501
128-A
7 May 44

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501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/1jd

8 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 128-A, performed 7 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Target 13-X SAWAR-SAWMI Area. Secondary target: WEWAK.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was supplies and personnel in target 13-X, which is between the MAFIN Drome and the WOSKE River in the SAWAR-SAWMI area. Secondary target was supply and personnel areas at 34-D and 35-D, which is on the northern tip of CAPE MOEM at WEWAK. The target was to be bombed at minimum altitude by six (6) airplanes, each loaded with 22 x 100 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LERON River, and proceed direct from there to the target. There was to be no fighter cover.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Approach to the target was made on an approximate heading of 50 degrees at minimum altitude. Bombing was excellent, with 104 x 100 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs hitting in the western portion of the target, while 12 bombs dropped just south and west of the assigned area. A large fuel fire with black smoke up to 2,000 ft. was started in the southwestern central portion of target 13-X as well as several smaller fires throughout this area. Our squadron thoroughly strafed starting approximately 1½ miles inland and continuing through th the coast expending 5300 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. The ack-ack encountered was moderate of light intensity and none of our planes was hit,

(2) The 498th squadron led the Group formation. Their target was the ack-ack position 8-W which they were to hit with their 75 mm. cannons as well as bombs. They approached the target from the east. The 501st approached the target from the south followed by the 499th and 500th squadrons in that order.

Narrative Report on Mission 128-A, cont'd.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 NADZAB from 0623-0626/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over LEROM River from 0630-0645/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: Nil.
Attack: Target 13-X SAWAR-SARNI from 0954-0956/K, at minimum altitude.
Landing: Strip #4 NADZAB from 1316-1318/K. (4 planes). Two planes landed at HOLLANDIA for gas and landed at NADZAB at 1440/K.

f. ROUTE: NADZAB-VALLEY-TARGET-VALLEY-NADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Fain, Squadron Commander, led the 501st squadron on the attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Fain	A/P 082	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 093
Lt. Harper	A/P 074	Lt. Schade	A/P 335
Lt. Nirdlinger	A/P 076	Lt. Nusbaum	A/P 033

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Fain, in A/P 082, led the first flight on to the target covering the western half of the area on a heading of approximately 50 degrees at minimum altitude. Major Fain dropped six of his bombs just south of the target, and due to mechanical difficulty, was unable to drop the remaining 16 100-pounders, which were salvoed at sea. In #2 position, Lt. Harper, in A/P 074, trailed his bombs through the entire area along the same heading. Lt. Nirdlinger, in A/P 076, flew in #3 position in the first flight. Six of his bombs hit near camouflaged shacks just to the south and west of the target. Several of his bombs hit near a wooden bridge across the WOSKE River, and the remaining bombs hit in the northwestern tip of the target. Both wingmen reported that a large fuel fire with explosion, flame and black smoke to 2,000 ft. was

started by this flight's bombing. The smoke was still visible as these planes neared HOLLANDIA.

(2) Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 093, was leader of the second flight and approached the target on a heading of approximately 55-60 degrees, also covering the western half of target 13-X. All bombs of this flight, which include those of Lt. Schade, in A/P 335, in #2 position, and Lt. Nusbaum, in A/P 033, in #3 position, hit well within the target. Other than a few small fires in the area, there were no visible results of the bombing, due in part to the character of the terrain which is heavily wooded.

b. Ack-ack fire was of heavy caliber and of light intensity. The altitude was good but the fire inaccurate. It was seen to come from position 8-W in the target and from a position at the east end of SAWAR Strip. M/G and small arms fire was reported by one crew only from the target and from the area between SAWAR Strip and the WOSKE River.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photographic Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Major Fain's crew reported seeing many men manning guns near position 8-W as well as personnel around houses and shacks in this vicinity. They also reported a small boat with 2 men aboard off the northwest shore of MASI-MASI, which is southeast of WAKDE.

Narrative Report on Mission 128-A, cont'd.

7. Photo prints were not received at the time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 128-A, 501st Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bomb Hits: Hits	No. of Bomb Hits: Misses	Remarks
082	22	8/11	100 lb.		6	16 salvoed at sea
074	22	sec.		22		
076	22	delay		16	6	
093	22			22		
335	22			22		
033	22			22		
Total	132	8/11	100 lb.	104	12	16

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber: Carried	.50 Caliber: Expended	.50 Caliber: Gun Fail.	.30 Caliber: Carried	.30 Caliber: Expended	.30 Caliber: Gun Fail.
082	4500	1000	nil	2000	none	
074	"	400	Faulty ammo.	"	"	
076	"	1550	nil	"	"	
093	"	1150	LIN	"	"	
335	"	1000	nil	"	"	
033	"	200	LLN/LIN	"	"	
Total	27,000	5300		12,000		

NOTE: L: Left; L: Lower; W: Waist

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd.
082	K-21	30	none
033	K-17	12	"
074	K-21	30	"
Total		72	

APPENDIX "A".

MISSION NO. 128-A DATE: 7 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--Second
ALTITUDE--Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--0954-0956/K.
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS

APPENDIX "C".



501
132-H
JCH. 11 May 4

5OTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

GAE/kjd

12 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 132-H, performed 11 May 1944 by nine (9) airplanes of the 50th Bomb Squadron. Objective: Target 2-V WAKDE Island. Secondary target: WEWAK Area South of 46-0.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the northwestern diagonal area south of the strip at WAKDE Island. This area was designated as Target 2-V. The secondary target was supplies and personnel south of target 46-0 at WEWAK. Target was to be bombed at medium altitude by nine (9) airplanes, eight (8) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs and one (1) carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs.

b. Nine (9) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other two squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEMON River, and proceed direct from there to the target. There was to be no fighter cover nor a rendezvous with any other groups.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered and was of particular success. Approach to the target was made on an approximate heading of 275 degrees. 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped from an altitude of 6,000 ft., with 29 bombs hitting in the target, 7 bombs just south of the target, and 8 bombs just off shore of this area. Two large fuel fires, possibly airplanes, were started in the target itself with flames to 200 ft. and smoke up to 3,000 ft. All crews agreed that the island had been particularly well hit by all the Group's bombing. Smoke was still visible 30 miles away from the target.

(2) The 499th squadron led the Group formation. Their target was the northwestern diagonal area 5-V. The 500th squadron flew #2, and our squadron was third over the target. The latter two squadrons hit target 2-V.

Narrative Report on Mission 132-E, cont'd.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 0750-0755/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over LEROM River from 0800-0813/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: Nil.
Attack: Target 2-V WANDE Island from 1100-1101/K, at 6,000 ft.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1430-1437/K.

f. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-SOUTH OF HOLLANDIA-TARGET-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Fain, Squadron Commander, led the 501st squadron on the attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Major Fain	A/P 401	Lt. Symons	A/P 595	Lt. Larson	A/P 764
Lt. Wichmann	A/P 089	Lt. Flanagan	A/P 074	Lt. Coffman	A/P 064
Lt. Harper	A/P 093	Lt. Hirdlinger	A/P 076	Lt. Brigham	A/P 335

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Fain, in A/P 401, led the first flight on to the target on a heading of approximately 275 degrees, and his line of flight was directly over the center of target 2-V. His four 500-pounders were dropped just on the south side on the "warm up" area. His flight consisting of Lt. Wichman, in A/P 089, in #2 position, and Lt. Harper, in A/P 093, in #3 position, dropped their bombs on the lead plane's release. All ten of their bombs hit in the designated area. This flight reported a large fuel fire started as a result of their bombing with flames to 200 ft. and smoke up to 3,000 ft.

(2) The Second Flight, led by Lt. Symons, in A/P 595, followed the first flight in trail and slightly to the north. All bombs of this flight, which included

those of Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 074, in #2 position, and Lt. Birdlinger, in A/P 076, in #3 position, hit in the target and started a second fire in this area.

(3) The Third Flight, led by Lt. Larsen, in A/P 764, came in south of the target. His bombs as well as those of #3 man, Lt. Brigham, in A/P 335, hit off shore south of the dispersal area. Lt. Goffman, in A/P 064, in #2 position, dropped his bombs in the wooded area just south of target 2-V.

b. There was no ack-ack reported by any of our crews.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing and Photographic Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Major Fain's crew reported a very large explosion and fire with flames up to 500 ft. and heavy black smoke up to 4,000 ft. seen just west of target 5-V. This fire was described as either a fuel dump or possibly a burning airplane. This sighting was confirmed by all the other crews. A fairly large fire was also reported by Major Fain's crew in target 9-X, which is northeast of the center of the strip.

b. Lt. Symons' crew reported small fires and smoke pall over target 5-W, and the same was reported in the vicinity of target 2-W.

c. Lt. Birdlinger's crew reported T/E u/i bomber in the revetment area 4-V, the serviceability of which could not be determined.

Narrative report on Mission 132-S, cont'd.

d. Lt. Flanagan's crew reported a barge beached at HETAF, which is 20 miles southeast of WAKDE Island.

e. Lt. Larsen's crew reported a large settlement on the eastern bank of LAKE SAMABO at 1430S-S--0415-S. They said that the buildings were oblong shaped and that the whole village was more orderly than the ordinary native villages.

7. Photo prints received confirm the results of our squadron's bombing, although they show ten bombs off shore rather than the eight reported by crew members, at the time of briefing.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

[illegible] report on Mission [illegible]

[illegible] TABLE [illegible]

A/C	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] lbs.	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] lbs.	[illegible]	[illegible]

PHOTO TABLE [illegible]

A/C	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	10	[illegible]
Total		70	4

APPENDIX "[illegible]".

* 501
133-V
12 May 44
JCH

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/13d

13 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 133-V, performed 12 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: BORAM AIRDROME.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective of this strike was the rendering further unserviceable of the BORAM Airdrome. There was no secondary target assigned. The strip was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes, five (5) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs, and one (1) carrying 4 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, and proceed up the valley direct to the target. There was to be no fighter cover, and ours was the only squadron on the mission.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Approach to the target was made on an approximate heading of 290 degrees at an altitude of 5000-5500 ft. The bombing was considered good. A total of 29 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs were dropped. Of these, 19 bombs dropped just east of the BORAM Strip and 10 bombs dropped on the east end of the runway. A large fire with black smoke up to 2500 ft. was started 200 ft. east of the strip. On making a 180 degree turn after the bombing, several new craters were seen on the strip. All crews reported the runway unserviceable prior to the strike, and other results were unobserved due to the long delay on the fuse of the bomb.

(2) Our squadron was the only squadron on this mission.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

Narrative Report on Mission 133-V, cont'd.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

g. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 1053-1055/K.
Squadron Rendezvous: From 1058-1100/K on course.
Attack: BORAM Airdrome from 1224-1225/K at 5000-5500 ft.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1403-1405/K.

f. ROUTE. MADZAB-AMBAMBERG-TARGET-AMBAMBERG-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 90th SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Fain, Squadron Commander, led the 90th Squadron on this attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Fain	A/P 468	Lt. Symons	A/P 518
Lt. Hirdlinger	A/P 693	Lt. Lewis	A/P 674
Lt. Monaghan	A/P 699	Lt. Coffman	A/P 678

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Fain, in A/P 468, led the first flight on to the target at an altitude of approximately 5250 ft. at a heading of approximately 290 degrees. His line of flight was approximately down the center of the runway. His 4 five hundred pounders were dropped in the flight gap just east of the runway. His flight consisting of Lt. Hirdlinger, in A/P 693, in #2 position, and Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 699, in #3 position, dropped their bombs on the lead plane's release. All 10 of their bombs fell in this same approximate area and started a fuel fire with black smoke up to 2500 ft. This fire was started approximately 200 ft. east of the runway.

(2) The second flight, led by Lt. Symons, in A/P 518, followed the first flight in trail at approximately a nine second interval. Lt. Symons' bombs also fell just east of the runway while his wingman, Lt. Lewis, in A/P 674, in #2 position, and Lt. Coffman, in A/P 678, in #3 position, each dropped their five bombs on the east end of the runway, five hitting to the north and 5 to the south on the strip. The planes

then made an 180 degree turn and returned over the strip. The second flight reported seeing new craters on the strip, but due to the long delay on the bomb fusing, it was difficult to observe exactly where the bombs hit.

h. There was no anti-aircraft reported by any of our crews.

i. There was no fighter covers.

j. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

k. There were no injuries to our personnel.

8. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing and Photographic Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. REMARKS.

a. All crews reported the MEHAN strip thoroughly unservicable with numerous bomb craters and described the strip as a "sea of mud". They were also unanimous in their report that no heavy equipment or personnel were seen on the runway area.

b. 1Lt. Symanzyk crew reported some road construction around bomb craters on the road in the BRANDI Plan. area.

c. 1Lt. Gaffney's crew reported seeing 20-25 barges in groups of 4-5 beached on the southeastern shore of MEHAN Pln. This was the only crew reporting this sighting.

7. Photo prints received did not show bomb bursts due again to the long delay on the bomb fuses. However, from the photographs, it would appear that the strip is unservicable.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/C	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bomb Hits Direct	Near	Remarks
[illegible]	4	8-GP Fire Bomb	500 lbs.	4	5	
Total	8	8-GP	500 lbs.	30	30	

FIRE TABLE #1

A/C	Type Bombs	Incendiary	Estimate Burn %
[illegible]	8-GP Fire Bomb	30	4
Total		30	30

APPENDIX "A".

MISSION NO. 133-V DATE: 12 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--First
ALTITUDE--5000-5500 ft.
TIME OVER TARGET--1224-1225/K.
⊤ PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
⊥ OTHER PLANES
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS

APPENDIX "B".



501
135-D
14 May 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/1jd

15 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 135-D, performed 14 May 1944 by nine (9) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: TAKAR VILLAGE. Secondary target: 46-D at WEWAK.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the village of TAKAR, which is on the coast eight (8) miles southeast of WAKDE Island. The secondary target was supplies and personnel at Target 46-D WEWAK. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by nine (9) airplanes, eight (8) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs and one (1) carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs. The target and coastal area was then to be strafed from minimum altitude.

b. Nine (9) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at MADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LERON River, and proceed direct from there to the target. There was to be no fighter cover, nor a rendezvous with any other group.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. The Group circled WAKDE Island and approached the target from northwest and southeast at a heading of approximately 120 degrees. The bombing was excellent. A total of 44 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped on or near TAKAR Village from an altitude of 6,000 ft. Of these, 33 bombs hit in the village area, 5 hit off shore, and the remaining 6 bombs were salvoed. Results other than bomb bursts were not observed. Withdrawing to the left and making a wide circle out to sea in order to lose altitude, our planes came in again on the same heading to make their strafing run. The area from the mouth of the BIER River to the WENTOR River was thoroughly strafed on this second pass with 10,270 x .50 caliber and 800 x .30 caliber ammunition expended in the strafing attack. It was on this second pass that

Narrative Report on Mission 135-D, cont'd.

our crews noted several destroyed huts and bomb craters in the village, probably the result of the medium altitude bombing.

(2) The 498th Squadron led the Group formation followed by the 499th, 500th, and 501st Squadrons. All four squadrons attacked the same target.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of bombs sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 0700-0705/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over LEBON River from 0730-0740/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: NIL.
Attack: First pass TAKAR Village from 1030-1033/K at 6,000 ft.
Second pass TAKAR Village and central area from 1045-1050/K at minimum altitude.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1405-1410/K.

f. ROUTE.

MADZAB-VALLEY-SOUTH OF HOLLANDIA-TAKHIP-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Larsen led the 501st Squadron on the attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Lt. Larsen	A/P 401	Lt. Lewis	A/P 664	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 764
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 864	Lt. Jones	A/P 036	Lt. Badnell	A/P 093
Lt. Hirdlinger	A/P 076	Lt. Harper	A/P 099	Lt. Schade	A/P 039

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Larsen, in A/P 401, led the first flight on to the target on a heading of approximately 120 degrees, his line of flight being directly over the center of the village. His bombs, 4 500-pounders, dropped in the target just north of the PRA-

Narrative Report on Mission 135-D, cont'd.

RONFOR Creek. The flight consisting of Lt. Jacobson, in A/P 064, in #2 position, and Lt. Hirshinger, in A/P 076, in #3 position, dropped their bombs on the release of the lead plane. Lt. Jacobson's bombs dropped slightly to the right of the village, while Lt. Hirshinger dropped four to the right of the village and was forced to salvo one bomb off shore. Other than bomb bursts, these crews could report no damage observed. Making a wide circle to the left to rim and losing altitude, this flight came back on to the coastline and thoroughly strafed the coastal area from NEER River southeast to the WENTOR River.

(2) Second flight, led by Lt. Lewis, in A/P 064, was formed slightly out toward the coast. Lt. Lewis reported in interrogation that his bombs had salvoed. The photographs show his five bombs hit on the shore along what appeared to be small huts there. Lt. Jones, in A/P 064, in #2 position, dropped his five bombs on TAKAR Village beach, while Lt. Harper, in A/P 097, in #3 position, dropped on the lead plane's release and his bombs hit just off shore. This flight also heavily strafed the coastal area.

(3) Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 76h, was leader of the third flight. All of his bombs as well as those of his wingmen, Lt. Mahill, in A/P 097, in #2 position, and Lt. Schade, in A/P 089, in #3 position, dropped in TAKAR Village. The coastal area was also strafed by this flight.

b. There was no aab-ack reported by any of our crews.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

Narrative Report on Mission 335-D, cont'd.

6. [redacted]

[redacted] 1a. Hoagland's crew reported a fire on the east end of the [redacted]

[redacted] 1b. Mr. Schmid's crew reported seeing two new looking large white buildings approximately 40' x 80' in [redacted] [redacted] of the [redacted] Grade. The crew reported them as possible supply buildings. All crews reported seeing no enemy activity in that area.

7. Radio prisoners reported that the bombing of two airplanes of the enemy flight. Leaflets were also taken but do not seem to contain a great deal of information.

For the Squadron Commander

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 135-D, 501st Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE # 1

A/P	No.Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
401	4	Impt.	500 lb.	4		
064	5	"	"	5		
076	5	"	"	5		
064	5	"	"	4		1 Salvoed
036	5	"	"			5 Salvoed
097	5	"	"	5		
764	5	"	"		5	
093	5	"	"	5		
097	5	"	"	5		
Total	44	Impt.	500 lb.	33	5	6

STRAFING TABLE # 2

A/P	.50 Caliber Expended	Remaining	Gun Malf.	.30 Caliber Expended	Remaining	Gun Malf.
401	[illegible]	[illegible]	LHW	None		NIL
064	[illegible]	[illegible]	UHW/LHW	[illegible]		NIL
076	[illegible]	[illegible]	LHW/UHW	[illegible]		NIL
064	[illegible]	[illegible]	NIL	[illegible]		NIL
036	[illegible]	[illegible]	NIL	[illegible]		NIL
097	[illegible]	[illegible]	NIL	[illegible]		NIL
764	[illegible]	[illegible]	NIL	2000	200	NIL
093	[illegible]	[illegible]	NIL	2000		NIL
097	[illegible]	[illegible]	UHW	2000	600	NIL
	[illegible]	900	LHW	2000		NIL
Total	34,400	10,270		16,000	800	

PHOTO TABLE # 3

[illegible]	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
064	K-21	30	2
036	K-17	20	1
064	K-21	30	
093	K-21	30	2
Total		110	5

APPENDIX - "A"

501
136-E
15 May 4

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

16 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 136-E, performed 15 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: SAWAR-SARMI Area Target 6-X. Secondary target: 46-D at WEWAK.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was target 6-X in the SAWAR-SARMI area. This was the FOEHAGE PLTN. area where there were numerous buildings, supplies and personnel. Secondary target was supplies and personnel at Target 46-D at WEWAK. Target was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude by six (6) airplanes, four (4) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs, and two (2) carrying 4 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over this area, and proceed direct from here to the target. There was to be no fighter cover nor a rendezvous with any other group.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. The Group came in to the target from land to sea at a heading of approximately 40 degrees making one bombing and strafing pass. The bombing was excellent. A total of 28 x 500 lb. 8-11 sec. delay demo. bombs were dropped on or near target 6-X. Of these, 23 were dropped on the target itself and 5 hit just northwest of the target. At least 2 shacks were blown up and bombs were seen to hit in the immediate vicinity of 4 or 5 50 ft. long barrack-type thatched buildings, which were 1500 ft. northwest of the suspected Jap Headquarters. (540557—Ref. OFAI River 1/20,000). On withdrawing a lugger on the southeast coast of VANDERMOEAR Island was heavily strafed and one Jap aboard was killed. The entire target was heavily strafed from a point 2 miles inland to the coast with 3025 x .50 caliber and 225 x .30 caliber expended.

Narrative report on Mission 136-E, cont'd.

(2) The 500th Squadron led the Group formation followed by the 501st, 498th, and 499th squadrons in that order. All four squadrons were assigned the same target.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 NADZAB from 0810-0813/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over NADZAB area from 0820-0825/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: Nil.
Attack: Target 6-X SAWAI-SAWI from 1127-1130/K.
Landing: Strip #4 NADZAB from 1450-1455/K.

f. ROUTE. NADZAB-VALLEY-SOUTH OF HOLLANDIA-TARGET-VALLEY NADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Fain, Squadron Commander, led the 501st Squadron on the attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Fain	A/P 401	Capt. Barth	A/P 405
Lt. Flanagan	A/P 074	Lt. Davis	A/P 518
Lt. Goffman	A/P 064	Lt. Hirdlinger	A/P 089

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Fain, in A/P 401, led the first flight on to the target on a heading of approximately 40 degrees, his line of flight covering the left central portion of the target. His 4 500-pounders were dropped toward the eastern end of the target among buildings just on the edge of the wooded area. He thoroughly strafed from a point 2 miles inland all through the target and also on VAN-DOESOLA Island where he leveled a few bursts into a lugger on the southeast shore.

Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 074, flew on Major Fain's right wing and dropped his 5 bombs on the southeastern portion of the target. He too strafed the area heavily, and continuing towards VANDERMEAR Island, blasted the lugger off the southeast shore probably killing one Jap who was aboard. Lt. Coffman, in A/P 064, flew in #3 position. 3 of his bombs hit in the northwest corner of the target and 2 just beyond still in heavily scattered stores area.

(2) Capt. Barth, in A/P 465, was the leader of the second flight, which covered the western portion of the target, especially where the Jap Headquarters were reported to be. His 4 bombs dropped in the southwestern portion of the target blowing up 2 native shacks in that area. Capt. Barth also strafed starting well inland and continuing out through the entire run. Lt. Davis, in A/P 518, flying #2 position in the second flight, dropped his 5 bombs just north of the suspected Jap Headquarters target. His bombs dropped in the immediate vicinity of 4-5 50 ft. long barrack type thatch buildings, which this crew thought might possibly be the Jap Headquarters. He too strafed the entire run and also on withdrawing a few bursts were sent into VANDERMEAR Island. In #3 position, Lt. Hirdlinger, in A/P 089, covered the furthermost west portion of the target with 4 of his bombs hitting in the target itself and one just northwest of it. All crews reported the strafing as particularly heavy.

b. There was no ack-ack reported by any of our crews.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing, and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report on Mission 136-E, cont'd.

6. HIGHLIGHTS.

a. All crews reported that although many houses and buildings in the target seemed to be partially destroyed, there were still a good many that remained in good condition.

b. Major Fain's crew observed living quarters on the hill in the central area on the southwest side of the target.

c. Capt. Smith's crew observed a 2 story barracks-type building in the southeast corner of the target, while a one story barracks-type building was seen in the southeast corner. On leaving the target, Lt. Flanagan's crew reported seeing one unidentified airplane on the northeast end of WAKE Strip.

d. All crews reported numerous fires on the southeast end of WAKE Island, one with black smoke to 300 ft. and one small one with white smoke to 100 ft.

7. Photo prints were not received at the time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl.1- APPENDIX A.
2- " B.
3- " C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report on Mission 136-E, 501st Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hit	Miss	Remarks
401	4	S-11	500 lb.	4		
074	5			5		
064	5			3	2	
405	4			4		
518	5			3	2	
089	5			4	1	
Total	28	S-11	500 lb.	23	5	

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail	.30 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fails
401	4800	2475	UFW	none		Nil
074	4400	1850	LFW	2000	100	"
064	4400	1500	UFW/LFW/LIR	2000		"
405	4800	1000	Nil	none		"
518	4400	1000	Nil	2000	125	"
089	4400	1000	Nil	2000		"
Total	27,200	8825		8000	225	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
064	K-38	30	None
	-20	15	"
Total		45	

APPENDIX "A".



MISSION NO. 136-E DATE: 15 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--Second
ALTITUDE--Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--1127-1130/K.
PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
OTHER PLANES
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS

APPENDIX "B".

* 501
137-F
16May4
JCK

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

17 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 137-F, performed 16 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: SAMAR-SARMI area Target 15-E Sawmill. Secondary target: Stores and Personnel area between WOM Pt. and WEMAK Township.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was target 15-E in the SAMAR-SARMI area. The particular target was a sawmill in the village on the west bank of the TOR River, one mile inland from the mouth of the river. The secondary target was supplies and personnel area along the shore between WOM Pt. and WEMAK Township. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes, four (4) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. inst. dem. bombs and two (2) carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. dem. bombs. The target was then to be strafed from minimum altitude with six (6) airplanes abreast.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over this area, and proceed direct from here to the target. There was to be no fighter cover or rendezvous with any other group.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. The squadron came into the target from land to sea at a heading of approximately 350 degrees on their initial bombing run at an altitude of 6,000 ft. Bombing was excellent. A total of 28 x 500 lb. inst. dem. bombs were dropped, and all bombs were reported as being on the target. One fire with white smoke up to about 150 ft. was seen coming from the center of the target. Withdrawing out to sea and making a wide circle to the left, the squadron then returned to the target to strafe at minimum altitude. A few bursts were sent into the target with the majority of the strafing being along the coast over the TOR River to three miles south. On the strafing pass, a second fire was observed in the target. In all

Narrative Report on Mission 137-F, cont'd.

7700 x .50 caliber and 2000 x .30 caliber rounds were expended in this strafing.

(2) The 499th squadron led the Group formation and had as its target a jetty on the TOK River just north of our designated area. The 500th, 501st, and 493th squadrons followed in that order their target being the sawmill area.

4. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

5. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 NADZAB from 0710-0713/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over NADZAB area from 0720-0735/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: Nil.
Attack: Bombing at 6,000 ft. Target 15-K from 1030-1033/K. Strafing at Minimum altitude Target 15-K to coast from 1042-1045/K.
Landing: Strip #4 NADZAB from 1410-1415/K (5 planes). A/P 335 landed at DUMPU at 1340/K for gas and returned to NADZAB at 1535/K.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Fain, Squadron Commander, led the 501st Squadron on the attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Fain	A/P 401	Lt. Symons	A/P 405
Lt. Harper	A/P 064	Lt. Wichmann	A/P 335
Lt. Schade	A/P 089	Lt. Bedell	A/P 528

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Fain, in A/P 401, led the squadron on to the target at a heading of approximately 350 degrees at an altitude of 6,000 ft. His line of flight was directly over the center of the village where a sawmill was reported. His four (4) 500-pounders dropped in the center of the target. His wingman, Lt. Harper, in A/P 064, flying #2 position, and Lt. Schade, in A/P 089, flying #3 position dropped their bombs on

the release of the lead plane and their bombs too hit in the designated area. Continuing on, the flight made a wide circle to the left around SAMI and coming back inland losing altitude came on to the target again at a heading of approximately 80 degrees. Just as they reached the target for the second time, bombs were dropping from another squadron on the area, and it was necessary to make a sharp turn to the right to avoid these bombs. A few strafing bursts went into the target, but the majority of the strafing was done from the east bank of the TO River down the coast for approximately three miles.

(2) The second flight was led by Lt. Symons, in A/P 405. He followed much thesame path as Major Pain and dropped his four bombs on the target itself starting a white smoke fire which was seen rising up to 150 ft. from the center of the target. His wingman, Lt. Wichmann, in A/P 335, flying #2 position, and Lt. Bedell, in A/P 528, flying #3 position, each dropped their five bombs in the designated target and continuing around on the same course thoroughly strafed the coastal area. Accurate spotting of the bombs was not possible due to cloud coverage and dust covering the target. However, the second flight reported that a second fire had been started in the target when they came in for their strafing run.

b. Ack-ack was not directed at our squadron. However, 20-30 bursts of heavy and medium caliber ack-ack were seen directed at other planes, and this is reported as coming from position 8-K and from the SAWAR Drome area.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing, and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

Narrative Report on Mission 137-4, cont'd.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Major Fain's crew reported seeing 3-4 large oil fires in the WEWAK area. One of these, at the east end of the BOGAM Strip, was seen rising 7,000 ft. and could be seen from a distance of 50 miles.

b. Lt. Schade's crew reported seeing a fire and smoke on the east end of DAGUA Strip.

c. Lt. Symon's crew reported black smoke fires on the southwest end of WAKDE Island.

7. Photo prints received show both black and white smoke coming from the neighborhood of the designated target.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 137-F, 50th Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hit	Miss	Remarks
401	4	Inert.	500 lbs.	4		
064	5			5		
089	5			5		
405	4			4		
335	5			5		
518	5			5		
Total	28	Inert.	500 lbs.	28		

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Malf.	.30 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Malf.
401	4800	3000	Nil.	None		
064	4400	2000	"	2000		
089	4400	1000	"	2000	2000	Nil
405	4800	600	"	None		
335	4400	1200	"	2000		
518	4400	1200	"	2000		
Total	27200	7700		8000	2000	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Req'd
518	K-21	20	
405	K-17	20	3
335	K-18	30	
Total		70	3

APPENDIX "A".

MISSION NO. 137-F DATE: 16 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--Third
ALTITUDE--6000 ft. and Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--1030-1045/K.
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS.

APPENDIX "B".



☆ 501
OR/BKB 138-E
17 May

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 723 UNIT 1

OAS/138

18 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 138-E, performed 17 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: SAWAR-GARMI Area East side of Target 6-X. Secondary target: Supplies and Personnel Area on the Neck of CAPE NGEM.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the east side of target 6-X in the SAWAR-GARMI area. This is the FORMOSA FIELD area. The secondary target was at NEMAI, supplies and personnel on the neck of CAPE NGEM. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes, 5 of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs and one carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs. The target was then to be strafed at minimum altitude with six (6) airplanes abreast.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEROM River, and proceed direct from there to the target. There was to be no fighter cover or rendezvous with any other group.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Only five (5) of our planes reached the target, one (1) plane, #595, turning back at 08h0/X 50 miles northwest of ADMIRALTY due to engine trouble. The mission was otherwise carried out as ordered. The squadron came into the target from land to sea at a heading of approximately 20 degrees at an altitude of 6,000 ft. However, due to cloud cover, it was not possible to drop their bombs on this run. Therefore, the squadron went out to sea and returned on a heading of approximately 200 degrees and dropping to an altitude of 5,000 ft. released their bombs on this second pass. Due to the fact that it was necessary to make two bombing runs, no strafing run was made. The bombing was excellent. A total of 24 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped on the target.

Narrative Report on Mission 138-E, cont'd.

All bombs hit in the northwestern portion of the target. Other than bomb bursts, the crews could report no results visible.

(2) The 501st Squadron led the Group formation followed by the 498th, 499th and 500th squadrons. All four squadrons were assigned the same target.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADIAB from 0710-0713/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over LEROM River from 0715-0730/K.
Fighter Rendezvous: Nil.
Attack: Target 6-E at 5,000 ft. from 1040-1043/K.
Landing: Strip #4 MADIAB from 1355-1400/K. A/P 595 failed to reach target, turned back at 0840/K. and landed at base at 0955/K.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Marston, Group Operations Officer, led the Group formation as well as the 501st Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Marston	A/P 405	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 595
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 099	Lt. Nirdlinger	A/P 076
Lt. Davis	A/P 060	Lt. Flanagan	A/P 074

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Marston, in A/P 405, led the squadron on to the target on a heading of approximately 20 degrees at an altitude of 6,000 ft. Due to cloud coverage over the target, it was not feasible to drop bombs on this initial run. Major Marston, therefore, went out to sea, made a 180 degree turn and losing altitude, came in on to the target again at a heading of approximately 200 degrees at 5000 ft. All planes dropped their bombs on the lead plane's release. Major Marston's bombs as well as those of

his wingman, Lt. Jacobson, in A/P 099, in #2 position, and Lt. Davis, in A/P 060, in #3 position, hitting in the northwestern portion of the target.

(2) The second flight, consisting of two (2) airplanes, was led by Lt. Hirdlinger, in A/P 076, and with Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 074, as his wingman. Both of these planes dropped their bombs on the release of the lead plane, and all 10 of their bombs hit in the same area, the northwestern portion of target 6-X.

b. There was no ack-ack reported by any of our crews.

c. There was no fighter cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDIXES.

a. Bombing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Over the target, all crews reported a small fuel fire just east of the target near point 550560. (Ref. ORAI River 1/20,000). They also reported a larger burning fiercely on the southeastern shore of VANDERMEAR Island.

b. Lt. Davis's crew reported 5-10 barges near the jetty area on the southeast shore of SANNI Pt. Several of these were reported as being serviceable.

c. All crews reported the landing near TOKM area on the northern coast of New Guinea and said that the landing seemed to be progressing satisfactorily.

Narrative Report on Mission 138-E, cont'd.

7. Photo prints received confirm the bomb hits as reported by our crews. Bombs are seen bursting among buildings in the target.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 138-E, 501st Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
405	4	Inst.	500 lb.	4		
399	5			5		
060	5			5		
395	5					
076	5					5 Returned to base
974	5			5		
				5		
Total	29	Inst.	500 lb.	24		5

PHOTO TABLE #2

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd.
405	K-22	40	
076	K-17	35	8
397	K-21	20	
Total		95	8

APPENDIX "A".

501
139-4
OK - 18 May

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/134

19 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 139-4, performed 18 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Targets of Opportunity in the BUT and DAGUA areas. Secondary target: Supply Area 1-D HANSA BAY.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was supply and personnel areas in the DAGUA and BUT areas. The secondary target was 1-D at HANSA BAY. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes, each carrying 3 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs. The entire area from BUT through DAGUA, WEWAK and BORAM was then to be strafed at minimum altitude.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEMON River, and proceed direct from there to the target. Fighter cover was to be in the area, and there was to be no rendezvous with any other group.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. The squadron leader chose DAGUA as the target and approached there from sea to land at a heading of approximately 263 degrees at an altitude of 7500 ft. The first flight selected supply and personnel area 1500 ft. south of the DAGUA Drome dropping 9 1000-pounders in that area, starting a fire with black smoke up to 1,000 ft. The second flight bombed a supply and personnel area at the west end of the DAGUA Drome, their 9 1000-pounders hitting in this area. Withdrawing to the right out to sea, the squadron then lost altitude and making a wide circle to the left started their strafing run at BUT Drome and continued down the coast strafing 2 possible serviceable trucks on DAGUA and other targets of opportunity from there to the BRANDI PLTN. A total of 7995 x .50 caliber and 2400 x .30 caliber rounds were expended in the strafing.

Operation Report on Mission XIV-4, cont'd.

(2) The 16th Squadron led the Group formation followed by the 19th, 20th, and 21st Squadrons. The first two squadrons hit targets in the [illegible] area, while the latter two squadrons were assigned targets at [illegible] and [illegible].

f. [illegible]

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of bombs [illegible] by other Allied units.

g. [illegible]

Takeoff: Over Group A [illegible]
Group Leadership: [illegible]
Fighter Escort: [illegible]
Attack: [illegible] supply drops at [illegible] ft. from [illegible]/ft.
Strafing from [illegible] to [illegible] from [illegible]/ft.
Landing: [illegible] from [illegible]/ft.

h. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

a. 1Lt. Hudson led the pilot squadron on the attack with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Hudson	A/P [illegible]	1Lt. [illegible]	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Jones	A/P [illegible]	1Lt. [illegible]	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Harper	A/P [illegible]	1Lt. [illegible]	A/P [illegible]

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION:

a. 1Lt. Hudson, in A/P [illegible], led the squadron on to the target on a heading of approximately [illegible] degrees at an altitude of [illegible] ft. He didn't drop the supply over [illegible] ft. south of the center of the [illegible] Bridge. He dropped his [illegible] Antipersonnel in the area and very hit there just north of the road. The wingmen, 2Lt. Jones, in A/P [illegible], in #2 position, and 2Lt. Harper, in A/P [illegible], in #3 position, dropped on the lead plane's release. A fire with black smoke up to 1000 ft. was started in this area. The second flight came over the target at approximately the same

Narrative Report on Mission 139-4, cont'd.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. There was no aborts reported by any of our crews.

c. Flight cover was over-cover and was reported as adequate.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There was no injuries to our personnel.

h. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and work sites.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were made by the various crews at minimum altitude on their strafing run from NOF through NOFA:

(1) Lt. Rasbaum's crew reported a Caterpillar tractor seen just north of NAGA Drome, as well as 3-4 trucks seen on the road between NAGA Village and NAGA Drome. They were reported later to have attempted to hide under trees along the side of the road. Two dumps with approximately 75 oil drums were seen one

Narrative Report on Mission 199-A, cont'd.

[redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

7. Photo prints received show the first flight's bombing to be extremely accurate, the bombs hitting directly in the target assigned and hitting just as reported by the combat crew.

For the Squadron Commander:

[redacted]

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report Mission FTO X39-4, [redacted] Bomb Sq.

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Total	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]			[redacted]		
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Total [redacted]		[redacted]		[redacted]	[redacted]	

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Total		[redacted]	[redacted]

APPENDIX "A".

501
141-C
20 May

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

BEO/1jd

21 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 141-D, performed 20 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Personnel Concentration DAGUA-BUT.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was personnel and supplies in the area between DAGUA and CAPE KARAWOP. There was no secondary objective. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes, each carrying 2 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs and strafed at minimum altitude.

b. Six (6) airplanes were to take off from Strip #4 at WADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LERON River, and proceed from there to the target. No fighter cover was to be provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Our squadron approached the target for their bombing run at 5600 ft. as assigned, but were unable to get in due to cloud cover at this altitude, which caused them to have to circle to the left and make their bombing run at 3500-4000 ft. One flight bombed the concentration of naval personnel which was supposed to be one mile inland from the mouth of the BOIKEN Creek. This flight dropped three bombs here and held their remaining three bombs, hoping to find an additional target for them. They were not able to do this, as their run quickly carried them out to sea, where they were forced to salvo the remaining bombs in order to strafe with safety. The other flight bombed BOIKEN Village dropping their entire load of six (6) bombs directly among barrack-type buildings and huts in the area. There were no visible results of bombing other than smoke caused by bursting of bombs. The squadron strafed the inland huts in DAGUA Village and the coastal track from DAGUA Village to CAPE KARAWOP without any visible

results. A total of 5100 x .50 caliber rounds were expended in strafing.

(2) The 499th squadron led the Group formation followed by the 500th, 501st, and 498th squadrons in that order. All squadrons hit targets in the BUT-DAGUA-CAPE MARAWOP areas, except the 498th Sq. which turned back due to weather.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy airplanes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 NADZAB from 0710-0713/K.
Group formation: Over LEROW River from 0722-0735/K.
Attack: DAGUA supply areas at 3500-4000 ft. from 0915-0917/K.
Strafing from DAGUA to CAPE MARAWOP from 0918-0924/K.
Landing: Strip #4 NADZAB (1st flight from 1110-1112/K). (2nd flight landed at GUSAP at 1045/K. Took off GUSAP 1115/K and landed at NADZAB 1200/K.)

f. ROUTE. NADZAB-VALLEY-SEPIK RIVER-TARGET-SEPIK RIVER-VALLEY-NADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Symons led the 501st squadron with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Symons	A/P 764	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 383
Lt. Jones	A/P 082	Lt. Flanagan	A/P 074
Lt. Schade	A/P 089	Lt. Bedell	A/P 036

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Symons, in A/P 764, led the first flight on to the target. His initial approach was made on a heading of approximately 315 degrees, which would

have given his flight a bombing run passing over the Jap naval personnel concentration in the BOIKEN Creek area and over the reported Jap Army Headquarters at KARAWOP Pltn. This approach was made at 5600 ft., but cloud formation forced the flight to make a 360 degree turn to the left and come back for a lower bombing run at 4000 ft. This run was made on an approach from south-north heading. The flight dropped half of their bombs in the BOIKEN Creek area hitting between the 1800 ft. mountain and the creek in the BOIKEN Pltn. The flight was unable to find a target for their remaining bombs before passing out to sea and were forced to salve them in the water between CAPE KARAWOP and KARASAU Island in order to make a safe strafing run. Lt. Jones, in A/P 082, and Lt. Schade, in A/P 089, flying #2 and #3 positions, dropped their bombs on the lead plane's release. All three airplanes strafed huts along the shore from DAGUA Village to CAPE KARAWOP. Lt. Jones and Lt. Schade took K-21 pictures of strafing.

(2) Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 383, led the second flight with Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 074, and Lt. Bedell, in A/P 036, flying #2 and #3 positions. This flight made their bombing run on an approximate zero heading, bombing BOIKEN Village. Their entire load of two bombs per plane dropped among huts and barrack-type buildings in this area. After bombing, the flight let down in a 180 degree turn to the left coming back ½ mile west of DAGUA A/D to begin their strafing run. The flight strafed the shoreline from DAGUA to BOIKEN. This flight was also to have strafed and photographed the coastline from BOIKEN Village to HAWAIN Village, but were unable to do so, due to the danger of being hit by bombs dropped by the group succeeding us over the target. Lt. Flanagan took K-21 pictures of bombing results and K-17 pictures of bombing and strafing covering the coastline from DAGUA A/D to BOIKEN Village.

b. There was no ack-ack reported by any of our crews.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

Narrative Report on Mission 141-D, cont'd.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were made by the various crews at minimum altitude on their strafing run from DAGUA Village to CAPE KARAWOP.

(1) Lt. Syman's crew reported one empty gun pit on the crest of a ridge 1½ miles southeast of DAGUA Village at point 014237. (All ref. BUT East 1:1).

(2) Lt. Jones's crew reported three (3) serviceable trucks seen 1½ miles west of DAGUA Drome at point 940250, as well as 10 thatched buildings, possibly bivouac area, in the vicinity of point 030227. They also reported seven (7) well constructed buildings seen at KARAWOP Village.

(3) Lt. Schade's crew reported one dummy gun in gun pit ½ mile southeast of DAGUA Drome at point 983240.

(4) Lt. Flanagan's crew reported one unidentified crashed airplane approximately one mile west of west end of DAGUA Drome. They were unable to estimate how long it had been there. They also reported one truck, of undetermined serviceability, seen along north side of DAGUA Strip.

(5) Lt. Bedell's crew reported a fire with smoke up to 300 ft. seen halfway between DAGUA and BUT Dromes. They also reported 6-8 craters on DAGUA Strip, which had fuel drums in them, as well as reporting 30-40 fuel drums seen lined up along west end of DAGUA Strip.

(6) No crews were able to see signal panels reported to be west of DAGUA Drome.

Narrative Report on Mission 141-B, cont'd.

(7) From an altitude of 4,000 ft., Lt. Symons's and Lt. Flanagan's crew reported 2 camouflaged canoes on the beach southeast of WHISLING Village at point 10031.

7. Photo prints received confirm the bomb hits as reported by our crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report 141-D, 501st Squadron

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
764	2	Inst.	1000 lb.	1		1 salvoed
089	2			1		1 "
082	2			1		1 "
383	2			2		
036	2			2		
074	2			2		
Total	12	Inst.	1000 lb.	9		3

STRAFING TABLE #2

.50 Caliber

A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Failures
764	1600	none	nil
089	4400	600	LLN/LRW
082	4400	900	ULN/LLN
383	4800	1200	nil
036	4400	900	LRN/ULN
074	4400	1500	nil
Total	24,000	5100	

NOTE: L: left; L: lower; N: nose; R: right; U: upper; W: waist

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
074	K-17	15	5
	K-21	30	3
082	K-21	30	2
089	K-21	30	0
Total		105	10

APPENDIX "A".

50
142-
21 May

50lst BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/134

22 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 142-C, performed 21 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 50lst Bomb Squadron. Objective: Personnel Areas at DAGUA and BUT.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was personnel and supplies and possible troop concentrations in the area between the NIMAHAU River northwest of DAGUA and CAPE KARAKOP. There was no secondary objective. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude with six (6) airplanes, each carrying 2 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs and then to be strafed at minimum altitude.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEROM RIVER, and proceed from there direct to the target. There was to be no fighter cover nor a rendezvous with any other group.

2. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Our squadron approached the target from the southeast, made a 180 degree turn, and came in for their bombing run at an altitude of 5200 ft. at a heading of 320 degrees. Bombing was excellent. A total of 12 1000-pounders were dropped in the target. Of these, the first flight dropped its 6 bombs among shacks and buildings 2 miles west of BUT DROME completely demolishing them. The second flight's bombs (6) hit in the Jap camp area 2 miles southeast of DAGUA DROME at point 9.5034 demolishing three shacks in that area. (All ref. BUT East and West 1:1). The squadron then withdrew to the left over sea, made a wide circle losing altitude, and came in again on the target for their strafing run. In all 6600 x .50 caliber rounds were expended in the strafing run, which started at the NIMAHAU River and continued down the coast to CAPE KARAKOP. It was on this strafing run that one of our planes, A/P 074,

was lost. The crash was not seen by any crew members on the mission. However, at the interrogation after the mission, a column of black smoke up to 3000 ft. was reported approximately 3/4 mile south of east end of DAGUA DROME at point 975236. This smoke was not seen on the bombing run and also was not seen until after passing on the strafing run. Some of the crews reported it as a fuel fire, and one crew said it might possibly be a crashed plane. The last time Lt. Wichmann's plane was seen was at the south of the west end of DAGUA strip at approximately 0951/K. When Lt. Wichmann's plane did not return, a search mission was sent out. Arriving in the DAGUA area at 1515/K, the search plane immediately circled the area where the fire had been seen in the morning. The crashed P-38 was seen there and was positively identified as one of our planes by the white markings on the tail as well as the orange cowling. In the opinion of the pilots and crew of the search mission, it would have been impossible for any crew members to survive the crash, which was still burning when the search plane left the area. The tail section of the plane was seen 50-60 ft. away from the main portion of the fuselage. (Note: Bombing results of A/P 074 have been included in the above count, since their bombs were observed by otherplanes).

(2) The 500th squadron led the Group formation followed by the 501st, 498th, and 499th squadron in that order. All four squadrons hit targets of opportunity in the area bounded by the KINAHAU River and CAPE KARAMOP.

4. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) At the time of interrogation, our crews reported a crashed [illegible] T on the beach 1½ miles west of DAGUA DROME, but other than reporting the fire and smoke southeast of DAGUA DROME which they said might possibly be a crashed plane, there was no report on the loss of A/P 074.

Narrative Report on Mission 142-C, cont'd.

g. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 at MADZAB from 0739-0742/K.
Group formation: Over LEROM River from 0755-0800/K.
Attack: BUT and DAGUA supply areas at 5200 ft. from 0737-0740/K.
Strafing from MINAHAU River to CAPE KARAMOP from 0837-0853/K.
Landing: Strip #4 at MADZAB from 1140-1142/K.

f. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-SEPIK RIVER-WAROKE-SEPIK RIVER-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE FIRST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. 1Lt. Lewis led the First Squadron on this mission with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Lewis	A/P 1[illegible]	1Lt. Monaghan	A/P 3[illegible]
1Lt. Wichmann	A/P 07[illegible]	1Lt. Jacobson	A/P 3[illegible]
1Lt. Mirdlinger	A/P 0[illegible]	1Lt. Davis	A/P 0[illegible]

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) 1Lt. Lewis, in A/P 1[illegible], led the first flight on to the target making his initial approach on a heading of approximately 100 degrees. The target he had spotted was a concentration of shacks and buildings ½ mile west of BUT DROME at point 1Lt. Lewis's bombardier released his 2 bombs, and they hit squarely in the area as did those of his wingman, 1Lt. Wichmann, in A/P 07[illegible], and 1Lt. Mirdlinger, in A/P 0[illegible]. The area was observed to have been "blown to bits" and debris was seen throughout the spot where the bombs had hit. 1Lt. Lewis then withdrew to the left beyond DAGUA DROME and made a wide circle at zero losing altitude as he circled. He came in to the coast at minimum altitude just above the MINAHAU RIVER and strafed from that area down to CAPE KARAMOP. His No. 3 man covered the coastline, and his No. 2 man covered a strafing path about 3/4 mile inland. It was on this strafing run, about halfway between BUT and DAGUA, this plane was seen to pull up suddenly and attempt to gain altitude as though it had apparently been hit by anti-aircraft fire. Due to the exigency of the strafing run, it was impossible for the crew, who

made this observation, to continue to watch the flight path of this airplane, which was later found crashed 3/4 mile southeast of the east end of DAGUA DROME. The plane was last seen by a crew member of another airplane apparently continuing its strafing run south of the west end of DAGUA Strip. Obviously the pilot had elected to continue his strafing attack as long as possible even though his plane had been already damaged. Lt. Lewis and Lt. Middlinger, noticing the BEAUFORT on the beach 1½ mile west of DAGUA, circled the area to see if there were any survivors there, but seeing no signs of life there, they then left the area. Lt. Middlinger took K-22 photos of the strafing.

(2) Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 383, led the second flight. He came in on a heading of about 105 degrees and chose a target 2 miles southwest of DAGUA DROME, a Jap camp area at point 9452234. His bombs as well as his wingman, Lt. Jacobson, in A/P 518, and Lt. Davis, in A/P 602, hit squarely in this area and demolished at least three shacks there. All crews of the second flight were unanimous in their report of "hitting the nail on the head". This flight then withdrew out to sea and at minimum altitude came in on a strafing run which extended from DALAM Village to CAPE KATAWOF. This flight reported a fire south of DAGUA DROME which some crew members said was in the Jap camp area bombed and some put farther east. The whole flight, however, reported it as a fuel fire, and there was no mention of a crashed plane. Lt. Jacobson took low obliques of the strafing with the K-22 camera.

b. One of our crews reported seeing two bursts of medium ack-ack fire at the lead plane of the second flight midway between DAGUA and BUF DROMES. The altitude was level with our planes, but it was inaccurate fire of light intensity. Another crew reported light A/C fire from this same approximate area.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. A/P 41-30074 crashed 3/4 mile southeast of DAGUA Drome at approximately 0951/T. This plane was a total loss as reported by a search mission, which arrived in the area at 1515/T and saw the plane still burning there and identified it by the white tail markings and orange cowling.

Narrative Report on Mission 142-C, cont'd.

e. The crew members of the crashed airplane were:

2nd Lt.	Delmar L. Wichmann	0-742399	Pilot
2nd Lt.	Warren W. Everett	0-738126	Co-pilot
S/Sgt.	Edgar D. Faulkner, Jr.	19170027	Engineer
S/Sgt.	George R. Belchik	16070703	Radio Opr.
S/Sgt.	Fred A. Clayton	14125311	Gunner
S/Sgt.	William J. Hogan	19033171	Photographer

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were in the opinion of this Officer actions by crew members which should justify awards. A/P 074, after apparently being hit by enemy fire, continued on in its strafing attack and as a result crashed with the loss of its entire crew. Such devotion to duty should receive the highest commendation.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were made by the various crews at minimum altitude on their strafing run along the coast from BALAM Village, 3 miles northwest of BUT Drome and all along the coast to CAPE KARAWOP.

(1) Lt. Lewis's crew reported one crash BEAUFORT seen on the beach 1½ miles west of DAGUA Drome at point 935254. BEAUFORT was still smoking. No personnel were visible.

(2) Lt. Monaghan's crew reported 5 trucks near the beach 1½ miles northwest of DAGUA Drome, 3 of doubtful serviceability and 2 gas trucks looked to be in good condition. 30-40 oil drums were observed in the same area. They also observed, together with all the rest of the crews, fire and column of black smoke up to 2,000 ft. approximately 3/4 mile south of east end of DAGUA Drome at point 975236. This smoke was not seen on bombing run, and was not seen until after passing on the strafing run. Crews described it as an oil fire or a fire caused by a crashed airplane.

(3) Lt. Nirdlinger's crew reported three white panels, 20 ft. apart, in line pointing towards the beach along the east bank of the NINAHAU River—4 miles

Narrative Report on Squadron Ill-C, continued

west of BUT Dragon at point [illegible]. They also reported one or two [illegible] west [illegible] of DAONA strip as well as 2 small fuel dumps in BUT Village.

(b) Lt. Goodbourn's crew reported a broken overhead mile west of DAOUN Dragon at point [illegible] still intact.

3. Photo prints received confirm the bomb hits as reported by our crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report [illegible]

[illegible] TABLE [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

[illegible] TABLE [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	6600	

PHOTO TABLE [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total		[illegible]	[illegible]

APPENDIX "[illegible]"



N

MISSION NO. 142-C DATE: 21 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--Second
ALTITUDE--5200 ft. and Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--0937-0953/K.

- PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
- OTHER PLANES
- BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS
- STRAFINGRUN
- BOMBING RUN

APPENDIX "B"




BEAUFORT
DAGUA A/D
JAP CAMP AREA
074 CRASHED HERE
STRAFING RUN
BOMBING RUN



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 142-C DATE- 21/5/44
345th BOMB GROUP
511ST BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0951-0953/L
ALTITUDE. 5200 FT. & MIN.

APPENDIX "C"

501
143-D
22 May 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

BBS/134

23 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 143-D, performed 22 May 1944 by five (5) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: AGK-AGK Positions at BUT-DAGUA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was ack-ack positions in the BUT-DAGUA area. There was no secondary target. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) airplanes two (2) of which carried 2 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs and four (4) of which carried 3 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs. Target was also to be strafed at minimum altitude by all six (6) airplanes.

b. Six (6) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEROM River, and proceed from there direct to the target. There was to be no fighter cover nor a rendezvous with any other group.

2. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Our squadron approached the target on their bombing run at 4800-5000 ft. coming in on a heading of approximately 165 degrees. Bombing was unobserved. A total of 13 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped with eight (8) hitting close around a possible ack-ack position one mile southeast of BUT Village starting a fire with black smoke rising up to 1500-2500 ft. This smoke lasted about 3 minutes and was completely gone when the planes returned for their strafing run. 2 bombs fell within 100 ft. of a M/G position north of the center of BUT Drome. This gun position was seen later to be empty. 3 bombs fell along the south edge of BUT runway with no visible results. The squadron strafed the coastal installations and villages from BUT to KOFI Village 3 miles east of CAPE KARAWOP. A truck and several oil drums spotted between the center of DAGUA Drome and the beach were heavily strafed. A possible ammunition dump at the northwest end of

DASHA Drome was set afire by strafing, causing intermittent puffs of white smoke which was visible for 20-30 minutes after the attack. A small fire with white smoke was started in SHAIN Village. Only five (5) planes attacked the target, as one airplane was unable to take off due to mechanical failure.

(2) Major Marston, Asst. Group Operations Officer, led the 501st squadron as well as the 345th Group. The squadrons flew in the following orders 501st, 498th, 499th, and 500th squadron. All four squadrons hit ack-ack positions in the BUT-DASHA area.

4. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

5. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 0650-0653/K.
Group formation: Over LEROM River from 0705-0715/K.
Attack: BUT ack-ack positions at 5,000 ft. at 0820/K.
Strafing from BUT to KOFI Village from 0850-0900/K.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1100-1200/K.

6. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-GEPIK RIVER-TARGET-GEPIK RIVER-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Marston led the 501st Squadron with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Marston	A/P 401	1Lt. Harper	A/P 389
1Lt. Goffman	A/P 089	1Lt. Bedell	A/P 518
1Lt. Flanaghan	A/P 093		

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Marston, in A/P 401, led the first flight on to the target making his approach on a heading of approximately 165 degrees, selecting for his target

an ack-ack position approximately one mile south-east of BUT Village. Lt. Gaffney, in A/P 669, flew #2 position, and Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 695, flew #3 position. This flight dropped their entire load of 8 bombs, grouping them very closely around the ack-ack position and completely covering it. A column of black smoke was started which rose 1000-1500 ft. and lasted for about 25 minutes. This flight then let down in a circle to the left coming back for their strafing run along the coast from BUT through KOFI Village. A truck and several oil drums spotted between NAOUA Bruce and the beach were heavily strafed as well as a possible ammunition dump at the northwest end of NAOUA Bruce. Light explosions were started here and puffs of white smoke were seen to rise, which were visible for 20-30 minutes after the attack.

(2) Lt. Harper, in A/P 383, led the second flight with Lt. Rodell, in A/P 518, flying on his wing in #2 position. This flight selected the ack-ack position north of the center of the BUT runway for its bombing. Their entire load of 5 bombs were dropped. Lt. Harper's bombs hit within 100 ft. of the ack-ack position, while Lt. Rodell's bombs were strewn along the south side of the BUT runway. When passing this area on their strafing run, Lt. Harper saw his bomb craters and also the gun pit which had been his target. This gun pit was seen to be empty of any guns. The flight strafed installations and huts along the coast from BUT to KOFI Village, starting a small fire with white smoke in SMAIK Village.

b. Slight M/G fire was received by the airplanes when passing over NAOUA Bruce. Tracers were observed to be going due north, indicating that the gun was possibly firing from somewhere along the south side of the drome, although the gun position itself was not seen. 2 puffs of white smoke, indicating possibly medium ack-ack, were seen to burst over the water off shore opposite BUT Plan., at flight altitude, but otherwise inaccurate.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

Narrative Report on Mission [illegible], continued

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

f. [illegible]

5. APPENDIX.

a. [illegible]
b. Map of [illegible]
c. Map showing [illegible]

6. [illegible]

a. The following [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

b. The following [illegible]

(1) [illegible] [redacted]

(2) [illegible] [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

7. [illegible]

For the Squadron Commander:

[illegible]
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

501
M6-E
25 May 44

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

26 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 146-E, performed 25 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: DAGUA—Personnel and Supplies.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective of the strike was a supply area 1000 ft. west of DAGUA Drome. According to photo interpretation reports, this area contained two stacks of fuel drums, each consisting of 300 drums. In addition to this, numerous boxes of supplies were reported to be stowed under the trees there. This target was to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude by six (6) planes, five with a maximum load of 22 clusters of 3 x 23 lb. parafrags, and one loaded with 12 clusters of 3 x 23 lb. parafrags.

b. Six (6) airplanes were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other three squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEMON River, and proceed from there to the target. There was to be no fighter cover, and our group was to be the only one on this target.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Six (6) airplanes of this squadron attacked the target as ordered. However, one of these planes was delayed in take-off and did not reach the target in time to join our squadron formation. However, this plane, No. 076, joined the 498th squadron and bombed and strafed with them. The five (5) airplanes of our squadron attacked the target on one pass at minimum altitude. They approached from the west on a heading of approximately 110 degrees, started their strafing attack just west of BUT Drome, continued down the coast over the water just beyond BUT, then hitting the coast again at SWAIN; and continued down towards DAGUA. Reaching the target, which was 1000 ft. west of DAGUA Drome, these five (5) airplanes released a total of 110 clusters of 3 x 23 lb. parafrags. Bombing was excellent. Of these, 104 clus-

ters were "strung out" through the target area itself and six clusters were dropped just beyond. Of these latter 6 clusters, 2 were seen to drop on a LILLY at the west end of DAGUA Drome. The crew described this plane as being possibly serviceable, since it was up on its wheels and was seen to be moored by ropes to the ground. Bombs were seen by two crews to have hit on the nose of the plane, and there can be no doubt that it was destroyed. Four remaining clusters were dropped at the east end of DAGUA Drome with unobserved results. As the result of the bombs dropped in the target itself, a column of black smoke 300-400 ft. high was seen in the central portion of the target after the attack. Crews, however, could not see the oil drums which were reported to have been there.

A/P 076, flying "tail end Charlie" on the 498th Squadron, dropped 5 clusters in DAGUA Village and was forced to salvo 7 clusters, because the pilot was unable to find a suitable target. All six of Fourth airplanes strafed from BUT Drome through CAPE MANAWOP and expended 7350 x .50 caliber and 1500 x .30 caliber rounds of ammunition.

(2) The 500th squadron was leader of the Group formation, and was followed by the 501st, 499th, and 498th squadrons in that order. All four squadrons hit targets in the BUT-DAGUA-CAPE MANAWOP area.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: Strip #4 MAUZAB (5 planes) from 0744-0747/K.
(1 plane) at 0755/K.

Group Formation: There was no rendezvous with the remaining squadrons of the Group, due to delay in take-off.

Attack: Bomb and Strafe DAGUA personnel and supply areas at minimum altitude from 0930-0934/K.

Landing: Strip #4 MAUZAB (5 planes) from 1114-1117/K.
(1 plane) at 1132/K.

Narrative Report on Mission 146-E, continued

f. ROUTE. HADZAB-VALLEY-SEPIK RIVER-TARGET-SEPIK RIVER-VALLEY-HADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Monaghan was leader of the 501st Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Monaghan	A/P 437	Lt. Harper	A/P 089
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 093	Lt. Schade	A/P 069
Lt. Davis	A/P 060	(Note: Lt. Jones, in A/P 076, attacked the target with the 498th Squadron).	

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Monaghan, in A/P 437, led the first flight of the squadron on to the target. Coming in over land, they made a 180 degree turn and started their strafing run just west of BUT Drome. They continued down the coast strafing as they proceeded and attacked the target itself at a heading of approximately 110 degrees. Lt. Monaghan covered the northern side of the target and toggled off his 22 clusters so that they all landed in the target itself. Lt. Jacobson, in A/P 093, flying #2 position, toggled 16 of his clusters in the target, and saved the remaining six dropping them on targets on DAGUA Drome. Two of these were seen to hit squarely on the nose of a LILLY, which was parked on the west end of the strip. This bomber looked to be in possibly serviceable condition, since it was on its wheels and was moored by ropes to the ground. It is considered that the plane was destroyed. Lt. Davis, in A/P 060, flew #3 position which necessitated his covering the coast. His 22 clusters, however, were dropped just to the north of the target area and are considered to be excellent hits.

(2) In the second flight, in A/P 089, Lt. Harper was the leader. He too covered the northern side of the target and dropped his clusters squarely throughout the area. After his bombing, his crew noted a fire with brownish-black smoke rising to 300-400 ft. over the center of the target itself. Lt. Schade, in A/P 069, flew #2 position covered the southern portion of the target, and all 22 of his clusters dropped on the assigned area with unobserved results. All crews re-

ported that they could see no evidence of the fuel drums which were said to have been in the area. These five planes then continued strafing from DAONA through to CAPE NAMAHOF.

(3) Lt. Jones, in A/P 076, which was delayed on take-off, failed to join our squadron before reaching the target. As he arrived in the area, he saw the 498th squadron making its bombing and strafing run, and he joined their formation. He too strafed from BUT down the coast and dropped five of his clusters on DAONA village with unobserved results. His remaining 7 clusters were salvoed at sea, due to the fact that he could not find any suitable target.

b. Ack-ack of various types was reported by several of our crews. At least 3 crews reported 3-4 white puffs, either mortar or light caliber, of ack-ack on plane level, but inaccurate as to range. They were received when over the water between BUT Village and the west end of DAONA Drome. Another crew reported seeing one black puff probably medium ack-ack. This too was inaccurate at plane altitude, and was seen near the center of DAONA Drome. Light M/G fire inaccurate but flight level was seen coming from hills south of DAONA Village.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our airplanes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Lt. Harper's crew reported seeing numerous native-type buildings in good condition in the hills south of BORAM Pltn.

Narrative Report on Mission No. 166-E, continued

b. All crews reported a small fire with black smoke ½ mile south of the east end of DAGUA Strip, as well as a large fire with black smoke to 800-1000 ft. in the hills 2 miles southwest of BOLEN Village.

7. Photo prints received provide very incomplete cover of bombing.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report on Mission 146-E, 501st Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
437	22 Clusters	Para-frag	3 x 23 lb.	22		
093	"			16	6	
060	"			22		
089	"			22		
069	"			22		
076	12				5	7 clus. salvoed
Total	122 Clusters	Parafrags	3 x 23 lb.	104	11	7

STRAFING TABLE #2

	.50 Caliber			.30 Caliber		
A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
437	4400	900	Nil	2000	None	Nil
093	"	1900	"	"	300	"
060	"	1500	"	"	1000	"
089	"	900	"	"	200	"
069	"	500	"	"	None	"
076	"	1650	"	"	None	"
Total	26,400	7350		12,000	1500	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
060	K-21	10	0
089	K-21	20	2
069	K-21	20	0
Total		50	2

APPENDIX "A".

501 147-D 26 May 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/1jd

27 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 147-D, performed 26 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Report Jap Headquarters near CAPE KARAWOP in the DAGUA Area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the reported Jap Headquarters in an area southwest of CAPE KARAWOP. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) planes, four (4) of them carrying 3 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs and two (2) of them carrying 2 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs. All planes were then to strafe the area from BUT to CAPE KARAWOP at minimum altitude.

b. Six (6) planes were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with two other squadrons of the 345th Group over the LEMON River, and proceed from there to the target. No fighter cover was to be provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Six (6) planes of this squadron approached from the southwest at an altitude of 4500 ft., but found the target covered with clouds. They circled once and came in on the same heading, but this time slightly too low, and a third circle was made and the squadron bombed then from an altitude of 3000-3500 ft. at the target which was the suspected Jap Personnel Headquarters southwest of CAPE KARAWOP. Bombing was excellent. Of these, 16 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs dropped, 13 bombs hit in the target and started a light gray smoke fire in the area, while 3 strung across the northwest half of KARAWOP Pltn. with no visible results other than bomb bursts. The squadron then went out to sea, lost altitude as they made a wide circle, and coming in on the coast just above BUT strafed particularly heavy the whole coastal strip from there through BANAK Village, which is just west of CAPE KARAWOP. Although no important targets were sighted on the strafing run, TJAKOMBELI Village and the reported M/G positions on hills inland from the coastline were

concentrated upon and in all 18,225 x .50 caliber and 4200 x .30 caliber rounds were expended. One of our planes was hoisted by M/G fire south of BAGHA, but the damage was slight and no personnel was injured.

(2) The 501st Squadron led the Group formation to the target on the bombing run. They were followed by the 498th and 499th squadrons. After the bombing, the 501st Squadron made a wide sweep allowing the 498th, with its cannons, to be first on the strafing run. They were followed by the 501st and 499th on this second pass. All squadrons hit targets in the BUT-BAGHA-CAPE KARAWOP area, while the strafing was concentrated on the possible anti-aux positions in the hills 5a from the shore. After both passes were made, the Group reassembled with the 501st again in the lead.

4. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

5. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: Strip #4 at MADZAB from 1035-1037/K.
Group formation: Over LEROM River from 1058-1057/K.
Attack: Bombing at CAPE KARAWOP from 3000-3500 ft. from 1235-1237/K.
Strafing from BUT Drome to CAPE KARAWOP from 1237-1245/K.
Landing: Strip #4 at MADZAB from 1425-1430/K.

6. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-GAPIE RIVER-TARGET-BROKEN WATER BAY-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Col. Tyson, Group Commander, led the 501st Squadron as well as the Group on this mission. The flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Colonel Tyson	A/P 491	Lt. Symons	A/P 401
Lt. Nirdlinger	A/P 076	Lt. Goffman	A/P 036
Lt. Flanagan	A/P 518	Lt. Bedell	A/P 093

Narrative Report on Mission 147-D, continued

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Colonel Tyson, in A/P 491, made his initial approach on a heading of approximately 275 degrees at an altitude of 1500 ft., but finding a layer of clouds over the target, he circled to the right and to sea and came in again on the same heading at a lower altitude. Being slightly too low, a third approach was made once again at the same heading at an altitude of 2000-2500 ft. On this run, the bomb was dropped. Col. Tyson's 2 1000-pounders hit squarely in the target, while those of his wingman, Lt. Ellingson, in A/P 496, in #2 position, and Lt. Flanagan, in A/P 508, in #3 position, were dropped on the lead plane's release and hit just to the right and left of the lead plane's bombs. A fire with light gray smoke was seen to be started in this area.

(2) In the second flight, Lt. Symons, in A/P 401, came in on the same heading at a slightly lower altitude dropping his 2 bombs on the target. His right wingman, Lt. Sartoris, in A/P 496, dropped his 2 bombs across the waterfront of KARAMOP Villa., while the #3 man, Lt. Nahill, in A/P 499, hit directly in the target. The squadron then circled out to sea making a wide circle so that the LCVP with the "commandeering H'qs" could be fired on the strafing run. Our squadron then began their strafing run at YAMCHUMLI Village 2 miles west of BUT Drome and continued down the coast to DAMAX Village and CAPE KARAMOP concentrating their fire on reported positions in the hills inland from the coastline.

b. Ack-ack of various kinds and varying intensities were received by our planes. Several planes reported 4-5 white rocket-like streamers seen firing from the side of hills south of BUT. Streamers were at airplane level and came within 100-150 ft. of our planes. They had apparently fired from a point [illegible]. (All ref. BUT Beat and Beat 111). Another crew observed spiralling rocket-like streamers which seemed to be coming from what appeared to have "large flower pots", 2 of which were along the north side of DAGUA Drome and one in the center of DAGUA Village. M/G fire, which was inaccurate, of moderate intensity, but flight altitude was encountered from three machine guns on the cliff of a hill one mile south of the east end of DAGUA Drome. M/G fire also inaccurate and of slight intensity, was received from the general vicinity of BUT Drome.

Narrative Report on Mission 1AF-8, continued

g. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. One of our airplanes, No. 518, piloted by 1Lt. Flanagan, was hit by A/C fire, and the damage, however, was slight.

g. There were no injuries to our personnel.

h. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDIXES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were made by the various crews at various altitudes.

(1) 1Lt. Hirlinger's crew reported trucks 30-40 miles inland between WEWAK and HANSA BAY appeared to be well used.

(2) 1Lt. Flanagan's crew reported a heavy explosion resembling a 500 lb. bomb was seen in the center of WEWAK runway. A puff of white smoke rose from this 200-300 ft. The crew thought this might have been some sort of a warning signal of the impending attack.

(3) Capt. Ryan's crew reported sighting 3 small fires with light smoke seen along the coast between WEWAK and WOM Pt., as well as one small fire seen on HANSEN Island. This crew also reported seeing a large explosion in the water 3 miles off shore from NIT Village at position 900300.

(4) 1Lt. Caffman's crew reported a truck on the road in the hills 2½ miles southeast of BOIKEN Village at point 135190.

Narrative Report on Mission 1[illegible]-B, continued

b. From minimum altitude while on the strafing run, the following sightings were made.

(1) 1Lt. Finnigan's crew reported the road between BUT and DAGUA appears generally serviceable. They also noted 4 empty gun pits in the fringe of trees along the north side of DAGUA strip. Gas drums in craters around the east end of DAGUA strip appeared to have been burned out.

(2) 1Lt. Kirchinger's crew reported tracks in the Jap camp area southeast of DAGUA Drome appeared to be well used.

7. From photo prints received of the bombing, the bombs were shown to be bursting in KIRANGO ville, slightly northeast of the assigned target. 2 bombs also are shown to have fell in the water just off shore. Other than the exploding bombs, no results can be seen in these photographs.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 141-V DATE-26/5/44
345th BOMB GROUP
501ST BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1235-1245/L
ALTITUDE: 3000-3600' # MINIMUM
APPEN...

DRAWN BY - GROUP PHOTO

501
148-F
2 Inv
JCH.

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/ljd

28 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 148-F, performed 27 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Personnel Area one mile long southwest of BUT A/D.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective of the strike was a personnel area southwest of BUT Airdrome. The area to be bombed was one mile long and covered either side of a creek where the Japs were reported to have their camps. Target was to be hit first at medium altitude by six (6) planes, four (4) of them carrying 5 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs and two (2) carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs. All planes were then to strafe the area at minimum altitude from BUT eastward covering the foothills inland rather than the shore area.

b. Six (6) planes were to take off from Strip #4 at NADZAB, form with the other squadrons of the 345th Group over the LERON River, and proceed from there to the target. No fighter cover was to be provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Six (6) planes of this squadron came over the water around KAIRIRU Island, then making a 180 degree turn approached the target from the southwest coming in on their bombing run over the hills at an altitude of 4500-5000 ft. on a heading of approximately 45 degrees. Bombing was excellent. 28 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs were dropped and all hit in the assigned area. Other than bomb bursts and smoke over the target, crews could report no results. After the bombing run, the planes headed out to sea, made a wide sweeping turn to the left, lost altitude and came in to the shore one mile above BUT Airdrome and started their strafing run. Due to the fact that Japs had been reported inland rather than on the coastal areas, the strafing was concentrated on the foothills back

from the coast. The entire area was heavily strafed from one mile west to BUT to just west of the west end of DAGUA Drome. Five (5) of our planes were holed by M/G fire over the target. Damage, however, was of a more or less minor nature, and there were no injuries to any of our combat crews. It is the unanimous opinion of the crews, that the method and type of attack and the bomb load employed on these missions is not only ineffective but also increasingly costly, due to the increase in A/A activity. Due to the terrain, it is impossible to strafe effectively the gun positions, and our planes are making themselves ideal targets for the Jap M/G and mortar fire. All crews suggested, also, the use of numerous small bombs, such as 100-pounders, or free-falling fragmentation bombs, as the most effective way to destroy personnel located in these foothills.

(2) The 498th led the attack followed by the 500th and 501st squadrons in that order. The 498th came in on a heading of 135 degrees and bombed the area to the east of our target. The 500th and 501st squadrons bombed the same target.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 0733-0736/K.
Group formation: Over IRRON River from 0745-0800/K.
Attack: Bombing personnel area southwest of BUT from 4500-5000 ft. from 0935-0937/K.
Strafing from BUT Drome to DAGUA Drome at minimum altitude from 0943-0950/K.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1145-1150/K.

f. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-GEPIK RIVER-TARGET-PAST HANSA BAY-CAPE CROISILLES-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Nusbaum led the 501st Squadron on this mission. Flights were as follows:

Narrative Report on Mission 148-F, continued

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Nusbaum	A/P 405	Lt. Harper	A/P 383
Lt. Davis	A/P 437	Lt. Gentry	A/P 099
Lt. Kirsil	A/P 069	Lt. Jacobson	A/P 089

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Nusbaum, in A/P 405, led the first flight on the attack. He came in from sea to land and made his bombing run at a heading of approximately 45 degrees at an altitude of 4500 ft. His 4 500-pounders were dropped squarely in the center of the assigned target from near the bank of the creek in the northern portion of the target. His wingman, Lt. Davis, in A/P 437, and Lt. Kirsil, in A/P 069, each dropped their 5 bombs on the lead plane's release. Their bombs also hit in the target.

(2) The second flight led by Lt. Harper, in A/P 383, followed in trail on the same heading as Lt. Nusbaum. Once again all bombs of both the flight leader and those of his wingman, Lt. Gentry, in A/P 099, and Lt. Jacobson, in A/P 089, dropped in the assigned target.

(3) The squadron then went out to sea, made a wide circle to the left, lost altitude, and came in to the coastline one mile above BUT Drome at minimum altitude. Heading inland all three (3) planes of each flight strafed the foothills and areas south of BUT Drome endeavoring to mack out with their .50 caliber bullets the ack-ack positions in the foothills there. The strafing of this area was heavy and 9750 x .50 caliber and 2000 x .30 caliber were expended.

b. There was a marked increase in ack-ack activity on this mission as compared with the previous missions. Although it maybe noted that this increase has been a gradual one.

(1) All crews reported M/G fire on their strafing run. It was accurate varying from intense to moderate and was at the exact altitude of our run. This fire came from the foothills south of BUT Drome, from the area between BUT and DAGUA, and from south of DAGUA Drome. It was especially noticed that the guns were

placed in the hills about 50 ft. above the level of the strips, and, therefore, could fire horizontally into our low flying formation. This M/G fire was pin-pointed as coming from several positions; from position ½ mile southeast of BUT Drome at point 875862, from the hills one mile southwest of SHAIN Village, and from the foothills south of BAGRA Drome. (Ref. BUT East and West 1:1).

(2) 6 bursts, of what is no doubt considered to be definitely mortar fire, came from the hills south of BUT and exploded on BUT runway itself. These bursts were described by several crew members as being similar to a bomb burst with large flashes and black smoke. They seemed to be coming from the foothills south of BUT Drome from an elevation of 50 ft., and were so timed that they burst just as our squadron approached the area at tree-top level.

(3) The white streamers, which ~~had~~ only "were" been reported for the past two days, were thgaisma in evidence on this mission than ever before. It was noted that the streamers had a very slow velocity and were also "wavy and spiralling". Several crew members said that they looked "like phosphorus bombs exploding". One man described it as a "Roman Candle" with its "long tail of smoke and no burst at the end". This fire emanated from numerous positions inland. They were pin-pointed as follows: In the foothills south of BUT Drome at positions 858267, 869259, south of BUT Mission at point 895258, and from southeast of SHAIN village at point 928858. (Ref. same as above).

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. Five (5) of our planes were holed by M/G fire. A description of the damage follows:

A/P 405—Right wing tip—bulkhead on the wing hit from above; right engine generator hit; gas line and oil line hit.

A/P 437—Left nacelle hit and damaged two bulkheads and battery.exh

A/P 099—Right engine, #8 cyclinder, exhaust stack hit. Cowl flaps damaged and fuselage hit.

Narrative Report on Mission 148-F, continued

A/P 383—Right blister blown off.

A/P 069—Right side of bombardier's compartment hit.

g. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. All crews reported the following sighting which was seen from 5000 ft. at 0925/K and as the squadron approached RUF Bremen: 2 large fires with black smoke up to 5,000 ft. seen coming from the base of GAPE WEST Peninsula just east of BORAM strip at position 385055. (Ref. WEST West 141).

7. K-21 vertical prints received from the mission show the bombing confirms crews' reports of the bombing. These photographs show the bombs landing squarely in the target area and in approximately the same location as reported by our crews after the mission.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 148-F, 501st Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
465	4	Incd.	500 lb.	4		
457	5			5		
069	5			5		
383	4			4		
097	5			5		
089	5			5		
Total	28	Incd.	500 lb.	28		

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail	.30 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
465	4000	1400	nil	None		
457	4400	2100	1400/nil	2000		
069	4400	800	nil	2000	300	nil
383	4000	2100	nil/nil	None		
097	4400	2000	1400/nil	2000	1500	nil
089	4400	1150	nil/1400	2000	1000	nil
Total	27200	9750		8000	2800	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Req'd
069	K-21	30	
383	K-21	30	1
089	K-21	30	1
Total		90	15

APPENDIX "A".



MISSION NO. 148-F
DATE: 27 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--Third
ALTITUDE--4500-5000 ft. and Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--0935-0950/K.
PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
OTHER PLANES

APPENDIX "B"



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 148-F DATE: 27 May 44
345th BOMB GROUP
501 BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0455-0457
ALTITUDE: 4500-5000 Ft.

DRAWN BY - GROUP PHOTO

50
149
28 May

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

BEG/134

29 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 149-I, performed 28 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Personnel Area East of DANDRIWAD River.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was ground support of Allied Forces in the TADJI-BUT area, our specific target being a concentration of enemy personnel reported to be 2 miles southwest of CAPE DJERUAN. The target was to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude by six (6) planes, 5 carrying 5 x 500 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs and one carrying 4 x 500 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs. Villages along the coast around the mouth of the DANWAP River were also to be strafed.

b. Six (6) planes were to take off from Strip #4 at MADZAB, form on course and proceed direct to the target. No fighter cover was to be provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Six (6) planes of this squadron attacked the target after making one dry run to be certain of its location. The bombing run was made on a heading of approximately 270 degrees coming in at minimum altitude. Bombing was excellent. The entire load of 29 x 500 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs were dropped in the assigned area with no visible results other than light brown smoke after bombing. There were no indications of enemy activity observed in the target. After bombing and strafing the target, our planes made a strafing run covering the coastal villages from DANWAP River through SUAIN Pltn., starting light grey smoke fires in these villages. A large unidentified boat, described as having two cabins and looked like a houseboat or a small ferry boat, was strafed by 2 planes at the mouth of the DANWAP River with no visible results.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) This was a close support mission in which each of the 4 squadrons of the 345th Group were assigned individual targets and separate times for attack. Each squadron proceeded to and from the target as a single unit, and no group formation was involved.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 NADZAB from 0719-0721/K.
Attack: Bombed and strafed personnel area 2 miles southwest of CAPE DJERUAN at minimum altitude from 0921-0928/K.
Landing: Strip #4 NADZAB from 1115-1120/K.

f. ROUTE. NADZAB-RAMU VALLEY-GEPIK RIVER-TARGET-RAMU VALLEY-NADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Symens led the 501st Squadron on this mission. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Symens	A/P 518	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 401
Lt. Nirdlinger	A/P 076	Lt. Coffman	A/P 060
Lt. Schade	A/P 078	Lt. Jones	A/P 093

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Symens led the squadron into the target, making one dry run passing north of the target area from east to west in order to be certain of the exact location before bombing and strafing. After completing his dry run, he circled around south of the mountains and then made his attack on a heading of approximately 270 degrees. He dropped 5 bombs all of which strung across the approximate center of the assigned target. His wingmen dropped 5 bombs each in the target, and all three 3 planes heavily strafed it. There were no results visible other than bursting of

bombs. All three planes took photographs of bombing. After bombing, the flight proceeded to strafe coastal villages from DANMAP River through SUAIN Pltn. starting light grey smoke fires in the villages.

(2) Lt. Monaghan led the second flight making his approach and bombing run the same as that of the first flight. His plane carried 4 bombs all of which were dropped near the center of the target, while his 2 wingman dropped 5 bombs each in the assigned target with no visible results. Lt. Monaghan and Lt. Jones took photographs of their bombing attack. After bombing, the flight strafed the coastal villages from DANMAP River through SUAIN Pltn. Lt. Monaghan and Lt. Jones also strafed a small 2 cabin boat near the mouth of the DANMAP River with no visible results.

b. Ack-ack encountered was generally light and ineffective. Slight, inaccurate, M/G fire at flight altitude was reported by one crew from a position approximately 1½ miles southeast of the target at point 602275. (Ref. SUAIN East 1:1). Another crew reported one white burst of what was possibly a 20 mm. self-destroying shell. This burst directly in front of the nose of their plane when about one mile southeast of SUAIN Pltn. No damage was inflicted.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were reported or confirmed by all crews and differing only in unessential details:

Narrative Report on Mission 149-I, cont'd.

(1) WEWAK: 0915/K—Small fire on east side of WOM Pt. white smoke to 500-600 ft. Seen from 3000'.

(2) MUSCHU ISLAND: 0915/K—15-20 barges, undetermined serviceability, and one, apparently serviceable lugger, along north side of bay opposite MUSCHU Pltn. at approximate position 260239. (Ref. KAIRIRU West 1:1). Seen from 3000 ft. Numerous barges along southeast shore of MUSCHU Island, undetermined serviceability from CAPE MARBU to CAPE BARAMAR also seen from 3000 ft.

(3) BOIEN HARBOR: 0919/K—4 barges, probably serviceable, off BOIEEN PEIN. seen from 2000 ft.

(4) CAPE KARAWOP: 0919/K—One sunken barge and probably serviceable barge seen from 2000 ft.

(5) CAPE DJERUAN: 0921/K—One small barge, apparently serviceable, on beach ½ mile south of NIAP village, seen from 2000 ft.

0924/K—2 large caves in side of mountain with signs of heavy track activity around entrances one mile south of mouth of BAMAP River at point 564290. (Ref. SWAIN East 1:1). Seen from minimum altitude.

7. Photos prints received do not provide coverage of bombing and strafing attack thus making photo assessment of damage impossible.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

501
150-D
29 May 44
JOA

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

GAB/lsd

30 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 150-D, performed 29 May 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Gun Position 1000 ft. SSW of SHAIN Village in the BUT-DAGHA area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the destroying of a gun position which had been spotted on photographs, and had been reported by many of our crews as firing white streamers in the BUT-DAGHA area. This position was pin-pointed 1000 ft. SSW of SHAIN Village on a bare knoll. The target was to be bombed at medium altitude by six (6) planes, five (5) of them carrying 6 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs and one (1) carrying 4 x 500 lb. inst. demo. bombs.

b. Six (6) planes were to take off from Strip #4 at MAIZAR, form the squadron, and proceed direct to the target. There was no group rendezvous nor any fighter cover.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Six (6) planes of this squadron attacked the target coming in from the sea on a heading of approximately 160 degrees at an altitude of 5000-6000 ft. One run was made, and it was the unanimous opinion of the crews that the bombing was excellent. Of the 34 bombs dropped, all went in the target and started a small landslide there as well as a puff of brownish white smoke. The crews all expressed the opinion that the gun position had been definitely hit.

(2) Two squadrons of the 345th Group had targets in the BUT-DAGHA area, the 501st and 500th squadrons. Each squadron proceeded to and from the target as a single unit.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

g. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Strip #4 MADZAB from 0800-0803/K.
Attack: Bombed gun position 1000 ft. SSW of SMAIN VILlage at 5800-6000 ft. from 0958-1000/K.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1144-1146/K.

f. ROUTE. MADZAB-VALLEY-MERIK LAGOON-KAIRIEW ISLAND-TARGET-KAIRIEW ISLAND-GEPIK-VALLEY-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 500ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Symons led the 500st Squadron on this mission. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Symons	A/P 408	Lt. Harper	A/P 764
Lt. Gentry	A/P 060	Lt. Kirwil	A/P 093
Lt. Flanagan	A/P 036	Lt. Jacobsen	A/P 064

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Symons led the squadron on to the target coming in from sea to land on a heading of approximately 160 degrees at an altitude of 5800-6000 ft. The target was easily spotted and his bombardier dropped his bombs well in the pin-pointed position. His wingmen, Lt. Gentry and Lt. Flanagan, dropped their bombs on the lead plane's release and saw their bombs hit squarely in the bare knoll which was the target area. The bombardier of the lead plane reported seeing a small landslide started as the result of the bombing as well as brownish white smoke coming from the area.

(2) The second flight was led by Lt. Harper. He followed the first flight in trail and released his bombs so that they too hit the target squarely, as did the bombs of his wingmen, Lt. Kirwil and Lt. Jacobsen. The bombardier of the lead plane of this flight noted black smoke and yellow dust arising over the target as the result of the bombing.

b. There was no ack-ack encountered.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

Narrative Report on Mission 150-B, cont'd.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDIXES.

a. Bombing, Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were reported:

WENAK: 0945/K—2 barges off shore halfway between CAPE BORAN and NUSH Peninsula were floating and appeared serviceable. Seen from 6,000 ft. by Lt. Harper's crew.

KAIRIW ISLAND: 0946/K—A camouflaged barge or lugger near shore one mile west of KAIRIW seaplane base. Reported by Lt. Kirsil's crew which was seen from 6,000 ft. Also Lt. Kirsil's crew reported flame and fire with black smoke up to 2,000 ft. seen 1½ miles southeast of SMIN Village at point 932240. (Ref. BUY Sheet 1:1). Seen from 6,000 ft. at 1000/K.

Lt. Symm's crew observed a new and well used road going up into the hills in close proximity to target. Seen from 6,000 ft. at 1000/K.

7. Photo prints received show bomb bursts blanketing the exact target, although it cannot be determined whether the gun position was destroyed.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 150-B, 501st Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
[illegible]	4	Inert.	500 lb.	4		
[illegible]	6			6		
[illegible]	6			6		
[illegible]	6			6		
[illegible]	6			6		
[illegible]	6			6		
Total	34	Inert.	500 lb.	34		

PHOTO TABLE #2

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
[illegible]	K-17	16	2
[illegible]	K-21	30	6
Total		46	8

APPENDIX "A".

MISSION NO. 150-D DATE: 29 May 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--First
ALTITUDE--5800-6000 ft.
TIME OVER TARGET--0958-1000/K.
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES

APPENDIX "B".



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 150-D DATE-29-May 44
345th BOMB GROUP
501 BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0458-1000K
ALTITUDE: 5800-6000'

DRAWN BY- GROUP PHOTO

APPENDIX "C"

501
158-L
6 Jun 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/134

11 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 158-L, performed 6 June 1944 by seven (7) Airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Ground Support on BIAK Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective, which was given by the ground station on BIAK Island, was four (4) tanks at point 372406. (Ref. BOSNEK 1:1). This target was to be bombed by seven (7) airplanes, each plane loaded with 2 x 1000 lb. 8—11 and 4—5 second delay demo. bombs.

b. Seven (7) planes of this squadron were to take off from Hollandia Drome, form with the 345th Group on course, and proceed direct to the target via WAKDE Island. There was no rendezvous to be made with fighters as area cover was provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Five (5) planes only reached the target. Two (2) of our planes were prevented by obstruction on the taxi strip from reaching the runway in time to take off with our squadron. These two (2) planes took off with the planes of the 499th squadron, which failed to reach the target due to weather. Our five (5) planes, however, reached the orbiting point off BIAK Island and circled until given a target by the ground station. This target was given as four (4) tanks at point 372406. (Ref. BOSNEK 1:1). A dry run was made across the assigned target from shore to sea without the tanks being seen. A second run was then made in the opposite direction and all bombs dropped at the point given by the ground station. All bombs (10 x 1000 lb. 4-5 and 8-11 second delay fuse) were dropped at the pin-pointed target with explosions seen but damage unassessed, due to the high cliffs beyond the target and to the speed of the planes. Two more passes were made at the target before the planes left. One plane strafed the target during two of these passes.

Narrative Report on Mission 158-L, cont'd.

(2) All four squadrons of the 345th Group were to join in this mission, but due to difficulties in take off, the squadrons went up separately. The 500th squadron reached the target at a later time, but the 499th and 498th did not reach BIAK due to weather.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From HOLLANDIA from 0900-0903/K.
Attack: BIAK Island from 1145-1200/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA 1335/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-TARGET-WAKDE-HOLLANDIA.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Colonel True, Group Commander, led the 501st Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Colonel True	A/P 491	Lt. Monaghan	A/P 401
Lt. Kirmil	A/P 069	Lt. Bedell	A/P 518
Lt. Jones	A/P 437		

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Col. True led the squadron on to the target coming in on a dry run from shore to sea without seeing the assigned target, which was four (4) tanks. He then made a second run in the opposite direction and dropped his bombs on the pin-pointed target as assigned by the ground station. All planes in his flight, as well as those of Lt. Monaghan's, were dropped on the lead plane's release, and were reported to have hit the assigned target which was marked with smoke flares. However, due to the high cliffs beyond the target and to the speed of the planes, damage could not be assessed. Two more passes were made at the target before leaving, and one of our planes strafed during two of these passes.

Narrative Report on Mission 158-L, cont'd.

b. Light ack-ack fire encountered and inaccurate was seen coming from the hills at point 372409. (Ref. BOSNEK 1:1).

c. Fighter cover was area cover.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

TARGET—Mortar fire was seen coming from hills north of MOKMER Drome. One unidentified tank was seen moving south-east on MOKMER runway at the south end. Four Jap trucks with open bodies were seen parked on the roadside at PARAI. They appeared serviceable. A 35 ft. barge, of undetermined serviceability, was seen beached at PARAI.

7. The mission was photographed by an A-4 motion picture camera.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX "A".
2 - " "B"
3 - " "C"

Narrative Report on Mission 158-1, 500lb Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Location
491	2	G-31	1000 lb.	2		
486	2	"		2		
457	2	M-5		2		
458	2	Fragm.		2		
518	2	Delay		2		
Total	10		1000 lb.	10		

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	.30 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
489	1400	1500	NIL	2000	2000	NIL

APPENDIX "A".

FPO 158-L DATE: 6 June 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
TIME OVER TARGET: 1145-1200/K.
ALTITUDE: 500-1000 ft. and Minimum
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS
STRIKE MISSION PHOTOGRAPHED BY A-4 MOTION PICTURE CAMERA.

35
42

APPENDIX "B".

May Reference - MOKMER 1:20,000



39
39

501
FK0158
6 JUN 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 913 UNIT 1

CAS/1st

11 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 158 , performed 6 June 1944 by one (1) plane of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Special Search and Supply Dropping Mission to P-38 Pilot downed six (6) miles south of Babo, Dutch New Guinea.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective of this mission was to drop life rafts and provisions to a P-38 Pilot who had gone down on the 5th of June 1944, six (6) miles south of Babo Airdrome. The supplies were to be dropped only if the pilot could be located.

b. Our plane was to take off from Hollandia Drome, form with a fighter escort of four (4) P-38's, and proceed direct to the target. Four additional P-38's were to accompany the flight and create a diversionary attack at Babo, while our plane searched the area. However, these latter four planes could not take off, due to an accident on the Hollandia strip.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Although the downed pilot could not be located and the supplies were not dropped, the mission was not without excitement, nor without results. When thirty minutes out from the Babo area, our single plane, with its four-plane cover, spotted an unidentified single seater fighter at an altitude of 10,000 ft. Then, as our plane circled the area of search, it was intercepted by two (2) OSCARS. A detailed description of the attack can be found in paragraph "d". Our plane, however, due to the excellent tactics employed by Lt. Nusbaum, the pilot, came through unscathed, and one of the OSCARS was later shot down by the P-38's. Lt. Fisk, a P-38 pilot who was acting as observer with Lt. Nusbaum, was slightly injured when he was thrown into the Navigator's compartment by a violent maneuver of our plane.

(2) This was a single plane mission, our plane being the only plane of the 345th Group involved.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) A detailed description of the interception follows in the words of the pilot, Lt. Hudson, and the co-pilot, Lt. Hanlay:

"When thirty (30) minutes out from Rabo, we spotted the first enemy plane. We were on a course of 270 degrees, and this plane, which was a single seater fighter, was headed on a course of 90 degrees on our left at an altitude of 10,000 ft. We both thought it was a patrol or spotter plane. We were already losing altitude, so that we continued on towards Rabo at minimum altitude. Coming in over the top of the hills, we proceeded to a point five to six miles south of Rabo to start our search for the pilot.

"Ten minutes away , around 1200/L as we came over the "orbiting point", a cloud of dust was sighted coming off the Rabo strip. That meant only one thing to us--someone was about to take off from the strip. About four minutes later, as we circled, we saw two OSCARS over the strip at about 600 ft. In the meantime our fighter cover had sighted a TOJO at 10,000 ft. above the drome. The TOJO, which was probably a diversionary, started to come down on the P-38's, who were circling at 5,000 ft. We continued to circle and search for the downed pilot for five minutes, as the two OSCARS approached from Rabo--unsighted by the P-38's.

"At 1215/L, we were attacked simultaneously by the two OSCARS. The first one, will call him No. 1, made a diving pass between 10 and 11 o'clock from above at about 1000 ft. He pressed his attack closely and was plenty aggressive, but luckily not too damn accurate. Breaking off at 50 ft. away from us, he went off at 7 o'clock and climbed again to 1000 ft.

"At the same time No. 2, coming in on a low approach, made a pass from 5 o'clock, firing as he came. He broke off at 8 o'clock and disappeared.

"No. 1 had by this time returned to a position above and in front of us and proceeded to make another pass from 10 to 11 o'clock. This was also a diving pass. He turned into the approaching OSCAR, and in a steep turn making a difficult deflection shot for the Nip. He pressed the attack to within 50 to 75 ft., broke off to 5 o'clock, and climbed up to 1000 ft. again.

"He then started his third pass, this one from 4 o'clock, but our gunners, both in the tail and the waist, the turret gun had jammed, drove him off with their fire. We could see their tracers all around the Nip, who then pulled up to 1000 ft. and levelled off. At this time the four P-38's, when, needless to say, we had been calling, came in and polished off the OSCAR".

It can be seen from the Pilot's and Co-pilot's narrative that it was only through the most skillful handling and maneuvering that our plane came through the attack unscathed. By turning into the approaching OSCAR each time, and staying at absolute minimum altitude, Lt. Nusbaum used excellent evasive tactics. His gunners, handling the offensive end, in the tail and at the waist guns with their accurate firing, kept off the Nip on his last pass.

(2) One of the accompanying P-38's had his hydraulic system shot out and was forced to crash land at Hollandia.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From Hollandia Drome at 0930/K.
Search: 5 miles south of Babo--1200-1230/K.
Landing: Wakde Island at 1430/K at Hollandia at 1700/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-BABO-WAKDE ISLAND-HOLLANDIA.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Nusbaum, in A/P 405, was the pilot on this mission.

Narrative Report on Mission 158 cont'd.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a.
(1) Lt. Nusbaum volunteered to conduct this search mission which necessitated his circling in the closest possible proximity to an enemy airdrome--Subo. As can be seen, interception was not only antiticipated, but was a reality. Despite this, Lt. Nusbaum continued his search, and only when he could not locate the downed pilot, after circling for thirty minutes, did he return to base.

b. There was no ack-ack encountered.

c. Fighter cover was excellent and was provided by four P-38's.

d. There was no damage sustained by our plane.

e. Lt. Fisk, a P-38 pilot who was acting as observer, was slightly injured when he was thrown from the pilot's compartment into the navigator's compartment.

4. In the opinion of this Officer, both Lt. Nusbaum and his co-pilot, Lt. Hanley, are worthy of the highest commendation, not only for volunteering for this difficult mission, but also for their skillful handling of the plane and their courage during interception.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Interception Diagram.

b. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

GELVINK BAY: 20 barges at CAPE BORSONGOBA (0225-S--13435-E). Seen from 4,000 ft.

7. There were no photos taken on this mission.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.



APPENDIX "A".

INTERCEPTION DIAGRAM
FFO Mission 158 DATE: 6 June 44
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345

501

160-D
8 Jun 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

BSG/1jd

9 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 160-D, performed 8 June 1944 by eight (8) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: GROUND SUPPORT SORIDO AIRDROME.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was destroying of enemy personnel and possible tanks in the area on or immediately around SORIDO Drome on BIAK Island. The target was to be bombed at minimum altitude by eight (8) planes, four (4) of which carried 2 x 1000 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs and four (4) of which carried 4 x 500 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs. The area was to be strafed by all planes.

b. Eight (8) planes of this squadron were to take off from HOLLANDIA Drome, form with the 345th Group on course, and proceed direct to the target via WAKDE Island. There was no rendezvous to be made with fighters, as area fighter cover was provided.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered. Our squadron attacked the target eight (8) planes abreast coming in from sea to land striking the coast at the east end of SORIDO Drome and passing along the length of the drome on a heading of approximately 290 degrees for their bombing and strafing run. The flight turned sharply to the left at the west end of the drome passing out to sea where they reformed and proceeded directly to HOLLANDIA for refueling and preliminary interrogation. At HOLLANDIA the squadron leaders were interrogated by S-2 of the 89th Squadron and preliminary mission reports were turned in. The squadron then proceeded to their home base at NADZAB. Bombing results were excellent. All planes dropped their entire entire load of bombs on the assigned target, and each plane strafed the area heavily. Due to the shortness of the strafing run, an average of only 1100-1200 .50 caliber rounds were expended by each plane. Two small fires were started.

Narrative Report on Mission 160-D, continued

These fires made a quick flash and died out rapidly, indicating that they might have been small ammunition dumps. There was no other visible results. from our attack. After completing the attack, "Ointment", the ground control station, called our squadron leader and stated "observers report you blew hell out of the target".

(2) All four squadrons of the 345th Group hadsthe same target assigned.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From HOLLANDIA A/D from 0630-0638/K.
Attack: SORIDO A/D on BIAK Island at 0828/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA A/D from 1015-1020/K.
Take-off: HOLLANDIA A/D from 1055-1100/K.
Landing: Strip #4 MADZAB from 1325-1335/K. (7 planes).
A/P 518 landed at 1615/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-TARGET-WAKDE-HOLLANDIA-MADZAB.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Col. True, Group Commander, led the 501st Squadron. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Col. True	A/P 491	Lt. Harper	A/P 383
Lt. Jones	A/P 437	Lt. Coffman	A/P 093
Lt. Kirwil	A/P 069	Lt. Bedell	A/P 518
Lt. Monaghan	A/P 405	Lt. Symons	A/P 401

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Col. True led the squadron on to the target coming in from sea to land and striking the coast at the east end of SORIDO Drome. The squadron attacked the target eight (8) planes abreast in echelon to the right. One pass was made, each plane dropping all of their bombs and strafing on this run. Lt. Monaghan

took K-21 and Lt. Bedell took K-22 photographs of the attack. It was the unanimous opinion of the crews that the bombing was excellent, although there were no visible signs of direct damage inflicted on the enemy. 2 small fires—possibly ammunition dumps—were set off.

(2) Lt. Bedell, in A/P 518, developed a fuel leak after taking off from HOLLANDIA enroute back to NADZAB, forcing him to land at TADJI for a check. He proceeded on to NADZAB landing at 1615/K.

b. There was no ack-ack encountered other than slight inaccurate ground fire reported by one crew only.

c. Fighter cover was area cover provided by P-40's.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and bomb hits.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. TARGET: All crews were unanimous in reporting no sightings of enemy activity over the target.

b. RAMU VALLEY: 1500/K—Three scantily dressed white men surrounded by a group of 20-30 natives were seen near a small native village 20-25 miles east of ANNAMBERG. (Approximately 14510-E 0455-S). The location of this party was described as being on the flat valley very close to the edge of the hills. The white men were described by crews as follows:
"From what little clothes they had on they looked like Australian pilots. They were waving frantically at us as we buzzed by, and one of the men was waving what seemed to be an Australian flag. A panel resembling

Narrative Report on Mission 160-B, continued.

a plane was spread out on the ground nearby.

e. CAPE VERKAM: 0730Z—Seen from 4,000 ft. 1 crew sighted wrecked twin engine unidentified Jap bomber beached near CAPE VERKAM. Pilot is certain this plane was not seen when he passed by 5 June, indicating possibly this plane was hit during Jap raid on WAKDE night of 5 June.

7. Photo prints received confirm the bomb hits as reported by our crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 160-D, continued, 501st Bomb Sq.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
491	2	8-11	1000 lb.	2		
437	4	sec.	500 lb.	3	1	
069	4		500 lb.	4		
405	2		1000 lb.	2		
383	2		1000 lb.	2		
093	4		500 lb.	4		
518	4		500 lb.	4		
401	2		1000 lb.	2		
Total	24	8-11		23	1	

STRAFING TABLE #2

.50 Caliber

A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Failures.
491	4800	1000	Nil
437	4400	1800	"
069	4400	800	"
405	4800	1200	"
383	4800	875	"
093	4400	1225	"
518	4400	1200	"
401	4800	1500	"
Total	36,800	9600	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
518	K-22	10	3
405	K-21	30	13
Total		40	16

APPENDIX "A".



MISSION NO. 160-D DATE: 8 June 1944
SQUADRON NO. 501 GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET--First
ALTITUDE--Minimum
TIME OVER TARGET--0828/K.
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES
• BOMB HITS AS REPORTED BY CREWS

Map Ref: SORIDO, SCHOUTEN ISLANDS 1:20,000 f

APPENDIX "B".

501
163-J
10 Jun 44

CONFIDENTIAL

90BST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
348TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 968

MEB/km

11 June 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 163-J-348, performed 10 June 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 90Bst Bomb Squadron and four (4) airplanes of the 498th Bomb Squadron. Objectives: Barges and shipping at MANOKWARI.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the destruction of enemy shipping in the MANOKWARI area.
Secondary objective was supplies and installations around MANOKWARI township and drome, with tertiary objective barges and luggers around MOKMFOOR ISLAND. The targets were to be attacked at minimum altitude by the ten (10) planes, six of which were B-25 H-1 carrying 75 mm cannon and 4 x 500 lb 4/5 sec. delay bombs, and five (5) B-25 D-2 planes with 4 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs and one (1) B-25 D-2 carrying 2 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bomb. All planes were to strafe.

b. The ten (10) planes were to take off from MELANDIA drome at 0730/K form with one squadron of P-38 fighter escort over the drome, and proceed direct to the target. TOT was to be 1015/K.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered, except for take off, which was delayed to 0650-0659/K due to heavy traffic at the strip. Our ten (10) planes attacked the primary target with excellent results, making landfall just before DORE Bay and sweeping up the coast thru MANOKWARI, where the formation broke into individual elements to attack the many luggers, barges, and small Sugar Charlies found there. Three large luggers or small Sugar Charlies were destroyed around the docks and jetties at MANOKWARI town; one lugger was destroyed in the bay southwest of the airdrome; one small Sugar Charlie was sunk near the mouth of WOS River; two luggers were sunk along the north shore of DORE Bay; an A/A barge ½ mile off shore southeast of the airdrome was "liquidated" by direct bomb hits; three or four large buildings in MANOKWARI township were destroyed by bombing, as well as several buildings in WIRSI WIRSI.

CONFIDENTIAL

Six to eight additional barges/ or luggers were damaged by strafing.

(2) There were no other squadrons or groups involved in this attack.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: HOLLANDIA drome from 0800-0809/K
Attack: MANOKWARI; from 1137-1200/K at minimum altitude.
Landing: HOLLANDIA Drome from 1420-1437/K.

f. ROUTE.

DIRECT, following coastline.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 498th-501st BOMB SQUADRONS ON THE ATTACK.

a. FIRST FLIGHT (498th Sq.)

Lt. Fair	A/P 290
Lt. Brown	A/P 341
Lt. Butting	A/P 355
Lt. Hetherington	A/P 358

SECOND FLIGHT (501st Sq.)

Lt. Kortemeyer	A/P 405
Lt. Mayes	A/P 409
Lt. Flanagan	A/P 379

THIRD FLIGHT (501st Sq.)

Lt. Lewis	A/P 383
Lt. Noye	A/P 486
Lt. Geene	A/P 494

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Fair led the formation, with the four B-25 H-1's of the 498th flying as the first flight. Lt. Fair strafed and damaged 6-8 barges and luggers in the bay to the east of CAPE SANOCHEN. He also strafed heavy A/A positions on CAPE SANOCHEN. His four bombs hit in MANOKWARI; township, demolishing several buildings, one of which was unusually large red brick structure. He fired four shots with his cannon, scoring a direct hit on a lugger alongside the jetty at MANOKWARI. Lt. Brown bombed and strafed a lugger in the bay S.W. of the airdrome, sinking it.

He fired 21 rounds with his cannon, scoring 3 direct hits on heavy A/A positions at the south end of the drome. Lt. Nutting dropped four bombs and got off rounds with his cannon, getting a lugger near the MANOKWARI jetties and destroying several buildings in the PREMI area. Lt. Rutherington dropped one bomb on a burning lugger in the bay SW of the drome and two bombs around buildings in NIRGI NIRGI village area. He was forced to salvo one bomb, and got off only one round with his cannon, due to mechanical failures. He strafed barges and buildings around MANOKWARI.

(2) Lt. Kortemeyer 301st Sq. led the second flight. He dropped his four bombs among luggers and small Sugar Charlies around the MANOKWARI jetties, destroying one Sugar Charlie with a direct hit at the waterline. Lt. Mayes dropped all four of his bombs among buildings in MANOKWARI town, destroying several of them. He heavily strafed a lugger along shore between CAPE MOKPI and DORE BAY. His plane received minor damage from A/A fire and two of his enlisted crewmen received minor injuries. Lt. Flanagan got a direct hit on a Sugar Charlie near the mouth of the WOS River, destroying it. One of his bombs hit in MANOKWARI town starting a small fire of grey smoke.

(3) Lt. Lewis led the third flight. He dropped one bomb on a lugger in the bay SW of the drome and two bombs among the numerous barges and small craft along shore at MANOKWARI town. His plane was badly hit by A/A while passing over the town, but the plane did not go out of control and he was able to return safely to HOLLANDIA. No crewmen were injured. Lt. Moye made numerous passes at ships, destroying one lugger in DORE Bay and scoring two very near misses on a Sugar Charlie near MANOKWARI jetty. Lt. Goens destroyed an A/A barge about ½ mile off shore SE of the drome. He scored a direct hit on it with a 500 pounder and it was completely obliterated by the burst.

(4) All planes strafed barges, gun positions and buildings in the target area, causing considerable damage which is impossible to accurately assess. All in all, this was a very successful mission.

b. ACK-ACK.

(1) Ack-ack fire was very intense, being mostly heavy and medium calibre, with some machine gun fire. The medium calibre fire, which was reported by crews as intense,

inaccurate to accurate, came from a position near the SW end of the airdrome. Crews reported the heavy fire as intense and accurate, coming from the following positions: 200 yards in from the shore due south of the drome; the dispersal strip area halfway between PRIWI and the north end of the drome; three positions along the beach at Cape SANOGEN; a position on the west shore of PASIR POKRIM Bay; and from the hills 3-4 miles NW of WIRSI WIRSI. Intense and accurate M/G fire was received from MANOKWARI town, from gardens ½ mile NW of WIRSI WIRSI, and from the hills directly behind MANOKWARI town.

c. Fighter cover was provided by one Squadron of P-38's and was very good.

d. A/P 290 (B-25 H-1) and A/P 383 were badly holed by A/A fire and will be out of commission for several days. Four B-25 D-2 planes (A/P 405,426,379,409) received minor damage from A/A fire which did not render them unserviceable.

e. T/Sgt. C.A. Krauss asn 12133251, radioman, and S/Sgt. O.D. Spencer asn 39455712, turret gunner of A/P 409 received minor wounds from A/A fire while flying over the target.

4. On basis of the details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards, other than the award of the Purple Heart to T/Sgt. C.A. Krauss and S/Sgt. O.D. Spencer for wounds received from enemy action while over the target.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Photo Tables.
b. Map of bombing run and results of attack.
c. Map showing route to and from target.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. The following sightings were reported.

Crews were unanimous in reporting numerous barges, luggers and small Sugar Charlies in and around DORE Bay and MANOKWARI. Heavy activity of small craft and some 10-12 landing barges were reported around the MANOKWARI dock area. Lt. Lewis reported a tower in the bay midway between Cape SANOGEN and MANOKWARI, adding that it looked like a floatplane moor or channel marker. Lt. Flanagan reported several trucks in MANOKWARI town.

Narrative Report on Mission 162-J-310, cont'd.

7. Undeveloped film from this mission was sent to APO 713 Unit 1 for processing. No prints to hand for photo interpretation by this Officer.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN
Capt. Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Appendix A.
2 - " B.
3 - " C.

Narrative Report on Mission 162-J-310, cont'd.

BOMBING TABLE #2

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks	Time Fuse
280	4	8/11 sec.	500 lb.	4			4
341	2	"	"	2			21
355	4	"	"	4			20
358	4	"	"	3	1 Salvo		1
408	4	"	"	4			
409	4	"	"	4			
370	4	"	"	4			
378	4	"	"	4			
386	4	"	"	4			
464	4	"	"	4			
Totals	36		18,500 lbs. On target	37	1		26

PHOTO TABLE #2

A/P	Camera	Exposures	Prints Received
395	K-20	20	0
383	K-21	30	0
Totals		50	0

APPENDIX "A"



MISSION NO. 162-3-220 DATE: 30 JUNE 44
SQUADRON NO. 498-90B GROUP 345
SQUADRON ORDER OVER TARGET—FLIGHT
ALTITUDE—MINIMUM
TIME OVER TARGET— 1137-1200/K
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES

APPENDIX "B"

501
163-E-1
11 Jun 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 565

BEG/bm

12 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 163-E-8, performed 11 June 1944 by four (4) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: Barge sweep along north coast of the Schouten Islands from Cape OERIMBORI to WARI.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was destruction of enemy barges on the north shore of the SCHOUTEN ISLANDS. There was no secondary target assigned. The objective was to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude by four (4) B-25 D-2 planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay bombs.

b. The four (4) planes were to take off from HOLLANDIA drome, form with the 498th squadron, and proceed to WAKDE for loading of bombs and ammunition. From WAKDE the group formation was to proceed to Cape d'URVILLE for rendezvous with fighter escort and then proceed direct to the target.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered, except for the fighter rendezvous. After circling at the rendezvous point for thirty minutes without contact with fighters, the group proceeded to the target without fighter cover. The attack was made as planned, starting the sweep at CAPE OERIMEORI and working east along the coast as far as WARI on BIAK ISLAND. No barges were sighted and all bombs were returned to base. Native huts in MOS village near the northeastern tip of BIAK ISLAND were strafed with 950 x .50 cal. rounds with no visible results.

(2) The 498th Squadron participated on this strike, having the same target assigned.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report on Mission 163-E-8, cont'd.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: HOLLANDIA from 0855-0900/K.
Landed WAKDE at 1015/K.
Take-Off: WAKDE from 1400-1404/K.
Rendezvous: Circled CAPE d'URVILLE 1430-1500/K.
Attack: SCHOUTEN ISLANDS from 1610-1625/K at minimum altitude.
Landing: HOLLANDIA from 1815-1855/K.

f. ROUTE: Direct to target and return via WAKDE.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Col. Neuman led the 498th Squadron and the group formation. Lt. Kortemeyer led the 501st Squadron, and our flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

Lt. Kortemeyer	A/P 405
Lt. Moye	A/P 426
Lt. Flanagan	A/P 379
Lt. Coons	A/P 454

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Kortemeyer led the squadron into the target, which was attacked in two (2) plane elements. No barges were sighted, so all planes returned their bombs to base. Lts. Kortemyer, Moye, and Flanagan strafed native buildings in MOS Village with no visible results. On route home, Lt. Coons landed at WAKDE to pick up ground crew personnel and brought them back to HOLLANDIA. The squadron was considably delayed in landing at HOLLANDIA, due to heavy air traffic, extremely heavy clouds of black dust, and rapidly approaching darkness. In the opinion of the Officer submitting this report, all four of our pilots showed exceptional flying skill and mastery of their profession by landing their planes safely without injury to personnel or airplanes.

b. ACK-ACK.

(1) There was no ack-ack fire reported by any of our crew.

c. There was no fighter cover provided.

Narrative Report on Mission 163-E-8, cont'd.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to any of our personnel.

4. In the opinion of this Officer, based upon information available at the time of submitting this report, there were no individual acts which would justify awards or citations.

5. SIGHTINGS.

a. Crew were unanimous in reporting no sightings of enemy activity.

6. No pictures were taken on this mission.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

501
168-E
16 Jun 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/134

20 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 168-E-8, performed 16 June 1944 by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: JEFMAN and SAMATE Airdromes.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary objective: Grounded airplanes at JEFMAN and SAMATE Dromes. SAMATE to be bombed and strafed and JEFMAN to be strafed.

Bomb Load: 12 x 100 lb. parademe inst. bombs per plane.

b. Six (6) planes of this squadron to take off from HOLLANDIA, rendezvous with 38th Group at WAKDE, and rendezvous with P-38 fighter cover at MIOSWAAR Island. Formation then to proceed direct to the target.

2. ATTACK.

(1) Six (6) airplanes reached the target approaching SAMATE Drome from the southwest at a heading of 22 degrees, but were unable to drop bombs there due to the ridge south of the target. SAMATE, however, was strafed heavily as was the personnel area designated 5-X between JEFMAN and SAMATE. Our squadron was intercepted by 5-6 OSCARS and NAMPS between SAMATE and JEFMAN dromes. Several passes were made, but attacks were not pressed too closely and in each case were driven off by the P-38's. One NAMP was definitely shot down by Lt. Kertemeyer in airplane 078. Continuing on to JEFMAN Island, 68 x 100 lb. parademe bombs were dropped on the southwest portion of the island and in the dispersal area northwest of the drome. Two twin engine bombers were hit by these bombs, one twin engine bomber was strafed and damaged. Bombs hit also among at least 6 twin engine bombers in the dispersal area, of which 3 are thought to be definitely hit. A fuel dump southwest of 3-N was hit starting a fire with an explosion and flames up to 500 ft. Ack-ack position at 3-N was hit and probably destroyed. JEF-

NAN Island was thoroughly strafed and 12,450 x .50 caliber and 2300 x .30 caliber were expended in the strafing. Both SAMATE and JEPUAR were covered with heavy black smoke as our squadron pulled away from the target.

(3) The 345th Group followed the 38th Group over the target. The 501st Squadron led followed by the 498th, 499th and 500th.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) At 1255/K just after leaving SAMATE Drome, the squadron was intercepted by 5-6 OSCARS and HAMPS. Several passes were made from 1000 ft., but attacks were not pressed too closely and in each case the enemy planes were driven off by the excellent fighter cover of the P-38's. One OSCAR came in from two o'clock. From 1000 ft. the OSCAR made a pass at one of our planes, but was driven off by a burst from our turret guns.

One OSCAR came in from 9 o'clock within 250 yards. The turret gunner scored a hit and saw a puff of smoke. OSCAR is considered damaged.

A HAMP came in between 11 o'clock and 12 o'clock on a diving pass from 1000 ft. to within 300 ft. of 1Lt. Hertemayer's plane #078. At this range 1Lt. Hertemayer opened fire with his forward firing .50's in the nose and got in a four second burst with tracers seen going directly into the HAMP. The enemy plane just flipped over on its back, turned to the right and when last seen by members of the crew was flying upside down 250 ft. above the water. The flight leader of the second flight of the 498th squadron reported seeing this HAMP crash into the water.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units, although one B-25 of the 499th squadron was shot down, and one P-38 was lost on this raid.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take off: From HOLLANDIA from 0900-0903/K.
Rendezvous: With 38th Group at WAKDE at 1010/K.
With fighters at MIOSWAAR Island at 1155/K.
Attack: JEPUAR and SAMATE from 1255-1259/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA at 1730/K.

Narrative Report on Mission 168-2-8, cont'd.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-MISWAAR ISLAND-ACROSS PENINSULA-YARSNE-VOGELKOP PENINSULA-WAKDE-HOLLANDIA.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501st SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Major Marsten, Group Operations Officer, led the 501st Sq. and the 345th Group on this attack. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Marsten	A/P 099	Lt. Kortemeyer	A/P 078
Lt. Kirnil	A/P 069	Lt. Bedell	A/P 076
Lt. Moye	A/P 060	Lt. Mayes	A/P 437

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Major Marsten led our squadron six planes abreast to SAWATE Drome from the southwest at a heading of approximately 22 degrees. Due to a slight ridge to the south of the target, they were unable to drop their bombs at SAWATE Drome. However, the drome and the dispersal area was heavily strafed, as was the small personnel area 5-X which lies between SAWATE and JEFMAN Island. Coming in on JEFMAN, still six planes abreast, the entire flight's bombs were dropped in the southwestern portion of the drome and and northwestern dispersal area. Lt. Kirnil bombed the ack-ack position at 3-W probably destroying it. One of Lt. Moye's bombs scored a direct hit on a BETTY bomber in the dispersal area, and he also strafed a BETTY in the area and damaged it. Lt. Kortemeyer scored a hit on another twin engine bomber near the strip. Lt. Mayes's bombs started a fire and explosion in a fuel dump just south of position 3-W with flames up to 500 ft. His bombs and Lt. Bedell's dropped among 6 bombers in the area, of which three were thought to be definitely hit. All planes strafed heavily throughout the run, and all crews agreed that upon leaving the target both JEFMAN and SAWATE were covered with heavy black smoke. (Note) (See paragraph d. (1) for interception).

b. As the squadron approached JEFMAN Island, 5-6 aerial burst bombs (phosphorus) were seen to explode over the airdrome at 500 ft. with streamers coming down about 100 ft. lower. M/G fire, which was slight and inaccurate, was received from the eastern end of SAWATE Drome. Medium inaccurate but intense ack-ack fire was received from position 1-W and 4-W on JEFMAN. Heavy and accurate and moderate ack-

Narrative Report on Mission 168-2-8, cont'd.

ack fire came from position 5-W on JEFMAN.

c. Fighter cover, provided by approximately 80 P-38's, was described as "superior". Each enemy plane had at least two P-38's on its tail on each pass, and each enemy plane was driven off by the excellent cover of the P-38's. Their score of 25 shot down serves to confirm the excellent job which was accomplished.

d. There was no damage sustained by any of our planes.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. In the opinion of this Officer, Major Marston's leadership of this mission, which was the longest ever attempted by B-25's in which interception was not only anticipated but a reality, deserves the highest commendation. Lt. Kortemeyer for his shooting down a NAMP also deserves an award.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. At SAMATE at 1255/L, all crews observed 3-4 twin engine bombers in the dispersal area southwest of the strip, and 8-10 trucks and 3 SBF parked in front of a large operations building on the north side of the strip. 3-4 small fires were likewise seen in the area by all crews. Lt. Kortemeyer's crew reported a large SUGAR CHARLIE just south of CAPE SAMATE and a gunboat approximately one mile northwest of SAMATE. 6-7 twin engine bombers were seen on the west end of SAMATE Drome by several crews also. An OMCAN was seen to go down into the sea 1½ miles northwest of CAPE SAMATE by Lt. Kortemeyer's crew.

b. At JEFMAN a large oil fire was observed in supply area 2-I with flames up to 200 ft. and black smoke up to 2,000 ft. All crews were unanimous on this sighting. At least 2 burning airplanes were seen on the southwest end of JEFMAN strip and one burning bomber seen in target area 1-V. 2 SBF, possibly unserviceable, ~~were serviceable~~, were seen on the northeast end of the strip. All crews reported a fire in the personnel area 5-X as well as 3-4 bombers seen near the center of JEFMAN Strip. Lt. Mayes reported an unidentified plane was seen to crash near the center of the west end of JEFMAN strip. All crews reported a cruiser northeast of DOOM Island and from 5-8 unidentified merchant vessels in the vicinity.

Narrative Report on Mission 168-2-8, cont'd.

c. On the route home, Capt. McBride, Navigator on Major Karston's plane, reported the following sightings:

1305/K—Small motor boat at mouth of WARONGI River on Southeast coast, Dutch New Guinea.

1318/K—4 camouflaged barges in cove, and two along shore at CAPE ASI. (13140-E—0025-S).

1325/K—SUGAR CHARLIE at CAPE SANSAPOR (13205-E—0035-S).

1435/K—At NORMFOOR ISLAND—large lugger just south of MANKER Strip. Barge on fire at BUCK BAY.

1620/K—Flashes seen coming from MEMGEN ISLAND reported as either signalling or possibly gun flashes.

7. Photographs received did not give a complete coverage of the targets but do in some instances confirm the results as reported by the crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

1 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.

Narrative Report on Mission 168-4-2, cont'd.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hit	Missed	Remarks
099	12	para-	100 lb.	12		
069	12	demo		12		
060	12	Inst.		8		4 Rob. to bomb
078	12			12		
076	12			12		
437	12			12		
Total	72		100 lb.	68		4

STRAFING TABLE #2

	.50 Caliber			.30 Caliber		
A/P	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
099	4400	2200	None	2000	300	None
069	4400	1600	"	2000	800	"
060	4400	2500	"	2000	600	"
078	4400	2100	"	2000	300	"
076	4400	2000	"	2000	none	"
437	4400	2050	"	2000	300	"
Total	26400	12450		12000	2300	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Req'd.
099	K-21	30	5
	K-20	25	6
437	K-20	35	9
060	K-21	30	11
Total		120	31

APPENDIX "A".

501
169-E
17 Jun 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1

CAS/lja

20 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, performed 17 June 1944 by four (4) planes of the 501st Bomb Squadron. Objective: SAMATE and Dispersal Areas.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary objective was the SAMATE Drome and dispersal areas to be bombed and strafed by four (4) airplanes. Bomb load: 12 x 100 lb. 4/5 sec. delay paradrome. bombs per airplane.

b. Four (4) airplanes of this squadron were to take off from HOLLANDIA, form the group, rendezvous with the 38th Group at WAKDE, rendezvous with the fighters at MICHMAAR Island, and proceed direct to target.

c. ATTACK.

(1) Four (4) planes reached the target and approached from the northeast to the southwest and dropped 38 x 100 lb. 4/5 sec. delay paradrome. bombs on the west end of of SAMATE Strip and in the dispersal area southwest of the strip. Several small fires were started in the dispersal area, but results were generally unobserved due to the dense growth in the area. However, the strip and dispersal areas were thoroughly strafed as were several villages south and southeast of the target. In all 8,000 x .50 caliber and 1600 x .30 caliber were expended in strafing. The crews reported that the target area seemed to be more or less deserted, although a few planes were observed on the runway.

(2) The 38th Group led the attack. However, they attacked shipping targets near CAPE SORONG, while the 501st and the 500th squadrons hit SAMATE Drome and the 498th and 499th squadrons hit JEFMAN.

d. INTERCEPTION.

(1) There was no interception by enemy planes.

(2) Our crews reported no observation of losses sustained by other Allied units.

e. TIME AND LOCATION OF.

Take-off: From HOLLANDIA Drome from 0940-0943/K.
Rendezvous: With 38th Group at WAKDE at 1053/K.
With fighters at MIOSWAAR Island at 1200/K.
Attack: SAMATE from 1358-1400/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA 1745/K.

f. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-WAKDE-MIOSWAAR ISLAND-VOGELKOPF PENINSULA-TARGET-RETURN.

2. AIRPLANES OF THE 501ST SQUADRON ON THE ATTACK.

a. Lt. Kertemeyer led the 501st squadron as well as the group on this attack. There was only one flight which was as follows: Lt. Kertemeyer, in A/P 078; Lt. Bedell, in A/P 099; Lt. Moye, in A/P 060; and Lt. Hayes, in A/P 437.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Kertemeyer, as flight leader, led this squadron and the 500th squadron eight (8) planes abreast across the drome and dispersal areas. Our squadron attacked the western portion, while the 500th attacked the eastern. Approaching from sea to land, the target was well covered by our planes and the bombs were seen to drop in the designated target area, but due to the dense growth and trees in that area, results except for a few small fires were unobserved. The target was strafed thoroughly and continuing south villages along the route were also strafed.

b. Slight and inaccurate M/G fire was received from the northwest corner of BAK Island, which is 2 miles north of SAMATE Drome.

c. Fighter cover was provided by four (4) squadrons of P-38's and was excellent.

d. One of our planes (069) received a .30 caliber slug in the left nacelle, but damage was of a minor nature.

e. There were no injuries to our personnel.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, cont'd.

5. APPENDICES.

a. Bombing, Strafing and Photo Tables.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. All crews reported one BETTY bomber and 2 HIRANO towards the west end of SANATE strip as well as a fuel truck near these planes.

b. Lt. Mayer's crew reported seeing 4 luggers 2 miles northwest of SAPE NAIGE.

c. An unidentified merchant vessel was seen blown up by the 38th Group attack at point (TH) 5525. (Ref. SORONG 1/500,000.

7. Photo coverage was poor but shows the bombs falling in the area as reported by the crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

1 Incl.
Incl. 1 - APPENDIX A.

Narrative Report on Mission 169-E-9, cont'd.

BOMBING TABLE #1

A/P	No. Bombs	Type	Weight	No. of Bombs Dropped Hits	Misses	Remarks
078	12	para-	100 lb.	12		
060	12	demo.		10		2 Ret. to base
099	12	4/5		8		4 salvoed
437	12	sec.		8		4 ret. to base
Total	48		100 lb.	38		10

STRAFING TABLE #2

A/P	.50 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.	.30 Caliber Carried	Expended	Gun Fail.
078	4400	2500	none	2000	800	none
060	4400	2500	"	2000	800	"
099	4400	2000	"	2000	none	"
437	4400	2000	"	2000	none	"
Total	17600	9000		8000	1600	

PHOTO TABLE #3

A/P	Type Camera	Exposures	Prints Rec'd
099	K-21	30	6
060	K-21	30	6
Total		60	12

APPENDIX A.

(+501) 498 183-B-5 1 July 44

498TH Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
501st Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
APO #713-1
Temporary APO #565

July 2, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 183-B-5, performed by the 498th & 501st Bombardment Squadrons, July 1, 1944. Objective: Possible gun position in Target IX, Noemfoor Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO #713-1. ATTENTION OF A.G., OF S, A-2.

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary target was possible gun positions on a hill in the Southern portion of target IX (Kamiri Village) on Noemfoor Island. Two Squadrons--the 498th and 501st--each employing 6 B25D-1's, each loaded with 4 x 250 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse bombs. This target was to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous

The Group rendezvous was accomplished over Humboldt Bay, enroute to the target.

c. Attack.

(1) The 498th Squadron approached the target fromh the Southwest and attacked at minimum altitude, on a heading of approximately 50 degrees, in two elements of three planes each. 23 x 250 lb. 8/11 sec. delay fuse bombs were dropped, of which twenty-one hit in the Southern portion of the target and two hit slightly South of the target. Results other than bomb bursts were not observed. The area from the beach one mile South of the target to the Southern end of Kamiri Drome was thoroughly strafed.

(2) 501st Squadron bombing results were excellent. Twenty bombs were dropped and four salvoed. Twelve bombs hit on hill in target No. 1, eight fell on a 200 ft. hill one mile East of MENDEKWARI Village. There were no visible results other than bomb bursts. The South end of KAMIRI Drome and the entire length of target No. 1 were heavily strafed with no visible results.

d. Time and location of:
Take off: HOLLANDIA DROME, 1100 - 1105/K
Attack: NOEMFOOR ISLAND, 1314 - 1320/K
Landing: HOLLANDIA DROME, 1540 - 1600/K

e. Route: HOLLANDIA & WAKDE - BIAK - TARGET - OWI ISLAND - HOLLANDIA.

2. FORMATION -- Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Group
The 498th Squadron, led by Lt. Neblett was number 1 in the sequence of the attack, followed by the 501st Squadron. The second flight of the 498th was led by Major Rosenbaum.

b. 498th Squadron

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Neblett	278	Maj. Rosenbaum	099
Lt. Smith	082	Lt. Morris	372
Lt. Best	340	Lt. Miller	335

c. 501st Squadron

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Coffman	064	Lt. Lewis	092
Lt. Henley	069	Lt. Kasten	036
Lt. Jacobson	518	Lt. Alger	060

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of the attack.

(1) The 498th Squadron, led by Lt. Neblett, approached the target from the North, but not receiving the "all clear" from MUSTANG (the A-20's), the Squadron circled and came in for the attack from the Southwest at a heading of approximately 50 deg. Lt. Neblett released two of his 250 pounders slightly South of the designated target, but his remaining two hit well on the hill in the Southern part of the target. His wingmen, Lt. Smith in

No. 2 and Lt. Best in No.3, each dropped their four bombs on the hill area in the target. The second flight, following at an interval of 40 seconds, was led by Major Rosenbaum, 345th Group Operations Officer, who released three of his bombs well in the target, the fourth hung-up and was returned to base. His wingmen Lt. Morris in No.2 and Lt. Miller in No.3, each dropped their four bombs in the target. The area from the beach one mile South of the target to the Southern end of Kamiri Drome was well strafed.

(2) The 501st Squadron, led by Lt. Coffman made their bombing run on a heading of approximately 200 deg. Lt. Coffman and Lt. Henley dropped four bombs each along the North slope of the hill in target No. 1. Lt. Jacobson, misjudging the target, overshot and dropped his four bombs on a 200 ft. hill about 1 mile East of MENDEKWARI Village. Lt. Lewis, leading the second flight, overshot the assigned target and dropped his four bombs on the North slope of the same hill. Lt. Karten dropped his load of four bombs on the crest of the hill in the assigned target. Lt. Alger salvoed his bombs on approach to the target, due to failure of bomb release mechanism. All planes strafed target No. 1 heavily.

b. Interception, A/P's destroyed in the air and on the ground:

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel casualties:

Nil personnel of these squadrons injured.

d. Damage to own A/P's:

Nil airplanes of these squadrons damaged.

4. CITATIONS

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendations of awards.

5. Armament and Ordnance.

	498	501
Bombs dropped	23	20
Bombs returned	1	
Bombs salvoed		4
Total	24	24
.50 cal. expended	6100	7200
.30 cal. expended	475	900

6. SIGHTINGS

a. No sightings of enemy ground activity in the target area were reported by either squadron.

b. The 498th Squadron reported one small column of smoke of short duration coming from KONNASOREN A/D. Also approximately twenty (20) fuel drums in target 3X.

c. The 501st Squadron reported a road inland from PIEFOERI to MANOKWARI appeared to have been used recently.

7. Prints received confirm the crew's report of bombing, with the exception that the photos reveal two bombs of the 498th Squadron and two of the 501st hitting in the inlet just South of the target.

For the Squadron Commanders:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Capt., Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer,
501st Bomb Sq.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer
498th Bomb Sq.

Inclosures

1. Route overlay to and from target.
2. Bomb assessment chart.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. 1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 713-1.
2. 1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, 310th Bomb Wing, APO 565.
3. 2 copy A-2, Fifth Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
4. 1 copy S-2, 345th Bombardment Group, APO 713-1.
5. 1 copy S-2, 498th Bomb Squadron file.
6. 1 copy S-2, 501st Bomb Squadron file.



KAMIRI TARGET MAP
ADVON 5AAF
Mission 4183-E-5 Sq 498 & 50
Order of Attack 498 - 501
Time over Target 1314-1320
Altitude MIN

Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes

501
(+498)
185-E-7
35 Lb 44

498TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 715-1
TEMPORARY APO 565

4 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 185-E-7, performed by the 501st and 498th Bomb Squadrons, 3 July 1944. Objective: Laying of Smoke Screen on KORNASOREN Airdrome on NOEMFOOR Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 715-1.
(ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2.)

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was the laying of a smoke screen on KORNASOREN A/D in coordination with the landing of paratroopers on KAMIRI A/D, the 501st Sq. employing 6 B-25-D-1 and the 498th Sq. 5 B-25-D1 and 1 B-25-D-2. All planes were loaded with 6 x 100 lb. white smoke bombs. The area was to be bombed from 800-1000 ft.

b. RENDEZVOUS.

The Group rendezvous was accomplished over Humboldt Bay enroute to the target.

c. ATTACK.

(1) The 501st Squadron led the Group formation. On arrival at NOEMFOOR Island at 0836/K, the Group leader attempted to contact NOMEN--Controller Ashore--but was unable to do so. He then contacted SAUCEPAN 71--Controller Afloat--who relayed the message to NOMEN. Radio contact was poor due to heavy static. The Group leader asked NOMEN to display a green light if it was ok to bomb the target. The green light was not displayed. At 0857/K, A-20's began laying a smoke screen at KAMIRI, and the C-47's started dropping paratroopers. The Group leader called NOMEN again on the command set stating that he was going in over the target unless a red light was displayed. Acknowledgement of this message was received on liaison, NOMEN stating that it was ok to attack the primary target. Six (6) planes of the 501st Squadron dropped their entire load of 36 bombs, and five (5) planes of the 498th Squadron dropped 30 bombs in the dispersal area south of the KORNASOREN A/D completely blanketing the drome with smoke, the 501st bombing from 800-1000 ft. and the 498th from 800 ft. flying directly behind

the 501st Squadron on the same course. A/P 278 of the 498th salvoed its bombs in the target area, but they fell safe. The run was made from west to east on a heading of approximately 100 degrees.

d. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take off: HOLLANDIA Drome from 0730-0740/K.
Attack: KORNASOREN A/D from 1001-1005/K.
Landing: HOLLANDIA Drome from 1244-1250/K.

e. ROUTE. HOLLANDIA-CAPE d'URVILLE-TARGET-CAPE d'URVILLE-HOLLANDIA.

2. FORMATION -- Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Group.
The 501st Squadron, led by Lt. Coffman, was first in sequence to attack. The 498th, led by Lt. Neblett, was second over the target.

b. 501st Bomb Squadron

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Coffman	A/P 064	Lt. Lewis	A/P 093
Lt. Henley	A/P 078	Lt. Kasten	A/P 036
Lt. Jacobsen	A/P 518	Lt. Petty	A/P 055

d. 498th Bomb Squadron

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Neblett	A/P 082	Lt. Nutting	A/P 099
Lt. Ceppatelli	A/P 278	Lt. Lamb	A/P 372
Lt. Best	A/P 347	Lt. Messer	A/P 335

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a.
(1) The 501st Squadron, after circling 8 miles north of KORNASOREN, approached the target from the west on a heading of approximately 100 degrees. All of their bombs dropped from an altitude of 800-1000 ft., and all bombs fell in the dispersal area south of the drome. The drome was completely blanketed with smoke. All planes of the 501st Squadron carried cameras, and all planes except A/P 055 took pictures of the attack.

(2) The 498th Squadron followed the 501st on to the target at an interval of forty-five seconds. All planes, with

Narrative Report FFO 185-E-7, cont'd.

the exception of A/P 278, dropped their bombs in the dispersal area south of the drome. In all, 30 x 100 lb. smoke bombs were dropped and 6 were salvoed. K-20, K-21 and moving pictures were taken.

b. INTERCEPTION, A/P's destroyed in the air and on the ground:

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

Nil personnel of these squadrons injured.

d. DAMAGE TO OUR A/P's.

Nil airplanes of these squadrons damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendations of awards.

5. ARMAMENT and ORDNANCE.

	501	498
Bombs dropped	36	30
Bombs salvoed		6
Total	36	36

NOTE: No ammunition expended by either squadron.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. No sightings of enemy activity in the target area were reported by the 501st Squadron. Crews of both squadrons reported that our landing and ground operations were progressing satisfactorily and that the entire operation appeared to be well coordinated and highly successful.

b. The 498th reported three shacks and a length of railroad track on the east end of KORNASOREN Strip. On the route home, crew of A/P 347, reported seeing four men and a barge at CAPE HAWINI--15715-E--0145-S. Another barge was seen approaching this point from 2 miles off shore.

Narrative Report FFO 185-E-7, cont'd.

7. Photo interpretation of prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commanders:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer,
501st Bomb Squadron.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer,
498th Bomb Squadron.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

DISTRIBUTION:

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2. 1 copy COMMANDING GENERAL, 310th Bomb Wing, APO 565.
3. 2 copies A-2, Fifth Bomber Command, APO 713-1.
4. 1 copy S-2, 345th Bombardment Group, APO 713-1.
5. 1 copy S-2, 408th Bomb Squadron file.
6. 1 copy S-2, 501st Bomb Squadron file.

501-
187-E-6
5 July 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 713 UNIT 1
TEMPORARY APO 565

BMG/ljd

7 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 187-E-6, performed by the 501st Bomb Squadron 5 July 1944. Objective: BARGE SWEEP Around WAIGEO ISLAND and the Shoreline Northwest of MANOKWARI.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 713-1. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was to attack enemy barges along the southwest and northwest coast of WAIGEO Island and along the north coast of Dutch New Guinea from CAPE GOEDE HOOP to CAPE SAMERA, in conjunction with the 498th Squadron each squadron employing six (6) airplanes. Our six (6) planes were all B-25-D-1, and two of them carrying 3 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs and four carrying 4 x 250 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs. Attack was to be made at minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group rendezvous was accomplished over Humboldt Bay enroute to the target.

c. Attack.

(1) The 501st Squadron led the Group formation. On arrival at WAIGEO ISLAND, a careful search was made but no barges were sighted. Our planes strafed the native village and canoe on KRI ISLAND, strafed BESIR Village on the south coast of GAM ISLAND, and also strafed the unnamed village on the north tip of BIG GOF ISLAND. After circling WAIGEO ISLAND, the squadron proceeded to CAPE GOEDE HOOP area and began their barge search, sweeping the coast from west to east. A total of 6 barges were sighted of which one was definitely destroyed and 3 were badly damaged by strafing and were probably destroyed.

d. Time and Location of:

Took off HOLLANDIA 0730/K.

Narrative Report FFO 187-E-6, cont'd.

Attacked WAIGEO ISLAND from 1125/K-1200/K.
Attacked MANOKWARI from 1255-1300/K.
Landing 3 A/P HOLLANDIA 1600/K.
2 A/P landed WAKDE at 1530/K for gas. Took off WAKDE 1600/K--landed HOLLANDIA 1650/K.
A/P 060 landed ONI ISLAND at 1530/K/5 BOM.
Took off ONI ISLAND 1130/K/6--landed HOLLANDIA 1330/K/6.

a. Route. HOLLANDIA-CAPE GORDE HOOP-WAIGEO ISLAND-CAPE GORDE HOOP-CAPE SAMEBA-HOLLANDIA.

2. FORMATION. -- Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Group.

The 501st Squadron, led by Captain Neuenschwander, Squadron Commander, was first in consequence with the 498th Squadron flying second over the target.

b. Flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. Neuenschwander	A/P 064	Lt. Lewis	A/P 093
Lt. Moye	A/P 078	Lt. Petty	A/P 060
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 518	Lt. Kasten	A/P 036

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The target was attacked in flights of two planes each. None of our planes bombed on WAIGEO ISLAND, as targets sighted did not seem of sufficient importance to justify bombing. The few villages attacked were very lightly strafed. In the attack on barges between CAPE GORDE HOOP and CAPE SAMEBA, a total of 6 x 500 lb. and 15 x 250 lb. bombs were dropped. 8800 x .50 caliber and 600 x .30 caliber rounds were expended.

(2) The first 2 barges sighted were in a cove near WARPAPERI VILLAGE. These barges are considered as badly damaged and probably destroyed, as they were heavily strafed by Capt. Neuenschwander, Lt. Lewis, Lt. Jacobson, and Lt. Petty, with Capt. Neuenschwander scoring a near miss with a 500 lb. bomb and Lt. Jacobson a near miss with a 250 lb. bomb.

(3) The next 2 barges sighted were about 2 miles west of CAPE BOROPEM, along shore. These barges were heavily camouflaged. One of them was definitely destroyed and the other badly damaged and probably destroyed. Lt. Lewis dropped 2 500 lb. bombs at them one of which scored a direct hit, and Capt. Hauenschwander scored a near miss with another 500-pounder. Lt. Petty dropped one 250 lb. bomb with unobserved results. All three planes heavily strafed these barges.

(4) Another barge was sighted in little GEELVINK BAY near MASENI VILLAGE. This barge was strafed by Capt. Hauenschwander and Lt. Moye. Lt. Moye dropped two 250 lb. bombs at it, one of which failed to explode and the other overshot. Lt. Jacobson was unable to see the results of the 2 bombs he dropped at it. It is impossible to estimate damage inflicted on this barge.

(5) The next barge sighted was about 2 miles west of BEFOOR VILLAGE. Lt. Kasten was unable to make a run on this barge, but dropped 3 bombs in BEFOOR VILLAGE with unobserved results. Enroute to the target, a large stack of supplies had been sighted near this barge but the supplies were not there when our planes returned for their attack. The barge was of doubtful serviceability and was strafed by Lt. Lewis and Lt. Jacobson.

(6) A barge, loaded with supplies, was sighted in a small cove 1½ miles southeast of CAPE SAMERA. Only 2 planes were able to make an attack on this barge, only one of which could strafe it. Lt. Moye dropped 2 bombs at it, one of which failed to explode and the other bounced over for a near miss. Lt. Petty dropped one bomb at this barge with unobserved results. His run on the barge was made from sea to land, and after passing over the barge, he pulled up over low hills. Momentarily losing sight of his exact location, he suddenly found himself cruising over MANOKWARI Town. An intense barrage of ack-ack immediately opened up which fortunately failed to hit his plane. After scooting out to sea with violently and evasive action, he lost contact with the squadron, and after searching for them proceeded on to OWI ISLAND where he landed due to gas shortage.

Narrative Report FFO 187-E-6, cont'd.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground:

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel injured.

d. DAMAGE TO OUR PLANES.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs dropped: 6 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
15 x 250 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
Bombs returned: 1 x 250 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bomb.

8800 x .50 caliber and 600 x .30 caliber rounds expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. MANOKWARI—While passing over MANOKWARI Town, Lt. Petty sighted approximately 20 barges apparently in good condition. They were grouped around 8-Y, 9-Y, 10-Y, and 11-Y.

7. One print of pictures taken was received by this Officer. It is impossible to make any interpretation or damage assessment.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

501
208c
27 Jul 44
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CONFIDENTIAL

5018T BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 900

[illegible]/[illegible]

26 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission NO 208-0-26, performed by the 501st Bomb Squadron 27 July 1944. Objective: GAMBIA AIRDROME in the BANDAMEA ISLANDS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTH Air Force, APO 719-A, (ATTENTION: A.S. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. The primary objective was GAMBIA Airdrome, particularly airplanes on the ground. The target was to be attacked by three (3) squadrons of the 345th Group, each using nine planes carrying 20 x 100 lb. para demo. 1/5 sec. fuze bombs. The 38th Bomb Group also participated, attacking the same target immediately after the 345th Group's attack. The attack was to be made at minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous.

Group rendezvous was completed over GOI Island and wing rendezvous over SORIDO drome. Fighter rendezvous was made over ARMO Island.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. The approach to the target was made over low hills along to the south shore of GAMBIA BAY, coming across the target from South to North. Complete surprise was achieved. Numerous Japs were on the strip when our plane began strafing, and trucks and runway rollers were in operation on taxi ways and roads, and not one shot was fired at our planes by the enemy. 70 x 100 lb. para demo. 1/5 second fuze bombs were dropped on runways and dispersal areas. Two (2) Bisch's at the northwest end of runway no. two (2) were destroyed by direct bomb hits. Eight (8) road rollers on no. two (2) runway were hit by bombs and believed destroyed. Three (3) gas trucks northwest on the end of no. one (1) runway were bombed and strafed with unobserved results. Two (2) trucks were destroyed on the northwest end of no. two (2) runway, and three trucks were destroyed on taxi ways east of no. two (2) runway. One bugger was destroyed in GAMBIA BAY and eight to ten Japs, hanging on the side were killed. A supply dump 1 mile southeast of no. two (2) runway was bombed, starting black smoke and fire, fire and black smoke was started also on the northwest end of no. one (1) runway

b. Time and Location of:

Took off Mainar 0738-0741/K
Attack GAZEIA AIRDROME 1133-1135/K
Landed Mainar 1455-1500/K (7 planes)
A/P 518 landed MOKMER 1450/K
A/P 660 landed MOKMER 1515/K

g. Route. MOKMER-AMBO INLAND-GAZEIA-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Wing.

The 14th Group led the wing formation with the 38th Group following in no. two (2) position.

b. Group.

The 501st Squadron, led by 1Lt. Col. Goltherp Group Commander, was first over the target, with the 500th Squadron second and the 499th Squadron third.

c. Squadron.

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
1Lt. Col. Goltherp	491	1Lt. Davis	518	1Lt. Mirdlinger	076
1Lt. Nolan	060	1Lt. Welsh	064	1Lt. Heidorf	082
1Lt. Mayes	073	1Lt. Kasten	089	1Lt. Jacobsen	093

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The target was attacked by seven (7) planes, as two of our planes had turned back before reaching the target due to mechanical failures. 1Lt. Col. Goltherp led the first flight on a sweep directly down the length of No. 2 runway. 1Lt. Kasten flew on his right wing and 1Lt. Jacobsen flew his left wing, as 1Lt. Nolan and 1Lt. Davis had returned to base before reaching the target, necessitating a change in the squadron formation for the attack. 1Lt. Col. Goltherp dropped six bombs among four (4) road rollers at the south end of no. two (2) runway and dropped his remaining four (4) bombs at the north end of the same strip. He strafed 3 gas trucks at the north end of no. one (1) runway. 1Lt. Kasten dropped four (4) bombs south of no. two (2) runway starting a black smoke fire and bombed and strafed the trucks at the north end of no. one (1) runway.

a. (1) Lt. Jacobson flying #3 position in the First Flight, started his run slightly at an angle to the left of #2 runway crossing it near the N.W. end. As Lt. Jacobson passed over #2 runway control tower he strafed and dropped one bomb and a second was parked on a wrecked A/P near the tower. He strafed on through the target area dropping the last eight (8) bombs on 3 gas trucks and 3 road rollers on the N.W. end of #1 runway. While over the target his gunner thoroughly strafed A/P's in the revetments to the left of #1 runway and the buildings and storage areas to the right of #1 runway.

(2) Lt. Nirdlinger led the second flight, with Lt. Heidorf and Lt. Welch flying in #2 and #3 positions on his wing. Lt. Nirdlinger dropped all of his bombs in the dispersal area at the N.W. end of #2 runway, destroying two (2) small 2E bombers believed to have been DINAHS. Lt. Heidorf made his run from a slight angle to the runways crossing near the N.W. end of each strip. Four bombs were dropped at the end of #2 runway and two (2) revetments each containing one (1) 2E Bomber, were strafed and each blasted with two bombs, the remaining two bombs were dropped at 3 road rollers at the end of #1 strip. Huts were strafed on the right of #1 runway. Lt. Welch dropped all of his bombs in the dispersal area west of #2 runway, aiming at six or seven 2E planes he saw there. He was unable to observe the results of bombing, but did report that several of the planes were heavily strafed and believed damaged.

(3) Lt. Moye flew as third flight in single ship. He strafed trucks, fuel drums and planes in his sweep up the two runways and held all his bombs to drop on a lugger he had spotted in GALELA BAY. His ten bombs scored several very near misses on the lugger, which he also heavily strafed. Ten or twelve Japs were seen hanging in the water from the side of the lugger on which his bombs hit, and it was believed they were all killed.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the grounds

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.

(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Two (2) [illegible]HANS destroyed by direct hits at the N.E. end of #2 runway.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to Our Planes.

(1) Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs dropped: 70 x 100 lb. para. demo 4/5 sec. delay.
Bombs Salvoed: 10 x 100 lb. para. demo 4/5 sec. delay.
Bombs returned: 10 x 100 lb. para. demo 4/5 sec. delay.

11,700 x .50 caliber and 1,600 x .30 caliber rounds expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were made at minimum altitude. Sightings listed below were confirmed by all crews. 10-15 small 2E light bombers at [illegible] AIRDROME, 3 Gun pits 100 yards east of center of #2 runway, 12-15 fuel drums scattered around the north end of #1 runway, a search light position northwest end of #2 runway seemed empty, Fox Tare Dog or Fox Tare Charlie along side of jetty 20 miles southeast of [illegible] AIRDROME and numerous barges in this same area.

7. Photo prints were not received at time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

[illegible] F. [illegible],
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1- Route overlay to and from target.
2- Bomb Assessment Chart.


130°E
0.5°N
N
GALELA
A/D
HALMAHERA
ISL.
BIAK
IS.
MOKMER
A/D
NEW GUINEA
0.5°S
130°E
BANDA SEA
AROE
ISL'S

21-C
29 SCM
OK
aRR

CONFIDENTIAL

5081st BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M)
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
APO 928

[illegible]/[illegible]

30 July 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission [illegible], performed by the 5081st Bomb Squadron 29 July 1944. Objective: Armed recce of WEWA BAY in the MARIANNA ISLANDS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 720, (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. The assigned objective was to make an armed recce of WEWA BAY in the MARIANNA ISLANDS, with particular attention placed on enemy shipping found in that area. The attack to be made by six (6) planes at minimum altitude, each carrying 20 x 100 lb. demo. bombs with 1/5 sec. fuzes. No other Allied air units were to participate, and there was no fighter escort.

b. Rendezvous.

Squadron formed over MEKMER area and proceeded direct to target.

c. Attack.

(1) The mission was carried out as ordered, and was very successful, considering the employment of only four (4) airplanes. A Sugar Charlie off shore of MAPA Village was bombed and strafed at 1247/K and when A/P 076 returned for the second attack the Sugar Charlie had moved up the coast to CAPE FOAM, it was again attacked and destroyed, being left partly submerged, one barge was strafed and damaged at MIE Island, and two (2) baggers were sunk, one at WEWA Island and one off WOGI. WEWA Village was bombed and strafed, several buildings were destroyed and fires were started. [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] Villages were bombed and strafed starting fires in each one, GAMSUNG Village was strafed with unobserved results.

d. Time and location of:

Took off MEKMER [illegible]/K
Attack WEWA BAY [illegible]/K at minimum altitude.
Landing MEKMER [illegible]/K (2 planes)
1654/K (2 planes)

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1. Route.

Direct to target and return.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Lt. Hirdlinger led the Squadron, and pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Hirdlinger	A/F 076	Lt. Easton	A/F 089
Lt. Reidorf	A/F 078	Lt. Welsh	A/F 437

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The attack was carried out without fighter escort, our planes proceeding direct to the target, passing north of WAKDE Island enroute. Landfall was made at the northeast shore of WEBA BAY. Lt. Hirdlinger began his attack at 1155/K, strafing SAMOERE VILLAGE. Proceeding around the shore of WEBA BAY, a barge was sighted off MEE Island, this was heavily strafed and damaged at 1209/K. Lt. Hirdlinger strafed SAMA Village and dropped one (1) bomb, starting fires. WEBA Village was strafed at 1215/K and a large fire was started. A lugger and a Sugar Charlie were sighted off shore from PAPA Village. Lt. Hirdlinger made viscious attacks on both, strafing each and scoring 3 near misses on the lugger and 4 near misses on the Sugar Charlie. Machine gun fire was received from the SUGAR CHARLIE which was damaged by the first attack. Lt. Hirdlinger's crew elected to return for a second attack, although his gas was low and his radio was out and two planes of the second flight had already started back to base. He came back for the final attack at 1332/K, finding that the vessel had gotten under way and was steaming north, apparently heading for WEBA Island. On this second run Lt. Hirdlinger scored two direct hits with his bombs and the vessel was destroyed, it was last seen settling to the bottom of the bay.

b. (2) Lt. Easton led the second flight of two planes, with Lt. Welsh flying on his wing. He started his attack by strafing BOEE Village, dropping two (2) bombs which destroyed several buildings and started fires. He then made two passes on WEBA Village, dropping four (4) bombs and strafing buildings. His next attack was on a lugger off WEBA Island, he strafed the lugger and destroyed it with two bomb hits. He then made a pass at the SUGAR CHARLIE OFF MAPA Village, strafing it and dropping his last two bombs for near misses.

a. (3) Lt. Heiderf, flying #2 position in the first flight, started his run at GAMGENO Village where he strafed and dropped two (2) bombs which started a fire. Another two(2) bombs were dropped on SAGEA Village with unobserved results, as fires and smoke had already been started here by Lt. Nirdlinger. As Lt. Heiderf passed over WEMA Village, he dropped two (2) bombs and then saw a lugger near by at which he dropped his remaining four (4) bombs with near misses. The lugger was strafed by the crew with unobserved results.

(4) Lt. Welch flying #2 position in the second flight, started his attack at DOEE Village by strafing the native huts. While over KOEEA he strafed and dropped two (2) bombs on the docks, damaging them. He dropped four (4) bombs WEMA Village destroying three buildings and leaving one burning, the village was also thoroughly strafed. Lt. Welch dropped two (2) bombs and strafed a lugger near WEMA Village, the bombing being near misses. Near WOGI Village he strafed and dropped two bombs on a lugger destroying beyond repair.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. In the opinion of this officer, Lt. Nirdlinger and the members of his crew should be awarded the AIR MEDAL for the courage and devotation to duty displayed in making their second and successful attack upon the enemy freighter in WEMA BAY. This crew elected to stay on and press home their attack, even though half of the planes in the formation had turned back because of gas shortage, their plane was without radio, they were without fighter cover, and were at that time within range of over ninety (90) enemy fighters, which could easily attack them at any moment.

Narrative Report FFO 211-0-24, cont'd.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 40 x 100 lb. para. demo 1/5 sec. delay.
Bombs Salvoed: Nil.
Bombs Returned: Nil.
9800 x .50 caliber and 700 x .30 caliber expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were made at minimum altitude. Sightings listed below were confirmed by all crews. Several uniformed light skinned men, believed to be Japs in villages around NHEA NEY. Five (5) large barracks type buildings and numerous other buildings of bamboo construction in NHEA Village.

7. Photo prints were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1- Route overlay to and from target.
2- Bomb Assessment Chart.



ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
FFO - 211-C-14
501ST BOMB SQ. 345TH BOMB GP.
TOT 1155-1340/K
ALT. MIN.

P REF: EAST INDIES WEST
V-BOM COM.



SIGHTINGS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN
MISSION: FFO 211-6-14
TOT: 1155-1340/K ALT. MIN.
T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS
T OTHER PLANES
AUST. AERO MAP, SHEET A-5
SCALE: 1,000,000

211-C-8
29 Jul 44
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501st BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M)
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
APO 920

BBB/mm

30 July 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission TTO ZZZ-0-35, performed by the 501st Bomb Squadron 29 July 1944. Objective: Barge Group from CAPE SABRA to CAPE KORKAAP to BAK BAK.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Primary Objective.

The primary objective was a barge group from CAPE SABRA to CAPE KORKAAP to BAK BAK. The target was to be attacked by four (4) airplanes of the 501st squadron, each plane carrying 10 x 100 lb. demo. 1/5 sec. fuze bombs. There was no other squadron participating and no fighter escort, the attack was to made at minimum altitude.

b. Rendezvous.

Squadron formed over Balmer Airdrome and proceeded direct to the target area.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered, except that only three planes attacked the target. Airplane 518 returned to base shortly after take-off due to nose wheel trouble. The mission was not fruitful due to the few number of barges seen. A small fishing boat in a cove six (6) miles west of BAK BAK was damaged by strafing and two near misses with 100 lb. demo bombs, two (2) bombs were dropped on huts in BAK BAK which were also strafed, starting fires. Two (2) 100 lb. demo. bombs were dropped on the nearby village of WERDA with nil observed results. Four (4) bombs were dropped at ack/ack positions near KOKAB these positions were also strafed, nine (9) bombs were dropped among a group of buildings at KOKRSAN VILLAGE starting fires and destroying several buildings. Airplane 093 was badly holed by ack/ack fire over KOKAB, the turret gunner was wounded.

d. Time and location of.

Take Off: NOKIER 0729-0731/K
Attack : CAPE SABRA-CAPE KORKAAP-BAK BAK 0950-1015/K.
Landing : 1117/K (3 planes)
0750/K (A/P 518)

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Narrative Report FPO 213-0-45, cont'd.

g. Result.

[illegible] WAAR-GAPE [illegible]-GAPE SABRA-PAK PAK-KOKAS-[illegible].

2. PERSONNEL. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Squadron.

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Jacobson	A/F 093	Lt. Mayo	A/F 069
Lt. Nolan	A/F 069	Lt. Girdler	A/F 518

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Jacobson, in A/F 093 led the squadron on this mission. After searching the north shore of MACHINE GULF as far west as CAPE TIMOR with no sightings of ship targets, the squadron headed south to CAPE [illegible], then proceeded southeast along the NEW GUINEA coast. At [illegible], a small fishing boat was sighted. Lt. Jacobson strafed it and dropped one (1) bomb which exploded 50-100 feet off. He later strafed native huts in PAK PAK VILLAGE. Later when sweeping east along the south shore of MACHINE GULF, a pass was made on [illegible] VILLAGE. Here Lt. Jacobson's plane was hit by a burst of heavy ack/ack fire, putting more than thirty (30) holes in his ship and knocking out the electrical system. His turret gunner was wounded in the foot and hand. Lt. Jacobson salvoed his remaining nine (9) bombs. On landing at MUNDER BROOK the left main wheel tire blew out but the plane was landed safely. Lt. Nolan, flying no. 2 position on Lt. Jacobson, dropped two (2) bombs and strafed WAPAR VILLAGE, as Lt. Jacobson bombed the fishing boat, he also dropped two (2) bombs in the VILLAGE OF PAK PAK scoring direct hits, causing a fire and black smoke. As the flight reached KOKAS heavy, medium, light ack/ack and machine gun fire was received from a bald hill southwest of the village. He took evasive action and swung out to his right to give room to the flight leader. Lt. Nolan dropped four (4) bombs on ack/ack positions, 1000 feet to the west of the jetty, with near misses and strafed the village area. To the east end of KOKAS, he strafed personnel and construction work on the peninsula east of the launch jetty with unobserved results. On the return home Lt. Nolan salvoed the remaining two (2) bombs at sea. Lt. Mayo flew no. 3 position in A/F 069, as A/F 518 had returned to base shortly after take off. He strafed the small boat near [illegible] and dropped one (1) bomb for a near miss. After strafing PAK PAK and KOKAS, he dropped his remaining nine (9) bombs into a group of buildings at [illegible]

Narrative Report [illegible] continued.

3. [illegible]

a. (1) [illegible] completely [illegible] of the buildings.

b. [illegible] Flares dropped in the air and on the ground.

(1) No interception.

(2) [illegible] observed dropped in the air.

(3) [illegible] observed dropped on the ground.

c. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

d. [illegible]

(1) [illegible] one hole in steel wave [illegible] plane by [illegible] flak while over [illegible].

4. [illegible]

a. In the opinion of this officer, the [illegible] could be [illegible] on [illegible] for bombs received by dropped while over [illegible].

5. AMMUNITION USED.

Bombs dropped: [illegible] x 500 lb. demo. [illegible] incendiary
Bombs returned: [illegible] x 500 lb. demo. [illegible] incendiary
Bombs returned: Nil

4,000 x .50 caliber and 600 x .30 caliber rounds expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were confirmed by the crew. The following sightings from minimum altitude were made by all crews. AN ROAD VILLAGE there was many soldiers along the water front, new construction and a new road under the road well [illegible]. BIRK VILLAGE gun pits on the northern bank at the river mouth were going.

7. Photo prints were not received at time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

[illegible]
[illegible], Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer

2 Incl.
Incl. 1-Route overlay to and from target.
2- Bomb Assessment Chart.


[redacted]
MANOKWARI
BIAK ISL
MOKMER
N
JAPAN ISL.
MACCLUER GULF
BABO
KOKAS
GEELVINK BAY
03°S
136° E
NABIRE
NEW GUINEA

301
211-C
29 July
OK
ARCA

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

CAS/rpb

30 July, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 211-C-17, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 29 July, 1944. Objective: Barge Sweep, CAPE SORONG to CAPE KARAKRA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

To : Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Primary objective: Barge Sweep - CAPE SORONG to CAPE KARAKRA.

Secondary: None.
Bomb load: 10 X 100 lb demo bombs, 1/5 second delay per A/P.
Altitude: Minimum.

(b) Formation: Formation of the four A/P's of this Squadron, which was the only squadron on this mission, was to be made East of MOKMER A/D.

(c) Attack: All four planes reached the target and completed a sweep from CAPE SANSAPOR to CAPE KARAKRA at 0850/K to 1100/K at an altitude of 50/100 ft. Bombing was excellent with a total of 17 100 pound demolition bombs, 1/5 second delay fuse, being dropped.

One barge, probably unserviceable, was strafed just South of CAPE SANSAPOR, while another five miles Southwest of the same Cape was also strafed, but with unobserved results. A barge at CAPE KASBI was bombed and strafed and left listing. At JEF LIO two bombs were dropped with unobserved results. At JEF KASIM where three bombs were dropped, a warehouse filled with supplies was blown up and a white, red-roofed building, 150 ft X 30 ft was destroyed, starting a fire with black smoke to 200 feet. Seven bombs were released at BIRA demolishing four/five shacks and starting a small fire. At CAPE KARAKRA four bombs were dropped destroying a European type building. A beached barge and a canoe loaded with supplies were strafed at CAPE SABRA - the canoe was definitely sunk. Villages along the coast from CAPE SELE to CAPE SABRA were thoroughly strafed.

(d) Time and location of:
Take-off: MOKMER A/D at 0715/K.
Attack: CAPE SORONG to CAPE KARAKRA at 0850/K to 1100/K.
Landing: MOKMER A/D at 1250/K.

(e) Route: MOKMER - CAPE SORONG - SELE STRAITS - CAPE KARAKRA - GEELVINK BAY - MOKMER.

2. FORMATION: PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING

(a) The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Truman with flights as follows:

A/P 051 - Lt Truman	A/P 048 - Lt Barney
A/P 237 - Lt Bissell	A/P 372 - Lt Meyers

Narrative Report FFO 211-C-17, continued.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) Lt Truman, leading the Squadron on the sweep, was forced by weather to stay close to the shore of DUTCH NEW GUINEA, coming in at CAPE SANSAPOR. He strafed one probably unserviceable barge just South of CAPE SANSAPOR, and a beached barge five miles Southwest of CAPE SANSAPOR. One bomb was dropped on a barge at CAPE KASNI, which was also strafed and left listing. Another bomb was released at JEF KASIM, where a warehouse was hit and also strafed starting a fire with black smoke up to 200 ft. Two bombs were dropped on BIRA VILLAGE, where two shacks were blown up. Lt Truman then strafed a canoe loaded with supplies off CAPE SABRA definitely sinking it.

Lt Bissell dropped two bombs at JEF KASIM, where he hit a red-roofed building 150 X 30 ft in size. His other two bombs were dropped at BIRA VILLAGE, which was strafed also. He strafed the villages between CAPE SELE and CAPE SABRA.

Lt Barney released one bomb at the JEF LIO oil terminal, two were dropped at BIRA VILLAGE hitting a shack and starting a fire there, and two were dropped at CAPE KARAKRA. He also strafed villages along the North shore of MAC CLUER GULF.

Lt Meyers dropped one bomb on JEF LIO, one at BIRA VILLAGE hitting a shack there, and two at CAPE KARAKRA, destroying a European-type building. Strafing was accomplished along the route.

(b) A/A fire was encountered from known positions in the SORONG AREA and was described as both medium and light calibres, fairly accurate and at flight level. One crew reported three batteries of M/G on the North end and one on the South end of RAM ISLAND.

(c) Interception:
1. Nil interception.
2. Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
3. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
4. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

(d) Nil personnel injured.

(e) Nil A/P's damaged.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 17 X 100 lb demos, 4/5 second delay.
Bombs returned to base - 23 X 100 lb demos, 4/5 second delay.
9,000 X .50 calibre and 2,050 X .30 calibre expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

All crews reported seeing a Sugar Charlie and five barges at CAPE SORONG.

Both Lt Meyers and Lt Barney's crews reported a 2000-ton U/I M/V between CAPE SORONG and SORONG.

At JEF LIO a large crane, buildings and oil drums were reported by Lt Barney's crew.

Much activity in the JEF KASIM area was noted, also a large wagon or trailer loaded with supplies.

Narrative Report, FFO 311-C-17, continued.

At CAPE KARAKINI a cleared area with many tire tracks was seen by Lt Bissell's crew.

7. K-20 photographs were taken but prints have not been received at the time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

1 - Incl
Route and bomb assessment.

TP - TOOK PHOTOS

DRAWN BY GROUP PHOTO

ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 211-C-13 DATE-7-29-44

345th BOMB GROUP

600TH BOMB SQUADRON

TIME OVER TARGET: 1150 TO 1245

ALTITUDE: 10' TO 200'

CONFIDENTIAL

OK
ORN
501
212-C-9
30 July 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M)
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
APO 920

BEO/ms

31 July 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FTO 212-C-9, performed by the 501st Bomb Squadron 30 July 1944. Objective: Give Air Support to GROUND TROOPS making a landing at CAPE OPMARAI.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTH AIR FORCE, APO 710. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was to give air support to GROUND TROOPS making a landing at CAPE OPMARAI. The planes were to stay in that area from 0900-1100/K and give aid if it be needed. The two flight leaders planes carried 1 x 1000 lb. demo. bomb 8/12 sec. delay fuse and the other three (3) airplanes carried 10 x 100 lb. demo. bombs with 8/12 sec. delay fuses. The attack was to be made at minimum altitude. The secondary target to be hit if not needed at the primary target, was a barge sweep in the SEIE STRAITS area.

b. Rendezvous.

Squadron rendezvous was made over MOKMER and then proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. The Squadron proceeded to the primary target, reporting in to SAUCEPAN at 0912/K. No support was needed, as our landing was going ahead with practically no opposition. At 0917/K SAUCEPAN released the squadron from their primary assignment and ordered them on attack on the secondary target. Our planes swept the northern New Guinea coast from CAPE OPMARAI to a point about six (6) miles east of SORONG, then cut southwest overland to RENIOE Village, proceeding from there south along the coast to MAK MAK Island. One barge off the west shore of MAK MAK was attacked with 8 x 100 lb. demos. and strafed heavily, destroying the barge and damaging the jetty. 300-500 fuel drums scattered along the M/T road inland from the jetty were strafed and bombed with 1 x 1000

CONFIDENTIAL

lb. 8/15 sec. delay demo. and 26 x 100 lb. demo, starting huge black smoke fires which crews believed destroyed the entire dump. In this same area the JEF LIO jetty and a barge along side of it were attacked with six (6) 100 lb. bombs and strafed heavily, destroying the barge and damaging the jetty.

d. Time and location of:

Take off MOKMER 0730/K
Attack Primary Target-Air Support C.OPRAMAI 0912-0917/K.
Attack Secondary Target-GELE STRAITS 0955-1035/K
Minimum Altitude.
Landing MOKMER 1215-1218/K.

e. Route. MOKMER-CAPE OPRAMAI-GELE STRAITS-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Major Rosenbaum, 345th Group Deputy Squadron and [illegible] squadron. 501st Squadron pilots and planes were as follows.

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Rosenbaum	A/P 069	Lt. Davis	A/P 437
Lt. Nolan	A/P 082	Lt. Erskine	A/P 518
Lt. Kasten	A/P 089		

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The secondary target was attacked by five (5) planes as one of the planes scheduled to fly failed to check out for take off. Major Rosenbaum strafed the barge west of MAK MAK Island and dropped 4 x 100 lb. bombs for near misses. He next strafed fuel drums at JEF LIO TERMINAL and dropped five (5) bombs directly among the drums, starting heavy black smoke fires. His next pass carried him over a barge near the jetty. This barge was heavily strafed and four (4) bombs dropped for near misses. He strafed the fuel drums again and dropped his last two (2) bombs directly into them. In all, five large fires were burning in the area when our planes departed. Lt. Nolan flying #2 position in the first flight, dropped two (2) bombs with near misses and strafed a barge west of MAK MAK Island. The barge was damaged but did not sink. At JEF LIO TERMINAL he dropped one bomb and strafed the docks causing damage. A barge near the docks was also bombed and strafed. Six (6) bombs were dropped on oil drums along the road east of the village causing fires and smoke. Three passes were made on these drums and each time tracer bullets caused new fires.

a. Lt. Kasten dropped 10 x 100 lb. bombs, getting a near miss on the jetty and the nearby barge, and nine (9) hits among the fuel drums, making two passes at the barges and five passes at the fuel drums, strafing heavily.

b. Lt. Davis led the second flight, which consisted of himself and Lt. Erskine. Lt. Davis strafed the two barges and the oil drums, and dropped one of his two 1000 lb. bombs among the oil drums. His other bomb was returned to base, as he was saving it for a possible future target that might be sighted. Lt. Erskine flying in #2 position in the second flight, dropped two bombs and strafed the barges to the east of MAK MAK Island, this barge was still afloat when last seen by his crew. In the JEF LIO TERMINAL on the coast east of MAK MAK Island, he dropped one bomb scoring a near miss which damaged warf installations and one on a barge near the wharf with unobserved results. Three passes were made on the oil dump. Here he dropped six (6) bombs and strafed, causing fires on each pass.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 1 x 1000 lb. demo. 8/15 delay.
Bombs Dropped: 40 x 100 lb. demo. 8/11 sec delay.
Bombs Returned: 1 x 1000 lb. demo. 8/15 sec delay.
Bombs Salvoed: Nil.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were made at minimum altitude. The following sightings, all in JEF LIO area were reported or confirmed by all crews:

Narrative Report FFO 212-C-9, cont'd.

8. The track to JEF LIO airfield and to KIAMOKA airfield appeared well used. KIAMOKA Village seems to be occupied and active. JEF LIO oil derrick still intact, with four buildings in good condition.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



SIGHTINGS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN

[redacted]

T PLANES TAKING PHOTOS

? OTHER PLANES

MAP REF: Jefman - Sele Area
V 908 OSN [redacted]

[redacted]

501
OK. 213-4
aRN 31 July 44

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[illegible] BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M)
[illegible]TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
APO [illegible]

[illegible]/[illegible]

31 July 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission APO 213-6-4, performed by the [illegible]th Bomb Squadron 31 July 1944. Objectives Sea Search of CERAM-MERODA SEA-MANOOR-TALIABOR ISLAND.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710.
(ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. The assigned objective was to make a Sea Search of CERAM-MERODA SEA-MANOOR-TALIABOR ISLAND. The attack to be made by six (6) airplanes at minimum altitude, each carrying 3 x 500 lb. demo 1/5 sec. delay fuze bombs. No other Allied units were to participate, and there was no fighter cover.

b. Rendezvous.

The squadron formed over MOKMER area and proceeded direct to the target area.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Five airplanes reached the target area, A/P 069 flown by Lt. Welsh returned to base after two and one half hours of flight, due to mechanical trouble. There were no important enemy shipping sighted. Five (5) small 40-50 ft. sail boats were sunk by bombing and strafing. One at TABOELOE ISLAND, one at CAPE FENCE, one off shore of CAPE KORA and two along the east shore of WEBVEER BAY. Nine (9) other small sail boats were damaged by strafing, one at CAPE DEBENGHAND, two at CAPE MARIBROE, one in BOKI STRAIT and five (5) in MOMOOLE STRAIT. TOLON Village on TALIABOR ISLAND AND BOER VILLAGE on MANOOR ISLAND, were bombed and strafed with no visible results. A crashed BETTY BOMBER near TOLONG VILLAGE on TALIABOR ISLAND was heavily strafed.

d. Time and location of:

Take off MOKMER 0652/K
Attack MANOOR - TALIABOR ISLAND 1115-1230/K
Landed MOKMER 1516-1554/K (2 airplanes)
Landed MOKMFOOR ISLAND 1554/K (3 airplanes)
Take off MOKMFOOR ISLAND 1615/K
Landed MOKMER 1648/K (3 airplanes)

e. Route. MOKMER-MAC CLUER GULF-MANOOR-MOKMER

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Narrative Report FFO 213-C-4, cont'd.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. 1Lt. Hirdlinger led the squadron, and pilots participating were as follows

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Hirdlinger	A/P 076	1Lt. Jacobson	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Heidorf	A/P 518	1Lt. Erskine	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Welch	A/P 069	1Lt. Nelson	A/P [illegible]

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The target area was attacked by five (5) planes as one of the planes had turned back two and one half hours after take off. 1Lt. Hirdlinger began his attack by strafing a sail boat off CAPE DEBEKOLONO. This boat, like the others attacked on this mission was 40-50 feet long, and seemed to be a fishing boat. Tonnage estimated as 30 G.T. 1Lt. Hirdlinger continued his run along the north shore of MANGOIE and TALIANGE Islands, strafing one sail boat off TABOELOE Island, one off CAPE PENOE, TWO near CAPE MARIKASOE. He dropped one (1) 500 lb. bomb among buildings in TALONO Village with unobserved results. After strafing the two sail boats at CAPE MARIKASOE, 1Lt. Hirdlinger circled, expecting the second flight to join him at this point. He lost the second flight, however, and after circling the area again without locating them, he proceeded on course to base, returning along the same route the squadron had followed to the target. 1Lt. Heidorf, flying #2 position in the first flight started his attack by strafing a schooner to the southeast of TABOELOE Island just north of of MONGOIE Island with damaging results. He damaged a schooner by strafing near CAPE PENOE. In a cove to the S.E. of TALONO a schooner was strafed with unobserved results . 1Lt. Heidorf strafed the previously crashed BETTY BOMBER at TALONO. He then strafed and dropped one bomb in TALONO Village with unobserved results. 1Lt. Heidorf then strafed and dropped two bombs on the previously strafed schooner S.E. of TABOLLOE Island destroying it.

b. 1Lt. Jacobson led the second flight, strafing a sail boat off CAPE DEBEKOLONO, one off TABOELOE Island, and strafing and bombing one near CAPE PENOE, with a 500 pounder which destroyed it. He strafed two sail boats in near CAPE MARIKASOE, damaging both. At this point he lost contact with the Squadron leader, and thinking 1Lt. Hirdlinger had gone ahead around the south side of the Island, proceeded on course expecting to join. He strafed another sail boat in ROKI S BAIY, one near CAPE KOEA, and attacked two sail boats moored together in VESUVIUS BAY, dropping two bombs for near misses.

Narrative Report FFO 213-C-4, cont'd.

b. 1Lt. Jacobson sighted five (5) small boats in MEMBOKE STRAIT, damaging all of them. Still not having made contact with the Squadron leader, 1Lt. Jacobson took his flight back to MYKMEN, stopping at NOEMFOOR Island for refueling. 1Lt. Erskine, flying #2 position in the second flight, strafed a schooner near CAPE FENKE. The next attack of strafing and bombing sank a small schooner in the mouth of VESUVIUS BAY. While making a circle in the bay, 1Lt. Erskine dropped one bomb at native canoes on the east shore with unobserved results. His third bomb was dropped in the bay sinking a three (3) mast schooner and a smaller boat was destroyed. 1Lt. Nelson flying # 3 position in the second flight started his attack on targets of opportunity on the east coast of NOEMFOOR Island, strafing and damaging a schooner. His second strike was in the NOKI STRAITS wh ere another schooner was strafed with unobserved results. OFF CAPE KOMA 1Lt. Nelson strafed and dropped one bomb on a schooner capsizing it. In VESUVIUS BAY he dropped a bomb which exploded in the village docks and in the village with unobserved results. As he passed through the MEMBOKE STRAITS he strafed a schooner with unobserved results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 13 x 500 lb. demo. 4/5 sec. delay.
Bombs Returned: 3 x 500 lb. demo. 4/5 sec. delay.
Bombs Salvoed: 2 x 500 lb. demo 4/5 sec. delay.
9,500 x .50 cal. 800 x .30 cal. expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were made at minimum altitude. The following sighting was seen or confirmed by all crews. A crashed BETTY BOMBER in a small clearing 2 miles S.E. of TOLONG Village.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

Narrative Report FFO 213-0-4, cont'd.

For the Squadron Commander.

ISAAC E. BAKER
2nd Lt. Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO 213-C-4 31 July 1944
501ST BOMB SQ. 345TH BOMB GROUP
TOT: 1115-1230/K ALT. Min.

MAP REF: EAST INDIES WEST
V BOM COM

501
218-6
5 Ag 44

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]
[redacted]
APO 920

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Operation Report on Mission NO [redacted], performed by the [redacted] Bombardment Group [redacted], [redacted] Shipping Area North coast of [redacted], (Secondary target).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710. (ATTENTION: A.A. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. [redacted]

The primary objective was to make an attack on [redacted] Air Base. The Secondary target was a shipping group around the north coast of [redacted]. The target was to be attacked from minimum altitude, each airplane carrying [redacted] x 500 lb. para fuze 1/5 sec. delay fuze bombs. Each other squadron, [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], of the [redacted] Group were to [redacted], with 16 P-38 fighters as top cover.

b. [redacted]

The Group formed over [redacted] Drome and made rendezvous with the P-38's at [redacted] Island.

c. [redacted]

The primary target was not reached due to weather. The Group turned back at [redacted]/K at 0905 south - 2140 north, when the fighters decided not to try to go through the weather. The north coast of [redacted] was searched from west to east. A small unnamed [redacted] CHARLIE along the shore four miles east of [redacted], was bombed and strafed, two direct hits and one near misses with 500 lb. para fuze, 1/5 sec. delay fuze bombs, destroying it. Twenty-six (26) bombs were dropped in [redacted] Village completely demolishing it. Eighteen (18) bombs were dropped on a small island village 5 miles N.E. of [redacted], destroying several the roofed buildings and starting large black smoke fires visible for 50 miles. A ferry and several small boats at [redacted] were bombed and strafed. 2 bombs hit the ferry and damaged it, and several of the small boats were destroyed. 6 bombs fell on shoals on shore, blowing them to bits. [redacted] Village was strafed and hit with with 20 bombs. Unidentifiable village along the S.E. shore of [redacted] BAY was strafed and four bombs were dropped scoring near misses, and hitting in the water.

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b. Time and location of:

Time off MINDEN 0640/K
Attack target 1045 - 1130/K
Landed MINDEN 1430/K

b. Route:

MINDEN - MAG GIRES GULF - FIRAN ISLAND - TARGET - MAG GIRES GULF - MINDEN.

2. PREPARATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Capt. Hammondmander led the group, and pilots participating from this squadron were as follows:

PLANE NUMBER			PLANE NUMBER		
Capt. Hammondmander	A/P	1[illegible]	Lt. Kerton	A/P	[illegible]
Lt. [illegible]	A/P	[illegible]	Lt. Miller	A/P	[illegible]
Lt. [illegible]	A/P	[illegible]	Lt. [illegible]	A/P	[illegible]
Lt. [illegible]	A/P	[illegible]			

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. CAPTAIN HAMMONDMANDER started his attack on [illegible] by strafing a heavily camouflaged vessel near SUMBAWA Village. He was over departed this vessel as a small SUGAR CHARLIE. Captain Hammondmander was unable to release any bombs on his pass at this vessel, but did get several good strafing hits. Lt. [illegible] Next he sighted a beached barge just east of [illegible], but as it seemed unserviceable, he strafed it and did not bomb. Captain Hammondmander made his next attack on MAMAI Village, dropping a string of ten bombs directly against the buildings in the town, which he also strafed heavily on one pass only. The weather reported that ten minutes later two large fires were burning in the village. He next strafed KOEI Village and dropped his last two bombs there amongst buildings. LT. [illegible] attacked the SUGAR CHARLIE, dropping two bombs at it for 20 - 30 feet near misses, and strafing it heavily, seeing his tracers very low on the side of the vessel. He next strafed the W/W barge without bombing it. He strafed MAMAI Village and bombed it with eight (8) x 100 pounders, and strafed SEMBAWA Village, hitting it with two bombs. He finished his attack by strafing several unidentifiable villages along the N.E. coast of CERAM with all possible. LT. [illegible] flew No. 3 position in the first flight. He strafed the SUGAR CHARLIE but was unable to get a bombing run on it. He strafed and bombed the jetty and small boats at MAMAI, dropping two bombs which hit about ten feet short for very near misses. His next attack was on KOEI Village, where he dropped two bombs for direct hits among buildings, which he also strafed. He observed his eight remaining bombs when leaving the target.

Narrative Report [illegible], cont'd.

a. Lt. [illegible] attacked the SUGAR CHARLIE by strafing it and dropping two bombs for very near misses. His crew reported that the vessel was later blown up by direct hits from a plane flying behind their plane (NB: This was Lt. Kasten, leading the second flight in A/F 437). His next attack was made on SKIRMAN Village, where he dropped two bombs which fell to the left of the village, hitting the shoreline for nil damage. He next strafed buildings in KEBI Village and dropped six bombs among them with unknown results. His last two bombs were accidentally salvoed after leaving KEBI.

b. Lt. KASTEN, leading the second flight attacked the well camouflaged SUGAR CHARLIE located to the east of CAPE GELI, strafing and dropping four bombs. He thought they scored near misses, but other crews saw his bombs bounce into the vessel for direct hits, destroying it. As he proceeded to the east he strafed SKIRMAN Village with unobserved results. In WAMAI Village, west of SKIRMAN BAY, Lt. Kasten dropped eight bombs destroying numerous buildings. Lt. BILLING flying No. 2 position in second flight started his attack by strafing the SUGAR CHARLIE. He flew to the east and spotted a target on the EASTERN BESAR Island where there were numerous new tin roofed buildings, he strafed and dropped six bombs damaging some of the buildings and setting fire to others. Lt. Billing made one strafing pass over SKIRMAN with unobserved results. As he entered WAMAI Village he strafed and expended two bombs on the jetty destroying numerous small boats and damaging the jetty. His last pass was made on WAMAI Village where he strafed and dropped his remaining four bombs, adding to the previous flights bombing destruction of the village. Lt. CHEEMUS, flying No. 3 position in the second flight also strafed the SUGAR CHARLIE near CAPE GELI, with unobserved results. Near LIMARAM, he sent a short burst of fire into a U/S barge. On the eastern of the two larger BESAR Islands, Lt. CHEEMUS strafed and dropped twelve bombs, all of which fell in the area of the newly constructed tin roof buildings, causing heavy columns of black smoke which were seen thirty minutes after leaving the target. He strafed the village of SKIRMAN before leaving the area.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. Nil airplane damage.

Narrative Report 97th BS-G-6, cont'd.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND SUPPLIES.

Bombs Dropped: 72 x 100 lb. para demo 1/5 sec. delay.
Bombs Returned: Nil
Bombs Salvaged: 20 x 100 lb. para demo 1/5 sec. delay.
13,000 x .50 cal 1500 x .30 cal. expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. There were no sightings reported other than those in the target area, all of which were made at minimum altitude. The following sightings were seen or confirmed by all crews. At BENALI a 60 - 70 ft. schooner off shore. In BONA two large black smoke fires up to 1,000 feet were seen in the vicinity of the drome, visible 50 to 60 miles. On the S.E. coast of GIRAI there were numerous sudden buildings, new, in villages.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander.

ISAAC B. BAKER
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET
FFO 82D-G-6 5 Aug. 44
8OBT BOMB SQ. 345TH BOMB GP.
TOT: 1101-1[illegible]K ALT. Min.

Map Ref: EAST INDIES WEST
V BON CON

OK 8 Aug 44
aRR

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BMB/1jm

9 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission PPO 221-C-5-C, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 8 August 1944. Objective: BARGE SWEEP WAIGEO ISLAND. (TERTIARY TARGET).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was to make an attack on shipping located in WASILE BAY. The secondary target was a barge sweep in the WASILE BAY area. The tertiary target was a barge sweep in and around WAIGEO Island. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude with each airplane carrying 1 1000-pounder and 2 500-pounders. All bombs containing 4-5 second delay fuze. The 499th and 500th squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate in attacking the primary target with two squadrons of P-38's as top cover.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over SORIDO Drome and made rendezvous with two squadrons of P-38's over ADJOE Island.

c. Attack.

The primary target was not reached due to weather. The Group turned back at 1315/T at 02° 40' North-129° 10' East. Flying east, the Group separated and the 499th and 500th squadrons flew along the north coast of WAIGEO Island, while the 501st squadron flew along the southern coastline of WAIGEO Island. A total of 3 1000-pounders and 9 500-pounders were dropped on villages in WAIGEO Island. No barges were sighted along the island. An unnamed village on GEMIEN Island was set afire. Two quarter-tonnes were dropped on an unnamed village at the west end of GAM Island. A 1000-pounder was dropped on a small island at the south end of MAJALEBIT BAY. One 500-pounder was dropped and strafed on WAIGE Village at the east end of WAIGEO Island. No results were observed other than destruction of native villages. OMBIRMA Vil-

Narrative Report FFO 221-C-5-C, continued.

lage at the southeastern corner of WAIGEO Island was strafed. Six 500 quarter-tonners and 2 half-tonners were dropped on SAONEK Village off WAIGEO Island destroying native buildings starting a small fire with black smoke up to 100 ft. Due to lack of targets, 3 500-pounders and 3 1000-pounders were salvoed.

f. Time and Location of.

Take off: From MOKMER Drome at 1035/I.
Attacked Target: From 1400-1440/I.
Landing: MOKMER Drome at 1705/I.

g. Route.

MOKMER-AMOK ISLAND-0°40' North-129° 10' East-WAIGEO ISLAND-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Mirdlinger was the squadron leader, and pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Mirdlinger	A/P 064	Lt. Masten	A/P 437
Lt. Erwkins	A/P 089	Lt. Billig	A/P [illegible]
Lt. Nolan	A/P 078	F/O. Muster	A/P [illegible]

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The Group received word that the fighters were turning back due to weather and changed their course to hit the tertiary target. Lt. Mirdlinger, the squadron leader, made a sweeping attack along the south coastline of WAIGEO Island. Sighting no barges, he strafed a village on GOMIEN Island, strafed and dropped a quarter-tonner on a village at the west end of GAM Island, strafed and dropped a 1000-pounder, which fell short and hit in the water, at SAONEK Village. He also bombed and strafed WAIPE Village. Lt. Erwkins, flying #2 position, and Lt. Nolan, flying #3 position, observed no targets and salvoed theirbombs with the exception of one 500-pounder which Lt. Nolan dropped on GAM Island.

b. Lt. Masten, leader of the second flight, dropped all of his bombs on SAONEK Village destroying native buildings and started a small fire black smoke up to 100 ft. F/O Muster, flying #2 position, and Lt. Billig, flying #3 position, dropped on the flight leader's release. The

Narrative Report FTO 221-C-5-C, continued.

The majority of their bombs fell in the same area as Lt. Kasten's causing destruction to the native buildings.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 3 x 1000 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
9 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
Bombs Salvoed: 3 x 1000 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
3 x 500 lb. 4/5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 7100 x .50 caliber and 120 x .30 cal.

6. There were nil sightings on this mission.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

OK 501 222-C-7 9 Aug 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEG/ljd

10 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 222-C-7, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 9 August 1944. Objective: SHIPPING WASILE BAY.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was to make an attack on shipping located in WASILE BAY. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude with each plane carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demo. bombs. The 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate in the attack with two squadrons of P-38's as top cover.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over SORIDO Drome and made rendezvous with two squadrons of P-38's over ADJOE Island.

c. Attack.

All six of our planes attacked the primary target. The bombing was excellent. Two direct hits and 2 near misses were scored on a FOX TARE BAKER or FOX TARE CHARLIE anchored 2,000 yards southwest of Pier B in WASILE BAY causing fire with gray smoke and knocking off the forward mast. The ship was left listing and believed to have been destroyed. One SUGAR CHARLIE located 500 yards southwest of Pier B was blown to bits by a direct bomb hit and destroyed. Another SUGAR CHARLIE with Jap camouflage brown paint located in WASILE BAY due south of HATETAHAKO A/D about one mile off shore was bombed with 3 hits alongside the waterline lifting the ship out of the water causing it to make a 90° spin. The SUGAR CHARLIE was left listing and smoking badly and believed destroyed. Numerous luggers and barges packed tight along the shore between Pier B and the 500 ft. pier west of Pier B. An estimated 20-25 barges anchored in this area. These barges were strafed and bombed with 8 500-pounders starting heavy black smoke fire which obscured accurate assessment of damage to barges and piers. A small motor

Narrative Report FPO 222-C-7, continued.

boat located in the center of WASILE BAY was strafed with unobserved results. Stores and buildings along the shore at Pier B were strafed with unobserved results.

c. Time and Location of.

Take off: From MORNING Dreams at 1007/K.
Attacked Target: From 1335-1340/K.
Landing: MORNING Dreams at 1725/K.

d. Route.

MORNING-ADJUK ISLAND-TARGET-ADJUK ISLAND-MORNING.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Mirslinger was the squadron leader, and pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Mirslinger	A/P 064	Lt. Kasten	A/P 437
Lt. Billig	A/P 089	Lt. Thomas	A/P 099
Lt. Nelan	A/P 059	Lt. Muskit	A/P 059

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Mirslinger led the squadron into the target making his run on an approximate north south heading dropping 2 bombs among barges around the jetty west of Pier B, and strafed heavily as he passed them. He made a direct attack on a large ship, which he classified as a FOX TANK CHARLIE, which was some 2,000 yards southwest of Pier B. He attacked diagonally across the starboard bow. He dropped 2 bombs both of which fell short with the second hitting almost at the waterline of the ship starting an explosion with gray and white smoke billowing up. The ship started listing immediately. After making this attack, he swung to the right out to the center of WASILE BAY where he strafed a small motor boat with unobserved results. Lt. Billig flew #2 position and Lt. Nelan flew #3 position. Lt. Billig strafed shore installations and barges around Pier B, but was unable to make a bombing run on shipping, as he was crowded out of the flight formation. All of his bombs were returned

to base. His cameraman took K-21 pictures of the shore installations and barges. Lt. Nolan strafed shore installations and barges around the jetty. Lt. Nolan strafed a peculiarly erected building setting it on fire. This building was some 1500-2000 ft. inland from the base of Pier B. It was described by his crew as looking like some sort of a control tower or observation tower with large glass windows completely around its sides. One crew member said it might be a lighthouse. It was approximately 75-100 ft. high. As the flight turned to make its attack on shipping, Lt. Nolan was forced out of position and had to cut under #1 and #2 plane. This caused him to be in line for an attack on the SUGAR CHARLIE, which was camouflaged with brown paint. He dropped one bomb which hit on the port side near the stern starting a fire with white smoke. The ship was left burning. Lt. Nolan was unable to drop any more bombs due to rack malfunction. He returned three bombs to base.

(2) Lt. Kasten, leader of the second flight, started his attack by strafing and dropping one bomb on a SUGAR CHARLIE near the 500 yards jetty west of Pier B. He continued his run on the possible FOX TARE BAKER or FOX TARE CHARLIE anchored 2000 yards southwest of Pier B. He strafed and dropped two bombs from stern to bow, one bomb hitting the waterline under the stern and the other falling and hitting the mast knocking part of the superstructure off which tumbled into the water before the bomb exploded. When leaving the bay, the ship was seen to be listing. Making a right hand turn, he strafed and dropped one bomb on a SUGAR CHARLIE which was seen to disintegrate. Lt. Thomas, flying #2 position in this element, strafed and dropped two bombs on shore installations and jetty west of Pier B with unobserved results. As he made a right hand turn, he observed a SUGAR CHARLIE, well camouflaged with brown paint, in the center of MANILA BAY. He strafed and toggled 2 bombs, one on each side, along the waterline lifting the ship out of the water and causing it to make a 90° spin. The SUGAR CHARLIE was left listing and smoking badly. Lt. Muskit, flying #3 position in the 2nd flight, started his run by strafing and dropping 3 bombs on luggers and barges anchored off shore alongside Pier B with un-

[illegible] operations. As he pulled away from the dolphin, he continued his run by crossing [illegible] towards the FOX TANK BARGE or FOX TANK BARGES before giving way to LA. Upon [illegible] the ship drop where he was. After leaving the dolphin, he returned the boat.

b. Interruption. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interruption.
(2) Nil allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

g. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injuries.

f. Damage to Our Aircraft. Nil airplane damage.

4. CONDITIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for accurate data or comment.

5. ANTIAIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES.

Bombs Dropped: 24 x 500 lb. [illegible] current delay open bombs.
Bombs Jettisoned: 1 x 500 lb. [illegible] gas. delay bomb.
Bombs returned to base: 7 x 500 lb. [illegible] gas. delay.
Ammunition Expended: 7750 x .50 caliber and 600 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Crews were unanimous in sightings in the target area differing only in minor details as to location of shipping. They were as follows:

20-25 luggers and barges along north shore of NAMIE BAY around three jetties.
2 unidentified merchant vessels anchored 500-1000 ft. south of Pier A.
[illegible] barges along center of eastern shore of NAMIE BAY.
2 unidentified M/V, possibly tankers, along the west shore of KACE BAY between KACE and DIANE PT. These were seen from [illegible] miles distance and exact identification was impossible.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]


N
NEW
GUINEA
0
100
200
300
STATUTE MILES



BOMB ASSESSMENT CHART.

FFO 222-C-7 9 August 1944
501st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Order Over Target—First
Time Over Target—1335-1340/K.
T Planes Taking Photos.
T Other Planes

Map Ref:
Moluccan Island 1/125,000
Small
Possibly M/B

501
224-A-4
11 Aug 44
OK
aRA

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BMG/ljd

12 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FTO 224-A-4, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 11 August 1944. Objective: SHIPPING JAGE-WASILE Bay.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710.
(ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was to make a search for shipping in the HALMAHERA Area covering BULI Bay and JAGE Bay, and if no shipping were sighted up to that point, to search DODINGA Bay for shipping with TERNATE Town as a last resort target. Target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demo. bombs. The 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group were to participate in the attack with two squadrons of P-38's as escort.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over SARMI Drome and made rendezvous with two squadrons of P-38's over ADMIRALTY Island.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. All six of our planes attacked the primary target. The squadron was delayed in take off due to a misunderstanding of take off time, but overtook the group formation enroute to the target making their attack in our assigned position #3 in the group formation. Bombing results were excellent. Three passes were made at a large supply dump and personnel area at CAPE JAGAL (01° 02' N.—127° 55' E.), starting six large fires and nine columns of heavy black smoke visible 30-50 miles from the target. 100-200 Japs were seen and strafed on the ground around the supply dump. One large lugger or small-type SUGA CHA LIK off shore from WASILE Village (01° 08' N—127° 53' E) was heavily strafed and hit by several 500-pounders, one of which was seen to go directly through amidship. This

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report FFO 224-A-4, continued.

vessel was badly damaged, and it is reasonable to list it as definitely destroyed as the result of our attack. A Chinese Junk-type lugger nearby was also badly damaged from strafing and near bomb hits. 2 luggers off shore between FAJAOEL and SOEBAIM (01° 10' N—128° 02' E) were destroyed by bombing and strafing. These 2 ships were seen to sink by our crew members. One plane received one M/G hole in the tail. There were no injuries to our personnel.

d. Time and Location of.

Take off: From MOKMER Drome from 1005-1007/K.
Group Rendezvous: Enroute to target 1225/K.
Attacked Target: From 1305-1340/K.
Landing: 1700-1703/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-ADJOK ISLAND-BULI BAY-TARGET-BULI BAY-MOKMER

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Davis was the squadron leader, and pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Davis	A/P 437	Lt. Moye	A/P 064
F/O. Muster	A/P 089	Lt. Ohnemus	A/P 069
Lt. Thomas	A/P 078	Lt. Musket	A/P 099

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Davis led the squadron on to the target making his first run at a large stack of supplies just north of CAPE JAWAL where he dropped 2 500-pounders, one of which skipped over the stack of supplies he was aiming at and bounced directly into a much larger stack just ahead, which he had not sighted at the time of his bombing release. On exploding this bomb was seen to blow the stack to bits. After passing over the supply area, he sighted a large lugger just off shore from WASILE Village, which he strafed heavily dropping one 500-pounder which was seen to hit the lugger at the waterline passing directly through both sides of the ship leaving a gap-

ing hole in the waterline on both sides and exploded within 4-5 ft. of the lugger on the far side. This ship was seen later on the second pass to be settling to the bottom having turned over on its side with one deck completely submerged.

F/O Muster dropped three bombs on targets and salvoed one after leaving the target. His first bomb was dropped in the supply dump at CAPE JAWAL scoring direct hits starting a fire. His second bomb was dropped at a new jetty on the southeast shore of KAOK BAY near BESA Village (01° 55' S--127° 55' E) for a 30-40 ft. miss doing no apparent damage. His third bomb was dropped at a lugger off shore between FAJAOEL and SOEBAIN. This bomb hit short, skipped and caused no apparent damage. He thoroughly strafed docks, shore installations and supply dumps along the east shore of KAOK BAY.

Lt. Thomas made his first pass at the jetty near BESA strafing it. He dropped his first two bombs in the supply area at CAPE JAWAL starting a large fire. After circling to the left, he came in for a second pass at the supply area strafing and dropping two more bombs with excellent results. On this pass, he sighted a large number of Japs running around the supply area stating there were easily 100 of them, and possibly as many as 200, and that as his plane was strafing away so heavily he must have caused a large number of casualties. After making this last pass on the supply area, he proceeded on up to WASILE where he made a strafing pass at 2 luggers along the southwest shore with unobserved damage. Lt. Thomas received light M/G fire from the luggers, getting one hole in the tail assembly of his plane with no injuries to personnel.

(2) Lt. Moye, leading the second flight, started his attack by strafing and dropping one bomb on a supply dump just north of CAPE JAWAL causing fires and damage to the supply dump. As he continued his run, he strafed up the coast to FAJAOEL. The second pass was made by strafing the same area. Lt. Moye, making his third pass over this area, dropped 3 500-pounders on the supply dump starting another fire.

Lt. Ohnemus flew #2 position in the second flight dropping one bomb on a stack of fuel drums in the supply dump at CAPE JAWAL. Exact results were not

visible, but the crew thought they hit the fuel drums. On his second pass, Lt. Ohnemus dropped one bomb on the edge of AKESELAKA Village (01° 05' N--127° 55' E) near CAPE JAWAL scoring a direct hit on a fuel dump there. As his third bomb was dropped at a ship, which he reported as a SUGAR CHARLIE but interrogation established this to be a large Chinese Junk-type lugger, scoring a near miss and badly damaged this ship leaving it listing. On the third pass up the coast, he dropped his fourth bomb on supplies at CAPE JAWAL supply dump with unobserved results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. A/P 078 received one M/G hole in the tail.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 23 x 500 lb. 4-5 sec. delay demo. bombs.
Bombs Returned to Base: 1 x 500 lb. 4-5 sec. delay demo. bomb.
Ammunition Expended: 9,750 x .50 caliber and 1500 x .30 caliber expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings over the target were reported or confirmed by all crews: 1305-1340/K. Minimum.

Floatplane base 100 yards north of CAPE JAWAL Island with six unidentified floatplanes all burning after vicious strafing attack by P-38 escort.

Narrative Report FFO 224-A-4, continued.

3-4 large barrack buildings, all apparently new, along southwest shore of KAOE BAY approximately 10 miles southwest of MADJAID. (01° 05' N--127° 45' E).
Crews estimate at least 12 M/V recently sunk or in sinking condition in KAOE-WASILE Bay area.
Supply dump at CAPE JAWAL described by crews as largest they have seen yet.
Many stacks of large 10-15 ft. square crates were reported with small supply stacks too numerous to count.
Barges and shore activity in LOLOBATA Town area. Crews were not close enough to estimate number of barges.
New jetty southeast shore of KAOE BAY near BESSA Village, and a new jetty west shore of KAOE BAY near new barracks--10 miles southwest of MADJAID.

all crews in the second flight reported seeing 3-4 luggers along the south shore of WASILE BAY in vicinity of FAJAUKL. (Comment: These were not seen by the first flight as their run was slightly different at this point).

Lt. Musket's crew sighted a radio tower, Jap flag on top, 2-3 nearby shacks on tip of Pt. KAOE.

1240/K--5000 ft.--BOELI-SERAMI BAY--2 unidentified merchant vessels low in water resembling tankers. Seen by the gunner of F/O Muster's crew. (Comment: This sighting was not reported by other crews).

1325/K--800 ft.--One very large unidentified M/V sighted approximately one mile off shore from TERNATE Town. Vessel had steam up at time of sighting. (Comment: Reported by all crews although differing only in slight variations as to exact location of shipping.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



FFO 224-A-4
11 August 1944
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target—1305-1340/K.
Order over target—Third



FFO 224-A-4
11 August 1944
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target—1305-1340/K.
Order over target—Third
T Planes taking Photos
Other planes.

MAP REF: HALMAHERA GROUP
V BOMCOM 603

225A
12 Aug 44
OK
ORN

SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
36TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

HBD/ajm

20 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission #70 [illegible], performed by six aircraft of the 501st Bomb Squadron 20 August 1944, on Japanese Babo Airdrome.

TO : 1. COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 708, (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective of this strike was to render the serviceable runway 1-7 of the Babo Airdrome, the target was to be attacked at medium altitude by six planes, four of which carried 8 x 1000 lb. fragmentation bombs and two carrying 3 x 1000 lb. incendiary bombs. The secondary target was to be personnel and stores in the Manokwari area, which was also to be attacked at medium altitude. The 501st and 500th squadrons of the 36th Group were to participate in this attack.

b. The Group formed over the NORMIN Drome area, and proceeded directly to the target.

2. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. All six of our planes attacked the primary target. Bombing results were generally unobserved, due to a heavy layer of black smoke about over the target which our weathergram indicating clouds caused by the earlier bombing of the "Dumbos". Two crew members reported seeing two explosions in the water near the shore around the north of the crash dam northeast of runway 1-7, which might have been some of our bombs falling. One crew member, a cameraman who was taking pictures, reported seeing flames which he believed were bombs dropped by the second flight hitting the south half of runway 1-7 falling directly on it. This would be seven 1000-pounders hitting in this area. It was impossible to accurately assess bomb damage. In all 48 x 1000 lb. incd. demo. bombs were dropped over the target. (All Map References Babo A/D Temporary Target Map A-2 Edition 5 AAF.

Narrative Report 370 225-d-11, continued.

1. Time and location of.

Take-off: From MOKHEH Bremen from 1350-1355/K.
Attacked target: At 1510/K from 7500-8000 ft. altitude.
Landing: MOKHEH Drome at 1630/K.

2. Route.

MOKHEH-CANNET-MOKHEH.

B. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

1. 1Lt. Brigham, of the 345th Group, Operations Officer, led the formation. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Brigham	A/P 491	1Lt. Marlan	A/P 465
1Lt. Brakins	A/P 078	1Lt. Williams	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Nolan	A/P 069	1Lt. [illegible]	A/P [illegible]

3. PROFILE OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) 1Lt. Brigham led the squadron over the target from an altitude of 7500-8000 ft. He flew north northwest to south southeast. Due to the heavy layer of dust and smoke caused by the "heavies", who were just moving off the target, observation where his bombs fell were generally unobserved. His combined load of three bombs were dropped on the north third of runway 1-7. His crew believed their bombs to have fallen one striking the intersection of runway 1-7 and 3-7, and the other two falling to the left of runway 1-7 in the grass area. They all agreed that visibility was poor and that pin-pointing their bombs was impossible. 1Lt. Brakins, flying #2 position in the second flight, dropped his two bombs on the flight leader's release with unobserved results. 1Lt. Nolan, flying #3 position, also dropped his bombs on the release of the lead plane. Due to the heavy coverage of smoke and dust left by the previous bombing of the "heavies" he was unable to observe any of the bursts of his bombs.

(2) 1Lt. Marlan, leader of the second flight, toggled his three bombs soon after the first flight had released their bombs. His crew believed their bombs to have dropped on the lower half of runway 1-7 with observation as to damage could not be determined.

Narrative Report FFO 225-A-11, continued:

1Lt. Willard, flying #2 position, and 1Lt. Gammon, flying #3 position, also dropped their entire load of bombs on the flight leader's release with unobserved results. Both of these latter two planes took K-21 pictures of the bombing.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

3. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

4. Damage to our planes. Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 14 x 1000 lb. inst. demo. bombs.
No ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were observed and were reported or confirmed by all crews.

Several buildings in target 8-A were seen to be wrecked.
Jetties 2-V and 3-V are intact.
Runway 2-V is unserviceable and badly torn up.
One twin engine bomber on the east side of runway 1-V, 1000 ft. from the north end.
North end of runway 1-V appears to be in rough condition. Serviceability of runway questionable.
Bombing by "heavies" observed and bombs covering the south half of runway 1-V.

7. Photos were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC R. BAKER,
2nd Lt. Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl1
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



FFO 225-4-11
12 August 1944
501st Bomb Squadron
345th Bomb Group
Time Over Target: 2510/L.
Order Over Target: First
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes
Ref:
BARO A/D V BONCOU 56-A.


N
NEW
GUINEA
TTO 285-6-11
12 August 1944
50th Bomb Squadron, 345th Bomb Group
Time Over Target: 1530K.
Order Over Target: First

501
226
OK
aRD

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IMR/lsl

14 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 226-A-11, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 13 August 1944. Objective: Strike Against Supply Area WASILE BAY.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 710.
(ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against supply dumps in WASILE BAY. The target was to be attacked from minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demolition bombs. The secondary target was to be a strike on the Town of Ternate, which was also to be attacked from minimum altitude. The 499th and 500th squadrons of the 345th Group were to participate in this attack.

b. Rendezvous.

The group formed over MOKMER Drome, proceeded to ABJOE Island where they made rendezvous with fighters, 3 squadrons of P-38's, and from there the formation proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. All six of our planes attacked the primary target. Bombing results were generally unobserved, due to the dense growth of tall trees. It was impossible to estimate accurate damage. As our squadron approached the target at minimum altitude, a huge billowing cloud of smoke 1,000 ft. to the north of the 500 ft. pier, probably caused by the previous squadron's bombing. This column of smoke caused our squadron to veer to the left throwing the left wingman over the heavy ack-ack position northeast of Pier B, where they strafed and dropped 10 bombs in the ack-ack area with near misses. Bombs were also dropped in the bivouac and barracks area north of Jetty B. Bombs fell in the motor pool area and among warehouse buildings northeast of Pier B., where direct hits were observed, causing widespread debris.

Narrative Report FFG 226-A-11, continued:

Two canoes in the south half of WASILE BAY were attacked and tracers were seen to enter them. Three Japs were seen aboard one canoe. One small boat in the center of WASILE BAY was strafed and sunk. 2 luggers 1500 ft. south of Jetty A were strafed. Several Japs were seen aboard at the time believed hit. No visible damage to luggers. The largest concentration of bombs fell in the native dump and personnel area to the north and around Jetty A where dense growth of tall trees covered the assigned area made results other than bomb bursts impossible. The entire area was thoroughly strafed from the 500 ft. pier to 300 yards past Pier A. A FOX TANK DOG located 3,000 ft. off Jetty A was strafed with unobserved results.

c. Time and Location of:

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome from 0850-0852/K.
Group Rendezvous: Enroute to target.
Attacked target: At minimum altitude from 1225-1235/K.
Landing: MOKMER Drome from 1615-1618/K.

e. Route:

MOKMER-AJOE ISLAND-TARGET-AJOE ISLAND-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Nirdlinger led the squadron over the target. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Nirdlinger	A/P 437	Lt. Kasten	A/P 401
Lt. Erskine	A/P 078	Lt. Willard	A/P 099
Lt. Nolan	A/P 069	Lt. Musket	A/P 064

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Nirdlinger led the squadron on to the target. When he was about one mile away from the target on his run in, he noticed a very large explosion of gray-brownish smoke near Jetty B. This caused him to change his run slightly and veer to the left. About 3,000 ft. north of Pier B, he noticed heavy ack-ack fire coming at the squadron from their left. He immediately swung his flight sharply to the left t making a diving run on the ack-ack position strafing and bombing it heavily, in order to cut down its effective fire against the planes in the second flight.

Lt. Middlinger dropped four bombs in the personnel area west of the ack-ack position among buildings and personnel, dropped four on the ack-ack position itself scoring near misses, and after passing over it and back to the right to get back in the assigned target where he dropped his remaining four bombs among small buildings setting in a smaller ravine in the dump and personnel area north of Pier A. He strafed during the entire run, and after passing out into the bay , made a strafing run across a FOX TANK BOB about 3,000 ft. off shore from the pier. Lt. Brakina, flying #2 position in this flight, made his run along the roadway northwest of Pier B. He dropped 10 bombs here all of which were seen to fall directly among small buildings and supply shacks strung along the road. A white smoke fire was started here. He continued his run along the shoreline from Pier B to Pier A strafing continuously. He released his two remaining bombs in the bay when the squadron started to form for the return to base. Lt. Nelson was flying #3 position. He dropped back slightly behind the flight leader to make a good strafing and bombing run over the heavy ack-ack position where he dropped four bombs for a very close miss. His plane flew directly over the position, and his crew members saw three guns in the position being manned by enemy gunners. After passing the ack-ack position, he dropped his remaining 8 bombs in the dump and personnel area north of Pier A. His crew members saw several of his bombs falling directly among buildings in this area. Passing out into the bay, he strafed 2 barges or small luggers, seeing several Japs aboard them. Continuing across the bay, his waist gunner strafed two canoes, one of which had 3 Japs aboard it, and Lt. Nelson later strafed with waist guns a further canoe, and his crew reported that it was definitely sunk after passing there, adding that they flew so low that the prop-wash undoubtedly helped to sink it.

(2) Lt. Kasten, leading the second flight, started his run so as to start 300 yards northwest of the 500th ft. pier. Due to a heavy explosion and billowing smoke which was probably caused by the bombing of the previous squadron, swerved his flight to the left where his right wingman would miss the smoke and explosion. Starting his run near the end of Pier B, he dropped four bombs on buildings and warehouses 100 yards west of Pier B. His remaining 8 bombs were dropped to the northwest of Pier A in the dump and personnel area. These bombs were seen to fall among

the buildings, and the results of the explosions were unobserved. 1Lt. Kasten strafed continuously throughout the target. Coming off the target, he strafed a small boat or canoe in the center of WAGILA BAY where tracers were seen to enter it. 1Lt. Willard, flying #2 position in this flight, dropped his first two bombs in the water pass area at the west end of Pier B. Columns of black smoke were seen to rise from the results of the bombings. 10 bombs were dropped in the active dump and personnel area to the north of Pier A where his crew observed bombs falling among buildings with unobserved results other than bursting of bombs. He continuously strafed the target from Pier B around the coastline to Pier A. Passing out into the bay, he made a strafing run on a PGM TARE DOS located 3,000 ft. off shore from Pier A. 1Lt. Hamish, flying #3 position in this flight, started his run by making a strafing pass and dropping 2 bombs at the known heavy ack-ack position west of Pier B with near misses. His remaining 10 bombs fell south of the road leading to the west from Pier A. These bombs fell among 2 warehouses and barrack-type buildings. Results were unobserved. After leaving the target passing out into the bay, his tracers were seen to enter a small boat with unobserved damage.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 70 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Bombs Salvoed: 2 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Ammo. Expended: 8800 x .50 caliber and 400 x .30 Cal.

Narrative Report FFO 225-A-11, continued.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were confirmed or reported by all crews:

20 vessels consisting of approximately 16 small boats or luggers, 6 barges and 3 large luggers or small [illegible] GUNBOATS, and one steel hulled M/V, possibly FOR THAN [illegible], 3000 ft. off Jetty A.

One barge off CAPE LOLOBATA, 128° 06' E-01° 16' N.

One barge along shore at AIKIAM, 128° 41' E-01° 07' N.

2 [illegible] ships off shore at KAOE. Crews reported that one of these appeared to be moving, adding that they kept it under observation for a considerable time.

One lugger near BORO 127° 59' E-01° 19' N.

Barracks buildings in target area northwest of Jetty B reported as still intact and apparently undamaged.

B-25, 345th squadron, seen crashing in water [illegible] yds. southeast from Jetty A. Plane sank in 3-4 seconds. No survivors were seen by our crew members.

14. Nelson's crew observed the following sightings:

One large barge off CAPE TOKEMBO, 128° 02' E-01° 36' N.

3 luggers in BOKILI BAY near LABILABI, 128° 21' E-01° 28' N.

3 barges and one lugger in BOKOLO BAY, 128° 31' E-01° 35' N.

Lt. Willard and Lt. Masten, as well as their crew members, observed barges at the mouth of the creek at the southwest end of HATETABAKO A/B.

7. Photo prints were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1-Route overlay to and from target.
2-Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 226-6-21 13 Aug. 1944
501st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Order Over Target—Second
Time Over Target—1225-1235/K.





ROUTE TO & FROM TARGET

FFO: 226 A 13 DATE-13 Aug 44
345th BOMB GROUP
498 BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 1455K
ALTITUDE: 6/6500'

Inc #1

DRAWN BY— GROUP PHOTO
Cpl. ADAM A. GWIAZDA

501
OK
GRA 227-A
14 Aug 44

5OIST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 929

BSO/234

15 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFU 227-A-5, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 14 August 1944. Objective: Shipping West coast of Halmaheras and Installations in TERNATE Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fifth Air Force, APO 719. (ATTENTION: A.C. of S., A-2).

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was the strike against enemy shipping along the west coast of the HALMAHERAS from PATINTI STRAITS to DODINGA Bay with the last resort target being enemy supplies, installations and personnel in the Town of TERNATE. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demolition bombs. The 500th squadron of the 345th Group also participated in this attack.

b. Rendezvous.

The group formed over MOKEMS Drome proceeding to AJUK Island where they made rendezvous with 2 squadrons of P-38's, and from there proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with the exception that only five planes were able to reach the target. One plane turned back at 1130/K at 00° 10' N—129° 05' E, due to engine trouble. A total of 20 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demolition bombs were dropped. 9 bombs were dropped among warehouse buildings around #1 Government wharf at TERNATE scoring direct hits and starting a large fire and smoke up to 400-500 ft. Flames were visible for 15 minutes after leaving the target. One bomb was dropped on a coal stud 1000 ft. west of #1 wharf scoring a direct hit. 5 bombs were dropped among buildings along #2 jetty scoring several hits and starting a column of yellow smoke rising 200-300 ft. 2 bombs were dropped on buildings around the Post Office and Radio station starting a fire with gray white smoke 200-300 ft.

Narrative Report FPO 227-4-5, continued.

The entire town area from the fleetplane anchorage to the Chinese shops south of FORT CHARLE was strafed. 2 bombs were dropped on a large SUGAR CHARLIE scoring direct hits on the north shore of DODINGA BAY, 00° 49' N—127° 33' E. The ship broke in two and the aft half sank immediately. The fore half was burning fiercely from oil fire. 1 bomb was dropped at a large lugger or small schooner off MAKE Island, 00° 35' N—127° 29' E. 2 small 20-30 ft. boats were strafed at MOTI Island, 00° 30' N—127° 30' E, with nil apparent results. Two planes received minor holes from possible gun fire over TERNATE. One crew member was wounded.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome from 0850-0852/K.
Group Rendezvous: Enroute to target at 0900/K.
Attacked Target: Shipping—1210-1300/K.
TERNATE Town—1305-1307/K.
Landing: 1 A/P MOKMER Drome at 1430/K.
5 A/P MOKMER Drome from 1415-1417/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-JOB ISLAND-CAPE SAOKEN-PATINTI STRAITS-DODINGA BAY-TERNATE-KAOK BAY-MONLI BAY-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Davis led our squadron. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Davis	A/P 437	Lt. Moyo	A/P 408
Lt. Fisher	A/P 078	Lt. Chumma	A/P 099
Lt. Thomas	A/P 069	Lt. Muskat	A/P 089

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Davis, leading the group, hit the target at the PATINTI STRAITS at 00° 35' N—127° 29' E. He strafed and dropped one bomb with near misses on a small schooner off MAKE Island. His next attack was made on a SUGAR CHARLIE in DODINGA BAY at 00° 49' N—127° 33' E, where he strafed and dropped one bomb near amidship breaking the SUGAR CHARLIE in two. Having no other targets in the primary area, he changed course, reformed the group, and struck the secondary target

which was TERNATE Town. He started his run on TERNATE about 500 ft. south of the #1 Government wharf where he dropped one bomb in the warehouse district, which was 300 ft. southeast of #1 wharf. The bomb was seen to enter a large warehouse building and exploded demolishing it and setting it on fire. His fourth bomb was dropped 300 ft. southwest of #2 jetty, which caused a large explosion. A member of Lt. Davis's crew observed two junks thrown up to the plane level by this explosion. Lt. Davis strafed during his entire run which ended 1000 ft. south of the southeast end of FORT ORANJE. Flying in #2 position, Lt. Fisher strafed the schooner off MARE Island with unobserved results. He dropped his first bomb on the SUGAR CHARLIE, the same as Lt. Davis, scoring a direct hit on the waterline at the stern of the ship causing a large explosion . An oil fire was started as the result of the explosion. The ship was definitely destroyed. As he reached the secondary target, 2 bombs were dropped on warehouses about 200 ft. east of #1 wharf and bombs were observed to fall on two warehouses demolishing them and causing a fire to break out. His fourth bomb was expended on buildings 500 ft. northwest of Jetty #2 scoring direct hits. He strafed the entire target breaking away about 1200 ft. south of FORT ORANJE.
Lt. Musket, flying #3 position, filling the vacancy left by Lt. Thomas, who turned back earlier due to engine trouble. Lt. Musket strafed a small boat off shore east of MOTI Island with unobserved results. Making his bombing run on TERNATE, he dropped his first three bombs in the new warehouse area under construction 500-1000 ft. south of #1 jetty. His crew was unable to see direct results of these bombs. His fourth bomb was dropped among buildings in the Chinese shop area some 600-700 ft. southeast corner of FORT ORANJE. This bomb was seen to demolish an unidentified building. He strafed during the entire run over TERNATE stopping his strafing fire about 1000 ft. south of the old Dutch Fort.

(2) Lt. Naye led the second flight over the target. He strafed a larger lugger or small schooner off MARE Island. His attack on TERNATE commenced about half way between the floatplane anchorange and the #1 Jetty. He dropped his first bomb in the warehouse

area around #1 Jetty. The second bomb scored a direct hit on a coal shed 700 ft. inland from the base of #1 Jetty. His third bomb was dropped about 600 ft. inland from the base of #2 Jetty. His crew could not see what it hit, as this area was heavily wooded. His last bomb dropped in and around the Post Office and Radio Station, and a large column of gray white smoke was later seen arising from this location. He strafed during the entire run over TERNATE.

Lt. Ohnemus flew #2 position on Lt. Maye's wing. His attack was reported as follows: "We started our search along the coast at 1230/K. Entering PATINTI STRAITS just below SAKETA Village at 1251/K, we strafed 2 small sailboats off shore east of MAKE ISLAND. No particular damage was noted. At 125[illegible]/[illegible], we saw the lead flight sink a large schooner or SUGAR CHARLIE with a direct hit leaving it burning. As we passed it, we noticed it had been broken in two and the entire rear half of the ship had sunk. A large column of black smoke was pouring from the front half indicating that oil was burning there. At 1305/K, we started our strafing run on TERNATE where we dropped 4 500-pounders. The first two fell directly on the third of 3 large warehouse buildings lined in line inland from the #1 Jetty. Our gunner reported this building badly damaged. Our second and third bombs were dropped 300 ft. apart and fell about 500 ft. due east of the hospital and mosque building just south of the #2 Jetty. We couldn't see what we hit because of heavy trees, but shortly after our bombing, a column of yellow smoke started climbing up from this spot. This smoke rose some 200-300 ft. in height. As we left the target, 2 large fires were seen burning from TERNATE, one among the warehouse buildings around #1 Jetty, and the other fire around the Post Office and Radio Station, and that the yellow column of smoke was still billowing up between these 2 fires which were still burning 15 minutes after we left TERNATE."

(3) Lt. Thomas developed engine trouble before reaching the target and was forced to return to base at 1130/K at approximately 00° 10' N—129° 05' E. About 10 minutes later, flying alone, his crew saw three unidentified airplanes, which were small, and had the appearance of fighter planes, pass behind them from left to right. Scattered clouds were in the area at the time and evidently these three planes did not see their ship. No attempt was made at interception, and Lt. Thomas landed safely at MORNE at 1430/K.

Narrative Report FTO 227-1-5, continued.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

g. Personnel Casualties.

(1) S/Sgt. SANDY A. CORTESTO, 20746145, Mechanic Gunner, in A/P 437, was wounded in the right thigh by A/A fire. Extent of injuries unknown.

h. Damage to our planes.

(1) A/P 437 and A/P 689 received minor holes from possible gunfire over TERNATE.

4. CITATIONS.

a. It is recommended that S/Sgt. Cortesio be awarded the PURPLE HEART for wounds received in action over TERNATE.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 20 x 500 lb. 4-5 second demo. bombs.
Bombs Salvoed: 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second demo. bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 5920 x .50 caliber and 400 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were confirmed or reported by all crews:

2 small craft leaving wake like 25-30 meter boat heading south 180° degrees in PAJOHI BAY, 00° 15' N—127° 33' E.

3 SUGAR CHARLIES near shore at TERNATE—one north of #1 Jetty, one south of #1 Jetty, and the other tied up at #1 Jetty all with paint camouflage.

One lugger near beach 2,000 ft. south of #1 Jetty.

8-10 barges along shore at TERNATE Town.

3 luggers in cove at MASIRUKETEN Village southwest shore of KAOK BAY, 00° 53' N—127° 38' E.

Seen from KAOK BAY—fires with four columns of gray smoke building up to 500-600 ft. high. Reported by 2 crews as being around CAPE JAWAL, and also reported by 2 crews as being in WASILE Pier area.

Narrative Report FPO 227-4-5, continued.

Lt. Myers and Lt. Chamness' crew observed one bomb or projectile falling north shore of TIGER ISLAND, [illegible] N., [illegible] W. Reported by one crew as serviceable and the other crew as unserviceable.

Lt. Chamness' crew sighted a rectangular shape structure, described as resembling a collapsible canvas pontoon, on a small island off GIRI-GIRI Village, [illegible] N., [illegible] E.

Lt. Fisher's and Lt. Chamness' crew reported a large rectangular building, apparently of wood construction, directly behind MMO Village, [illegible] N., [illegible] E.

Lt. Thomas, returning to base alone due to engine trouble, sighted three unidentified planes, believed to be fighters, flying westward in vicinity of [illegible] N., [illegible] E. Planes passed 1000 yards behind single ship. Full interception, due to westward course.

7. Photo prints were not received at the time of writing this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. [illegible],
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


FFO 287-4-5 14 Aug 44
5th Bomb Sq, 38th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1230-1307/K.
Order Over Target: First
N
NEW GUINEA
STATUTE MILES

FTO 227-4-5 24 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1230-1307/K.
Order Over Target: First

| Planes Taking Photos
| Other Planes
• Instantaneous Bomb Hits.



501
228-1
15 Aug

OK
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501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEG/ljd

17 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 228-A-4, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 15 August 1944. Objective: Shipping West Coast of HALMAHERA and Installations in TERNATE Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Force, APO 920.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was the strike against enemy shipping along the west coast of the HALMAHERAS from PATINTI STRAITS to DODINGA Bay with the last resort target being enemy supplies, installations and personnel in the town of TERNATE. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demolition bombs. The 500th squadron led the group formation with the 501st and 499th squadrons flying #2 and #3 positions respectively.

b. Rendezvous.

The group formed over MOKMER Drome proceeding to AJOE Island where they made rendezvous with P-38 fighter escort, and from there proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. All six planes reached the target. Bombing was excellent. A total of 20 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demolition bombs were dropped, of which 12 500-pounders were dropped on TERNATE, 5 bombs on the jetty near DODINGA Village on the east shore of DODINGA Bay, and 3 bombs were salvoed. The bombing of TERNATE resulted in one direct hit on a large building 100 ft. west of the MHV Trading Company; one bomb dropped on native quarters just north of the Post Office and radio station starting a fire with black smoke up to 50-60 ft.; one hit among unidentified buildings 500 ft. south of FORT ORANJE 600 ft. inland from shore; 2bombs hit on unidentified buildings 800 ft. north of FORT ORANJE and 400 ft. inland from shore; one bomb scored a direct hit on the Sultan's Palace. The bomb

Narrative Report FFO 228-A-4, continued.

was seen to completely demolish the northeast quarter of the building. One bomb hit 1000 ft. south of FORT GRANK and 100 ft. inland from shore; one bomb hit hotels south of the MHV Trading Co.; one bomb hit in the MHV Trading Co. and damaged the building and starting a fire; 2 bombs scored direct hits on the Post Office and radio station; one bomb hit 700 ft. south of FORT GRANK in Chinese shops 150-200 ft. inland from shore; one bomb dropped among shacks on the shore at the base of DODINGA jetty. #1 Government wharf just south of FORT GRANK and the area around the Sultan's Palace were strafed. A native boat off CAPE TOKAKA, 00° 12' S— 127° 40' E, was strafed as well as 2 boats off CAPE KARO KARO, 00° 20' N— 127° 36' E. with nil visible results. After leaving TERNATE, the squadron reformed in DODINGA BAY, and proceeded east for the return to base. At DODINGA Village, at position 00° 55' S—127° 45' E, A/P 383 made a bombing run on the 500 ft. jetty dropping four bombs. In making this bombing run, A/P 383 collided in midair with A/P 518 causing A/P 383 to crash into the hill directly behind the jetty with loss of the entire crew. A/P 518 received damage to the right wing forcing him later to make a crash landing in the water at KAMIRI without loss of personnel.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome from 0750-0752/K.
Group Rendezvous: Over MOKMER Drome at 0807/K.
Attacked Target: Barge Sweep from 1145-1215/K.
TERNATE from 1225-1226/K.
Landing: MOKMER 3 planes at 1605/K.
A/P 089 landed at MOKMFOOR Island at 1550/K.
Took off MOKMFOOR at 1640/K—landed MOKMER 1720/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-AJOK ISLAND-PATINTI STRAITS-PAJANI BAY-TERNATE-DODINGA BAY-KAOK BAY-BOKLI BAY-AJOK ISLAND-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Hirslinger led the squadron. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Lt. Hirslinger	A/P 383	Lt. Nolan	A/P 518	Lt. Kasten	A/P 401
Lt. Dillig	A/P 089	Lt. Thomas	A/P 099	Lt. Erskine	A/P 437

Narrative Report FFO 228-A-4, continued.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Hirdlinger led the squadron and made a strafing run down the length of TERNATE village but did not drop any bombs there. After the squadron attack on TERNATE, he reassembled the squadron in DODINGA BAY before heading back to HOKNER Drome. As he approached DODINGA village, he made a bombing run on the jetty there releasing his four bombs, three of which hit in the water alongside the jetty, and the fourth on land. As he was making his bombing run, Lt. Hirdlinger pulled up sharply causing the tail of his airplane to strike the right wing of A/P 518, which was flying #3 position. Lt. Hirdlinger's plane was seen to wobble in flight apparently out of control, and a few instants later, crashed headon into the crest of the hill directly behind the jetty exploding on contact. There could not have possibly been any survivors.

Lt. Billig, flew #2 position on Lt. Hirdlinger's wing. He strafed a sailboat in PATINTI STRAITS. He strafed shacks in SEMO village and in MAIDO village along the western coast of the south HALMAHERA Peninsula, then swung around the west shore of MOTI Island strafing shacks in TAFOMOKTOK village on MOTI Island. Approaching TERNATE town, his line of flight was such that he was forced to swing around the SUGAR CHARLIE or FOX TARE DOO anchored south of the #1 wharf, and was unable to make a bombing or strafing run on it. He then cut back into the town hitting the shore at the base of the #2 jetty, where he started strafing buildings along the waterfront up as far as 500 ft. south of FORT ORANJE. He dropped three bombs in TERNATE town, the first hitting the Post Office building, and the other 2 hitting unidentified buildings in the Chinese houses and shop area south of FORT ORANJE. His fourth bomb was dropped at DODINGA jetty with unobserved results.

(2) Lt. Nolan led the second flight of two airplanes on the target. He did not attack any targets of importance during his shipping search along the HALMAHERA coast. Reaching TERNATE, he began his attack just north of the #1 Government wharf flying a heading of 350 degrees. He dropped one bomb among the native quarter buildings northwest of the Post Office and radio station. One bomb dropped among Chinese houses

500-600 ft. south of FORT ORANJE. His third bomb dropped on the center of the road directly west of the Sultan's mosque, and his fourth bomb about 200 ft. west of the Sultan's Palace. He strafed along the entire run except for the area immediately around FORT ORANJE. After the squadron had reformed into 2 flights of 3 planes each for their return to base, Lt. Nolan flew #3 position in the first flight on Lt. Nirdlinger's left wing. At DOBINDA village, as Lt. Nirdlinger was making his bombing run on the jetty, Lt. Nolan's right aileron was badly damaged when Lt. Nirdlinger's plane climbed suddenly. The crew's narrative of events were as follows:

"We were coming in for a run on the jetty intending to make a strafing pass on some buildings about 300 ft. north of the jetty. Lt. Nirdlinger was to bomb the jetty itself. We were flying about 200 ft. altitude when suddenly A/P 383 climbed sharply and its tail hit our right wing. Our plane went out of control immediately, but we managed to climb the hill directly ahead of us and expected to ditch the plane in KAGE BAY. The co-pilot notified the crew to prepare for a crash water landing. We managed to get our plane under control, however, kept our altitude and called Lt. Billig, in A/P 009, asking him to escort us back to NOEMFOOR. It took all of our strength to hold the plane under control--both pilot and co-pilot working the controls continuously. We trimmed the plane with full right aileron and full right rudder, boosted the manifold of our left engine to 10 inches above that of the right engine and 100 RPM greater than the right engine. The plane flew at a 15° bank. It took us 3 hours and 20 minutes to reach NOEMFOOR. By the time we had reached MANOKWARI, we were able to climb to about 5,000 ft. As we approached NOEMFOOR, we dropped our wheels to check them for landing. At this point, we asked the crew if they wanted to bail out. They elected to stay with the plane. We then dropped down to 2500 ft. and made a 3-4 mile approach to KAMIRI Drome. The entire crew came forward and braced themselves--one behind the pilot, one behind the co-pilot, one on the floor of the Navigator's compartment, and one against the ammunition box on the left side. We dropped our wheels maintaining about 170 MPH air speed. We tried to line up on the

runway, but at this point, the right engine cut out with our RPM falling to 1500. We pushed the prop up, but to no effect. Our plane started to skid and drop about 1000 ft. per minutes. We were unable to straighten it out. We pulled our wheels up quickly, feathered both props, got the plane under control, cut the disconnects, and opened the hatch. Our tail hit first and the plane maintained a level attitude. The water rushed in as soon as the nose hit, and we landed in smooth water about 4-5 ft. deep over a coral shelf. Our crew got out in an orderly fashion, and got away from the plane as quickly as possible, as the nose had begun to smoke. An Army "Duck" was about one half mile away when we crash landed, and they came over and picked us up".

Lt. Thomas flew #2 position on Lt. Nolan's wing. He strafed a 50-60 ft. boat, believed to be a lugger, off CAPE TOKAKA. This boat was reported by airplanes of the third flight as definitely sunk by his attack. He strafed two unidentified small villages along the west shore of the south HALMAHERA Peninsula with nil visible results. Coming in to TERNATE town, he began his run about 800 ft. north of #1 jetty starting at the coastline and working inland slightly. His first bomb was dropped on a large building 100 ft. west of the MHV Trading Co. scoring a direct hit. After dropping this bomb, he swung sharply to the right in order to avoid FORT ORANJE, and was unable to release his three bombs. These were later salvoed at sea enroute back to MOKMER.

(3) Lt. Kasten led the third flight of two planes with Lt. Erskine flying on his wing. Lt. Kasten strafed the small sailboat in PATINTI STRAITS with unobserved results. He then swung up the west shore south of the HALMAHERA Peninsula strafing PAJAHI-islam village at the head of PAMAHI BAY. He strafed two small boats or luggers off CAPE KARO KARO with nil visible results. Approaching TERNATE town, a large fire and smoke in the warehouse area around #1 jetty was directly in his path of flight causing him to swing over the water to the right in order to miss it. He cut back into shore and started strafing around the #2 jetty. He drpped one bomb in the native quarter area about 500 ft. northwest of the Post Office building starting a fire there, with black smoke up 50-60 ft. He dropped his second bomb among unidentified bldgs.

Narrative Report FFO 228-A-4, continued.

about 500 ft. south of FORT ORANJE 600 ft. inland from the shore. His third bomb hit 800 ft. north of FORT ORANJE and 400 ft. in from shore. At this point, he resumed strafing having ceased strafing while flying over FORT ORANJE. His strafing run carried him in a direct line to the Sultan's Palace 1000 ft. inland from #3 jetty. He dropped his fourth bombs there, and other crews reported seeing it scoring a direct hit on the Palace demolishing the entire northeast section.

Lt. Erskine, flew in #2 position in the third flight, starting his run along the west coast of the HALMAHERAS. His waist gunner threw a few bursts into SKETA village, 127° 52' E—00° 27' S. The waist gunner also strafed PAJAKI islam. Nil visible results. Lt. Erskine made his bombing run on the secondary target—TERNATE. The first bomb fell 500 ft. north of #2 jetty. His second bomb fell in the back end of the NHV Trading Co. and damaging the building and setting it on fire. His third bomb fell on the back end of the Post Office and radio station where a small fire was started and part of the building was blown away. His last bomb was dropped in the Chinese houses and shop district scoring a direct hit. Buildings were seen demolished by this bomb. The entire town was strafed, and he completed his run 1000 ft. south of FORT ORANJE.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) The following named men were killed in the crash of A/P 383 at DODINGA jetty:

1st Lt. Eugene Nirdlinger	0-798567	Pilot
2nd Lt. Jacob E. Hedenquist, Jr.	0-829477	Co-pilot
1st Lt. John Scalzone	0-729574	Bombardier
Sgt. Herbert Ratnoff	13126558	Engineer
T/Sgt. William J. Welch	31017833	Radio Opr.
S/Sgt. Henry G. Romaine	20245444	Gunner

Narrative Report FFO 228-A-4, continued.

Sgt. John L. Davis, 34763157, sustained injuries due to a crash water landing off KAMIRI Dreme 1530/K, 15 August 1944.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) A/P 383 completed destroyed as well as A/P 518.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. SIGHTINGS.

a. (1) Lt. Thomas's crew observed the following:

1223/K—from minimum altitude—at MAITARA Island (between TERNATE and TIDORE Island) steel construction 150 ft. high, apparently a derrick or radio tower under construction.
1237/K—from 800 ft. altitude—3 luggers in cove at PASIRPUNTIN village southwest corner of KAOE Bay.
1243/K—from 1000 ft. altitude—2 large Jap vessels anchored at KAOE—one described as a FOX TARE CHARLIE and one as a FOX TARE DOG.
1245/K—100 ft. altitude—2 small SUGAR CHARLIES and 12 barges around WASILE BAY Pier area.
1246/K—HATEKABAKO airstrip appeared serviceable. No planes visible. LOLOBATA strip appears grass covered with bomb craters in runway. No planes visible.

(2) Lt. Kasten's crew reported the following: 1244/K—1000 ft. altitude—2 unidentified freighters anchored at KAOE, apparently cargo ships or FOX TARE type.

(3) Lt. Billig's crew sighted at 1238/K, 800 ft. altitude, 2 or possibly 3 luggers at PASIRPUNTIN village.

(4) Lt. Erskine's crew reported the following:

1238/K—minimum altitude—PAJAMI-island—a concrete ami gun position described as a coastal defense gun.
1236/K—2 fishing boats, possibly luggers, against the pier at PASIRPUNTIN village.
1243/K—KAOE BAY—2 small white fires seen on Pt. KAOE.

Narrative Report FFO 228-4-4, continued.

1245/K-3-4 small fires on the shore of WASILE, 127° 58' E--01° 04' N.

All crews observed many large fires and explosions in TERNATE town.

7. In general, photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN M. BRIGGS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 228 A-4 15 August 1944
501st Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1145-1226/K
Order Over Target: Second.



501
229-A
16 Aug

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M)
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M)
APO 920

IEB/bm

17 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 229-A-4, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 16 August 1944. Objective: Airplanes on the MITI Airdrome.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FAR EAST AIR FORCE, APO 920.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was the strike against enemy airplanes on the MITI Airdrome. The target was to be attacked from 100 foot altitude, six planes each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. The 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group also participated in the attack.

b. Rendezvous.

The group formed over MOKMER Drome proceeded to AJOE Island where they made rendezvous with P-38's, and from there proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with all planes reaching the primary target. MITI Airdrome was attacked with six airplanes abreast, where a total of 272 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped. The bombs covered a strip approximately 3000 feet wide and through the center of MITI Island including the dispersal areas at the South end and east of the center of the runway. Crews verify the destruction of seven (7) SEF's in the dispersal area east of the south end of the airdrome at positions: 2 at 138123, 1 at 144121, 1 at 138133, 1 at 138141, 1 at 126125, and 1 at 129123. Two twin engine bombers were destroyed which were located: 1 at 131126 and 1 at 125132. (All positions MITI PLANKINTEL). The entire length of the Island was strafed. Three fires of heavy black smoke were seen on MITI Island for twenty minutes after planes had left the target. The camp area between the north half of the runway and the bay was strafed with nil visible results.

Narrative Report FPO 229-A-4, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome from 0640-0642/K.
Attacked Target: 1047/K.
Landing: 1410/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-AJOE Island-Target-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Moye led our squadron. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Moye	A/P 078	Lt. Kasten	A/P 427
Lt. Ohmemus	A/P 069	Lt. Willard	A/P 099
Lt. Fisher	A/P 060	Lt. Musket	A/P 401

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Moye led the squadron on to the target, making his run on a heading of approximately 315 degrees. He started dropping his bombs about 1,000 ft. inland and they strung into and about halfway across the south dispersal area. His bomb rack failed after dropping 32 bombs. The remaining 40 bombs were returned to base.
Lt. Ohmemus flew on the extreme right of the squadron front, in No. 2 position of the first flight. His heading was about 307 degrees. His bombs fell across the south dispersal area. His crew(and other crews confirming)reported 5 SSP's covered by his bombs. He dropped 48 bombs and was forced to salvo the remaining 24 bombs and the bomb rack, after leaving the target.
Lt. Fisher flew on Lt. Moyes left wing, dropping 12 bombs on the target in the south dispersal area, salvoing the remaining 60 bombs and the bomb rack, due rack malfunction. His waist gunner strafed the camp area between the N.W. end of the runway and the shore, with nil visible results.

(2) Lt. Kasten leading the second flight, put his three planes to the left and even with the first flight making our squadron attack the target with six planes abreast.

He made his run from S.E. to N.W. along the N.W. side of NITI Island. His bombs were released and covered the area from the S.E. side of the dispersal area to the North third of the runway. His crew (and other crews) confirm his first bombs fell on a W/T [illegible]. The entire area was strafed. Lt. Willard, flying in No. 2 position in the second flight started his run on Lt. Kasten's bomb release. His bombs fell on the early part of his bombing and strafing run before mechanical trouble developed in the bombay rack. These bombs fell with unobserved results. The remaining 56 bombs and rack were salvoed on return to base.

Lt. Nuckel flying to the extreme left of the squadron dropped his 72 bombs starting the run [illegible] ft. S.E. of the S. end of the runway with the last falling near the center of the strip. Just East of the S. end of the strip crews observed his bombs falling on 2 [illegible]'s and a [illegible] with unobserved results. He strafed the entire target with most concentrated fire on a large building just West of the center of the runway. Results of his strafing was unobserved.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Crews verify destruction of 7 [illegible]'s in dispersal area and 2 twin-engine bombers.

c. Personnel Casualties. Nil personnel injured.

d. Damage to our planes. Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation or awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 272 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Bombs Salvoed: 120 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs and 3 racks salvoed.
Returned to base: 40 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 7390 x .50 cal and nil .30 cal.

Narrative Report #70 [illegible], cont'd.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were confirmed or reported by all crews:

2 fires in north end of the Island just starting to burn as the result of "heavies" bombing. "Heavies" bombing began center of runway and extended evenly and covered the entire north end of KYTI Island with a few bombs straddling over into the water, the results appeared excellent.
Huge fires in the N.E. area of the Island and black smoke seen to rise 2,000 ft. as result of "heavies" bombing. In the dispersal area 2000 ft. to the east and to the south third of the runway, 8 explosions were seen which were probably airplanes blowing up. One ack-ack gun described as possibly 40 mm. standing on east half of the runway approx. 1500 ft. south of the center. Gun was out in the open and no personnel were seen around it. 2 fresh holes resembling new gun pits seen approx. 800 ft. east of the center of the runway at position 1[illegible]. (All ref. KYTI PLANIMETRIC). 1 Betty seen burning east of runway at position 1[illegible]. 8 [illegible]'s, 2 intact and one burning, east of center of runway pos. 1[illegible]. 1 Betty under trees at N.W. end of runway undamaged pos. 1[illegible]. 1 [illegible] undamaged east of center of runway at point 118152.

7. In general photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC R. BAKER,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 229 [illegible] 16 August 1944
501st Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target. 1047/K
Order Over Target. Second



MITI A/D


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HALMAHERA SEA
FTO 289 A-4 16 August 1944
501st Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time over target. 1047/X
Order Over Target. Second
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5000' X 330'
23 LB. FRAG BOMBS IN THIS AREA.
MAGALIHOE I.
GILEMOELAND IS.

501
230-A
17 Aug 4

CONFIDENTIAL

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEO/bm

18 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 230-A-1, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 17 August 1944. Objective: Airplanes on MANILA TOWN AIRDROME.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Force, APO 920.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was destruction of enemy A/P on the ground on MANILA TOWN A/D. The target was to be attacked at 200 ft. altitude by six planes, each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. The 499th, and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group, and one Squadron of the 38th Group, also participated.

b. Rendezvous.

Group formed over MOMBER A/D, made rendezvous with fighters for escort at PEBANG Island, proceeded direct to target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with five planes reaching the primary target. Lt. Hall flying A/P 060 turned back ten minutes before reaching MANILA TOWN A/D due to engine trouble. Bombing was excellent. 276 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped in dispersal area north of west end of the runway with heavy dust obscuring observation of results, but crews reported seeing 6 - 8 fighters in the area bombed, one of which was an OSCAR which had apparently crash landed, and 2 were heavily camouflaged and of questionable serviceability. A/P 060 dropped 36 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs off SKIRMAN BAY to lighten the load and returned 36 bombs and rack to base.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOMBER A/D 0908-0910/K.
Attack: MANILA TOWN A/D 1245-1247/K.
Landing: MOMBER A/D 1620/K

e. Route.

MOMBER - PEBANG ISLAND - TATORT - MOMBER.

CONFIDENTIAL

Narrative Report FFO 230-A-1, cont'd.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. 1Lt. Jacobson led our Squadron. Pilots were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Jacobson	A/P 437	1Lt. Erskine	A/P 069
1Lt. Hanner	A/P 078	1Lt. Thomas	A/P 069
1Lt. Hall	A/P 060	1Lt. Billig	A/P 064

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The Squadron attacked the target five (5) A/P abreast, making their run across the north dispersal areas on a heading of approximately 210 degrees. The first flight dropped 132 parafrag bombs, covering the dispersal area at the west end of the runway. Heavy dust obscured visibility considerably, but crews reported 6 to 8 fighters seen in the area of their bombing. Two planes had rack trouble and were forced to return a total of 84 bombs to base.

(2) The second flight consisted of only two A/P's when making their attack, as 1Lt. Hall in A/P 060 turned back 20 minutes before reaching the target due to engine trouble. The flight dropped their bombs in the west dispersal area. Crews reported a crash-landed OSCAR and two camouflaged A/P's in the area covered by their bombs of which 144 x 23 lb. parafrags were dropped.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Crews could not verify destruction of any enemy A/P, due to poor visibility. There were 6 - 8 fighters in the area bombed, and several of these were undoubtedly damaged and/or destroyed.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to Our Planes.

(1) Nil airplane damage.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation of awards.

Narrative Report FFO 230-A-1, cont'd.

5. ARMAMENT AND AMMUNITION.

Bombs dropped: 276 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs on target.
Bombs dropped: 36 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs on SHIRMAN Bay.
Bombs returned: 120 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs returned to base.

3720 x .50 caliber ammunition expended and Nil .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

a. Poor visibility resulted in very few sightings. As the squadron was leaving the target, Lt. Jacobson, the Squadron Leader, sighted a 4 Engine Flying Boat sitting on the water approximately 150 feet offshore at CAPE MANEM. Seen from minimum altitude at 12,000'. Not confirmed.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION.

Six (6) prints received. Confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1-Route overlay to and from target.
2-Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 230-A-1 17 August 1944
501st Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target. 1245-1247/K.
Order Over Target. Third




C. KARBAS
FPO 230-A-1 17 August 1944
501st Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target. 1245-1247/K
Order Over Target. Third
T Planes Taking Photos.
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1/069
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NAMLEA TOWNSHIP
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C. NAMLEA
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233-A
20 Aug 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IEB/lid

21 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 233-A-1, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 20 August 1944. Objective: RAINIS Bay, KARAKELONG Island.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 920.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was destruction of the weapon pits at RAINIS BAY, KARAKELONG ISLAND. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demos. The Group was to be separated before reaching the target with the 499th and 501st squadrons hitting RAINIS BAY, and the 500th squadron and the 823rd squadron, of the 38th Group, were to hit BEO, KARAKELONG ISLAND.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER airdrome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The squadron did not attack the assigned target. While making a circle off shore for the attack on the assigned area waiting for the previous squadron's bombs to explode, they discovered the group formation bombing the coastal track of KARAKELONG ISLAND from ALOEMA Village, 04° 12' 30" N—126° 50' 30" E, to a point 1½ miles southwest of ALOEMA. The squadron leader decided to bomb the area the group leader had attacked, dropping 56 x 100 lb. para-demolition bombs with no visible results other than bomb bursts.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER A/D from 0705-0707/K.
Attack: ALOEMA Village area from 1120-1125/K.
Landing: MOKMER A/D from 1545-1547/K.

Narrative Report FFO 233-A-1, cont'd.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Davis led our squadron. Pilots participating were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Davis	A/P 437	Lt. Erskine	A/P 089
Lt. Hamner	A/P 078	Lt. Ohnemus	A/P 099
Lt. Fisher	A/P 064	Lt. Thomas	A/P 069

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Davis led the first flight and formed the squadron for the attack on the assigned target, but seeing the group leader had picked a spot farther down the coast, decided to attack that target rather than make a 360° turn and attack the assigned area and bring his squadron home alone. He strafed the area from ALOEMA Village, 04° 12' 30" N--126° 50' 30" E, to a point 1½ miles southwest of ALOEMA where he dropped 12 100-pounders with unobserved results other than bomb bursts. Lt. Hamner and Lt. Fisher strafed and each dropped 12 bombs on Lt. Davis' release with unobserved results.

(2) Lt. Erskine led the second flight with Lt. Ohnemus and Lt. Thomas flying #2 and #3 positions respectively. They released a total of 20 bombs in the approximate vicinity of the first flight's bombs with unobserved results. Lt. Erskine salvoed 4 bombs and Lt. Thomas salvoed 12 bombs due to lack of targets.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception.
(2) Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

Narrative Report FFO 233-A-1, cont'd.

d. Damage to Our Planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. AMMUNITION AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs dropped: 56 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Bombs salvoed: 16 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Ammunition expended: 6250 x .50 caliber and 800 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or confirmed by all crews:

A native canoe heavily laden with personnel just off shore at TAODOEWATA Pt, 04° 16' N—126° 55' E.

A large wooden type constructed platform, apparently an observation post station, at TAODOEWATA Pt, 04° 16' N—126° 55' E.

Coastal roads from TAODOEWATA Pt to area bombed southwest of ALOEWA appeared in good condition and well used.

Lt. Ommanus's crew observed the following sightings:

2-3, apparently new, buildings in the edge of the hills 3-4 miles inland from coast and 2½ miles west of TAODOEWATA Pt. One crew member only reported several sandbags in the vicinity of TAODOEWATA Pt.

At 1300/K, from 4,000 ft.—A single unidentified plane spotted trailing the squadron formation approximately 90 miles northwest of ASIA Island. Plane identified as fighter type—single engine, single tail—when it went into a bank to turn back toward the HALMAHERAS.

Lt. Hanner's crew observed the following sightings:

At 0950/K—from 400 ft.—2 unidentified planes, probably fighters, sighted at 129° 40' E—02° 15' N.

At 1110/K—from 400 ft.—3 unidentified planes, believed to be bombers, sighted trailing formation from 127° 10' E—04° 8' N——126° 55' E—04° 8' N. These planes were lost in cloud formation when our planes turned to attack the target.

Narrative Report FFO 233-A-1, cont'd.

7. Photos received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 233-A-1 20 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target—1120-1125/K.
Order Over Target—Second
⊤ Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes



FPO 233-A-1 20 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target—1120-1125/K.
Order Over Target—Second.



234-A-1
OK 21 Aug 44
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501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

DKb/1jd

22 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 234-A-1, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 21 August 1944. Objective: MAOK Airdrome.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (F), APO 920.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against airplanes on MAOK Airdrome. The target was to be attacked at 100 feet altitude by six planes, each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. The 499th and 500th squadrons of the 345th Group and one squadron of the 38th Group also participated on this strike.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER Airdrome, made rendezvous with fighters at AJOK Island, and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Five planes reached the target. Bombing was excellent. A total of 356 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped on dispersal areas on both sides of runway #2. One frag bomb was seen to hit and explode on a steel control tower west of the center of the runway with nil apparent damage to the tower. 8-10 trucks and one passenger car on the road along the east side of the runway were heavily strafed with unobserved results. Bombs dropped, which were intended to hit these vehicles, were blown by the wind on to the runway and exploded 50-100 ft. from the vehicles. No apparent damage to vehicles from the bombs were observed. The entire airdrome was thoroughly strafed with nil apparent results. No fires were started and no smoke other than bomb bursts were seen. One plane, delayed in take-off, turned back when unable to join the squadron before they reached the target.

Narrative Report FFO 214-4-1, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: MOKMER A/D from 0800-0802/K.
Attack: KACK A/D at 1144/K.
Landing: MOKMER from 1500-1504/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-AJUE ISLAND-KACK-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. 1A. Jacobson led our squadron. Pilots and planes were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1A. Jacobson	A/P 437	1A. Kasten	A/P 089
2/O Hunter	A/P 078	1A. Hustut	A/P 079
1A. Hall	A/P 064	1A. Billig	A/P 069

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The squadron attacked the target five planes abreast. 1A. Jacobson led the first flight on their run from north to south down the #2 runway. The first flight dropped 214 parafrag bombs on the dispersal areas and north two-thirds of the runway. Crews reported one bomb hit a steel constructed tower on the west side of the center of the runway with no apparent damage to the tower. 8-10 motor trucks on the road along the east side of the runway were strafed and bombed, with the bombs drifting with the wind 50-200 ft. to the west with no apparent damage to vehicles. The target was thoroughly strafed.

(2) 1A. Kasten led the second flight which consisted of two planes. Their strafing and bombing run started at the northeast edge of the flight gap and continued south parallel to the #2 runway, then across KACK Village, to KACK Point. 60 parafrag bombs were dropped on the flight gap and east of the north half of runway #2. 80 parafrag bombs were dropped in KACK Village area with unobserved results. 1A. Billig returned four bombs due to malfunction of bomb rack.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes seen destroyed on the ground or in the air.

g. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 356 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Bombs Returned: 76 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 5310 x .50 caliber and 550 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported:

1140/K—2 unidentified vessels 1000-1500 tons, apparently anchored, east of KAOE and seen from 150 ft. at approximate position 127° 57' E—01° 10' N.

One camouflaged small SUGAR CHARLIE near the coast at RIANI 7 miles northeast of KAOE.

1144/K—8-10 trucks and one passenger car along runway east of runway #2. Road showed indications of heavy usage.

One unserviceable fighter, or possibly a dummy plane, near southwest end of runway at position 114137. (All Ref. KAOE Flakintel 13 July).

2 twin engine bombers 400-500 ft. south of runway at position 116137.

60-70 ft. tower near jetty at KAOE village at point 132099.

1145/K—2 unidentified 1000-1500 ton ships near shore 7-8 southwest of KAOE. These and 2 merchant ships reported northeast of KAOE were described as rusty or possibly sunken ships.

1155/K—WASILE Pier Area—2 unidentified M/V, possibly SUGAR CHARLIES and 8-10 barges and other small craft seen from 100'.

Narrative Report FFO 234-A-1, cont'd.

7. Photos received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 234-A-1 21 August 1944
501st BS. 345th BG.
Time Over Target 1144/K
Order Over Target - Second.



VFO 234-A-1 21 Aug. 1944
501st BS. 345th BG.
Time Over Target -1144/K
Order Over Target-Second
T Planes Taking Photos



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501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BMG/lsd

25 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 237-A-1, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 24 August 1944. Objective: SHIPPING LAMBEN STRAIT, EASTERN CELEBES.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WAS REPORTED CHANGED AT THE CELEBES

The ~~primary~~ objective was a strike against enemy shipping in the LAMBEN STRAIT, EASTERN CELEBES. The ~~secondary~~ TERTIARY target assigned, in the event shipping was not present in the strait area, was supplies and installations along shore in LAMBEN STRAIT. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay demolition bombs. The 500th and the 499th squadrons of the 345th Group also participated on strike, with the 500th squadron leading, the 501st squadron flying #2 position, and the 499th squadron #3 position in the Group formation.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group staged out of KORMASOREN A/D going there late in the afternoon of the 23 August 1944. The squadron flew direct from KORMASOREN to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Six planes reached the target area. Our attack was not very fruitful, as no definite losses of shipping were inflicted on the enemy by our squadron's attack. Our planes dropped 9 bombs on a small FOX TARE CHARLIE (reported by crews as FOX TARE DOG) in the BANGKA STRAIT at approximate position 0141 N--12506E. This ship was blown to bits by our bombing, but interpretation of photographs revealed it had already been mortally damaged by an earlier attack by the 500th squadron, and thus our squadron cannot be credited with the sinking of this ship. 9 bombs were dropped on a warehouse in an unnamed village near CAPE POKLISAN (0104N--12529E) destroying one large red tin roof building. 2 of our planes sighted a lone enemy bomber while over the BANGKA STRAIT area. They attempted

interception of this bomber, which was described as either a SALLY or DINAH. Our tracers were seen entering the Jap plane. Our planes lost contact with it when the Jap plane flew into clouds over hills south of BANGKA STRAIT. Only 2 of our planes made a sweep into the ~~primary~~ secondary target area of LAMBEH STRAIT, one of these planes having already expended its entire bomb load and the other having three bombs left. Barges and luggers along the southeast shore of LAMBEH STRAIT were strafed by one plane with nil apparent damage, while the other plane made 2 bombing runs on the FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2000-3000 gross tons, in the STRAIT near a warship later identified as a MINELAYER of the ITSUKUSHIMA class. 3 near misses were scored, one 20 ft., one 30 ft., and one 50 ft. There were no observation of damage inflicted, and no photographs were taken by the plane making this bombing run, thus making it impossible to assess damage on this ship.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From KORMASOREN A/D, NOEMFOOR at 0800/K/24.
Attack: Target area from 1215-1230/K.
Landing: MOKMER Drome from 1630-1632/K.

e. Route.

KORMASOREN-KAOE BAY-TARGET-KAOE BAY-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Jacobson led the squadron. Attack on shipping was in 2 plane flights. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 437	Lt. Kasten	A/P 089	Lt. Schade	A/P 813
Lt. Hall	A/P 069	Lt. Willard	A/P 099	Lt. Billig	A/P 064

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Jacobson dropped 2 bombs on the SUGAR CHARLIE in BANGKA STRAIT, one falling short and one going over for no damage. His third bomb was dropped on a large tin roof house near CAPE POELISAN. This bomb was seen to score a direct hit destroying the building. His fourth bomb was dropped at barges at the southeast end of LAMBEH STRAIT with no damage inflicted. He strafed several barges and luggers on his run through the strait with no apparent damage.

Narrative Report FFO 237-A-1, cont'd.

Lt. Hall dropped his first bomb at the SUGAR CHARLIE in BANGKA STRAIT with no damage. Passing down into LAMBEH STRAIT, he sighted a FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2000-3000 tons, and made a run at it diagonally across from port stern to starboard bow dropping one bomb which fell short for a 50 ft. miss. Later, when the squadron had rejoined, he reported to the squadron leader that he had 2 bombs remaining, so the squadron leader escorted him back into the LAMBEH STRAIT for a second pass at the FOX TARE CHARLIE, which he made diagonally across the ship amidship dropping 2 bombs, one of which fell short in the port side for a 20 ft. near miss and the going long for a 30 ft. miss on the starboard side. He was forced to bank his plane violently to the left in order to avoid running into intensive fire being thrown at him from the MINELAYER, thus making it impossible for his crew to observe accurate results of damage inflicted on the freighter.

(2) Lt. Kasten led the second flight with Lt. Willard on his right wing. They started their run on a SUGAR CHARLIE in the BANGKA STRAIT at position 01411 N—12506E. Lt. Kasten strafed and dropped 3 bombs at the SUGAR CHARLIE of which one hit the midship waterline, and the other two scored near misses. Lt. Willard dropped one bomb on this ship scoring a direct hit near the aft. When this flight started their second pass on this SUGAR CHARLIE, only debris remained in the area. This ship was definitely destroyed. This flight made two strafing and bombing passes at buildings and warehouses in an unidentified village at position 01408N—12529E. Lt. Kasten dropped one bomb destroying a large red tin roof building. Lt. Willard dropped 3 bombs with unobserved results other than bomb bursts.

(3) Lt. Schade led the third flight with Lt. Billig flying in #2 position. They started their run on the sinking SUGAR CHARLIE at position 01411N—12506E where Lt. Schade dropped 2 bombs with near misses. While circling to the right, they observed a T/E bomber, either a SALLY or DINAH, flying to the southwest over BANGKA STRAIT. These two planes tried to make interception with the bomber. Tracers from both our planes were seen to enter the plane with unobserved results. The chase was given up as the plane entered hills and clouds south of BANGKA STRAIT. A bombing and strafing pass was then made at the unidentified village at 01408N—12529E where Lt. Schade dropped his remaining two bombs starting fires among buildings. Lt. Billig also dropped 2 bombs on this unidentified village scoring direct hits on two buildings demolish-

ing them and starting two fires with black smoke. Lt. Billig brought his two remaining bombs back to base.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes seen destroyed on the ground or in the air.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) 1 plane holed by M/G fire. Minor damage and no casualties.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 22 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay bombs.
Bombs Returned: 2 x 500 lb. 4-5 second delay bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 10,900 x .50 caliber and 1000 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Lt. Jacobson's and Lt. Hall's crew observed the following sightings at 1215-1230/K from minimum altitude:

One MINELAYER in LAMBEH STRAIT. CM was not damaged by the time our squadron left the target area. CM was seen to be undamaged when our planes returned for second pass over LAMBEH STRAIT. (This was CM of ITSURUSHIMA class).

One possible SUGAR ABLE, reported as larger than LIBERTY ship, in LAMBEH STRAIT near CM. This was the ship attacked by our planes. (Photos reveal this as FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2000-3000 GT).

One small patrol boat, resembling our mine sweeper type, near shore 5000 ft. east of CM.

One SUGAR CHARLIE along south shore of LAMBEH STRAIT 4,000 ft. west of the CM.

1 unidentified merchant vessel, possibly FOX TARE CHARLIE, seen burning badly off south shore in LAMBEH STRAIT 5000 ft. west of CM.

4-5 barges marked with large red crosses, northwest shore of LAMBEH STRAIT near town at position 12514E—0127N.

A total of 30-50 barges and luggers in LAMBEH STRAIT at time of our attack.

Estimate additional 5-6 SUGAR CHARLIES in LAMBEH STRAIT, but crews were unable to give exact location.

Tower on southwest tip of LAMBEH Island described as resembling our airdrome control tower at position 12510E—0123N. Another tower on crest of ridge near southern end of LAMBEH Island at position 12514E—0126N.

Numerous new buildings along south shore of LAMBEH Island at position 12513 E—0125 N.

All crews confirmed the sightings as follows:

1330/K—12,000 ft.—Very high column of black smoke over LOLOBATA area. Estimate 8-10,000 ft.

A P-38 seen strafing a SUGAR CHARLIE at the southeast shore of KAOE Bay near PINTATOE Village.

7. Interpretation of photos received confirms attack on and destruction of small engine aft freighter 100-150 gross tons, wooden construction in BANGKA STRAIT. This ship had previously been damaged by attack of earlier squadron.

Shipping in LAMBEH STRAIT.

Only prints of K-24 wing camera received. FOX TARE CHARLIE 2-3000 tons being strafed. Nil apparent damage. MINELAYER, ITSUKUSHIMA class, anchored in center of STRAIT. Undamaged. 6-8 luggers and barges along southeast shore of STRAIT. Camouflaged SUGAR CHARLIE 3-500 GT undamaged.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN S. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

3 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart of LAMBEH STRAIT.
3 - Bomb Assessment Chart of BANGKA STRAIT.

FFO 237-A-1 24 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp
Time Over Target: 1215-1230/K.
Order Over Target: Second



FFO 237-A-1 24 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1215-1230/K.
Order Over Target: Second
⊤ Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes



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29 Aug 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEO/ljd

30 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 242-A-1, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 29 August 1944. Objective: MAOE Township. Secondary target: MITI Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against MAOE Township in the HALMAHERAS. The secondary target was MITI Town. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs. The 501st Squadron led the Group formation with the 499th Squadron in #2 position, the 822nd Squadron of the 38th Group in #3 position, and the 500th Squadron in #4 position.

b. Rendezvous.

No fighter cover was provided. The Group formed over MOKMER Drome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. The bombing was excellent. A total of 72 100 lb. para-demo. bombs were dropped in MAOE Township starting from 500 ft. north of the jetty and blanketing the north half of the town. Numerous grass-type buildings were destroyed. One M/T, out of a group of 3, was blown up by a direct hit. The remaining two were possibly damaged. A small fuel fire with black smoke up 200-300 ft. was started near the center of the town at position 132093. (All ref. MAOE Flakintel 13 July 44). A reported fuel dump east of runway #2 (Target 4-x) was heavily strafed with nil results. No ack-ack was fired at our squadron on the run over the target. When approaching the target, a barrage of short-fuse medium ack-ack fire was seen thrown up from known positions on runway #2. Bursts were from 200-250 ft. altitude, indicating that the enemy was anticipating the strafing run over runway #2. On withdrawal over the target, 3-4 bursts of heavy ack-ack were seen while over water between MAOE and LOLOBATA, apparently from the known 120 mm. position north of runway #2 at MAOE. Ack-ack was inaccurate.

Narrative Report FFO 242-A-1, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-ff: From MOKMER A/D from 0740-0742/K.
Attack: KAOE Town from 1105-1107/K.
Landing: MOKMER Drome from 1620-1623/K.

e. Route.

MOKMER-CAPE LELAI-BOELI BAY-TARGET-BOELI BAY-CAPE LELAI-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Kasten led the squadron. Pilots and planes were :

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Kasten	A/P 437	Lt. Erskine	A/P 069
Lt. Hamner	A/P 060	Lt. Musket	A/P 813
Lt. Hall	A/P 099	F/O Muster	A/P 089

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) The first flight dropped their entire load of bombs in the town area beginning 500 ft. north of the jetty and stringing south for 500-600 ft. south of the jetty. Several grass huts were seen destroyed by direct hits. One M/T, among a group of 3 near the jetty, was destroyed by a direct hit. The other two were probably damaged. The coastal area from the fuel dump at GOROEA, Target 4-x, south to BOLEO Pt. was heavily strafed.

(2) The second flight dropped their entire load of 36 bombs beginning about 400-500 ft. north of the jetty and stringing south through the township for a distance of 1500 ft. There were no direct results observed other than destruction of numerous grass buildings and starting light gray smoke. The coastline from target 4-x to BOLEO Pt. was heavily strafed with no visible results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes seen destroyed on the ground or in the air.

Narrative Report FFO 242-A-1, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 72 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 5250 x .50 caliber and 400 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were confirmed by all crews:

A radio tower and lookout tower at CAPE BOLEO is still intact at position 143051. (All ref. KAOE Flakintel 13 July 44).
Stacks of small wooden boxes along the road from junction of runway #2 road and jetty road from 126115-135138.
2-3 trucks and one bulldozer 1000 ft. inland from jetty at position 123104.
New large fram building under construction 500 ft. south of the town area at position 136080.

Lt. Musket's crew observed one camouflaged barge near shore 2500 ft. north of the jetty at position 138125.

Lt. Hall's crew sighted a new shack under construction at the south side of control tower on runway #2.

All crews were unable to see oil drums in reported fuel dump at target 4-x.
A crashed enemy 4 EF/B at position 12800E--0120 N, at CAPE TOZNOKO.

7. Photo prints confirm results of sightings reported by crews. Bomb bursts appeared so far in the background of pictures as to make accurate assessment of damage impossible. Barge sighted by crew 2500 ft. north of jetty shown to be approximately 100 ft. north of jetty.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


MTO 242-4-1 29 Aug 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1105-1107/K.
Order Over Target: First
N
Halmahera Is.
Biak Is.
Mokmer Apd
NEW GUINEA
0
100
200
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Statute Miles

501
O.K. ARM
246-A-1
25 Sep 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IRB/1jd

3 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 246-A-1, performed by four airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 2 September 1944. Objective: LANGOAN. Secondary target: LEMBEH Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against airplanes on LANGOAN Airdrome. The secondary target was LEMBEH Town. The target was to be attacked at 100 ft. altitude by four planes each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. The 500th and 499th Squadrons of the 345th Group were to participate.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER Drome. Rendezvous with the fighters was never made.

c. Attack.

The primary target was not attacked due to weather. Three planes reached the secondary target. The bombing was excellent. A total of 216 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped on buildings in LEMBEH Town covering the area from 0530-F747, starting a fire with black smoke which rose rapidly, and when last seen, smoke was 400-500 ft. high near the base of the peninsula at point F543. (All ref. LEMBEH Strait WEG Photo 818-B, coordinates 1 inch equals 1 unit). The town was strafed from 0535 through wharf jetty area at F0100. One plane turned back at 0715/I near NOEMFOOR due to engine trouble.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER at 0633/I.
Attack: LEMBEH Town from 1115-1120/I.
Landing: NOEMFOOR 1610/I. Took off NOEMFOOR 1725/I. Landed MOKMER 1755/I.

Narrative Report FFO 246-A-1, cont'd.

g. Route.

MOMMER-TIFORE ISLAND-LEMBEH TOWN-MOMFOOR-MOMMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Jacobson led the squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT

Lt. Jacobson	A/P 437
Lt. Billig	A/P 813
Lt. Erskine	A/P 064
Lt. Thomas	A/P 099

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The flight, led by Lt. Jacobson, dropped their entire load of bombs in the town area beginning at 0530 to F747. A fire with black smoke was started near the base of the peninsula at F543. Other bombs fell with unobserved results. All planes strafed through the town and wharf jetty area at F0100. On leaving the target, the flight observed one plane of the 500th squadron losing speed and altitude and its left engine smoking badly. Lt. Jacobson ordered the flight to form on the crippled plane and fly as an escort, but it was losing speed and altitude so rapidly that it was impossible to do so. The 500th plane made a water landing at position 2517E—0145N. Lt. Jacobson observed the Group forming for the return trip home, but ordered his flight to stay over the position of the downed plane as long as possible or until rescue arrived, as his gunner had sighted two enemy fighters in the area apparently waiting for a chance to strafe the men in the water. His flight did so and dropped Mae West life vests, liferafts, rations and emergency radio. The flight stayed in that vicinity for 45 minutes until the gas supply became dangerously low at which time they were forced to return landing at MOMFOOR for refuel.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Two unidentified enemy fighters made a single combined pass at our flight from seven o'clock high and breaking away at three o'clock high after A/P 437's gunner gave them a burst of fire.

Narrative Report FPO 246-A-1, cont'd.

(2) Two planes of the 500th Squadron were lost on this mission. One made a water landing at position (2517B—0145N). The other lost altitude and apparently crashed into land on the northeast slope of MT. TOKEKOKO at 8858. (Ref. MERAUKE Sheet 90—1:200,000).

(3) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.

(4) Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

g. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

i. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. It is the opinion of this Officer that 1Lt. Jacobson should be recommended for the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross, and 1Lt. Billig and 1Lt. Brubaker for the award of the Air Medal. Basis: returning to aid the crew of a ditched aircraft, despite fighter interception and dangerously low gas supply.

5. ARMAMENT AND OFFENSE.

Bombs dropped: 216 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Bombs dropped at sea: 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs.
Ammunition expended: 2500 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

All crews observed the following sightings:

A MINELAYER, 500 ft. off shore southwest of peninsula at LEMBEH Town at position F680. (All ref. LEMBEH STRAIT VMI Photo 8148-B).
2 Patrol Craft, approximately half the size of the MINELAYER, along shore near base of peninsula F635 through E540.
A third Patrol Craft at E633.
FOX TARE CHARLIE attached on earlier mission sitting high in water listing near center of LEMBEH STRAIT at position 0579.

Narrative Report FFO 246-A-1, cont'd.

6-8 barges and small craft along shore at [illegible] Town at [illegible].

2 [illegible] in cove north of the town at position [illegible].

1 man around partially inflated liferaft near oil slick [illegible] miles off shore northeast of MT. TOKUKUKO at position [illegible]. Photographed, dropped emergency radio, raft and supplies and left at 1205/I. 2 SAF were still seen in area.

1 unidentified enemy bomber flying southwest course over BANGKA Strait, apparently observing the squadron attack.

14. Goodson's crew observed 1 B-25 flying southwest heading 150 ft. and losing altitude apparently crashed into land on northeast slope of MT. TOKUKUKO at [illegible]. (Ref. NEMADO Sheet 90—1:250,000). This plane was being pursued by 2 SAF which had apparently shot it down.

7. Photos received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt., Agr Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 246-A-1 2 Sept. 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp
Time Over Target: 1115-1120/I
Order Over Target: Second




LEMBEH STRAIT
LEMBEH ISL.
SCALE IN FEET
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1000
2000
3000
4000

OK
GRK

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

HEQ/1st

18 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Amendment to Narrative Report on Mission VFO 246-A-1, performed by four airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 2 September 1944. Objective: LANGOAN. Secondary target: LEMBEH Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (F), APO 925.

1. Certain details of this mission have come to the attention of this Officer since the original narrative report of this mission was submitted on 3rd Sept. 1944.

2. It is felt that this additional information should be submitted in order to avoid any possible injustice to pilots concerned.

3. In the original narrative report paragraph 3 a. Details of the Mission, it was stated, "Lt. Jacobson ordered the flight to form on the crippled plane and fly as an escort....." The correct circumstances were as follows: Lt. Jacobson, flight leader, led his flight back to the crippled plane where he and his two wingmen, Lt. Billig and Lt. Erskine dropped supplies, life rafts, etc.

4. The original report also states paragraph 3 a. Details of the Mission: "Lt. Jacobson observed the group form for the return trip home, but ordered his flight to stay over the position of the downed plane as long as possible or until rescue arrived....." The correct facts were as follows: Lt. Jacobson notified his wingmen that he was going to stay over the downed plane and told them that they could stay or return to base, reminding them their gas supply was low. Both pilots elected to stay and remained with Lt. Jacobson in the area for approximately forty-five minutes.

5. It is requested that these amendments be incorporated in the original report.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN K. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

501
249-A
55ept41

5051st BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345th BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 900

IRR/LM

6 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 249-A-8, performed by five airplanes of the 5051st Bomb Squadron 5 September 1944. Objective: BAILOLO A/D and Personnel Areas.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (F), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy personnel, supplies and equipment on and around the BAILOLO airdrome, and the European type village about 3 miles from the drome. The targets were to be attacked from 100 ft. altitude by 5 planes, each carrying 78 x 20 lb. parafrag bombs. The 498th, 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group also participated on the strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over NOEMFOR airdrome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with all planes reaching the target. Bombing was excellent. A total of 316 x 20 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped on the southwest half of the runway and across diagonal drome. No damage was observed as bomb bursts caused a dust cloud over the drome. 10-20 small planes 200 ft. west of the southwest third of the drome was strafed with unobserved results. 24 x 20 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped on BOLORE Village (Dutch-Chinese) starting one fire (the white smoke up to 200 ft. and three smaller ones. The village was thoroughly strafed and numerous were seen entering grass huts.

d. Enemy Reaction.

Takeoff: From NOEMFOR 0730/I.
Attack: BAILOLO A/D and personnel areas 1105-1115/I.
Landing: NOEMFOR 1510/I.

Narrative Report FTO 249-A-2, cont'd.

g. Bombs.

[redacted].

2. MISSION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. 1Lt. Jackson led the squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Jackson	A/P 437	1Lt. Millig	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Fisher	A/P [illegible]	1Lt. Hunter	A/P [illegible]
1Lt. Chenoweth	A/P [illegible]		

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. 1Lt. Jackson led the squadron over the target with all five planes present, as the second flight pulled up to the right even with the first flight. All planes dropped their bombs on 1Lt. Jackson's release. All bombs were dropped in the airdrome area with the exception of 1Lt. Jackson and 1Lt. Chenoweth, who each spread 20 bombs for the attack on the European type village. No results of the bombing was observed other than the target of bombs, as dust covered the entire target area. The remaining [illegible] bombs were dropped on [illegible] village (Jurgen-Ehrgen). Photos show this to be [illegible] village (Jurgen-Ehrgen). One large fire was started with smoke up to 300 ft. and 3 smaller ones. The airdrome target area was strafed with unobserved results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) There was no interception and no enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. [redacted]

(1) [redacted].

d. [redacted]

(1) [redacted].

4. OPINIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

Narrative Report 770 [illegible]-4-2, cont'd.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 360 x [illegible] lb. parafrag bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 9980 x .50 caliber and 900 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

[illegible] barracks type buildings in LOKOKI village at position [illegible].

A small bomb near shore off WEWA village at position [illegible].

7. Photo prints received confirm reports of crews that there was little, if any, enemy activity in this area.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


TFO 249-4-2 5 Sept. 1944
90th Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1105-1115/Z
Order Over Target: First.
N
NEW GUINEA
Statute Miles

FFO 249-4-2 5 Sept. 1944
501st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1105-1115/I
Order Over Target: First.
Planes Taking Photos.
7 Other Planes.

Photo Ref: 17th Recon 27 Aug. 44
Commingl to C. Tarcola

236 X 23 LB. FRAGFRAG BOMBS DROPPED IN THIS AREA.



QK
ERN
JUI
252-α
8Sep41

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 980

BSO/234

9 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 252-α-1, performed by four airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 8 September 1944. Objective: GALELA Airdrome and Personnel Areas.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy personnel and stores around GALELA Drome, particular targets assigned this squadron being Target 2-α and 3-α. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by four planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs. All four squadrons of the 345th Group participated on this strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER airdrome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. The bombing was excellent. 21 100-pounders were dropped in the central part of Target 2-α. Nil visible results were observed other than bomb bursts. 3 100-pounders fell in the water in GALELA Lake. 24 100-pounders were dropped in Target 3-α with nil visible results. No. 1 runway in dispersal area and the area from there to the target, including light and medium gun positions east of No. 1 runway, was heavily strafed. A previously unreported 20 mm. or 25 mm. gun position on MOMA Pt. one mile southeast of GALELA Town was strafed.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome 0734/I.
Attack : Target from 1053-1056/I.
Landing: MOKMER Drome at 1415/I.

Narrative Report FFO 252-A-1, cont'd.

g. Bombs.

MOKMER-BANDET-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. 1A. Erskine led the squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1A. Erskine	A/P 437	1A. Seiderf	A/P 060
1A. Turvilligent	A/P 009	1A. Hamhet	A/P 613

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The squadron approached the target from the north making landfall well above GALELA A/D and circled around the edge of the hills in a general southerly course, approaching their targets on a run over #1 runway. Here they started strafing ack-ack positions east of #1 runway to cover their approach to the assigned targets. The first flight attacked Target 2-a dropping 21 of their bombs in the assigned target, with the remaining 3 bombs tumbling over into GALELA Inlet. There were no visible results of the bombing. The second flight dropped all 24 of their bombs in target 3-a with nil visible results. Ack-ack encountered was as follows: Intense; heavy-medium-light; inaccurate to accurate from known positions, altitude plane level and slightly below. Intense 20 mm. or 25 mm. ack-ack from new position at BOMBA Pt. one mile southeast of GALELA Village. Bursts were at plane level and one plane was rocked. Heavy positions at the southeast end of #2 runway were seen to fire 3 rounds per gun at each wave of planes passing over. Medium position east of the center of #1 runway fired at our squadron on approach to the target. Did not fire after planes had passed overhead.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) There was nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO 252-4-3, cont'd.

3. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

4. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs dropped: 48 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Ammunition expended: 3750 x .50 caliber and 1300 x .30 cal.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were confirmed by all crews:

1 LILY bomber, apparently serviceable, on hardstand near northwest end of #1 runway. (Flakintel 063135 Galela 21 July 1944).
1 SNF, possibly TONY, on hardstand in the same area. (Flakintel 067139 Galela 21 July 1944). Believed to be serviceable. SNF had orange nose spinner and orange wing tips and color dark brown or black, possibly night fighter.
Estimated 10-15 2 E/B in dispersal area west of #1 runway. All unserviceable.
No. 1 runway appeared serviceable. No. 2 runway doubtful serviceability.
All buildings in GALELA A/D area appeared to be in bad repair.

Lt. Terwilliger's crew reported a SUGAR CHARLIE estimated 300 g.t. riding at anchor near shore off LIMAOK village--6-7 miles north of GALELA at position 0155N--12752E. Not confirmed.

7. There were no bomb bursts shown in photo prints received by this Officer, thus making interpretation and assessment of damage impossible.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FTO 253-4-1 8 Sept. 44
500lb Bomb No. 340lb Bomb Qty.
Time Over Target: 1053-1054/I.
Color Over Target: Black.




Flyover Tubing Fusion
Other Flyover
Left GAZZA—Ships
TPC 1:250,000 75-A
Left Flight
Left Flight
049
187
2X
813
069
3X

254-A
10 Sept 44
QK
aRQn

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BRR/13d

11 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report On Mission FFO 254-A-2, performed by four airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 10 September 1944. Objective: MANILA Town.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (F), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy personnel and stores in MANILA Town particularly Target 1-X. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by four planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. parademo. bombs. All four squadrons of the 345th Group participated on this strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER airdrome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Four airplanes attacked the target. Bombing results were excellent, considering the difficulty involved in making a minimum altitude run over this particular target. Three planes attacked the assigned target, dropping their entire load of 12 bombs each. Photos show that 24 of these bombs fell in the township and 12 bombs strung over into the bay. There were no visible results of bombing due to smoke and dust over the target resulting from bomb bursts. One plane was assigned to make a run along the coast from CAPE KAHRAU to CAPE MANILA with the objective of taking out a medium ack-ack position 1500 yards east of CAPE MANILA. This position did not fire at our squadron, and the pilot attacking it flew directly over it before he was able to see it. He dropped his 12 bombs immediately, but they all overshot the gun position stringing along the coast to the west of it for nil damage. It was impossible to strafe Target 1-X due to terrain difficulties, but one plane strafed the reported headquarters buildings on the

north side of the center of the MAMLEA Township airdrome. Slight, inaccurate, heavy ack-ack bursting 200-300 ft. above our planes was received from the known heavy position 1-N 1500 yards north of MAMLEA Town. 8-10 bursts were reported in all.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome at 1025/I.
Attack: Target from 1401-1404/I.
Landing: MOKMER at 1745/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-MAC CLUER GULF-TARGET-MAC CLUER GULF-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Our squadron led the Group and 1Lt. Jacobsen led our squadron on this mission. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
1Lt. Jacobsen	A/P 069	1Lt. Fisher	A/P 808
1Lt. Hammer	A/P 813	1Lt. Heiderf	A/P 099

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The squadron approached the target from the north making their run on a heading of approximately 235 degrees. Three planes attacked the township dropping 36 bombs, of which 24 bombs fell among buildings in the town and 12 strung over into the water. It was impossible to estimate damage due to dust and smoke from bomb bursts over the town. One plane made a sweep along the coast from CAPE KARMAU to CAPE MAMLEA strafing during the entire run, with the intention of taking out a medium ack-ack position 1500 yards east of CAPE MAMLEA. As this gun did not fire, the pilot was unable to locate it in time to bomb it accurately. He dropped all 12 bombs at the position, but he released too late, and all bombs overshot for nil damage. One plane strafed lightly the headquarters buildings north of the center of MAMLEA Drome. It was impossible for any planes to strafe the township itself effectively due to terrain.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO 254-A-2, cont'd.

(1) There was nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs dropped: 48 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Ammunition expended: 2050 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or verified by all crews:

Nil sightings of enemy activity in A/D and Township area.
75-80 milk cattle near trees off CAPE KARRAU, 2 miles east of MANDRA Township A/D.
5 A/P of the 498th squadron were seen leaving the target. One apparently missing from the last flight.
Township A/D apparently serviceable with nil airplanes.
MANDRA Town appeared to be in good condition previous to bombing.
At 1605/I/10—2500 ft.—13236E—01518—KAREKIP—25 miles inland from the north shore of MAC CLUER GULF——2 men, not natives, apparently waving at planes as they passed by. Men were near mission building or barrack-type building alongside KAMORNDAN River. One man was waving a white flag, and the other a yellow flag. Pilot states he believes it is possible to affect a water rescue at this point.

7. Photo interpretation confirms essential results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 254-4-2 10 Sept. 44
501st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1401-1404/I.
Order Over Target: First



256-A
12 Sept 44
OK aBCN

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IHB/lsd

14 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 256-A-3, performed by six planes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 12 September 1944. Objective: GALEIA.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy personnel and stores in GALEIA, particular target being 2-x. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, 2 planes carrying 100 lb. para-demo. bombs and 4 planes carrying 100 lb. 8/11 second demolition bombs. In all a total of 72 bombs were to be expended. All 4 squadrons of the 345th Group participated on this strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER airdrome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Five planes reached the target. Bombing was excellent. 36 100 lb. 8/11 second demolition bombs and 24 100 lb. para-demo. bombs were dropped on target 2-x with unobserved results. The entire area from No. 2 runway to target 2-x was strafed with nil visible results. Three planes were holed by ack-ack, which was heavy, medium, and light caliber; very intense and accurate coming from known positions 064067, 064088, 106119, and on BONGO PT.—one mile southeast of GALEIA Village. (Ref. GALEIA Flakintel 21 July 44). Our personnel losses were nil. 1 A/P returned to base 10 minutes after take-off because turret guns were inoperative.

d. Time and Location of.

Take-off: From MOKMER Drome 0808-0810/I.
Attack: From 1131-1134/I.

Narrative Report FFO 256-4-3, cont'd.

Landing: 1 A/P landed MOKMER 0825/I.
3 A/P landed MOKMER 1510/I.
2 A/P landed MIDDLEBURG 1335/I/12
1 A/P took off MIDDLEBURG 1255/I/13—landed MOKMER 1435/I/13. 1 A/P FROM MIDDLEBURG.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Davis led our squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Davis	A/P 064	Lt. Billig	A/P 767
Lt. Hayes	A/P 411	Lt. Hamner	A/P 068
Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 773	F/O. Muster	A/P 803

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. The squadron attacked the target making landfall to the south of the 360 ft. hill staying low behind hills and starting their run on an approximate heading of 90 degrees from west to east. Lt. Davis, leading the first flight, dropped his entire load of 12 100-pounders among buildings and supplies in target 2-x with nil visible results. He strafed the entire area from No. 2 runway to target 2-x with unobserved results. F/O Muster and Lt. Terwilliger, flying #2 and #3 positions respectively, dropped their entire bombload on the flight leader's release. Their bombs were seen to fall among newly erected buildings and debris was seen flying through the air, as the result of the exploding bombs. F/O Muster and Lt. Terwilliger also strafed the designated target area with nil visible results.

b. Lt. Billig led the second flight with Lt. Hamner flying on his wing of this two plane formation. They dropped their bombs and strafed in the assigned target with unobserved results. It was impossible to estimate the damage incurred due to the thick growth of tall trees.

c. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) There was nil interception and nil enemy aircraft planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Narrative Report FPO 256-4-3, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) 773—Left wing, left nacelle, and left landing gear.
(2) 068—Right elevator and stabilizer damaged.
(3) 767—Left side of fuselage damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

36 x 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs dropped.
12 x 100 lb. 8/11 sec. delay demo. bombs returned to base.
24 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs dropped.
6850 x .50 caliber ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or verified by all crews:

Many new buildings being erected in the valley on the south side of the 3060 ft. mountain 1½ miles southeast of the airdrome.

Many new buildings and numerous oil drums under trees were seen in target 2-x.

Bombs from the 499th Squadron were seen to cause a large explosion which billowed smoke to 200-300 ft. just east of NGUDINO LAKE.

1A. Davis's crew reported one 2 E/B at the south end of No. 2 runway at position CA2072. (Ref. GALELA Flakintel 21 July 44). The bomber appeared serviceable. They also observed at 1103/I, at 1000 ft. altitude—one Class "A" VB at CAPE LEIAI, at position 1284.2E—0435N. Barge was seen in motion.

1B. Turwilliger's crew reported a radio antenna on large KOKAMA Island, 15 miles southeast of GALELA.

1A. Billig's crew encountered light, heavy, accurate ack-ack from eight positions beginning from 520650 to 770635. (Ref. GALELA Flakintel 21 July 44). His crew together with F/O Muster's crew received medium, intense and accurate ack-ack at flight level due east of the RED TABAKANI Mk. in GALELA Village.

Narrative Report FFO 256-A-3, cont'd.

7. Photo interpretation confirms results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC H. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 256-4-3 12 Sept 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1131-1134/I.
Order Over Target: Fourth





068 767 773 803 064



FFO 256-A-3 12 Sept 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1131-1134/I.
Order Over Target: Fourth
⊥ Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes
• Indicates 100 lb. demo. bombs
• Indicates 100 lb. para-demo. bombs



GALELA

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

SCALE IN FEET

501
260-A
OK aRR 16 Sept 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEG/lsd

17 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 260-A-4, performed by six planes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 16 September 1944. Objective: WAREHOUSES ON GORONTOLO, CELEBES.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against warehouses on GORONTOLO. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 4 x 500 lb. 8-11 second delay incendiary bombs. The 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group also participated. Fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MIDDLEBURG Island and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Four planes reached the target. A total of 12 x 500 lb. 8-11 second delay incendiary bombs were dropped with 11 on the assigned targets and 1 on a group of 6 small and 1 large building in GORONTOLO town on the approach to the target. The large building was not hit but the small buildings surrounding it were seen to be burning fiercely after the bomb exploded. Of the 11 bombs dropped in the assigned target, 8 hit in the assigned target on the south tip of the island along the east side of the river starting huge fires; three bombs dropped in the south end of the target of warehouse buildings on the west bank and near the mouth of the river. The one large building and the 3 smaller buildings south of the flag pole in the center of this target were seen to have been demolished by these bombs. Many buildings along both banks of the river were heavily strafed with nil visible results. 2 planes failed to reach the target due to engine trouble and returned to base.

Narrative Report FFO 260-44, cont'd.

d. Location and Time of.

Took off: From MOKMER Drome from 0420-0428/L. (6 planes)
Landed: MIDDLEBURG from 0620-0630/L. (6 planes)
Took off: MIDDLEBURG from 0730-0732/L. (5 planes)
Landed: MIDDLEBURG 0945/L. (1 plane).
Attacked target: From 1120-1125/L. (4 planes).
Landed: MOKMER Drome 1454/L. (1 plane).
Landed: MIDDLEBURG 1500/L. (4 planes).
Took off: MIDDLEBURG 1625-1627/L. (5 planes).
Landed: MOKMER Drome 1810-1815/L. (5 planes).

e. Route.

MOKMER-MIDDLEBURG-TARGET-MIDDLEBURG-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Musket led our squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Musket	A/P 411	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 855
Lt. Legget	A/P 865	Lt. Blair	A/P 767

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Musket led the squadron over the target with Lt. Legget flying #2 position on his right wing. Lt. Musket made his run over the island near the junction of the 2 rivers, dropping his four incendiary bombs among buildings on the south tip of the island.

(2) Lt. Legget made his rund own the west bank of the river dropping 1 bomb on a group of 6 small and 1 large buildings in GORONTOLO Town causing the 6 smaller buildings surrounding the large building to catch afire. Three 3 remaining bombs were dropped on the south third of the warehouse target near the mouth of the river, as this was the only part of this target remaining intact. His bombs were seen to explode and start huge fires. The complete area from GORONTOLO Town to the coast was strafed.

(3) Lt. Terwilliger led the second flight also bombed the small island in GORONTOLO River, with all four of his bombs falling among buildings near the south tip of the island. It was impossible to accurately

assess damage inflicted because of smoke and haze over the target. After bombing the island, he strafed the east bank of the river, putting several heavy bursts into the radio station and surrounding buildings.

(4) Lt. Blair, flying #2 position, in this flight, strafed the west bank of the river area from GORONTOLO Town to the warehouse area where he had to give way to the left due to huge fires and thick black smoke in this area. No bombs were dropped over the target due to electrical malfunction. Bombs were salvoed on leaving the target.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) There was nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

12 x 500 lb. 8-11 second delay incendiary bombs dropped.
8 x 500 lb. 8-11 second delay incendiary bombs salvoed.
4 x 500 lb. 8-11 second delay incendiary bombs returned to base.
3400 x .50 caliber rounds expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or verified by all crews:

Numerous houses and buildings all in excellent repair around all sides of LAINBOTO Lake Northwest of the target.
7-8 buildings in GORONTOLO Town marked with Red Cross.

Narrative Report FFO 260-4-4, cont'd.

Wooden Sugar Charlie 150 tons under construction in slipway, south end of island in GORONTOLO River.

Entire north half of southernmost target on west bank of river gutted with flames 500 ft. and smoke rising 2000-3000 ft. Crews reported all buildings north of flag pole in center of the target were ablaze.

Flames from burning buildings seen falling onto lugger along shore at northeast end of warehouse target area on west bank of river.

Circle in center of warehouse area shown on target photograph is a flag pole, with Jap Army flag flying, and guard armed with rifle standing at base of the pole.

Lt. Muskat's crew observed a class "A" VB underway on 200 degree heading at 0010S—12710E.

7. Photo interpretation confirms results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 260-A-4 16 Sept 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1120-1125/I.
Order Over target: Third



501
262-A-
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501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IEB/lsd

19 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 262-A-4, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 18 September 1944. Objective: AIRPLANES LANGGAM AIRDROME.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against airplanes on LANGGAM Airdrome. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. The 498th, 499th, and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group also participated. Area fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOMMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Five planes reached the target. Bombing results were excellent. Four airplanes dropped 288 parafrag bombs stringing them directly across the dispersal area east of LANGGAM runway. Crews reported two unserviceable fighters and one camouflaged P/E bomber, apparently serviceable, in the target at the time of our attack. Crews were unable to estimate the damage because they were too far from the target by the time the bombs exploded. All five planes heavily strafed the target and the surrounding area. One plane was unable to make bombing run over the assigned area, due to a sharp turn by the squadron forcing it off the target and dropped 36 parafrag bombs into LAKE TONDANO, of which 12 hit on land around TEIAP Village (585325). (Ref. AMOERANG, CELEBES 1:200,000). One plane failed to reach the target due to damaged cowling.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOMMER from 0615-0617/I.
Attacked target: From 1035-1037/I (5 planes).
Landing: MOMMER at 0810/I. (one Plane).

Narrative Report FFO 262-A-4, cont'd.

	MOMFOOR at 1435/I (2 planes).
Took off:	MOMFOOR at 1450/I (2 planes).
Landed:	MOMMER from 1500-1503/I (3 planes).
	MOMMER at 1535/I (2 planes).

g. Route.

MOMMER-TARGET-MOMMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Jacobson led our squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Jacobson	A/P 437	Lt. Fisher	A/P 064
Lt. Lamar	A/P 855	Lt. Blair	A/P 818
F/O. Hunter	A/P 385	Lt. Hayes	A/P 865

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Jacobson led the Group and Squadron over the target. Lt. Fisher, second flight leader, pulled his flight of two planes up and to the left of Lt. Jacobson's flight to make the run across the target in five planes abreast. Four planes dropped 288 parafrag bombs completely across the target. Results of the bombing could not be determined, as the squadron was out of visual range before the bombs exploded. As the squadron had to make a slight "S" turn to line up on the target, Lt. Lamar, who was flying #2 position on Lt. Jacobson, was forced to abandon the attack or overrun the squadron. He broke away to the right and dropped 36 parafrag bombs in LAKE TONDANO of which 12 fell on land around TEIAP Village. (Ref. AMONRANG, CELEBES, 1:200,000). The five planes thoroughly strafed the target and surrounding area.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) There was nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

Narrative Report FFO 262-4-4, cont'd.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 324 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Bombs Returned to base: 288 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammunition Expended: 5900 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Crews sighted 3 SKF, undetermined serviceability, along the center of the east side of the runway.

7. Photo interpretation confirms results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



FFO 262-A-4 18 Sept 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1036/I
Order Over Target: First.

OK 501
ORA 263-A
19 Sep 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IEB/134

20 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 263-A-2, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 19 September 1944. Objective: Personnel and Dispersal areas SIDATE A/D.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against personnel and dispersal areas to the south of SIDATE Airdrome. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs. The 498th, 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission. Area fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Four planes reached the target. Bombing results were excellent. A total of 48 100 lb. para-demo. bombs were dropped in personnel and dispersal areas 2,000 ft. wide parallel to the south side of the runway. 5 or 6 small fires were started in the area and grey white smoke was seen to rise 200-300 ft. high. One silver T/E bomber, single tail, red nacelles, was set on fire by strafing by our planes. Bomber was in the hardstand or revetment 1200 ft. south of the center of the runway. Another T/E bomber, heavily camouflaged, of undetermined serviceability, in revetment 150 ft. south of the center of the runway, was strafed with nil damage observed. One shiny black 287 was seen in the hardstand 1700 ft. south of the center of the runway. 12 bombs were dropped by our planes in the immediate area surrounding this fighter

causing probable damage to it, although no direct hit was observed. One plane strafed two barges about 3 miles east of SIDATE with nil visible results. All four B-25's heavily strafed a path 2,000 ft. wide south of and parallel to the runway. Our losses nil. Two planes returned to base--one due to engine trouble, the other as escort.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: MOMBER from 0620-0622/I (6 planes).
Attacked Target: At 1006-1007/I (4 planes).
Landed: MIDDLEBURG from 1422-1425/I (4 planes).
Took off: MIDDLEBURG from 1535-1537/I (4 planes).
Landed: MOMBER from 1712-1715/I (4 planes).
MOMBER 1220/I (2 planes).

e. Route.

MOMBER-TARGET-MIDDLEBURG-MOMBER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Muskat led our squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Muskat	A/P 437	Lt. Billig	A/P 411
Lt. Leggett	A/P 325	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 855
F/O. Muster	A/P 064	Lt. Hayes	A/P 818

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Muskat led the squadron over the target. Lt. Billig, who was flying in #4 position, pulled up and to the right so the squadron could make the run over the target four planes abreast. Lt. Muskat dropped his 12 100 lb. para-demos. through the parachute and dispersal area. His side gunner strafed a heavy camouflaged 2 HB in a revetment approximately 1000 ft. south of the east third of the runway. Tracers were seen to enter the plane causing it to smoke. Lt. Hayes, flying on the extreme left of the squadron, dropped his bombs on the Squadron leader's release. He strafed a heavily camouflaged 2 HB in a revetment 150 ft. south of the center of the runway with nil visible results. Lt. Leggett dropped 12 100 lb. para-demos. slightly after the Squadron leader's release. Lt. Billig who had pulled up and to the right of the squadron dropped his bombs on Lt. Leggett's release. Two of his bombs dropped near a

black SSF with nil visible results. While making the approach to the target, his gunner heavily strafed two Class "A" VB barges located in a cove three miles east of SIDATE with nil visible results. The results of the squadron's bombing couldnot be determined due to the heavy growth of trees over the area. The four planes heavily strafed a path 2000 ft. wide south of and parallel to the SIDATE airdrome.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil enemy planes destroyed in the air.

(2) Two T/E bombers in hardstands strafed, one set on fire and damaged.

2. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

4. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 48 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Bombs Salvoed: 12 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Bombs Returned to Base: 12 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Ammunition Expended: 5400 x .50 caliber and 950 x .30 Cal.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or verified by all crews:

One camouflaged barge at anchor at AKKLAMO on west coast of HALMAHERA at point 0123N—12736E.

Large fires along AMOERANG BAY, grey smoke up 2500 ft. possibly resulting from attack by "heavies".

3 unidentified silver fighters seen in a distance, pulled away from formation heading towards LEMBEH STRAIT. Identity not determined.

Narrative Report FFO 263-4-2, cont'd.

2 luggers at anchor in cove 7 miles west of SIDATE.
4 barges on beach and one small sailboat just off shore 3 miles east of SIDATE.
SIDATE runway--red clay surface appears serviceable except for 1500-2000 ft. strip at east end.
Numerous well used trails and M/Trucks running south from center of runway.
Many tinned roof shacks surrounding new disposal loop under construction south of center of runway.

14. Mushet's crew observed a possible radar station, but believed to be a channel marker for sea navigation, on north shore of AMBERAMO BAY at position 0116S--141.3E.

7. Photo interpretation confirms results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC H. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

OK 501 ORN 267-A 23 Sept 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BMG/1jd

24 Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 267-A-2, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 23 September 1944. Objective: Personnel and Supplies SIDATE Airdrome.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against personnel and supply areas to the south of SIDATE Airdrome covering the strip from TINGA ROEMOONG Village north to the runway. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs. The 498th, 499th and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered. Six planes were over the target. Bombing results were excellent with a total of 72 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs dropped in the personnel and supply areas. Approximately two-thirds of the bombs fell in TINGA ROEMOONG Village, and the remaining one-third covered a strip 5,000 ft. north from TINGA ROEMOONG Village. There were no visible results other than bomb bursts. One unidentified airplane, reported as being of questionable serviceability, was strafed at the west end of the runway with no visible results. Photos later showed this plane to be definitely unserviceable prior to our strafing. Ack-ack encountered on the mission was slight, with 12-15 inaccurate bursts of medium fire being received from known positions south of the center of the SIDATE runway. One of our planes was holed with no injury to personnel.

Narrative Report FFO 267-4-2, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER 0555-0557/I.
Attacked Target: From 1010-1012/I.
Landed: MIDDLEBURG 1345/I.
Took off: MIDDLEBURG 1510/I.
Landed: MOKMER 1650/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-MIDDLEBURG-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Davis led our squadron. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Davis	A/P 437	Lt. Fisher	A/P 411
Lt. Ball	A/P 865	Lt. Leggett	A/P 813
Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 803	Lt. Lamar	A/P 895

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Davis led the squadron over the target making his run on an approximate zero degree heading, approaching from over the hills south of TINGA ROEMOONG Village. This flight dropped their entire load of 12 bombs each on TINGA ROEMOONG Village and the personnel area stretching 4000-5000 ft. north from the village. TINGA ROEMOONG Village and the entire area from there to the coast at the west end of the runway was heavily strafed with nil visible results.

The second flight made the same run as the first flight dropping their bombs in the same area and strafing from TINGA ROEMOONG Village to the west end of the runway with nil visible results. Lt. Leggett strafed an unserviceable twin engine airplane at the west end of the runway with nil visible results. On withdrawal from the target, Lt. Leggett received a hole in his right aileron from a 20 mm. shell. No members of his crew were injured and his plane was able to continue in formation landing safely at MOKMER.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO 267-A-2, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Holed in right aileron, A/P 813.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 72 x 100 lb. para-demo.
Ammunition Expended: 6000 x .50 caliber and 1700 x .30 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or confirmed by all crews:

A fire in LANGOAN with black smoke up to 1500 ft.
A fire with black smoke up 400-500 ft., apparently a burning airplane, in disparsal loop 800 ft. south of the east third of the runway.
A fire in AMORANG Township with white smoke rising 200 ft.
4 luggers, 1 SUGAR CHARLIE, and 2 type A VB in AMORANG Bay.

Lt. Terwilliger's crew reported, on the east coast of the CELEBES, 2 large M/V along shore one-half mile apart with 5 or 6 small loading craft lying between them near BENTENAN Village north of BENTENAN Island at point 0058N--12453E.

7. Photo prints received confirms results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


AMOERANG BAY
SIDATE A/D
BLACK SMOKE
400/500 FT
457
T
803
805
855
812
T
T
FFO 267-A-2 23 Sept. 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1010-1012/I.
Order Over Target: Second
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes
REF. V BOMCOM PHOTO 827-A
ASSIGNED TARGET
ASSIGNED TARGET
BOMB BURSTS
N
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
SCALE IN FEET

501
275-A-2
10CT44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

HEQ/13d

2 Oct. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 275-A-2, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 1 October 1944. Objective: Warehouses BOLAANGOEKI, CELEBES.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against warehouses and other installations along the shore at BOLAANGOEKI, CELEBES. The secondary target was personnel areas at KAKAS Village, CELEBES. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs. The 498th, 499th, and 500th Squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered, with the exception that only four planes reached the target. Bombing results of these four planes were excellent, with a total of 48 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs being dropped over the assigned primary target. Of the bombs dropped, approximately 38 hit on land among buildings with approximately 10 bombs falling into the water. One group of three warehouse buildings on the northern most tip of the peninsula at BOLAANGOEKI were destroyed by direct bomb hits. A large fire with greyish black smoke rising 1500 ft. was started as a result of our attack. Two camouflaged barges along the north shore of BOLAANGOEKI Bay were strafed by the waist gunner with nil visible results. Two planes turned back before reaching the target—one due to engine trouble and the other acting as escort. No ack-ack fire of any description was encountered on the mission.

Narrative Report FFO 275-4-2, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER 0553/I—6 planes
Attacked Target: From 1056-1058/I (4 planes)
Landed: MIDDLEBURG 1303/I—4 planes.
Took off: MIDDLEBURG 1433/I—4 planes.
Landed: MOKMER 1558/I—4 planes.
Landed: NOEMFOOR 0735/I—2 planes
Took off: NOEMFOOR 1020/I—1 plane
Landed: MOKMER 1120/I—1 plane
Took off NOEMFOOR 1500/I—1 plane
Landed: MOKMER 1600/I—1 plane

e. Route.

MOKMER-MARKET-MIDDLEBURG-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Hall led the squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Hall	A/P 865	Lt. Bell	A/P 813
Lt. Wilkinson	A/P 069	Lt. Blair	A/P 803

Lt. Musket, in A/P 437, and Lt. Willard, in A/P 767, failed to reach the target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Musket, in A/P 437, was scheduled as leader of the squadron for this strike, but his plane developed engine trouble enroute to the target forcing him to land at NOEMFOOR. Lt. Willard, flying A/P 767, returned with him as escort. Lt. Hall took over as leader of the squadron and proceeded to the target with Lt. Wilkinson flying #2 position on his wing. Lt. Bell led the second flight with Lt. Blair in #2 position. After making landfall on the CELEBES and while making an approach to the target, the squadron got separated from the group formation while passing through and around clouds. After circling and attempting to relocate the group, the squadron attacked the assigned target. In the meantime four planes of the 498th Squadron joined our planes for the attack on the primary target. On reaching the target, the terrain encountered and the extreme smallness and narrowness of the target area made it impossible for the planes to make a

Narrative Report FPO 275-4-2, cont'd.

7. Photo prints confirm results as reported by crews. The jetty is still intact and has a narrow gauge railroad track running to the end with a crane at the end of the jetty. Buildings are of grass construction and seemed to have been undamaged prior to our attack. Falling bombs shown in photographs would indicate extensive damage was done to all buildings on the tip of BOGAANGONKI Peninsula as well as to the group of buildings around the sawmill and jetty.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN H. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

a good attack in formation as planned. However, the attack was made in two plane elements with effective results. Our four planes dropped all of their bombs, covering the area from the sawmill and jetty to the tip of BOHAMOKKI Peninsula. A compact group of three buildings at the tip of the peninsula were demolished by bomb hits and a large fire was started around the sawmill and jetty area. Lt. Bell's waist gunner strafed two camouflaged barges along shore in BOHAMOKKI Bay with nil visible results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 48 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Bombs Salvoed: 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Bombs Returned to Base: 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 3400 x .50 caliber and 700 x .30 cal.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sighting was reported or confirmed by all crews:

A lighthouse at POMDANG Is. at point 12428—0025N is intact.

Crew observations over the target were very meager due probably to the newness of the target and the smallness of the area covered, and the difficulties encountered in making the run. Crews generally agreed that there were numerous camouflaged small craft—possibly 8-10—concealed in small inlets around the shores of the bay. 3 ships were under construction in the slipways.

Narrative Report FFO 275-4-2, cont'd.

7. Photo prints confirm results as reported by crews. The jetty is still intact and has a narrow gauge railroad track running to the end with a crane at the end of the jetty. Buildings are of grass construction and seemed to have been undamaged prior to our attack. Falling bombs shown in photographs would indicate extensive damage was done to all buildings on the tip of MIKAMOKI Peninsula as well as to the group of buildings around the sawmill and jetty.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN H. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

501
QKORA
278-X
4 OCT 4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IEB/ljd

5 Oct. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 278-A-3, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 4 October 1944. Objective: SIDATE—Dispersal Areas.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against airplanes in the dispersal areas at SIDATE. The secondary target was a strike on an electrical plant and surrounding buildings at TOMMANO. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay bombs. The 498th Squadron of the 345th Group was the only other squadron to participate on this strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

Both squadrons formed over MOMMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered, with the exception that only five planes reached the target. Bombing results were excellent. A total of 60 x 100 lb. para-demo, 8-15 second delay bombs were dropped, 44 hitting in the dispersal areas causing possible damage to one unserviceable SSF and one twin engine bomber, which was unserviceable, but appeared to be under repair at the time of our attack. 3 small fires with white-grey smoke rising 100 ft. were started 1500 ft. south of the east third of the runway at grid square 100-F. (Ref. Flakintel 1 inch Grid SIDATE VEC Photo 827-A). The area was strafed with nil visible results. 16 bombs fell short hitting south of the east end of the runway with nil visible results. One plane failed to reach the target due to engine trouble and fuel transfer.

Narrative Report FPO 278-A-3, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of:

Took off: From MOKMER at 0615/I—6 planes.
Landed: MOKMER at 0838/I—1 plane
Attacked Target: SIDATE—dispersal areas at 1048/I—5 A/P.
Landed: SAMSAFOR 1355/I—5 planes.
Took off: SAMSAFOR 1505/I—5 planes.
Landed: MOKMER 1630/I—5 planes.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-SAMSAFOR-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Jacobson led the group over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Jacobson	411	Lt. Thomas	855
Lt. Hall	069	Lt. Blair	767
Lt. Willard	813		

NOTE: Lt. Hall, A/P 808, did not reach target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Jacobson, leading the group on the strike, made landfall on the GILBERS at TOTOK Bay where the flights began to take interval. Lt. Jacobson, with Lt. Hall and Lt. Willard flying #2 and #3 positions respectively, made their run over the target on a 270 degree heading. Release of bombs were started south of the east end of the runway. A total of 36 bombs were dropped with 16 falling short of the dispersal area.

(2) Lt. Thomas, leading the second flight with Lt. Blair flying #2 position, dropped their entire load of 12 bombs each in the target. Observation of the damage done was limited due to the type of bombs and heavy foliage in the area. The target was heavily strafed by all planes.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO [illegible], [illegible]:

[illegible]

(1) [illegible]

[illegible]

(1) [illegible]

4. CITATIONS.

[illegible] Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND OPERATIONS.

[illegible] .50 cal. [illegible]; [illegible] .50 cal. [illegible]; [illegible] .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported:

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

7. Photo prints received contain results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC R. MAYER,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

501
280-A
6 OCT 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

BEG/ljd

7 Oct. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 280-A-1, performed by five airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 6 October 1944. Objective: AMAHAI Personnel Area.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

Primary objective was a strike against personnel in the AMAHAI A/D area particularly target 2-X. There was no secondary target. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six airplanes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The 498th Squadron of the 345th Group was the only other squadron to participate on this strike.

b. Rendezvous.

Both squadrons formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered, with the exception that only five planes hit the target. Bombing results were excellent. A total of 60 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay bombs were dropped, 36 hitting in the target with nil visible results other than bomb bursts of dust. 10 bombs were dropped on a group of 5-6 shacks in the wooded area north of the east end of #2 runway demolishing the shacks with direct hits. One plane was unable to make run over the assigned target dropping 12 bombs along the dispersal lane north of #2 runway with nil visible results. 2 bombs were dropped at a new, apparently serviceable, blue twin engine airplane described by crew members as a NICK at the northwest corner of #2 runway at point 143-02. (Ref. Flakintel 1 inch grid AMAHAI A/D VBC 806). The bombs missed with no apparent damage sustained to the airplane. Personnel area 4-X and the entire #2 runway area was heavily strafed. One plane was holed with minor damage. Ack-ack encountered was of moderate intensity, heavy caliber which was inaccurate to accurate from the six gun position north of #2 runway. 3 guns in this battery were seen firing. Crews reported

the gun was in a clearing 1500 ft. north of the medium gun position at 2-W. Bursts were slightly above and behind. The airplane that was hit was bracketed by 8-10 bursts.

d. Time and Location of:

Took off: From MOKMER from 0900-0902/I.
Attacked target: From 1155-1157/I.
Landed: At MOKMER from 1453-1455/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-GORONG ISLAND-TARGET-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Major Neuenschwander, Group Operations Officer, led the group formation. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Major Neuenschwander	A/P 411	Lt. Fisher	A/P 865
Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 767	Lt. Hayes	A/P 069
Lt. Ohnemus	A/P 813		

NOTE: A/P 773, (Lt. Wilkinson, pilot) failed to check out before take off.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Major Neuenschwander made an excellent approach to the target bringing the squadron in on a heading of approximately 270 degrees for a diagonal run across the assigned target. He dropped all 12 of his bombs across the extreme eastern end of #2 runway and the northwestern corner of target 4-X. Lt. Ohnemus, flying #3 position on the left wing, was in position for a perfect run dropping all 12 bombs in the assigned target. Lt. Terwilliger, flying #2 position, was forced to take evasive action due to ack-ack encountered over the target and as a result was unable to bomb the assigned target. His bombs fell along the wooded area adjacent to the taxiway on the north side of #2 runway.

(2) The second flight made a similar run with Lt. Fisher, flight leader, getting all of his bombs in the target, with Lt. Hayes swinging to the right of target 4-X in

an effort to attack medium ack-ack positions around #2 runway. On reaching the target, he was unable to locate these medium gun positions, so he dropped 10 of his bombs on a group of 5-6 shacks in the wooded area north of the east end of #2 runway. These shacks were demolished by direct hits. Passing on over the run, he spotted a twin engine airplane near the northwest corner of #2 runway. Lt. Hayes attempted to swing sharply to the left in order to make a run on this plane, but was unable to maneuver into position in time to hit it with his two bombs which were dropped for misses with no apparent result. The target was heavily strafed by all planes.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) A/P 865 suffered minor damage when holed by ack-ack fragment.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 60 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay.
Ammunition Expended: 5700 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or confirmed by all crews:

One SSF camouflaged, undetermined serviceability, under trees northeast end of #2 runway at point 155-J4. (Ref. Flakintel 1 inch grid AMAHAI A/D VBC 806).

Twin engine airplane, undetermined serviceability, southeast end of #2 runway at point 160-H8. (Ref. Flakintel 1 inch grid AMAHAI A/D VBC 806).

Narrative Report FFO 280-A-1, cont'd.

New, apparently serviceable, blue twin engine airplane, believed to be NICK, at northwest corner of #2 runway at point 143-02. (Ref. Flakintel 1 inch grid AMAMA I A/D VMC 806).

7. Photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN E. GREEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO 280-A-1 6 Oct. 1944
501st B.S. 345th B.G.
Time Over Target. 1155-1157/I
Altitude. Minimum




N
BANDA I.
FFO 280-A-1 6 Oct. 1945
501st B.S. 345th B.G.
Time Over Target. 1155-1157/I
Order Over Target. First
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes
SILS SHACKS DESTD HERE
RUNWAY
HX TARGET
865
411
813
767
069
BANDA SEA
0
1000'
2000'
3000'

OK 501 ORA 281-A1 7 OCT 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

IEB/ljd

8 Oct. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 281-A-4, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 7 October 1944. Objective: TOMPASO--Warehouses.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against warehouses at TOMPASO. There was no secondary target. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The 498th Squadron of the 345th Group was the only other squadron to participate on this strike.

b. Rendezvous.

Both squadrons formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered, with the exception that only five planes hit the target. Bombing results were excellent. A total of 48 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs were dropped among buildings in TOMPASO town starting fiercely burning fires in 10 or 12 buildings around the center of the town. The target was strafed as well as five possible M/G positions in the wooded area just north of the town. One plane failed to reach the target due to engine trouble and salvoed its bombs prior to landing at KAMIRI. No personnel injured. Another plane salvoed its bombs when unable to release over the target due to failure of the electrical system. One plane was hit by 20 mm. ack-ack fire after leaving the target area while making withdrawal between LANGOAN A/D and PASO Village. The pilot made a force landing at MOROTAI damaging it with the crew uninjured. Accurate 20 mm. fire was received from an unlocated position believed to be on a ridge one-half mile south of PASO Village in LANGOAN A/D area. Slight inaccurate M/G fire from 5 positions

Narrative Report FFO 281-4-4, cont'd.

was encountered from the wooded area along the north side of TOMPASO Village.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER 0630/I.
Attacked Target: From 1034-1035/I.
Landed: MOROTAI at 1200/I.--1 plane.
Landed: KAMIRI 0700/I.--1 plane
Landed: MOKMER 1705/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-SANSAPOR-MOKMER

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Morris, 498th Squadron, led the group formation. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Musket	A/P 411	Lt. Wilkinson	A/P 767
F/O. Muster	A/P 773	Lt. Leggett	A/P 069
Lt. Bina	A/P 855		

NOTE: Lt. Hall, A/P 865, failed to reach the target.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Musket led the squadron over the target with F/O Muster and Lt. Bina in #2 and #3 positions respectively. The run over the target was made on a 60 degree heading. The first flight dropped 24 bombs on the target starting 10-12 fires. Lt. Bina failed to drop his bombs on the target due to failure of bomb electrical system. His bombs were salvoed enroute home.

(2) Lt. Hall, who was to lead the second flight over the target, made a forced landing at NOEMFOOR due to engine trouble. Lt. Wilkinson then took over the second flight with Lt. Leggett on his wing. They dropped 24 bombs on the target with 8-8 direct hits. Both flights thoroughly strafed the target and surrounding area. On retiring from the target, this flight passed near PASO Village in LANGOAN A/D area where Lt. Wilkinson's plane was hit by 20 mm. fire, which knocked out his right engine. This fire was believed to have come from the ridge one-half mile south of PASO Village. Lt. Wilkinson was es-

Narrative Report FFO 281-A-4, cont'd.

corted back to MOROTAI by Lt. Leggett where he made a forced landing.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) A/P 767—Right engine shot out by 20 mm. fire. Also damaged when crash landed at MOROTAI. Totally destroyed.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 48 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay.
Bombs Salvoed: 24 x 100 lb. para-demo. 8-15 second delay.
Ammunition Expended: 3900 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sighting was reported and confirmed by all crews:

Fiercely burning fires among buildings along the north side of the main east-west road in TOMPASO as squadron approached the target.

7. Photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ISAAC E. BAKER,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO 281-A-4 7 Oct. 1944
501st BS. 345th BG.
Time Over Target 1034-1035/I
ALTITUDE. Minimum.

501
298-A
24 OCT 4
498

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

345th Bombardment Group (M) AAF
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 920

5 November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 298-A-1, Performed on 24 October, 1944 with objective at SANDAKAN HARBOR, N.E. Borneo. (05°50'N - 118° 08'E).

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attention of: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the afternoon of 23 October, seventeen (17) airplanes of the 345th Bomb Group took off from MOKMER AIRDROME, Biak Island and proceeded to MOROTAI ISLAND to stage missions from that base. Plans and arrangements were made to stage over one night, run the mission the following day and return to base after landing at MOROTAI and refueling. Accordingly only a small number of ground personnel and a limited amount of equipment accompanied the strike force. In short, we were not prepared for the second strike and the additional day. Ground personnel should be highly commended on the the excellent work they accomplished in working long hours with insufficient personnel and resources. On the 24th of October, under orders from the 310th Bomb Wing, seventeen B-25's took off to strike shipping at SANDAKAN HARBOR. Reconnaisance had revealed a large amount coastwise traffic along the NE side of BORNEO. The logical place for a stop-over was determined as SANDAKAN and this was confirmed during the night by a Catalina. The mission was successful enough but due to factors discussed later, the results were not as satisfactory as they normally would have been. Of the seventeen planes taking off, fourteen reached the target and three returned to base early because of mechanical failures. The length of the mission, as usual during the past two months, was approximately nine hours. The average remainder of fuel per plane on return to base was little over 100 gallons. One plane of the 500th Squadron exhausted it's fuel almost immediately after landing and could not be taxied to the dispersal area.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

b. RENDEZVOUS

1. The Group Rendezvous was accomplished over the water at MOROTAI.

2. Rendezvous with 1 Squadron P-38's (Close Cover) and 1 Squadron P-47's (Top Cover) was accomplished enroute to the target.

c. ATTACK

Fourteen (14) B-25's loaded with 4 X 500 lb. 4/5 second delay fuse bombs reached the target. Since information on the area was meager and indefinite the approach and axis of attack was planned to be from SW to NE. The Catalina which had been in this area the previous night had reported medium and intense A/A. Also the exact location of SANDAKAN AIRDROME was unknown. For these two reasons, it was decided to get the planes over the target in the shortest possible time and also to allow greater coverage of possible A/A positions. This plan was to be executed by sending the formation in two waves, each wave having all planes practically in line abreast formation.
With Lt.COL.COLTHORP leading, the Group approached the target and executed the attack as planned. Although there were several small M/V's and VA's along with barges in the harbor only a few planes were actually able to attack them. Several of the pilots, thinking that only one pass was to be made and being unable to attack the shipping, dropped their bombs on the shore installations in and around SANDAKAN TOWN. Contrary to our expectations the Group received almost no A/A. Therefore three runs were made over the target but since all bombs were expended on the first run, the succeeding attacks were by strafing only.
During the attack the following results were achieved:
1 FTC of approximately 2000 tons was definitely sunk.
1 S/S was definitely sunk.
1 FSD was definitely sunk.
2 VA's sunk, several VA's and small craft damaged.
23 bombs were dropped on shore installations damaging several buildings and starting four medium sized fires. One of which was apparently an oil fire with black smoke up to 1000 feet. Results of thorough strafing of the town were not visible.

4. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception encountered.

5. TIME AND LOCATION OF:

Take Off	MOROTAI	0610/I
T.O.T.	SANDAKAN HBR.	1030-1035/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING ON THE MISSION.

498th & 501st

Lt.Col. L.G.COLTHORP	A/P 104	2nd.Lt.M.R.BELL	A/P 818
1st.Lt.G.L.FRAZIER	" 880	1st.Lt.R.M.ERSKINE	" 012
* 2nd.Lt.T.O.GIESTRAP	" 814		

* TURNED BACK DUE TO MECHANICAL TROUBLE

499th

1st.Lt.F.N.FOX	A/P 018	1st.Lt. P.E.TARANUK	A/P 048
1st.Lt.M.J.OPIE	" 836	Capt.W.E.DEKKER	" 035
* Capt.R.J.TODD	" 876	1st.Lt.I.M.MOSSER	" 161

* Turned back,unable to transfer fuel.

500th

Lt.Dick	A/P 007	Lt.RASMUSSEN	A/P 864
Lt.THOMPSON	" 837	Lt.ZIMMERMAN	" 663
* Capt.RAZZLE	" 059		

* Turned back due to mechanical trouble.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Details of Individual action.

Note: Only outstanding details of action are included.

Col.COLTHORP led the Group Formation to the target without incident and crossed the NE coast of BORNEO approximately ten miles of SANDAKAN HARBOR. He turned N to strike the target from SW to NE. His first attack was on a VA near the center of the harbor. He dropped one bomb which was a hit resulting in the sinking of the lugger.

He dropped 3 bombs at the 5000 ton FTC with two bombs near misses the third was long. Observations by other planes indicate that one of the near misses failed to explode.

Lt.OFIK followed Col.COLTHORP's attack on the FTC and dropped 4 bombs, one of which (and possibly a second) was a direct hit. Photos confirm the direct hit and resulting explosion just forward of the bridge.

Lt.DICK made a run on a S/B approximately 3 miles W of SANDAKAN scoring a direct hit which resulted in the sinking of the vessel.

Lt.RASMUSSEN dropped 2 bombs at a FTD off SANDAKAN PT. scoring one direct hit. The explosion resulted in the sinking of the vessel.

b. DETAILS OF INTERCEPTION AND AERIAL COMBAT.

Nil Interception.

c. DETAILS ON DAMAGE TO OWN PLANES.

2 planes were holed by small arms fire.

d. A/A FIRE

Scattered light, inaccurate small arms fire from shipping.

e. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

Nil personnel injured.

4. CITATIONS

Crews credited with sinking of M/V's are being considered for eligibility for awards.

5. SIGHTINGS

4-6 S/C's, one 5000 ton FTC, 1 S/B, 1 FTD and 10-15 barges and luggers were seen in SANDAKAN HARBOR.

6. TABLES

Note: Lack of information concerning cameras and ammunition expended in strafing make it impossible to account for every planes therefore no tables are submitted.
A total of 55 X 500 lb. bombs were dropped.
APPROX. 15000 X .50 CAL. AND 4500 X .30 CAL. WERE EXPENDED

PAT M.GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER



Target: Sandakan Harbor
Mission FPO 298-A-1
24 October, 1944
345th Bomb Group (H)
T.O.T. 1020-1035/I
Altitude: Minimum

501
277-A3 OK
30CT44 ABR

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

REG/13d

4 Oct. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 277-A-3, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 3 October 1944. Objective: Barge Sweep SAMANA Island. Last Resort Target: SAMANA Village.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces (P), APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a barge sweep around the entire coast of SAMANA Island with the last resort being an attack on SAMANA Village, in the event no barges were sighted. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. para-demo. 4-5 second delay bombs. No other squadron in the 345th Group was to participate on this strike. No fighter cover was to be provided.

b. Rendezvous.

The squadron took off in two plane elements which proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

Six planes conducted a barge sweep around SAMANA Island. Nil barges were sighted. All planes attacked the assigned target in SAMANA Village. Bombing was excellent. 72 x 100 lb. para-demo. bombs were dropped with 39 hitting in and around the assigned target starting a small fire. 21 bombs hit in the water. One airplane dropped 12 bombs on the north side of SAMANA Bay when the bomb bay doors opened at the beginning of the bombing run. A small fire was started in this area. The assigned target was lightly strafed with nil visible results.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER from 0300-0310/I.
Landed: MIDDLEBURG 1000/I.
Took off: MIDDLEBURG 1025/I.
Landed: MOKMER from 1210-1310/I.
Attacked target: 0700-0734/I--Barge sweep.
0735-0736/I--SAMANA Village.

Narrative Report FPO 377-4-3, cont'd.

g. Route.

MORNING-MUDDLEBURG-TARGET-MORNING.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. 1Lt. Reiderf led the squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT		THIRD FLIGHT	
1Lt. Reiderf	A/P 411	1Lt. Fisher	A/P 767	1Lt. Lanner	A/P 808
1Lt. Hayes	A/P 803	1Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 833	1Lt. Clemmons	A/P 855

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) MAIN ATTACK.

All six planes made a thorough sweep around the entire coast of SAMANA starting from the north and circling the island in a counter clockwise direction. There were no sightings of barges or other indications of enemy activity.

(2) ATTACK ON SAMANA VILLAGE.

After completing the barge search, all six planes proceeded to attack the last resort target at SAMANA Village. The ship construction ways--reported to be in the SAMANA area--were not seen. Our planes, therefore, attempted to strafe and bomb the assigned area on the south shore of the bay at SAMANA village. Bombing results were excellent, although two planes encountered some difficulty in releasing bombs resulting in A/P 411 dropping its entire load of bombs on the north side of the bay, when the bombsy doors were opened for the beginning of this bombing run. A/P 767 was able to release only 2 bombs in the target with the remaining 10 bombs delaying in release and falling well off shore in the water. The low hills close to the assigned target and the smallness of the area made effective strafing impossible.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed in the air or on the ground.

Narrative Report VPB 577-4-9, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. AMMUNITION AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 72 x 100 lb. para-demo, 4-5 sec. delay.
Ammunition Expended: 1000 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported or confirmed by all crews:

Fresh cut lumber and sawdust indicate new building activity in SAMAMA area.
Boat yard, where 2 or 3 luggers or small SUGAR CHARLIES appeared to be under construction, was seen near the southwest tip of SAMAMA Island at TANDJONGMALIMA Village at position 1240Z--02213E.

7. Photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

BENJAMIN R. OWEN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay to and from target.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.



FFO 227-A-3 3 Oct. 1944
501st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 0735-0736/I
Order Over Target: First
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes

Ref: Photo (239-2-1) SANANA (8Prs - 6PG)

501
OK 308
- 3Nov4

SOUTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
38STH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

ALO/134

6 Nov. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report #70 [redacted] performed by six (6) airplanes of the 508th Bomb Squadron 3 November 1944. Objective: ALICANTE and FARNIDA Airdromes.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy installations and airplanes in the dispersal areas and on ALICANTE runway to be bombed and strafed and FARNIDA A/D to be strafed. There was no secondary target. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes each carrying 4 x 500 lb. half second delay demolition bombs. Fighter escort was to be provided by twenty-four (24) P-38's. The 428th, 429th, and 500th Squadrons of the 38th Group were also to participate with the 429th and 500th bombing FARNIDA A/D.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MORATAI and proceeded to rendezvous with the fighters over TJION Island and from there direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with five airplanes dropping a total of [redacted] x 500 lb. half second delay demolition bombs on installations and [redacted] areas in and around ALICANTE runway. [redacted] ed dropping their bombs among gun [redacted] lower left portion of the runway with [redacted] sults. 3 MAP were definitely destroyed [redacted] at the west side of the center of the runway. These planes were seen to burst into flames. Lt. Leggett A/P flying A/P 003 on Capt. Jacobson's right wing, was hit by medium anti-aik fire while on the approach to the target. He managed to bomb and strafe the target. Sustaining damage to his right main gear, which later was seen to fall out of his plane and his right wing to fold and break off, Lt. Leggett did a half roll and crashed into the bay 12 miles northeast of ALICANTE airdrome at position 1230SE-1090E. There were

There were no survivors of this crash. One airplane failed to release its bombs due to electrical failure. Ackack was of medium caliber, very accurate, heavy intensity, of flight altitude coming from areas surrounding the airdrome. After leaving the target, the squadron was interrupted by 2-4 ZEKES and ZEKE. Fuses were made from 3 and 9 o'clock at the enemy flight with nil damage inflicted to our planes by the enemy. FARKEDA A/D was not strafed as planned by this squadron, due to enemy interruption over ALIHAPEN A/D.

4. Time and Location of:

Took off: From MOKOTAI from 0740-0750/L.
Rendezvous: With fighter escort over YAPOE Island at 0800/L.
Attacked Target: From 1210-1211/L.
Landed MOKOTAI at 1440/L.

5. ROUTE

MOKOTAI-YAPOE ISLAND-YAROSE-TAMON STRAIT-SOUTHEAST MINDANAO-MOKOTAI.

II. FORMATION: Planes and pilots participating.

A. Capt. Jacobson led the squadron as well as the 345th Group. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Capt. Jacobson	A/P 012	Lt. Billig	A/P 016
Lt. Leggett	A/P 003	Lt. Elmir	A/P 175
Lt. Chenoweth	A/P 178	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 055

III. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

A. Captain Jacobson led the squadron with six airplanes flying abreast, on an approximate heading of 45 degrees. All bombs were dropped on the squadron leader's release with the exception of Lt. Chenoweth whose bombs failed to release due to electrical failure. Lt. Terwilliger dropped his bombs among gun emplacements on the lower left portion of the airdrome with unobserved results. Other results of the bombing were unobserved due to the long delay fuse. Flying abreast the squadron strafed 3 MW located at the west side of the center of the airdrome setting them afire and definitely destroying them. Lt. Leggett, flying A/P 003 on Capt. Jacobson's right wing, was hit by

medium anti-ack fire while on the approach to the target. Unmindful of damage to the airplane, he bombed and strafed the target. Upon leaving the target, he observed his right main gear fall out of the engine nacelle and pieces of cowling flying off. Shortly thereafter, flames were seen coming from his right engine. He started to make a ditching at sea, but he observed instead 3 TOJOS were preparing to make an attack from three o'clock upon the squadron. At this time his right main gear was seen to fall out of his plane. He immediately got back into formation knowing the disaster which would follow. He stayed in formation until the bright red flames were trailing at least 50 ft. behind his right engine nacelle. Pulling out of formation, his right wing was seen to fold and break off. He did a half roll and crashed into the bay 12 miles northeast of ALICANTE airdrome at position 12305E—1058N. There were no survivors of this crash.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) 1213/I—Minimum altitude—5-7 TOJOS and TONYS intercepted squadron shortly after leaving target. Two passes were made from 3 and 4 o'clock at the second flight. Jap planes were not eager to press attack. 3 SBP set afire by strafing and definitely destroyed, located on west side of center of runway.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) The following names and serial numbers of crew crew members of A/P 43-36003 are:

Pilot	2nd Lt.	LEGGETT, WILLIAM C.	0-760874
Co-pilot	2nd Lt.	WALDO, JAMES T.	0-765160
Navigator	2nd Lt.	CHANCE, JAMES W.	0-762061
Radio Opr	T/Sgt.	Aslin, Harold C.	17119593
Gunner	S/Sgt.	Donovan, Joseph J.,Jr.	31081663
Gunner	S/Sgt.	Zenesky, Mitchell W.	31039324

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil damage to our planes.

4. CITATIONS.

In the opinion of this Officer, details of this mission provide basis for recommendation of awards.

Narrative Report FFO 308- cont'd.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 28 x 100 lb. 8-15 sec. delay demo.
Bombs Returned: 8 x 100 lb. 8-15 sec. delay demo.
Ammo. Expended: 6000 x .50 caliber and 100 x .30 cal.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were reported and were generally confirmed by all crews:

Approximately 20-25 SBF and unidentified T/E bombers seen on the airdrome of which 9 were probably serviceable.
10 trucks on road southwest of runway.
Approximately 50 Japs seen running from houses southwest of runway.
3 SBF seen taking off prior to our attack.
Numerous gun emplacements situated in dispersal areas surrounding airdrome. Crews were unable to pin point positions.

7. Photos were not taken on this mission.

For the Squadron Commander:

ARTHUR L. QUEDNBALL,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

FTO 308 3 NOV 44
501 B.S. 345 B.G.
TIME OVER TARGET [illegible]
ORDER OVER TARGET—FIRST
NO PHOTOS TAKEN.





FFO 308 3 NOV 44
501 B.S. 345 B.G.
TIME OVER TARGET--1210-1211/1.
ORDER OVER TARGET--FIRST
REF.
SW PACIFIC AREA PLANNING MAP

SCALE: 1 INCH--100 STATUE MILES.

aRN 501
FFO-30
4NW4

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

AIO/ljd

5 Nov. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 309- performed by four (4) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 4 November 1944. Objective: DALIAO Airdrome.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FAR EAST AIR FORCES (P), APO 565.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against enemy installations and airplanes in the dispersal area and on DALIAO Airdrome. There was no secondary target. The target was to be attacked at minimum altitude by four (4) airplanes, each carrying 6 x 100 lb. 8-15 second delay bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The other three squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate with the 500th and 498th hitting Libby Airdrome, and the 501st and 499th striking DALIAO A/D.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOROTAI and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with the exception that only three planes carried bombs. Bombing was excellent. A total of 18 x 100 lb. 8-15 second delay demolition bombs were dropped on the west of center of runway. A DINAH near the south end of the runway in the dispersal area was strafed and probably damaged. One bomb hit among shacks in the southwest corner of the dispersal area with unobserved results. The area was thoroughly strafed with 4500 x .50 caliber and 100 x .30 caliber. One A/P failed to carry bombs due to malfunction of racks in pre-flight.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOROTAI at 0740/I.
Attacked target: At 0929/I.
Landed: MOROTAI at 1135/I.

e. Route.

MOROTAI-TALAUD ISLAND-TARGET-TALAUD ISLAND-MOROTAI.

2. FORMATION. Planes and Pilots participating.

a. Captain Jacobson led the squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

Capt. Jacobson	A/P 012	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 855
Lt. Blair	A/P 175	Lt. Billig	A/P 016

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Captain Jacobson led the squadron over the target four (4) planes abreast on an approximate heading of 90 degrees. Bombs were dropped on the flight leader's release with all hitting in the assigned target. A DINAH located near the south end of the runway in the dispersal area was strafed and probably damaged. Shacks in the southwest corner of the dispersal area were hit with unobserved results.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and one DINAH was probably damaged by strafing.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil planes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 18 x 100 lb. 8-15 sec. delay demo. bombs.
Ammunition Expended: 4500 x .50 caliber and 100 x .30 cal.

6. SIGHTINGS.

Captain Jacobson's crew reported five unidentified small ships anchored in DAVAO HARBOR. Serviceability undetermined.

Narrative Report VFO 309- cont'd.

7. No photos were taken on this mission.

For the Squadron Commander:

ARTHUR L. QUICKSALL,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

FFO 309 [illegible] NOV 44
501 B.S., 345 B.S.
TIME OVER TARGET—0929/1
ORDER OVER TARGET—FIRST
(SECOND IN GP FORMATION)
NO PHOTOS TAKEN.

DALIAO (MINDANAO)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
SCALE IN FT.

V BOMBER COMMAND
1:19,000 822F



FFO 309 4 NOV 44
501 B.S., 345 B.G.
TIME OVER TARGET--0929/1.
ORDER OVER TARGET--FIRST
(SECOND IN GROUP FORMATION)

REF.
SW PACIFIC AREA PLANNING MAP
SCALE: 1 INCH--100 STATUTE MILES.



(7-8, 7-9, 50)
312-A-1
7 Nov 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 920

9 November, 1944

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FTO 312-A-1, Performed by the 345th Bomb Group (M), 7 November. Objective: SAKIRA AIRDROME, N. NANAHERA ISLAND.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.
Attn: A. C. of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL

a. On the afternoon of 6 November, twenty-two (22) airplanes (B-25's) of the 345th Bomb Group took off from NORDER DROME, BIAK ISLAND, and proceeded to NOROTAI to stage a mission from that base. Six airplanes of the 500th Squadron and six airplanes of the 501st Squadron and four airplanes of the 498th Squadron and two airplanes of the 499th Squadron reached NOROTAI. Four airplanes of the 499th Squadron became lost in the weather and darkness before reaching NOROTAI. It is believed they turned back somewhere in the vicinity of NOROTAI ISLAND. Two of the airplanes landed at WAKDE ISLAND, being unable to find NOROTAI. One airplane landed at KEMFOOR ISLAND. One airplane, No. 104, is still missing, although two search missions were sent out in search of it. Early on the morning of 7 November the 499th Squadron sent two more airplanes to NOROTAI. One airplane of the 499th Squadron which had arrived at NOROTAI on 6 November had been required to salvage ammunition, bombs, and twist guns because it was running low on gas before it found NOROTAI. On the morning of 7 November, nineteen (19) airplanes were available for the mission. The primary target assigned by the V Bomber Command was a strike on SAKIRA AIRDROME in Northern HALMAHERA ISLAND. The secondary target assigned was BIAK AIRDROME in northern NEERLANDIA ISLAND, (0°15' N, 136°47' E.) The Group was instructed to hit the secondary target in case fighter cover had to turn back. The fighters turned back within fifteen minutes after takeoff, but the 345th Group attempted to find a hole in the front which lay approximately 150 miles north of NOROTAI, and run NNE - WSW. One hour after takeoff the Group landed at NOROTAI ISLAND. A tertiary target, SAKIRA AIRDROME, was then assigned the Group. The Group attacked SAKIRA AIRDROME in flights of three, flights in trail with two minutes interval between squadrons. The attack was made at minimum altitude. The center of No. 1 runway and the dispersal area were bombed by the 499th and 501st Squadrons. The center of No. 2 runway and the dispersal area plus the personnel area immediately south of No. 2 runway between the runway and

GALENA BAY were bombed by the 498th and 500th Squadrons. All squadrons strafed throughout their approach, across runways and dispersal areas and during withdrawal to coast. Tracers were seen to enter buildings. The approach was made from over the hills NNE of No. 1 runway, crossing the runways from N to S and withdrawing over GALENA BAY and around the S of ZEO YAMAZAKI NF, and out across GALENA BAY to the N. The mission was characterized by excellent bombing of all squadrons and the dearth of observed results. All crews reported the runways appeared deserted of activity. It was believed there were no serviceable airplanes on the ground there. One airplane on the ground was set on fire, but it is believed it was already unserviceable, even though it looked in good condition, because grass was grown up around it and it apparently had not been moved for months. Of the nineteen airplanes on the mission, seventeen airplanes got all of their bombs on their targets. One airplane was forced to salvo its bombs in the personnel area S of No. 2 runway due to mechanical trouble. One airplane returned all of its bombs because of rack malfunction. A total of 1194 x 23 lb parafrag instantaneous fuze bombs were dropped on the targets plus 72 bombs salvoed on the target. 27300 rds of 50 caliber ammunition and 350 rds of 30 caliber ammunition were expended. Three airplanes were hold by anti-aircraft. Approximately 20 rds of medium anti-aircraft fire were fired at the level of the planes, but fire was inaccurate and behind airplanes. Light anti-aircraft fire and small weapons fire was intense and accurate. Two of our airplanes had one hole each in them, and one airplane had eight holes in it, all due to small arms fire.

It is believed that a target with so little suitable reconnaissance target material on it should never be attacked with parafrag bombs. If it is desired to deny the enemy use of the dump, heavier bombs should be used. Our bombs landing in the personnel areas may have done some good, but it is believed that no worthwhile results were obtained on the runways. The danger to our airplanes due to anti-aircraft fire is too great to make a strafing of the GALENA AIRDROME profitable.

B. RENDEZVOUS

1. Group rendezvous was made over the water just S of PETOR PEN.

2. There was no fighter rendezvous for the attack on the tertiary target.

3. Immediately after rendezvous flights formed in trail and proceeded to the target.

Narrative, Mro 312-A-1, 348th Bomb Group - con't

[illegible] Sqdn.

Capt N. E. MONTEMORE	A/P 663	1Lt R. E. WEINELL	A/P [illegible]
1Lt F. G. REED	" 663	**1Lt D. H. MAHONEY	" [illegible]
1Lt E. H. MAGEAN	" 673	*1Lt R. D. THOMPSON	" [illegible]

** Returned 72 x 23 lb parafrags to base due to rack malfunction.
* " 24 x 23 **[illegible] Sqdn.** " " " " .

Maj J. R. HUMANN	A/P 016	*1Lt J. R. HALL	A/P 002
1Lt R. J. WIKINSON	" 178	1Lt H. R. BELL	" 173
1Lt G. E. LANAR	" 173	1Lt R. L. BINA	" [illegible]

* Returned bombs to base due to rack malfunction.

3. **DETAILS OF DAMAGE RECEIVED BY PLANES OF THIS GROUP: YESTERDAY.**
NONE

a. Airplane No. 016 of the [illegible] Squadron received eight holes. One bullet hit the nose of the plane knocking out a large section of the plexi-glass. The rest of the holes in this plane were low in the fuselage back of the radio compartment. Airplanes Nos. 183 and 002 of the [illegible]th Squadron each received one hole in the fuselage but no serious damage was done.
Airplane No. 154 of the [illegible]th Squadron is missing.

b. Small arms fire came principally from the personnel area S and SE of the runways. Personnel at CAIRNS AIRFIELD are becoming proficient with their small arms fire against strafing airplanes. The medium anti-aircraft gun fired at our planes from the SE side of BIG TANAKAN NE during their withdrawal. Two crews reported approximately three shots from a gun located 200 yds W of the shore of MOUNTAIN LAKE near the personnel area. The gun could not be pin-pointed by them, and was reported as possibly heavy anti-aircraft because of the black puffs of anti-aircraft bursts. No heavy anti-aircraft position is known to be at this location by this office and all other crews maintain there was no heavy anti-aircraft fire, therefore it is believed these two crews were mistaken in their identifying the gun as a heavy.

c. List of personnel on airplane No. 154 which is missing:

Pilot	HALL, HOWARD L.	2nd Lt.	0-[illegible]
Co-Pilot	HANDING, GEORGE W.	2nd Lt.	0-[illegible]
Engineer	JOYNER, ALFOR F.	S/Sgt.	[illegible]
Radio-Oper.	HUTTS, WILLIAM A.	T/Sgt.	[illegible]
Arm-Gunner	GEORGE, DOUGLAS G.	S/Sgt.	[illegible]
Passenger	JEPSON, HENRY A.	T/Sgt.	[illegible]
Passenger	SCHOONMAKER, ROBERT J.	Cpl.	[illegible]

Narrative, FFO 312-A-1, 345th Bomb Group - cont'd.

g. ATTACK

Squadrons attacked the target in the following order: 500th Squadron, 501st Squadron, 499th Squadron, and 498th Squadron. The Group was led by Capt H. E. HOFFMAN, who was squadron leader of the 500th Squadron, the 501st Squadron was led by Maj J. A. MEADAN, the 498th Squadron was led by 1Lt H. E. GINDER, the 499th Squadron was led by 1Lt F. H. FOX. There are no further details than were given under GENERAL g. above.

h. INTERCEPTION

Nil interception encountered.

i. TIME AND DURATION OF:

1. For primary and secondary targets:

Take off	NORMAL	0757/I
Landed	NORMAL	0915/I

2. For tertiary targets:

Take off	NORMAL	1200/I
E.O.T.	GAINED	1230/I to 1300/I
Landed	NORMAL	1400/I to 1415/I

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING ON THE MISSION.

500th Sqdn.

* 1Lt H. E. GINDER	A/P	306
Maj G. A. DOOLITTLE	"	359
1Lt H. H. STAPHROM	"	628
1Lt J. W. MEADAN	"	353

* Salvoed bombs over target.

499th Sqdn.

Capt J. A. SAMER	A/P	202
1Lt F. H. FOX	"	357
1Lt H. K. WIENT	"	295

Narrative, FFO 312.A-1, 345th Bomb Group - cont'd

4. CITATIONS

There are no citations warranted on this mission in the opinion of this officer.

5. AIRCRAFT AND OPERATION

Bombs dropped - 1104 x 23 lb pomfrag instantaneous fuze

Bombs jettisoned - 72 x 23 lb pomfrag instantaneous fuze by one airplane of the 499th Squadron, due to mechanical trouble.
Bombs returned to base - 180 x 23 pomfrag instantaneous fuze. Due to malfunction in two airplanes of the 501st Squadron and one airplane of the 499th Squadron.

27,300 x .50 and 350 x .30 caliber ammo expended.

6. ATTACKS

Two trucks were sighted along the shore of SAIPAN MAIN directly S of No. 2 runway.
A light anti-aircraft position 1200 yds S of the center of No. 2 runway was seen silenced by the strafing. There were four Japanese in this position. No other Jap personnel were seen. Bombs seemed to be lightly used and there were no fires or other indication of the present personnel area being used by the Japs.
Several dummy airplanes were seen in the dispersal areas.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photo interpretation verifies the one airplane claimed set on fire and other fires in the vicinity which cannot be identified. There is but one road in the pictures showing apparent recent use.

For the Commanding Officer:

Aldridge R. Nichols
ALDRIDGE R. NICHOLS,
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment chart
Incl 2 - Route diagram

MAP REF. -
IALELA GROUNDE
VEIN AIR COMMAND 4-2 SEC. 706

SCALE IN MILES

AREAS BOMBS WERE DROPPED

- 498th Sqdn - 216 x 23 parafrag
- 499th Sqdn - 144 x 23 parafrag
- 500th Sqdn - 336 x 23 parafrag
- 501st Sqdn - 408 x 23 parafrag



FFO: 312-A-1 7 Nov. 44
498, 499, 500, 501 Sqdns -
345th Bomb Group
ALT: 50 to 150 feet
TIME OF ATTACK: 1130/I to 1150/I
TOTAL OF:
1104 x 23 parafrag bombs dropped.
72 x 23 parafrag bombs salvoed.
120 x 23 parafrag bombs returned to base.
27300 rds of 50 calibre ammo expended.
350 rds of 30 calibre ammo expended.

GALELA LAKE



LEGEND

FFO 312-A-1 7 November, 1944
345th Bomb Group (M)
Route to and from Target

MAP REFERENCE

NA-5 Australian Aero Chart
1:1,000,000

501
335 0-2
30NOV44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

1 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 330-D-2, performed by six airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 30 November 1944. Objective: DISPERSAL AREAS AT DALIAO and PADADA AIRDROMES.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against grounded aircraft in the dispersal areas at DALIAO and PADADA Airdromes. There was no secondary target. The targets were to be attacked at minimum altitude by six (6) airplanes, each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The other three squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with all six planes hitting the assigned targets. A total of 382 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped in the revetment area west of DALIAO strip destroying several wooden type buildings. Due to heavy camouflaged netting in the dispersal area, it was impossible to ascertain whether any enemy planes were hit. The same dispersal area was thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. Having expended their entire bomb load, the squadron heavily machine gunned the dispersal area east of PADADA strip with tracers seen entering a gas truck located east of the northwest end of the strip. Flames were seen to rise 200 ft. in the air completely destroying the gas truck. Results other than reported were not observed. Inaccurate machine gun fire was encountered of light intensity from the east of the center of the revetment area off PADADA runway.

Narrative Report FFO 335-D-2 cont'd.

Fifty parafrag bombs were returned to base due to malfunction of racks.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER 0515/I.
Attacked Target: DALIAO 1040/I--PADADA 1045/I.
Landed: MOKMER 1810/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TARGET-TALAUD ISLANDS-MOROTAI-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Girdler led the group formation with Lt. Heiderf leading the 501st Squadron over the targets. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Heiderf	A/P 172	Lt. Ohmemus	A/P 034
Lt. Blair	A/P 173	Lt. Hayes	A/P 199
Lt. Bell	A/P 016	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 199

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Heiderf led the squadron over the target with Lt. Blair flying #2 position and Lt. Bell flying #3 position. Making his approach on an approximate heading of 200 degrees, his flight made their pass on the revetment area west of DALIAO strip dropping their bombs on the flight leader's release. Due to heavily camouflaged netting, it was impossible to determine whether hits were scored on any enemy planes that might have been located there. The flight proceeded to PADADA where they heavily strafed the dispersal area east of the runway with tracers seen entering a gas truck at the east of the northwest end of the strip. Flames were seen to rise 200 ft. destroying it.

b. (2) The second flight, led by Lt. Ohmemus with Lt. Hayes flying #2 position and Lt. Terwilliger flying #3 position, dropped 194 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs in the revetment area west of DALIAO strip destroying several wooden type buildings along the west of the center of the runway. The area was heavily strafed with unobserved results. After completing their run on DALIAO, the flight made a strafing pass on the dispersal area east of the PADADA runway with unobserved results. This flight returned fifty parafrag bombs to base due to malfunction of racks.

Narrative Report FFO 335-D-2, cont'd.

c. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil airplanes destroyed on the ground.

d. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

e. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 382 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Bombs Returned to Base: 50 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammunition Expended: 10,700 x .50 caliber expended.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were observed by crew members:

1010/I--500 ft altitude--large steel tower, probably 100 ft. high, located at CAPE SAN AGUSTIN at point 12610E--0620N. Could possibly be radar or lookout station. A house was located nearby.

A possible 2 gun position located about 4 miles southeast of TACABILI Village at point 12610E--0625N. No personnel were observed.

DALIAO--1040/I--Minimum--1 unidentified SSF seen on fire and destroyed at center of west side of runway as result of previous squadron's bombing.

Large camouflaged net located 700 yards northeast of northwest end of runway in revetment area.

PADADA--1045/I--Minimum--One twin engine bomber, probably BETTY--seen destroyed in dispersal area northeast tip of strip as result of previous squadron's bombing.

Narrative Report FFO 335-D-2, cont'd.

2 SSF, probably serviceable, in revetment area east of center of PADADA runway.

One unidentified SSF seen burning in revetment area east of center of runway, as result of previous squadron's bombing.

7. Photo prints received do not show specific results of bombing.

For the Squadron Commander:

WALTER O. WILLARD,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route Overlay
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

FFO 335-D-2 30 Nov. 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: DALIAO 1040
Order Over target: Fourth
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes.
Altitude--Minimum



OK aRR 501 347-D 12 Dec 44 Box 967

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 920

ALO/136

13 Dec. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 347-D-2, performed by five (5) airplanes of the 501st Bomb Squadron 12 December 1944. Objective: Grounded Aircraft in Dispersal Area NE of PADADA Runway, MINDANAO.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against grounded aircraft in the dispersal area NE of PADADA runway. The secondary target was shipping in the immediate area off PADADA. The tertiary target was the airdrome and dispersal area at BUAYAN in southern MINDANAO. The target was to be attacked by five (5) airplanes each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The other three squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed over MOKMER Drome and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The mission was carried out as ordered with four airplanes hitting the assigned primary target. A total of 288 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped in the dispersal area NE of PADADA runway. Bombs were seen to drop near two camouflaged twin engine bombers located NE edge of the center of the runway which were considered probably damaged. One SBF and one twin engine bomber, both camouflaged, on the east side of the runway and southeast of the dispersal area were strafed with unobserved results. On the second pass over the target, the dispersal area NE of PADADA strip was heavily machine gunned with one airplane dropping the remaining 36 parafrag bombs on 2-3 buildings one probably a hangar and the other a tinned roof building approximately 500 ft. in the dispersal area at the east of the south end of the runway. Results of this attack were unobserved. Ack-ack was of medium caliber, slight and inaccurate coming from positions 3,000 ft. NE of the center of the runway and from the south end of the runway. M/G fire was encountered in the dispersal area SW of the runway. Nil damage to our airplanes. One A/P turned back at 0900/I 90

Narrative Report FFO 347-B-2, cont'd.

miles north of MOROTAI due to failure of fuel transfer.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From MOKMER 0515/I.
Attacked Target: 1050-1052/I--First pass.
1106-1108/I--Second pass.
Landed: MOROTAI 1315/I.
Took off: MOROTAI 1400/I.
Landed: MOKMER 1700/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-PALAUD ISLAND-TARGET-PALAUD ISLAND-MOROTAI-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Major Mortensen led the Group formation with Lt. Hall leading the 501st Squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

Lt. Hall	A/P 041	Lt. Blair	A/P 016
Lt. Cook	A/P 009	Lt. Billig	A/P 172

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. Lt. Hall led the squadron over the target with four planes flying abreast. Making his approach on an approximate heading of 30 degrees, the squadron made their pass on the dispersal area NE of PADADA strip dropping their bombs on the flight leader's release. Lt. Billig, flying A/P 172, dropped his bombs and strafed two camouflaged twin engine bombers located NE edge of the center of the runway with unobserved results. Lt. Cook, flying A/P 009, strafed and bombed one SSF and one twin engine bombers, both camouflaged, east of the runway in the IX dispersal area with unobserved results. Making their second pass over the target, Lt. Cook dropped his remaining 36 bombs approximately 500 ft. in the dispersal area east of the south end of the runway with unobserved results. Lt. Blair, flying A/P 016, on his second pass heavily machine gunned one twin engine bomber of undetermined serviceability approximately 2,000 ft. in the dispersal area SW of south end of the runway. Results were unobserved. The squadron completed two passes over the target thoroughly strafing the entire target and expended 8100 x .50 caliber rounds of ammunition. A/P 152 turned back at 0900/I 90 miles north of MOROTAI due to failure of fuel transfer.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil airplanes destroyed on the ground.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

Narrative Report FPO 347-D-2, cont'd.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped: 288 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Bombs Returned to base: 72 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammunition Expended: 6100 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were observed by crew members:

One SCF, probably serviceable, in dispersal area NE of North end of runway.

Fire, black smoke rising 1000 ft. located 1,000 ft. in dispersal area NE of north end of runway.

7. Photo prints received show the area was thoroughly covered with parafrags. However, photographs were insufficient to give details of the damage inflicted by this squadron.

For the Squadron Commander:

ARTHUR L. GUICKMAN,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route Overlay.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.

CONFIDENTIAL

FTO 347-B-2 12 Dec 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 1050-1105/I.
Order Over Target: Second
T Planes Taking Photos
Altitude--Minimum



PADADA A/D
Special Map
Scale 1:20,000

CONFIDENTIAL

501
352-D-2
17 Dec 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (M) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
APO 928

AL0/134

18 Dec. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FTO 352-D-2 performed by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Squadron 17 December 1944. Objective: Dispersal and Personnel Areas at LIGANAN A/D.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against grounded aircraft and enemy installations in the dispersal and personnel areas surrounding LIGANAN A/D. There was no secondary target. The target was to be attacked by six (6) airplanes each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. No fighter cover was to be provided. The 498th, 499th, and 500th squadrons of the 345th Group were also to participate on this mission.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed on course and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

Taking off from SANSAPOR, the squadron carried out the mission as ordered with five (5) airplanes hitting the assigned target. 348 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped in personnel area 6x and 3x with nil visible results. Bombs also dropped in target IV with nil visible results. (Ref. Special Map LIKANAN Drome 1:20,000). The target was thoroughly machine gunned with no results of observation. 12 bombs were dropped in the water off shore due to the fact that bombs would have dropped in a restricted area. Airplane #199 turned back 90 miles north of SANSAPOR due to fire in electrical wiring. Ack-ack was of light caliber, light intensity, inaccurate, coming from known position in target IV. M/G fire encountered in personnel area 6x.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off: From SANSAPOR 0600/I.
Attacked Target: 0953-0955/I.
Landed: SANSAPOR 0705/I--one plane.

Narrative Report FTO 352-B-2, cont'd.

Took off: SANSAPOR 1345/I--one plane
Landed: MOKMER 1500/I--6 planes.

e. Route.

SANSAPOR-PALAUD ISLANDS-TARGET-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Erskine, 501st Squadron, led the Group formation with Lt. Col. Coltharp flying #2 position in the lead flight. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Erskine	A/P 012	Lt. Lamar	A/P 009
Lt. Col. Coltharp	A/P 173	Lt. Terwilliger	A/P 178
Lt. Bell	A/P 016		

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Erskine led the squadron over the target in two flights--the first flight consisting of three airplanes and the second flight two airplanes. Making his approach on an approximate heading of 150 degrees, Lt. Erskine led his flight over the dispersal and personnel area surrounding LIGAWAN A/D. Lt. Col. Coltharp, flying A/P 173 in #2 position, made a sweeping wide turn dropping his bombs and strafing target IV. Lt. Bell, flying A/P 016 in #3 position dropped his bombs in the personnel area 6x. Lt. Erskine was unable to drop all of his bombs in the target area. 12 bombs were dropped in the water off shore thus preventing these bombs hitting in an area that was restricted to bombing. All results of the bombing and strafing by this flight were not visible. (All ref. Special Map LIGAWAN A/D 1:20,000).

(2) Lt. Lamar, leading the second flying A/P 009, and Lt. Terwilliger flying A/P 178 on his wing, followed the same pattern as the first flight at an interval of thirty seconds. All of this flight's bombs dropped in personnel area 6x with nil visible results. The area was thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. Capt. Underwood, flying A/P 199, did not reach the target and turned back 90 miles north of SANSAPOR due to fire in electrical wiring. He dropped his bombs in the water prior to landing at SANSAPOR.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil airplanes destroyed on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO 352-D-2, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped in Target Area: 360 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Bombs Dropped in Water: 72 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammo. Expended: 6600 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were observed by crew members:

0946/I--500 ft.--One barge anchored off shore at ZUPON PACT PT. at point 125°45E--06°49N. Reported by one crew member only.

Majority of buildings in personnel area llx appeared untenable. No personnel seen in area.

One heavy equipment, believed to be a ste roller, in dispersal area at north end of #2 runway.

One truck, believed to be unserviceable, in southern dispersal area between runway #1 and main taxiway.

7. Photo prints received show the target area was thoroughly covered with parafrags.

For the Squadron Commander:

ARTHUR L. QUICKSALL,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route overlay.
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
FFO: 352-D-2 DATE: 17 Dec 44
345TH BOMB GROUP
501st BOMB SQUADRON
TIME OVER TARGET: 0953-0955/I
ALTITUDE: Minimum
125°
130°
135°
5°
0°
N
Davao
Talaud Is.
Pitoe
Ajoe I.
Sansapor
Biak I.
EQUATOR


First Flight
Second Flight
FTO 352-B-2 17 Dec 44
301st Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target: 0953-0955/E.
Order Over Target—First
Altitude—Medium
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes.
LIKANAN DROME
LIKANAN DROME
SPECIAL MAP
Scale 1:20,000

501
361-D5
26 Dec 44

501ST BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAF
345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF
APO 920

ALO/134

27 Dec. 1944.

SUBJECT: Narrative Mission Report FFO 361-D-5, performed by six (6) airplanes of the 501st Squadron 26 December 1944. Objective: MATINA A/D and barges along the mouth of DAVAO River.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925.

1. GENERAL.

a. Objective.

The primary objective was a strike against grounded aircraft and enemy installations surrounding MATINA A/D to be attacked by four (4) airplanes, each carrying 72 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs. An attack on barges by two (2) airplanes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb. 4/5 second delay para-demo. bombs was to be made at the mouth of DAVAO River. There was no secondary target. No fighter cover was to be provided. The 500th and 501st Squadrons were to attack the same targets with the 498th Squadron hitting SAMAL ISLAND.

b. Rendezvous.

The Group formed on course and proceeded direct to the target.

c. Attack.

The squadron carried out the mission as ordered with all six (6) airplanes hitting the assigned targets. Bombing was excellent. 156 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs were dropped beginning 2000 ft. west of the dispersal area trailing through the dispersal area and MATINA A/D with nil visible results. The area was thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. 20 x 100 lb. 4/5 second delay para-demo. bombs were dropped at four (4) barges anchored at the mouth of DAVAO River. The lugger was seen to explode with smoke rising to 100 ft. Four (4) barges at the mouth of DAVAO River were strafed with unobserved results. Ack-ack fire encountered was of medium caliber, slight intensity, inaccurate, coming from known positions surrounding MATINA A/D. Machine gun fire was also reported from the same areas.

Narrative Report FEO 361-D-5, cont'd.

d. Time and Location of.

Took off--From Mokmer 0530/I.
Attacked Target: From 1043-1045/I.
Landed MOROTAI at 1320/I.
Took off--From MOROTAI 1440/I.
Landed: Mokmer 1800/I.

e. Route.

MOKMER-TOBI ISLAND-TARGET-MOROTAI-MOKMER.

2. FORMATION. Planes and pilots participating.

a. Lt. Hall led the 501st Squadron over the target. Pilots and planes were:

FIRST FLIGHT		SECOND FLIGHT	
Lt. Hall	A/P 172	Lt. Lamar	A/P 009
Lt. Gross	A/P 190	Capt. Underwood	A/P 152
Lt. Bina	A/P 020	Lt. Blair	A/P 016

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION.

a. (1) Lt. Hall led the squadron over the target six (6) planes abreast on an approximate heading of 55 degrees. Four (4) planes of this formation dropped a total of 156 x 23 lb. parafrag bombs commencing 200 ft. west of the dispersal area and trailing through the dispersal area and the runway with nil visible results. The area was throughly strafed with unobserved results. Lt. Hall, flying A/P 172, was unable to release his bombs while making his run over the target due to pilot error. Capt. Underwood, flying A/P 152, was able to release only 12 of his bombs due to malfunction of racks.

(2) Lt. Lamar, flying A/P 009, and Lt. Blair, flying A/P 016, made a barge sweep down the DAVAO River each carrying 12 100-pound para-demos. Lt. Lamar scored direct hits on a lugger on the south coast at the mouth of DAVAO River. The lugger was seen to explode with smoke rising to 100 ft. Strafing of four (4) barges at the mouth of DAVAO River was accomplished by Lt. Lamar and Lt. Blair. Results of this strafing was unobserved.

b. Interception. Planes destroyed in the air and on the ground.

(1) Nil interception and nil airplanes destroyed on the ground.

Narrative Report FFO 361-B-5, cont'd.

c. Personnel Casualties.

(1) Nil personnel casualties.

d. Damage to our planes.

(1) Nil airplanes damaged.

4. CITATIONS.

a. Details of this mission provide no basis for recommendation for awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE.

Bombs Dropped in target area: 156 x 23 lb. parafrags.
20 x 100 lb. 4/5 sec. para-demo.

Bombs Returned to base: 132 x 23 lb. parafrags.
Ammunition Expended: 17,100 x .50 caliber.

6. SIGHTINGS.

The following sightings were observed by crew members:

1043-1045/I--Minimum--1 B-T, serviceability undetermined, in dispersal area east of south end of MATINA A/D.
1 unserviceable twin engine bomber, probably a B-T, located in dispersal area 500 ft. west of center of runway.

1046-/I--200 ft.--2 unidentified airplanes airborne just after squadron made run over target Made no attempt at interception.

1053/I--Minimum--Large oil fire, black smoke rising 1000 ft. at point 07°08N--125°40E.

7. Photo prints received confirm results as reported by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

ARTHUR L. QUICKSALL,
1st Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Intelligence Officer.

2 Incl.
Incl. 1 - Route Overlay
2 - Bomb Assessment Chart.


125°
130°
135°
FFO 361-D-5 26 Dec 44
501st Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target--1043-1045/I
Altitude--Minimum
MINDANAO
Davao
Matina
5°
Talaud IS.
Tobi I.
Pitoe
AJoe I.
0°
Biak
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

FFO 361-D-5 26 December 1944.
501st Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time Over Target:
1043-1045/I.
Order Over Target--2nd
Altitude--Minimum
T Planes Taking Photos
T Other Planes
* Signifies 100 lb. para-demo. bombs
" 23 lb. parafrag bombs



DAVAO
Special Map
Scale 1:20,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

362-A
27 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAS/jdj

15 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 362-A ; 27 December 1944

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS.

Six planes took off in the late afternoon of the 27th December, and searched for shipping in the area North of MINDORO and along the West coast of LUZON, paying special attention to the area from the entrance of MANILA BAY to BALAUIG POINT. Two of our planes found targets at SAN FERNANDO HARBOR dropping four (4) half-tonners and firing 2400 50's on two Fox Tare Uncles. One of these vessels was straddled by two near misses, while on the other a miss and a near miss were scored. A third plane strafed a lugger with 400 rounds at BAUANG in LINGAYEN GULF, but results were generally unassessable. The three remaining planes lost contact with the formation, and returned to base without attacking.

2. OBJECTIVE.

To hit the enemy once again at his weakest point - shipping, was the objective of this mission, with particular emphasis placed on the coastline West of Central LUZON, where much shipping activity had been reported.

3. ATTACK.

a. The six B-25's on this mission were from each of the four squadrons and were led by Col Coltharp, the Group Commander. The planes flew to the target area in 6-plane formation; but due to darkness, three planes lost contact at CAPE CALAVITE, and one plane in the LINGAYEN GULF area, these four returning to base early.

b. Planes and pilots participating:

345th Group	- Col Coltharp	- A/P 045
499th Sqdn	- Lt Slaughter	- A/P 174
500th Sqdn	- Lt Bissell	- A/P 210
500th Sqdn	- Lt Schmidt	- A/P 023
501st Sqdn	- Lt Chneaus	- A/P 034
501st Sqdn	- Lt Billig	- A/P 189

c. The two planes reaching SAN FERNANDO HARBOR were piloted by Col Coltharp and Lt Slaughter. The Colonel dropped his two (2) 1000 lb (4/5 sec delay) bombs on a Fox Tare Uncle, straddling it with two near misses. Lt Slaughter attacked the other FTU, with his two (2) 1000-pounders, scoring one near miss. Lt Bissell reached LINGAYEN GULF and strafed a lugger at BAUANG with results unobserved.

d. The only opposition encountered was light and medium A/A fire, moderate and inaccurate from the vessels and from shore installations at SAN FERNANDO HARBOR.

Narrative Mission Report FFO 362-A , cont'd.

4. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS.
In the opinion of this Officer there were no actions justifying awards on this strike.

5. STATISTICS.
a. Time Table-
Take-off: at 1645/I from DULAG
Attack: at 2130/I at SAN FERNANDO HARBOR
Landing: from 2210/I/27 to 0120/I/28 at TACLOBAN
b. Route: DULAG - MINDORO - WEST COAST LUZON - MINDORO - TACLOBAN.
c. There was no fighter cover.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

Narrative 362-A, see consolidated narrative filed 499th.

all Sqds
499 363-A
28 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAS/jaj

15 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 363-A ; 28 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2

1. On the afternoon of December 28th, six planes took off hoping to find reported transports in the CORON BAY area, in the CALAMIAN ISLAND group, Southeast of MINDORO. No convoy sighted, the planes attacked targets of opportunity - such as they were - in the area. A total of seventeen (17) quarter-tonners were released and 8000 rounds of .50 calibre were expended. On the Southwest shore of BUSANGA ISLAND, a direct hit was scored on a barge, which was seen to explode. Another bomb definitely knocked out a section of the jetty at which the barge was tied. Two barges and a lugger at this same location were definitely damaged by both strafing and bombing. Near misses and .50 calibre hits were scored on a steel landing stage underway off the East coast of BUSANGA ISLAND.

2. A convoy of transports in this location could be either evacuating or reinforcing enemy troops at either MINDORO or LEYTE ISLANDS. To stop such a move was the object of this strike. To harass his vulnerable barge supply line was the secondary assignment.

3. a. Our strike force, led by Lt Col Coltharp, Commander of the Group, was composed of planes of the 499th Squadron, the 500th and the 501st. The planes, forming over the strip into 2 3-plane V's, attacked their targets in two plane elements.

b. Planes and Pilots:

Lt Col Coltharp	A/P 210 - (500th Sq crew)
Lt Schmidt	A/P 023 - 500th Sq
Lt Hatcher	A/P 041 - 501st Sq
Lt Smith	A/P 030 - 499th Sq
Lt Mass	A/P 163 - 499th Sq
Lt Billig	A/P 785 - 501st Sq (499th A/P)

c. Col Coltharp dropped 2 x 500 (4/5 sec delay) bombs on the landing stage, scoring near misses as well as .50 calibre hits. Three (3) other 500 pounders were dropped at the stage, however it still remained afloat. Lt Schmidt gets credit for the 50' barge which exploded at the jetty on the Southwest shore of BUSANGA ISLAND. The other 2 barges and the lugger at this jetty were bombed and strafed, and definitely damaged. Lt Hatcher dropping 2 x 500 lb (4/5 sec delay) bombs scored a direct hit on the jetty, destroying a portion of it. In all, nine quarter-tonners were dropped in and around the jetty and barges.

Narrative Report on Mission FFO 363-A ; (cont'd)

d. The Nip put up no opposition to this strike, neither in the air or by A/A or ground fire.

4. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions on this mission justifying awards.

5. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off: 1455 to 1500/I from TAMAUAN A/D.
Time of Search: 1710 to 1825/I in CORON BAY area.
Attack: 1822 to 1825/I at CORON BAY.
Landing: 1900/I at SAN JOSE A/D, MINDORO.

b. Route: TAMAUAN-CALAMIAN ISLANDS Group-TARGET-SAN JOSE A/D, MINDORO.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

N115 Quad
498 363-A
27-28 Dec 4

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GA2/343

15 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 363-A-1, 27-28 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925, Attn: A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Although nine planes took off on this night strike against enemy shipping in SAN FERNANDO COVE, only four of these were able to make attacks - two at the target proper and two off the East coast of CENTRAL LUZON at 15105-119335E. At SAN FERNANDO two (2) thousand-pounders and four (4) quarter-tonners were dropped, causing an explosion and fire of short duration on a Fox Tare Uncle of approximately 5000 tons. Off the coast of LUZON, four half-tonners missed a lighted ship. Strafing was at a minimum, due to the blinding effect of the nose gun flashes.

2. Once again, to strike the enemy where he is weakest - in his shipping, was the objective of this strike. A convoy sighted in SAN FERNANDO COVE consisting of nine (9) freighter transports, twelve (12) small transports, and two (2) destroyers was the specific target assigned.

3. a. The planes - three from the 498th, three from the 499th, two from the 500th and one from the 501st - took off individually, but attacked in two-plane elements.

b. Planes and pilots:

498th Squadron	
Lt McKinney	A/P 134
Lt Tuftie	A/P 034
Lt Gilstrap	A/P 176
499th Squadron	
Capt Fox	A/P 163
Capt Nunes	A/P 030
Lt Price	A/P 785
500th Squadron	
Lt Symington	A/P 007
Lt Buffington	A/P 127
501st Squadron	
Capt Jacobson	A/P 173

c. Capt Fox and Lt McKinney reached SAN FERNANDO COVE, the former dropping two (2) 1000 (4/5 sec delay) on an U/I vessel there with unobserved results. Lt McKinney with four (4) x 500 (4/5 sec delay) scored a hit on a 5/6000 ton freighter, causing an explosion and a fire of short duration.

c. Capt. [illegible], following the instructions of Major Mortensen (Op. Ops. Off) who was leading the Group, picked a group of Junks to one side of those being attacked by the lead squadron. His attack was almost simultaneous with that of the lead squadron. Lt. Phillips led his element over a group of Junks still farther to the flank. Each plane dropped two (2) bombs on each of two passes made. However, of all the bombs dropped, only Lt. Kinney succeeded in obtaining decisive results. He scored a very near miss which upset a junk, rendering it unserviceable. Each plane thoroughly strafed two or three Junks on each pass with very probable damage resulting. Photography was good--several prints were received. There was nil interception nor A/A.

4. **COMMENTS**

Nil

5. **CITATIONS**

No recommendations for awards or citations will be forwarded as a result of this strike.

6. **STATISTICS**

a. **Time Table**

Take off	0750/I	from	San Marceline (Luzon)
2 A/Ps turn back	0855/I	from	17.22' N--117.12' E
2 A/Ps land	1030/I	at	San Marceline
4 A/Ps TOT	1110-1230/I	in	Hong Kong area
4 A/Ps leave tgt	1230/I		
4 A/Ps land	1630/I	at	San Marceline

b. Fighter Cover of P-51's was in the target area but cover was not as close as desired.

For The Squadron Commander:

PAT E. GOFORTH
Capt., Air Corps
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

501, 520, 499
364 99
28-29 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAS/343

17 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission 364-A ; 28-29 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Seven planes took off on the late afternoon for a night strike against CLARK FIELD, with BULAN A/D as secondary. Only four of our planes reached the target; three returning early, one due to mechanical failure, the others due to weather. One hundred forty-four parafrags were dropped on CLARK FIELD, while the runway at ANGELES No. 1 was strafed. The planes then proceeded to BULAN A/D, where seventy-one (71) parafrags were dropped and the airdrome area strafed. Due to darkness, no accurate assessment of damage could be made.

2. "Softening-up" in preparation for the LUZON OPERATION was the objective of this strike, while grounded airplanes between No. 4 and No. 6 runways at CLARK FIELD was the particular target assigned.

3. a. The planes flew individually to the target, taking off at five-minute intervals; since it was felt hat it would not be possible to fly formation over the target at night. The Group Leader was Lt Hall of the 501st Squadron.

b. The planes and pilots participating in this strike and their squadrons are as follows:

Lt Hall	A/P 173	501st Sq
Lt Chnemus	A/P 034	501st Sq
Lt Symington	A/P 007	500th Sq
Capt Nunes	A/P 030	499th Sq
Lt Phillips	A/P 013	499th Sq
Lt Price	A/P 785	499th Sq
Lt Slaughter	A/P 174	499th Sq

c. Only four of our planes reached CLARK FIELD. Two of these dropped 144 x 23 lb parafrags there, 72 falling along the South side of No. 2 R/W trailing off to the Southeast, and 72 falling in the assigned dispersal area between No. 4 and No. 6 R/W's. At ANGELES A/D, South of CLARK FIELD, the No. 1 R/W was strafed. Three planes, hoping to find better weather at the secondary target, proceeded to BULAN A/D where they strafed and dropped 71 x 23 lb parafrags just South of the East half of the strip. In all cases accurate damage assessment was impossible, due to the poor weather and to darkness.

Narrative Report on Mission 364-A ; (cont'd)

4. The enemy's opposition at CLARK FIELD was nil. However at BULAN light and medium, moderate and inaccurate A/A fire was received from positions along the beach West of the R/W. Positions spotted were: a 20mm. on point at E end of BULAN TOWN; a 20mm. on beach at the W end of town; a 20mm. position on the beach halfway between the W edge of town and the mouth of the stream W of the strip. A .50 calibre position was seen firing, as were two medium positions 2500' and 3000' W of the W end of the R/W.

4. The success of this strike was impaired due to the fact that CLARK FIELD was "socked in" when our planes reached there.

5. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions justifying awards on this strike.

6. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off:	1920-2250/I/28 from TACLOBAN
Attack:	2250-2300/I/28 at CLARK FIELD
	1220-0155/I/29 at BULAN A/D
Landing:	0430-0710/I/29 at TACLOBAN

b. Route: TACLOBAN-MINDORO-E COAST OF LUZON-CLARK FIELD-BULAN A/D-TACLOBAN.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

All Sources
364-A
29 Dec 4

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAB/345

16 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 364-A ; 29 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Taking off from MINDORO on the afternoon of the 29th, six planes carried out a low-level strafing attack on SIIAY A/D on NEGROS ISLAND. Carrying no bombs, these planes swept twice across this enemy staging base, expending 9000 rounds of .50's and destroying two OSCARS and damaging a twin-engine bomber. Two shiny staff cars - flying the Jap flag - were strafed, one exploded and burned, the other was hit in the radiator and was considered destroyed. On leaving the target, two large columns of black smoke attested to the success of the strike.

2. The objective of this strike was to harass and to ferret out any Nip planes that might attack either our bases on LEYTE and MINDORO or our shipping plying between these two islands. Specifically, the targets were grounded A/P's on the SIIAY and in the dispersal areas.

3. a. Our strafers, led by Lt Col Geltharp, Group Commander, was comprised of planes from three squadrons - the 499th, 500th and 501st. Approaching the target from the North, a preliminary "searching" pass was made, followed by two strafing runs with 6 planes abreast.

b. Planes and Pilots:

Lt Col Geltharp	A/P 210 - (500th Sq crew)
Lt Schmidt	A/P 023 - 500th Sq
Lt Hatcher	A/P 041 - 501st Sq
Lt Smith	A/P 030 - 499th Sq
Lt Hass	A/P 163 - 499th Sq
Lt Billig	A/P 785 - 501st Sq (499th A/P)

c. Lt Col Geltharp, on his second pass, strafed a serviceable SNF on the North side of the R/W. This plane was seen to catch fire, and to explode. Another camouflaged plane, also an OSCAR, whose serviceability was doubtful, was strafed and also set afire. Lt Hatcher strafed two staff cars near the end of the R/W. Of these two cars, which were flying the Jap flag and seemed to be 1942 Cadillacs, one exploded and the other was hit on the radiator. Both are considered definitely destroyed. Lt Schmidt in addition to strafing the OSCAR, also sprayed with .50 calibre a TEB, thought to be a NEZUI, of doubtful serviceability.

d. Medium, moderate and inaccurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered from a 3-gun camouflaged position 1000 ft North of the strip and from a row of four positions on the East side of the strip.

Narrative Report on Mission FFO 364-A ; (cont'd)

4. In the opinion of this Officer, there were no actions justifying awards.

5. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off: 1335/I from SAN JOSE, MINDORO
Time over Target: 1500 to 1505/I at SIIAY
Landing: 1600/I at TAMAUAN (3 A/P's)
1645/I at DUIAG (3 A/P's)

b. Route: SAN JOSE, MINDORO-SIIAY A/D-TAMAUAN-DUIAG.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Asst Intell Officer.

498, 499, 500, 501
FFO 366-A
30 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72 OAS/343

17 January 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 366-A-4; 30 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2.

1. On the morning of the 30th December 1944, twenty of our planes took off to hit TUGUEGARAO A/D in Northern LUZON. After a difficult search in the CAGAYAN VALLEY, sixteen of the planes found the target, hitting it at tree-top level with 574 parafrags, 12-100 lb parademos, and upwards of 13,600 rounds of .50 calibre. Searing bomb hits on three or four barracks buildings with debris flying and white smoke up to 100', the planes strafed the area thoroughly, and troops were seen to enter the buildings. However, most of the pilots agree that the target had little to offer. Three planes were holed, one of our radio-gunners was injured, and one plane landed on single engine at MINDORO.

Three of our planes, unable to contact the Group formation, hit the tertiary target - LEGASPI A/D, dropping forty-eight (48) parafrags and six (6) 100 pounders, with no visible results. On their sweep across the drome the planes strafed the area, as well as a beached lugger nearby.

2. Although information on the target was incomplete, it was thought the Japs were using TUGUEGARAO as a new staging base - perhaps as a satellite of AMBERI A/D. To hit any grounded planes before they could stage into CLARK FIELD on further South, was the objective. If no planes were found, a barracks area showed promise as a possible target.

3. a. Four squadrons of the 345th Group participated in this strike with the 498th leading, and the 499th, 500th and 501st following in that order. This was a difficult target to find, and the planes had to circle and search in the CAGAYAN VALLEY before the town could be spotted. Coming onto the target from South to North, the squadrons went across abreast.

b. The following planes and pilots took part in this strike:

498th Sq	499th Sq
Capt Nutting	A/P 168 - Capt Todd
1Lt Gilstrap	A/P 205 - 1Lt Andrews
1Lt Gowen	A/P 174 - 1Lt Opie
1Lt Neich	A/P 163 - 1Lt Philips

(A/P numbers for 498th Sq are not available)

Narrative Report on Mission FFO 365-4-4; (cont'd)

500th Sqd	501st Sq
A/P 171 - Lt Schmidt	A/P 012 - Capt Jones
A/P 888 - Lt Bonta	A/P 173 - Capt Underwood
A/P 187 - Lt Landon	A/P 189 - Lt Rana
A/P 097 - Lt Thompson	A/P 172 - Lt Billig
A/P 127 - Lt Bissell	A/P 023 - Lt Hatcher
A/P 210 - Lt Caning	A/P 834 - Lt Lamar

c. Searching the area South and West of TUGUEGARAO TOWN, the planes finally found the airdrome, but finding no targets, proceeded Northeast of town to the barracks area where the majority of the bombs were dropped - and where the results, such as they were, were accomplished. Some holes were seen in the barracks roofs, and debris was seen to fly - with small fires , one with white smoke to 100', resulting. Strafing results were generally unobserved. Three planes, piloted by Lts Rana, Billig and Hatcher of the 501st, were unable to locate the formation and attacked LEGASPI, the tertiary target. Making a pass from Southwest to Northeast, 48 x 23 lb parafrags and 6 x 100 (8/15 sec delay) demos were dropped in the dispersal area North of the R/W, with no visible results. Fighter cover was particularly good on this strike. The fighters splitting up - part of them covering our three planes at LEGASPI, the remainder going on to the primary.

d. Four of our planes were hit by M/G fire over the target. Three with minor damage, while the fourth - Capt Underwood's plane - had its oil line punctured by M/G fire. Capt Underwood of the 501st was forced to fly on single-engine and had to land at MINDORO. S/Sgt C. W. Cornish of Lt Schmidt's crew (500th Sqdn) was injured in the wrist, due to small arms fire.

5. On this mission, there were in the opinion of this officer, no actions justifying awards.

6. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off:	0645-0650/I from DULAG and TACLOBAN
Attack:	1045 to 1100/I at TUGUEGARAO
	1015 to 1020/I at LEGASPI
Landing:	1410 to 1420/I at DULAG and TACLOBAN

b. Route: LEYTE-MASBATE-WEST COAST OF LUZON-CAGAYAN VALLEY-TARGET-RETURN.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

500+501
FFO 366-A-4
31 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAS/jdj

18 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 366-A-4, 31 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Eight planes from the 500th and 501st Squadrons continued in the afternoon of the 31st the task they had started in the morning of that day. Attacking at minimum altitude, strafing and dropping 100-lb demos and 23 lb parafrags, they made a tour of the enemy bases of Northern NEGROS and setting a bomber and a fighter afire, damaging three trucks, and scoring direct hits on operations buildings and A/A positions.

2. This strike was designed to impede any enemy attempt to strike our air bases at LEYTE and MINDORO or our shipping lanes between LEYTE and MINDORO. Grounded A/P's and personnel and supply installations were the specific target of the day.

3. a. In addition to the eight B-25-J's of the 500th and 501st Squadrons, four from the 498th and six from the 499th participated in this strike. The targets on the West side of NEGROS, were generally hit from South to North, while those on the East side were attacked on a southerly heading.

b. In the 500th and 501st Squadrons the following planes and pilots took part in this strike:

500th Sqdn		501st Sqdn	
Capt Bassel	A/P 127	Lt Hall	A/P 041
Lt Smith	A/P 783	Lt Chenuns	A/P 034
Lt Lewis	A/P 187	Lt Bena	A/P 172
Lt Landon	A/P 023	Lt Hatcher	A/P 016

c. In all six enemy drones were attacked by these two squadrons. At ALIGANTE 10 x 100 lb demos and 24 x 23 lb parafrags were dropped on the operations buildings and surrounding area with generally unobserved results. On the Southeast side of the R/W about 1000' from the North end; a twin-engined bomber, of undetermined serviceability, was strafed and set afire. Two large trucks on the highway East of the R/W were also strafed and damaged. Continuing on to SILAY A/D, two hundred-pounders were dropped on the operations building with unobserved results, while ten dropped on gun emplacements 3500 ft North of the strip. A truck was strafed and damaged. MALOGO A/D was then strafed, with no visible results. At TALISAY a single engine fighter was damaged and an A/A position hit by strafing, while 4 hundred-pounders and 60 23 lb parafrags hit in the vicinity of the Operations buildings. Proceeding

on to BACOLOD A/D two hundred pounders and numerous rounds of .50 calibres were used against a firing A/A position. Small buildings and a truck on the N/W were strafed as well. At BINALBAGAN, 14 x 100 lb bombs were dropped, scoring direct hits on buildings there and on a 20mm. position.

d. The heaviest enemy opposition was encountered at SILAY, where two planes were holed by a moderate amount of heavy, medium and light coming from a three-gun position North of the strip. Light, slight and inaccurate A/A was encountered at BACOLOD and BINALBAGAN. One of our gunners, S/Sgt George E. Farough was injured slightly by shrapnel.

4. According to the crews all the dromes showed the results of previous heavy bombings and little signs of enemy activity. The various dromes offered little in the way of targets, and many bombs were returned to the base for this reason.

5. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions justifying awards on this strike.

6. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off: 1230-1235/I at DULAG.
Group Rendezvous: 1230-1250/I over DULAG.
Attack: 1330-1400/I at A/D's on N. NEGROS ISLAND.
Landing: 1530-1610/I at DULAG.

b. Route: DULAG-NORTHERN LEYTE-CEBU-TARGET-NORTHERN LEYTE-DULAG.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.

500+501
FFO 366-A-3
31 Dec 44

HEADQUARTERS 345TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) AAF
OFFICE OF GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
A.P.O. 72

GAS/jdj

18 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 366-A-3; 31 Dec 1944.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, FEAF, APO 925. Attn. A.C. of S., A-2.

1. Eight planes of the 500th and 501st squadrons did their share in keeping inactive the enemy's CEBU dromes on the last day of '44. At LAHUG our planes sprayed the drome with some 12,000 rounds of fiftys, and liberally spread some 270 parafrags and thirty four hundred pounders in the dispersal and barracks areas. A large fuel fire resulted, as well as direct hits on barracks, and five or six shacks near the strip set on fire.

2. In order to protect our air bases on LEYTE and our supply lines to MINDORO, it was deemed necessary to keep inactive the VISAYAN airdromes. To destroy installations and any planes on the ground was our specific target.

3. a. Led by the 501st Squadron, with Capt Brigham, Group Operations Officer as leader, the two squadrons approached the target from the South, making their run more or less parallel to the strip, from South to North. The target was hit in two ship-elements.

b. The pilots and their planes were:

501st Squadron		500th Squadron	
Capt Brigham	- A/P 172	Capt Hassel	- A/P 127
Lt Bens	- A/P 189	Lt Landon	- A/P 210
Lt Ohnemus	- A/P 034	Lt Smith	- A/P 783
Lt Hatcher	- A/P 187	Lt Lewis	- A/P 888

c. With a total of 274 x 23 lb parafrags and 34 x 100 lb (8/11 sec delay) demos hitting in the personnel and dispersal areas N of the strip, and with all crews agreeing that their strafing had been particular successful; it was thought that a good job had been done. Lt Hatcher is credited with setting afire several grass shacks near the N.W, while crews of several of the planes saw their bombs hit in the barracks buildings. Lt Lewis scored a direct hit on a long barracks-type building at the South end of the target. The fuel fire which was started seems to have been the result of several planes' bombs, but the crews were unanimous that black smoke was rising to 2000-3000' and that the target area .

d. The enemy's opposition was not too stiff. Light and medium A/A, on the whole, inaccurate was encountered. The altitude of the bursts was at our level, holing one of our planes. The

majority of the fire seemed to be coming from previously spotted positions on the West side of the R/W. On returning to DULAG, one of our planes overshot due to the shortness of the R/W. However, no personnel were injured.

4. The crews were all of the opinion that the mission was a success, and although no grounded planes had been seen, definite damage had been done to installations near the R/W.

5. In the opinion of this officer, there were no actions justifying awards on this strike.

6. STATISTICS.

a. Time Table:

Take-off:	0700-0705/I from DULAG
Attack:	0802-0805/I at LAHUG A/D
Landing:	0855-0900/I at DULAG

b. Route: DULAG-NORTHERN LEYTE-TARGET-DULAG.

CARL A. STRAUSS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer.