.Bombs Dropped	216 X 23 lb. parafrags.
No.Bombs Returned	216 X 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammo Expended	15,750 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT. E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Incl: (1)
Incl: Target Overlay

15 June

499
168
15 June 45



499th Squadron

Mission FFO 168-A-8 15 June,1945.
Okaseki A/D Formosa
T.O.T. 1120/I Minimum altitude

Ref: V Bom Com Photo Okaseki A/D No.1-A

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
167-A-1
16 Jun 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

19 June,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 167-A-6, 16 June,1945. ALCALA AREA.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. On 16 June 1945, five B-25's executed a minimum altitude bombing and strafing attack on enemy troops at MASIN BARRIO in the ALCALA AREA (1754N-12158E) in support of Guerilla Forces. In the attack, 60 X 100 lb. bombs and 13,600 X.50 Cal. ammo were expended on the target. The Barrio and adjacent area were well covered by the attack which damaged several shacks. Further results or targets were concealed by trees. We sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was designed to give direct support to our Filippino Forces in this area.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron approached the ALCALA AREA from the south at 1500 feet and circled to the SW until cleared for attack by " Nephew 4" the ground controller. When cleared the squadron assumed attack formation of single planes in trail with a thirty second interval between planes. The axis of attack was from S to N at minimum altitude, each plane circling left for succeeding passes.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

1st.Lt.L.W.Morton led the Squadron in A/P #600 with Major W.D.Decker, the Squadron Commander as his co-pilot. Other pilots and planes in their order over the target were: 2nd.Lt. Harben in A/P #174, 1st.Lt.Mangum A/P #166, 2nd.Lt.Campbell A/P #948, 1st.Lt.Reed A/P#355. 1st.Lt.Bray was unable to take off because of engine failure.

c. Attack

During the four runs over the target, each plane dropped 12 bombs making a total of 60 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demos. The target was thorcughly strafed on each pass with a total of 13,600 rounds of .50 Cal. for all four passes.

Four or five bombs were dropped just S of the target but the remaining bombs and strafing gave thorough coverage. Three small shacks were set afire and several others were damaged. Other than these no other results were visible. If troops were present they were well hidden. The only opposition was possible mortar fire as indicated by a sighting of three bursts on the tree tops over the target. None of our planes were damaged and we sustained no casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS - Nil

5. CITATIONS

Nil

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0815/I	CLARK FIELD
T.O.T.	0937-50/I	ALCALA
Land	1155/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Route

Out: - Direct

In : - TARGET APARRI LINGAYAN BASE

c. Operational

Bombs Dropped	60 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. demos.
Bombs Dropped in target	55- 100 lb. demos.
Ammo Fired	13,600 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
169-A-5
18 Jun 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

19 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 169-A-5, 18 June,1945. ALCALA AREA, LUZON.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning of 18 June, 6 of our B-25's again attacked Troop and supply concentrations in the ALCALA AREA, in LUZON. The squadron's bombing target was a concentration of buildings ½ mile east of the town of ALCALA. In a total of 5 passes over the target, the squadron dropped 71X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo bombs in the target and expanded 14,780 rounds of .50 Cal. ammo. One Bomb was dropped in ALCALA TOWN, causing no damage. Results of the attack were excellent, 4 buildings were either destroyed or heavily damaged in the target and one large, tin roofed, building in ALCALA was set afire by strafing, and numerous small fires were seen burning in the target. Enemy opposition was restricted to meager, inaccurate M/G fire, causing no damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The object of this mission was to "knock out" remaining installations in the ALCALA AREA.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

The squadron was last of 4 squadrons from the Group to make the attack. Upon arrival to the target theGround Control "Nephew 4" was contacted and gave the squadron clearance for bombing and strafing attack, Lt.Morton then brought the Squadron into attack formation of single plane in trail then made a "Dry Run" over the target. He however, marked the target for other planes by dropping a bomb at each end during the first pass. The attack which consisted of 4 more passes was made from E-W with planes turning left for the other runs.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating

1st.Lt.L.W.Morton led the squadron in A/P #563, with other planes coming "in trail" in the following order: Lt.Reed A/P #306, Lt.Bray A/P #355, Lt.Mangum A/P #600, Lt.Helma A/P #174 and Lt.Harben in A/P #177.

c. Attack

Planes made the attack on a heading of approximately 87 degrees, Lt.Morton's bombs hit among several small houses and several bombs fell short, no specific results could be reported from his attack however. Other planes followed with the attack, covering the entire target by both bombing and strafing, of 72 bombs dropped, 71 were in the target, 1 was dropped in ALCALA TOWN causing no damage, 4 buildings were either destroyed or heavily damaged by bombs in the target, and one large tin roofed building was set afire by strafing in ALCALA TOWN, this building burned fiercely with a large column of smoke to 2000 feet. Moderate, inaccurate M/G fire was received from a 30 foot rise at (605-662 Ref: Alcala Map 3564-I 1/50,000) and in the target area.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	CLARK FIELD	0915/I
T.O.T.	ALCALA AREA	1145-1210/I
Land	CLARK FIELD	1325/I

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
168-A-4
18 Jun 4

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74 PEG/rjl

18 June,1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 168-A-4, 18 June,1945. ALCALA TOWN AREA, LUZON.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six of our B-25's attacked troop and supply concentrations at ALCALA AREA, dropping 72 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay bombs and expended 11750 X.50 Cal. ammo. Although no specific results or damage were observed, the target was well covered by both bombing and strafing in a total of 4 passes.
There was no enemy resistance or opposition of any type encountered and we suffered no damage.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was another of the series flown in that area to disrupt and destroy troop and supply concentrations remaining in that area.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. This Squadron led the Group Strike, squadrons took off at 30 minute intervals. On arrival to the target (½ mile NW BAYBAYOG, ALCALA AREA) a "Dry Run" was made to assure assigned target was to be hit, then planes made a 360 degree turn, assumed attack formation of single planes in trail, and made the attack from SW to NE on a heading of approximately 12 degrees.

b. Pilots And Planes

1st.Lt.L.W.Morton in A/P #563 led the Squadron with other planes trailing in the following order: Lt Campbell in A/P No.948, Lt.Bray A/P No.174, Lt.Mangum A/P No.355, Lt.Reed A/P No. 166, and Lt.Harben in A/P No.205.

c. Attack

After making contact with Ground Control "Nephew 4" and getting a clearance for attack, Lt.Morton proceeded with others following in trail, a 360 degree turn to the left was made after the first bombing and strafing pass and 3 additional passes were made.

No special results can be brought out, since only bomb smoke and dust was observed over the target after the attack, however, bombs were in the target and the larger number of them burst in the wooded section of the assigned target with a few in the edge of the clearing and one in the river just off the target.
No M/G or small arms fire was received.

4. S-2 COMMENTS.

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

T.O.	0815/I	CLARK FIELD
T.O.T.	0930-50/I	ALCALA AREA
Land	1215/I	CLARK FIELD

b. Statistics

No.Bombs Dropped	72 X 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay
No.Bombs Dropped on Target	71 X 100 lb.
Ammo Expended	11,750 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
188-A-9
7 Jul 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl
10 July,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 188-A-9, 7 July,1945. SHO-KOTO-SHO IS. FORMOSA.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On the morning 7 July, nine of our planes participated in the Group Strike at SHO-KOTO-SHO ISLAND, dropping a total of 108 X 100 lb. general purpose bombs and expended 22,000 X.50 Cal. ammo. Attack was made from minimum altitude and no results were observed. There was no enemy opposition and we suffered no damage or casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The primary objective of this strike was to destroy any possible installations and personnel which may be on the island, the mission was an unsually easy one, and provided good opportunity to give numerous new crews to "take a crack" at the real thing.

3. ATTACK

a. This squadron flew #2 position in the Group Formation, three passes were made with planes going over 9 abreast. Bombs were dropped on all three passes.

b. Planes and Pilots

1st.Lt.Tyree led the Squadron in A/P #060 with Lt.May in A/P #948 and Lt.Gwyn in A/P #177 flying on his right and Left Wing respectively.

Major W.D.Decker, Squadron Commander, took the second flight over with Lt.Kovack in A/P #600 flying on his right wing and Lt.Fitzpatrick flying on his left wing.

The third flight was led by Lt.Cunningham in A/P #306 with Lt.Moeller in A/P #205 flying #2 and Lt.McKinnon in A/P # 355 flying #3.

c. Results Of Att ack.

As there were no installations whatsoever observed on the island no damage was reported and only results observed were bomb smoke and several small grass fires .

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

No individual actions are worthy of awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	Clark Field	0725/I
T.O.T.	SHO-KOTO-SHO	1045-1130/I
Land		1445/I

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
191-A-6
10 Jul 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 74

PEG/rjl

18 July, 1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report Mission FFO 191-A-6, 10 July, 1945.
Shipping Search West Coast, FORMOSA.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 10 July, 1945, 4 B-25's conducted a shipping search along the West Coast of FORMOSA from the S tip to KIRUN HARBOR including the PESCADORES ISLANDS. No profitable targets were found, however, and the flight chose BOKUSHI TOWN as an alternate target. In the minimum altitude attack, 21 X 250 lb. demos and 7500 X.50 Cal. were expended on the target. As a result of the attack, a small factory just S of BOKUSHI was further damaged by three direct hits on the buildings, and 3 warehouses in BOKUSHI were probably damaged by one bomb which was seen to crash into one warehouse but the explosion was not noted. Results of other bombs dropped on the factory and town were not observed. There was no interception and we sustained neither damage nor casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission was to locate and destroy any coastwise shipping in FORMOSAN coastal waters. To accomplish the mission this squadron was assigned theWest Coast and the 498th Squadron the East Coast.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The four B-25-J's flew direct from CLARK FIELD to a point 20 miles S of TAINAN and began to search at that point. According to detailed instructions on Flak Areas, the formation systematically avoided such known areas along the flight path. The formation during the search consisted of two plane flights in loose echelon. The approach to the alternate target, BOKUSHI, was from sea to land at a point NW of the town, flying East until sufficiently far enough inland to turn and attack from E to W (in the proven manner from land to sea) at minimum altitude.

b. Pilots and planes.

Capt.C.H. Smith led the Squadron in A/P #060 with 2nd.Lt. Turnham on his wing in A/P #177. 2nd.Lt.McKinnon led the second element in A/P #355 with 2nd.Lt.May on his wing in A/P #948.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

Capt.Smith led the Squadron along the coast keeping well out of A/A range at defended points to KIRUN HARBOR, being fired at once from SHINCHIKU the shot being far short of the formation which was well out of range. Since the search had been entirely without success Capt. Smith led the squadron to the PESCADORES ISLANDS and executed a search there with the same futile results. During the search the formation passed within extreme A/A range of CHOMOSUI A/D and received 6-8 bursts of heavy A/A which burst all around the formation. Fortunately the flight was in loose formation for one burst fell directly between the two elements. The burst was quite close but no damage sustained nor was the explosion felt by the crews. As a last resort Capt.Smith decided on BOKUSHI TOWN as an alternate target. Five bombs were dropped on a small damaged factory just N of BOKUSHI causing further damage to a large building and destroying a small building. Two bombs were dropped on 3 warehouse type buildings in BOKUSHI TOWN. One bomb was seen to crash into one building but the explosion was not seen. This building was probably damaged as a result. Three bombs were dropped on a R.R. station with unobserved results. The remaining bombs were strung through the town with unobserved results. Three bombs which failed to release over the target were salvoed in the water just off the target. Results of strafing were unobserved. When approximately thirty minutes from LAOAG, Lt.May's plane became low on fuel and he dropped back and proceeded to LAOAG where he landed and refuled, then returned to Clark.

4. CITATIONS

Nil.

5. COMMENTS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off 0700/I CLARK FIELD
Search 0945-1300/I FORMOSA
T.O.T. 1245/I BOKUSHI
3 planes Landed 1630/I CLARK FIELD
1 plane landed 1520/I LAOAG - Landed CLARK FIELD 1735/I

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

499
210-C-1
29 July 45

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 245 PEG/rjl

5 August,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 210-C-1, 29 July 45.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a mid-morning strike six B-25's attacked a radio and light house installation on CAPE SATA (3100N-13040E) as a last resort when bad weather encountered 20 miles S of MIYAKAKI prevented completion of a shipping sweep of eastern KYUSHU and the INLAND SEA. In the minimum altitude attack, 20 X 500 lb. demos were dropped at targets and3,500 X.50 cal. ammo were expended. However because of the smallness of the target and steepness of the terrain little actual damage was done by bombing but several near misses probably caused some damage to buildings and equipment. One plane sustained minor damage from meager small arms fire but there were no casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the mission was to find and destroy any shipping found in the target area which extended along the eastern coast of KYUSHU ISLAND into the Western end of the INLAND SEA. The secondary target was the RR yards at MIYAZAKI.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. This squadron leading the Group Formation made rendezvous with the pursuit escort at CAPE TOI and then proceeded along the East coast of KYUSHU to a point 20 miles south of MIYAKAKI where the escort requested a turn back because of bad weather. Accordingly the Group turned and being still S of the assigned secondary, took targets of opportunity as a last resort. This squadron located a light house on a small island just off CAPE SATA and a possible radio installation just to the N on the mainland. The approach was from E to W turning onto an axis of S to N for the attack. Formation over the target consisted of two, three-plane "V"'s in trail for the initial run and single planes in trail for the succeeding run. The bomb load for each B-25-J's was 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay fuse demos.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

b. Planes and Pilots Participating.

Lt.Col.G.A.Doolittle (Group Commander) led the squadron and Group Formation in A/P #355 with 2nd.Lt.Kovach in A/P #205 on his right and 2nd.Lt.Zemer in A/P #600 on his left. 1st.Lt.Cunningham led the second flight in A/P #306 with 2nd.Lt.May on his right in A/P #060 and 1st.Lt.Worthington on his left in A/P #941.

c. Attack

Each plane made two minimum altitude bombing and strafing runs during which, a total of 20 X 500 lb. bombs were dropped at targets. However, the small targets were situated on the peak of sharp rises and to achieve any measure of success each bomb must need be a direct hit. Several near misses were scored but can only be evaluated as causing probable damage. During a final pass the lighthouse was still standing but smoke prevented observation of damage. It is doubtful if strafing was at all effective since the buildings appeared to be constructed of stone and cement. The only opposition encountered was meager, small arms fire and possible M/G fire from the island just off CAPE SATA. One plane sustained a small hole from small arms fire. There were no casualties.

4. S-2 COMMENTS.

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	IE SHIMA	0710/I	
Rendezvous	Cape TOI	1000/I	(Fighters)
Attack	CAPE SATA	1035/I	
Land	IESHIMA	1300/I	

b. Fighter Cover

Excellent by two squadrons of P-47's. A third squadron assigned did not appear.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

~~744~~
499
211-C-1
30 July 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 245 PEG/rjl

7 August,1945.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 211-C-1, 30 July,1945.

TO : Commanding General, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of:
A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 30 July 1945, six B-25's conducted a shipping search along the East Coast of KYUSHU ISLAND and into the INLAND SEA, finding nil shipping targets and as a last resort, attacked a light house at CAPE SADANO and a radio installation at O SHIMA. In the attacks 18 X 500 lb. bombs and 6940 X.50 ammo were expended. The lighthouse was damaged but lightly and the radio building at O SHIMA was reported destroyed, another building damaged and a third set afire. We sustained no casualties and no damage. Opposition to our strike was limited to meager, light inaccurate A/A fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this mission was to destroy and sink any surface craft found in the target area which included the entire East Coast of KYUSHU and the INLAND SEA between the SHIMONASEKI STRAITS and KURE. Areas to be avoided were SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, KURE and nearby islands, and MATSUGAMA AIRBASE on SHIKAKU ISLAND.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. The squadron flying in the number 4 position of the Group Formation made rendezvous with the fighters at Cape Toi and proceeded along the east coast of KYUSHU to OSHIMA (3258N - 13205E) then crossed to the west coast of SHIKOKU to TAKAYAMA to CAPE SADANO. Having found nil targets two planes made two passes at a lighthouse at this point. The formation then made a wide circle into the INLAND SEA just above the HOEJO STRAITS also with no targets sighted. The formation then returned along the E coast of KYUSHU to O SHIMA where a radio station was attacked. Formation over the target consisted of three, two-plane flights in trail at minimum altitude.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating.

1st.Lt.C.E.Rice led the squadron in A/P # 934 with 2nd.Lt.Gwyn on his wing in A/P #208. 1st.Lt.Tyree led the second element in A/P # 992 with 1st.Lt.McKinnon on his wing in A/P #071. 1st.Lt.Fitzpatrick flew as the third element in A/P #904. Lt.Moeller returned to base early in A/P # 210 when fuel transfer system failed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

c. Attack

1st.Lt.Tyree and 1st.Lt.McKinnon made two passes on the lighthouse at CAPE SADANO dropping four and two 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay fuse demos respectively. The lighthouse was slightly damaged by one bomb which exploded near the base of the tower and by concentrated strafing. In the attack on the radio station at O SHIMA 12 bombs and concentrated strafing during several runs left the radio building destroyed according to crew reports. Mission photographs fail to confirm the reports but crews statements are sufficient to establish the fact that the building was at least heavily damaged. One building was left burning and another damaged. There was no fighter opposition. Meager, light, inaccurate A/A fire was received from vicinity of TURINOHAMA (3327N-13216E) and from a hill just W of CAPE TSURU. There were no personnel casualties and no damage.

4. S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. CITATIONS

Nil.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time Table

Take Off	0830/I	IE SHIMA
1 plane Landed	1058/I	IESHIMA
Fighter Rendezvous	1115/I	CAPE TOI
BAYO STRAITS	1300/I	
Attack	1220/I	CAPE SADANO
Attack	1235/I	O SHIMA
Land	1530/I	IESHIMA

b. Fighter Cover

Excellent.

c. Operational

Bombs on targets	18 X 500 lb.
Bombs salvoed	6 X 500 lb.
Ammo Fired	6940 X.50 Cal.

For The Squadron COMMANDER:

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., AirCorps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

499
212-A-2
end 31 July 45

499th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 245

PEG/rjl

9 August,1945/

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission FFO 212-A-2, 31 July,1945. MARUSHIMA 3213N - 13024E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

On 31 July,1945 six B-25's participated in a 345th Group Strike on the MARUSHIMA NITROGEN WORKS at MARUSHIMA TOWN from minimum altitude. As originally planned the strike was designed as a shipping strike but because of a delayed take off the secondary target, MARUSHIMA was attacked with a total of 24 X 500 lb. bombs and 6050 X.50 Cal. ammo. Thirteen bombs were reported to have fallen in the plant area but results were obscured by a heavy pall of smoke and dust. Other results included possible damage to a bridge, damage to several residences, and damage to a factory near the nitrogen plant. One plane was holed four times by 20 mm. fire and another was holed one time. There were nil personnel casualties.

2. OBJECTIVE

The mission was originally designed as a shipping search with the secondary target at the Nitrogen Plant at MARUSHIMA.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. B-24's delayed take off of the strike and this resulted in late arrival at the fighter rendezvous point. The fighters, having arrived sometime earlier did not have sufficient fuel to complete the mission therefore, the force flew directly to the secondary target, entering YATSUSHIRO BAY through the KURONO STRAITS. The formation flying #3 in the sequence of attack took interval behind the #2 squadron and crossed the coast approximately 5 miles S of the target and then turned left onto the axis of attack. Formation over the the target consisted of six B-25-J's abreast at minimum altitude.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating.

Capt.Walter R.Naas led the Squadron Formation in A/P# 600 with 2nd.Lt.Zemer on his right in A/P #060 and 2nd.Lt.Turnham on his left wing in A/P #166. 1st.Lt.Wright led the second element in A/P #064 with 2nd.Lt.Gamble on his right in A/P #205 and 2nd.Lt. Meeller on his left in A/P #306.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Over the target Lt.Wright placed his flight to the right and abreast of the first flight.

c. Attack

Because of the abruptness of the turn onto the attack run, (which was necessitated by the terrain) Lt.Wright's flight crossed the area just N of the Plant. However his left wingman dropped one bomb in the factory area. Capt.Naas led the flight over the factory area but could not see any actual targets because of the heavy smoke which screened the installation. Consequently the results of this flight's 12 bombs were unobserved. The second flight damaged a long "I" shaped building NE of the target, a factory was also bombed N of the Nitrogen Plant and damaged, and several residences were either destroyed or damaged. Damage to the factory was probably considerable but hardly enough to interupt production. As Capt.Naas pulled off the Nitrogen Plant he spotted a medium A/A position firing from the top of a hill near the coast. As he trained his sights on the position, the planes of the number 4 squadron cut in front of him making it impossible for him to strafe. To avoid a collision he was forced to turn and climb his entire flight exposing them to fire from the A/A position. It was here that Capt.Naas's plane was holed four times, once in the wing, the left engine, nose, and fuselage. It was found later that the number 4 squadron had not followed the preceeding squadrons but had turned inside and entered the wrong canyon, which resulted in the confusion. One other plane sustained minor damage from A/A fire. During the approach approximately 30 bursts of A/A were seen over the target above attacking planes. Over the target moderate, to intense, heavy medium and light, accurate A/A fire was observed from unreported positions ringed around the East end and side of the NITROGEN PLANT and from reported positions on the coast. There was no fighter interception and we sustained no casualties. Photos show entire area covered with smoke, particularly around the nitrogen plant area, and confirm crews reports.

4. CITATIONS AND S-2 COMMENTS

Nil.

5. STATISTICS

Take Off	0800/I	IE SHIMA
Fighter Rendezvous		1032/I
Attack	1115/I	
Land	1340/I	IE SHIMA

Fighter cover was excellent.

PAT E.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER